If the reality we experience is the only thing that we have experienced, how do we know that there isn’t anything beyond our reality?
We know for a fact there are things we do not, and perhaps cannot, currently experience that we will be able to sometime in the future. I don’t think that’s what you’re talking about.
If, instead, you were talking about aspects of reality that we will never have access to, even in theory, then the question is meaningless. Or maybe metaphysics.
If, instead, you were talking about aspects of reality that we will never have access to, even in theory, then the question is meaningless
OK, pretend I'm a well-meaning philosophical novice, and explain to me, as simply as you can, why the question is meaningless. It looks to me as if it's referring to aspects of reality that humans can't access; there may be none we can ever know of, making the question unanswerable, but why is it meaningless?
explain to me, as simply as you can, why the question is meaningless.
I didn’t say it was meaningless. I said it was meaningless or metaphysics. Metaphysics doesn’t have to be true or false. As a matter of fact, as I understand it, it can’t be. Something that is metaphysical becomes meaningless when there is no possible use for it. I don’t classify making people say “golly geewhilikers” as useful.
If the reality we experience is the only thing that we have experienced
You don't dream? How do we know dreams are really just our mind "attempting to work out" problems and conundrums even in unconsciousness like the prevailing theory claims? Sure, it can be measured with an EEG, but all that proves is the mind is being stimulated by activity, not that the activity is a contained system.
I take this as a fun thread, which is refreshing every now and then. Conversely, however, how do we know there isn't a horrible swamp monster under our bed at all times that goes away once we look under it? We don't, now do we? Not really. Like the prevailing sentiment of the replies thus far suggests, it seems there are much more "relevant" affairs and states of matter to tend to. But never let someone tell you what and what not (or how) to think.
Identity is knowledge. You likely thought you knew all there was to know at six years old. Your entire set of knowledge and view of the world likely (or at least should have) changed significantly from then by age 12. As it did in comparison to when you became 18. And then again at 21. And 30. And so on and so on. Effectively, we become a new person with a new understanding of reality (effectively, a new reality altogether) every time we learn something. Can this not be said and argued as fact?
But surely the statement, "There is a reality that humans can't experience" is either true or false, isn't it? I still don't see the leap from "unanswerable" to either "meaningless" or "neither true nor false."
But surely the statement, "There is a reality that humans can't experience" is either true or false, isn't it? I still don't see the leap from "unanswerable" to either "meaningless" or "neither true nor false."
@T Clark’s motto—If there is no way of knowing whether a statement is true or false, even in theory, then it’s either metaphysics or meaningless.
If you ask any more questions, I’m going to give you my prerecorded RG Collingwood metaphysics lecture, which you’ve probably heard before.
If the reality we experience is the only thing that we have experienced, how do we know that there isn’t anything beyond our reality?
Because if it would be something than it would literally be 'some thing', meaning a thing we can identify. Something beyond our reality is exactly that, beyond our reality and then it would not be recognizable as something for us. The speculation therefore is idle. Of course there may well be a lot of things that are not part of our reality yet, just like iron was beyond the reality of the people in the stone age. At such a point though, it is not 'not part of our reality per se', but 'not yet part of our reality'.
Does your question only assume we “know” something that is inside our reality? You drew a line in reality and said we are in reality over hear, and over there is beyond our reality. You also only mentioned how we can’t know anything beyond our reality. This implying we can know reality, but only know the reality that is not “beyond”.
So is your issue here merely a version of the Kantian phenomenal/noumenal distinction? Is it essentially epistemological about “knowing”, or is it getting ant something metaphysical or ontological about the nature of reality?
If there is no way of knowing whether a statement is true or false, even in theory, then it’s either metaphysics or meaningless.
OK, no more questions, just pointing out that your motto, while no doubt useful, isn't likely to convince someone who hasn't already adopted it as a motto. (The question I would have asked is, Why does the lack of a definitive answer drain the meaning from a question? But I won't!) (Also, if I understand you, it's not really a matter of "either metaphysics or meaningless." You're saying that metaphysics doesn't have to be true or false. But the statement in question does have to be. Ergo, it's not metaphysics. Ergo, it's meaningless. But see my [unasked!] previous question -- where did the meaning go away to? It seemed perfectly meaningful when it was posed.)
