Sorry, by sections we've been discussing I simply meant the paragraphs in §31, which gave rise to the above discussions about games and rules. As far ...
§32 is a short but illuminating subsection: §32 brings the discussion so far back to Augustine briefly, and is thus useful to measure the distance tra...
Mm, it is not the mere fact of 'having descriptions' that matters. That alone would pull the rug out from any causal theory before it even got off the...
I'm simply commenting on the phenomenon of 'what seems obvious' - not really anything to do with the book or its argument. Kripke does a better and mo...
I would hold off, for now, of getting too deep into a discussion of the nature of games and their relation to rules. There's alot of that to come, and...
It's interesting 'what seems obvious' to different people. I remember the first time I came across Kripke's thesis that names have literally nothing t...
There is no textual evidence to support arbitrarily cleaving the phrase in two. Speaking of 'stretchs of creative interpretation'. Nothing in the rest...
§31: §31 continues the theme, already developed previously, that an ostensive explanation requires knowing something about the kind of thing that is b...
This is all well and good, until, of course, one pays attention to the specificity of Wittgenstein's example, which for reminders' sake, runs like thi...
Yes, but that's not what's being discussed. It's not about the term 'number', but the term 'two', in the example discussed: §29: "Perhaps someone will...
In the context of the sections we're talking about, the point to be made is something like: in order to point out red, we need to understand that it i...
Just to circle back to this: What you call 'categories' here, and what Witty variously refers to as the 'place' that is 'prepared' for a word prior to...
A remark about the 'difficulty' of the PI: one should be careful about taking a priest's approach to the book, as if reading it requires some series o...
Neither. I interpret it as a cup of water, and everyone knows what that is. Most children understand this, long before they are introduced to either m...
I'd suggest that the first thing to understand is that senses work upon differences - gradations, distinctions, and invariants under movement - in an ...
One last way to put it: ostension is indexical - acquiring definite meaning from a particular space and time - and all indexicals by definition are ge...
I was using the word in the same manner as Witty speaks of places and kinds. Consider it a synonym, if you like. Your question is still confusing to m...
I quite obviously mean what Wittgenstein does when he speaks of types, places, and roles in language and the like. I thought that was quite clear give...
A role is always general. That's... just what it means to be or to 'occupy' a role. A name plays the role... of a name, with a distinctive grammar sha...
Yep. But the pointing out of a proper name is still to employ that proper name in a role: "that is X" grammar implied here]; I speak of and about a na...
The phrase "correctly identifying" has not so far been used by either me or the passages we're up to in the PI, so I'm not sure what you're responding...
Mary Tiles - The Philosophy of Set Theory: An Historical Introduction to Cantor's Paradise Albert Lautman - Mathematics, Ideas and the Physical Real G...
The differential nature of ostension leads to this question: §30: "One has already to know (or be able to do) something before one can ask what someth...
Both. Water is composed of molecules, each of which are molecules of water. This isn't so much a question of philosophy or chemistry than an ambiguity...
Ugh, the question of 'weather it is possible or not to learn language only through ostension' is a pseudo-debate and should be dropped as having to do...
Anyway, with respect to ostension, the remarks so far in the PI have had nothing to do with if "we can learn language solely through ostension" or not...
This is a dumb criticism. When I say "wow he looks like a leather handbag from all that sun", the metaphor - or simile, in this case - only extends to...
Some remarks on §1: (1) "In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated wit...
I don't think you'll get much out of this reading group by simply hewing to this position and then measuring everything in the PI against it. The poin...
But why thought? In saying 'Slab!', it is not 'thought' at stake but actions. I want that person over there to hand me that slab next to him. The soun...
I guess if I were to summarize the critique it is that Heidegger doesn't pay enough attention to the impossible: that every possibility is equally and...
If you're working off the PDF, I think that's an OCR error. It's just 'Slab!', with an exclamation mark in my copy of the book. With respect to §19 as...
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