What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
From Wikipedia:
"Ordinary language philosophy is a philosophical methodology that sees traditional philosophical problems as rooted in misunderstandings philosophers develop by distorting or forgetting what words actually mean in everyday use. "Such 'philosophical' uses of language, on this view, create the very philosophical problems they are employed to solve." Ordinary language philosophy is a branch of linguistic philosophy closely related to logical positivism.
This approach typically involves eschewing philosophical "theories" in favor of close attention to the details of the use of everyday "ordinary" language."
"Ordinary language philosophy is a philosophical methodology that sees traditional philosophical problems as rooted in misunderstandings philosophers develop by distorting or forgetting what words actually mean in everyday use. "Such 'philosophical' uses of language, on this view, create the very philosophical problems they are employed to solve." Ordinary language philosophy is a branch of linguistic philosophy closely related to logical positivism.
This approach typically involves eschewing philosophical "theories" in favor of close attention to the details of the use of everyday "ordinary" language."
Comments (69)
Thats a pretty broad question but I right away thought if logical fallacies.
Fir example, the expression “comparing apples to oranges” is and everyday way of stating a “category error” logical fallacy.
I'm not really sure if I understand what is meant by "misunderstandings philosophers develop by distorting or forgetting what words actually mean in everyday use." Is this an example - Philosophers talk about free will, but on an everyday basis I am more likely to talk about whether a person should be held responsible for their actions?
Examples that come to my mind are many of the philosophical problems concerning “nothing” and/or “nothingness”:
If someone asks me if there's something in my room, and I reply: “there ain't nothing in my room”, in ordinary life the phrase has a perfectly clear meaning, and questions about “nothing” or “nothingness” never even arise.
But a logician or metaphysician could be quite puzzled by this, when analyzing the phrase he may think:
1.There ain't nothing in my room= There isn't nothing in my room= There is not(not something) in my room= It is not the case that there is (not something) in my room.
2. Either there is not something in my room, or there is something in my room.
3. Therefore, the phrase “There ain't nothing in my room” means “There is something in my room”, which is exactly the opposite of what I meant to say.
And so the metaphysician could ask: How can a phrase be understood as the exact opposite of what it actually means (according to its logical structure)? And he could then go on by saying that “nothing” is actually “something”, and develop a complex metaphysical system from that premise, or by looking for the “true/correct” analysis of the meaning of that sentence.
In ordinary language philosophy, like I said, questions like that don't even arise, they are “bewitchments by language”.
If we follow the late Wittgenstein's maxim that the meaning of a word (or of a sentence) is its use in a particular language game, then all that matters is that everybody understands what the phrase means in the context of ordinary life activities, and have no need of analyzing the logical structure of the phrase to do so.
It's not something that can be written on the back of an envelope. Here's Austinby way of a start.:
It's a mode of critique more than a set of solutions. It's basic tenet might be "cut the bullshit".
Today, I'd guess most philosophers would disagree.
One example that comes to mind is in the topic of "reference". There are all these paradoxes as to how can we talk about things that don't exist? Pegasus, Zeus, etc.
But if you think about a it a little, you soon figure out that referring is an act people do, it's not something that a word does. That can be an ordinary language philosophy solution to a problem. But there's bound to be disagreements.
Do you have any specific examples in mind?
Or the sustained critique of the Vienna Circle.
Or the rejection of referential theories of meaning.
"[A]t that time the orthodoxy best described as linguistic philosophy, inspired by Wittgenstein, was crystallizing and seemed to me totally and utterly misguided. Wittgenstein's basic idea was that there is no general solution to issues other than the custom of the community. Communities are ultimate. He didn't put it this way, but that was what it amounted to. And this doesn't make sense in a world in which communities are not stable and are not clearly isolated from each other. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein managed to sell this idea, and it was enthusiastically adopted as an unquestionable revelation. It is very hard nowadays for people to understand what the atmosphere was like then. This was the Revelation. It wasn't doubted. But it was quite obvious to me it was wrong. It was obvious to me the moment I came across it, although initially, if your entire environment, and all the bright people in it, hold something to be true, you assume you must be wrong, not understanding it properly, and they must be right. And so I explored it further and finally came to the conclusion that I did understand it right, and it was rubbish, which indeed it is."
—?Ernest Gellner, Interview with John Davis, 1991
Amen.
Or even this: - in which you seek to set out how we might best deal with the word "consciousness", not by making stuff up, but by looking at how it has actually been used. Not a bad example of the ordinary language approach.
Example 1:
Person 1: "I wonder how long the universe has been in existence."
Person 2: "Since time infinite."
Person 3 (supervisor): "Quit slaffin' off; get back to work, the two of you."
