Naming and Necessity, reading group?

It is available here:

https://academiaanalitica.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/kripke-saul-a-naming-and-necessity-cambridge-harvard-university-press-1981.pdf

I own it and haven’t started reading it yet ... but I wasn’t planning to for a month or two either.

I'll do it.

Quoting Snakes Alive

I'll do it.

Great to have you on board @Snakes Alive!

The Investigations thread is dying out as we speak, so I hope we can get this one started.

Interesting.

When this came out Kripke was the New Messiah.

Will you start at the beginning, or before that, at the preface?

Quoting Banno

Will you start at the beginning, or before that, at the preface?

I'm not certain. I feel as though elucidating Kant's ideas about categories and a priori and a posteriori needs some elucidating if someone is unfamiliar with those notions. There's also a lot of Wittgenstein in Kripke or known as Kripkenstein.

Do you care to lead this reading group? Pretty please?

Quoting Posty McPostface

There's also a lot of Wittgenstein in Kripke or known as Kripkenstein.

'Kripkenstein' is a reference to Kripke's particular take on Wittgenstein on interpreting a rule, which he (Kripke) expounded in his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. The topic is quite different from the topic of Naming and Necessity.

Quoting Pierre-Normand

'Kripkenstein' is a reference to Kripke's particular take on Wittgenstein on interpreting a rule, which he (Kripke) expounded in his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. The topic is quite different from the topic of Naming and Necessity.

Oh, sorry about that mistake. I stand corrected. Do you care to join us on this reading group Pierre?

Quoting Posty McPostface

(...) Do you care to join us on this reading group Pierre?

For sure. I may not be able to participate assiduously, but, if this gets going, I'll likely comment occasionally.

Quoting Pierre-Normand

For sure. I may not be able to participate assiduously, but, if this gets going, I'll likely comment occasionally.

Right on! Thanks for getting on board. I hope @Banno can assist us in the interpretive part of understanding the main gist of the book. Some narrative is always needed on these sort of things, IMO.

Quoting Posty McPostface

Do you care to lead this reading group? Pretty please?

My time here is too erratic... trying to spend it learning bass and reading actual books.

But I might start.

Skip the Preface - we can come back to it for clarification.

Proper names, then.

They are not definite descriptions.

Any questions?

Quoting Banno

Proper names, then.

They are not definite descriptions.

Any questions?

I will wait for other members to address this claim. But, can you explicate the rationale behind this conclusion?

A definite description picks out one and only one individual. Agreed?

And it can be successful even when it doesn't work - as the man with the champaign example shows.

And the thing a proper name or a definite description picks out is its referent.

Some curious stuff about unicorns that we can come back to.

Quoting Banno

A definite description picks out one and only one individual. Agreed?

Yes; though, when we talk about the qualitative aspect of things or facts, they can be different than the quantitative aspect of that thing or fact.

Quoting Banno

And it can be successful even when it doesn't work - as the man with the champaign example shows.

I'm not aware of this example. Can you please explain it to us folk?

Quoting Banno

And the thing a proper name or a definite description picks out is its referent.

A proper name ought to have a rigid designator. Definite descriptions not necessarily so.

Quoting Banno

Some curious stuff about unicorns that we can come back to.

Yes, what's your take on empty names like Harry Potter, Pegasus, or the definite description of the member of this forum who lives in Australia known as "Banno"?

Now, what is the relation between names and descriptions? There is a well known doctrine ofJohn Stuart Mill, in his book A System of Logic, that names have denotation but not con­notation. To use one of his examples, when we me the name 'Dartmouth' to describe a certain locality in England, it may be so called because it lies at the mouth of the Dart. But even, he says, had the Dart (that's a river) changed its course so that Dartmouth no longer lay at the mouth of the Dart, we could still with propriety call this place 'Dartmouth', even though the name may suggest that it lies at the mouth of the Dart. Changing Mill's terminology, perhaps we should say that a name such as 'Dartmouth' does have a 'connotation' to some people, namely, it does connote (not to me-I never thought of this) that any place called 'Dartmouth' lies at the mouth of the Dart. But then in some way it doesn't have a 'sense'. At least, it is not part of the meaning of the name 'Dartmouth' that the town so named lies at the mouth of the Dart. Someone who said that Dartmouth did not lie at the Dart's mouth would not contradict himself

(p.26)

After setting up the terms involved, Kripke continues to push a wedge between names and descriptions. The notion is that name work, even when they do not satisfy some definite description. Notice here that he is working from common natural language examples.

Quoting Posty McPostface

I'm not aware of this example.

So you may say, 'The man over there with the champagne in his glass is happy', though he actually only has water in his glass. Now, even though there is no champagne in his glass, and there may be another man in the room who does have champagne in his glass, the speaker intended to refer, or maybe, in some sense of 'refer', did refer, to the man he thought had the champagne in his glass.

p. 25

I will wait for other members to catch up or contribute. Thanks.

History. Both Frege and Russell, and as a consequence many others, took names to simply be shorthand for definite descriptions. But Kripke's interpretation of modal logic, possible world semantics, took it for granted that a name can refer to the very same individual in multiple possible worlds - rendering, for example, the possibility that I never posted on this forum as "in some possible world, Banno did not post on PF".

I hope we can get by without too much formal logic here; but possible world semantics will always be sitting there, watching.

Quoting Banno

I hope we can get by without too much formal logic here; but possible world semantics will always be sitting there, watching.

I wouldn't mind at least mentioning it. I like the juicy parts of a thorough analysis.

SO by p.28 we have two competing theories of the relation between a name and a corresponding definite description. The first is that the name has both connotation and denotation, and hence the name may successfully refer, that is have a denotation, despite the connotation not being a suitable definite description.

The second theory is that the description is what links the name to its referent; a proper name without a corresponding definite description fails to refer. Until the appearance of N&N, this was the preferred view.

The elephant in the corner is that proper names can refer even if the corresponding definite description fails.

Examples to be considered...

First, the afore mentioned man who does not have a glass of champaign.

Second, Dartmouth, which one succeeds in referring to even should it not stand at the mouth of the Dart.

Third, The United Nations and the Holy Roman Empire.

Fourth, an example from Twain.

Fifth, Hesperus and phosphorus. We will probably revisit Venus.

Sixth, existential Aristotle,

Reply to Banno

So, how does a name attain meaning? Through baptism?

How does baptism occur for names and their referring rigid designators?

Some of my own writing on Family Resemblance:

Prior to Philosophical Investigations the ideal way to give the meaning of something had been thought to be by specifying both genus and differentia. So a 'triangle' is defined as 'a plane figure (genus) bounded by three straight sides (differentia)'. Logically, this sort of definition can be seen as a series of conjunctions; A triangle is a plane figure and has three sides. More generally, "P" might be defined using a simple conjunction of "A" and "B":

P =def A AND B
By examining closely the use of terms such as 'game', 'number' and 'family', Wittgenstein showed that for a large number of terms such a definition is not possible. Rather, in some cases a definition needs to be a disjunction of conjuncts,

P =def (A AND B) OR (C AND D)
but furthermore the way we use such terms means that we can both extend and detract from the series by adding or removing some of the conjunctions.

P =def (A AND B) OR (C AND D) OR...
Nor should we conclude that because we cannot give a definition of "game" or "number" that we do not know what they are: "But this is not ignorance. We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn".[5]

For a while I had much sympathy for Searle's approach (p.31), defending it using baptism; not too far from causal links, but inadequate.

Reply to Banno

I feel as though we should pause and go through the process of how names attaining their meaning through baptism, which is further instantiated through causal links. Care to explain and where should we be looking at in the text?

Thank you.

Modality of meanings deserves a mention too.

Reply to Posty McPostface Go on then.

Reply to Banno

I'm still playing catch up. But, if you want to hear my dribble then a name attains meaning when it has a rigid designator that instantiates a concepts or a web of beliefs about it or otherwise known as definite descriptions in the world. My only concern is how do definite descriptions obtain wrt. to rigid designators.

Again, modality is eluding me here.

For example, what are causal links according to Kripke and how do they obtain in the world or possible world's?

Reply to Posty McPostface Let's take it slowly.

Quoting Posty McPostface

a name attains meaning when it has a rigid designator that instantiates a concepts or a web of beliefs about it

My bolding.

Consider pp. 31-33, where Kripke points to a difference between a name having a meaning, and a name singling out its referent. "Moses does not exist". If the sentence is true, and Moses does not exist, then "Moses" means, say "the man who led the Israelites out of Egypt"; and refers to nothing, since there is no such man.

So there seems to be a difference between the meaning of a name and what it refers to.

That is, the meaning of a name is not its referent.

So Kripke says the following on page 33:

Quoting Saul Kripke

For example, if someone said 'Aristotle does not exist' means 'there is no man doing such and such', or in the example from Wittgenstein, 'Moses does not exist', means 'no man did such and such', that might depend (and in fact, I think, does depend) on taking the theory in question as a theory of the meaning of the name 'Moses', not just as a theory of its reference. Well, I don't know. Perhaps all that is immediate now is the other way around : if 'Moses' means the same as 'the man who did such and such' then to say that Moses did not exist is to say that the man who did such and such did not exist, that is, that no one person did such and such. If, on the other hand, 'Moses' is not synonymous with any description, then even if its reference is in some sense determined by a description, statements containing the name cannot in general be analyzed by replacing the name by a description, though they may be materially equivalent to statements containing a description. So the analysis of singular existence statements mentioned above will have to be given up, unless it is established by some special argument, independent of a general theory of the meaning of names; and the same applies to identity statements. In any case, I think it's false that 'Moses exists' means that at all.

What does he mean by saying that a description need (not) to refer to an object for that object to have meaning in the first place? Am I sounding confused here?

Quoting Posty McPostface

a description need (not) to refer to an object for that object to have meaning in the first place?

Objects have meaning?

Quoting Banno

Objects have meaning?

Not in isolation. This goes back to the Tractatus; but, objects have meaning in relation to other objects, which are states of affairs, deriving from atomic facts.

Quoting Banno

A definite description picks out one and only one individual. Agreed?

Sometimes. Definite descriptions also have covarying readings with no single referent:

"Every author who writes a story shows the story to an editor."

Here "the story" does not refer to a single story.

Some definite descriptions do not even refer to any existing individual:

"If I had written a story, I would have shown the story to an editor."

Quoting Posty McPostface

I'm still playing catch up. But, if you want to hear my dribble then a name attains meaning when it has a rigid designator that instantiates a concepts or a web of beliefs about it or otherwise known as definite descriptions in the world. My only concern is how do definite descriptions obtain wrt. to rigid designators.

A terminological thing here: a name doesn't have a rigid designator according to Kripke, it is a rigid designator. A rigid designator is a kind of term or word. A name has a referent.

Quoting Banno

My bolding.

Consider pp. 31-33, where Kripke points to a difference between a name having a meaning, and a name singling out its referent. "Moses does not exist". If the sentence is true, and Moses does not exist, then "Moses" means, say "the man who led the Israelites out of Egypt"; and refers to nothing, since there is no such man.

So there seems to be a difference between the meaning of a name and what it refers to.

I don't think there's any reason to think the name refers to nothing if there is no such man. That is, Moses need not exist for us to refer to him – we refer to all sorts of things that don't exist. Prima facie the opposite opinion isn't plausible, so I wouldn't adopt it without some good ulterior reason. And so I think this problem, or distinction, or whatever, doesn't get very far.

Quoting Snakes Alive

A terminological thing here: a name doesn't have a rigid designator according to Kripke, it is a rigid designator. A rigid designator is a kind of term or word. A name has a referent.

I will let Banno clarify my confusion. I've always held that objects are rigid designators to the act of baptism of a name.

I digress and hope you guys can flesh this beast out.

Quoting Posty McPostface

I will let Banno clarify my confusion. I've always held that objects are rigid designators to the act of baptism of a name.

Nope. "Rigid designator" applies to terms, or words. The definition is on p. 48. You can say that a name rigidly designates an object.

Reply to Snakes Alive Yep. Names are rigid designators. It makes no sense to say names 'have' rigid designators.

Reply to Snakes Alive

Okay, then I had it backwards then. Thanks.

Quoting Snakes Alive

You can say that a name rigidly designates an object.

But not the other way around, yes?

Reply to Snakes Alive Sure. Do you want me to say proper definite description, just to be clear?

I think I will just continue to take it as read.

Reply to Posty McPostface
Let's clarify the difference between a rigid designator and a definite description.

A definite description is (supposedly) a predication that picks out an individual by what it true of them. "The first man to walk on the moon" picks out Armstrong.

A rigid designator (supposedly) picks out the very same individual regardless of what is true of them. "Neil Armstrong might not have been the first man to walk on the moon."

The taste of N&N so far (we are up to about p30?) is that there are issues here that might be philosophically interesting.

SO if "Neil Armstrong" means "The man who first walked on the moon", and yet it is true that some other person, not Armstrong, might have accomplished that task in his stead, then...

Are we to conclude that the man who was first to walk on the moon, might not have been the first to walk on the moon? Or does this give some undue importance to the actual world? So the statement "Armstrong might not have been the first man to walk on the moon" really means that the man who, in the actual world, was first to walk on the moon, might not, in some other world, have been first to walk on the moon...

Quoting Posty McPostface

a name attains meaning when it has a rigid designator that instantiates a concepts or a web of beliefs about it or otherwise known as definite descriptions in the world.

Not a bad first guess.

Perhaps a name attains a meaning when it has associated with it a definite description, such that only the individual concerned instantiates the concepts or web of beliefs set out by that description.

This view could be contrasted with the view that a proper name rigidly designates the same individual regardless of what concepts or web of beliefs are true of it.

Reply to Banno I'm not sure in what sense the examples I gave are 'improper.' I'd rather say that a definite description has a certain semantic function, which in some environments yields a single referent, and in others doesn't. A name, perhaps, yields a single referent in a wider variety of contexts, though names also don't always behave this way either.

Quoting Posty McPostface

But not the other way around, yes?

Right, an object (that isn't a word) doesn't designate anything, in Kripke's terminology.

Quoting Banno

SO if "Neil Armstrong" means "The man who first walked on the moon", and yet it is true that some other person, not Armstrong, might have accomplished that task in his stead, then...

Are we to conclude that the man who was first to walk on the moon, might not have been the first to walk on the moon? Or does this give some undue importance to the actual world? So the statement "Armstrong might not have been the first man to walk on the moon" really means that the man who, in the actual world, was first to walk on the moon, might not, in some other world, have been first to walk on the moon...

The significance of the claim, as I read it, is that the sentence 'Neil Armstrong might not have been the first man to walk on the moon' is true, and has no intuitively false reading. But if Neil Armstrong has the same semantic value as 'the first man to walk on the moon,' then there should be a false reading of that sentence (though there may be a true one as well, which you highlight here). In other words, the definite description account overgenerates readings here, and there is no way to read the sentence as necessarily false. This is evidence that the name refers to that man, and not to whoever was the first to do what he did.

Quoting Banno

A definite description is (supposedly) a predication that picks out an individual by what it true of them. "The first man to walk on the moon" picks out Armstrong.

A rigid designator (supposedly) picks out the very same individual regardless of what is true of them. "Neil Armstrong might not have been the first man to walk on the moon."

A couple things here:

-Definite descriptions and rigid designators aren't mutually exclusive. Most definite descriptions aren't rigid designators, but some, perhaps, are (I think Kripke's example is 'the even prime,' which rigidly designates 2).

-"The first man to walk on the moon" picks out not Armstrong, but whoever happens to have been the first man to walk on the moon. In actuality that happens to be Armstrong, so in the modal logic, relative to the actual world, it picks out Armstrong. "Armstrong," we might say, then just picks out Armstrong simpliciter, and its semantics has nothing to do with walking on the moon.

I really don't think these things can be elucidated without understanding the modal logic, so maybe we differ here. I'm almost inclined to think that reading NN is pointless without a first course in modal logic.

Reply to Snakes Alive There's a need for something like a suspension of critique t to get at what is being said in a philosophical work.

And the next step - or few steps - in N&N is to seperate the a priori from the necessary.

Kripke points out that the traditional view, that a priori stuff is what is known without experience, is at the least debatable. His examples (p. 35) is a computer calculating that a certain number is a prime. We know this, not because of our own a priori calculations or what have you, but because we know and trust the computer, a result of our empirical understanding of how it works.

Goldbach's conjecture is that every integer greater than 2 is the sum of two prime numbers. It is (presumably) either true, and necessarily true, or it is false, and necessarily false.

But we don't know which.

We know, a posteriori, that it is true up to 400,000,000,000,000,000 or thereabouts, as a result of some clever computing.

Kripke pushes the wedge between being necessary and being a priori ever deeper.

Kripke is setting up the pieces for the forthcoming game. He intends to use the terms sorted here in particular ways. He is taking the formality of his previous work and setting out its implications. Doing so involves setting out ways of using these words.

Now if you want to object to this configuration, that’s fine. Me, I’m happy to go along with him just to see how it works out. And I think that the result is a reasonably coherent, consistent way of talking about names and nesecity.

Looks like this is turning out to be a dialogue between us two @Banno. Hundrum, meh.

Reply to Posty McPostface Perhaps it is a bit tedious, but to steal from Wittgenstein, all we have done so far is to put the pieces on the board; the game hasn't quite started yet.

Quoting Banno

Perhaps it is a bit tedious, but to steal from Wittgenstein, all we have done so far is to put the pieces on the board; the game hasn't quite started yet.

Then please continue. I'm on page 34, reading about the a priori and necessary.

Reply to Posty McPostface SO the point here is that what is a priori are things we know; it's an epistemological notion.

But that necessity is a metaphysical notion - it's necessary if and only if it is true in all possible worlds.

SO there is no simple relation between the two.

Quoting Banno

SO the point here is that what is a priori are things we know; it's an epistemological notion.

But that necessity is a metaphysical notion - it's necessary if and only if it is true in all possible worlds.

SO there is no simple relation between the two.

Understood. So, how does baptism occur? What are causal links? Ontologically speaking.

@Banno.

Kripke talks about "criteria of identity". Can you elaborate on this?

Kripke pg. 42:The question of essential properties so-called is supposed to be equivalent (and it is equivalent) to the question of 'identity across possible worlds'. Suppose we have someone, Nixon, and there's another possible world where there is no one with all the properties Nixon has ill the actual world. Which one of these other people, if any, is Nixon? Surely you must give some criterion of identity here! If you have a criterion of identity, then you just look in the other possible worlds at the man who is Nixon; and the question whether, in that other possible world, Nixon has certain properties, is well defined. It is also supposed to be well defined, in terms of such notions, whether it's true in all possible worlds, or there are some possible worlds in which Nixon didn't win the election. But, it's said, the problems of giving such criteria of identity are very difficult.

Reply to Posty McPostface Well, what sort of thing is an essential property?

If one supposes that there are essential properties, and that these are what distinguish one individual from another, then to identify Posty McPostface in some other possible world, all one has to do is to find the individual with the essential properties of Posty McPostface in that world. Or something like that.

So these properties would be the criteria by which we recognise their Posty as the very same as our Posty.

But this is a wrong way to think about possible worlds.

I think of possible worlds as being stipulated: that is, we set them up as we want them to be. hence,

A possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we associate with it.

Quoting Banno

I think of possible worlds as being stipulated: that is, we set them up as we want them to be. hence,

A possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we associate with it.

Can you clarify your terms by which you mean "stipulative"?

Reply to Posty McPostface Just that the possible world is built by our stipulation. Suppose that Moses did not lead the Israelites out of Egypt... The very act of making the supposition brings that possibility into the discussion.

...as opposed to the idea that we see possible worlds at a distance - through a lens, darkly. See p.44

This is perhaps best seen as a grammatical point. It is a rejection of an argument that might go as follows:

We cannot suppose that Moses could not have led the Israelites out of Egypt. For "Moses" refers to the man who led the Israelites out of Egypt. And if in some possible world the Israelites were not led out of Egypt by some man, then in that world there is no Moses. Further, it is not possible that someone else, who was not Moses, led the Israelites out of Egypt. In whatever possible world you pick, whomever leads the Exodus is Moses.

Again, I see Kripke here as setting up a decent modal grammar for English, by interpreting his more formal modal logic in English.

Quoting Banno

Again, I see Kripke here as setting up a decent modal grammar for English, by interpreting his more formal modal logic in English.

Please elaborate on that. I'm stumped by "trans-world identification" as I'm on page 44.

Quoting Posty McPostface

I'm stumped by "trans-world identification"

That's what Kripke avoids; one is not obliged to observe some possible world and identify an individual (a "counterpart") with some arbitrary degree of similarity to Moses and then posit that the person so identified is the very same as the actual Moses. One just stipulates the identity: suppose Moses only had one hand. Suppose Moses had an innate fear of water. Suppose Moses could not speak Egyptian.

Keep it simple.

Reply to Banno

Go on...

Interesting take that Kripke has...

By virtue of talking about Moses in another possible world, all we've done is posit the exact same thing(Moses) into another set of circumstances(those of our own imagining). If it is - in part at least - the circumstances themselves that definitively determine what counts as Moses, then we've just committed an error in thought/belief by stipulating different circumstances to the 'same' thing. Different circumstances will produce different things when circumstances themselves are part of what definitively establishes identity.

That is the case with Moses.

Kripke showed the incoherency/self-contradiction that results from attempting to use particulars as a criterion for identity across possible worlds by showing that if we attribute different circumstances(possible worlds) to the same thing, we end up saying some thing both... was and was not... the thing that 'X'.

He wants to say that we only need the name to maintain identity across possible worlds, and that there is no problem with trivially stipulating different properties to that object. There is no problem with saying that Nixon may not have been president in 1970, and so it is intuitively clear that being president in 1970 is not necessary and/or essential to being Nixon. Being president in 1970 is not an essential property of Nixon.

When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed. A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid.