OK, no more questions, just pointing out that your motto, while no doubt useful, isn't likely to convince someone who hasn't already adopted it as a motto.
I really wasn’t trying to convince anyone, I guess I was just pointing out that we were headed off into a more complicated discussion which is probably outside the intended scope of this thread.
Why does the lack of a definitive answer drain the meaning from a question?
What value, meaning, is there in a question that can’t be answered, even in theory? What do you do with it? What does it teach you? What implications, consequences does it have? How do I use the OP’s opening question?
how do we know that there isn’t anything beyond our reality?
Do something with that. Show me what value it has. Let’s go further than that. We’ll assume there is something beyond the reality we can experience that is not accessible and never will be. How does that change anything?
These are the kinds of questions that make philosophy look ridiculous. I guess that’s why they bother me so much.
We’ll assume there is something beyond the reality we can experience that is not accessible and never will be.
This, me thinks, is the arbitrarily-placed, obsequious stipulation that when removed makes the entire topic just a tad bit more open to conversation, no? :smile:
This, me thinks, is the arbitrarily-placed, obsequious stipulation that when removed makes the entire topic just a tad bit more open to conversation, no?
How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our reality?
Because reality is what there is.
To posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more of what there is. It is to extend reality.
This is why the extent of our language is the extent of our world.
Hopefully, replacing "limit" with "extent" will head off some of the misplaced criticism of that phrase.
The other mistake here is to equate what we experience with what is real, and so to conflate "How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our experience" with "How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our reality".
"Beyond reality" is not a region; it is a grammatical error.
How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our reality?
Because reality is what there is.
I know what you mean, but I don't think @an-salad is defining it that way. They're making a distinction between "our reality" and "reality = our reality + whatever else there might be". The last thing we need is a debate on how to use the term "reality"! :smile: Using the word in the way an-salad uses it, wouldn't you agree that the question is a sensible one? And if you'd rather not use "reality" in the more restricted way an-salad means, we can come up with a different term, it doesn't matter.
Maybe put the question this way: Could there be anything that humans will never be able to know or experience?
The set of true sentences is never complete, if that helps. I suspect that is what Reply to an-salad and Reply to J are trying to capture - that there is always more to be said.
All of existence is a prison. The question is, what is outside that prison?
This is unexpectedly profound, perhaps that was your intent, perhaps not. For the average person, even those who claim to have found the charms of love or who otherwise remain placated by the juvenile pleasures life has to offer (wealth, physicality ie. "the flesh" or "pleasure", feeling of esteem and respect from strangers, hollow as these things are, they remain the sole driving force behind most of life's actions and ambitions, and of course, naturally, most of life's suffering) all have the same thing in common. We inevitably want more. No, we delude ourselves, often passively with empty gratitude shared in public (ie. "I'm so grateful, I couldn't ask for more") so as to sell an image to an ultimately uncaring world. But this inevitability manifests in "mid life crises", peculiar hobbies, marital strife, microaggressions, and more if left unexamined and unaddressed. Not to mention those who have yet to find peace and purpose.
Regardless of our status in life—perceived, real, deluded or anything in between—we all have one sobering dynamic in common. We all hunger and thirst. Both physically and of course symbolically, for that which we do not have, and even that which we do have. This is clear as day and does not require any sort of explanation for someone living in abject poverty or afflicted with a debilitating condition or ailment, naturally. But what of an upperclassman with everything the average man (or woman) reasonably strives for in life? Stable, high-paying job, big house, loving partner, beautiful family, good friends, respect from his or her peers, an abundance of wealth (including time)—and above all—that ever so elusive feeling of true peace at the very last moments of one's day to be followed by true purpose and drive at the start of the following, only to repeat indefinitely until the last of one's days. What of that man? Is he simply deluded? Or are those who compare his life and status to imprisonment merely jealous and disappointed with their own (projection, perhaps)? Surely this must be the only relevant dynamic (a binary "one or the other") in relation to the aforementioned questions posed. Mustn't it?