Example 2:
Person 1: "I love her so; I would give my life for her. Yet I don't know what love is."
Person 2: "I'd sleep out in the rain if that's what she wanted me to do. And yet I also don't know what love is."
Person 3 (wife): "Shut your clapper! Tell your buddy to take a hike, and then take the trash out already."
Responses to your OP seem to be talking about a bunch of different things. Some of these don't seem to have much to do with what I think of as ordinary language philosophy. You're the original poster, but you haven't posted since the OP. You have a responsibility to continue to contribute to the discussions you start. This thread needs some guidance.
Quoting Chaz
OLP is not a theory (argument) but a method, though it is working within the analytical tradition (calling it "linguistic" is to dismiss it as not also about our world). Some people say it is a diagnosis, but I resist the conclusive implication of calling it "therapeutic"--that it makes philosophy, or its problems, go away, or treats them as errors or a confusion. It does not pit "ordinary" language ("what words actually mean in everyday use") against philosophical language (though G.E. Moore appears to be a example of that). Moore did want to resolve our skepticism; Austin in a sense ignored it, focusing on the fallout: positivism's rejection of anything but true/false statements. Wittgenstein's later work started with a similar issue (his earlier self) as Austin, in trying to show that there is not one way of how things have meaning, but his "conclusion" is not that language creates skepticism (though its criteria is the means). What he found out, uncovered, learned about us--which is a better way of framing OLP's goal (not a "solution")--is our desire, our weaknesses, our blindness to ourselves (philosophy's and humanity's). That our desire for certainty is a reaction to the threat of skepticism, but that it is situational, possible to investigate, but not always (or forever) resolvable by our knowledge.
The method is not to attend to the "details" of language, but to see or imagine what matters to us when we say "...", for example, "I know..." (in every day situations and in philosophical ones). That this is philosophical data, much as Socrates' questions, that helps deepen and broaden our picture/understanding of our world, our philosophical problems, and our selves.
I did attempt an OP on it Ordinary Language Philosophy but I'm not sure I did a very good job of clearing up the mischaracterizations. Stanley Cavell is a good current example--try any essay in "Must We Mean What We Say".
An example from that OP:
The method is to ask or imagine (as Austin says): what do we ordinarily imply ("mean") when we say…, e.g., “I know”, "I think", "I forget", "I apologize", which also might involve fleshing out the context (situation) that would go along with that case. As an example, when we ordinarily say an action was done accidentally rather than mistakenly, we can imagine a case (a context): that “the gun went off in my hands and killed the donkey” (accidentally), as opposed to: “I did want to kill the cow, but hit the donkey instead” (mistakenly) (this is Austin's example). The example allows us to see what is usually skipped over unexamined: to describe what “actions” are and how they work, e.g., that “intention” does not come up in every circumstance (just when asked about a mistake) and how moral culpability works (Austin will talk of excuses—“The donkey just walked in the way!”).
This takes Wittgenstein as solving (or trying to solve) skepticism (or something else) with communal agreement--that "forms of life" are somehow foundational. This is a cliff-note misunderstanding; like that OLP champions "ordinary language"; which will solve philosophy, or make it irrelevant. I'm sorry, but this is just a jealous dismissal without any real understanding, which unfortunately happens more often than not really though.
Quoting Chaz
Oh please for all that is good in the world save me from philosophical summaries (even mine).
Philosophical summaries are useful for those who are only getting acquainted with a topic or subject. It's a good starting point, from which one can advance by learning the inherently distinguishable differences that the summary does not mention, and thus proceed to learn about the topic's more intricate details.
In summary, philosophical summaries are not not good as philosophical summaries, but they are good as starting points for the dilettante.
OLP is not about knowledge or being told anything; it's about texts, and going through a process; answering the questions, seeing for yourself.
I assume we're all familiar with the claim made that our senses are unreliable. This is one of the bases on which it's contended that what we perceive isn't what's really there. From it as well comes such wondrous philosophical concepts as sense qualia, or the external world, and more.
Why do we think our senses are unreliable? Well, a pencil when placed for God knows what reason in a glass of water appears crooked, or bent. But it isn't crooked! It isn't bent! See (or don't see)?
How about stars? We seem them as tiny, shiny dots in the sky. But they're not! They're huge, hot gassy things.
As Austin points out, a pencil in a glass of water doesn't seem crooked or bent. We know what something looks like when it's crooked or bent (like a branch or stick) in the ordinary world, and the words "crooked" or "bent" in ordinary language refer to that. The part of a pencil in the water seems located differently than the portion out of the water through refraction--almost separate from it--but doesn't seem bent or crooked.
