Examining Wittgenstein's statement, "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world"
I have recently been presented with Wittgenstein's statement-quote, "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world". I found it quite shallow. The immediate thing I thought was that one's reality (world) consists of much more than words (language). It also contains images, sounds, feelings, experiences, ... In fact, one's world gets limited only when one tries to put it in words. This is what we mean when we say "I can't explain it in words ...". Which is something that I think Wittgenstein says it should remain in silence. OK, but it doesn't mean that it is not part of the "world" of the one who experiences it!
So, because I was surprised that such a statement-quote by a prominent philosopher has been preserved and, more than that, used by people as argument or for explaining things in general, I wanted to be certain that my initial surprise was indeed justified, and I have looked at it from various angles:
1) Does it mean that a baby, for whom language does not even exist at all, has no world, i.e. nothing exists for him/her? No pleasure in sucking milk? No sense of the warmth of his/her mother hug? No intimate connection with her? No recognition of objects? And so on ...
2) If I see an object for the first time and I don't know how is it called, does this mean that I have no reality at all about that object, i.e., the object doesn't exist for me?
3) Most people use a computer in their everyday work but have a minimal knowledge of computer terminology. They only know all that is needed to know to perform their work efficiently. And, in fact, the computer plays a big role in their life. For a lot of them their life may depend on it. Likewise, for people who drive everyday to their work and back, the car is big part of their life. Yet, they may not know very little about car terminology and its mechanism.
And so on ... (I think I passed my point)
Now, looking the statement the other way around: If I am a linguist or philologist or a writer, knowing my language as only few do, how does that make or can expand my world to a proportionally large extent? That is, how much it pushes or can push back the frontiers of my world?
"My world" is small or large depending on what I do in the actual world, how many things I know about life, the actual world and the universe, how many things I have experienced and I am experiencing in my life. And then I can also add the following to "my world": my sufferings, my losses, my feelings in general, my consciousness, my ideas, my intelligence, my skills and abilities, ... All those are part of my world and are dependent only in part on my language.
Now, you may ask why I gave such an importance and started a discussion on that statement-quote, namely "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world". Well, it's not the only one! There are a lot of statements-quotes by prominent philosophers that have been disputed over time. I leave them for some other discussion! :)
For the moment I would really like to hear your opinion on all this ... Thank you.
***
Postscript, Aug 6, 2021
Thank you all for your responses!
I am happy that this topic helped to clarify the meaning of this statement-quote by Wittgenstein. More specifically, I suggest that you read @Antony Nickles's response, which I deem not only very inspiring, but also an exemplary demonstration of how to handle such a kind of topic.
So, because I was surprised that such a statement-quote by a prominent philosopher has been preserved and, more than that, used by people as argument or for explaining things in general, I wanted to be certain that my initial surprise was indeed justified, and I have looked at it from various angles:
1) Does it mean that a baby, for whom language does not even exist at all, has no world, i.e. nothing exists for him/her? No pleasure in sucking milk? No sense of the warmth of his/her mother hug? No intimate connection with her? No recognition of objects? And so on ...
2) If I see an object for the first time and I don't know how is it called, does this mean that I have no reality at all about that object, i.e., the object doesn't exist for me?
3) Most people use a computer in their everyday work but have a minimal knowledge of computer terminology. They only know all that is needed to know to perform their work efficiently. And, in fact, the computer plays a big role in their life. For a lot of them their life may depend on it. Likewise, for people who drive everyday to their work and back, the car is big part of their life. Yet, they may not know very little about car terminology and its mechanism.
And so on ... (I think I passed my point)
Now, looking the statement the other way around: If I am a linguist or philologist or a writer, knowing my language as only few do, how does that make or can expand my world to a proportionally large extent? That is, how much it pushes or can push back the frontiers of my world?
"My world" is small or large depending on what I do in the actual world, how many things I know about life, the actual world and the universe, how many things I have experienced and I am experiencing in my life. And then I can also add the following to "my world": my sufferings, my losses, my feelings in general, my consciousness, my ideas, my intelligence, my skills and abilities, ... All those are part of my world and are dependent only in part on my language.
Now, you may ask why I gave such an importance and started a discussion on that statement-quote, namely "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world". Well, it's not the only one! There are a lot of statements-quotes by prominent philosophers that have been disputed over time. I leave them for some other discussion! :)
For the moment I would really like to hear your opinion on all this ... Thank you.
***
Postscript, Aug 6, 2021
Thank you all for your responses!
I am happy that this topic helped to clarify the meaning of this statement-quote by Wittgenstein. More specifically, I suggest that you read @Antony Nickles's response, which I deem not only very inspiring, but also an exemplary demonstration of how to handle such a kind of topic.
Comments (235)
I think that if Wittgenstein's statement is taken too concretely it goes too far, because there is so much more to life experiences than simply words. There is the whole dimension of images and the non verbal in communication. Nevertheless, the use of language is so important for thinking and probably is the critical factor which makes human beings different from other species and has shaped culture.
While we do think in images and other sensory ways, especially in relation to practical tasks, I think that most of our understanding of life and our meanings are bound up with language. I remember a friend telling me that she had difficulty in thinking about her experiences because she could not put them into words. I would not say that her language ability is particularly poor, but her comment did make me think about how language does affect the ability to process experiences. I know that art therapy offers scope for people to construct their experiences visually, but in most cases, words still play an important role in reflection upon the art.
I don't know Wittgenstein, but that's never kept me from throwing in my <$0.02 worth. There is a sense in which the world does not exist until it is named. This is examined in the Tao Te Ching. The unnamed world is identified as "non-being," while the named world is called "being." I think this is a useful way of seeing things, but it certainly isn't the only way. I'm not sure if that has anything to do with what Wittgenstein was talking about.
It is a good question what 'the limits of language' are and would it be if someone's mental state deteriorated so much as, for example, in dementia. Or, we could be talking about a heightened state of consciousness, where a person in unable to describe the ineffable, as in mystical states.
I'm just asking similarly to the Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein actually explains and even negates this proposition from the Tractatus.
Okay, I don't have a copy. But, even then my interpretation of your comment was based on how you worded what you wrote, and how it resounded within the linguistic structure of my inner world.
Check this out, I guess you would like it because is so related to your question. Is That a Fish in Your Ear? Translation and the Meaning of Everything
What is the "linguistic structure of your inner world"?
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Would a professional writer have done better - vocabulary, style, etc. - if you'd asked faer to write your post for you?
I don't think that Wittgenstein meant that there is no world outside of language. I see it more as an attempt to show that human "reality" is limited (even by senses). And language is also following that limited reality that people can understand and also express through it.
Maybe Wittgenstein meant that we need to understand language's limitations as to be able to "see", feel more of our world. Like breaking the borders of language as to get as much more "reality" as we can.
I can't otherwise explain that such a great mind as Wittgenstein would make such a "shallow" statement(mistake) as you say.
I suppose that each one of us has a slightly different one, with a mixture of private and shared meanings. How we think probably involves different terms which we have come across in the various academic studies which we have followed. I would even say that I see the world a bit differently than a year ago as a result of discussion about certain words. I had never had thought so much about the idea of consciousness as much, and this has probably changed my own consciousness.
But, aside from philosophy I think that my own linguistic experience is affected by song lyrics. Also, certain authors, such as William Blake and Cormac McCarthy, have impacted my own linguistic universe. Also, generalizing about our linguistic universes, I do wonder if the words embedded in our most important experiences have a profound effect here too.
There isn't much to say about ones private language or a "pain" that one might feel. I think @Banno would disagree about your notion of a private language.
Could you give an example of a private meaning other than a pain or qualia?
Actually, I am sure that @Banno will have plenty to say on this thread because he is extremely interested in language. I suppose my own take on private language is the way in which specific words take us to very unique memories, which may involve pain and qualia, but are more of entire narratives or stories. I am sure that is probably a bit outside of Wittgenstein's discussion and is about mythic structure rather than simply linguistic structure.
So, your basically saying that one's psychology is in part a private language? Am I reading you right on this?
I guess that I probably am, or that we all have individual journeys, with individual meanings, and this is probably based on reading psychotherapy, I think that this does crossover into philosophy because apart from stories being important rational explanations, using language, come into play. We live in mythic dramas and use language to think about life and why things happen.
5.6
The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
— T
What is the significance of his shift from language and the world to “my language” and “my world”? The self cannot be found in the world. It can play no part in logical relationships, and propositions about it are nonsense. My world and my language do not connote a relationship between facts or objects.
My language means not simply English or German but the way in which I represent reality.
5.61
Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.
So we cannot say in logic, ‘The world has this in it, and this, but not that.’
For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.
We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.
— T
The logical relationships within the world are not the only relationships. There is also a relationship between the “I” and the world.
5.62
This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.
For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest.
The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.
— T
In what way does the limits of language show that the world is my world? Suppose someone were to reject W.’s claim saying: “There must be more to my world”, to which the response would be: “What more is there”? And of course no answer could be given. If an answer could be given, whatever is said would be within that limit. I take this to be a form of skepticism. He is not denying that there may be more than I can say or think but that it is nonsense to say this because it does not point to anything. It does not mark a limit to the world or to language but to my world and the language I understand. But the same is true for all of us.
Solipsism - solus "alone" and ipse "self”. That language which alone I understand, is that language which solus ipse is understood. If there is a language I do not understand then even though the propositions are in proper logical order to picture reality, they are for me without sense (sinnlos) because I do not know what state of affairs they represent. They cannot represent if they cannot be understood.
5.621
The world and life are one.
5.63
I am my world. (The microcosm.)
— T
The world is all that is the case (1). The facts that make up the world are not independent of the subject who perceives and represents those facts. This is the point of the cube having two facts. Facts are not independent of their representation. A picture is a fact. (2.141)The facts of the world include the representation of facts.