One of the intuitive theses I will maintain in these talks is that names are rigid designators. Certainly they seem to satisfy the intuitive test mentioned above: although someone other than the u.s. President in 1970 might have been the U.S. President in 1970 (e.g., Humphrey might have), no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon. In the same way, a designator rigidly designates a certain object if it designates that object wherever the object exists; if, in addition, the object is a necessary existent, the designator can be called strongly rigid. For example, 'the President of the U.S. in 1970' designates a certain man, Nixon; but someone else (e.g., Humphrey) might have been the President in 1970, and Nixon might not have; so this designator is not rigid.

In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not have been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been Nixon (though he might not have been called 'Nixon'). Those who have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identi­fications' are unproblematic in such cases.

So, here Kripke clearly argues against the idea that all circumstances(properties) definitively establish identity(are essential). He does however, allow room for such essential properties by stipulating that essential properties are true of that object in any case where it would have existed.

So while being president of the U.S. in 1970 designates Nixon, it is a nonrigid or accidental designator.

Reply to creativesoul so what do you make of this, @Posty McPostface?

Reply to Banno

Postys on downtime. I hope others can contribute.

Reply to Banno

Honestly Banno, I am struggling to set aside my own position. It must be done in order to grasp what Kripke is getting at. One must also have a good grasp of all the notions(possible worlds semantics, a priori/a posteriori, and types of truth) that he is working with besides setting out his own theory of identity.

So: the question of transworld identification makes some sense, in terms of asking about the identity of an object via questions about its component parts. But these parts are not qualities, and it is not an object resembling the given one which is in question. Theorists have often said that we identify objects across possible worlds as objects resembling the given one in the most important respects. On the contrary, Nixon, had he decided to act otherwise, might have avoided politics like the plague, though privately harboring radical opinions. Most important, even when we can replace questions about an object by questions about its parts, we need not do so. We can refer to the object and ask what might have happened to it. So, we do not begin with worlds (which are supposed somehow to be real, and whose qualities, but not whose objects, are per­ceptible to us), and then ask about criteria of transworld identification; on the contrary, we begin with the objects, which we have, and can identify, in the actual world. We can then ask whether certain things might have been true of the objects.

This piques my interest. I agree to some extent. However, this assessment is already theory laden with notions that I reject for various reasons. Kripke is rejecting them as well as some of the conventional 'takes' based upon them, but he's also accepting them, in some strong sense, as useful(intuitive).

His distinctions, I think, are key to understanding his lectures on Necessity and Naming.

Reply to Banno

Quoting creativesoul

So while being president of the U.S. in 1970 designates Nixon, it is a nonrigid or accidental designator.

I'm not quite sure. It seems to me that the rigid designator isn't the state of affairs here because those can be contingent. The rigid designator is who and not; what, when, where, how.

As to what instantiates a who in a state of affairs is another question worth exploring in my opinion, @Banno.

I think this goes back to your reply to my question about the "criteria of/for identity".

I'm currently on page 60 of the book.

Quoting creativesoul

So while being president of the U.S. in 1970 designates Nixon, it is a nonrigid or accidental designator.

You can, with the actual indexical, produce an necessary, a posterior identity statement, like:

"The actual 1970 US president was Nixon."

Don't worry that there are possible worlds in which that statement, if spoken in that world, would be false. It's still true with respect to that possible world.

Right, Banno?

I think the answer to the question creativesoul brought up inadvertently can be found in this passage:

Kripke pg. 60:I hope the idea of fixing the reference as opposed to actually defining one term as meaning the other is somewhat clear. There is really not enough time to go into everything in great detail. I think, even in cases where the notion of rigidity versus accidentality of designation cannot be used to make out the difference in question, some things called definitions really intend to fix a reference rather than to give the meaning of a phrase, to give a synonym. Let me give an example. 7t' is supposed to be the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter. Now, it's something that I have nothing but a vague intuitive feeling to argue for: It seems to me that here this Greek letter is not being used as short for the phrase 'the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter' nor is it even used as short for a cluster of alternative definitions of 7t', whatever that might mean. It is used as a name for a real number, which in this case is necessarily the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter. Note that here both ' 7t" and 'the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter' are rigid designators, so the arguments given in the metric case are inapplicable. (Well, if someone doesn't see this, or thinks it's wrong, it doesn't matter.)

Quoting Wallows

So while being president of the U.S. in 1970 designates Nixon, it is a nonrigid or accidental designator.
— creativesoul

I'm not quite sure. It seems to me that the rigid designator isn't the state of affairs here because those can be contingent...

I agree that the rigid designator in this example is Nixon. I didn't mean to imply otherwise.

Designators can be contingent. Kripke makes a point to distinguish between rigid designators and accidental/nonrigid ones. As you say, because possible world semantics allow us to change the circumstances(Kripke calls these 'properties') and retain the identity of Nixon(the object of thought).

Quoting Wallows

I think this goes back to your reply to my question about the "criteria of/for identity".

I'm currently on page 60 of the book.

I suggest that you back up and re-read the bit about the meaning of a name and the meaning of a reference(pg. 32, 33, 34). Kripke draws a distinction between the two. Theory laden... sigh. For me, understanding this takes setting aside pre-existing certainty about some things. the more I re-read, the clearer it seems.

Kripke is not offering a theory of the meaning of a name. He is arguing for a theory of reference. The two are not the same by any stretch.

"Nixon", as a referent, is adequate and necessary to identify and refer to this man. That holds good in all possible worlds. That is a theory of referent(what counts as such).

"Nixon", as a name, identifies this man and everything that makes this man who he is(surely some circumstances are irrevocable - say if this man has one hand as a result of warfare). That is a theory of the meaning of a name, and as such it does not hold good in all possible worlds. To quite the contrary, it is to change the circumstances while retaining the identity of an object of thought that makes possible world semantics what they are.

Quoting frank

So while being president of the U.S. in 1970 designates Nixon, it is a nonrigid or accidental designator.
— creativesoul

You can, with the actual indexical, produce an necessary, a posterior identity statement, like:

"The actual 1970 US president was Nixon."

Don't worry that there are possible worlds in which that statement, if spoken in that world, would be false. It's still true with respect to that possible world.

Right, Banno?

Yeah, I dunno about this take...

Seems to me that the very use of "actual" eliminates coherent use of possible world semantics.

Kripke, it seems to me, strongly believes that possible world semantics are intuitively useful. His strong assertion...

When you ask whether it is necessary or contingent that Nixon won the election, you are asking the intuitive question whether in some counterfactual situation, this man would in fact have lost the election. If someone thinks that the notion of a necessary or contingent property (forget whether there are any nontrivial necessary properties [and consider] just the meaningfulness of the notion) is a philosopher's notion with no intuitive content, he is wrong.

I do find it interesting that he allows for 'essential properties' in several ways but asks to set them aside...

So this notion Kripke invokes on page48...

When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed. A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid.

...is quite intriguing by my lights. It not only allows the discussion of basic, foundational, and/or otherwise irrevocably important necessary elemental constituents, but he goes even farther and offers a special status for them(what counts as a strongly rigid designator)!

A rigid designator of an essential property can be called strongly rigid.

Perhaps it may be worth mentioning and/or asking ourselves the following...

Aren't we talking about the object of our thought when we're identifying and subsequently providing so-called "counterfactual" possible worlds scenarios in light of it? Aren't we then saying that after we identify this thing(this object of thought), whatever else we may say about it, if it is to qualify as being rigid, can only be strongly rigid.

Rigid designator. Strongly rigid designator. Accidental/nonrigid designator.

Circumstances(states of affairs that can be stipulated without changing the identity) can only be accidental/non-rigid designators.

Elemental constituents then - as a result of being necessary for the very existence of the thing being identified - remain intact across all possible worlds scenarios for a different reason than a name does.

If it is the case that all A's consist of B's, then there is no possible world scenario that can be coherently posited about A's without B's, for that would be to talk about something other than this A.

There are no apple pies in any meaningful possible world if there are no apples in that possible world. There are no apple pies without apples... not counterfactually, not sensibly, not intuitively...

"Apple" is a strongly rigid designator.

Reply to Banno

Where yat Banno?

:cool:

Reply to frank Yep.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/230677

Reply to creativesoul Sittin' here puzzlin' over how you managed to get things so wrong, again.

Let's call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the same object,

p.48.

One of the intuitive theses I will maintain in these talks is that names are rigid designators.

p.48

The apparatus of possible words has (I hope) been very useful as far as the set-theoretic model-theory of quantified modal logic is concerned, but has encouraged philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures.

p.48(n.)

And,

Those who have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identi­fications' are unproblematic in such cases.

p.49.

Quoting Banno

There's a need for something like a suspension of critique to get at what is being said in a philosophical work.

Yup.

Not that I have a dog in this race. But that's pretty much how I read philosophy in my first brush -- and how I read Kant the some-odd 7 years ago I started that reading group up.

Guess I'm just giving a thumbs up to this interpretive technique more than anything -- since it seems to be something that folks don't pick up on.

Reply to Banno

What have I written here that is incommensurate with anything you've quoted?

:brow:

Reply to Moliere Cheers.

I read Kripke as setting up a grammar that allows coherent discourse on modal issues. Hence it is especially important to recognise the way he seperate names from descriptions, necessity from the a priory and the analytic, and so on.

Reply to creativesoul

I've just no clear idea of what you mean here: Quoting creativesoul

Kripke showed the incoherency/self-contradiction that results from attempting to use particulars as a criterion for identity across possible worlds by showing that if we attribute different circumstances(possible worlds) to the same thing, we end up saying some thing both... was and was not... the thing that 'X'.

My bolding.

SO, are there any problems with transworld identification? Can we move on, accepting it as simple stipulation?

'Cause we are about to start looking at contingent a priori truths. Here's were it gets interesting.

A truth is a priori if it is known without referring to experience.

Pre-Kripke, such truths were generally taken to also be necessary. This was doubtless because of an obsession with some few examples that backed this case up; mathematical and grammatical cliches such as 2+2=4 and bachelors are all of them unmarried.

The example, Kripke uses is Stick S, which is stipulated to be 1m long.

So, how long is S?

Well, the way we determine how long any stick is, is by holding it up agains S. We measure against S, and refer to that experience to determine the length of the new stick. That is, we use an a posteriori test.

But we can't do that in the case of S.

So our knowledge that S is one metre long is not a posteriori.

Hence, it is a priori.

And yet, S, that stick, might have been another length. It's length is contingent.

And the conclusion: that S is 1 metre long is an a priori, contingent truth.

I should have noted this earlier:

Another category I mentioned was that of certainty. Whatever
certainty is, it's clearly not obviously the case that everything
which is necessary is certain. Certainty is another
epistemological notion. Something can be known, or at least
rationally believed, a priori, without being quite certain.
You've read a proofin the math book ; and, though you think
it's correct, maybe you've made a mistake. You often do make
mistakes of this kind. You've made a computation, perhaps
with an error.

Certainty is a type of belief, not a type of knowledge.

Quoting Banno

And the conclusion: that S is 1 metre long is an a priori, contingent truth.

I didn't start rereading Naming and Necessity yet, or even read the vast majority of this thread, but that, surprisingly, is something I agree with. I was assuming I wasn't going to agree with anything Kripke said in this book. (Because for one, I think the whole idea of a "rigid designator" is just complete nonsense, at least aside from an individual simply stipulating that they're going to use a term rigidly.)

Quoting Banno

And,

Those who have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identi­fications' are unproblematic in such cases.

p.49.

If we're just saying that in counterfactual (or "possible worlds") talk, we can refer to things so that they're "the same x" as they are in the actual world, barring counterfactual modifications we make to them, and to some extent that's necessary to make sense of counterfactual talk at all, that shouldn't take a whole book/series of lectures to note.

Quoting Banno

SO, are there any problems with transworld identification? Can we move on, accepting it as simple stipulation?

When we think of Nixon losing an election, we must be thinking of a Nixon who ran in the first place, as opposed to a NIxon who left the US to become a Tibetan monk when he was 17. This possible world must also be one in which the sun didn't go supernova 10,000 years ago.

The list of things that had to be just so for there to be a Nixon who ran for president of the USA would appear to be massive and extending backward to the beginning of the universe. Therefore, I agree it's a simple stipulation. I don't agree that any of the profound philosophical questions associated with the stipulation have been answered by Kripke.

Agree?

I've noticed a mention of essentialism in reading Naming and Necessity. Is that what instantiates identity?

Reply to Terrapin Station Let's see how Kripke teases out the consequences of that simple suggestion.

Quoting frank

I don't agree that any of the profound philosophical questions associated with the stipulation have been answered by Kripke.

What profound philosophical questions?

We just stipulate, then work out the consequences as needed. Generally, we don't draw attention to the sun not going supernova 10,000 years ago when ordering coffee; why bother when discussing what would have been the case had Nixon become a monk?

The take home is that possible worlds are stipulated, and not found. And that does dissolve a icture of modality that was fraught with philosophical difficulties.

Reply to Wallows I've no idea what you are asking.

Reply to Banno

I'm asking a question about the process of identification or the criteria of identification according to Kripke. Here is a snippet from the text:

Kripke pg. 49:In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names
are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not
have been the President, it is not the case that he might not
have been Nixon (though he might not have been called
'Nixon'). Those who have argued that to make sense of the
notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense
of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the
cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon,
and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened
to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identifications'
are unproblematic in such cases.

He adds this as a footnote to the above:

Kripke footnote (16) on page 49:Of course I don't imply that language contains a name for every object.
Demonstratives can be used as rigid designators, and free variables can be used
as rigid designators of unspecified objects. Of course when we specify a
counterfactual situation, we do not describe the whole possible world, but
only the portion which interests us.

He goes on:

Kripke, pg.50:Does the 'problem' of ' transworld identification' make any sense? Is it simply a pseudo-problem?
[...]
Similarly, given certain counterfactual vicissitudes in the history of the molecules of a table, T, one may ask whether T would exist, in that situation, or whether a certain bunch of molecules, which in that situation would constitute a table, constitute the very same table T. In each case, we seek criteria of identity across possible worlds for certain particulars in terms of those for other, more 'basic', particulars. If statements about nations (or tribes) are not reducible to those about other more 'basic' constituents, if there is some 'open texture' in the relationship between them, we can hardly expect to give hard and fast identity criteria;
[...]

Quoting Wallows

I'm asking a question about the process of identification or the criteria of identification according to Kripke. Here is a snippet from the text:

In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names
are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not
have been the President, it is not the case that he might not
have been Nixon (though he might not have been called
'Nixon'). Those who have argued that to make sense of the
notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense
of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the
cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon,
and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened
to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identifications'
are unproblematic in such cases. — Kripke pg. 49

What I get from that with respect to your question is that the "criteria of transworld identity," which isn't something we need to figure out first (that's putting the cart before the horse as Kripke says) is gained by (a) the fact that we're going to stipulate some things as rigid designators, and (b) for some things, like Nixon, it wouldn't really make sense to entertain a counterfactual to the effect of "What if Nixon wasn't Nixon," regardless of whether we actually call him "Nixon" or not. (He's "that same guy" in counterfactuals, whatever we call him.) That tells us our criteria of transworld identity. It tails along from how we talk about counterfactuals.

Whether all of that is something that Kripke would agree with, I don't know, but that's what I get from the passage you quoted at any rate.

Reply to Terrapin Station

Well, he does mention a sort of Sorities paradox in regards to identity along with the problem of maintaining that same identity over time. Logic doesn't deal with such vageness as he mentions in a footnote to the above passages.

Quoting Banno

What profound philosophical questions?

Heraclitus type questions like those Wallows has mentioned.

Quoting Banno

We just stipulate, then work out the consequences as needed. Generally, we don't draw attention to the sun not going supernova 10,000 years ago when ordering coffee; why bother when discussing what would have been the case had Nixon become a monk?

Every little thing seems to be related to every other little thing in the universe. If Nixon lost the election, how could that be the same universe as this one? How could that be the same Nixon as ours? As cool as this essay is, it does not resolve problems of that type. It does not make them go away. We don't do science by examining language use. We don't solve philosophical problems that way either. I'm sure this is obvious to you.

Quoting Banno

The take home is that possible worlds are stipulated, and not found. And that does dissolve a picture of modality that was fraught with philosophical difficulties.

The take home is that we can stipulate possible worlds as things that are stipulated. If we want to think about possible worlds that are found, we are free to do that as well, unless you know of some reason we shouldn't.

Kripke, pg.50:Does the 'problem' of ' transworld identification' make any sense? Is it simply a pseudo-problem?
[...]
Similarly, given certain counterfactual vicissitudes in the history of the molecules of a table, T, one may ask whether T would exist, in that situation, or whether a certain bunch of molecules, which in that situation would constitute a table, constitute the very same table T. In each case, we seek criteria of identity across possible worlds for certain particulars in terms of those for other, more 'basic', particulars. If statements about nations (or tribes) are not reducible to those about other more 'basic' constituents, if there is some 'open texture' in the relationship between them, we can hardly expect to give hard and fast identity criteria;
[...]

Emphasis mine

Yup.

That's what I'm talking about Banno. What if they are??? Those are unaddressed issues.

In support of Kripke... his point - if I read him correctly - is that there are times(anytime???) when we do not need to talk about the fundamental elemental constituents of something in order to sensibly discuss the thing(object) we're discussing. I would agree that most often we do not.

Quoting frank

What profound philosophical questions?
— Banno

Heraclitus type questions like those Wallows has mentioned.

Yeah, I think Kripke takes care of Heraclitus' 'same river' pseudo-problem. It's untenable... utterly untenable.

Quoting frank

The take home is that we can stipulate possible worlds as things that are stipulated. If we want to think about possible worlds that are found, we are free to do that as well, unless you know of some reason we shouldn't.

Nah. Possible worlds are a metacognitive endeavor. There are no possible worlds without extremely complex language.

All you'll find is language use.

Quoting Banno

Sittin' here puzzlin' over how you managed to get things so wrong, again.

Hmmm...

"So wrong"

"again"

Puzzlin' indeed.

Quoting Banno

I read Kripke as setting up a grammar that allows coherent discourse on modal issues. Hence it is especially important to recognise the way he seperate names from descriptions, necessity from the a priory and the analytic, and so on.

Yes.

Quoting Banno

SO, are there any problems with transworld identification? Can we move on, accepting it as simple stipulation?

There are still some problems with transworld identifications, but I do not think that Kripke's language use grasps them. He has addressed some though...

For the sake of the read, and to understand his critique, those(remaining unaddressed issues) can be set aside...

A much worse thing, something creating great additional problems, is whether we can say of any particular that it has necessary or contingent properties, even make the distinction between necessary and contingent properties. Look, it's only a statement or a state of affairs that can be either necessary or contingent ! Whether a particular necessarily or contingently has a certain property depends on the way it's described. This is perhaps closely related to the view that the way we refer to particular things is by a description...

I think that this bit above underwrites quite a bit of these lectures. I do not concur. However, it is important to understand what Kripke is getting at...

Reply to creativesoul

What do you mean?

I hope the idea of fixing the reference as opposed to actually defining one term as meaning the other is somewhat clear.

This seems pivotal as well...

Quoting Wallows

What do you mean?

I need a quote of me from you to me.

Then, I may answer...

Reply to creativesoul

Kripke pg. 53:So : the question of transworld identification makes some sense, in terms of asking about the identity of an object via questions about its component parts. But these parts are not qualities, and it is not an object resembling the given one which is in question. Theorists have often said that we identify objects across possible worlds as objects resembling the given one in the most important respects. On the contrary, Nixon, had he decided to act otherwise, might have avoided politics like the plague, though privately harboring radical opinions. Most important, even when we can replace questions about an object by questions about its parts, we need not do so. We can refer to the object and ask what might have happened to it. So, we do not begin with worlds (which are supposed somehow to be real, and whose qualities, but not whose objects, are perceptible to us), and then ask about criteria of transworld identification; on the contrary, we begin with the objects, which we have, and can identify, in the actual world. We can then ask whether certain things might have been true of the objects.

Reply to Wallows

Yes. I agree with that. It seems that if we do not do that, then possible world semantics lose coherency...

Kripke pg. 53:...the question of transworld identification makes some sense, in terms of asking about the identity of an object via questions about its component parts. But these parts are not qualities...

My side issue with this concerns certain situations where the object in question is existentially dependent upon it's parts(emergent things/objects). Kripke's scheme cannot take account of those situations. Earlier, I mentioned an apple pie and apples. Kripke stated of such situations...

Kripke pg. 53:Most important, even when we can replace questions about an object by questions about its parts, we need not do so...

I would think that the value we place upon possible world semantics(imaginary counterfactuals) ought be established, in some strong sense of the word, by virtue of correctly identifying the object(by our knowledge about the object in question when it is in fact an existentially dependent composite of other parts). If there can be no A without B, then a possible world scenario positing an A without B would be saying something like that we could imagine a world in which there were apple pies without apples, and that such an endeavor would be somehow useful for attaining/acquiring knowledge and/or understanding of apple pies.

:yikes:

Kripke pg. 53:But these parts are not qualities, and it is not an object resembling the given one which is in question...

"Resembling"...

Why ought an apple pie resemble all of it's parts as a pre-requisite to insisting that there are no sensible possible world scenarios that imagine apple pies without apples?

Reply to Wallows So what's the problem?

Here's how I read it. Some folk say that there is a problem in identifying individuals in other possible worlds. Kripke points out that other possible worlds are specified by our musings... and hence that there is no problem with such a grand title as "transworld identification".

Quoting frank

If Nixon lost the election, how could that be the same universe as this one?

Quoting frank

As cool as this essay is, it does not resolve problems of that type. It does not make them go away.

I disagree. His view does exactly that. At least for the sort of questions posited so far.

Quoting frank

If we want to think about possible worlds that are found, we are free to do that as well, unless you know of some reason we shouldn't.

Go for it. A the cost, as you yourself point out, of coherence.

Quoting Banno

Go for it. A the cost, as you yourself point out, of coherence.

Yet we do it all the time. That's the problem with the argument from The Way We Speak. We have contradictory customs.

Quoting Banno

And the conclusion: that S is 1 metre long is an a priori, contingent truth.

Feeding this back into what has gone before, it is possible that Nixon was called Nixoff, and was a native of Canada and became a social worker. At which point, there is only the stipulation of the possible world that makes Nixon and Nixoff 'the same person'. (Which could be made more plausible if we suppose that his parents (possibly) emigrated and changed their name.)