By saying the pencil appears crooked we distinguish what we see from the reality. In reality, the pencil isn't crooked, but it seems that way to us; therefore, we don't perceive what is in fact. In fact, though, a pencil in a glass of water looks to us just as it should look. It looks like a pencil in a glass of water. We wouldn't expect it to look straight, i.e., like a pencil when not in a glass of water. Nobody, seeing a pencil in a glass of water, shouts out "My God, what happened to the pencil!"
By using ordinary words in an extraordinary manner, we create fictions, problems through extrapolation.
Thanks for providing an example of your point:
Quoting Antony Nickles
Yeah, right--the irony was not lost on me. Another specific example from Malcolm is coming up with circumstances when we would say: "I know" and then see and describe what those instances imply about our various criteria for that concept (realizing that a concept can have multiple options--"senses" Witt says--ways they make sense, ways they can be used in different contexts.
One sense of "I Know" is that I am certain: "I know when the sun will rise today"; the criteria for this might be that I can give evidence of that certainty, etc. This appears to be philosophy's one and only use and preoccupation. Second, we can say "I know New York", as in: I know my way around; I can show you; Third, I know (knew) that, as in to confirm or agree with what you said; and Fourth, I know, as in to sympathize with you. Cavell uses this last sense to shed light on our knowledge of another's pain--we don't "know it" in the first sense, we acknowledge it, recognize and accept (or ignore or reject) the claim their expression of pain makes on me.
Nothing has changed in this stand, as you haven't made an argument against mine yet. I don't know if you wish to continue; I'll be glad to drop the dialogue.
The whole point of OLP is to "analyze the logical structure" of our concepts. Not as a normative authority, or to "make everyone understand", or to come to (uncover) some agreement. It is to shed light on the problems of traditional philosophy, as our language (the criteria for it) reflects our interests, and judgments, and the ways things fall apart, etc. This can be a study, as Austin does, or when we do not know how to continue with a concept, as Wittgenstein examines.
Quoting Amalac
And, again, Wittgenstein examined lots of words (and the different but ordinary criteria there are for judging in which of their sense they have been used, in this context) in finding out there is no one way in which words are meaningful to us--that there is no maxim.
If it wasn't just advice, I would argue that philosophy is not about acquiring knowledge, that your thoughts in reading it are more important than what it is telling you. Thus starting with a summary reduces philosophy to a set of answers people judge and regurgitate or dismiss; it trivializes the point of going through the process of being changed by reading. Not just changing your mind, as in now you hold a different opinion, but changing the actual way in which you think, broadening your sense of the world, realizing a greater version of your self. Wittgenstein does not have a "theory of meaning" anyone (he) can tell you. Even the method of OLP can not be explained by its outcomes (as is being assumed here); there are no conclusions; no "maxim" or answer, e.g., when questions are framed without any sense of the picture itself. Most importantly, the postulations of what is implied when we say ___, are for you to see (come to) for yourself, or they have no force; they are not arguments, not true/false "theories" or statements--what is there to summarize?
Austin for sure. Then Wittgenstein started to look at how we bullshit ourselves, and what it is about us that we want to bullshit ourselves, drawn out by Cavell into an investigation of our shitty human condition.
You're right, but only in the cases where non-philosophers read. I am in the opinion that although everyone has philosophical thoughts and like to ponder questions, not everyone is a philosopher. Much like not everyone has a sense for physics, for horseback-riding, for parachuting, for etc. etc. It takes a philosopher to think like a philosopher. It can be taught to a non-philosopher how to think like a philosopher, much like creative writing can be taught and uneven parallel bars can be taught. But a natural-born philosopher with no prior reading experience in philosophy would benefit greatly from summaries.
After all: all philosophy textbooks are summaries, albeit a bit more detailed than Wiki.
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When the teacher appears, the student is ready. It does not matter what portal to knowledge one takes; as long as he or she goes through the portal. It could be via summaries, via detailed annotated and discussed readings of the Republic, via learning about the brief history of philosophy, the apt student's ability will make him or her learn quickly and effieciently, no matter what portals one takes to get into the subject matter.
One word of advice, which you can take or leave: If you speak in negatives, for instance how you speak of ordinary language philosophy, the negatives on one hand do not help the student's learning; on the other hand are irritating to the reader; and on the third hand contain no useful information. When you try to introduce new paradigms in knowledge to someone, the negatives are ballast. Speak only in positives, what it IS, not what it is NOT.
For instance:
"A car is a motorized vehicle for transporting two to six people and which runs on four wheels."
V.f.
"A car is not a toy. A car is not a newspaper article. A car is not my grandmother's nose. A car is not a toilet seat."