5.631
There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.
If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.—
5.632
The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.
— T
“It alone could not be mentioned”, solus ipse. The I (ipse) alone (solus) that writes the book is not something that is found in the book.
5.633
Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?
You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye.
And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.
— T
The subject is metaphysical because it is not a part of the physical world. Propositions about it are nonsense, for it does not represent anything in the world.
That which sees is not something seen. Just as the eye is not in visual space, the subject is not in logical space. The subject that represents is not something represented.
5.634
This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori.
Everything we see could also be otherwise.
Everything we describe at all could also be otherwise.
There is no order of things a priori.
— T
What is the connection between the metaphysical subject and the contingency of facts?
5.64
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.
— T
The I alone which sees the world, that experiences, that describes, has no logical connection to the world. We can only say how things are, not how they must be or will be.
5.641
There is therefore really a sense in which the philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I.
The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the “world is my world”.
The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject,
the limit—not a part of the world.
— T
My world is the world I see, the world I experience, the life I lead. My limits are its limits.
It's very peculiar that Wittgenstein ends the discussion in a decade or so with the private language argument, no... Where the limits are drawn, distinctions are made and what's left to say is where semantics and meaning starts and possibly ends.
Isn't the idea of a private language already precluded in the Tractatus?
If what you are saying is true, then psychology of the self is what it means...?
How do you reconcile this with everyday deeds and ethics?
Did you read it in context?
It seems not.
So try this: what is the first line of the Tractatus?
I won't quote it, because it is important that you engage with the text yourself.
Read this together with the line in question, and reconsider.
You might even consider reading some of the stuff in between, or a summation.
You are using the phrase somewhat differently to Wittgenstein.
What is the notion of psychology to a Tractarian solipsist, Banno? It seems somewhat difficult for me to say that it's all behavior...
Approaching a philosopher through a single context free quote like it's a bumper sticker is probably not ideal.
In the context of the Tractatus the quote represents the tip of the iceberg. Its repercussions are still being felt.
Moving things along, it seems that for Witty philosophy can't speak of ethics and aesthetics - he refers to as these 'transcendental' - they are essentially outside the factual world philosophers can describe using language. The work of philosophy then rests on demonstrating the limits of thought by demonstrating the tautologies of propositions. Is that correct? Do you think that Witty's approach is still sound 100 years on? I know there is early and later Witty and this can confuse things.
I am aware that I am using the idea of private language very different to Wittgenstein. I have not read that much by him apart from excerpts, and probably should at some point. I know that he is seen as so important, and I recently discovered a bookshop with rows of shelves focusing upon him.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Well, first, we cannot take one line out of context and imagine that we can understand it without projecting our own concerns. As Wittgenstein says, "We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough." (PI, p. 212; 3rd 1958)
From the Ogden translation, starting on p. 229 of the PDF from the link:
Quoting Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus
Quoting Alkis Piskas
I'm guessing when you say "much more than words", you would agree that Wittgenstein is not saying that there are ONLY words, but just that the limits are what can be EXPRESSED in language ("logic" here). I think we can also agree that the sense of the word "world" that you are using includes your claim that even what cannot be expressed in words is part of the "world" (more "exists"); some people call this non-verbal, or pre-linguistic, or even objective.
In the TLP, I don't take Witt as making statements, but that this is all a speculation, a thought-experiment, an imagining of a world if we set certain threshold criteria. So your sense is not the sense of "world" (or "existence") that Witt is using. I take Witt to be postulating that, if something cannot be expressed (further, in logic), it is not part of the "world" (does not "exist") for us. So "world" is a term for him--defined by this requirement, limitation. As with "exist"; something like: that you are not aware of, that does not/can not matter to you. If you do not have a way of expressing something in words, it can not be thought of by you. If you have a terrible vocabulary, then the delicacy and intricateness of the "diaphanous" nature of something is lost on you, to you.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Yes, that is what Witt is working from; the world does not exist for them as yet. Witt is not discussing feelings or experiences, but facts "1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things." This is to also to close off "thoughts" as an internal state of affairs. He is requiring a criteria of logic--everything else is off the table, e.g. ethics, aesthetics, poetry, etc.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Sort of, yes--you would be able to express something about it, yes? This is not a claim about objects or making a claim to a fact about everything ("the world" as you are taking it)--that the object does not "exist" in the sense that it is nothing. So, yes, the inner workings of a computer or car also do not exist for that person. This is not to say that the world is dependent on the subject, but that he is pushing a different idea of the "world" and its "existence". Now, why? and do we disagree with that cause? are deeper questions than to fight with a philosopher from your own terms and understanding (beliefs/opinions).
I would argue, as I take Witt to turnabout in the PI, that the criteria he sets in the TLP of only what is logical, strips our language of its ordinary criteria (different for each thing), which is more precise and limber than his requirement here--thus, we are able to see more, deeper, with greater distinction and, in a sense, reason, particularly in the vast areas that Witt is ruling out in the TLP. He investigates the desire for that criteria, along with the desire for an internal "meaning" or mental states, in the PI.
See .
The thing about ethics, and it's something that pisses philosophers off, is that it is not what you say, but what you do, that is of relevance.
I'm asking if Wittgenstein's solipsist from the Tractatus even had a psychology? If he or she did, then what was it based on?
Who's that, then?
Tell me about him.
I might have to write a book about it heh. I thought you might help out more with this. @Fooloso4 what do you think?
I'm tempted to say, as I usually do, that behavior determines everything in the world of the Tractarian solipsist, but, what is this behavior responding to might be of greater importance.
SO, give me some indication of having read the relevant bits. Tell me what you think they say.
So doesn't that mean that many things that are said about ethics arent doable at all in reality? Isn't time to start putting ethics in a base that reflects more actual life and what humans can really achieve? Ethics seem like idealistic fairytale and those who "preach" about them are the first who don't follow them!
The salient point in relation to the OP is that it is the really important stuff that can't be said.
A shallow reading misses this.
I'm going to piggyback of what Fooloso4 has already said in this thread. What do you think can be said about Wittgenstein's Tractarian solipsist?
I would take it a little further and wonder "can't be said" or maybe we don't "dare" to say them?
"Whereof on cannot speak..."
And this is why it is vital to refer to the text.
5.541
At first sight it looks as if it were also possible for one proposition to occur in another in a different way.
Particularly with certain forms of proposition in psychology, such as ‘A believes that p is the case’ and A has the thought p’, etc.
For if these are considered superficially, it looks as if the proposition p stood in some kind of relation to an object A.
(And in modern theory of knowledge (Russell, Moore, etc.) these propositions have actually been construed in this way.)
5.542
It is clear, however, that ‘A believes that p’, ‘A has the thought p’, and ‘A says p’ are of the form ‘“p” says p’: and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects.
5.5421
This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul—the subject, etc.—as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day. Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul.
— T
W. is not denying the existence of the soul but a particular concept of the soul as an object in the world containing or possessing thoughts, beliefs, etc.
You talk about what Wittgenstein meant to his work? If yes I agree.
But before I asked your thoughts on that. Yes language has its limitations(huge ones) but seems to me that people make also limited use of it! I see fear in using it to express their own deeper thoughts and feelings. Fear of facing their own self maybe if they hear what their thoughts "say" , their world would shake. So they prefer to depress language also as to protect themselves.
Yes, the solipsist is not an object but rather a subject. The only extension in this world of the solipsist is his or her mind.
But, his or her behavior is governed by logic that permeates the world.
So, think about that for a moment... As to whether the subject even has a psychology?
“Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a “beetle”. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word ‘beetle” had a use in these people’s language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. No, one can “divide through” by thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant”
The title phrase is not placing a limit on language, so much as on the world. It's the same limit as set out in 1. The world is all that is the case.
And this will be misconstrued, too. You just can't expect to gain an understanding of this stuff from a few aphorisms. It requires a bit of effort.
"The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" does not mean that he denies the existence of the real world outside of the linguistic world. It just means that outside of the proper linguistic world, there are many metaphysical objects such as afterlife, God, free will, infinities ... etc, in which clear and meaningful linguistic communication is not possible due to the limitation of language.
They are, in Wittgenstein, a senseless world. It does not mean it is a useless or illusory world, or non existing world. They are senseless in the sense that logical and clear communication is not easy, if not impossible. They are a senseless world but they rightly exist, and are an important part of the universe.
So, that explains the situation with babies with little or no linguistic capabilities. Their world does exist quite rightly so. They will see and hear and perceive what we do. But due to their limitation of language, they cannot communicate with the grownups in business or engineering skills level, that is all. Their world does exist.
For using computers and driving cars without linguistic knowledge, it is because the computer programmers and motor engineers have designed those devices to be used without any detailed knowledge on how they work. But you still must know how to use the computer i.e. power it on, and login and start your apps or internet browsers to work it. And cars, you must know how to start it with you key or fob, and check the petrol level, and how to put into 1st gear, the next gears and move forward and steer into the direction you want drive safely - you know the skills how to do these things, as you know how to make yourself coffees and drink and make your meals, and how to use your washing machine to do washings etc. These are skills that have nothing / very little to do with linguistic capabilities unless you are writing instruction booklets for them.
Yeah, it does.
But yeah, lies to children.
In exploring the theme of Wittgenstein's view of solipsism, G. E. M. Anscombe describes his contrast between what can be expressed (or thought) through language and what can only be shown but not expressed. Language is a mirror of reality: (page 164)
This mirroring suggests realism. Something is being mirrored. However, the mirroring not only expresses statements about reality but also shows what cannot be expressed: (page 166)
What is unsayable is in the "limits" of logic which are the world's "limits" (5.61) and the world is "my world" (5.62 and 5.63). This is where solipsism comes in: (page 166)
This leads to Wittgenstein's paradoxical view of solipsism expressed in 5.64:
This can be seen as coming from Wittgenstein's view of language as saying what can be said about my world and showing what cannot be said about my world.