But such stipulations are susceptible to ridicule or earnest criticism, though they be immune from dis-proof. Just as a stipulated metre stick can be criticised as being prone to expansion when damp or hot, so Nixoff can be criticised as being uninterestingly Nixon. Or, a possible Moses who didn't part the Red Sea, as not the Moses that anyone cares about, or a possible world in which the moon landings were faked, as too fanciful.

But possible worlds have uses, (unlike the counterfactuals being considered here), like metre sticks, either as projections to the future - I might go shopping later, it might stop raining: - or as tools of discovery of the past. The detective considers possible worlds in which each of his suspects committed the murder, works out the consequences in each case, and looks for evidence that supports or contradicts each possibility. Could Armstrong have done it and faked his alibi of being on the moon? could Nixon have done it and not talked about it on his tapes? Could Moses have time travelled? Possibilities are eliminated until the only one left is that the butler did it. And time will tell whether or not it stops raining and I go shopping.

In practical modal reasoning, there is a rule against changing the known facts, that there was a murder, that it is raining, That Nixon was the president, or whatever, that does not apply when one makes a novel about if Hitler had won the war. Such a novel can be instructive as a warning but is not admissible in court.


Quoting frank

We have contradictory customs.

We write novels, and we try cases, and different rules apply, but as long as we keep our customs separate, and keep fiction out of the courtroom, there is no contradiction.

Quoting unenlightened

We write novels, and we try cases, and different rules apply, but as long as we keep our customs separate, and keep fiction out of the courtroom, there is no contradiction.

Right. There's a TV show called The Man in the High Castle in which an alternate reality is depicted. It shows the allies having lost WW2 and North America is divided between the Germans and the Japanese. If we stop the think about it, it's amazing how easily we navigate a story of that kind.

We see Hitler, but we know it's not our Hitler. The two Hitlers are like cousins.

Reply to frank Yeah, that's the Phillip K Dick novel. I was thinking of Len Deighton's SS-GB, but there are others too. Unless we are philosophers, there is little problem understanding counterfactual possible worlds and their difference from the detective's possible solutions.

But as I have never been to the US, it is possible that The Man in the High Castle is substantially true, and all this stuff about presidents is fake news. Or is it?

Can anyone provide an example of a possible world or counterfactual situation that is not stipulated?

Quoting Banno

Can anyone provide an example of a possible world or counterfactual situation that is not stipulated?

Not me, but suppose that I could ...

{insert un-stipulated possible world example here}

... if I stipulate that a possible world is un-stipulated, is it stipulated? Does Kripke die of shame at this point?

Reply to unenlightened No more than if you stipulated that 2+2=5

Quoting Banno

if you stipulated that 2+2=5

I can propose a couple of possible worlds: (a) a dull world where the number signs have gotten swapped, or (b) a rather confusing one where Nature abhors a foursome, such that whenever one has two pairs of shoes, another shoe comes spontaneously into existence, and whenever two couples meet for lunch a child is born.

But what I was wondering is why you were asking anyone to stipulate an un-stipulated possibility? Architects' plans stipulate possible buildings; but just because they cannot plan an unplanned building, does not prove that unplanned buildings cannot exist.

Quoting Banno

So what's the problem?

Here's how I read it. Some folk say that there is a problem in identifying individuals in other possible worlds. Kripke points out that other possible worlds are specified by our musings... and hence that there is no problem with such a grand title as "transworld identification".

I don't see any problems, I am just interested in the 'identity criteria' to which Kripke refers to. What is it?

Quoting Wallows

What is it?

What do you think it is?

Reply to unenlightened That doesn't work.

Reply to Banno Quoting unenlightened

Can anyone provide an example of a possible world or counterfactual situation that is not stipulated?
— Banno

Not me...

Does that work better?

Quoting Banno

What do you think it is?

No idea, honestly.

Reply to unenlightened Much.

Reply to Wallows Fine.

Reply to Banno

Perhaps we should move on. What do you suggest we focus on next since I got hung up on criteria for identity.

Reply to Banno
Heraclitus: "Can't step in the same river twice."
Frank: "Wow! It's the same river, but it changes over time."
Banno: "That's fine. It's the same river because we say it's the same river."

Heraclitus and Frank: :meh: :smirk:

Frank: "If I said penguins fly, would they? We say it's the same river because it's the same river, not the other way around."

Banno: "You're all idiots. Go back to work."

Frank and Heraclitus: :up: :up:

Quoting unenlightened

But as I have never been to the US, it is possible that The Man in the High Castle is substantially true, and all this stuff about presidents is fake news. Or is it?

Could be. Sometimes the fascism leaks out around the edges. :worry:

Reply to frank What?

You're all idiots. Go back to work.

Reply to Banno

:lol:

Reply to Banno I doesn't work.

Reply to unenlightened as you are the chap who made the funniest retort in web history, I forgive you.

Quoting Terrapin Station

If we're just saying that in counterfactual (or "possible worlds") talk, we can refer to things so that they're "the same x" as they are in the actual world, barring counterfactual modifications we make to them, and to some extent that's necessary to make sense of counterfactual talk at all, that shouldn't take a whole book/series of lectures to note.

It shouldn't, no. But David Lewis remained puzzled, I think, to the day he died.

Quoting Wallows

Perhaps we should move on.

I'm not sure there is any point. @Frank hasn't worked out that we can't step in the same river even once, and yet it is the same river. You say you haven't understood the notion of identity criterion, on the rejection of which the remainder of the book is based, and although I found it interesting to revisit, I have several other books I ought be reading.

Quoting Banno

You say you haven't understood the notion of identity criterion, on the rejection of which the remainder of the book is based, and although I found it interesting to revisit, I have several other books I ought be reading.

That's true; but, I'm willing to learn what it's all about.

Thanks.

Reply to Wallows But all you do is push stuff off the table. If you will not engage, I can't see how this will be any fun.

Where did Frank go astray?

Quoting Banno

But all you do is push stuff off the table. If you will not engage, I can't see how this will be any fun.

Where do you want me to look at?

I'm looking at this from page 53:

Kripke pg. 53:So : the question of transworld identification makes some sense, in terms of asking about the identity of an object via questions about its component parts. But these parts are not qualities, and it is not an object resembling the given one which is in question. Theorists have often said that we identify objects across possible worlds as objects resembling the given one in the most important respects. On the contrary, Nixon, had he decided to act otherwise, might have avoided politics like the plague, though privately harboring radical opinions. Most important, even when we can replace questions about an object by questions about its parts, we need not do so. We can refer to the object and ask what might have happened to it. So, we do not begin with worlds (which are supposed somehow to be real, and whose qualities, but not whose objects, are perceptible to us), and then ask about criteria of transworld identification; on the contrary, we begin with the objects, which we have, and can identify, in the actual world. We can then ask whether certain things might have been true of the objects.

Reply to Wallows
SO what do you make of this:Quoting frank

When we think of Nixon losing an election, we must be thinking of a Nixon who ran in the first place, as opposed to a NIxon who left the US to become a Tibetan monk when he was 17. This possible world must also be one in which the sun didn't go supernova 10,000 years ago.

The list of things that had to be just so for there to be a Nixon who ran for president of the USA would appear to be massive and extending backward to the beginning of the universe. Therefore, I agree it's a simple stipulation.I don't agree that any of the profound philosophical questions associated with the stipulation have been answered by Kripke.

Kripke has not rid us of problems associated with transworld identity, for as your quote shows there may be issues with regard to what constitutes an individual. Is Frank addressing the same thing?

I don't think so.

Quoting Banno

Is Frank addressing the same thing?

I don't think so also. I think frank is addressing a possible world in which Nixon could have chosen a different path than politics. What instantiates his identity is a world where his identity as a politician is found in, is our own world. I can't see above the horizons of our own world, so I'll leave it at that.

@Frank what's your take on this conundrum?

If we were Native Americans, We might adopt names with meaning. Instead of speaking of 'Nixon', which after all identifies anyone who happens to have that name, including my doctor, his wife and children, we might call him 'Big Chief Cover-Up.' And it would make no sense to suppose that Big Chief Cover-Up was not a big chief and didn't get involved in a cover-up, because his name identifies this as his essence. This is not to say that they or we believe in formal immutable essences, because after some momentous event, one changes one's name - before the election, he would have been called 'Dances with Words', or something.

Similarly, when making counterfactual histories about the Nazis, no one supposes that Hitler was a decent chap. There are rules about these things; about how far and in what direction one can change reality and take the audience with you. Kripke is not addressing these rules, (and I think Frank would like him to), because they are too subtle, conventional, complex and vague for philosophy. For Kripke, names are entirely arbitrary, like the x's and y's of algebra - because he is a logician and therefore an idiot.

"Suppose Maverick was a conformist" holds no terror for him, any more than a mathematician balks at "Let 'i' be the square root of -1", having just declared that all squares are positive.

What page are we supposed to be up to, and did we include the introduction?

The way these things typically work best, by the way, is if:

(a) we stay structured re everyone reading along and commenting at the same pace,
(b) everyone comments as they read, and ultimately takes their comment to just be their comment, which means, among other things, that:
(c) we're all respectful of other's comments, no matter how much of a different take they are than our own (something this board has a big problem with in general, and I get wrapped up in it, too, as a reaction to people not being respectful towards my comments), so that
(d) we don't feel a need for everyone to have the same opinion. We're okay with others continuing to disagree with us.

Quoting Wallows

what's your take on this conundrum?

Some would say that Becoming is primary and the contradiction of a changing identity is a product of analysis. And this is analytical philosophy. :)

Do you agree about the a posteriori necessary statements?

This is - or perhaps was - a thread dealing with a particular book. Insofar as the aim was to understand the book, some effort must be put in to seeing how the author is making use of the terms involved.

Of course, as Un and Frank repeatedly point out, we can use words in ways other than the way the author does.

However if your aim is to understand the approach taken by the author, then understanding what he is doing with the words involved is the only way to achieve and understanding that is anything more than superficial.

It's a hackneyed example, but true: if your aim is to play chess, then don't continually point out that you can actually move the bishop to any square you like. All it shows is that you have misunderstood what is going on.

@unenlightened pointing out that Native Americans (is that how they choose to be referred to? As part of the fauna?) might use names in a way that is different to how Kripke uses names, while potentially very interesting, is beside the point.

@Terrapin Station asks us to respect the chess player who moves the bishop to any square they like. Sure, but let's also understand that that they are not a good chess player, and that their behaviour is not conducive to improving your game.

Quoting frank

Some would say that Becoming is primary and the contradiction of a changing identity is a product of analysis. And this is analytical philosophy.

A capitalised "Becoming" is hardly common in Analytic philosophy, but rather the obsession of the Other Folk.

Quoting Banno

However if your aim is to understand the approach taken by the author

I think his point is a little more modest than you would have it. Let's stick to that modesty and we won't have any run-ins with the Other Folk.

Quoting frank

I think his point is a little more modest than you would have it.

SO you understand both my position and Kripke's? Well, set out Kripke's position for us. That's what we are here for,

Quoting unenlightened

And it would make no sense to suppose that Big Chief Cover-Up was not a big chief and didn't get involved in a cover-up, because his name identifies this as his essence. This is not to say that they or we believe in formal immutable essences, because after some momentous event, one changes one's name - before the election, he would have been called 'Dances with Words', or something.

Since Unenlightened brought the topic up of essences. What makes one's essence real?

Could we perhaps adopt a minimalist position, that we can set out at least some of our modal questions and assertions by stipulation?

And proceed by saying that these are the ones Kripke wants to talk about?

Reply to Wallows What is an essence?

Quoting Banno

What is an essence?

Something that ensures one's identity contrasted with others? It's what instantiates one's identity over all possible worlds to a singular predicate.

If an essence is a bunch or properties that some individual must posses in order to be that individual, then isn't the essence a description of the individual that must be the same in every possible world?

That is, a definite description that is also a rigid designator.

But that doesn't work.

So that's not what an essence is.

Quoting Banno

So that's not what an essence is.

Then what is it? Just a wild guess on my part; but, an essence can be a definite description that is not shareable.

Quoting Wallows

an essence can be a definite description that is not shareable.

Then in what way would it be a description?

Perhaps there is not really such a thing as an essence. Or perhaps the notion has no use.

Quoting Banno

Then in what way would it be a description?

Nixon being president of the 37'th United States is not shareable.

Quoting Banno

Perhaps there is not really such a thing as an essence. Or perhaps the notion has no use.

Perhaps; but, I see some utility of using it contextually speaking about things like tables or chairs or the 37'th President of the United States. It does invoke some metaphysics; but, it can be remedied with treating the subject as a host of descriptions that are unique and non-transferable.

Quoting Wallows

Nixon being president of the 37'th United States is not shareable.

In what way? I can tell someone - a child, perhaps - and isn't that sharing? Don't we share this understanding?

Quoting Banno

In what way? I can tell someone - a child, perhaps - and isn't that sharing? Don't we share this understanding?

I am using 'not sharable' in a different sense here. By which I mean to imply that there was no other person at the time that could have been President of the United States because Nixon was never assassinated or didn't die from typhus or cancer during his presidency or prior to becoming the 37'th President of the United States.

Kripke, pg. 113, footnote 57:In addition to the principle that the original of an object is essential to it, another principle suggested is that the substance of which it is made is essential. Several complications exist here. First, one should not confuse the type of essence involved in the question 'What properties must an object retain if it is not to cease to exist, and what properties of the object can change while the object endures?', which is a temporal question, with the question 'What (timeless) properties could the object not have failed to have, and what properties could it have lacked while still (timelessly) existing?', which concerns necessity and not time and which is our topic here. Thus the question of whether the table could have changed into ice is irrelevant here. The question whether the table could originally have been made of anything other than wood is relevant. Obviously this question is related to the necessity of the origin of the table from a given block of wood and whether that block, too, is essentially wood (even wood of a particular kind). Thus it is ordinarily impossible to imagine the table made from any substance other than the one of which it is actually made without going back through the entire history of the universe, a mind-boggling feat. (Other possibilities of the table not having been wooden originally have been suggested to me, including an ingenious suggestion of Slote's, but I find none of them really convincing. I cannot discuss them here.) A full discussion of the problems of essential properties of particulars is impossible here, but I will mention a few other points: (I) Ordinarily when we ask intuitively whether something might have happened to a given object, we ask whether the universe could have gone on as it actually did up to a certain time, but diverge in its history from that point forward so that the vicissitudes of that object would have been different from that time forth. Perhaps this feature should be erected into a general principle about essence. Note that the time in which the divergence from actual history occurs may be sometime before the object itself is actually created. For example, I might have been deformed if the fertilized egg from which I originated had been damaged in certain ways, even though I presumably did not yet exist at that time. (2) I am not suggesting that only origin and substantial makeup are essential. For example, if the very block of wood from which the table was made had instead been made into a vase, the table never would have existed. So (roughly) being a table seems to be an essential property of the table. (3) Just as the question whether an object actually has a certain property (e.g. baldness) can be vague, so the question whether the object essentially has a certain property can be vague, even when the question whether it actually has the property is decided. (4) Certain counterexamples to the origin principle appear to exist in ordinary parlance. I am convinced that they are not genuine counterexamples, but their exact analysis is difficult. I cannot discuss this here.

Quoting Wallows

I see some utility of using it contextually speaking about things like tables or chairs or the 37'th President of the United States.

The table and chairs, yes - and this is what I would like to talk about (p. 47 is where it starts, but there is so much more later on). But if being the 37th president is part of the essence of Nixon, then the definition of essence as necessary properties - properties an individual must posses in order to be that very individual - fails. It gets replaced with something like "essence is the properties that belong to an individual in the actual world"...

But that would mean that every property one possesses is a part of the essence.

Reply to Wallows Don't copy-and-paste at me. Paraphrase or quote the bit you think I should be looking at.

Kripke, pg. 114, footnote 58:Peter Geach has advocated (in Mental Acts, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1957, Section 16, and elsewhere) a notion of 'nominal essence' different from the type of essential property considered here. According to Geach, since any act of pointing is ambiguous, someone who baptizes an object by pointing to it must apply a sortal property to disambiguate his reference and to ensure correct criteria of identity over time-for example, someone who assigns a reference to 'Nixon' by pointing to him must say, 'I use "Nixon" as a name of that man', thus removing his hearer's temptations to take him to be pointing to a nose or a time-slice. The sortal is then in some sense part of the meaning of the name; names do have a (partial) sense after all, though their senses may not be complete enough to determine their references, as they are in description and cluster-of-descriptions theories. If I understand Geach correctly, his nominal essence should be understood in terms of a prioricity, not necessity, and thus is quite different from the kind of essence advocated here (perhaps this is part of what he means when he says he is dealing with 'nominal', not 'real', essences). So 'Nixon is a man', 'Dobbin is a horse', and the like would be a priori truths

Quoting Banno

Don't copy-and-paste at me. Paraphrase or quote the bit you think I should be looking at.

Those are entire footnotes dedicated to elucidating what Kripke thinks about 'essence'. I doubt I could make a better claim than he has about the issue. Sorry.

Quoting Wallows

...was no other person at the time that could have been President of the United States

A property had by only that individual - that is, the property picked out by a definite description.

Quoting Wallows

Those are entire footnotes dedicated to elucidating what Kripke thinks about 'essence'.

Good god - you might as well copy-and-paste the entire text of the book; it is all about essence. Put some effort in.

Reply to Banno

I'm not following you here. I meant to imply that essential properties of objects are their relations to other objects. Does Kripke ever talk about facts?

Quoting Banno

A property had by only that individual - that is, the property picked out by a definite description.

Well, yes. Now, what?

Quoting Wallows

Nixon being president of the 37'th United States is not shareable.

So you are saying something like, since Nixon actually was president 37, no one else could actually have been president 37.

But it remains that someone other then Nixon might have been president 37.

So you are setting up "essence" to mean the collection of definite descriptions that are true of an individual in the actual world.

This post just by way of working out what you mean.

Quoting Banno

So you are saying something like, since Nixon actually was president 37, no one else could actually have been president 37.

But it remains that someone other then Nixon might have been president 37.

Yes, someone else could have been president of the US; but, nobody else was. Hence, the designator for the 37'th president of the US is Nixon, and this is strongly rigid in this world.

Quoting Banno

So you are setting up "essence" to mean the collection of definite descriptions that are true of an individual in the actual world.

Had Nixon lost the election, then the definite description of being the 37'th president of the United States would not have referred to him; but, it does in our world.

Quoting Wallows

and this is strongly rigid.

A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid.(p.48)

Hey?

Neither Nixon nor the 37th president are necessarily existent - neither must exist in every possible world.

Let's go back to a few basics.

Something is essential if it exists or is true in every possible world.

Something is possible if it exists in at least some possible world.

Something is impossible if it cannot exist in any possible world.


Any disagreement?

Quoting Banno

Neither Nixon nor the 37th president are necessarily existent - neither must exist in every possible world.

OK, then I seem to be lost here.

Quoting Banno

Any disagreement?

Nope, makes perfect sense.

I think one of the aims here is that Kripke is forcing a wedge between proper names and any associated descriptions. But in attempting to understand the essence of something as related to a description - actual or necessary - runs up against this.

It is good to be confused, because Kripke is pointing to a bunch of confusions around the way we talk about modality.

The remainder of the book is his (start of a) solution.

Does Kripke talk about facts? Facts are nice and simple.

Quoting Banno

Something is essential if it exists or is true in every possible world.

Or every possible world we're examining. Say for Wallows, a tree in his front yard wouldn't be that tree unless it was oak.

We won't look at possible worlds where it's anything but oak. Oak is essential in that sense.

Is that right Reply to Pierre-Normand

Quoting frank

Or every possible world we're examining.

No. In every possible world.

Keep the bishop on the diagonals, Frank.

Reply to Wallows Is it a fact that someone else might have been president 37?

Quoting Banno

Is it a fact that someone else might have been president 37?

It's a fact that Nixon was the 37'th president of the US in our world. Does Kripke limit the scope of facthood to only our possible world? Isn't it a fact that water is H20 in every possible world?

Quoting Wallows

It's a fact that Nixon was the 37'th president of the US in our world.

But it's also a fact that he might not have been.

Quoting Wallows

Does Kripke limit the scope of facthood to only our possible world?

No - he takes the first order logic of facts and finds a way to use it to discuss possibility and necessity.

Quoting Wallows

Isn't it a fact that water is H20 in every possible world?

Let's see what he says later in the book. He hints at his answer around p. 52-53, talking about whether the parts of an individual are essential. But work needs to be done in order to see his answer. All he does at this stage is lave it as an open question:

Most important, even when we can replace questions about an object
by questions about its parts, we need not do so.

And after having gone over this again, we are back to the Metre Stick.

Do we move on to that again, or is there more here that needs settling?

Thanks for helping us out @Banno.

Quoting Banno

...the way we determine how long any stick is, is by holding it up agains S. We measure against S, and refer to that experience to determine the length of the new stick. That is, we use an a posteriori test.

But we can't do that in the case of S.

So our knowledge that S is one metre long is not a posteriori.

Hence, it is a priori.

And yet, S, that stick, might have been another length. It's length is contingent.

And the conclusion: that S is 1 metre long is an a priori, contingent truth.

A note about Kripke and essentialism:

SEP on essentialism:According to a less extreme and correspondingly more popular form of essentialism, origin essentialism, an object could not have had a radically different origin than it in fact had. The view that a particular table could not have been originally made from completely different material than the material from which it was actually originally made and the view that a person could not have originated from a different sperm and egg than those from which he or she actually originated are both forms of origin essentialism. Origin essentialism has been defended by Kripke (1972/1980)

Kripke imagines that when we use a rigid designator X, we zero in on the possible worlds in which X exists (with some exceptions.) So if Wallows is discussing the diseases which could have afflicted that oak tree, then Kripke would have no problem accepting that oakness is essential to the object Wallow is talking about.

Quoting frank

Kripke imagines that when we use a rigid designator X, we zero in on the possible worlds in which X exists

No; we specify them, we do not zero in.