Critiques are solutions too. Inasmuch as solutions can be found. In the sense that 5 <> 6 is a solution much like 5=5 is a solution.
A solution can be expressed in two ways: Positively, "X is ____", or negatively, "X is not ____." A criticism expresses the solution in the latter way.
After all, solutions point to a set that satisfy the criteria in question. You can point at a solution within the set; and you can point out the solution by pointing at things NOT in the set and declaring they are not part of the set. The solution is delineated either way.
Most people like to think of this in terms that criticism leads to a solution, but it is not the solution itself.
I don't know Carnap, but Wittgenstein literally embodies (with the interlocutor) our tendency for something certain (like a Platonic form, or positivist logic), and Cavell explores what that means for us, our struggle to overcome the fear of our responsibility.
Quoting Manuel
Let's try this OLP style: "Referring"--as is promising, indicating, distinguishing--is a concept ("knowing" "intending", say, practices). I would offer that one ordinary criteria of referring is that it is something words can do, that you actually can do it (get the referring done) using only words, that the words are the doing of it--"I refer you to Exhibit A". With those words, the act of referring is accomplished. Well, yes, you said it, but you can (or not) acknowledge that saying: "I convince you" does not make one convinced (but we can talk about what/how words convinced us). And I even do something to you; I have referred you to something, as in: given notice. There is no now avoiding being referred, even if you don't, thereafter, actual refer to whatever someone has referred you to.
Quoting Manuel
My claim is that these are the workings, the criteria for identity, the terms of correctness, of referring; if you disagree (on the features), there may be examples or counter-examples, after which I might: see and grant that something is an important distinction, admit I was thinking of something else, point towards the concept in different contexts, etc.--but we have a process for coming to agreement, call it rational--even if only to learn how we/to disagree. Now can we learn anything from this, or from looking more into this, about the philosophical idea of reference?
Also, the desire to never have a disagreement, fueled by skepticism, creates the opposite of the kind of "ordinariness" that language has.
OLP does not point to a set that satisfies (and, again, notice the skeptical fear of inconclusiveness); it uncovers the criteria of how we even are satisfied (here), or not. And it is not a "solution", say, on the terms/grounds of mathematics. See The Mathematical and the Ordinary.
I wonder if you could provide a simple, tangible example. Not a complicated one at all. A simple one. How a OLP uncovers criteria that makes us satisfied (in what sense satisfied?).
Quoting Antony Nickles
I see, you did not take my advice on how NOT to explain things with negatives - how not to explain a thing by saying what it is not. You used two negatives with one blurred, muddled, ineffectual, vague positive claim. So... I don't know your point, until you state it in oridnary language. Simple, ordinary, common language. You seem to be the worse user and disciple of the very thing you advocate. You advocate ordinary langauge; and you use vague concpets expressed by negatives (in saying what it is not) when I have shown you that is not at all a good way of expressing your opinion.
Quoting Chaz
At best: sublime readability, and a mission to dig as deep as possible (though not deeper).
At worst: bluff, imperiousness, charlatanism, guruism, preistliness, laziness, sophistry, prejudice, mysticism, ism-ism, tribalism.
Only one, really, and it soon straightens out. Usually, the speaker equivocated between denying that the reference was (directly or indirectly) to words, pictures or other symbols,
Quoting Michael
... and admitting as much,
Quoting Michael
(6 years old, but recently exhibited.)
Frodo is a hobbit, "Frodo" is a word. Clearly there are two different referents.
Either words refer or they don't. You can use many types of examples or counterexamples in the traditional style, but the point can be made more concisely by now. I'm only saying that people refer, it's an act that people do. They can refer with words, as is often the case, or with gestures.
That may seem clear during the phase of the game where you are confident in asserting,
Quoting Michael
Later, perhaps trying to square this with the fact there are no hobbits, you must start to explore ways of restating things. Hence,
Quoting Michael
The existence of hobbits is traded for the existence of, and indirect reference to, certain varieties of words and pictures and other symbols.
The point I should be making is that if you can't say something coherent about simply 'words', then stop. The first quote describes words in a metaphor and demands a clean presentation. The second both negates it and muddies the water. The third explains why this is brilliant. It's authoritarian dismissal as the emperor's new wardrobe and served to maintain the religious madness we are still trying to cure. Did that make sense? Not asking for agreement; just is it a coherent claim about a thing?
I'm not sure we agree on what the grammar is for advice. When someone doesn't ask questions but just makes blind assertions, one answer is: well, no, not quite, more like....
Quoting god must be atheist
Well unless you have a counterclaim or a question, this is just rude; and just because you don't understand it, doesn't make it any on those things.