Could you elaborate on that please?
Think on that a bit. I've bolded the problematic word. In what way is the real world outside of language? Tell me about something which cannot be put into words.
That is not physically or materially "outside". It means "not possibly described by". Or over the limitation of linguistically describable.
You really believe this? That language gives people all the tools to express everything inside themselves?? All your actual feelings you find language always appropriate to describe them?
And except that, you get more meaning of what someone means when you talk face to face with him and see his facial expressions too. Facial expressions that might say much more than the actual language. So yes for me language is limited. If it wasn't, people won't have to use almost all of their body as to communicate and fully express themselves.
Quoting Banno
My understanding on that is that Wittgenstein meant that since human world (reality) is limited by his senses, then language follow this limitations also. And we might need to acknowledge that and break language's borders as to get more "reality" from the world. Things that can't be said (as you mentioned) doesn't mean that don't exist also.
You said it.
That's not what was claimed.
Quoting dimosthenis9
Where is this claim made?
Ice skating on the sun is a lot of fun.
Said that too.
It is not about the ontology of the world, but the whole point is Wittgenstein's ideas about the relation of language to the world.
It's what you claimed.
Quoting Banno
It is made in my head.That's what I understood.Not necessarily right of course.
There's no benefit in imagining unexplainable things; of which this is oddly an example or not.
That's my takeaway. I don't charge for it.
[quote=Lao Tzu]Those who speak do not know. Those who know do not speak[/quote]
Mighty interesting, once you compare the above to,
[quote=Ludwig Wittgenstein]The limits of my language means the limits of my world[/quote]
Lao Tzu seems to be saying that there are things you can know but can't put into words.
Wittgenstein seems to be saying that what you can't put into words, you can't know. Socratic!
1. If you know then you can word it (False as per Lao Tzu, True as per Wittgenstein).
Contradiction!
Both Lao Tzu and Ludwig Wittgenstein seem to be doing a dance around, this is important, ineffables. The former claims that the ineffable is knowable while the latter claims that the ineffable is unknowable.
Thank you for your comment!
All that is quite plausible. Indeed, we should not take the statement literally but give it some interpretation margins. Yet, it sounds quite concrete. That's why, I should maybe limit my questions to a single one, that of the "baby" example, which is by itself refutes totally the statement in question.
I have an idea that Wittgensteinhimself himself must have re-examined it at some point later in his life and was not very happy with it.
And this concerns another topic I though of creating: One should not always cling to quotes-statements of prominent persons because they may have been stated under specific conditions or even refuted at a later time.
Thanks you for your response. This is certainly quite an interesting. But maybe from a point of view that is not so real for most of us (in the West).
Quoting Shawn
I guess it means the richness of one's vocabulary. Also, the degree to which I can express, describe or explain somethimg in words.
I think that is irrelevant to Wittgenstein’s point. He was not making that point to be inhumane to infants. He is reflecting on the nature of knowledge.
Quoting dimosthenis9
:100:
Right. In either case the person has certainly a "world" (reality). It doesn't matter if he cannot share it with others. It's maybe why Wittgenstein suggests that "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." ... (Yet, this does not validate his statement under discussion.)
:zip:
Quoting TheMadFool
I used a simple and comprehensible language and I think my desciption of the topic is very clear. A professional writer, even just someone whose mother tongue is English, could have improved the wording, but this has nothing to do with the present case.
Thank you for your response. Your thoughts make sense to me.
Quoting dimosthenis9
I thought that too. That's why I believe that he most probably has refuted this statement himself at some point later in his life.
But, anyway, saying that a prominent person said this and that so it can't be wrong, etc., is not philosophising. It cannot replace personal judgement. Philosophy involves personal judgement, reasoning and critical thinking. This is why I created this topic: to see what people have to say about it.
This is true. I fact, we also have to understood what exactly he meant by "limits of my language".
You have brought up a lot of thoughts (which I guess are attributed to Wittgenstein?) And they do offer for study. Maybe then one would place the statement in question in the right perspective. Bit we don't know this and then it would mean that the words themselves used in this statement are unable to express its truth. Even if there existed a much shorter and more direct explanation of the statement than what you have brought up, Wittgenstein himself would have said "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent"!
@Banno, maybe you misundertood my intention on creating this topic. I din't critisize Wittgenstein. In fact I said I was surprised in reading it. Therefore, I didn't expect a criticism. I wanted to hear views about the statement. Indeed, I ended my description with "I would really like to hear your opinion on all this". So you could just offer yours ...
That wasn't a criticism.
Wittgenstein wrote a book called the Tractatus.
You read one of the section headings and colluded that it was shallow.
I encourage you to go back to the book and read the chapter heading in context. Especially the first heading, in which Wittgenstein sets out how he is using the word "world".
Over to you.
Thank you for your response. I have not read only a little about the context but I admit I have not read Wittgenstein's whole work in which this statement is made. I just tried to apply this statement in real life. And it doesn't work for me. And that was the purpose of my topic: to find out, from people who know better, what does this mean to them. And, according to some other view, my examples cannot stand. Now, if this is not easy, it means that the words themselves in this statement cannot show its truth because thay are not enough, and in such a case, wouldn't Wittgenstein himself say, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent"?
(BTW, Now, since you seem to know about the context and Wittgenstein in general, maybe you also know if it is true that he negated this statement himself at later in his life? (I have read about it somewhere but I cannot trace it back ... @Shawn also talks about it in here.)
Thank you very much for your response. This is indeed true and a few have already brought it up. And since I don't know the context, I asked if someone could explain the statement and present a view that would invalidate my examples, which show that at least as it is, this statement cannot stand in real life. However, all those who (correctly mentioned the need of "context") have not such a context ready but only suggest to study the whole or part of Wittgenstein's work where this statement appears. This is not how it works, though. If the words themselves in a statement or even a short and direct explanation of it cannot show its truth then, wouldn't Wittgenstein himself say, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent"?
Quoting Antony Nickles
I agree. Good point!
Quoting Antony Nickles
Oh, this becomes really good!
Quoting Antony Nickles
All this is fine too!
@Antony Nickles, thanks again. I was really glad to read such a response! In fact, I was looking something like this when I created the topic. :up:
BTW, what's your relation with Socrates? :wink:
True. We don't have to take anything that has been said for granted and to accept it, just because someone said it. Even if that someone is a great philosopher and mind.
But it doesn't seem to be that case here.
I think you’re missing Wittgenstein’s point - you’re assuming that my world, all I know, is all that exists in the interaction. It’s missing something: the I that knows, the relation of knowing. This is the aspect of existence that one embodies in order to know, and is therefore missing from what one knows.
And Lao Tzu is not talking about things we know here, but the relation of knowing.
For me, there’s no contradiction.
Almost everything in my was direct quotes from the Tractatus including his numbers. The numbers should not be ignored.
I take it that Wittenstein is using the term 'transcendental' in the Kantian sense, that is, the condition for the possibility of both language and world.
Quoting Shawn
According to the Tractatus, I am not part of the world, I am not in the world, in the same way as the eye sees the world but is not what is seen.
What can be said does not limit what can be seen. Language represents or pictures the world, it cannot do so if it is not seen. It does not begin to be seen only when one begins to say things.
Less familiar? Sure. Less real? No. I just wanted to point out that the idea of language limiting our worlds is not uncommon.
Thank you @Corvus for your repsonse.
Quoting Corvus
Right. Physical or metaphysical and non-physical things that have a meaning for us, we can recognize them as such, etc. are part of our world, even if we have a difficulty in communicating them to other persons, due to the limitation of our language.
Quoting Corvus
These things refer to everyday are actions, a lot of them even done mechanically. In some of them you don'et even have to know the actual words of the things with which you perform these actions. E.g. You may have absolutely no idea what a browser is; you can just call it by the general name "program". Most people don't know what Internet actually is. For them it is kind of "world" or "space" somewhere out there, in which you can search and find things, read documents, watch moviews, hear songs, and all that beautiful stuff. IT language plays a minimal role in performing all these actions. From the moment you are "connected" to a virtual world that you can recognize as your real world, you only need to know the language of that world, as you do in real life.
Quoting Corvus
Right. So, should I then conclude that you generally agree with my position? Or have I missed something that supports Wittgenstein's position, namely, that language does indeed limit our world?
I don't think I mentioned anything about imagining things ... Such things would not be part of my world. Part of my wolrd are only things that I can experience, that are real to me..
Thank you for your response.
Quoting Wayfarer
This may be true. It is what @Antony Nickles called "facts".
Yes, indeed.
I see. OK, thanks!
Right. I agree.
The expressive power of language few can tap into. Rhetoric? An orator can touch the hearts of a hundred thousand people with one speech. Not an orator and you'll not be able to convince even one.
When I said not real I meant Tao Te Ching.
But then, aren't both statements 1) "the unnamed world is identified as 'non-being'" and 2) "the world does not exist until it is named" implied by Wittgenstein's statement?
I am happy that this topic helped to clarify the meaning of this statement-quote by Wittgenstein. More specifically, I suggest that you read @Antony Nickles's response, which I deem not only very inspiring, but also an exemplary demonstration of how to handle such a kind of topic.
I would grant that you are right that what can be expressed does not limit what can be seen; that is not the point. Witt is not "explaining"--he is not doing science here; these are not statements of fact--not statements. So, being "seen" does not make the world "exist" in the way that Wittgenstein is talking about here--you are assuming what is meaningful in saying something "exists", or is "seen" (think of them as terms you do not understand right away). As an example, you may not exist to the extent you have not expressed anything to differentiate yourself--categorically (in the logic of living) you are "not alive" (living your life), to yourself or to us. To be expressed in the relevant logical way, limits what meets the criteria of existing: in the sense of being meaningful to us, worth our notice; "seen", not in an empirical way, but in a way that reflects our interests and cares. This desire/compulsion for this criteria is investigated in his later work. As is the theory that language "represents or pictures" or references the world. Again, this is not a matter of competing opinions for someone to be right about.