Again, you choose to speak as if there were a kingdom of Possible Worlds, from which we might choose this one or that one. That's not how, at least for Kripke, it works. He sets out quite clearly that possible worlds come about as a result of our stipulations:

Generally, things aren't 'found out' about a counterfactual situation, they are stipulated

__________________________
Quoting frank

So if Wallows is discussing the diseases which could have afflicted that oak tree, then Kripke would have no problem accepting that oakness is essential to the object Wallow is talking about.

This way of speaking is not so much wrong, as twisted. So:

When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed.

Hence we ought insist that it is possible that the tree before us were not an oak.

SO perhaps at some point in reaching a diagnosis one might reconsider that the tree before us is indeed an oak. Perhaps the reason it is so difficult to diagnose is because it is a Dutch Elm.

Quoting Banno

I think one of the aims here is that Kripke is forcing a wedge between proper names and any associated descriptions. But in attempting to understand the essence of something as related to a description - actual or necessary - runs up against this.

It is good to be confused, because Kripke is pointing to a bunch of confusions around the way we talk about modality.

The remainder of the book is his (start of a) solution.

Since studying Naming and Necessity as part of an undergraduate course (so, obviously not an in-depth study) the problem I have always thought to be inherent in Kripke's notion of rigid designation is this: How do we know (apart from, and in the absence of, present ostention) who or what a name rigidly designates unless we rely on some (at least minimal) definite description to determine it?

Quoting Banno

When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed.

Hence we ought insist that it is possible that the tree before us were not an oak.

Not if we know it's an oak tree and we're discussing what could have been in regard to "that oak tree."

I'm afraid I'm going to have to take your chess instructor's license.

Reply to Janus Welcome.

So is the suggestion that, ostentation aside, some sort of definite description is needed for a name to pick out its referent?

Reply to Banno

So it would seem. If Kripke wants to say that names are not definite descriptions, well I think that much is trivially obvious; my name clearly says nothing about me at all, so it cannot by itself constitute a definite description.

But if he wants to say that names as rigid designators are somehow independent of definite descriptions, that they do not, so to speak, rely on definite descriptions in order to do their job of rigidly designating, well, that just seems, on the face of it, to be obviously false.

So in a 'possible world' scenario, how much information (definite description?) would be needed to establish that it is a counter-factually conditioned Banno that we are referring to, for example?

Reply to Banno The rigid designator is the person's DNA :D

Quoting Janus

So it would seem. If Kripke wants to say that names are not definite descriptions, well I think that much is trivially obvious; my name clearly says nothing about me at all, so it cannot by itself constitute a definite description.

It seems from what we have read that you are right here.

Quoting Janus

But if he wants to say that names as rigid designators are somehow independent of definite descriptions, that they do not, so to speak, rely on definite descriptions in order to do their job of rigidly designating, well, that just seems, on the face of it, to be obviously false.

So what are we to make of the Donnellan examples, p.25 & n.? It is apparent that a discussion about a given individual can take place, with reasonable success, in the case where the definite description used to pick out the individual has failed, as per champaign man; and even where the description would have picked out the wrong individual.

And it is simple to make these cases modal: "The man over there drinking champaign seems happy, but might possibly not be", when the man we are discussion has water in his glass, while another man over there, who we are not discussing, does indeed have Champaign.

Of course there are many ways referring can succeed, or fail. @unenlightened is useful for pointing out such cases, and how the vagaries of language lead astray those who would lay down firm rules.

Which considerations, amongst others, lead me to reject the idea that the only way to ensure that a name refers is to attach it to a definite description.

Quoting Janus

So in a 'possible world' scenario, how much information (definite description?) would be needed to establish that it is a counter-factually conditioned Banno that we are referring to, for example?

None.

Firstly, Banno is a rigid designator. I am Banno in all possible worlds in which Banno exists.

Secondly, supposing that some amount of information, beyond the rigid designator, is needed to ensure you are talking about Banno is to fail to see what possible worlds are. Again, they are stipulated, not found.

Reply to Banno
DNA

Reply to schopenhauer1 SO you insist I respond. I wasn't going to bother.

Is your point of significance? If so, set it forth.

Because your thought remains opaque.

Reply to Banno
Kripke was into scientific essentialism so I would suppose that something like your unique DNA fingerprint would be considered a candidate for a rigid designator.

Quoting Banno

And it is simple to make these cases modal: "The man over there drinking champaign seems happy, but might possibly not be", when the man we are discussion has water in his glass, while another man over there, who we are not discussing, does indeed have Champaign.

Ah, but in that case we are relying on ostention, not on whether the man is drinking champagne. You thought the man is drinking champagne, but it turns out he is not. Which man? That man over there (pointing).

Quoting Banno

None.

Firstly, Banno is a rigid designator. I am Banno in all possible worlds in which Banno exists.

Secondly, supposing that some amount of information, beyond the rigid designator, is needed to ensure you are talking about Banno is to fail to see what possible worlds are. Again, they are stipulated, not found.

OK, you can stipulate that you are Banno in all possible worlds in which you exist. But how am I to know who Banno is in the first place absent some definite description unless you are already known to me face to face? You might say I know you as the Banno who posts on this forum, but that is a definite description. For all I know you might be a bot.

So, I say it is impossible even to stipulate that you are talking about some particular Banno (out of all the Bannos in the world) without some means of fixing the stipulation (which, again, would involve either ostention or specification [description]). I can't see any way around that.

Quoting schopenhauer1

Kripke was into scientific essentialism

How do you know that?

Quoting Janus

Ah, but in that case we are relying on ostention, not on whether the man is drinking champagne. You thought the man is drinking champagne, but it turns out he is not. Which man? That man over there (pointing).

But there was another man over there who was drinking champaign. So no, it does not rely on the "over there".

Quoting Janus

But how am I to know who Banno is in the first place absent some definite description unless you are already known to me face to face?

By stipulation. Banno might have red hair. I don't, but I might have.

You see, you already know who I am, without a definite description.

A child could not give a definite description of their friend, mark; and yet can say "what if mark is at the shops?"

SO, on examination, it simply is not true that a definite description is what is needed to set the referent for a name.

Quoting Janus

I can't see any way around that.

I suspect that's because you are looking at it wrong.

Reply to schopenhauer1 You haven't looked at this topic much, have you. That you think we are looking for an example of a definite description sorta gives that away.

On your definition, identical twins are the very same person.

A bit of an issue, no?

Reply to Banno
Fine just add in epigenetics and the physical properties that make them unique. This wouldn’t change it much. Also I meant rigid designator, not definite description. It makes sense. In all possible worlds, that person would be that person and no one else.

Reply to schopenhauer1 Yeah. Nuh. You are not even reading, let alone on the same page.

Reply to Banno
Hey solved your problems

It's interesting 'what seems obvious' to different people. I remember the first time I came across Kripke's thesis that names have literally nothing to do with definite descriptions. This stuck me as obviously true and wondered - and still do - what all the fuss was, and is about.

Reply to StreetlightX
Something to do with proper names being different.

Reply to Banno

That's easy to say...can you explain why you would think that?

Reply to StreetlightX

Again, talk is cheap; can you explain where I am going wrong according to you?

How do we know what a name is designating absent either ostention or description?

Reply to StreetlightX Interesting. I had to be convinced - a very rabbit-was-a-duck experience. I guess that's what is happening here.

Reply to Janus I'm simply commenting on the phenomenon of 'what seems obvious' - not really anything to do with the book or its argument. Kripke does a better and more rigorous job than I can in answering your question.

Reply to Banno I think it came out of my having read Witty first. Kripke's thesis follows quite nicely from that background.

Reply to Janus Have I mentioned my friend Paul?

The odd thing about Paul is that you have no definite description of him, nor have I pointed to him in a way that picks him in particular out for you; and yet can ask me whatever you like about him.

How can that be possible, if you cannot know what a name is designating absent either ostention or description?

Reply to Banno I ate your friend Paul btw. He's been replaced by a robot that looks a great deal like Paul. I'm sorry you had to find out this way.

Reply to StreetlightX I read Kripke before WItti, at least in detail, so that might be right.

I don't see any need for a causal theory of reference.

Reply to StreetlightX Em. He's been dead this last year. Soup?

Reply to Banno Awkward.

Reply to Banno

Come one; it's obvious the two "over theres" are different. 'Over there' is itself meaningless without description or ostention.

Quoting Banno

By stipulation. Banno might have red hair. I don't, but I might have.

You're contradicting yourself; you've just given me a description of yourself. And even without that description (a description which is pretty much irrelevant, since you could dye your hair and remain the same person) I still don't know who you are beyond " the person who goes under the name of 'Banno' who is conversing with me on this forum"; which is itself another description.

You need to come up with something better than this if you are to convince me that I have been wrong.

Quoting Banno

A child could not give a definite description of their friend, mark; and yet can say "what if mark is at the shops?"

SO, on examination, it simply is not true that a definite description is what is needed to set the referent for a name.

Again untrue, because the child would need to have met Mark and know by means of ostention that he is referred to by that name (by at least one person even if only him or her self) in order to be talking sense.

Reply to Banno

You have given me a description; that he is your friend; you just haven't specified whether he is imaginary or not.

Quoting StreetlightX

?Banno
I ate your friend Paul btw. He's been replaced by a robot that looks a great deal like Paul.

More descriptions!

Quoting StreetlightX

I'm simply commenting on the phenomenon of 'what seems obvious' - not really anything to do with the book or its argument. Kripke does a better and more rigorous job than I can in answering your question.

All this tells me is that you don't seem to be able to answer the question, even though you've read the work (as I have also, but many years ago, and didn't find it answered the question either). Since I didn't think Kripke answered that question when I read the paper, I'm not surprised that you apparently cannot answer it.

Reply to StreetlightX Yeah. Might leave that one there.

Reply to Janus And which combination of these descriptions sets out for you without fail the exact person you are talking about?

And yet we are talking about one individual. The name refers without your having an associated definite description.

Most of the things commonly attributed to
Aristotle are things that Aristotle might not have done at all.
In a situation in which he didn't do them, we would describe
that as a situation in which Aristotle didn't do them.(p.61)

For me, this point settled the argument. The reference "Aristotle"pick out Aristotle even if we know nothing about him.

Reply to Banno Mm, it is not the mere fact of 'having descriptions' that matters. That alone would pull the rug out from any causal theory before it even got off the ground. Its instead a question about - necessity: these descriptions, and not others. Anyway, I'll let yall get back to reading.

It really is a nice theory. The only defect I think it has is
probably common to all philosophical theories. It's wrong.(p.64)

...Kripke's most quoted.

Quoting Banno

And which combination of these descriptions sets out for you without fail the exact person you are talking about?

And yet we are talking about one individual. The name refers without your having an associated definite description.

I haven't said that any set of descriptions would or could " set out...without fail that exact person" being talked about. Descriptions give us ideas about which individuals are being referred to, and those ideas are never infallible. I see no problem with that.

Of course, in principle, one person is being talked about, and of course, in principle, names refer; but no explanation has been given how a name could rigidly (i.e. infallibly) designate, not to speak of how it could refer even fallibly without any specification (i.e. description) of, or pointing to, the individual that is being referred to.

That's what you need to give an account of; aspersions, assertions and allusions won't cut it; you need an argument!

Reply to Janus You want a set of rules for referring.

Think on that, and we might move on to Lecture 2.

Reply to Banno
Then it's the baptism thing.

Reply to schopenhauer1

Of course it is the baptism thing, but to say that a name refers to an entity that has been baptized with that name is itself a definite description of that entity: 'the entity that has been baptized'..

The corollary is that if no such baptism occurred everyone could be mistaken in believing that the name in question rigidly refers to the entity in question. this doesn't seem to solve the question about how I know which entity is being referred to. On the other hand if I do know, on account of knowing the baptism, occurred of having witnessed it, then that would count as a knowing via ostention.

Reply to Janus If someone tells you Nixon could have lost the election, you must already know who Nixon is. And he would have to be something like an American human. Human-shaped, at least. There are sime essential properties to this Nixon. But that's not really informative. You know who Nixon is in the possible world the same way you know the meter-stick is a meter long.

Quoting Banno

Terrapin Station asks us to respect the chess player who moves the bishop to any square they like. Sure, but let's also understand that that they are not a good chess player, and that their behaviour is not conducive to improving your game.

If you don't understand that "good x" is subjective and not a fact, you're in no position to be judging anyone.

What page are we all on? I'm on 53.

Possible worlds are stipulated. All possible world scenarios pick out something in this world and stipulate that something in a different set of circumstances. We begin with an object and then we ask what might have happened to it. We do not begin with worlds whose qualities, but not whose objects, are perceptible to us and then ask about trans-world identity. Kripke writes on page 44...

A possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we associate with it...

...There is no reason why we cannot stipulate that, in talking about what would have happened to Nixon in a certain counterfactual situation, we are talking about what would have happened to him...

Kripke on page 48 writes...

Let's use some terms quasi-technically. Let's call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the same object, a nonrigid or accidental designator if that is not the case. Of course we don't require that the objects exist in all possible worlds. Certainly Nixon might not have existed if his parents had not gotten married, in the normal course of things. When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed. A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid.

So while it is certainly possible that Nixon may not have been president, no one other than Nixon may have been Nixon. Thus, proper names are rigid designators, but are not necessarily strongly rigid. Strongly rigid designators are of necessary existents. Necessary existents exist in all possible worlds.

It seems that Kripke wants to say that being an essential property of an object does not require that that object necessarily exist(in all possible worlds). I think that this is him continuing to drive a wedge between the historical notions of a priori and necessary. Just because something is known a priori, it does not follow that what is known is necessary...

Kripke re-visits what he wrote earlier on page 49...

Those who have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identi­fications' are unproblematic in such cases.

Because possible worlds are stipulated, and some properties are results of circumstances, and we can stipulate different sets of circumstances...

...whether an object has the same property in all possible worlds depends not just on the object itself, but on how it is described...

What does Kripke mean when he says that objects and their names are "stipulated" in possible world's? Kind of confused about what he means by that.

Kripke mentions early on that some problems of trans-world identity come from conflating epistemological issues with ontological ones. There are starkly different criteria here. What our knowledge of something requires is not the same as what that something's existence requires. Kripke does not claim to have solved all trans-world identity issues. Wallows' earlier quotes elucidate upon some of those.

When an object's elemental constituents are necessary for the object to exist, then when and if we attempt to stipulate that that object does not include it's elemental constituents, we are stipulating a possible world without that object. Kripke acknowledges these sorts of issues, while simultaneously allowing us to continue to sensibly discuss possible worlds scenarios regarding these objects, by virtue of talking about these objects without needing to discuss their essential parts.

We can talk about a table in another possible world without needing to talk about it in terms of it's molecules. I think he goes farther by implying that if talk of it's molecules does not or cannot effectively exhaust talk of it in terms of it's being a table, then something is clearly missing from the account. Molecules alone, specific kinds of wood alone... these things may be essential 'properties' of this table, but they are most certainly not sufficient for being a table, nor are they necessary. Not all wood molecules are tables. Not all tables consist of that type of wood.

There is something inherent to the identity of that table such that part of it's being that table is the fact that we call it such...

Quoting Wallows

What does Kripke mean when he says that objects and their names are "stipulated" in possible world's? Kind of confused about what he means by that.

I'm not sure he says that. Objects, as far as I understand, according to Kripke are picked out of this world - by virtue of naming them - and posited in another set of circumstances. The other circumstances are stipulated. The other circumstances are possible worlds.

Still confused. Thanks anyway.

Reply to Terrapin Station What makes a good chess player is subjective? Nuh.

Quoting creativesoul

What does Kripke mean when he says that objects and their names are "stipulated" in possible world's? Kind of confused about what he means by that.
— Wallows

I'm not sure he says that. Objects, as far as I understand, according to Kripke are picked out of this world - by virtue of naming them - and posited in another set of circumstances. The other circumstances are stipulated. The other circumstances are possible worlds.

Quoting Wallows

Still confused. Thanks anyway

What's confusing to you?

Reply to creativesoul AH! You got it. Cool!

Quoting Banno

?creativesoul AH! You got it. Cool!

:wink:

Maybe.

Reply to creativesoul

So, to stipulate something according to Kripke is to name something or give it a description?

Reply to Wallows Reading-wise, i am at the start of Lecture 2. But I am happy (?) to move back and forward as topics are of interest.

Much more could be said of K's view on Wittgenstein, for example, but first we ought be clear about what it is he is saying about metre rules and such.

We also skipped the mention of Certainty, which is of particular interest to me.

Quoting Wallows

So, to stipulate something according to Kripke is to name something or give it a description?

I don't think that that's quite right. I'm thinking that his use of "stipulate" is very specific here. It's being used as a means to isolate the different content of possible worlds, with the rigid designator(the name) being one component and the alternative circumstances being the other. The former remains across all possible worlds, whereas the latter does not.

Reply to Banno

What makes a good or bad anything is subjective.

Reply to Wallows To name and posit a variation.

Kripke's view of possible worlds is pretty minimalist. So simple "what if..." sentences like "What if I had eggs instead of cornflakes..." are to be understood as setting out a possible world in which I had eggs instead of cornflakes.

It might sound like an attempt to do something metaphysically awesome - to bring whole worlds into existence just to talk about cornflakes and eggs. It's not. the term "possible world" is a hang over from his formal logic, and are just differing interpretations.

So we can seek out the consequences that might have ensued if I had eggs instead of cornflakes. I wouldn't have opened the milk, and the pan would need cleaning.

What we do not have to do is to work out if the person eating the eggs in that possible world is the same as the person eating cornflakes in the actual world. That they are the same is set in the specification: "What if I had eggs instead of cornflakes..."

And that's where those who think there is a problem of transworld identity (@frank ?) get it wrong, setting the cart before the horse.

Reply to Terrapin Station Rubbish. A good knife is sharp. A good chess player at least knows how to move the pieces, and preferably a few decent openings.

Reply to Banno

Saying "rubbish" and then listing subjective criteria doesn't really work as an argument.

This is not the place for it Reply to Terrapin Station...

Reply to Wallows

Yes. Banno just elaborated nicely upon my response to you...

Reply to creativesoul
Excuse me?

Reply to Terrapin Station You are off topic.

As well as being wrong.

Reply to Banno

Lol, could you be any more transparent about not being able to defend your view?

Reply to Terrapin Station

This topic is about Kripke's paper/lectures. It is not about the archaic and utterly useless notion of subjective that you've invoked here...

You're excused.

Reply to creativesoul

I see you don't understand how discussions work.

Reply to Banno

I think that prior to getting into the second lecture, we ought offer a summary of the first. This summary ought set out the important distinctions that he set the groundwork for. The last twenty or so pages are important to understand. I'm still working through them. They seem to be explanations of earlier distinctions, but the notion of "fixing a referent" as compared to giving a synonym ought be understood...

Reply to Terrapin Station If I have it right, you are saying that the difference between a neo who moves pieces around at random, and a grandmaster, is purely subjective.

Well, you are using subjective in an odd way. Since the FIDE sets out clearly the requirements for a grand master, that status is not "based on feelings".

And, a grandmaster would be a far better protagonist than a neo, whether the difference is subjective or not.

The only thing more annoying than someone coming into a thread about a book and posting without having read the book would be someone coming into a thread about a book and posting a bunch of stuff that is simply not related to the book.

Reply to Terrapin Station :lol:

Reply to creativesoul off you go then.

Quoting Banno

If I have it right, you are saying that the difference between a neo who moves pieces around at random, and a grandmaster, is purely subjective.

It's not that the difference in how they're moving the pieces is subjective. It's that one set of moves versus another counting as "good at chess" is subjective .

I'm not using "subjective" in an unusual manner. The subjective/objective distinction has nothing to do with agreement, and subjective phenomena are not limited to "feelings." Re the requirements being codified and agreed upon, that doesn't make them obtain objectively. Again, the distinction isn't about agreement, and argumentum ad populums are fallacies.

You could be more ignorantly and arrogantly patronizing than assuming I haven't read Naming and Necessity, but I'll have to get back to you re how.

Quoting frank

you must already know who Nixon is.

Yes that's right and you only know that by ostention and/ or description which has been my point.

Quoting Banno

What we do not have to do is to work out if the person eating the eggs in that possible world is the same as the person eating cornflakes in the actual world. That they are the same is set in the specification: "What if I had eggs instead of cornflakes..."

And that's where those who think there is a problem of transworld identity (@frank ?) get it wrong, setting the cart before the horse.

I think, I get it. So, stipulative terms are those which we can specify; but, don't necessarily obtain in the actual world. Is that right?

What instantiates a stipulative term in a possible world is my next question. Do they obtain through the laws of nature, logic, and such?

But, then the question arises, what if possible worlds are so profoundly different from our own (let's say they have a different logical space than our own), that we could not effectively stipulate their contents from our own, then does that make the stipulative term of a 'possible worlds' moot?

Reply to Wallows Yes.

Reply to Banno

Alright. But the next two questions are still pertinent... What's your take on them?

Reply to Wallows No.

Look again at "What if Banno had eggs instead of cornflakes this morning?"

The stipulation is "Banno had eggs"; this, not a law of nature or a puff of logic, is what sets up the possible world.

It does not "bring the possible world into existence for us to investigate" or some such metaphysical miracle. Perhaps it is best just to think of the stipulation as having set up a possible conversation.

Reply to Wallows Give me time! I'm only doing this in order to procrastinate.

Reply to Banno

Okay, but then without the metaphysics we're kind of left with an empty referent as to you having eggs instead of cornflakes this morning

So, saying that Banno could of had eggs instead cornflakes this morning is cool and all; but, leaves us with nothing of any import or a senseless proposition, which might be revealed later on in the book if I am assuming it has import on meaning.

Quoting Wallows

But, then the question arises, what if possible worlds are so profoundly different from our own (let's say they have a different logical space than our own), that we could not effectively stipulate their contents from our own, then does that make the stipulative term of a 'possible worlds' moot?

Calling it a world seems to cause so much grief. It comes from the practice in formal logic of calling a given set of objects used in an interpretation, a world, and hence a possible world in interpreting modal statements.