Quoting god must be atheist
This is the most common misconception--granted, thus, it is a dumb name--but the last thing OLP can do is "state" things "with" "simple" "common" language. It makes claims about the ordinary (non-metaphysical, let's say) criteria we have for different language in different situations, for the purpose of shedding light on philosophical problems. I do provide examples elsewhere in this thread.
You have created your own example of the extent OLP has practical application. Wittgenstein was surely a genius, but he ought written a book for the rest of us.
Popper solved all this mess with "“Always remember that it is impossible to speak in such a way that you cannot be misunderstood: there will always be some who misunderstand you.”
Look me in the eye and claim this isn't bullshitting. I don't mean can you rationalize it either. Rather, is there really information content that could be further examined? In a meaningful way; as it applies to any philosophical problem called X. X=?
I agree; OLP would be looking into what (ordinary criteria) makes it "referring" in different cases, maybe how it is differentiated from implying, in order to see how "referring" is held to different (metaphysical) criteria at times, such as:
Quoting Manuel
Austin and Wittgenstein's starting point is that, yes, words can refer, but they do not only refer. They marry us, make promises, lie. That not only are things not meaningful in one way, but everything has its own ways; each of: agreeing, condescending, threatening, pointing, playing chess. (Some of these are/can be done with words, some not, of course.) And that maybe there are reasons for this, for us wanting referring to work a particular way.
Quoting Michael
And how OLP might help here is with the criteria for referring as naming; and with how we use "existing" as, say: alive; or: among the records we have but not all that we might find; or: "real" as opposed to literary, but then what if we want to say hobbits have an actual impact on me, as much as people (who can come off as unreal)? or that some people are alive, but lack existence (their self does). I realize these are mostly questions, but part of the point is that you must answer these for yourself for them to be philosophically relevant (they are not statements), that you could continue to answer these types of questions to shed light on why we want a referent to be a certain type of thing.
Semantics smacks of only about words, or limited in importance to language. When OLP examines the criteria of what we say when, we learn about our lives.
Quoting Cheshire
He is alluding to the historical argument that corresponds words to "meanings" or "thoughts", as if these are facts or things--that they refer to/from them.
Quoting Cheshire
Austin is defensively dismissive of philosophy's profundity over our ordinary criteria. Wittgenstein does a better job of investigating what philosophy wants in supplanting our ordinary criteria, and what it says about the human condition.
Quoting Cheshire
The desire for "coherency" and the attitude that words are simple, are some of the reasons philosophy has theories of language (all of it), and meaning (in every case, for every thing). Your unwillingness to look further may hide the need for a certain answer.
It might be. We would have to be careful not to confuse use and mention in fleshing it out. But I get that you don't think you are headed in that direction.
But that leads you to insist on,
Quoting Michael
Well, in the idiom of Lord of the Rings talk, yes. "Frodo" is how one particular hobbit is called by his peers. Perhaps it is presumptuous to expect to avoid that idiom.
Quoting Michael
Do you mean, in a fictive piece of writing? But then we are back to referring (indirectly, not confusing use and mention) to hobbit-pictures and hobbit-descriptions. You were adamant that you didn't want to go there.
So perhaps you mean fictional, but a fictional world? In which case, why say writing? I think it's because that (words and pictures) is indeed where you are headed, as you quite rightly try to transcend the fictive idiom, and talk literal sense.
Quoting Cheshire
I edited that comment to say I provided Malcolm's example (about "I know") above, and Austin's as well. Cavell (in Must We Mean What We Say) draws out Austin's examination of "intention": his finding (claim) that one condition is that something has to be "phishy" compared to our ordinary criteria for an action in order for there to be (the possibility of) an intention (see the cows and donkeys above). Now if we have criteria for pulling off an action correctly (felicitously Austin will say), apart from true/false, then we have a rational way to discuss a moral situation (understanding excuses, judgment, etc.), and also a explanation of the "normative" nature of language/our actions--you may say anything you want; at a certain point you are no longer, say, apologizing, or, playing chess (Witt's example). That conversation is the one Socrates started, Kant tried to finish, Nietzsche pried open again; one which we want finished, and ahead of our actions, with certainty, etc. Philosophy itself is under investigation (again).
I guess I got sidetracked by the poor depiction of OLP that I didn't even answer the question (@chad @Manuel @god must be atheist @Amalac @Cheshire @Banno)
Stanley Cavell examines the Problem of the Other Minds in "Knowing and Acknowledging" and covers a lot of ground on skepticism in his work; Austin examines the standard of true/false statements in How to Do Things With Words; Wittgenstein examines why we want a referential picture of meaning and what that means about the limitations of knowledge, and then the ethical position we are in; Nietszche uses examples of the things we say and do to show that our moral realm is affected by our desires, and how history plays a part, as well as our part; Emerson and Thoreau are drawing out our ordinary criteria from so far inside that it almost doesn't seem like they are doing philosophy, or that it applies, say, to Descartes, when Emerson says "we dare not say, 'I think,' 'I am,' ". I would even argue that Socrates is doing OLP, but that he ignores all the criteria except the ones he has in his back pocket.