Precisely the implication that I was suggesting follows from the statement in question. Mentioning anything imaginary is outside said limit. I might very well be off the trail at this point. Thanks for the response.
I just tried to explain to Foloso4 above that this is not an assertion of empirical knowledge. That "Witt is not "explaining"--he is not doing science here; these are not statements of fact--not statements."
Quoting Alkis Piskas
I would suggest this is a confusion that "meaning" is assigned to a word, so when we put words together, it is easy for you to see how they are supposed to be important, the point in saying them. But "this is not how it works". What this expression is doing is only able to be deciphered from the context of the text, the evidence of how it relates to the rest. This is the process of reading--it is not accomplished immediately, nor can it be simply explained, nor maybe told at all. So in a way, Witt had to write the whole book in order to write that sentence. There is no shortcut in philosophy or you end up with useless pithy meaningless statements. That being said, there is always the attempt; however, your ability to comprehend what anyone is telling you about this, presupposes that you already have some familiarity (even if mistaken) not simply taken from common sense, science, or your thoughts about it. And the last sentence you quote belies that we can speak about quite a bit, just not simply or just in statements. And, in the PI, Witt removes the logical criteria, and we find we can speak precisely about even more topics.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Right method, but, as with Witt in the TLP, the criteria pushed Plato to a forced conclusion.
Anything science hasn't learned about yet. For example, an empirically supported theory combining gravity and quantum mechanics. Or the proofs for unknown mathematical theorems. I suppose you will say we can put them into words (or equations) once we know what they are. So you mean potential language. Something that could possibly be expressed. Even if it requires new concepts.
So if we're talking about any possible human language or formalism, then the possibility that we're cognitively closed to some aspects or reality. Maybe we can't express what the exact nature of reality or consciousness is because it's beyond our cognitive abilities. Maybe there are things we don't know to build instruments of and put into words.
At any rate, it seems awful strong to limit reality to human language. Are the aliens saying the same things we are?
When you deny that the world does not yet exist for a baby it seems to me that that is exactly the point. If you connect existing to interests and cares why are you excluding the interests and cares of the baby?
Quoting Antony Nickles
It is not clear to me what way you think he is talking about. It is not that being seen makes the world exist but that the world must exist to be seen.
Quoting Antony Nickles
This makes no sense to me. I do not recall anything in the Tractatus along these lines. I must exist in order to differentiate myself. Perhaps on a forum like this no one might know I exist until I say something but speaking is not the only one in which I differentiate myself. Where does Wittgenstein talk about the "logic of living"? What does it mean? There are many ways in which I can express myself. Not all of them supported by the logical scaffolding of the Tractatus.
Yes. I understood that.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
I agree. That was why I brought it up.
Given what you've written, I'm going to assume that you haven't really studied the Tractatus. To understand what Wittgenstein is saying in this quote, you have to understand what is going on in philosophy vis a vis Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege ("I will only mention that I am indebted to Frege's great works and to the writings of my friend Mr. Bertrand Russell for much of the stimulation of my thoughts (p.3 Preface to the Tractatus)); and you have to understand Wittgenstein's goal in the Tractatus. I'm not going to get into the philosophy of Russell and Frege, but I will say a few words about the Tractatus, and what Wittgenstein was trying to accomplish.
In the Preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein clearly states that his goal is to draw a limit to the expression of thoughts, and since language is used to express our thoughts, it will only be in language that the limit can be drawn (p. 3 Preface). For Wittgenstein there is a definite logic to language. In fact, Wittgenstein's sees a one-to-one correspondence between propositions and facts in the world. Propositions describe the world, they are pictures of the world. So, the three main issues are logic, language, and the world, and Wittgenstein's analysis is an a priori analysis of these three ideas and how they connect.
So, Wittgenstein is caught up in the continuing problem of how thought and language connect to the world, i.e., how is it that we are able to say things about the world? His a priori investigation includes the idea that logic will reveal the structure of language and the structure of the world. There must be a logical connection that will reveal itself through analysis. His work extends "...from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world (Nb, p. 79)."
If as Wittgenstein believed, there is a one-to-one correspondence between what can be said about the world, and the facts of the world, then everything that can be said about the world, would give us a complete picture of the world. We would have completely described the world, given we have everything that can be said. So, if this is true, then the limits of our language, i.e., everything that can be stated about the world, would completely describe the limits of our (or my) world.
This hopefully, will give you a different way of thinking about the quote from Tractatus 5.62.
Also, your own understanding of the world is limited by your grasp of the propositions that really do line up with facts in the world. This, I believe, is why Wittgenstein believed it important to understand the logic of our language, which continued into his later philosophy. Although, his later philosophy is a much more expanded view of the logic of language.
Maybe this will help you to understand the quote a little better, and get you to read more about the history behind the Tractatus.
Again, this is not about competing opinions, between you and Witt or you and me. Your assertion that the "world must exist" is not "wrong"; it is just different in kind (scientific, empirical, etc.) then what Witt is doing in trying to take the criteria of logic and create a "world" from just that, as Kant did in a sense. To see what philosophical world we have when we start with those assumptions. I'm not saying he is right in doing that, but he would never have gotten to where he does in PI if he didn't develop this vision from this desire.
So this is not an "argument" about what "the" world and existence "are", it is a fantasy, a picturing to find what we can be certain of. All of these "statements" are only what he is certain he can say within the constraints he imposes on himself--taking a requirement and pushing it around to see how it fills out. Your definitions of "the world" and "existence" are stopping you from trying to learn anything before you even begin.
For me it is about trying to understanding Wittgenstein.
Quoting Antony Nickles
His argument is a priori, but it is not about creating a world, it is about the transcendental conditions and a priori structure of the world and language and what is beyond them.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I began a long time ago. My dissertation was on Wittgenstein.
I have not given a definition of the world or existence. I am in agreement regarding the limits of the world, but there is a distinction between the world and my world.
With regard to existence you say:
Quoting Antony Nickles
Do you mean that it does not "exist" if you are not aware of it or it does not matter to you, that what exists is what does matter to you, what you are aware of? In that case, as I said, the baby's world does exist, even though it is pre-linguistic and more limited. Its hunger matters, the fact that its hunger can be satisfied matters.
Spoon feeding time:
1. The world is everything that is the case
5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world
Hence, the limits my language are the limits of what is the case. That is, it if is the case then it can be stated.
That's not a limit on language, not a limit on what can be done, nor a limit on what can be understood, comprehended, felt, loved, hated... it's a limit on what can be said.
Can you say how much you love her? But I love her more than words can say...
6.5 When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words. The riddle does not exist. If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it.
7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.
A fool might think that what cannot be spoken of is not important. For Wittgenstein, it was of the highest importance.
Ethics and Aesthetics are found in what one does, not in what one says. This is how the Tractatus leads to the Investigations,
But the most outstanding thing shown by this thread is how little effort so many of you are willing to put into actually doing philosophy.
You donj't wnat philosophy; you want Twitter.
For the really hard of thinking, the bold bits are from the Tractatus, which can be found here: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5740/5740-pdf.pdf
That would be an answer to "Tell me about something which has not be put into words."
The question is, "Tell me about something which cannot be put into words."
You're contradicting yourself. Language = saying.
Quoting Banno
Quoting Banno
This doesn't make sense. Saying = Doing. Disambiguate please.
Again, read the Tractatus, or at least take a look at the secondary literature.
Follow up question, "Can everything real be put into words"?
:rofl: Don't get upset!
Quoting Banno
:up: :ok:
By the way, you need to take opposition more positively.
Oh, it's like a magic phrase that is unintelligible unless other magic phrases activate it.
It seems like a tactic of argumentation not to simply state your point. No one talks to themselves this way.
Not the really important stuff. Thereof, one might best just get on with it.
Like your disdain for metaphysics?
Philosophy so often goes nowhere. One common example is the "thing in itself", of which we can say nothing, and yet which occupies many volumes of metaphysics.
But there are ways of understanding some metaphysical proposition. See Confirmable and influential Metaphysics
Something similar is done in On Certainty, and in Austin's work, involving a close analysis of the language of metaphysical speculation in order to sort out what has potential and what is mere fluff.
The Tractatus sets out to give an account of exactly that. It shows how to systematically derive all possible truths from elementary propositions.
Of course this derivation from simples is later rejected in Philosophical Investigations.
What?
As in, again, your meaning is unclear.
The Kant ball(thing in itself) was called into question.
Found to meet criteria laid out in the Tractatus for things that can't be discussed.
The things that can't be discussed are derived from an abandoned system of simple truths.
Probably the grossest over simplification to date. But, I was trying to get at the timeline.
You are very welcome.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
In the OP, I was under the impression that you were in deep confusion with the understanding of Wittgenstein's quotes and his philosophical points with his sayings regarding the limitation of the world and language. Hence I explained in detail what I think about the quotes and its meanings in my post.
I was expecting your reply whether you agreed with my points or not. Of course I agree with me.
"4.023...The proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding"
But he is not stating the "structure of the world" (a priori or otherwise), he is dictating the terms for the structure of language. "The world is the totality of facts, not of things." (1.1; Ogden) This is not to make a statement that is either true or false; it is setting the bar of what he wants the criteria of "the world" to be--not "things" (in themselves), but only the totality of what he sees as a fact. He does not consider anything we do not find to be logical, to be. The world "is"=X. This is not a finding; it is a forced definition, in the second line; he starts there, it is not a conclusion.