Surely he (and anyone else with half a mind) would never attempt to equate such a charmed and privileged existence to that of a "prison", would they? No, not in a million years. Or so it seems. One argument—and not a particularly good one (without the right biases in my opinion)—would be to start by taking a page from the stereotypical "anti-materialism" playbook. Along the lines of "one doesn't own possessions, one's possessions own the person, requiring constant and daily vigilance and occasional villainy to ensure one continues from one day to the next living in the manner in which one has become accustomed, all the while knowing, deep down, he would be not only hopelessly lost but simply destroyed if he were to lose any one of these things many men live life without, for even the slave with golden shackles undoubtedly remains but a slave." No, it's not particularly great, but it has merit given the right context.
I notice you go one further by saying all existence is a prison, so even an enlightened anti-materialist who has given up all worldly desire is still "imprisoned" due to him being conscious of himself. No different than a historical wealthy monarch in charge of vast swathes of lands, armies, and treasure. This would seem to betray an almost "antinatalist" or "anti-human" sort of world view, along the lines of "all life is bad and the less of it, the better." Not a very popular position to hold, quite dangerous even, yet the philosophical validity is not lost entirely.
The brevity (or simplicity) or your remarks, while profound, do leave much to interpretation. "All of existence" is a very broad term. Perhaps a bit broader than one initially realizes. Logically speaking, if "all of existence" is a prison, that would mean, the only thing beyond "existence" and "not a prison" would be... non-existence? This makes your remark astonishingly less profound, or at the very least, less vast in terms of philosophical context. There would seem to be two possible dynamics that can follow from that point. A sort of spiritual or metaphysical reality that transcends (has existed before and will exist after) the life and death of the body. Or, as mentioned previously, a sort of, in my view rather myopic, "anti-life" or "antinatalist" view of the world.
Either of which are valid—if not somewhat tired and largely titular—positions to hold, sure. Life, particularly the majority of human existence before the modern age of science and technology that largely alleviated the prevalence and tenacity of human suffering, is seemingly skewed in disproportionate favor of opportunity of things like pain, injury, illness, suffering, death, etc. Simply put, there's more things that can go wrong than go right as far as the human experience goes in the context of existence as we know and define it. But what of it? Where do you make the leap from "I think, therefore I am" to "I think, therefore I am not?" Was this intended or merely an adverse side affect? :chin:
It would be a kind of miracle if what we experience is all there is - a kind of evolutionary freak accident. So, I highly doubt that there is not more to the world than what we experience.
The set of true sentences is never complete, if that helps. I suspect that is what ?an-salad and ?J are trying to capture - that there is always more to be said.
I think this is true, and I'd go further: We have no warrant for believing that "what can be said" is a perfect match for "what can be said by humans." It's a big universe out there . . .
Reply to J we might have such warrant. I think we need to introduce Davidson here. If it can’t be said by a human, then what reason could you have to think that it could be said?
Reply to Banno Well, two thoughts: First, to establish my point, I don't need a reason to think it could be said by a non-human, I only have to note that there is no reason why not. But, second, I think there is a pretty good reason to imagine sayable things that humans can't grasp. Consider the ant. Are there thoughts and experiences it cannot, in principle, have? Yes. And the badger? Yes. And the chimp? Yes. So why would this chain stop with humans? What makes us think we have access to all thinkable or sayable thoughts?
[R]eality is what there is. To posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more [than] what there is. "Beyond reality" is not a region; it is a grammatical error.
Reply to J somewhat off the track here. I’ll try again. If an alien says something that is utterly incomprehensible, what grounds could you have to think it had said something rather than just grunted?
Consider the ant. Are there thoughts and experiences it cannot, in principle, have? Yes. And the badger? Yes. And the chimp? Yes. So why would this chain stop with humans? What makes us think we have access to all thinkable or sayable thoughts?
somewhat off the track here. I’ll try again. If an alien says something that is utterly incomprehensible, what grounds could you have to think it had said something rather than just grunted?
Assuming the alien got here by traveling faster than the speed of light in some contraption (an impossibility given the physics we know of) there’s some good reason to presume some form of communication might be attempted. In line with how we teach dogs and, to lesser extents, cats to understand us via the things we say. Yes, all they hear are meaningful grunts, but they’re still meaningful to them as far as communication goes.