Let's play with calling it a "possible discussion", which, while problematic in other ways, might help explain away the mistake of thinking of possible worlds as metaphysical entities.

So we could have a chat about the consequences that might have ensued had I cooked eggs instead of the lazy option of cornflakes; or we could have a conversation about what might have occurred had Nixon not been elected. and so on. These conversations do not bring whole worlds into existence.

Quoting Banno

I'm only doing this in order to procrastinate.

Oh, a fellow wallower. Nice to meet you. :)

Quoting Wallows

a senseless proposition,

In what way is the proposed conversation without a sense? It is about me, my cornflakes, and the eggs I didn't eat. The meaning seems to me to be pretty clear.

Reply to Banno

Well there's nothing to attach the predicate of you eating cornflakes or eggs with bacon this morning. It has no referant that obtains in this world, or an empty referent. So, I figure we're committed to talking about a possible world where you ate eggs and bacon this morning. So, hurray metaphysics.

Reply to Wallows But hang on - the referent is Banno. that's what is referred to by the rigid designator "Banno".

I find myself asking at what stage I conclude that you are being obtuse for the sake of it? Knocking stuff off the table just to watch Banno pick it up again?

Quoting Banno

But hang on - the referent is Banno. that's what is referred to by the rigid designator "Banno".

But you eating eggs and bacon this morning never happened. It doesn't obtain in our world; but, in some possible one where that may have happened. The referant exists in that possible world and not this one. So, again hurray metaphysics!

Quoting Banno

Knocking stuff off the table just to watch Banno pick it up again?

As a fellow wallower, you must understand that this is simply a thing we do.

Reply to Wallows SO I'm going to invite you to re-think that post, and get back to me.

Reply to Banno

Then, is Banno a rigid designator?

Reply to Wallows Yes.

Reply to Banno

Then, had you eaten cornflakes and eggs with bacon this morning because you wanted a hearty meal also refer to that rigid designator in our world? What's happening to the referential component? Where is it instantiated?

Quoting Wallows

What's happening to the referential component? Where is it instantiated?

What? The sentence is about Banno and eggs and cornflakes. What referential component has a problem?

Reply to Banno

The referential, "Banno" in "Banno ate cornflakes and eggs with bacon this morning" denotes the Banno in this world or in a stipulated possible world or is that irrelevant?

Reply to Wallows See, this fills me with dread.

If "Banno" is a rigid designator - which it is - then it refers to Banno in any possible world in which Banno exists.

So yes, it denotes Banno in the actual world and in any possible world in which I exist - including the one where I ate eggs.

Quoting Banno

So yes, it denotes Banno in the actual world and in any possible world in which I exist - including the one where I ate eggs.

But, it doesn't obtain in this world only a possible stipulated one.

Reply to Wallows So? What do you mean by "obtain"?

Quoting Banno

What do you mean by "obtain"?

I simply believe that the fact that it doesnt obtain in our world gives the possible discussion a different meaning. Be it epistemic, ontological, and even in some sense metaphysical.

Reply to Wallows If you are saying that chats involving modality are different to chats that do not involve modality, then, yes, they are.

They are modal.

Reply to Banno

Okay, so since I got that straightened out, what's next?

Quoting Banno

If you are saying that chats involving modality are different to chats that do not involve modality, then, yes, they are.

So, do modal chats differ substantially from talk about what obtains? Do some philosophers restrict talk to things that only obtain. Is modal talk metaphysics?

Quoting Wallows

Is modal talk metaphysics?

Nuh. Epistemology.

But arguing in this way is misguided since there is considerable (understatement) overlap.

Reply to Wallows Next comes Creative's summation of Lecture One. Reply to creativesoul

Quoting Banno

Nuh. Epistemology.

What kind of epistemology?

Quoting Banno

But arguing in this way is misguided since there is considerable (understatement) overlap.

Overlap with what?

Reply to Wallows Pfff. Do some of the work for yourself. Consider it homework.

Quoting Banno

Pfff. Do some of the work for yourself. Consider it homework.

Point me in the right direction, kind Sir. What pages should I cover? I'm almost close to the end of the lecture I.

@creativesoul, waiting on you.

Quoting Janus

Yes that's right and you only know that by ostention and/ or description which has been my point.

You know Nixon in the actual world a posteriori. And it's true that we know him by his story. So it's troubling that we can think about a Nixon with an alternate story.

I think there are a variety of approaches to that question and Kripke was vague enough that he invites differing interpretations.

How do you assess our ability to think of a Nixon with an alternate story, when we know him by his story?

Quoting frank

How do you assess our ability to think of a Nixon with an alternate story, when we know him by his story?

For me the question would be as to how alternative the story could be without Nixon ceasing to be Nixon.

Quoting Janus

For me the question would be as to how alternative the story could be without Nixon ceasing to be Nixon.

So we would change a few things and it's still Nixon. Then we keep changing things and somewhere prior to imagining Nixon as a golf ball, we say that couldn't be Nixon?

Reply to frank

Perhaps we don't need to go as far as the golf ball to lose Nixon. Could Nixon still be Nixon if he had had different parents and also looked completely different or was a woman, for example?

Quoting Janus

Perhaps we don't need to go as far as the golf ball. Could Nixon still be Nixon if he had had different parents and also looked completely different or was a woman, for example?

Different biological parents: Kripke would say no. A hyper-anti-essentialist might say yes.

Looked different? That just takes a wig and some make-up, so I think only the hyper-essentialist would say no.

Woman? Mr. Sperm has a Y chromosome. If he had an X, would he be the same sperm?

Reply to frank

So how do we separate the name 'Nixon' and its referent from the associated definite descriptions of the referent; 'the man who had these biological parents', 'the entity who was a man' and so on?

Quoting Janus

So how do we separate the name 'Nixon' and its referent from the associated definite descriptions of the referent; 'the man who had these biological parents', 'the entity who was a man' and so on?

Kripke doesn't suggest that we ever do that. The hyper-anti-essentialist does.

Kripke just notes that we do easily speak of alternate Nixons. The concept of the rigid designator seems to apply to a scenario where we lay possibilities out in a row on a table, so to speak.

If you speak about alternate Nixons, are you thinking of it spacially in that way? Or do you imagine this universe as a script, and think of a re-write? Or what?

Quoting frank

Kripke doesn't suggest that we ever do that.

It's a long while since I read (and studied) Naming and Necessity, but as far as I understand Kripke wants to separate the idea of reference from any dependence on definite description. Nothing I have read in this thread has convinced me that he succeeded, or even could succeed, in doing that. So I thought when I studied it, and still tend to think, that it is "much ado about nothing".

Quoting frank

If you speak about alternate Nixons, are you thinking of it spacially in that way? Or do you imagine this universe as a script, and think of a re-write? Or what?

I think we can quite coherently imagine that Nixon could have had a very different life-course. What exactly it is that is most minimally necessary and sufficient to make someone count as being Nixon is not so easy to pin down. This would seem to be related to Wittgenstein's critique of essentialism in terms of "family resemblances". It is not a precise science.

Quoting Janus

...but as far as I understand Kripke wants to separate the idea of reference from any dependence on definite description

Reference? I think it's more about identity. If I write about an alternate Nixon, I shouldn't have any problem picking out which character in my story is Nixon. If you read my story and have difficulty, that means I suck at writing.

Quoting Janus

It's not a precise science.

Kripke agrees. Schopenhauer strongly disagrees.

Quoting frank

Reference? I think it's more about identity. If I write about an alternate Nixon, I shouldn't have any problem picking out which character in my story is Nixon. If you read my story and have difficulty, that means I suck at writing.

Reference and identity seem to be inseparably related, though. You can write about (in the sense of stipulate that you are writing about) an alternative Nixon, but does that character have some ineliminable relation to the actual Nixon, or is the relation merely an arbitrary stipulation; a "because I say so"?

Quoting frank

It's not a precise science. — Janus


Kripke agrees.

Well, "rigid designation" suggests precision whereas descriptions are always imprecise. Perhaps Kripke is ambivalent or inconsistent?

Quoting Janus

You can write about (in the sense of stipulate that you are writing about) an alternative Nixon, but does that character have some ineliminable relation to the actual Nixon

I would say yes. The actual Nixon, at a certain point, had the potential to either win or lose.

I understand what you're saying about reference. I'll have to think about it.

Quoting Janus

Kripke wants to separate the idea of reference from any dependence on definite description.

Indeed he does, or so it may seem...

That is the bit that I'm currently attempting to summarize. I think it amounts to the difference between the meaning of a name and a name as identity. He actually has a few examples where a description is clearly inadequate for identity. It also seems that he's using modality(possible world semantics) as a means to argue this...

Quoting creativesoul

It also seems that he's using modality(possible world semantics) as a means to argue this...

But, if every name is a rigid designator, then we're left with necessary existents that instantiate necessity. How do you deal with this?

Quoting creativesoul

I think it amounts to the difference between the meaning of a name and a name as identity. He actually has a few examples where a description is clearly inadequate for identity.

By "name as identity" do you mean "name as identifier". The problem I see is that many people can have the same name, and when we use a name to refer to someone we need supplementary descriptions (unless we are right there in which case pointing (ostention) will suffice) to enable us to identify who the name is being used to refer to.

Of course I agree that a description or any set of descriptions is "adequate for identity" but a description may be adequate for identification.

Quoting frank

I would say yes.

No matter how attenuated the fictional characters connection (in terms of description) to the real Nixon is? Are you thinking it is so simply on the basis that you (the author) think of your character as being somehow an alternate version of Nixon? Would it matter if others found the identity connection unconvincing?

Quoting Wallows

It also seems that he's using modality(possible world semantics) as a means to argue this...
— creativesoul

But, if every name is a rigid designator, then we're left with necessary existents that instantiate necessity. How do you deal with this?

I'm not sure that every name is a rigid designator for Kripke. Proper names are what he's dealing with... I think.

Assume he is talking about every name, for the sake of argument...

What do you mean "we're left with necessary existents that instantiate necessity"?

Quoting creativesoul

I'm not sure that every name is a rigid designator for Kripke. Proper names are what he's dealing with... I think.

Yes, I'll settle with that. I might be wrong of course about every name being a rigid designator. Of course, some names can have empty referents. Like, Pegasus, or Harry Potter.

Quoting creativesoul

Assume he is talking about every name, for the sake of argument...

What do you mean "we're left with necessary existents that instantiate necessity"?

Well, what "structures the world" according to my reading of Kripke are necessary existents. That's all I meant by it.

Quoting Janus

No matter how attenuated the fictional characters connection (in terms of description) to the real Nixon is? Are you thinking it is so simply on the basis that you (the author) think of your character as being somehow an alternate version of Nixon?

No. In any possible world that includes Nixon, there are characteristics essential to him. He has to be human-shaped, for instance. He can't be a golf ball.

Janus:
Would it matter if others found the identity connection unconvincing?

That would suggest that I'm straying either from facts about Nixon or logical possibility.

Quoting Janus

I think it amounts to the difference between the meaning of a name and a name as identity. He actually has a few examples where a description is clearly inadequate for identity.
— creativesoul

By "name as identity" do you mean "name as identifier". The problem I see is that many people can have the same name, and when we use a name to refer to someone we need supplementary descriptions (unless we are right there in which case pointing (ostention) will suffice) to enable us to identify who the name is being used to refer to.

Of course I agree that a description or any set of descriptions is "adequate for identity" but a description may be adequate for identification.

That was put poorly by me...

He repeatedly talks of the consequences for a theory of meaning and a theory of reference as they apply to his offering. So, it seems clear from that that Kripke is at a minimum showing the difference between them. Further seems that he's tying definite descriptions to theories of meaning and not to identity.

What I find intriguing is that he's using possible world semantics as a means for reduction...

What can we take away and retain the identity? You and frank have been discussing this and it's consequences. Kripke notes several times that there are essential parts, and that those are not the aim of his paper... So, it's scope of application is limited.

Seems that one of his main points is to displace the commonly held view that that which is necessary is also a priori. Another is to render the distinction between a priori and a posteriori flawed at a minimum, and useless at a maximum.

My own position is at odds with much of what Kripke is arguing from, and even a bit of what he is invoking on his own. However, I've decided to set difference aside here simply for the sake of understanding Kripke. Later on I think it would be beneficial for us to show the pros and cons of what Kripke is arguing for. This is a reading group, so expressing flaws or shortcomings is acceptable for me at some point after everyone who's interested in and capable of understanding what Kripke is getting at does.

Some have said that modal talk has an inherent issue. Namely(pun intended), that identity cannot transcend from our world to a hypothetical one(all possible worlds are hypothetical). Kripke shows that that is not always the case. He further sharpens his response to that particular criticism by virtue of clearly explicating between cases when identity cannot transcend between possible worlds(when essential parts exist), and cases where there is no problem whatsoever(when the description of an object is utterly inadequate for referring to and thus identifying the object of reference). He admits of the former(the existence of essential parts), and clearly states that. He further explicates that those cases are not the aim. He continues to explicate upon the latter.

Some have said that definition requires a description of the object being defined, and that identity is determined by such. Hesperus and Nixon are prima facie examples of cases where that quite simply does not hold up to scrutiny. We can easily posit possible worlds where descriptions of the object are not necessary to identify the object.

Hesperus could've gotten knocked of it's course. Some object of equivalent mass other than Hesperus could have come to rest 'at' the same spatiotemporal location. That possible world scenario does not make Hesperus something else. That possible world scenario does not make the other purely hypothetical object Hesperus. Rather, it shows that definite descriptions are not necessary for identifying Hesperus. "The evening star" is a description that is not necessary to identify Hesperus.

Had other events taken place, Nixon could have lost the election. Someone else could have won. This would not make Nixon a different object. This would not make the other person Nixon. It shows that descriptions of Nixon as president are not necessary for referring to and/or identifying Nixon. He was Nixon prior to his presidency after-all...

Quoting Wallows

Well, what "structures the world" according to my reading of Kripke are necessary existents. That's all I meant by it.

...When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed. A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid...

I'm concluding based upon the above that - according to Kripke's scheme - a necessary existent is equivalent to an essential property...

...a property can meaningfully be held to be essential or accidental to an object independently of its description...

The above seems to argue in defense or support of essential and/or necessary properties. What I do not get, cannot quite square, is the above with the below, which he wrote early on in the first lecture...

..A much worse thing, something creating great additional problems, is whether we can say of any particular that it has necessary or contingent properties, even make the distinction between necessary and contingent properties. Look, it's only a statement or a state of affairs that can be either necessary or contingent ! Whether a particular necessarily or contingently has a certain property depends on the way it's described...

Evidently there's a meaningful distinction to be drawn and maintained between particulars and objects?

Anyone here that care help me out?

Quoting creativesoul

Evidently there's a meaningful distinction to be drawn and maintained between particulars and objects?

I don't think so. He meant any particular thing.

Quoting frank

Evidently there's a meaningful distinction to be drawn and maintained between particulars and objects?
— creativesoul

I don't think so. He meant any particular thing.

Hmmm...

I'm not so sure.

If the paper arrives at self-contradiction, how far does the consequence of incoherency travel?

If it doesn't matter to some of the points he makes, then perhaps it be best to set it aside and bring it up at a more appropriate time.

Can anyone help here?

Reply to creativesoul Perhaps he was giving an account of Bertrand Russell’s and John Searle’s theories of descriptors? I don’t know. I’d have to read the paper again.

.Reply to creativesoul In the second quote he's complaining about the problems that arise from using descriptions. What seems to be contingent will turn out to be necessary.

In the second quote he's going to explain how that confusion can be resolved.

Quoting frank

In the second quote he's complaining about the problems that arise from using descriptions. What seems to be contingent will turn out to be necessary.

In the second quote he's going to explain how that confusion can be resolved.

He argues in favor of the first quote. He argues in favor of the second quote. The result is obvious self-contradiction unless there is a distinction to be drawn and maintained between objects and particulars.

Particulars are stipulated?

Yup. That must be the case...

Reply to creativesoul If we rely entirely on definite descriptions for identity, we'll end up with an actualist's account: all known properties of an object are necessary.

This would mean all statements about alternate possibilities are false. Most statements of that sort aren't aiming to say something about the nature of the universe, though. Often they're just about logical possibility.

Kripke talks about rigid designators as a way to capture more clearly what we mean by such speech. It's not a philosophical device. He's only using jargon for something that didn't previously have a name.

So in your first quote, he's venturing away from total reliance on descriptions. He doesn't leave description behind entirely and doesn't leave us with a very clear idea where we should draw the line.

Quoting frank

If... all known properties of an object are necessary.

This would mean all statements about alternate possibilities are false.

Unsure how this addresses my last post. Nonetheless, it makes no sense to me.



If all known properties of an object are necessary, it would mean that all statements about alternative properties are about that which is not... necessary.

Quoting frank

Most statements of that sort(possible worlds) aren't aiming to say something about the nature of the universe, though. Often they're just about logical possibility.

I agree. What follows below is a bit off topic, my own take on a few things, and disagrees sharply with the convention grounding Kripke's thoughts in a few ways...

It is worth mention that possible world scenarios can consist of true statements. What makes these statements true matters. I'll say more about that momentarily...

In order to be logically possible, a statement must follow the rules of correct inference. Conclusions are statements that follow the rules of correct inference. Logically possible statements are conclusions that follow the rules of correct inference. Valid conclusions are logically possible.

True statements are existentially dependent upon truth. Some logically possible statements are false. Some logically possible statements are true. Therefore, logical possibility alone is insufficient for truth.

...

Quoting frank

Kripke talks about rigid designators as a way to capture more clearly what we mean by such speech. It's not a philosophical device. He's only using jargon for something that didn't previously have a name.

So in your first quote, he's venturing away from total reliance on descriptions. He doesn't leave description behind entirely and doesn't leave us with a very clear idea where we should draw the line.

Okay.

So, Kripke is summarizing what's going on when we talk about possible worlds. He's noting(and naming) the different kinds of designators as a means for pointing out some things that had not been pointed out in past. He ventures away from total reliance upon definite descriptions. I think I agree with him on that much...

If it is the case that we cannot stipulate particulars(at least some alternative circumstances), then there can be no possible worlds talk at all, for it is the particular alternative circumstances that make them what they are. Those are stipulated.

Clearly, as skirted around above, the identity of the object in question is not always dependent upon definite descriptions. However, it seems impossible to not use the same name. So, possible world talk happens. We all make some sense of it. Clearly this is because we do no entirely depend upon definite descriptions as a means of identifying the object we're talking about. However, we always use the same name...

Is that about right, on your understanding?

Reply to creativesoul Sounds right to me.

Reply to frank

So...

What is your take on what's most important for the reader to firmly grasp in lecture one? I'm almost certain that I'm missing something somewhere along the line...

Reply to creativesoul That an identity is more than just some ideas about what a name means.

Your knowledge of identity comes from your involvement with a community that calls a particular by a certain name.

Quoting frank

Your knowledge of identity comes from your involvement with a community that calls a particular by a certain name.

Hmmm... "a particular"?

Particulars are stipulated though, right? Objects are named. Otherwise, the aforementioned self-contradiction...

Quoting frank

You know Nixon in the actual world a posteriori. And it's true that we know him by his story.

I wonder, could someone still use the name "Nixon", despite not knowing anything about him?

It just seems to me that if someone overheard you using the name "Nixon", and so came to ask "WhHo is Nixon?", that their question is about Nixon.

Quoting Janus

For me the question would be as to how alternative the story could be without Nixon ceasing to be Nixon.

SO let's have a look:

Suppose Nixon had had grey eyes. No problem? So the sentence "Suppose Nixon had had grey eyes" is about Nixon.

Suppose Nixon had not been elected President. Quite a few more things would have to change; someone else would have presumably been elected, and so on. But again, the sentence "Suppose Nixon had not been elected" is about Nixon.

Suppose Nixon had been a Woman. Again, quite a few other things might have to change in our freshly constructed possible world. What things? Whatever we like. After all it is our world. And again, the sentence "Suppose Nixon had been a woman" is about Nixon.

Suppose Nixon had been a golf ball. Now we are definitely pushing it. It seems difficult, impossible, even, to picture this possible world in any sort of coherent way.

But again, what is the sentence "Suppose Nixon had been a golf ball" about? It's about Nixon.

SO we might sit with the view that even were Nixon a golf ball, Nixon would be Nixon. Perhaps it's the conjuring of such an absurd possible world that is failing here, not the reference to Nixon.

Only proper names are rigid designators.

Reply to Noah Te Stroete Indeed he was.

Reply to creativesoul Not too shabby. I'm impressed by your brevity.

Reply to frank I don't see an argument pushing in this direction in the first lecture.

Are you jumping ahead?

Quoting Banno

don't see an argument pushing in this direction in the first lecture.

Are you jumping ahead?

I said:

Quoting frank

That an identity is more than just some ideas about what a name means.

Your knowledge of identity comes from your involvement with a community that calls a particular by a certain name.

His demonstrates the first sentence by pointing to aspects of the second.

Quoting creativesoul

Particulars are stipulated though, right? Objects are named. Otherwise, the aforementioned self-contradiction...

You are a particular human. Is that a stipulation in your view?

Quoting Banno

It just seems to me that if someone overheard you using the name "Nixon", and so came to ask "Who is Nixon?", that their question is about Nixon.

How do they know it's a "who" and not a "what"?

Reply to frank OK; "What is Nixon?"

Still about Nixon.

Reply to Banno if they think it's a "what", then they're asking me how to use the word.

Reply to frank SO they are asking you how to use the word "Nixon". Ok, what is your answer?

Reply to Banno Former president.

Reply to frank So... Their question was about Nixon.

Reply to Banno Is "Nixon" the same thing as Nixon?

Reply to frank One is a word, the other a person.

Reply to frank Suppose they do know Nixon is a person. That is not a definite description. Thay ask "Who is Nixon?"; isn't their question about Nixon?

Reply to Banno So a question about "Nixon" is not a question about Nixon.

They have to have some idea who Nixon is to ask a question about him.

Quoting frank

They have to have some idea who Nixon is to ask a question about him.

Perhaps; but they refer to Nixon without the benefit of a definite description, in order to ask who Nixon is.