The sense of "reality" is created by Witt's imposed criteria of logic. Like Kant, with the imposition of a standard as part of his "a priori" structure, we lose the "thing-in-itself". We are distanced from "reality" with picturing (4.06) a model (2.12) reaching out for a link (2.1511) applying a scale (2.1512) just touching (2.1515) as the logical form of a picture (2.17-18) a depiction of possibility (2.201) a sense of reality (2.222) made to agree (4.023) compared to (2.223; 4.05) an expression (4.121) bound from, limited (5.5561).
"4.023... one can actually see in the proposition all the logical features possessed by reality if it is true."
But this sense of truth is a phantasm. As he will say later in PI, what we say is true or false, but this is not an opinion (knowledge) of the world (#244). Witt in a sense pulls back his ambition as he sees that his criteria for logic is folding in on itself and limiting more and more what he can talk about that will meet that criteria. It is not that we only act or show after that, but that he can not talk about it because of his standard for what he will listen to.
Quoting Fooloso4
I was saying that in the sense that it does not register, as, say, knowledge. Now you can hang on tight to the idea that "existence" and "reality" are qualities; that there is an "outside" world. But in the TLP, Witt has no way to get at it; no way to make it exist for us, as in: in any meaningful way, except that it meets his logical criteria. His requirement for language kills the world before we can get to it.
Is the animal's world inside language? Is even the human world entirely within the bounds of language? If so, how does that work?
I think you are playing with the words here. He did told you something already. But since you insist. Can you put what is going on in unconscious human mind into words? If yes I would be glad to hear.
Quoting Banno
Quoting Banno
So since you say that for Wittgenstein was of the highest importance what can't be said. You think he proposes to just let them pass? To not deal with them at all since language can't help?? Not to try to actually "discover" more of them?? Let the important things be in the dark and in deep silence?
No.For me is about trying to get over language limitations as an attempt to discover them!Wittgenstein wouldn't give up such easily! And yes, then language might evolve also in the future! Human language has remained the same from Homo sapiens till now? Nothing is stable!
Quoting Banno
I don't doubt that you studied Wittgenstein and that you seem to be a well read man.
But is your understanding of Wittgenstein the only right one? Can't someone else read him and had a different opinion about what Wittgenstein actually meant? That is a shallow statement.
Quoting Marchesk
Awful wrong better.
Just a little bit.
Glad you admit it.Just on time as to get out the idea, that was starting to shape in my mind, of you being stubborn.
That's much the topic here: The content of beliefs is propositional"
For the purposes of exegesis, keep in mind Tractatus 1: The world is everything that is the case.
Comparing eggs and oranges is fraught.
Why, thank you. Stubbornness is a virtue cultivated by having to explain things repeatedly.
Again, if you want to understand Wittgenstein, or any other philosopher of worth, you needsmust expend some effort.
Quoting dimosthenis9
No; I think he worked on those issues for much of his life.
As long as you explain them right.
Quoting Banno
Again your understanding isn't the only one. And not necessarily the right one. The one who disagrees with your understanding doesn't mean that hasn't studied Wittgenstein.
Noted. In fairness if I was claiming to possess important insight that defies summary I'd be laughed out of the room. It appears as if some one thought they could be vague enough they would overcome the unattended baggage sold with a lexicon, but instead of realizing this wasn't the case; it was concluded that things can't be communicated.
That the content of beliefs may be propositional (in the restricted sense that they can in principle be propositionally expressed) does not seem to entail that the world those beliefs are about is propositional.
We can say "the world is everything that is the case" but the world itself is not encapsulated within that statement; it is rather our idea or ideas of the world that may be said to be encapsulated by it, or so it seems to me.
Not sure what you are getting at with the 'eggs and oranges' reference.
That is, you may find the answers to your questions in the exposition for (1) and (2) in the Tractatus; or at least what the early Wittgenstein and others took for the answer.
Thank you.
Quoting Cheshire
Philosophy has to resort to defiance of convention sometimes. I would put Plato's images, Witt's examples in the PI, Nietszche whole bravado, Emerson's sacrilege, and Heidegger in general in this column. Sometimes philosophy is about changing your mind, not about knowledge, but, thinking in an entirely different way--that's hard to tell someone to do, or get there by just saying things that are right.
Quoting Cheshire
I've said elsewhere in this discussion that if you look at it right you can see that he was starting with a hope that he could have a standard of logical structure that corresponded to the world, only to find out that a lot of the world doesn't fit into that kind of logic. This does not make us unable to talk about the rest, just that the discussion doesn't meet his standards. It is a very earnest example of trying to force things to be certain, predictable, predetermined, complete, abstract, etc.
Precisely what I needed to understand. Thanks.
Quoting Antony Nickles
I think this is the source of dissonance at least in my experience. I'll gladly adopt a new frame of reference to kick around an idea. But, if I'm listening for the idea and just getting my bearings crossed...complaints aside. It makes sense now, appreciated.
Quoting Janus
The dilettante attitude to which I made reference is not found in Janus. I regret that he made that inference.
Rather they were for those who mistake an aphorism for a philosophy.
The direction Janus was heading is his question:
Quoting Janus
is one on which I have written much, most of it in response to @creativesoul. I've not the time nor inclination to revitalise that deceased, maltreated equine. Hence my redirecting him to the debate.
Should have it sorted by Monday morning.
The meaning of "my world"
I would suggest that as Wittgenstein is using the term "my world" in a way that is not commonly accepted this contributes to any confusion in interpreting his intended meaning.
The original German was "meiner Welt, so it does not seem to be a problem of translating German to English.
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein discusses what language can and cannot do.
He argues that there are some aspects of life, such as ethics, that are beyond the limits of language, in that they transcend language.
5.6 - "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" ?
6.421 - It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)
7 - "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent"
Wittgenstein links language to "my world" not by representing the world but by displaying its logical form.
4.001 - "The totality of propositions is language"
4.121 - "Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language. Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it."
1.1 - "The world is the totality of facts, not of things"
1 - "The world is everything that is the case"
As with Mary in Mary's Room, Mary may know everything about the science of colour but may never have experienced the sensation of colour. Mary's world (in the sense of the world that Mary lives in) includes both those things within the limits of language - the science of colour - and that which transcends language - the experience of colour. The same is also true that for each of us, in that our worlds include both that which can be described and that which is beyond description.
However, Wittgenstein is limiting the term "my world" to only that part which can be described in language.
IE, when Wittgenstein writes "my world", he is using the term "my world" in a more restricted sense than is commonly accepted, contributing to any confusion in interpretations of his intended meaning.
Quoting Banno
I asked for personal opinions and views, not suggestions what book should I read, @Banno. More specifically, at the end of the description of the topic I asked: "I would really like to hear your opinion on all this".
So, if you have read a book that explains this quote and my questioning, you could present your view.
BTW, please note that @Antony Nickles has already covered the topic very successfully. I could even consider it "closed".
Quoting TheMadFool
... So can a silent magician! :smile:
... So could Charlie Chaplin in the era of silent movies! :smile:
Quoting Cheshire
That's OK, @Cheshire.
I have already praised your response to the topic, @Antony Nickles! Not olny personally, in my reply to your response, but also in public! (I prompted them to read your exemplary response to get inspired as I did!) :smile:
Great. Thanks.
Thank you for your response. You didn't have to assume that I have not read Wittgenstein's work, Tractatus, because it is very evident from my statement "I have recently been presented with Wittgenstein's statement-quote ..." ... which you quoted also yourself here! :smile:
In fact, I asked for people their opinion and views, not a suggestion on what book should I read.
No, I was certainly not confused about Wittgenstein's quote. If I was confused about something, this was with your overall response. Which is evident, since ended with questions ...
And I didn't get "brighter" with your new response.
It's not a big deal, though. Let's pass over it, shall we?
Touché! :up:
Well the OP sounded like the author was in deep confusion. Because you were talking about - the world is limited and the infants don't have their worlds because of the linguistic deprivation. And you were also wondering how you can use the computers even without knowing the linguistic abilities to describe the workings of it ... etc. It sounded a bit dramatic. I thought you were thinking as if the language is limited, so the world is limited, and the childrens cannot have their worlds etc.
I simply said, that the world is not affected at all, no matter how limited your languages are, even if you don't have language.
Well, I didn't reply to you to make you any brighter. I don't believe that anyone can make anyone anything. You make your own self whatever you want to be. No one said it was a big deal. See, you making out something which is not, and making out which is not, to something. It is just communication, which has been initiated by you, if you think it over. I couldn't quite understand what you meant, when you asked if I agreed with you, and I was just clarifying the whole situation, in case you were misunderstanding something further.
Well yeah but the book suggestion answers to your initial question. Maybe that's why they try to urge you read it. You can't blame them for that. Just answering your question.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Well if you were not confused what would be the reason to start the thread then at the first place? You did sound that you needed clarification for the Wittgenstein's statement. That's at least what I do when I'm confused.
What do you think this means? The statement continues:
Whether a proposition is true or false is determined by reality, by what is the case, a state of affairs, the facts.
Quoting Antony Nickles
The structure of language is also the structure of the world:
Quoting Antony Nickles
The point is that the underlying structure of the world is logical rather than physical.
He goes on to say:
Quoting Antony Nickles
It is not imposed criteria, logic is what he took to be the underlying structure of language and the world.
Quoting Antony Nickles
The passage from PI is not about the truth of propositions about the world, it is about sensations.
For once! :grin:
I see. Maybe then you have to look up the word confusion. Well, I'll make it easier: "Uncertainty about what is happening, intended, or required", "a situation of panic or disorder, the state of being bewildered or unclear in one's mind about something", "a situation of panic or disorder" (Ofxord LEXICO). Did I "look" I was in any of these states? :gasp: :worry: :yikes:
Well, the lesson is that sentences also carry emotions, not just meanings. What was radiating from the OP was a sense of confusion and panic. I stepped in to rescue you, as anyone would for the person drowning into the river of philosophy of language limited and shadowed by presence of the unfathomable universe.