Then again, what idiot believes him/herself capable of linguistically communicating complex thoughts to lesser beings of comparatively minuscule intelligence? Like, anyone earnestly trying to communicate the laws of physics or the aesthetics of a Rembrandt to an ant, dog, etc., is bound to be missing some marbles (and not the non-human animal for not understanding). Given the greater intelligence of the alien, they might want to communicate complex thoughts to us telepathically, or via some other weird manner, but not in the language they themselves speak. Otherwise, they’d be missing marbles (yes, this is conceivable: we all know that the greater the intelligence, the greater the likelihood and intensities of possible insanity).
Yup, my deep thought of the day.
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“The smiles you’ll give/and the tears you’ll cry/and all you touch/and all you see/is all your life will ever be” -- lyrics from “Breathe” by Pink Floyd
Reply to an-salad Because we can only experience what we experience. We can discover only what is availble to us via experience-- because that is all there is for us.
We cannot even speculate about what we cannot ever comprehend. This is basically Kantian Noumena (a term which defies itself!). Obvious, but confusing if you get hold of the wrong end of it.
Why would you suppose that? Do you think the big bang is beyond comprehension?
My implication was, based on said theory, there was a point before what is commonly referred to as "the universe." A point (no pun intended) where "reality" or "all there is" was substantially different than what it is currently. So much so it can barely even be discussed and remains but a humble, albeit generally-accepted theorem.
If, hypothetically, one could place themself, as they are, prior to the "Big Bang", everything we know now, the entire Universe as we know it, would, in theory, be "outside" or "beyond" reality. Wouldn't it? It didn't exist at that point. Not in any conceivable or fathomable form. Not really. No different than saying consciousness existed before intelligent beings came about.
The current universe would be "beyond reality" at the time prior to the Big Bang. Just as consciousness would be "beyond reality" prior to the first intelligent being. Is this not correct?
Reply to Banno I wasn't really trying to imagine an alien encounter. I agree that would certainly pose all sorts of conceptual problems. It's more a logical or intuitive idea: Why should we think that humans represent some sort of pinnacle of what can be thought or said? The only way to get that, it seems to me, would be by defining "what can be thought or said" in human terms. But is that realistic?
I meant all of the "therefores" to be mistakes, trying to show that they don't follow from the initial statements. For this one, the idea is that we can't speculate about anything we can't comprehend, which is quite true. But why would that mean that what we can speculate about and comprehend is all there is?
...and this and the rest is comprehensible - since you are here comprehending it.
Thanks. I’m glad to hear that what I said was comprehensible, if only to me. :grin: :wink: But then, so too is comprehensible the notion that there is yet more to discover and understand than humanity, and any individual within. has to date discovered and understood. And that some of these yet to be made discoveries and understandings might require new terminology so as to be properly linguistically communicated between us humans. (I’m with Reply to J on this one.)
That said, what you mentioned about it only being an extension of reality, rather than it being outside of reality, I find very valid.
Why should we think that humans represent some sort of pinnacle of what can be thought or said?
Indeed - notice that my objection is to the way the issue is phrased. As "there is stuff beyond our reality" when it should be "there is stuff that is true but unknown". (It's actually positing realism, or at least showing up some of the limitations of idealism.)
Indeed - notice that my objection is to the way the issue is phrased. As "there is stuff beyond our reality" when it should be "there is stuff that is true but unknown"
Yes, I think we're all in accord that the culprit here is the word "reality," no surprise. "Stuff we can know as humans" and "all the stuff that can be known" are fine with me instead, as long as the two aren't supposed to mean the same thing.
Reply to javra An analogy. Any integer can be named in a finite number of words. Yet a list of all the integers is not finite. Analogicaly, perhaps anything true can be said, but not everything that is true.
(All sorts of implications here, making it an interesting area of logic. Like that we can write down the set of all the integers in a finite set of words - I just did; but by stepping outside the rules for writing down the integers and using sets instead.)
Again, the payoff is that there is always more to be said.
I think any useful metaphysic has to be able to disinguish reality, being and existence. These terms all have overlapping meanings, but they’re not exactly synonymous.
Peirce distinguishes reality and existence. For Peirce the real is that which is what it is independent of what any one person or definite group of people may think it is. It is the object of the final opinion of the indefinite community of investigators. But note this does not refer to material objects as such, as for example the law of conservation of energy is real, because its action is independent of what any one person or group thinks about it. It would hold true even if all humans vanished. It is a stable, general pattern or "habit" of the universe (although personally, I believe that the fact that human intelligence is alone capable of grasping such principles is itself metaphysically significant.)