Quoting frank

So a question about "Nixon" is not a question about Nixon.

Yes. So if they ask "What is 'Nixon'", the answer is "a word".

If they ask "What is Nixon", the answer is "A president".

Reply to Banno They need to know something about Nixon in order to be talking about him.

Once they know he was a president, though that may be all they know, they can speculate that he might not have been a president.

Quoting frank

They need to know something about Nixon in order to be talking about him.

Well, I disagree. And perhaps the reasons will become clearer as we proceed through the book. But for now, will you agree that one can use a name despite not having an associated definite description? Perhaps there must be something that links a name to its referent; but it need not be a definite description.

Quoting frank

and somewhere prior to imagining Nixon as a golf ball, we say that couldn't be Nixon?

If Nixon was a golf-ball, he still wouldn't go straight.

It is the nature of counterfactuals that they posit a possible world that is not the case - a coulda woulda shoulda world that is fantasy. If wishes were horses, then beggars would ride, but they ain't and they don't. Whatever Banno had for breakfast, he had that and not something else, and it is impossible that he had something other than what he had. Such is a counterfactual world. There may or may not be a boundary of plausibility, or some limit to the amount of change you wish to countenance, but counterfactuals are all untrue.

That a man be a golf ball is not on the face of it more unreasonable than that cornflakes be eggs, or that brown eyes be blue.

But there are other sorts of possible world, such as Banno's breakfast tomorrow, that are not certainly one thing or the other; eggs or cornflakes are both real possibilities. Every time one makes a plan, one creates a possible world, and if everything goes according to plan, the possible world is realised, or if one has to adapt, another possible world is realised.

And there are epstemologically possible worlds, such that if you don't know what I had for breakfast then as far as you know, I might have had eggs or cornflakes, even though you know that whatever I had, I had that and 'could not' have had something else.

Quoting Banno

Perhaps there must be something that links a name to its referent; but it need not be a definite description.

As in 'Nixon' - the man, snake, or golf ball you were just talking about.

Quoting unenlightened

If Nixon was a golf-ball, he still wouldn't go straight.

Nice.

Quoting Banno

But for now, will you agree that one can use a name despite not having an associated definite description?

Yes.

Quoting frank

How do you assess our ability to think of a Nixon with an alternate story, when we know him by his story?

It's basically just a matter of what an individual takes to be essential and accidental, or necessary and contingent properties re their concept of Nixon (or whatever we might be talking about).

In other words, you'll have personal requirements for calling some x "Nixon," and you'll only call an x "Nixon" if it meets those requirements.

If every property of something is necessary with respect to your concept of it, then you can't do counterfactual scenarios with respect to it, because it just wouldn't be that thing in your view if there were anything different about it.

But for most people, not all properties of anything are necessary with respect to their concepts of that thing. Most folks have concepts where there are some contingent properties. So most people don't think, for example, that if Nixon didn't wear a blue suit on March 3, 1969, then they're not going to call that x "Nixon" any longer.

Quoting Banno

Perhaps there must be something that links a name to its referent; but it need not be a definite description.

And, here is where we get into metaphysics. How does the counterfactual obtain (or is instantiated) when saying Banno had eggs with bacon and cornflakes this morning because he was especially hungry?

Reply to Wallows I asked before what it means for a counterfactual to obtain - to be true?

Not "Banno had bacon"

But "Banno might have had bacon".

The "had bacon" bit is within the scope of the "might have" bit.

SO it's like "Wallows believes that Banno had bacon"; it might be true even if I had only cornflakes and milk.

Quoting Banno

I asked before what it means for a counterfactual to obtain - to be true?

Somewhat circular; by, stipulating them. Metaphysics implies that there might be a possible world where they actually obtain. Hence, I think we should stick with possible world semantics instead of "possible discussions".

Reply to Banno

All these examples only work if you posit some essence or soul- Nixon- such that it could have been incarnated as a woman or even a golf ball. But then the only way to identify who or what is being referred to as 'Nixon' is the entity that is a woman, or a golf ball, that is the incarnation of the essence that is called (has been baptized, if you like) 'Nixon'.

But these are all definite descriptions and without them I could have no idea who or what you are referring to when you say "Nixon" (unless, as I have already said, I was right there with you and you were pointing at the entity in question).

Even to say that someone or some thing was "baptized" and given some name is itself a definite description. That's why I thought, and still think (in the absence of any cogent argument from anyone to convince me otherwise) Kripke's supposed distinction is "much ado about nothing", or if you prefer " A tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing". But it's no surprise it has been taken so seriously; America is, after all, the land of hype.

Quoting Wallows

Metaphysics implies that there might be a possible world where they actually obtain.

Well, I don't agree. Take a look at Reply to unenlightened's post.

While there are those who say that existence in possible worlds must be treated in the same way as existence in the actual world, I am not one, nor, to my reading, is Kripke.

Quoting Janus

All these examples only work if you posit some essence or soul- Nixon- such that it could have been incarnated as a woman or even a golf ball

Why?

Reply to Banno

What else could mean that a woman or a golf ball in some alternate reality is the same entity as President Nixon in this one?

Quoting Janus

...without them I could have no idea who or what you are referring to when you say "Nixon"

And yet the folk in my question example, who do not have access to a suitable definite description, ask about Nixon.

Seems to me a falsification of the theory of definite descriptions. And as you probably know, and as we will find as we move forward, this is not the only type of counterexample.

Quoting Banno

While there are those who say that existence in possible worlds must be treated in the same way as existence in the actual world, I am not one, nor, to my reading, is Kripke.

Then what are counterfactuals if not definite descriptions for events that could have happened otherwise?

Quoting Banno

And yet the folk in my question example, who do not have access to a suitable definite description, ask about Nixon.

The clue is here:

Quoting Banno

They have to have some idea who Nixon is to ask a question about him. — frank


Perhaps; but they refer to Nixon without the benefit of a definite description, in order to ask who Nixon is.

You seem to be acknowledging that they must have some idea who Nixon is to ask a question about him, and yet you claim they refer to him without the benefit of a definite description. Now I have acknowledged that is possible if they have seen Nixon (that is know who he is by ostention) but absent that, what other way would they have of knowing who Nixon is than a definite description? You are yet to answer that one.

Quoting Wallows

Then what are counterfactuals if not definite descriptions of events that could have happened otherwise?

"could".

Reply to Banno

Yes, and what more can you say? I'm lost again...

Reply to Janus I find that a bit perplexing.

To be clear,

• this thread is about Kripke, and I do not agree with Kripke's theory of reference. My own view is that referring needs no grand philosophical explanation, but is just one of the many things we can do with words
• A definite description is not just any description. It serves to pick out the individual to the exclusion of all other individuals
• I gave a clear example of a question about Nixon in which the questioner did not have access to a definite description of Nixon, but in which they nevertheless referred to Nixon
• The meaning of modal sentences is found in the stipulation that sets them up.
• The question "What else could (it?) mean that a woman or a golf ball in some alternate reality is the same entity as President Nixon in this one?" cannot be readily presented in the Grammar proposed by Kripke. Insofar as that is our topic here, you are off topic.

Reply to Wallows Perhaps it will help to say that part of Kripke's purpose is to oppose the reification (making real) of modal proposals.

They are suppositions, not alternate realities.

Quoting Banno

My own view is that referring needs no grand philosophical explanation, but is just one of the many things we can do with words

I agree. I think that it doesn't not only not need any such explanation, but that any such explanation is impossible.

Quoting Banno

A definite description is not just any description. It serves to pick out the individual to the exclusion of all other individuals

I undertsnd that a descrition that was not definite enough to enable us to pick out an indivdiual would be useless; it woukd not enable us to know who we are referring to.

Quoting Banno

I gave a clear example of a question about Nixon in which the questioner did not have access to a definite description of Nixon, but in which they nevertheless referred to Nixon

Yes, but you haven't explained how they knew they we referring to Nixon. It is possible to be misteken about who we think we are referring to, isn't it?

Quoting Banno

The meaning of modal sentences is found in the stipulation that sets them up.

Yes, as stipulation which must amount to a definite description...or?

Quoting Banno

The question "What else could (it?) mean that a woman or a golf ball in some alternate reality is the same entity as President Nixon in this one?" cannot be readily presented in the Grammar proposed by Kripke. Insofar as that is our topic here, you are off topic.

I'm not off-topic because all I am asking is how it is established within Kripke's paradigm that we are referring to some entity and no other.

Reply to Janus More perplexity,

You agree with me that "referring needs no grand philosophical explanation", going further in saying such is impossible.

Yet you insist "...you haven't explained how they knew they we referring to Nixon."

How is this consistent?

Quoting Janus

I'm not off-topic because all I am asking is how it is established within Kripke's paradigm that we are referring to some entity and no other.

Well, perhaps it is that you wish to discuss the end of the book without working through the detail.

IS there any reason we should not move on?

So on to Lecture II, and the formulation of the theory of reference being investigated.

The bullet points, one by one:

1. To every name or designating expression 'X', there
corresponds a cluster of properties, namely the family
of those properties q such that A believes 'qX'.

Roughly, for everything we can name there is a bunch of properties we believe belong to that thing.

Cool?

Quoting Banno

Cool?

Very. :)

So, again essentialism rears its head.

Reply to Wallows Only for Kripke to take shots at.

2. One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed
by A to pick out some individual uniquely.

A definite description.

3. If most, or a weighted most, of the q's are satisfied by
one unique object y, then y is the referent of 'x'.

And if not, it ain't?

the "weighted" but is to keep the sort of argument offered by Searle in the scope of this exercise.

4. If the vote yields no unique object, 'x' does not refer.

And if not, it ain't.

5. The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the q' s'
is known a priori by the speaker.

Hm. Is it?

6. The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the
q' s' expresses a necessary truth

so - in every possible world... There's the rub.

Reply to Banno

Coming from one who prides himself on brevity...

Thanks!

:smile:

I think I'm beginning to understand Kripke's take here... and his aim... but I'm still left feeling like there are some other well-known philosophical issues being addressed by him, and they are still, as of yet, unbeknownst to me. I'm certain of it, as a matter of fact.

Reply to Banno

I see! Thanks.

Ok. Looks like we're on to the second lecture. I'm good with that, but just wanted to say one last thing regarding some ongoing disputes between several different participants...

Alright, so some are thinking/believing that Kripke is offering an unconvincing 'argument'. I suspect that that belief is ill-founded. While I cannot deny that Kripke's paper is unconvincing for many an issue, I suspect that those are not the aim to begin with.

For example, I see no reason whatsoever to think/believe that Kripke wants to completely separate definite descriptions from identity. He's not divorcing the two on all counts. He's just not. That much is clear because he repeatedly grants essential parts.

Rather, he is divorcing essential parts from possible world semantics.

(c) For any successful theory, the account must not be
circular. The properties which are used in the vote
must not themselves involve the notion of reference
in such a way that it is ultimately impossible to
eliminate.

No vicious circularity. No "Socrates is called 'Socrates'".

I might go to this:

It just is not, in any intuitive sense of
necessity, a necessary truth that Aristotle had the properties
commonly attributed to him. (p.74)

It would seem that it's a contingent
fact that Aristotle ever did any of the things commonly
attributed to him today, any of these great achievements that
we so much admire...

Hitler might have spent all his
days in quiet in Linz. In that case we would not say that then
this man would not have been Hitler, for we use the name
'Hitler' just as the name of that man, even in describing other
possible worlds. (This is the notion which I called a rigid
designator in the previous talk.)(p.75)

Here he is targeting both Searle and Lewis.

The supposition that Aristotle might have become a merchant and never contributed to Philosophy, is a supposition about Aristotle...

The supposition that Hitler might have died in the trenches of the first war is a supposition about Hitler.

And so on; the properties that we might include in our description of any individual are none of them necessary, and so cannot function to fix the referent across such suppositions. But that's not a problem because the proper name itself does the job for us.

Hence, thesis six is false.

Quoting Wallows

Then what are counterfactuals if not definite descriptions for events that could have happened otherwise?

Counterfactuals are more like proposals that something could have been other than it was. We create them via imagining differences from facts, where that's constrained by some combination of what we believe about possibilities and what makes sense to us.

Our conceptual criteria for particular concepts are important, too, which is what "rigid designation" is about, in that certain counterfactual proposals will result in us not considering some F an F any longer, because it would result in differences contra to what we require to call some x an F.

What it conventionally is for a counterfactual to be true or false is for our proposal to actually be possible or not. That's different than whether we believe it would be possible.

So "Roses could have been 24 inches in diameter" may be true.

"There could have been a real person just like Superman in 1940" may be false.

It just depends on what is actually possible.

If only what exists is possible--that is, if everything is actually metaphysically necessary (and that would follow if determinism is true, for example--well, and it would require something like metaphyiscal rigidity for constants, too), then every counterfactual is false.

Possible world semantics are existentially dependent upon thinking about one's own thought/belief. There's much groundwork already laid long before we begin carefully considering alternatives to what we already believe. Part of that groundwork is complex language acquisition itself. During such, we learn to use names to identify things, as well as a means for directing another's attention towards something, getting what we want, and perhaps for other purposes as well. We do all this long before we begin talking about possible world semantics. This already involves the use of definite description as a means of reference/identity.

When there has never been definitive descriptions as a means for reference, there can never be talk of leaving them aside.

Possible world semantics are existentially dependent upon definitive descriptions. When we're amidst language acquisition, we will further describe - in great detail - some thing to another person. We begin by using the name of that thing. Or at other times, we're describing - in great detail - the thing itself and we're looking to learn the name of it. The elucidation, either way, is meant to help us understand what it is that we're talking about. All of that happens before any discussion such as this one.

I don't think that Kripke would deny any of this.

There is no such thing as identity without definitive description until long after we've already known how to describe things as a means for identity.

Sorry ladies and gentlemen...

I'm going to retire from this one. I've struggled as much as I can take to set aside the fact that I reject possible world talk(the notions of contingency and necessity to be exact) for completely different reasons than Kripke is offering.

The rest of you enjoi and thanks!

:wink:

Quoting creativesoul

I'm going to retire from this one. I've struggled as much as I can take to set aside the fact that I reject possible world talk(the notions of contingency and necessity to be exact) for completely different reasons than Kripke is offering.

Sorry to hear. Hope you might change your mind. The book is definitely enlightening.

Reply to Wallows

Kripke uses possible world semantics without ever considering what they are existentially dependent upon... there's nothing enlightening about using rubbish as a means for alternative rubbish production.

Quoting creativesoul

Kripke uses possible world semantics without ever considering what they are existentially dependent upon... there's nothing enlightening about using rubbish as a means for alternative rubbish production.

They exist in a Meinongian jungle! :grin:

We're left with the dire need for a standard by which we can determine what is both necessary and sufficient for being X, when X is a composite(a group of things that already exist in their entirety prior to being/becoming a part of X).

That is the problem... always was... Kripke is of no help.

Sure we can talk about electrons... talk about electrons is not talk about this table. We can talk about this table without talking about electrons.

We cannot posit this table in a possible world scenario where there are no electrons.

Quoting creativesoul

Kripke uses possible world semantics without ever considering what they are existentially dependent upon.

Just...no.

Reply to Banno

Good argument.

Reply to Terrapin Station Thanks.

Quoting creativesoul

Kripke uses possible world semantics without ever considering what they are existentially dependent upon...

Architects design possible buildings. And some of them get built. If they are good architects, their possible buildings conform to the laws of structural mechanics. These are the possible buildings that if they are built, don't fall down. Similarly, if you are planning a possible car journey, it is probably a good plan to cross the river where there is a road-bridge. Generally, the more realistic the possible world, the more likely it is to be useful.

But meanwhile, Kripke is saying that possible worlds exist only as 'notions' and notions can be realistic or fanciful, but depend existentially only on someone's willingness to entertain them. If the building doesn't get built, or the journey is not made, these possibilities are unrealised, and remain mere notions.

So the next bit is about the logical relations between the theses. (5) can stand after (6) is rejected.

There are numerous counterexamples for
(2), "One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely," (3), "If most, or a weighted most, of the q> 's are satisfied by one unique object y, then y is the referent of 'x'", and
(4), "If the vote yields no unique object, 'x' does not refer";
that's because the situations they describe are not true a priori, but only after investigation. It's not the descriptions that determine the reference.

Kripke notes the rare case of initial baptism, which example seems to have captured the mind of many philosophers - including hereabouts - such that they have failed to look more broadly for examples, and so been misled in their theorising.

See especially p.79-80.

And so to the critique of (2), starting on p.80.

A first counterargument:
The learned fellow defines Cicero as "the man who denounced Catiline". The plain fellow does not; and yet talks about Cicero.

This is much the argument I used before in asking who Nixon was.

And I think it stands.

Reply to Banno So we're admitting essential properties and there's an obvious expectation of there being a definite description.

Reply to Banno You may not know Nixon's essential properties. He still has them.

Reply to frank Where do you see that?

Reply to frank Fine. The point at hand is that we do not need them to talk about him.

Reply to Banno Somebody needs to know who he is. The ignorant individual speaks of him with dependence on that. So as opposed to thinking every individual must know a definite description, it's that the community knows.

Reply to frank


So you would replace

(2)"One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely,"

with something like (2') "One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by someone in the language community to pick out some individual uniquely,"

That looks fraught.

Or do you suggest that somehow the community as a whole has beliefs?

Quoting Banno

)"One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely,"

with something like (2') "One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by someone in the language community to pick out some individual uniquely,"

No. I'm saying that Nixon is human-shaped in every possible world that contains Nixon.

Quoting Banno

Or do you suggest that somehow the community as a whole has beliefs?

Knowledge shouldn't be thought of as residing between the ears of individuals. The community is like a knowledge bank. Or a skills bank.

Reply to frank OK, I'm going to leave that hanging. I'm gathering that your approach is part of the reason Kripke brought the notion of a vote in - Thesis (4). Lets' keep going and see what is said about that.

So we must take care of certain circularities. We can't make sense of Cicero as "the man who denounced Catiline" if Catiline is no more than the man denounced by Cicero.

I'm not sure why he even bothered to point this out

Quoting frank

No. I'm saying that Nixon is human-shaped in every possible world that contains Nixon.

Of course, this is not sufficient to pick Nixon out form any other human-shaped individual. It is not a definite description and does not serve to pick out Nixon in the requisite way.

So in so far as Kripke's target here is the reference theory of definite descriptions, the relevance of your point is obscure.

So to (3). One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely.

Quoting Banno

I'm not sure why he even bothered to point this out

The discussion on P.83 goes towards explaining this, perhaps.

It seems that we can know who Einstein is, and also that he created the theory of relativity. The Descriptivist theory of reference seems to result in some sort of vicious circularity here, and yet this is the sort of thing we do every day. One could talk about Einstein without being able to present a belief that picks him out uniquely.

If, as (3) proposes, one of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely, then the reverse should follow; the name ought pick out the thing described, uniquely.

But it doesn't. See p.84 for the 'Godel' example. "The creator of the incompleteness theorem" does not serve to pick out, uniquely, Godel, but instead, Schmidt.

Yet when we are talking about Godel, we are not talking about Schmidt.

And to show that this is not as rare an occurrence as might be thought to dissipate the point, Kripke suggests it might actually be the case, for Peano and Deadakind.

Next an example that might reflect on what @frank is thinking. Suppose that most people - or even everyone - thought that Einstein had invented the Atomic Bomb. Would that make Einstein the inventor of the Atomic Bomb? Of course not. Nor does "Columbus" refer to a Greek mathematician or Norse explorer.

Quoting Banno

But it doesn't. See p.84 for the 'Godel' example. "The creator of the incompleteness theorem" does not serve to pick out, uniquely, Godel, but instead, Schmidt.

Yet when we are talking about Godel, we are not talking about Schmidt.

This was the argument that cinched the whole book for me.

Reply to StreetlightX It's interesting how it shows that, by looking at only a few limited examples, a generation of philosophers took on a theory that is simply wrong.

Quoting Banno

Suppose that most people - or even everyone - thought that Einstein had invented the Atomic Bomb. Would that make Einstein the inventor of the Atomic Bomb?

:rofl:

Reply to frank Has it been all too much for you, Frank?

Hey, @Banno, what does Kripke have to say about "counterfactuals"?

Reply to Wallows It's just another name for "possible world"; plausibly without bringing as much baggage with it.

I read Reply to Terrapin Station without much interest.

I suspect that there may be some lack of finesse in the use of description as against definite description in Reply to Wallows

Quoting Banno

It's just another name for "possible world"; plausibly without bringing as much baggage with it.

I think we should adopt the term here from henceforth to dispell he metaphysically of what @creativesoul has been wallowing about/'Over.

Reply to Wallows But he's gone anyway - except when he comes back.

Reply to Banno

So, to talk about counterfactuals, we have definite descriptions that we can stipulate about over and over, Nixon is Nixon and Banno had cornflakes this morning. What else can we say here?

Reply to Wallows It is really important to keep our terms clear. "Nixon" is not a definite description, it is a name. Nor is it essential that the stipulation used to suggest a counterfactual be a definite description.

So, "What if Nixon had blue eyes?" stipulates a counterfactual without using a definite description.

Quoting Banno

So, "What if Nixon had blue eyes?" stipulates a counterfactual without using a definite description.

I see. Now, I am enlightened.

Quoting Banno

Has it been all too much for you, Frank?

You came up with the Consensus Theory of Truth. Very American of you.

Look back at all the examples given either by Kripke or yourself that show that a definite description can't be exactly the same thing as a rigid designator. Which example is like this:

The name Prothobis is used by community X. By way of your amazing detective skills, you discover that all definite descriptions used by this community in regard to Prothobis are wrong. Nobody in this community knows anything true about Prothobis and they never have. They don't even know that it's actually a piece of software. They think it's a guy who frequents a coffee shop.

So help me out: how were you able to determine the true identity of Prothobis? Why isn't Prothobis the guy who frequents the coffee shop?

I think obscure questions help flesh out what's at stake. If you don't, just ignore my posts.

Thanks!
Prothobis

Quoting Wallows

It's just another name for "possible world"; plausibly without bringing as much baggage with it.
— Banno

I think we should adopt the term here from henceforth to dispell he metaphysically of what creativesoul has been wallowing about/'Over.