You were right, you were always right!
Yep. That's what it says in the very first line...
1. The world is everything that is the case.
This exchange leads nowhere ... So, let's drop it, OK?
This exchange leads nowhere. Let's drop it, OK?
Quoting TheMadFool
Thanks. (I'm not sure though about "always". I hope it is not ironic!)
Well, I wasn't as right as I thought I was.
OK
[quote=Socrates]What we know we must be able to tell[/quote]
[quote=St. Augustine]What is time? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks, I do not know.[/quote]
Kind courtesy of Daniel Bonevac.
I'm not arguing that the TLP is logically inconsistent. Or arguing that language does not work (at all) by correspondence or representation, but that, if a proposition is simply true or false, we only see the features that are logical. The structure of truth and falsity determines the extent of our world.
Quoting Fooloso4
Again, I don't disagree that the world has form. It's just that in the TLP Witt is limiting the breadth of the world to what meets a certain criteria of logic. But to watch him write only what he knows to be absolutely true with such knowing restraint; you can feel his reaching but also never stepping beyond that discipline, so every statement captures his mind frame perfectly.
Quoting Fooloso4
Imposed is too intentional; expected, desired; "what he took to be", not that it was something other than what he took it for, but that was all he took; narrowing our world to only a logic that could allay our fear of uncertainty.
As much as Wittgenstein expounded on the characteristics of language, he never gave a strict definition of what it to him actually is. As from Stanford Encyclopedia:
I'd say that language in his term is rather some kind of rules, symbolic nor not, that humans perceive, understand, and apply, based on how he arranged the order of discussion in Philosophical Investigations -- language-games, rule-following, and the private language argument. Arguably our subjective world consists of the rules we perceive.
Quoting TheMadFool
Cute quotes! :smile: As I understand them, they both mean that if I cannot describe something in words, it means that I don't actually know it, right? Well, as I already said, language is not the only way that an experience, a fact or knowledge in general can be comminicated. In fact, sometimes it is impossible to describe something that we know with language, including "body" language, symbols and whatever else can be called "language".
Here's another example: I know how to ride a bicycle. But however well I know my laguage, it is impossible to describe in words (or any language) what bicycle riding is to someone who has never seen a bicycle. And even if he/she knows what a bicycle is, it is totally impossible to teach him/her with just words (or other language) how to ride a bicycle. We all know this well.
Now, let someone tell me that I don't know how to ride a bicycle! :grin:
(Or that riding a bicycle is not in "my world" or that it's not true or a fact that I can ride a bicycle ... in whatever form one wants to place it.)
Bottom line: I can classify this kind of statements-quotes as only indicative, true in part or "half-truths". They cannot be used as actual truths or proofs (e.g. logical arguments in a discussion). To express a truth or present an argument as a proof, my statement and the truth it represents must always stand logically or be a provable fact.
Thank you for your response. This gives a good perspective on how Wittgenstein used the term "language". It remains to know what he exactly meant by "my world" ...
So, since it looks like you are acquainted with Wittgensttein's work, I would like to ask you the following:
1) Do you know if Wittgenstein has ever negated his principle "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world"?
2) Has he defined what exactly he meant by "my world"?
(I could of course study Wittgensttein's work myself but right now I have other priorities.)
Not quite the response I was expecting. Anyway...
St. Augustine knows what time is but he can't put it into words. Just like what you said about how Wittgenstein seems to have committed a faux pas when he so confidently declared, "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world."
Reminds me of a philosopher who's name I forget who claims that there are ineffables that are true. I'm sorry I can't recall his proof. Google it if it seems worthwhile.
Also, I seem to have erroneously hyperfocused on a narrow band of the language spectrum - the written & spoken word - and overlooked body language (e.g. dogs), chemical language (e.g. ants), to name a few. However, each gesture, each molecule of pheromone, can be treated as a word even in these cases. In other words, there's no fundamental difference between body, chemical, written/spoken language - they all have units of meaning comparable to words.
As for bicylcing, last I recall it's the cerebellum that learns/knows how to ride a bicycle. It might seem that this knowledge can't be written down/spoken of but, in my humble opinion, the cerebrum can with ease translate the skill into a set of propositions :point: How To Ride A Bike?
That said, the gist of my posts is the reality of ineffables. This not necessarily due to a poor vocab although being thus limited/constrained could give you a feel of mystical experiences (supposedly unwordable) - how it feels like to not be able to speak/write about what one has/is experienced/experiencing.
What needs to be understood is why he is doing this.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Again, you need to understand why he is attempting to draw the limits of what can be thought. He wants to point to what is beyond those limits, to what can be seen but not said.
I'm afraid I can't afford to be called "acquainted with Wittgenstein" yet. I happened to skim through some of his works recently. Therefore, I would reserve from giving improper answers to the two questions you asked. They are definitely good questions to investigate, however.
Sorry about that! :smile:
Quoting TheMadFool
No problem. We don't necessarily need names ... Indeed there are.
Quoting TheMadFool
Right.
Quoting TheMadFool
I have no idea about the mechanics of learning these things ... I leave it to the specialists. I just want to enjoy my riding! :grin:
Quoting TheMadFool
Yes, I got that! :smile: Indeed, the word "ineffable" fits perfectly. Pity that we can't ask Wittgenstein "What about ineffables?" :grin:
Fair enough!
Quoting D2OTSSUMMERBUG
Certainly there are!
1. The world is everything that is the case
As 1. "The world is everything that is the case" begins the Tracataus, it is probably especially important to understand its meaning, and I am trying to ensure that I've got hold of the right end of the stick.
The statement 1. "The world is everything that is the case" is initially confusing because Wittgenstein is using words in a way different to everyday usage and which can only be properly understood in context with the rest of the Tractatus, as others have already mentioned.
As a note, the Tractatus may be interpreted as espousing realism - the independent existence of objects, states of affairs and facts.
It seems to me that:
1) Wittgenstein's "world" is that which exists independently of any human observer, ie, the Earth and Universe in general. It therefore excludes human experiences of ethics, aesthetics, the experience of colour, the pain of a hot stove, etc. However, in common usage, the "world" would include both the human observer and the world they live in.
2) Wittgenstein's "case" has a meaning specific to the Tractatus- a fact - an existence of a state of affairs. However, in common usage we would say "it is the case that aesthetics is important"
"Tell me about something which cannot be put into words."
This raises the point as to how Wittgenstein is able to write about things that cannot be put into words.
6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)
Bertrand Russell in his introduction to the Tractatus wrote - "Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit"
As regards the exit, when Banno asks ""Tell me about something which cannot be put into words.", what appears to be a paradox is solved by the nature of language, in that the answer is simply "I cannot put into words my private experience of the colour red".
Summary
When Wittgenstein writes "the world is everything that is the case", what he means is very different from what would be meant in common usage.
The nature of language is such that it allows Wittgenstein to talk about things that, in a sense, transcend language.
Quoting RussellA
Quoting RussellA
And all these are what makes me believe that Wittgenstein wanted mostly to point out how language easily misleads us ,cause of its limitations! He seemed to me sometimes "playing" in purpose with language as to make it even more obvious to us.The word "world" seems be that case also here.
Good post.
TLP 1. The world is everything that is the case
It certainly is the case with Wittgenstein. As the SEP article on Wittgenstein wrote: "The Tractatus is notorious for its interpretative difficulties", of which the correct interpretation of the word " world" is one example.
For example, when Wittgenstein first uses the word "world", I am sure that only he knows what he means by it, certainly not the reader. It is not so much that he is using a private language of the kind as described in PI 243 "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language", but rather he is envisaging that the meaning that he intends the word to have will later become clear to the reader within the full context of the article.
It seems that Wittgensteins' approach is that the complete meaning of any particular word comes from its context rather than any pre-determined definition.
PI 21 - Now what is the difference between the report or statement "Five slabs" and the order "Five slabs!"?—Well, it is the part which uttering these words plays in the language game.
PI - 22 - Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.
However, there remains the problem with such a language game of the danger of circularity of meaning, in that, if the meaning of the word comes from the game and there are minimal links from the language game to an external reality, then there is the problem of how to choose between different games.
It seems that Wittgenstein does not always follow his own advice, when he writes:
TLP 4.112 - "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts"
He removes meaning.
(see SEP for more on this.)
One must be cautious in moving from the Tractatus to the Investigations. Some things change, some stay the same.
As I see it, normally when reading a sentence in another language, such as "der Apfel liegt auf dem Tisch" we use a two step process. First we translate it into English "the apple is on the table" and then we interpret it (the apple is on the table).
However, with writers such as Wittgenstein, it is often the case that a three step process is needed. For example:
1) First, TLP 1 "Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist" is translated into Standard English "The world is all that is the case"
2) Then we translate the Standard English "The world is all that is the case" into common usage "the world that exists independently of any human consists of a combination of simple and unalterable objects in space and time"
3) Finally, we interpret it - (within the world that exists independently of any human observer there are objects existing in combination within space and time, where such objects are unalterable and simple, ie, having no proper parts).
Once interpreted, one can then make a comment. Such as - Wittgenstein's "objects" are logical objects rather than physical objects.
IE, even when reading the Tractatus in English, it is as much a case of translation as interpretation.
I agree the most interesting parts are when he comes to a point where he feels something can only be, or is, shown. The question I'm attempting to answer is why he draws this line (as Kant has a reason to draw a line). I find this unspeakable structure, mirrored in the logic of the form, exhibited by propositions (4.121) and shown in their application (3.262), to be the edge of the work itself; the stepping-off point for his later work. But what is it about the limits he sees that makes them possible to go beyond?