Existence (or Actuality) refers to the primitive dyadic fact of an object reacting against or related to something else. It corresponds to Peirce's category of Secondness (Action/Fact/Brute Force).
Scope: Existence is limited to particular, individual, spatio-temporal facts, occurrences, and things that are actually here and now, having a brute impact on us or on other things. What is real extends far beyond that.
For Peirce, something can be real without existing (e.g., a universal law or a potential quality), but anything that exists is also real. The existing things are just the particular instances where the real generalities (laws and habits) are manifested in brute, immediate interaction.
I find the reality of potentialities or possibilities are particularly interesting in this respect. There are real possibilities, such as the fact that one out of 12 horses will win a race tomorrow, and impossibilities, such as that it might be won by some animal other than a horse. Some possibilities or potentialities are real, but others are not. A range of possibilities may be impossible to determine. The Schrodinger equation in physics is basically a strictly-formulated range of possible outcomes.
Being is not something specifically addressed in Peirce's lexicon in the same sense that it is in (for example) philosophical theology or 20thc existentialism. A large topic in its own right, but I would just observe the fact that we ourselves are beings (rather than existents or objects) is a clue to the nature of any enquiry into the nature of being, insofar as we ourselves are part of what we are seeking to understand.
Yes, I think we're all in accord that the culprit here is the word "reality," no surprise. "Stuff we can know as humans" and "all the stuff that can be known" are fine with me instead, as long as the two aren't supposed to mean the same thing.
Right. Presuming that the human species doesn’t bring about its own extinction (the pressing of a few red buttons could be sufficient for this to occur), then there’s bound to someday be a future species of life that evolves from that of the human species (no transhumanism required). Such that as regards intelligence relative to this future species we might be just as modern day chimps are relative to us. Their more refined conceptualizations and understandings then being out of reach to the human species not only in practice but also in principle.
Otherwise, there will always be something of reality which dwells beyond our own individually unique umwelt, this just as much as our collectively shared umwelt(s). This since no one individual umwelt can of itself be omniscient as regards all aspects of reality in general.
An analogy. Any integer can be named in a finite number of words. Yet a list of all the integers is not finite. Analogicaly, perhaps anything true can be said, but not everything that is true.
(All sorts of implications here, making it an interesting area of logic. Like that we can write down the set of all the integers in a finite set of words - I just did; but by stepping outside the rules for writing down the integers and using sets instead.)
Again, the payoff is that there is always more to be said.
If I read you right, I can only address the issue by pointing back to newly coined English terms that express complex enough concepts in manners that typically would otherwise require, at minimum, an entire sentence to properly express, and some requiring vast bodies of English language to so do: a meme (noun), copesetic (adjective), and words imported into English from other languages, such as the Germanic “umwelt” and “zeitgeist”. Devoid of at least some of these newly minted English terms, the concepts they convey could not be succinctly conveyed and manipulated within thoughts.
Then, so too will occur for concepts that are out of reach for the human species, as per my most recent reply to J on this thread. Language is reducible to semantics and the signs used to convey and manipulate these. So, I via reasons such as these find grounds to uphold that not everything which is an aspect of “that which is” can be currently said by us humans. Here’s but one example:
Suppose that in ontological fact time is neither linear nor recurring (i.e., circular, as in Nietzsche’s and other’s eternal return) but, instead, is a conflux of both that thereby amounts to neither. Not only would this require volumes to properly express in validly justified coherent manners (philosophically to not mention empirically) but, furthermore, the entire notion could not be pragmatically, succinctly, communicated and manipulated in thoughts devoid of an accordant term for this metaphysical understanding of time … a term which currently cannot be said for it does not yet (to the best of my knowledge) exist.
Now consider a vast spectrum of terms we've never heard of each with its own deep enough conceptual meanings all being stringed together in grammatically correct sentences so as to convey and manipulate concepts. These thoughts we, at the very least at present, have no access to and cannot express in words that we ourselves have at our disposal.
Existence (or Actuality) refers to the primitive dyadic fact of an object reacting against or related to something else. It corresponds to Peirce's category of Secondness (Action/Fact/Brute Force).