Yeah, that could be attempted trying to figure out what are the instances in which people use words to either refer or shout or anything else people do with words.
It just seems to me that finding conditions for these things to be very complex, involving many factors that often are taken for granted. Like paying chess, we use the word "queen" to designate a piece which can move freely on a board (this doesn't include throwing the queen at your opponents face) . Of course there need not be any physical queen (in terms of the plastic piece called a "queen") there, you could do it with a stone. Or with anything else, in fact you can use the chess piece which we call a "king" as a "queen".
You don't even need a chessboard to play chess, nor another player. You need to know the rules of chess, which are different from the rules of society. And so on. It can become extremely difficult to pin down all the conditions in which it is correct to say that we are using the words pertaining to a game of chess correctly, though we plainly do so.
Philosophers often think that they are arguing over the way things are. However, on closer inspection, they are often apparently not, but are rather simply using language in different ways, or recommending that language be used in a different way to describe the same sort of thing, or engaging in some kind of grammatical confusion, or something like that. OLP is a series of heuristics and observations about how and why this happens.
Its primary doctrine (if you want to call it that) is a kind of meta-semantic thesis about how words get their meaning: the meaning of a word is (or supervenes on, or essentially involves) the way a linguistic community uses it. To know what it is a philosopher is claiming, we have to look at the words they're using to make their claims, and what they could possibly mean by those words. Because philosophers often use words in non-standard ways, it is often not clear what they mean – and they often shift between standard implications of the uses of their words, and arguments that crucially invoke non-standard meanings to draw their conclusions. One can't have it both ways, and once one sees that this is what is happening, the point at issue is revealed not to be about 'the way things are' in the sense the philosopher might have thought.
To see how this works, it helps to remember Malcom's parable of the wolf and the fox. Suppose two philosophers are in a forest, and they come upon a clearing. Before them stands a furry, four-legged animal. Philosopher A says, 'It's a fox!' Philosopher B says, 'No, it's wolf!' Now, they disagree somehow. Confused, Philosopher A says, 'But what do you mean? It's the wrong shape to be a wolf – its tail is too large, and it's too small.' Are we, Philosopher A wonders, having a factual dispute about what sort of animal stands before us? That is, does Philosopher B see something different than A, or have some different opinion about what, given what they both see, the animal is like?
But no, Philosopher B responds, 'Oh, of course, I grant all that. Nonetheless, it is a wolf.' And now Philosopher A is confused again. If the two agree on the actual properties of this animal, why does Philosopher B insist on calling it a wolf, and not a fox? Are they perhaps using the words 'fox' and 'wolf' in different ways? Does Philosopher B speak English differently, or is Philosopher A confused about the criteria for what makes a fox or a wolf, according to the use of the words? He asks to clarify, but Philosopher B responds, 'Oh no, I quite agree that you are using the word 'fox' in the normal way. And I agree that according to the normal use of the English word 'fox,' the sort of animal we see before us is just the sort to which that word, ordinarily used, is correctly applied. Nonetheless, it is not a fox, but a wolf.'
Now Philosopher A is stumped. What can Philosopher B mean, that it is a wolf? There are a few things Philosopher B might legitimately do – (1) he might say that given what 'fox' means ordinarily, the animal before them is not of that sort, that is, a kind of factual claim, or (2) he might say that, given what sort of animal is before him, he disagrees that the word 'fox' is actually ordinarily applied to it, or ought to be applied to it, and one ought to use the word 'wolf' instead for that sort of creature. Or he might be doing some mix of the two, since in making claims we are always simultaneously coordinating on how things are, and what the appropriate use of the words used to describe them is.
But there is something Philosopher B apparently cannot do coherently – he cannot say simultaneously that the ordinary use of 'fox' is such-and-such, and that that animal is an appropriate target of the word according to that ordinary use, and that it is nonetheless not a fox, and that this claim is not a mere linguistic matter, but something substantive the philosopher has discovered. The claim sounds shocking and radical – that animal is a wolf, not a fox! Incredible! But on inspection, the philosopher is either confused, or is expressing nascently some desire to refer to what is normally called a fox using a different word, 'wolf' – for some reason. Hence the issue, if there is one, is linguistic.