I'm actually pointing out what Kripke's lectures do not cover. Nothing I've said here contradicts anything Kripke says about proper names as they apply to possible world scenarios and/or our ability to use proper names across them as an exclusive means of identity.

I agree with Kripke regarding all of his points - as they apply to what's going on in possible world talk(semantics). I simply disagree that that warrants concluding that proper names are both necessary and sufficient for identity in all circumstances. Possible worlds talk? Seems so.

Ok. I'm over it. This is more inline with Kripke's lectures...

Are there specific circumstances that are essential to making Nixon who he is? What's left of Nixon when we posit a possible world where everything that makes Nixon Nixon is changed(when we stipulate alternative circumstances that quite simple cannot produce Nixon)? Is there a point in continuing to call this hypothetical person by the same name?

How would it not be a case of mistaken identity? Are there such cases in possible world semantics?

There most certainly are specific circumstances which influence who people are, what people are, and how people are. We know that circumstances influence one's thought/belief system(worldview). We know that one is born without a worldview. We know that one's worldview influences one's decision making and behaviour.

Nixon ordered illegal behaviour. We know that presenting himself in the best possible way to the American public was very important to Nixon. We know that Nixon did not want to be thought of as a crook. These are all things that made Nixon Nixon.

Can we imagine a possible world where Nixon had no political aspirations? Can we imagine a possible world in which Nixon did not care if people thought he was a crook? Can we imagine a possible world in which Nixon did not look like, nor act anything like Nixon - and yet still somehow maintain that we're talking about the same person?

At what point are we stipulating circumstances which contradict the essential circumstances that are a part of what made Nixon who he was/is?

Under what possible world circumstances would we have a clear-cut case of mistaken identity? Surely our hypothetical meanderings are prone for such. It seems to me that Kripke's account cannot take that into account.

Quoting frank

The name Prothobis is used by community X. By way of your amazing detective skills, you discover that all definite descriptions used by this community in regard to Prothobis are wrong. Nobody in this community knows anything true about Prothobis and they never have. They don't even know that it's actually a piece of software. They think it's a guy who frequents a coffee shop.

Yes. This is a case of mistaken identity. That is, everyone who uses "Prothobis" think that it identifies a guy who frequents a coffee shop; this guy.

All possible world scenarios regarding the above are cases of mistaken identity, unless they include circumstances where Prothobis is not a guy at all, but rather is a piece of software.

Nixon is a golf ball.

Not all possible world scenarios are counterfactual.

Quoting Banno

One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely.

Why the "uniquely"?

If Kripke is simply granting another's notion to show it's flaws, then that's fine. However, if that is the case, then there are other issues with that.

Some 'properties'(scare-quotes intentional) make people who they are, but do not pick them out uniquely, for many folk share such 'properties'. It doesn't follow from the fact that some property is not necessarily unique to an individual that that property is not an essential part of who that person is... of that person's identity.

I can say that I imagine a world in which Richard Nixon did not do any of the things that he is infamous for. I can use the name Nixon, and stipulate all sorts of circumstances that are contrary to Nixon's. I can say all sorts of things about Nixon that simply are not true within my hypothetical possible world scenario surrounding Nixon. I could, in fact, deny every specific circumstance that Nixon was ever involved in, and yet we would still know who I am talking about...

How? Not because proper names are both necessary and sufficient for identity. Rather, because we already know who Nixon is by virtue of knowing the circumstances that he was involved in.

That is what makes possible world talk possible.

Quoting Banno

If, as (3) proposes, one of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely, then the reverse should follow; the name ought pick out the thing described, uniquely.

But it doesn't.

I do not think that Kripke's examples have what it takes to dismiss essential parts/properties wholesale. He uses another's false belief about both Einstein and Godel to show that the description is false. It does not show that the description does not identify Einstein and Godel to the believer.

The believer does not know that the description is false.

It does not follow from the fact that one holds false belief about Einstein that that false belief does not identify Einstein. Descriptions are sometimes about an individual, and as a result they can and do pick out a unique individual regardless of whether or not they are true.

"The first man who walked on the moon" picks out Neil Armstrong. If someone other than Neil Armstrong was the first man who walked on the moon, then the description which picks out Neil Armstrong is false. It still picks out Neil Armstrong and will continue to do so until the believer no longer believes that Neil Armstrong was the first man to walk on the moon.

Kripke wants to say that we can talk about Neil Armstrong in a possible world scenario without losing his identity even when we stipulate that he did not walk on the moon.

So...

He's ok with falsehood being used as a means to deny that true descriptions are necessary and sufficient for identity.

He's not ok with using falsehood as a means for identity.

:worry:

Quoting Banno

I read ?Terrapin Station without much interest.

t least we have some similar sentiment about each other.

Seems that Kripke - for some inexplicable reason - is demanding that a description about someone be true in order to identify the person. Names are not even truth-apt. Why ought descriptions be true in order to identify an individual? He also has no issue with positing false descriptions as possible world stipulations.

The man who invented the atomic bomb was not Einstein. Someone who believed that he did will use that description as a means to identify Einstein. As long as the listener either also believes that Einstein invented the atomic bomb, or knows that the speaker's belief about Einstein is false, the identification will succeed. Both will be talking about Einstein.

This shows that a description need not be true in order to successfully pick out(identify) an individual.

Kripke knowingly posits a falsehood(Nixon was not president) in order to support the idea that being president does not(is unnecessary in order to) identify Nixon. He further posits another falsehood based upon the first(that someone else won the election) in order to support the idea that winning the presidency is also insufficient for identifying Nixon. So, according to Kripke, the fact that we can and do posit falsehoods(false descriptions) consititutes warrant for holding that true descriptions are neither necessary nor sufficient for identity.

But...

On the other hand, he uses true descriptions in order to support the idea that false descriptions do not identify an individual uniquely. He uses true descriptions to identify someone uniquely other than Einstein and Godel.

Seems fishy...

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/233693

Reply to Banno

Re the post you're referencing there, it just depends on how you think about the name. If you take "Nixon" to refer to "Whatever was born on January 9, 1913 in Yorba Linda, California, to Hannah (Milhous) Nixon and Francis A. Nixon . . . and became the 37th president of the United States," then a golf ball could be Nixon (if Hannah had given birth to the golf ball, etc.) while "that guy" (previously picked out by "Nixon") would no longer be Nixon.

Reply to Banno

You're missing the point because I have yet to have made it clear.

Quoting Terrapin Station

If...

This I don't get. We have just worked our way through ninety-odd pages of close argument. Instead of addressing any of that text, you posit exactly the fraught position the argument set out to refute.

I do find that somewhat frustrating.

Reply to Banno

So, if Kripke was arguing contra what I just said, then Kripke is wrong.

Reply to Terrapin Station Why?

Reply to Banno

Because I'm right.

Quoting creativesoul

Not all possible world scenarios are counterfactual.

This strikes me as a deep insight. Would you be able to expand on it?

In the domain of talking about what's going on with possible world semantics; in terms of what we're doing when we pick out this person from this world and posit this unique individual into an alternative set of circumstances; in those very limited situations, I've no issue with what Kripke is claiming.

It quite simply does not follow from anything Kripke says that definitive description is unnecessary for identity in all other circumstances aside from possible world semantics and/or what's going on when we talk about circumstances alternative to what we believe.

The only reason that we can talk about setting definitive descriptions aside is because they have already helped us in establishing which individual we're talking about when we use proper names. We pick out this Nixon, not that one... even when Nixon is not here to point at. There are more than one person named Nixon. There is one Nixon who won the American presidential election. Names are clearly inadequate for identifying this Nixon, in this world. Not all use of "Nixon" picks out this Nixon in this world.

If 'Nixon' was both necessary and sufficient for identifying this person, there could be no other people with the name.

To be perfectly clear...

If it were not for both names and definitive descriptions there could be no such thing as identity across possible world scenarios. Neither is sufficient. Both are necessary for the very ability to use a name to posit someone unique into circumstances other than what made them so.

Quoting Wallows

Not all possible world scenarios are counterfactual.
— creativesoul

This strikes me as a deep insight. Would you be able to expand on it?

Deep? I don't know about all that. Simple? Surely.

If everyone believes that Neil Armstrong was the first man to walk on the moon, but he - in fact - was not, then any possible world scenario which stipulated that he was not would not be counter to fact.

Quoting creativesoul

Not all possible world scenarios are counterfactual.

Can you list any?

All it takes for a possible world scenario to not be counterfactual is for it to be true. Some possible world scenarios are true.

Reply to Wallows

He just explained one above.

Quoting Banno

It is really important to keep our terms clear. "Nixon" is not a definite description, it is a name. Nor is it essential that the stipulation used to suggest a counterfactual be a definite description.

So, "What if Nixon had blue eyes?" stipulates a counterfactual without using a definite description.

It seems to me that where you are confused is in thinking that either names are definite descriptions or that they are completely independent of them.

Of course "What if Nixon had blue eyes" does not "use" a definite description, but it implies one, namely "Nixon does not have blue eyes".

Quoting creativesoul

In the domain of talking about what's going on with possible world semantics; in terms of what we're doing when we pick out this person from this world and posit an alternative set of circumstances; in those very limited situations, I've no issue with what Kripke is claiming.

It shows that you don't have to have a particular definite description in mind when you use proper names.

Quoting creativesoul

The only reason that we can talk about setting definitive descriptions aside is because they have already helped us in establishing which individual we're talking about when we use proper names.

That's true in the case of counterfactuals. Can't really have a counterfactual with zero knowledge of the facts.

Quoting creativesoul

If it were not for both names and definitive descriptions there could be no such thing as identity across possible world scenarios. Neither is sufficient. Both are necessary for the very ability to use a name to posit someone unique into circumstances other than what we already believe while retaining the name.

I agree. But we both see that a definite description is not the same thing as a rigid designator, so I think we're on track.

Quoting Janus

It seems to me that where you are confused is in thinking that either names are definite descriptions or that they are completely independent of them.

Of course "What if Nixon had blue eyes" does not "use" a definite description, but it implies one, namely "Nixon does not have blue eyes".

:up:

Philosophy continually makes errors by trying to avoid psychologism or subjectivity.

You can't talk about semantics--meaning, reference, etc.--without talking about how individuals think about language. Whenever you try to say that reference or meaning works in some universal, mind-independent way, you're going to f-- up and say things that are wrong, things that can be very simply falsified merely by noting an individual who thinks about it otherwise.

Quoting frank

The only reason that we can talk about setting definitive descriptions aside is because they have already helped us in establishing which individual we're talking about when we use proper names.
— creativesoul

That's true in the case of counterfactuals...

That's true in all cases of talking about setting definitive descriptions aside and positing alternatives. It does not matter whether or not the alternatives are counterfactual. All it takes to be counterfactual is to be false. That which is true cannot be counterfactual. Some possible world scenarios are true. Some possible world scenarios are not counterfactual.

All possible world scenarios are existentially dependent upon definitive descriptions to help fix the referent of the name being used in the scenario.

"Nixon" refers to more than one person. More than one person are named "Nixon". Only one Nixon was president. Therefore, the name alone is insufficient for identifying this Nixon. Once we've already identified this 'Nixon', then and only then can we entertain circumstances that are alternative to the ones which are unique to this man, by virtue of using the name 'Nixon' as a means for retaining the identity.



Quoting frank

If it were not for both names and definitive descriptions there could be no such thing as identity across possible world scenarios. Neither is sufficient. Both are necessary for the very ability to use a name to posit someone unique into circumstances other than what we already believe while retaining the name.
— creativesoul

I agree. But we both see that a definite description is not the same thing as a rigid designator, so I think we're on track.

How many different people do you think were the first man to walk on the moon?

We could say that someone other than Neil Armstrong did. Would we be talking about the first man to walk on the moon?

Quoting creativesoul

If it were not for both names and definitive descriptions there could be no such thing as identity across possible world scenarios. Neither is sufficient. Both are necessary for the very ability to use a name to posit someone unique into circumstances other than what we already believe while retaining the name.

Which is just what I have been saying all along, but which you, somewhat puzzlingly, seemed to be disagreeing with me about earlier

Quoting creativesoul

Some have said that definition requires a description of the object being defined, and that identity is determined by such. Hesperus and Nixon are prima facie examples of cases where that quite simply does not hold up to scrutiny. We can easily posit possible worlds where descriptions of the object are not necessary to identify the object.

Reply to Janus

Wasn't disagreeing with you in the second quote. Was attempting to summarize Kripke.

I still stand by both quotes.

Quoting Janus

Of course "What if Nixon had blue eyes" does not "use" a definite description, but it implies one, namely "Nixon does not have blue eyes".

But "Nixon does not have blue eyes" is not a definite description.

In possible world scenarios shown by Kripke, definite descriptions are not necessary to identify the objects(including people), for they have already been identified in this world by those descriptions.

Quoting creativesoul

In possible world scenarios shown by Kripke, definite descriptions are not necessary to identify the objects(people), for they have already been identified in this world by those descriptions.

Quoting creativesoul

We can easily posit possible worlds where descriptions of the object are not necessary to identify the object.

To my eye these two statements are contradictory.

Quoting Banno

But "Nixon does not have blue eyes" is not a definite description.

Why would it not qualify as a definite description? I think it is a definite description, just as all descriptions are else they would not be descriptions; they are definite insofar as they define the object being described. Of course I also acknowledge that there are degrees of definiteness; just as there is no description that is not definite, there is no absolutely definite description. If I say "Nixon has blue eyes" for example that does not tell me what shade of blue his eyes are (or how large his irises are, what shape his eyes are and so on and on).

Quoting creativesoul

In possible world scenarios shown by Kripke, definite descriptions are not necessary to identify the objects(people), for they have already been identified in this world by those descriptions.

This seems silly to me; of course the definitions are used in this world to identify the entities in other world scenarios. Everything is done in this world, so what else could we be talking about?

Quoting Janus

If it were not for both names and definitive descriptions there could be no such thing as identity across possible world scenarios.
— creativesoul

We can easily posit possible worlds where descriptions of the object are not necessary to identify the object.
— creativesoul

To my eye these two statements are contradictory.

Quoting creativesoul

All possible world scenarios are existentially dependent upon definitive descriptions to help fix the referent of the name being used in the scenario.

"Nixon" refers to more than one person. More than one person are named "Nixon". Only one Nixon was president. Therefore, the name alone is insufficient for identifying this Nixon. Once we've already identified this 'Nixon', then and only then can we entertain circumstances that are alternative to the ones which are unique to this man, by virtue of using the name 'Nixon' as a means for retaining the identity.

Quoting Janus

Why would it not qualify as a definite description?

Because it does not pick out a single individual to the exclusion of all others.

Quoting creativesoul

Once we've already identified this 'Nixon', then and only then can we entertain circumstances that are alternative to the ones which are unique to this man, by virtue of using the name 'Nixon' as a means for retaining the identity.

But so what? That doesn't mean that the rigid designator is independent of definite descriptions.

Quoting Banno

Because it does not pick out a single individual to the exclusion of all others.

But no single description picks out (in the sense of by itself informs someone previously ignorant of the identity of) a single individual to the exclusion of all others; you need a set of descriptions for that; and each description is definite not in the sense that it definitely applies to only one person, (although some of them indeed may) but in the sense that it is part of the definition of what it is to be that unique person.

Quoting creativesoul

How many different people do you think were the first man to walk on the moon?

We could say that someone other than Neil Armstrong did. Would we be talking about the first man to walk on the moon?

Consider this statement:

Armstrong was the first man on the moon.

It's not necessarily true because it could have been Aldrin.

Compare this statement:

The actual first man to walk on the moon was Armstrong.

It's necessarily true.

See the difference?

Reply to Janus Where is this from?

a noun phrase introduced by the definite article or its equivalent, and denoting a particular entity or phenomenon.

Reply to Banno

What do you mean? It's from me of course; where else?

Reply to Janus Well it is at odds with what I understand - and the definition from Google I cited above - and the discussion provided at the beginning of the text.

Reply to Banno

In what way is it at odds?

Quoting Janus

no single description picks out (in the sense of by itself informs someone previously ignorant of the identity of) a single individual to the exclusion of all others;

Against

"a noun phrase introduced by the definite article or its equivalent and denoting a particular entity or phenomenon."

A bunch of predicates that fit exactly one individual. That's what a Definite description is.

Reply to Banno

OK, but is it necessary that each and every individual predicate in the bunch that fits exactly one individual itself fits exactly one individual?

Reply to Janus If it doesn't, it's not a definite description.

Quoting frank

The actual first man to walk on the moon was Armstrong.

It's necessarily true.

SO in every possible world, Armstrong was first on the moon in the actual world.

Reply to Banno

Perhaps I have been using the term 'definite description' in an eccentric way, but even if my definition of the term has been incorrect, it doesn't affect my argument because it doesn't follow that rigid designation is therefore independent of definite description on the 'orthodox' definition of the term.

Consider the idea of rigid designation itself: it means, for example, that Richard Nixon is the man who was named 'Richard Nixon' on such and such a date at such and such a place by such and such group of people (parents, officials or what have you), but all of that is, by your own definition, a definite description. So rigid designation cannot be independent of definite description; however tightly or loosely you want to define the latter.

Counterfactuals are nice because they are based on facts. Those facts, which obtain in the present world could have been otherwise in another stipulated manner of the term.

Facts don't have to obtain in another possible world to be real. They just are.

If we feel inclined to say ontologically where one word has its designated meaning, then we can always refer to definite descriptions to elucidate the matter.

Quoting Janus

So rigid designation cannot be independent of definite description; however tightly or loosely you want to define the latter.

Not entirely. The two just aren't identical. We know this because an individual speaker has flexibility in the use of rigid designator.

The knowledge of a definite description has to be somewhere among the members of the language community (if only historically).

Quoting Janus

Consider the idea of rigid designation itself: it means, for example, that Richard Nixon is the man who was named 'Richard Nixon' on such and such a date at such and such a place by such and such group of people (parents, officials or what have you), but all of that is, by your own definition, a definite description. So rigid designation cannot be independent of definite description; however tightly or loosely you want to define the latter.

Removing this sort of thing is the point of (C), p.71

Reply to Banno

But you haven't been able to explain how "such a thing" could be "removed" while still knowing who is being rigidly designated. Why not give it a go...in your own words?

Reply to Janus You do understand that I am not Kripke?

Shall we continue to read his book? This thread is about his book. Perhaps he will enlighten us.

Can someone give a snapshot of where we are all on at the present moment? I'm on page 73 of the book.

Reply to Banno

Fair enough, but if you think that he does adequately deal with this issue, why not enlighten us now, either by quoting the relevant section, or in your own words? Are you worried about inflicting a 'spoiler'?

I mean it's not as if there has been much, or perhaps even any, shared systematic reading of and commentary on the book carried out in this thread so far.

Reply to frank

I agree. :up:

Reply to Wallows 86.

Reply to Banno

Good dear, the Donnellan criticism in the footnotes on page 85 through 86 would be a topic worthy of its own.

It's funny. People are saying things like - how can one possibly imagine a world in which Nixon does not have such and such and did not do such and such???

One wants to say: tell me more about this person you can't tell me anything about.

Quoting StreetlightX

One wants to say: tell me more about this person you can't tell me anything about.

Plato's beard?

Quoting Janus

Once we've already identified this 'Nixon', then and only then can we entertain circumstances that are alternative to the ones which are unique to this man, by virtue of using the name 'Nixon' as a means for retaining the identity.
— creativesoul

But so what? That doesn't mean that the rigid designator is independent of definite descriptions.

It is when positing possible worlds. The identity is without issue even when we stipulate different descriptions... which is part of what Kripke is pointing out.

Reply to creativesoul

Yes, but the identity is only established by definite descriptions which are in accordance with the actualities of this world; so there is really no Independence of identity from definite description.

Sure you can say 'imagine Nixon was a golf ball in an alternate reality', but you still need the definite descriptions that establish who Nixon is in this world in order to know who is the golf ball, so the fact you can say that Nixon could be any entity in some imagined possible world with whatever alternative definite descriptions you want to stipulate is really a trivial one without significance.

You can say whatever ridiculous arbitrary thing you like about Nixon, (who can stop you!) in other words, and people will understand who you are talking about and what you are saying; but that fact doesn't mean much.

Quoting Janus

but that fact doesn't mean doesn't mean much.

It's externalism.

Reply to StreetlightXThey haven't seen it yet.

The thesis I wrote more than thirty years ago argued in defence of Searle, somewhat along line adopted here by Janus. SO I have some sympathy, and an understanding of what it is like to be held in thrall by a philosophical picture. It took a while for it to sink in that what I was doing was an ad hoc defence of a defunct theory.

I thought I would have to leave behind much of the analytic style of Austin and Searle that I had adopted. Certainly I had no truck with Kripke's causal theory - "it's causal" is what philosophers say when they don't know. I thought for a bit that Davidson's program was the answer. It probably wasn't until I had a chance to come to terms with Wittgentein's views on rules that I understood that any theory of meaning was going to be fraught.

Reply to Janus Are you reading the book?

Reply to Wallows Yep - So I think we might ignore it. There is too much misunderstanding here for that side argument to be at all helpful.

Unless you really want to?

(4) : If the vote yields no unique object the name does not refer.

Such a vote may not pick out a unique object; nor might it pick out any object at all.ANd yet the name still refer.

Of interest here are the extension of the Godel example to cases in which no one found the incompleteness theorem, or in which the theorem itself is wrong, and mathematics is complete.

Quoting Janus

Fair enough, but if you think that he does adequately deal with this issue, why not enlighten us now, either by quoting the relevant section, or in your own words?

It's not far ahead in my reading. Where are you up to?

P.88-89 Why not, and perhaps this is what @Janus is suggesting, set up "Godel", that name, not as the man who discovered the incompleteness theorem, but as the man most folk think discovered the incompleteness theorem.

The first reply is to apply the same sort of arguments seen before; the second is a bit different, and subtle. But I will have a go...

The assertion is "Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic". Now for this will be true only if by "Godel", we are referring to Godel.

