I just tried to explain to Foloso4 above that this is not an assertion of empirical knowledge. That "Witt is not "explaining"--he is not doing science...
I would grant that you are right that what can be expressed does not limit what can be seen; that is not the point. Witt is not "explaining"--he is no...
I can give a definition of justice, which I take as what you are referring to when you say "teach a student what the word 'justice' means", but does a...
Well, first, we cannot take one line out of context and imagine that we can understand it without projecting our own concerns. As Wittgenstein says, "...
The point of all the examples of the different types of practices/concepts is to show that there is a different grammar for each one. There are not "r...
I would point out that Plato laid out his theories (or not) after a fictionalized dialogue (with examples and mythological stories) between Socrates a...
After Kant we can say to refuse to consider race as a valid category is to deny the concept any rationality at all. How are we to address this? I can ...
@"Banno" Great, I appreciate the effort. I hope it was worth the time. I find the Introduction and defense of Nietszche/Emerson moral perfectionism in...
Both Kripke and Cavell take Witt as pointedly not trying to resolve skepticism (the "orthodox" view I described earlier), but take it seriously, inves...
Yeah that was maybe being more poetic than informative. I guess I should have said this is the imposition of the standards for math in place of (subli...
Yikes, caught me; red-handed. I'm burning all my Austin--shameful. The word I was looking for (maybe) was: are we always aware? aware of every conside...
This is a good thing to have clarified. You are already aware that Austin provided a lot of examples to show that there are more types of statements t...
This is well-taken; the OP does jump past some groundwork. Broadly, I would say there is the traditional skeptic, who sees that our actions are ground...
This actually helps to clarify, so thank you. It is not that math cannot change, or be expanded, but there is a structure/conditions to math (as there...
This is reserving judgment? What you see as resentment is perhaps a projection of jealousy (enough to want to trivialize OLP as only about words). Not...
I might put it that, in making a claim about what the implications are of the expressions of our concepts (how we qualify knowledge, intention, meanin...
Summon the specter of skepticism for the philosopher (reader), yes; the fear that leads to our need to have a foundational bedrock to justify our acts...
The fear is of the inability to justify obeying a rule or justify how we obey rules. Both Cavell and Kripke leave that possibility open, but Kripke's ...
This would be the point at #217 where we are no longer looking at interpreting a rule, but examining the act of obeying a rule; how we teach that and ...
Well all they have are a clear and thorough descriptions and examples at hand, but if you feel that philosophy has nothing legitimate or worthwhile to...
We can point to rules, we can give examples, we can threaten consequences; at a certain point sometimes they run out, you don't continue as expected--...
Again, it's not to get to a problem "thought about properly" (with exceptions). And it is not using a certain type of language, words, terms. It is an...
What if the "coding" "language" "intends" is something hidden, forgotten? That we need to reflect on when it is not successful? People mostly don't kn...
I'm going to tread lightly here, as all I am trying to point out is that modern OLP is relevant and important to the future of philosophy. Let's take ...
OLP is not trying to come up with "all the conditions" or instances, but just to compare the ordinary criteria we use in saying something like "I beli...
OLP makes claims** about the implications of when, for example, we say, "I know your phone number". How it matters, what counts as an instance of it, ...
Well I hate to bring up a methodology by name being hammered out (upon) elsewhere, but the examination (contemplation) of ordinary thresholds and proc...
I guess I got sidetracked by the poor depiction of OLP that I didn't even answer the question (@"chad" @"Manuel" @"god must be atheist" @"Amalac" @"Ch...
I edited that comment to say I provided Malcolm's example (about "I know") above, and Austin's as well. Cavell (in Must We Mean What We Say) draws out...
Semantics smacks of only about words, or limited in importance to language. When OLP examines the criteria of what we say when, we learn about our liv...
I agree; OLP would be looking into what (ordinary criteria) makes it "referring" in different cases, maybe how it is differentiated from implying, in ...
I'm not sure we agree on what the grammar is for advice. When someone doesn't ask questions but just makes blind assertions, one answer is: well, no, ...
OLP does not point to a set that satisfies (and, again, notice the skeptical fear of inconclusiveness); it uncovers the criteria of how we even are sa...
I don't know Carnap, but Wittgenstein literally embodies (with the interlocutor) our tendency for something certain (like a Platonic form, or positivi...
Austin for sure. Then Wittgenstein started to look at how we bullshit ourselves, and what it is about us that we want to bullshit ourselves, drawn out...
If it wasn't just advice, I would argue that philosophy is not about acquiring knowledge, that your thoughts in reading it are more important than wha...
The whole point of OLP is to "analyze the logical structure" of our concepts. Not as a normative authority, or to "make everyone understand", or to co...
Yeah, right--the irony was not lost on me. Another specific example from Malcolm is coming up with circumstances when we would say: "I know" and then ...
I didn't mean to be condescending, but you are better off diving into the text yourself and making your own mistakes. Especially about a method that i...
This takes Wittgenstein as solving (or trying to solve) skepticism (or something else) with communal agreement--that "forms of life" are somehow found...
OLP is not a theory (argument) but a method, though it is working within the analytical tradition (calling it "linguistic" is to dismiss it as not als...
This makes me think of Wittgenstein saying "We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling...
Real philosophy is not about knowledge of theories, so summaries and introductions spoil the point, which is to listen to how you react when you read ...
Well, if you are interested, I stand ready to clarify, draw something out further, or answer any questions. Or we can simply continue to see these as ...
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