Now, you might think – do philosophers really do this sort of thing? Isn't that silly? Who would even make such a claim? But the answer is yes, they do, all the time – in fact, this constitutes a large majority of what philosophers do. A philosopher often takes some situation, and against the way it would normally be described, claims that some other, seemingly surprising thing, is true of it instead. But when pressed, it seems they neither disagree about what is actually happening (the way things are), nor do they overtly claim to be making some sort of linguistic judgment or revision. So what are they doing? It is at this crucial juncture, so very common in philosopher, that the OLPer will say the philosopher is caught in some sort of 'confusion.' Untangling that confusion is unfortunately not a sure thing, since all such confusions are different, and there is no surefire way of figuring out how it arose or why, and no guarantee that the confused philosopher will understand how to untangle it.
A favorite example of the OLPers was the claim made by Russell that, properly speaking, we do not see any physical objects at all – we only see parts of our brains. Yet, according to the way the word 'see' is used, we typically never see our brains, but do see physical objects. So what can Russell mean? In reflecting on what he could mean by this, as an exercise, you might come to understand an example of what the OLPer is talking about.
I believe you are attempting to communicate with me and I value your input. I'm not sure how to best put my response in the form of a riddle. But, I will try.
The belief , I do have, (all the time) is that language intends some coding and decoding of information. The success of the sounds to carry information was successful prior to talking about it in a strange way. If we didn't know what we were saying(when you say it), then we couldn't talk about it; could we? I'm skeptical of claims that regard insight into meaning delivered in the most difficult to comprehend way. A superior understanding of a communication tool implies a higher versatility; and some how this thread defies a desire to be understood. Perhaps, an over investment in nonsense makes us hard to understand?
Russell is combining 'see' into a literal and non-literal sense to describe a concept.
OLP makes claims** about the implications of when, for example, we say, "I know your phone number". How it matters, what counts as an instance of it, in what ways it is meaningful to us. Here I am either confirming that you have given it to me, or I am making an assertion for which I can produce evidence to justify; i.e., that I can tell you what it is. But we also say, "I know" when someone makes a claim upon us, like, "I am in pain", which tells us about the problem of other minds, because we cannot confirm with knowledge that the other is in pain; so in this sense we acknowledge it, which also tells us something about our moral lives. **this is a type of claim I explain in an earlier discussion on OLP.
Quoting Cheshire
If you are looking at the criteria for when/why we say it, the implications of saying it, the responsibilities we are expected to answer for; you are arguing about what knowledge is.
Quoting Cheshire
I believe, I mean, I think, I understand, I see, I intended, I doubt...
OLP is not trying to come up with "all the conditions" or instances, but just to compare the ordinary criteria we use in saying something like "I believe it might rain" (a hypothesis), or "I really believe in the Dodgers this year" (feel strongly), compared to the goal of some philosophy to differentiate belief from truth, and comparing the difference in the criteria. And this isn't to say OLP is trying to find or impose the "correct" way, though Austin may feel stronger about that.
For me OLP is mostly a method used to try and dissolve some traditional philosophical questions. I think that this is useful in some instances. On the other hand, I'm not so confident any single major problem in philosophy has been solved by OLP.
I think that topics like "what it's like", "mind-body problem" and a few others can be, if not solved, then thought about properly using ordinary language. But these issues continue going.
And who belongs in OLP is also a bit messy. As you say, Austin, Strawson and other get grouped under this heading. At the same time, it seems to me as if some facets OLP are be closely related to logical positivism.
Carnap comes to mind as someone who tried to use ordinary language to solve "big problems". Also A.J. Ayer.
I'm going to tread lightly here, as all I am trying to point out is that modern OLP is relevant and important to the future of philosophy.
Quoting Snakes Alive
Let's take the example of the skeptic, who wants to say knowledge is essentially groundless. Now most people would put OLP in the camp that says, "No it is not!", only by means of showing that the skeptic is confused about what they are saying (or saying meaning is use). But Wittgenstein (and, after, Cavell) are able to show that there is a truth to skepticism, that knowledge is limited--we are separate (see The Claim of Reason). Now this is not "linguistic"; it is part of the human condition.
What if the "coding" "language" "intends" is something hidden, forgotten? That we need to reflect on when it is not successful?
Quoting Cheshire
People mostly don't know what they are saying when they say it. Only the "what you are saying" is not the "meaning" of the words, but their criteria for identity, the way they are judged, the responsibilities we are expected to uphold, etc.--what makes a mistake different than an accident.
Quoting Cheshire
Some things you can't tell people--or that they are so resistant to, they can only see for themselves. And you better skip Emerson, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, etc.
Quoting Cheshire
I think you mean a desire to understand; and that is not a desire to force something, constrain it, require of it a basic explanation.