But how does the idea that "Godel" refers to the person most people think proved the incompleteness of arithmetic get started, come to be what most people think, unless there is some other basis, distinct from "Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic", to pick him out and associate him with "the chap who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic";

Otherwise all we will be saying is, 'We attribute this achievement to the man to whom we attribute it',

Do we wish to conclude that Godel was not Godel before he discovered incompleteness? And yet if incompleteness is what picks him out, we are left with a vicious circularity.

P.90 argues that he same sort of thing will occur should we replace "most people" with an individual, or select group, or what have you.

And here he introduces the idea of a chain of reference, although for reasons of this circularity rejecting it as a way for the definite description theory of reference to escape. For in general we do not know this chain sufficiently well to be sure it contains no circularity.

Reply to Banno No, I wouldn't be commenting if this was strictly a 'reading' thread. I'm just happy to wait for the purported rebuttal(s) of the problem I had with the book when I read it as part of a course at Sydney Uni years ago. I read it then and found no cogent rebuttal. And on the basis of the memory of that I find I have little enthusiasm for wasting my time reading the book again. If I am mistaken that there is no cogent argument there then I am confident that I will eventually be disabused of that fallacy once you or someone else summons the energy or will to explicate, or even directly quote the relevant passages that embody, the cogent argument(s).

I'll be interested to see if you can come up with the goods to back up your somewhat patronizing claim that I and/or others are "held in thrall by a philosophical picture". Of course in the broadest sense it's also seems true that any philosopher who holds to the opinion that their philosophical views are not a case of thralldom in one way or another is probably deluding themselves.

Reply to Janus I have been reading and writing systematically. Given that you do not recognise this, along with your misapprehension of the term definite description, I'm content that I am re-reading in at least some detail a quiet entertaining and provocative book.

And now we get to what is usually taken to be the presentation of Kripke's own theory, of causal chains of reference. I will not copy it to here; it starts at p.91, the paragraph starting "But that's not what most of us do". Read it for yourself.

I recall thinking "that won't do" when I first read it; but now I am struck by how weakly it is presented.

Given recent discussions of looking at language rather than just theorising, I'm also struck by the similarity to the way Wittgenstein describes his various language games at the start of PI.

Indeed, I am moved to suggest that this is not Kripke presenting a theory, so much as his describing how things are.

Quoting Janus

I'm just happy to wait for the purported rebuttal(s) of the problem I had with the book when I read it as part of a course at Sydney Uni years ago. I read it then and found no cogent rebuttal.

Did you post that problem in this thread? If so, could you please link to it? I've only dipped in and out of this thread, so I didn't see it and, now that it's 17 pages, I have no hope of finding it.

I'm interested to see how much similarity there is to the problems I think I see in Kripke's analysis.

Quoting Banno

Unless you really want to?

I would like to address the issue of a cluster of descriptions if you don't mind.

Kripke talks about properties of objects. What's this about?

Reply to andrewk

In an nutshell, my criticism of Kripke's exposition is that if he is saying that names are not definite descriptions that is trivially true, and if he is saying that names are independent of definite descriptions that is patently false. I wonder if there is a third option, and on the assumption that there might be, I am still waiting for it to be presented and explained.

I'm happy to answer any questions and elaborate further, and am also interested to hear your critique of Kripke's analysis.

Quoting frank

It's externalism.

That's an unexpected take; I'd be interested to hear your reasons for saying that.

@Janus, can you highlight your sentiments about Naming and Necessity?

OK, I read the passage from P 91 as suggested, and I think this, which seems to express the substance of how Kripke thinks rigid designation is established, is itself a template for a definite description:

[i]"Someone, let's say, a baby,is born; his parents call him by a certain name. They talk about
him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain."[/i]

So, it would seem that it is on the basis of the accuracy of such a definite description, the most defining definite description of identity, as it were, that we may be thought to be referring or not referring to whomever we think we are referring. When it comes to historical figures we can never be absolutely certain that such a person existed and that we are referring to whomever we think we are.

For example, imagine it is the case that no one called 'Aristotle' authored the philosophical works that are universally attributed to a man named 'Aristotle'; to whom then do we refer when we speak of Aristotle?

Reply to Wallows

As I have said earlier as a work taken to present a positive theory of reference I think it is "much ado about nothing". Taken as a merely critical work, however, I think it does raise some interesting questions.

Quoting Janus

That's an unexpected take; I'd be interested to hear your reasons for saying that.

That's a professional assessment. :razz:

That the individual can speak of X without a specific definite description in mind suggests that "meaning ain't in the head."

Reply to frank

You are referring to Putnam. Do you take this to be Putnam's argument?

This seems to speak more to reference than meaning. So, reference is not in the head? Maybe off-topic?

Reply to Janus To quote Janus, they're all related: meaning, reference, and identity.

Quoting Janus

As I have said earlier as a work taken to present a positive theory of reference I think it is "much ado about nothing".

Since he says explicitly that this is not his aim, that's perhaps not surprising.

Reply to frank

LOL, did I say that? It's true though I do think they are all related, although being distinguishable from one another.

To return to the thread topic, though: I can refer to all the people I have actually met and whose names I have been told and have remembered without relying on definite descriptions. I can also refer to people whom I know only from seeing them on TV and having been informed of their names without relying on definite descriptions.

But can I refer to an historical figure whom i know only from descriptions of his or her life and actions without relying on definite descriptions? Also, does one have to have a definite description explicitly in mind when referring to someone in order to be said to be relying on definite description?

Quoting Banno

Since he says explicitly that this is not his aim, that's perhaps not surprising.

OK, I don't remember where he says that, but if it so then my criticisms have been misplaced.

Quoting Janus

But can I refer to an historical figure whom i know only from descriptions of his or her life and actions without relying on definite descriptions?

Counterfactuals and cases of error or ignorance seem to suggest that you don't have to have a definite description in mind.

Quoting Janus

Also, does one have to have a definite description explicitly in mind when referring to someone in order to be said to be relying on definite description?

I think just access to some portion of a description.

Quoting StreetlightX

People are saying things like - how can one possibly imagine a world in which Nixon does not have such and such and did not do such and such???

One want to say: tell me more about this person you can't tell me anything about.

Hmmm... I don't see anyone taking that stance. It's not about what one can imagine about someone picked out of this world. For me, at least, it's much more about what sorts of imaginings render the object picked out of this world to be basically non-existent. Imagining a world with water but no hydrogen comes to mind as an easy enough example to understand.

As it(possible world semantics) applies to picking out people, I'm not too sure that Kripke is that far off base, if at all. Certainly, there are some situations that are pivotal to making one who one is. Seems that those situations - if removed - would also remove an important part of the person, but I'm not at all certain that I would take a strong stance against anything Kripke has written thus far(regarding where I am).

Certain things other than people, I would... but, Kripke isn't dealing with those... yet(?).

Quoting Janus

Yes, but the identity is only established by definite descriptions which are in accordance with the actualities of this world; so there is really no Independence of identity from definite description.

I don't think that Kripke is divorcing identity from description. I think he's using the fact that possible world semantics allow us to stipulate different circumstances without losing identity to show some other things(stuff about a priori/a posteriori, a priori and necessity, perhaps even difference between theories of identity, meaning, and definition). I'm not sure exactly what he's doing, but thus far nothing he has said seems outright wrong...

I'm not too sure that I'll be convinced of much at all simply because we can lose description in positing possible world scenarios, but we'll see.

I personally have a strong aversion to modality(possible world semantics), so... this is tough reading for me anyway. It's like eating a food that is very hard to get down as a result of how badly it smells... you know? Something that the smell alone could make you vomit. I have to accept possible world semantics to understand what Kripke is getting at.

So, this is work for me!

:wink:

Quoting Banno

As I have said earlier as a work taken to present a positive theory of reference I think it is "much ado about nothing".
— Janus

Since he says explicitly that this is not his aim, that's perhaps not surprising.

Yes. I recall at least a couple of times that he explicitly denied that he was offering a theory.

Seems that the following is worth posting for reference...

(1) To every name or designating expression 'X', there corresponds a cluster of properties, namely the family of those properties q> such that A believes 'q>X'.
(2) One of the properties, or some conjointly, are be­lieved by A to pick out some individual uniquely.
(3) If most, or a weighted most, of the q> 's are satisfied by one unique object y, then y is the referent of 'x'.
(4) If the vote yields no unique object, 'x' does not refer.
(5) The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the q>' s' is known a priori by the speaker.
(6) The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the q>' s' expresses a necessary truth (in the idiolect of the speaker).

(Condition for satisfying the above) For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The properties which are used in the vote must not themselves involve the notion of reference in such a way that it is ultimately impossible to eliminate.

Ok. I take it that the six listed statements above are Kripke's aim. He's using proper nouns in possible world scenarios to place them under suspicion for various reasons.

Quoting creativesoul

Ok. I take it that the six listed statements above are Kripke's aim. He's using proper nouns in possible world scenarios to place them under suspicion for various reasons.

Please elaborate?

Reply to Wallows

Uh... no. That's clear enough.

Quoting creativesoul

Uh... no. That's clear enough.

So, what is your take on taking an existential quantification property of a counterfactual?

:yikes:

Reply to creativesoul

What?

Are you asking me how to count the things being said about a proper noun in a possible world scenario?

:meh:

There is a distinction between counterfactuals and possible world scenarios.

Facts are; events, states of affairs, the way things were/are, reality. Facts consist of what has happened. Counterfactuals are - quite simply - an account of what has not happened. That's what the prefix "counter" must mean, lest the distinction between factual/counterfactual is lost and both terms are rendered utterly meaningless. Continued use of of either term after throwing that distinction out the window amounts to uttering gibberish at worst, and unnecessarily confusing speech at best.

Counterfactuals - by any coherent definition - are counter to fact. Possible world scenarios can be true. That which is counter to fact cannot. Counterfactual scenarios are not equivalent to possible world scenarios.

All counterfactuals and possible world scenarios consist entirely of statements of thought/belief about what has not happened. Counterfactuals must be false. Possible world scenarios can be true.

Counterfactuals are false statements about some thing in this world. The counterfactual statement performs the task of picking out this object from this world and subsequently stipulating a set of imagined circumstances that are counter to this world's circumstances with regard to that thing. They must be false.

The possible world statement performs the task of picking out this object from this world and subsequently stipulating a set of imagined circumstances that are counter to what's believed about this world's circumstances with regard to that thing. They can be true.

Reply to creativesoul My reading of what Wallows was asking is that he wanted to know what you meant by 'using proper nouns in possible world scenarios to place them under suspicion'. I too am curious to know what you meant by that.

Quoting creativesoul

I take it that the six listed statements above are Kripke's aim.

You meant target?

Quoting frank

Counterfactuals and cases of error or ignorance seem to suggest that you don't have to have a definite description in mind.

So, I don't have to have anything specifically in mind when I refer to, say, Aristotle? What about having something in the back of my mind? Surely I have some idea who Aristotle is, otherwise how would referring to Aristotle be anything different than merely saying the name 'Aristotle'?

And that I must have some such idea seems to be what you are alluding to with this:

Quoting frank

I think just access to some portion of a description.

Reply to Janus So one cannot be thinking of "anything specific" unless one can present a description of some sort - definite or not.

@Janus; @frank, @Wallows, @creativesoul

Is it the case that there are necessary and sufficient conditions that determine, for every given proper name, if the name has successfully referred to a discreet individual?

that is, must there be universal rules for the use of proper names?

Reply to Banno

Is that a statement or a question?

Reply to Banno

Would there not need to be some rule or at least adequate conditions in order to make any distinction between successful and unsuccessful referring coherent?

Reply to Janus When I learned to drive, I learned the rule about stopping at the red light. And I can tell you what that rule is.

When did I learn the rule about using proper names?

Quoting Banno

if the name has successfully referred to a discreet individual?

What does "discreet individual" mean?

Reply to Wallows one thing.

Quoting Banno

one thing.

So, how does existential qualification/quantification work for counterfactuals?

Reply to Wallows I'm Sticking to my topic.

Reply to Banno

Then what would Kripke say?

Quoting Banno

Is it the case that there are necessary and sufficient conditions that determine, for every given proper name, if the name has successfully referred to a discreet individual?

But could we back up and ask if there are rules about what kind of speaker can use words to refer? Can a parrot do it?

Reply to Wallows Just for a bit, I am being Banno, not Kripke.

Reply to frank If not, why not?

Quoting Janus

So, I don't have to have anything specifically in mind when I refer to, say, Aristotle? What about having something in the back of my mind? Surely I have some idea who Aristotle is, otherwise how would referring to Aristotle be anything different than merely saying the name 'Aristotle'?

I think internalists are satisfied with the information being in the back of your mind.

You can talk about Aristotle without having correct information about him.

Quoting Banno

If not, why not?

Are you saying there are no rules about that?

Reply to Janus My opinion is that Kripke's complaints about theories of definite descriptions, and the examples he believes point to flaws in those theories, are based on an uncharitable reading of what those theories say.

I also find the invocation of possible worlds semantics an unnecessarily complex solution to what I consider to be a simple question. It is also metaphysically troublesome and hugely confusing, as is evinced by the amount of debate as to what it means.

FWIW I agree with the dilemma you set up, and I too wonder whether there is a third option, and if so what it is.

But these are just my opinions and, since some philosophers get a great deal of pleasure from reading and discussing Kripke's lectures, I don't want to spoil that for them.

Reply to frank Just wondering if there is a rule that includes people but not parrots.

Reply to frank Reference as a result of a private intent or intuition?

Quoting frank

You can talk about Aristotle without having correct information about him.

But if everything about a man who is reputed to have once existed and to be named 'Aristotle' that you think you know, including even the fact of his existence, is wrong, then on what basis could you be said to be talking about anyone other than an fictional character. Would you not then be using the name to refer to a character that exists only in your imagination, or at best the collective imagination?

Reply to Banno It's a simple question. Can parrots use words to refer?

Reply to frank It's a good question. What's the answer?

Reply to Banno Learning to drive does not consist solely in learning any set of rules. Much of the learning is simply know-how we learn by doing, just as it is with using proper names. We may learn explicit rules regarding correct use of proper names, or we may after the fact analyze what we are doing in an attempt to establish rules. There is no guarantee that we can establish a rule for everything we can do.

And, you haven't answered my question Banno! Here it is again:

Quoting Janus

Would there not need to be some rule or at least adequate conditions in order to make any distinction between successful and unsuccessful referring coherent?

That is, how do we know our use of proper names succeeds or fails to refer (if it indeed does succeed or fail) in the different situations in which we use them?

Quoting Janus

But if everything about a man who is reputed to have once existed and to be named 'Aristotle' that you think you know, including even the fact of his existence, is wrong, then on what basis could you be said to be talking about anyone other than an fictional character. Would you not then be using the name to refer to a character that exists only in your imagination, or at best the collective imagination?

I'm referring to Aristotle by proxy. Somebody else has to know or have known.

If I'm in error, it's with regard to the way the community uses "Aristotle."

Right?

Quoting andrewk

My opinion is that Kripke's complaints about theories of definite descriptions, and the examples he believes point to flaws in those theories, are based on an uncharitable reading of what those theories say.

I'm probably not as familiar with the 'definite description' tradition as you are; not enough to have an opinion about the charitably of Kripke's reading of it.

Quoting andrewk

I also find the invocation of possible worlds semantics an unnecessarily complex solution to what I consider to be a simple question. It is also metaphysically troublesome and hugely confusing, as is evinced by the amount of debate as to what it means.

I do agree with this!Quoting andrewk

But these are just my opinions and, since some philosophers get a great deal of pleasure from reading and discussing Kripke's lectures, I don't want to spoil that for them.

Yes, rectitude is not always essential for pleasure is it?

Quoting andrewk

My reading of what Wallows was asking is that he wanted to know what you meant by 'using proper nouns in possible world scenarios to place them under suspicion'. I too am curious to know what you meant by that.

Well, it seems that those statement amount to somewhat of an argument in favor of some form of essentialism. In addition, they also argue in favor of the idea that what is known apriori is a necessary truth.

What I'm saying is that a rough summary of what I've read thus far amounts to Kripke using proper nouns in possible world scenarios to target those arguments/notions. His examples seem to falsify a few of those statements.

Quoting frank

I'm referring to Aristotle by proxy. Somebody else has to know or have known.

If I'm in error, it's with regard to the way the community uses "Aristotle."

Right?

Yes, I agree. So once you go beyond those who knew the man who is called Aristotle personally, descriptions are relied upon for us to have any idea who we are referring to. This was my point earlier: ostention or description.

So when we talk about Aristotle we may or may not be talking about someone who actually existed, who did what he is reputed to have done and so on. If all we know about Aristotle are the details about his life and works that are reputed to be accurate, and those details are actually not accurate at all, other than that there was a man called Aristotle (among probably many other men called Aristotle) who lived around that time and to whom by some quirks of fate the life details and works of the 'historical' Aristotle were wrongly attributed, then I suppose we would be referring to that man.

We have no way of knowing, then, who exactly we are referring to. But I guess you could say that we are correctly referring to that man Aristotle to whom the details of the life and work of the historical Aristotle were falsely attributed.

Or would you rather say that we would be referring to another man who might have existed, a man never named Aristotle, whose life and work details are those of the historical Aristotle?

In either case it would be a definite description that establishes which man we are referring to it seems.

Quoting Banno

I take it that the six listed statements above are Kripke's aim.
— creativesoul
You meant target?

Yup. I mean those are what he's arguing against. He is doing so by using proper nouns in possible world scenarios and pointing out what's going on when we do such a thing.

I think it is very important to keep that in mind.

Quoting Janus

Yes, I agree. So once you go beyond those who knew the man who is called Aristotle personally, descriptions are relied upon for us to have any idea who we are referring to. This was my point earlier: ostention or description.

Yes. It's just that an individual speaker can use the name without knowing. That's only possible because there are or have been others who knew. The notion that a proper name can pick out a particular without anyone ever having known any kind of definite description associated with it is absurd.

Quoting Janus

Or would you rather say that we would be referring to another man who might have existed, a man never named Aristotle, whose life and work details are those of the historical Aristotle?

If we found out his name was actually George, then we'd probably still call him Aristotle and sometimes point out that his real name was George. :grin:

Quoting Janus

In either case it would be a definite description that establishes which man we are referring to it seems.

Yes. Except for the people who have those blue lasers coming out of their heads that shine directly on whoever they're talking about (even if the person's been dead for 2400 years.) Time travelling laser.

Quoting Banno

Is it the case that there are necessary and sufficient conditions that determine, for every given proper name, if the name has successfully referred to a discreet individual?

that is, must there be universal rules for the use of proper names?

Yes there are, but that criterion is not Kripke's target. As it pertains to the lectures, I too have issue with the definition and theses that Kripke is arguing against. During this thread I have put forth my own views from time to time when it seemed relevant to the reading, and thus appropriate. I suspect that there will come a time when those will be revisited.

I do want to understand Kripke's position though. It seems to me to be more like a discussion of what he sees as flaws in some historical 'schools of thought'. I'm good with that, even if he and I approach those schools of thought(and their purported problems) from different 'angles'...

His approach is explaining what's going on when we use proper nouns in possible world scenarios, and using what we learn about that as grounds for arguing against historical popular notions of essentialism(I think). In addition he targets the use of a priori and necessary as synonyms. He also argues against the distinction between a priori and a posteriori.

Quoting Banno

When did I learn the rule about using proper names?

When you drew the correlation between the name and the thing being named that the community of speakers had already drawn.

Quoting creativesoul

Well, it seems that those statements amount to somewhat of an argument in favor of some form of essentialism. In addition, they also argue in favor of the idea that what is known a priori is a necessary truth.

Those six statements may do that. But I don't think those statements fairly represent a mature descriptivist position. For example statement 5 is something that is at most believed, not known, by the speaker. Further, I don't think descriptivism requires putting it in that If...Then... form. I think a fairer rendering is that 'The speaker believes there exists an individual with name X that has most of the properties'. I don't think there's any need for the 'a priori' bit either.

It seems to me that the essentialism is an artefact of Kripke's interpretation of descriptivism, rather than a feature of descriptivism itself. So far as I know, Russell was not an essentialist.

BTW those six statements are listed on this wiki page on Naming and Necessity, which will perhaps be a more accessible reference as the above post listing them recedes further into the past of this long, long thread.

Quoting Banno

Just wondering if there is a rule that includes people but not parrots.

Parrots do not draw the correlation between the name and what's being named. The speech act theorists called that something or other, didn't they? The rhetic? No... Phatic? Cannot remember. Something like that. They pointed out that making the sound does not equal a meaningful utterance.

Quoting andrewk

Well, it seems that those statement amount to somewhat of an argument in favor of some form of essentialism. In addition, they also argue in favor of the idea that what is known a priori is a necessary truth.
— creativesoul
Perhaps. But I don't think those statements fairly represent a mature descriptivist position.

Well, they certainly do not accurately represent my own position, which could be viewed as a form of essentialism, although I wouldn't think that it is close enough to historical ones to view it as one. Someone else certainly may. I do strongly believe that there are some things which are an emergent product of simpler things in combination. In those cases, talking about the essential parts does not equal talking about the product of their combination. Water comes to mind as before. Easy to understand. Talking about hydrogen is not talking about water.

For example item 5 is something that is at most believed, not known, by the speaker. Further, I don't think descriptivism requires putting it in that If...Then... form. I think a fairer rendering is that 'The speaker believes there exists an individual with name X that has most of the properties'. I don't think there's any need for the 'a priori' bit either.

It seems to me that the essentialism is an artefact of Kripke's interpretation of descriptivism, rather than a feature of descriptivism itself. So far as I know, Russell was not an essentialist.

BTW those six statements are listed on this wiki page on Naming and Necessity, which will perhaps be a more accessible reference as the above post listing them recedes further into the past of this long, long thread.

Yeah, Kripke seems to have an axe to grind with regard to several historical positions. I personally have no interest in his targeting the a prior/a posteriori or showing that just because something is known a priori does not make it necessary, in the sense that it must be the case in all possible worlds.

I do find the definition awkard enough to be interesting. That is statement (1).