I grant that reality, existence, and being overlap while having different referents. But, finding little to no use for Pierce’s tripartite system of firstness/secondness/thirdness myself, I don’t subscribe to the definitions you’ve provided.
Following common speech and understandings, I deem reality to consist of what is real, with real being synonymous to actual (and with real and actual sharing a common Latin root). And you’re right: when so conceived, actual/real potentials (in contrast to unreal and hence impossible potentials) and the like get very interesting, and at times frustrating, to further enquire into.
Existence, as per its etymology, I then find consists of those aspects of reality which in any way, manner, or form stand out to us as conscious observers: thoughts thereby exist, just as much as rocks do. We as conscious observes, though an aspect of reality at large (for we as conscious observers are indeed actual, hence real), however do not exist, not in this formal means of understanding the term, for we don’t stand out to ourselves, not even conceptually via the concepts that do exist for us. As another example of common speech, think of Tillich's notions regarding the existence of God, such that to affirm the existence of God is to deny the actuality/reality of God. Were existence to be synonymous to actuality, this notion could not be properly conveyed via the terms used.
Being, on the other hand, at core to me specifies all that in any conceivable way “in fact is (and is hence real)” –this to include was and will be, though how so will be contingent on metaphysics adopted. Being, though, gets tricky in certain metaphysics wherein it is not synonymous to reality, this on account of a division between “what in fact is real in an ultimate sense” and “what in fact is illusory in an ultimate sense of reality (e.g., the maya of Indian religions ). Which then chimes with the English understanding of beings being sentience-endowed, unlike anything else which is within reality at large (reality at large consisting of both maya and that which is not maya).
I am curious if you find substantial reason to prefer Peirce's account of "real" and "existing" over those I've just presented, this given common speech understandings of the two terms.
Reply to javraI’ve noticed Peirce’s distinctions, mainly through interactions with @apokrisis over the years, and have read up on them a little. I find them useful precisely because he maintains a distinction between the real and the existent—a distinction I think is crucial, but which has largely dropped out of contemporary philosophical discourse. It survives, in a thinner form, in modern modal metaphysics, but typically only along strictly semantic lines (as in possible-worlds semantics), rather than with anything like Peirce’s richer, ontologically structured metaphysics.
In addition to 'res potentia', we also have to consider the reality of abstractions, such as the natural numbers. Here my sympathies lie with Platonism, although much of the debate around 'platonism in philosophy of math' is abstruse. But I take the point in the SEP article on same, that:
Mathematical platonism has considerable philosophical significance. If the view is true, it will put great pressure on the physicalist idea that reality is exhausted by the physical. For platonism entails that reality extends far beyond the physical world and includes objects that aren’t part of the causal and spatiotemporal order studied by the physical sciences. Mathematical platonism, if true, will also put great pressure on many naturalistic theories of knowledge. For there is little doubt that we possess mathematical knowledge. The truth of mathematical platonism would therefore establish that we have knowledge of abstract (and thus causally inefficacious) objects. This would be an important discovery, which many naturalistic theories of knowledge would struggle to accommodate.
I find the 'this would be an important discovery' unintentially ironic, as according to many, this was already evident to the ancient Greeks and probably the ancient Egyptians. But, in any case, the whole reason that this is such a controversial topic is straightforward: if number is real but not material, then it undercuts philosophical materialism and a lot of empiricist philosophy:
...scholars—especially those working in other branches of science—view Platonism with skepticism. Scientists tend to be empiricists; they imagine the universe to be made up of things we can touch and taste and so on; things we can learn about through observation and experiment. The idea of something existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous: It sounds embarrassingly like the way religious believers talk about God, and God was banished from respectable scientific discourse a long time ago.
Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, “has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science.” The fear is that if mathematicians give Plato an inch, he’ll take a mile. If the truth of mathematical statements can be confirmed just by thinking about them, then why not ethical problems, or even religious questions? Why bother with empiricism at all?
Reply to Wayfarer Yes, but then a platonic number or form (e.g., the perfect circle, devoid of which there is no pi, devoid of which there is no QM) will all "stand out" to us. Whereas consciousness (via which we apprehend objects of awareness such as the, I'll here say, universal of a perfect circle) does not. Were existence to be synonymous to actuality, as per what you've said of Peirce's interpretation, this discrepancy would not be accounted for.