Or get stuck on a raft with @Banno and mock each other while drifting, slowly, nowhere..
Again, it's not to get to a problem "thought about properly" (with exceptions). And it is not using a certain type of language, words, terms. It is an investigation into the ordinary criteria we have for language that informs us about the criteria we set for philosophy. And the reason these problems continue going is because, for example, one drive of the human is to not need the human--philosophy's problems shed light on the human condition. OLP is just a more productive way of doing that I've found.
Quoting Manuel
Because it is not a theory (not knowledge--an explanation) and does not have a common purpose, the method is used for a lot of things. But logical positivism is the exact nemesis of Wittgenstein's later work, and A.J. Ayer is the example Austin uses of a "descriptive fallacy".
Meanwhile this discussion lies ignored with no response. Either way, not winning.
I'm wary of claims like this, since there is no a priori reason to listen to philosophers about what is or isn't part of the human condition – often, their claims about such things are just empirically wrong on anthropological grounds, and what appears to them to be 'part of the human condition' is just presented to them that way because they've read certain things.
As to the issue of skepticism, philosophers have long recognized how its claims are bound up with uses of the word 'know,' and there have been suggestions that since these sorts of words are used differently in different places, there actually was no single coherent problem the skeptics were even addressing. I tend to agree.
Skepticism itself appears only at specific cultural moments that involve a disillusionment with certain forms of dogmatism, and then gets reified into an abstract problem of 'under what conditions does x know that p?' and so forth. One of the things I like about OLP is that it is able to treat problems as they arise in their native home. The bad flip side of this is that its refusal to create an abstract theory or set of procedures prevents it from being very effective in a lot of practical environments.
Folk 'round here seem to be able to go nowhere without my assistance, mocking or otherwise.
Yes. Philosophers often invent technical terms which differ substantially from ordinary language use that leads to mistakes. "Representation", "content", "event" and so on.
You're right that positivism is in many ways the opposite of OLP in so far as they used different Wittgensteins as a point of departure from which these philosophies developed.
The similarity I see is that both seek clarity of exposition in trying to deal with traditional problems, both focusing on language use as a way to proceed. I didn't mean to imply that OLP had a theory of knowledge. It's a method as you say.
Not that you say this at all, but it is a mistake to think that OLP (or language-use philosophy in general) originated in the 20th century in terms of having no precursors. Thomas Reid's work on the topic of language use is very interesting as he focuses on the way "the vulgar" (the common folk) use to talk about problems that philosophers get engrossed with. It's interesting and insightful to find aspects of OLP style thinking back then.
EDIT: To be fair, I should speak of language use philosophy as opposed to OLP as I don't adhere to it.
Well all they have are a clear and thorough descriptions and examples at hand, but if you feel that philosophy has nothing legitimate or worthwhile to say about doubt, fear of uncertainty, and the desire for control, than maybe you haven't been gripped by the necessity philosophy can instill, which differs from the solidity of the method of science.
Quoting Snakes Alive
I agree with the globalization of skeptical doubt, but Witt and Cavell uncover a informative reason the skeptic needs/wants that jump (I tried to get into this about Witt's Lion Quote in another discussion). I'm not sure OLP doesn't have a set of practical procedures--it is being used in aesthetics and literary theory and education.
This would be the point at #217 where we are no longer looking at interpreting a rule, but examining the act of obeying a rule; how we teach that and the implications when that falls apart. Cavell and Kripke are similar in believing things can still fall apart, but differ in how we keep it (put it back) together.
It's more that philosophers will read a series of books written in response to each other, and assume that what's talked about in those books must be universally meaningful or interesting, or get at what problems intrinsically confront human beings in some interesting way. The problem is that their scope is typically limited, and so they're typically wrong – usually because the only thing they've read is those books. Skepticism in the sense phils talk about it is just not something most people throughout history would have even understood.
Are you sure you're in the right forum...?
I might put it that, in making a claim about what the implications are of the expressions of our concepts (how we qualify knowledge, intention, meaning), we are saying something; something important to the problems of philosophy. Calling it "language" philosophy is to assume that there is (always) a space between our words and our lives.
No it isn't. Calling it language philosophy implies it has a corner it ought stay in which it resents. It's titled with terms Language Philosophy in the OP. I respect that others see value in it, but to me it is a self gratifying form of attention deficit disorder which frustrates more than it informs. I'll reserve judgement as to whether that's about words or lives. It must be entertaining in some way I haven't experienced.
This is reserving judgment? What you see as resentment is perhaps a projection of jealousy (enough to want to trivialize OLP as only about words). Not being interested does not make you right.