Antony Nickles

I might not be able to make this clear (thus pointing to the Wittgenstein) but I’ll try again; it’s not that a state is an object, but a “state” is th...

There seems to be two different topics mixed together. Being upset, however legitimate, about outlier moralism (“superiority”) and personal attacks (o...

Wittgenstein’s point is that there is a misconception of “states” as if they are objects (not of objects), like conceptualized in the same framework t...

I haven’t read the whole discussion (and this topic has been addressed at length elsewhere), but I thought I’d respond to your reservations. We just w...

From what I can tell, the Ten Coins situation does not have “features” at all, to even make explicit. This case doesn’t even have any criteria, or mec...

I haven’t read everything yet, but I think looking into this is essential, because a big part of what makes justification important to us, is its need...

@"Sam26" I did, perhaps unfairly, edit my last two comments after posting them. The problem I believe (looking for confirmation @"Jamal") is that foll...

Okay, bad example. I stand by the philosophical point about “seeming” and mimicry. If part of justification is ongoing, it is antithetical for there t...

But it is not a matter of “genuine” or “mimicked” justification, but strong or weak. We don’t need to look past the justification and imagine somethin...

I don’t have the familiarity with this way of problematizing justification, and I’m not sure I care to as I think you’re on the right track anyway. Th...

I do recognize we are surrounded by a great fabric without which nothing we do would be possible, but, outside of radical skepticism, I do not see any...

Of course there is formal logic, which has it uses, but I would think more important is the internal logic of a practice, some of which are particular...

This of course makes perfect sense within the framework of our present knowledge. So not sure this matters, but there is the case where a belief turns...

I’m not sure why “genuineness” comes into it. Why is that even introduced into the conversation? Maybe we are thinking of participating completely? “o...

When I think of a justified claim, I imagine judging the claim. When I think of a practice, I picture the person conducting the practice. Is this a se...

This having just read the first post. (I feel I should always say that all my statements of the way I take things to work are meant as provisional and...

Picturing sense data as objects is a different tangent, so I’ll leave that where it is, and delete this.

Retracting

This felt less like a discussion of the OP about multiple colors, so I’m pulling it.

@"Sam26" @"Banno" @"Ludwig V" @"Joshs" As I said , Prof. Hacker’s lecture stayed at the level of Witt as head-down here, just mapping out the facts of...

Hacker Lecture @"Sam26" @"Banno" @"Ludwig V" @"Joshs" I made 4-pages of scribbles during Professor Hacker’s recent lecture (mentioned above). I will t...

Actually, the book is out (at Albris here), so I think they are waiting, to put the video up, for the lecture to be given or published, as this was an...

@"Sam26" @"Banno" @"Ludwig V" @"Joshs" Well I hope someone else had a chance to catch Hacker's amazing lecture (130 people attended). He was very erud...

Summary/take-aways I don't know who all has an interest in this, but below is my recap of my notes on the Blue Book. I encourage those who followed al...

Section 20 - Finale! (p. 70-74) This mention of “opinion” brings us back to where “The solipsist… is not stating an opinion; and that's why he is so s...

Section 19 - special pain I take him to be saying that we could agree to symbolically hold an “exceptional place” (p.66) for the solipsist, but also t...

Section 18B - “use” (oh boy, here we go…) p.65 (I can’t face 66-69 yet.) One of the I think most misunderstood technical terms that Witt—ahem—uses. In...

Section 18 - the unidentifiable individual (p.61-65) At first, I take his “considering the criteria for the identity of a person” (p.61) as more about...

Section 17 - The solipsist’s reality (p.58-61) We may not get this “why” yet, but it is not an issue with language—not just notation. The method is to...

Section 16 - Physical vs logical impossibility (p. 56-57) As above, here (with color) we have a situation mistakenly analogized as a physical problem....

Section 15 - Why couldn’t I know your pain? (p. 53-55) Well my understanding is that an illocutionary act is a very specific thing, but it is used by ...

Section 14 - Variety of criteria and the place of pain (p. 49-52) The problem of (knowing) someone else’s “mind” is an age-old issue in philosophy. He...

Sec. 13 Personal experience and skepticism (p. 45-48] At a certain point in the next section (“It seems to us… p. 47 ), he lands on the question of wh...

Sec. 12 Expression and its accompaniments—memory, judgment, thinking (p. 40-43) And so we are adding layers back in, and I think we’re left to contemp...

Sec 11 Our words’ connection to the world (p. 35-39) Nice work; my thoughts are along the same lines. He is showing us examples of how we can correct ...

Sec 10 Intending and Meaning (pp. 32-34) “To intend a picture to be the portrait of so-and-so (on the part of the painter, e.g.) is neither a particul...

Sec 9 Non-existence and Statements without Facts (pp. 30-32) Thanks for cracking this, well done; I was at a loss (and maybe still am) as to why we im...

Sec 8 Purpose of Possibilities and Grammar (pp. 28-30) His hope in pointing out multiple variations of “know” or “longing” (p. 29) is that being aware...

Sec 7 Puzzling Rules (pp. 25-28) If philosophy’s puzzles “spring” from this desire for exactness, that makes its own expectation the creator of the is...

Sec 6 Coinciding Criteria (pp. 24-25) First, another note on his method. When he asks “what do we call ‘getting to know’” (p.24), by “call” he means w...

Section 5 (pp. 21-23) Russell and Undiscovered Feelings Maybe someone can help fill in the Russell here (mine is hearsay). The distinction I take as i...

Section 4C (pp. 18-20] Philosophical “Attitude” To step back just to page 18, he is I believe referring to Socrates when he asks why philosophy is “co...

Section 4B (pp.17-18) science vs. philosophy (generalizing) Obviously, over-generalization leads to logical errors, but what’s interesting is how he t...

Section 4A (pp.16-17) “language games” As he puts off until later in the book the actual discussion of whether a machine can think, I will defer until...

Section 3B (pp.14-15) Causes vs. Reasons Yes but aren’t justifications just one kind of (prepared) reasons, as are principals (beliefs for action), mi...

Section 3 (pp. 10-14) Acting without Rules As an aside, he finds another logical error, mixing contexts, or thinking we understand a word because we h...

Section 2B: 8-10 Analogy Some of these sections are a little bumpy so I don’t think we should feel compelled to go through all of it, but I do find th...

Section 2: 5-8 Two Mistakes Unraveling what is “different” here, one point is that, yes, there are things happening in the brain. And vision, hearing,...

Section 1B pp. 3-5: a “queer” mechanism of the mind At the bottom of page 3, Witt sketches a picture from what it “seems” like “we ought really to be ...

Section 1 pp. 1-3 Mental objects & Use Wittgenstein starts with claiming that we are incorrectly structuring ‘sense data’ (feelings, visions, thoughts...