Yes, I think we're all in accord that the culprit here is the word "reality," no surprise.
Yes. But the challenge is to explain exactly what the word "reality" is guilty of - or, better, what we are guilty of when we misuse the word "reality", if it is possible to misuse something that we have created. (I mean the word. not the reality.)
"Reality" is an example of the common philosophical mistake of over-generalizing, or perhaps better, of decontextualizing a perfectly useful word, which then becomes virtually useless. What counts as "real" and "unreal" depends on the context, which is specified when you complete a sentence and specify what the context is. The idea that you can lump everything real into one group and everything unreal into another group is just wrong. Things are often unreal under one description and perfectly real under another. Similarly, what existence depends on what kind of thing you are thinking of. Superman exists - as a character in comic books, but not as someone you might meet at a bus stop.
we can write down the set of all the integers in a finite set of words - I just did; but by stepping outside the rules for writing down the integers and using sets instead.
Yes. It is often possible to do something impossible by changing the rules. I'm not sure that proves anything - except that we wrote the rules in the first place. So we can change the rules or invent new ones any time we want to. Even mathematicians have been known to indulge in that - especially where infinity is concerned. But I don't think that really undermines the point you originally made.
For Peirce, something can be real without existing (e.g., a universal law or a potential quality), but anything that exists is also real. The existing things are just the particular instances where the real generalities (laws and habits) are manifested in brute, immediate interaction.
That's all very neat and tidy. But I don't think it reflects the complexity of the relationship between reality and existence. On the contrary, it looks like reading in a real distinction - between laws and generalities on one hand and the particular and individual on the other - into the difference between real things and things that exist. I think it is perfectly reasonable to say that there is a natural law about conservation of energy. If that's true, the law exists. Superman is a well-known comic-book character, but everyone knows that he is a fictional character and so not a real person.
These thoughts we, at the very least at present, have no access to and cannot express in words that we ourselves have at our disposal.
Fair enough. Our languages, natural and artificial, are not closed. There is plenty of room for new concepts. I don't see a problem.
BTW - isn't the existing theory of quantum physics an example of what you are talking about? Something that is both a wave and a particle?
We as conscious observes, though an aspect of reality at large (for we as conscious observers are indeed actual, hence real), however do not exist, not in this formal means of understanding the term, for we don’t stand out to ourselves, not even conceptually via the concepts that do exist for us.
Well, you are welcome to define a new use for "exists", but if it means that we, - you and I - do not exist, I think you might find it rather difficult to sell.
I find them useful precisely because he maintains a distinction between the real and the existent—a distinction I think is crucial, but which has largely dropped out of contemporary philosophical discourse.
I agree that there is a neglected distinction between "real" and "existent". But I don't think Peirce remotely captures it.
In addition to 'res potentia', we also have to consider the reality of abstractions, such as the natural numbers. Here my sympathies lie with Platonism, although much of the debate around 'platonism in philosophy of math' is abstruse.
I agree with that. The problem with platonism is not so much about the reality of abstract numbers and shapes but the denial of the reality of physical objects. Both exist and are real; but they are different knds of object, that's all.
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We as conscious observes, though an aspect of reality at large (for we as conscious observers are indeed actual, hence real), however do not exist, not in this formal means of understanding the term, for we don’t stand out to ourselves, not even conceptually via the concepts that do exist for us. — javra
Well, you are welcome to define a new use for "exists", but if it means that we, - you and I - do not exist, I think you might find it rather difficult to sell.
That's not what I said, is it? You and I are selves, and selves do stand out ... this to the consciousness embedded in each which, as consciousness, does not. One does not see "consciousness" in the mirror but only one's own physiological self.
"Reality" is an example of the common philosophical mistake of over-generalizing, or perhaps better, of decontextualizing a perfectly useful word, which then becomes virtually useless. What counts as "real" and "unreal" depends on the context, which is specified when you complete a sentence and specify what the context is. The idea that you can lump everything real into one group and everything unreal into another group is just wrong. Things are often unreal under one description and perfectly real under another. Similarly, what existence depends on what kind of thing you are thinking of. Superman exists - as a character in comic books, but not as someone you might meet at a bus stop.