I would say he realized two things: that the sense of "cannot" here is drawn by the criteria he has for a form of expression being "logical" only in the sense that it is a proposition that is either true or false. Anything past that is subject to dispute or disagreement and so cannot be a part of the "logical form" of what he is defining as "reality".
Also, he claims that the "logical form" "which mirrors itself in language, language cannot represent". The form of representation (2.172), how things stand (4.022), the logical form (4.12), what is not expressed (3.262) all seem to refer to the implications of our language (or its negation); what criteria apply to decide how/when a particular thing is expressed, what counts as something being the form of the thing it is. We see this in asking about the application of the sign (its use) (3.262), exhibited in the form of the expression (4.121)("what we mean [imply]when we say X", Austin will say).
I would argue there is a sense where "That which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by language." does not exclude us from discussing the form, or sense, or the picture, or what is concealed, i.e., "What can be shown" (4.1212). Witt takes the need for us out of the equation by only considering true/false propositions--what is "said" is only that which is certain. Everything else is either nonsense or individual. "In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct...That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the language which only I understand) mean the limits of my world." (5.62) We just do not regularly need to discuss these things because "my world" and your world are the same--for the most part our words agree with each other's lives. Only sometimes do we ask "Did you intend to do that?", "Do you know what you did?", "Why do you call this modern art; it does not appear self-referential at all?" I do not need to discuss logical propositions with you because their criteria involve neither you nor I. If I wish to make a claim about (my understanding of) the ordinary criteria for the form or standing of our shared lives (or what is concealed by it, for me, personally) than I am without the authority, justification, and necessity of the propositions of the TLP, but I am not without the ability, the possibility. And so Witt's "cannot" here is basically categorical; you can speak of these things, but you cannot say you speak with the authority and certainty of logic, and so, in that world, you do not speak at all.
Wittgenstein and what cannot be said
Wittgenstein wrote in TLP 6.421 "It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental". Russell wrote in the introduction to the Tractatus "Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit".
The apparent paradox of talking about subjective truths
The question is how is it possible to connect private subjective truths to a public word.
Using colour as an example of a private subjective truth. I observe an object in the world. I experience various private subjective truths about this object - (green, circular, opaque). I observe that public words are attached to this same object - "opaque, green, circular"
Several instances may be required, but using inductive reasoning about constantly conjoined events, ie, that of my private subjective truth (green) and the public word "green", I may infer that the public word "green" is linked to my private subjective truth (green).
Note that the link is between my private sensation and the public word, not between my private sensation and someone else's private sensation. IE, my private sensation of "green" may or may not be the same as someone else's private sensation of "green", even though we share the same word.
Note that there is no information within the public word "green" that describes any person's private subjective truth. However, that being said, the public word "green" can describe my private subjective truth of (green) to me.
My inference that the public word "green" is linked to my private subjective truth (green) may eventually turn out to be wrong, in that I am using inductive reasoning, but pragmatically, for the time being, it is probably good enough.
Conclusion
I can use the public word "green" to describe my private subjective truth (green) because of my inductive reasoning about constantly conjoined events.
That’s true! Without a language we cannot communicate with others. Imagine finding yourself in a country where everyone speaks a different language. Your life there would be very limited until you learn how to understand others and express yourself. And when you do, your world would “expand”: you’d learn about their culture, history and traditions.
This goes even further. If you can’t talk about something, you also cannot effectively reason about it in your head. Your ability to think is limited. There are many fields of study where journey to proficiency starts with building a vocabulary. For example, someone can listen to a piece of music and think “The sound just changed in an interesting way“, but a musician will think “It was a dominant seventh enharmonic modulation to the key of G”. One could argue that the musician has a more complex inner world (vocabulary) when it comes to music, which allows her to make inferences that other people wouldn’t. This is how we can associate language with internal limitations. My favorite thing is that we can always learn new concepts and keep expanding beyond our past limits.
:up: At last!
It's not about communication in general. @ceativesoul mentioned "talk about". (Since words here are the main factor.) Otherwise, we can communicate with others in a lot of different ways ...
Ethics is not at all transcendental --not in a Kantian sense or a supernatural or abstract way or exceeding experience. It is something very practical, real and rational. It has to do with survival and well being.
So as I see, Wittgenstein had also this wrong ...
Quoting creativesoul
But
Tractatus:
1, the world is all that is the case.
Hence the world is limited to what is the case, to what can be stated. This is not an observation so much as setting out what counts as meaningful discourse and what is nonsense.
This develops into the distinction between what is said and what can only be shown. It remains that one cannot express the grace in movement found in the Blue Danube in words; one can however share it.
Again, Quoting Banno
This:
Quoting Banno
- is different from this:
Quoting Banno
Unless you mean: Hence the world is limited to what is the case, to what can [potentially] be stated [by an intelligence with access to what is the case].
What is unknown about the world, though at the moment unstatable, is still the case - and will be statable as it becomes known.
Charity is good. Clarity is better. (More clarity means fewer requests for charity. Also less confusion and misunderstanding.)
If you agree with this:
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
- you should also agree with this:
Quoting creativesoul
Do you?
A point of clarity: being unstated and being unstateable - do you see them as different?
So better: What is unknown about the world at the moment is unstated, but is nevertheless stateable.
I don't mind critique or getting my goat got. I know your personality well. ;)
Yes, different.
Is this your position?
What is unknown is statable.
All unknowns are statable.
What is unknown is unstated but statable.
All unknowns are unstated but statable.
If one is talking about propositional knowledge, then pretty much. I don't see a viable alternative.
So:
In the case of propositional knowledge, what is unknown is statable.
Still in agreement?
Is there any other kind of knowledge? Or is all knowledge propositional?
I was thinking about this strange use of the suffix -able.
So we have an unknown that you say is statable but at this time no one on earth and nothing in the universe can state it.
Take drivable. Here is a car that's drivable but at this time no one on earth and nothing in the universe can drive it.
Drivable is being used in a very strange (you might even say a special) way. All the drivable cars I've come across could be driven by something in the universe.
A new car.
Adopting your phraseology:
So we have car that you say is drivable but at this time no one on earth and nothing in the universe has driven it. My next question is: Can anyone actually drive it? Possibly, possibly not. It's unknown. It's a trust issue: do I trust what you say?
By the same token and again adopting your phraseology:
So we have an unknown that you say is statable but at this time no one on earth and nothing in the universe has stated it. My next question is: Can anyone state it? Possibly, possibly not. It's unknown. Certainly, trust is not an option.
At the moment the unknown becomes the known the statable has been stated?
But are we then stating an unknown or stating a known?
Or is this the place for charity?
It seems like too crucial a distinction to gloss over with a charitable nod.
If they could not, then how is it a proposition?
You seem tone deaf to the point here, which is that propositions can be stated. While one can have a car that cannot be driven, one cannot have a proposition that can not be stated.
Doubtless there are dubious fringe examples. They are irrelevant. This is not something open to falsification. If you like, it's a hinge proposition.
We didn't say it was a proposition. We said it was an unknown.
Are unknowns propositions?
This point is clear and non-controversial. Propositions can be stated. If it's a proposition, it can be stated.
But we were talking about an unknown not a proposition.
We were taking about Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
What is the case is what can be placed into propositional form. That's what "what is the case" means.
If you have an alternate meaning, set it out.
Okay, that makes sense. Thanks. :smile:
Quoting Banno
This seems to be the crux of the controversy. This odd use of the word statable in connection to the unknown.
Using Banno's definition of statable:
Unknowns are statable because unknowns are still states of affairs and states of affairs can be put into the form of a proposition and every proposition can be stated.
Using a dictionary definition of statable: "capable of being stated."
In fact, it's not actually true that an unknown is statable - even if what is the case can always be put into the form of a proposition. An unknown is unstatable, not because it can't ultimately be put into the form of a proposition, but because the contents of the proposition are unknown.
An unknown, if and when it becomes a known, becomes statable.
So where Banno is content to say an unknown is statable, creative would like to place the unknown beyond the "limits of language." This is the portion of his world beyond the limits of language.
Both are true in their own way.
Nice summary! Indeed, on my view the unknown is akin to Kant's Noumena in that very specific way.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
That reminds me of "falsifiable", when it comes to true statements. Seems to me that true statements cannot be false, therefore are not able to be falsified or shown as false. I'm probably just not understanding correctly though.
:wink:
...akin in the regard that you and Kant insist on talking about that of which you cannot say anything.
Akin in saying that all you can say is that we can know that there are unknowns...
Name calling is not nice.
:wink:
A cool way to see the implications is to follow the the story of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. It's cultural relativity. Whorf tried to prove it by analyzing the Hopi language. He thought he discovered that they have no words for segments of time and so have no concept of discrete time.
His research was flawed and useless, but there's other research that concentrates on color.
Hence the world is limited to what is the case, to what can be stated.[/quote]
:up:
You don't/can't say anything. You clam up.
EITHER
1. There's nothing to say
OR
2. There's something to say but you can't say it
As long as ineffable experiences (2) can't be distinguished from no experience (1), the limits of my language means the limits of my world!
I remember being under the impression that Sapir-Whorf had been straight-up refuted by the color research, and being disappointed to find it isn’t quite that simple, because research is fucking hard.
One way to read this: people who speak languages that don’t have separate words for blue and green can still reliably distinguish blue and green color samples; one way to look at that is that this strongly suggests they are capable of learning a language that does have words like “blue” and “green”. So, perhaps, “my language” doesn’t mean English or German or Xhosa or something, but something more like “my linguistic faculty”. And then we could say the limits of what I could grasp, conceivably expressed in a conceivable language, are the limits of my world.
A soft version of Sapir-Whorf (and by implication Witt's assertion about the limits of his world) is accepted by linguistic scientists and can be supported by research. So your language can be demonstrated to influence your outlook on the world.
A hard version of the thesis isn't generally accepted or seen to be supported by research.
Wittgenstein's statement was indeed was biased and/or superficial. And this was what I tried to show with my topic.
On one side of the limit is what can be said, on the other is what can be shown, or seen, or experienced.
— T 6.421
They are not in the world. They are not facts. This does not mean he denies their importance or significance for our lives, only that they are not part of the logical structure of the world. It is only what is within the world of facts that can be addressed by language.
People do tend to read that statement taking "language" as the ground term, and deriving the limits of the world from language's limits. But it could be the other way around, as you point out: the limits of language are derived from the limits of the world, and its logical structure, leaving room, as you also point out, for the transcendent. That looks like a somewhat Kantian move...
The thing is, the logical structure LW finds in the world is clearly deduced (not to say "projected") from the logical structure of language. That's fine for logical primacy -- what's discovered is the conditions of possibility of the given -- but there's a whiff of circularity about such an inference as a philosophical act. Which is also fine -- at least I think so, since I don't see a way around that sort of hermeneutic circle -- but ought to be faced up to, acknowledged, and looked at squarely.
He used 'transcendental' in the Kantian sense of the conditions for the possibility of experience, but not according to the categories of the understanding.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
He assumed that there are simples, but I don't know if this was deduced from language. It might have been that he accepted a picture of the world based on irreducible building blocks. Of course such a picture can be applied to language, but Democritus' atoms, for example, were not derived from language.
I agree.
Quoting Fooloso4
The "world of facts" is an ambiguous expression. Actually, a fact is something that is known or proved to be true. And it is independent of language. It can be subjective: what I believe is a fact, it's a fact for me. It can also be a "common" fact: it is a fact, for me and other people who know me or to people to whom I can show/prove it, that I know how to ride a bicycle. It has nothing to do with language.
Anyway, this may be indeed Wittgenstein's viewpoint. But it is not explicit or implied from the immediate context, from what I have read regarding this statement. Yet, I can accept it as true. But even in that case, it's a limited view of what a "fact" is, as I expleined above.
However, the most important of all is that when we say "my world", we mean my reality, everything that is in it, including experiences. Words (language) are only a part of it.
So, whatever Wittgenstein's viewpoint is, it's quite limited, anyway.
Wittgenstein is unambiguous as to what he means by a fact.
A state of affairs is not dependent on anyone knowing or proving it to be true. This is not say that this is the correct or only meaning of a fact, but if we are to understand him we need to begin with the way he uses terms, otherwise we argue for or against things he did not say or mean.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
That may be what you mean but not what he means.
That's true. I have certainly not studied his work, but from what you tell me, I undestand that one needs to learn a new language, different from the language most philosophers --and people, in general-- use!
Then, we should quote him with thriftiness, and only to people that we know they have studied his work.
Well, if I knew all that, I will have certainly not started such a discussion! :smile:
Quoting Fooloso4
I think that this is --more or less-- what most people mean too. See, Wittgenstein is not "public material".
Well, all what you said seem very correct, and thank you for sharing that knowledge. :pray:
But for me, all this is more than enough. I'm going now to take a long break from Wittgenstein! :grin:
Many of the philosophers have some terms idiosyncratically. Why they do is an interesting question.
This may be true. But they shouldn't. If they do, it means they are themselves "idiosyncratic" or even not so stable mentally. Yes, as extreme as this might sound. Mental health depends a lot on rationality. When it is not stable, one can write or say things that don't make sense or are unsound, not based on logic. Rationality includes or implies analytical ability. Without that, one cannot go far philosophising!
Philosophers, as well as people talking about philosophical matters, have to be as much exact in the language they use as possible. This is required by logic (rationality) --which characterizes philiosophy-- and communicativeness. "Idiosyncrasy" should only be tolerated in their viewpoints, not in their language.
We often read quotes from known, well established philosophers, that we find somewhat "strange", the truthfulness of which we easily question or disagree with. A classic example is Descartes's "I think therefore I am", which has been, and still is, discussed a lot. In such cases, one has to find out why, the context in which, the philosopher said what he said. And usually, this can be easily found and explained. It's rearily a question of language.
Another case of misundestanding or having a difficulty to undestand what a philosopher says or means, is lack of rationality and ability to understand from our side. I remember, since my school days, having read quite a few times referring to Heraclitus as "the dark philosopher". He was never "dark" for me. He was very clear and his views can still stand today; they are timeless. He was/is "dark" only to people who couldn't/cannot understand the meaning of what he said. His language, however, was very clear and exact!
I do not find Wittgenstein's use of 'fact' unusual. My comments here are in regard to hermeneutics and the history of philosophy. We tend to be more receptive to those who seem to share our views. A shared terminology leads to the assumption of a shared understanding. It is a rhetorical device. It has been used to avoid censorship.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Descartes is a good example! He was keenly aware of what happened to Galileo and his work. He had to give the appearance of writing in support of the Church. When Descartes doubts everything this must include the teachings of the Church, but that is not something he could safely say. When he points to himself and reason as certain he points away from the authority of the Church.
Earlier than this is the example of Plato and Socrates. Although reason is a primary concern of the philosopher it is not the only concern. Plato found a way to write so as to avoid the fate of Socrates.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Given that there is wide ranging disagreement among competent scholars, I take a more modest view. Perhaps what you take to be clear and exact is only an appearance that hides the obscurity of his words.
But a thread on Wittgenstein is not the place to pursue these other matters.
You mean ... you can undestand its use, right? Which is OK. But it is far from usual, i.e. from what one can find in a standard dictionary and from what most people understand by it, isn't it? This was exactly was I was talking about! I add here something that I hope will make my point more clear: 1) People should be able to look up the words in dictionaries to know/undestand their meaning, 2) In a discussion one must use terms with their most common meaning or else use other words/terms in their place, which convey better what they actually mean and 3) one should not have to study the work of a philosopher to understand what he means by a term! I can't make my point more clear than that. I have already done a lot!
How so? You say:
Quoting Alkis Piskas
How could that be if a fact is not what is the case? For something to be the case we do not have to know that it is the case. We cannot, or more to the point, should not make factual claims about things we do not know, but the facts are what is the case whether we know them or not. We attempt to determine the facts of the matter.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
You made your point clearly, but if we are to understand a philosopher we must not make demands on them but rather understand what demands they makes on us. I think it important to write simply and clearly, but the great philosophers throughout history have been singular in their unwillingness to follow my advice.
I think we lost the ball ... So I'll bring it back. All started from the definition/use you gave of the term "fact" as "the existence of states of affairs". Then you said you don't find this unusual, and talked about "hermeneutics" etc. That is where the thing got off track and my reaction was the above statement: "it is far from usual". And I gave three (more) simple reasons why this is so. No "hermeneutics" and that kind of stuff, which make things go out of track ... Now, after all that, you still ask "How so?"! The only explanation I can give is that you are thinking --or trying to think-- in a complicated way, instead of thinking in simple terms and using simple, pure logic. And that is the only way in which any discussion can take place and have a meaning. Otherwise, the ball gets lost. Which is what happened here.
I don't take pleasure in this. I am out.
You have to keep your eye on the ball. I was trying to put the problem of interpreting Wittgenstein in the larger context of the problem of interpretation of philosophy. If we are to understand a philosopher we cannot simply look at standard dictionary definitions. We have to look at how they use terms.
You said:
Quoting Alkis Piskas
This is not what Wittgenstein means by 'fact'. Once you see how he uses the term it is no longer ambiguous. But Wittgenstein's use, although it does not fit the dictionary definition you provide, is not [edit; unusual]. What is known or proved to be true is what is the case. How could it not be?
Yes, by like technical definition. Fallacy is argument disrupting invalidity. Which is why it's the first thing we learn as philosophy students.
What's the first thing people learn as philosophy students?
I have never been one --not in a University-- and it is useful to know!
My bad, I meant among the first things. Typo. But, if I recall, the first thing I learned as a student was the history of the tradition. So, you kind of start with just a general back ground, then over view of thoughts and systems, then individual systems, then go into informal logic to learn how to cut through everyone's arguments. Which, I'm sure you've noticed here, are trash. But, you may be a bit more modest than I on that subject. You seem pretty good at calling nonsense.
I sure have! :smile:
Quoting Garrett Travers
I would say that I am "more strict" on that subject.
Quoting Garrett Travers
Thanks. But it's most probably because I am a little too strict! :smile:
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I thought ... I hoped you were going to mention things like clarity, precision, etc. in statements.
(It would help me in my next topic I plan to launch ...)
For this, do you mean clarity in logical propositions and arguments as standardized by academia, oe something else?
Exactly! And if they are not standardized, or one doesn't use terms in their standardised meaning, he should then clarify what he actually means by them. There are cases where key or important terms in a statement-argument have different meanings, or their meaning is debatable, etc. (A classic example is the term "reality".)
Yes, that's why you have to watch out for reduction fallacies, which delimit the meaning of a word in the argument. Ambiguity fallaicies, which employs a word in an unsual way that is used as an argument. Etymological fallacies, which rely solely on a words historical meaning, or etymological roots to make an argument. And Kant's a priori synthetic knowledge propositions, which are demonstrably ridiculous.
Plus, you have categorical propositions that are characterized by: all are, some are, all are not, some are not statements, respectively. These have usage rules.
Is this what you're highlighting, or am I rambling to you?
I'm not familiar with the term "reduction fallacies" so I skipped it! (Sorry. I do that sometimes! That's another thing one must not do in philosophical discussions! :grin:)
So, I just looked it up ... Reductio fallacy: "An informal fallacy of questionable cause that occurs when it is assumed that there is a single, simple cause of an outcome when in reality it may have been caused by a number of only jointly sufficient causes." ... Great! (I bring up this issue sometimes, but I dind't know there was a term for it.)
I will also look up the other kinds of fallacies. Thanks for bringing all this up! :up:
(I will make a long break now ...)