Nicely summarized. I might question whether the word was ever "perfectly useful," but other than that, you've said it well.
Nabokov said, "'Reality' is the one word that should always appear in quotation marks." He meant pretty much what you mean here. We could, for instance, create "Peirce-marks" to indicate when the word is being used as Peirce defined it.
The big bang is as an explanation for, and from, what we see around us; the very opposite of what you are suggesting.
If you were to somehow—right now—go back in time to a few moments before the Big Bang—with no idea that it was about to create what we call "the known Universe"—yet retain your knowledge of the known Universe, such knowledge would technically be "beyond reality" since the known Universe hasn't been created at that point.
The "known Universe" doesn't exist in reality at that point in time, other than in your head. Yet a few moments later—unbeknownst to you—it would. This is an explicit example (albeit hypothetical and per current scientific knowledge, currently impossible) of not only a valid posit of something "beyond reality" but a (theoretically) factual occurrence of reality being extended to something it was not previously.
Trivially, maybe "Big Bangs" happen all the time (in an "eternal" sense or context of frequency/occurrence) and another might happen in the future, removing all traces of the current Universe (this one) in favor of a new Universe that currently does not exist in any form (which technically, may have been what happened and may very well be the origins of this Universe, one simply does not know). Run it through ChatGPT if for whatever reason I'm not communicating to you sufficiently.
I'm basically saying there was a time this Universe (rather everything that we consider part of this Universe) didn't exist in any sort of recognizable form like it is now (ie. "pre-Big Bang" reality). At that time, talking about the Universe would be referring to something "beyond reality", yet would eventually become reality. It's the only example I got, but one example is all it takes to turn something from "100% absolute every single time" to "well, in most cases..." Which is a crucial distinction in philosophy (and basically anything else).
I mention consciousness arising from simplex organisms in case you say something like "but this Universe DID always exist, it was just all inside of the Singularity!", which I would respond by saying "that would be like saying consciousness always existed inside the first single-celled organism it just 'became active' once organisms evolved highly-functioning brains and resulting intelligence", which would be patently false.
...go back in time to a few moments before the Big Bang
There's no such time. Time came into existence along with the universe; the Big Bang is not an event in time but a boundary of time.
This sort of speculative physics makes for poor threads.
But time is a conceptual scheme embedded in our total belief network, hence asking about “time before time” is a misuse of those concepts, a confusion generated by stretching the scheme beyond its application to the world’s causal structure. The physics describes causal structure; those structures fix what makes sense to call “earlier” or “later.” If the causal structure doesn’t extend, neither does the temporal vocabulary.
There's no such time. Time came into existence along with the universe; the Big Bang is not an event in time but a boundary of time.
Maybe. There's a theory that we're in a black hole, which is inside a bigger universe. Instead of one Big Bang, there are Big Bounces that spawn universes. So our universe is in a bigger one, and our's is spawning more universes, which we detect as black holes.
The philosophical import being that we really don't know.
a platonic number or form (e.g., the perfect circle, devoid of which there is no pi, devoid of which there is no QM) will all "stand out" to us. Whereas consciousness (via which we apprehend objects of awareness such as the....universal of a perfect circle) does not. Were existence to be synonymous to actuality, as per what you've said of Peirce's interpretation, this discrepancy would not be accounted for.
Here, I want to come back to the reality of intelligibles. Scientific principles, mathematical relations, and the natural numbers are not dependent on any individual mind, yet they can only be grasped by a mind. That is the sense in which I hold they are real (in the noumenal or intelligible sense) but not existent (in the phenomenal, spatiotemporal sense. This is nearer to the pre-Kantian sense of 'noumenal', which Kant adapted, and changed, for his own purposes.)
This isn’t meant as a full metaphysical system, but as an heuristic:
* existent = that which appears in space, time, and causal relations; what can be encountered as a phenomenon
* real = that which has objective validity or logical necessity, but is not a physical particular
This is very close to Peirce’s schema: laws, generalities, and mathematical structures are real even though they do not exist as phenomena of Secondness. On those grounds, I don’t think “reality” can be collapsed into “existence” without erasing the ontological standing of intelligibles altogether.
Furthermore language depends on such abstractions. Whenever we use the terms ‘same as’, ‘equal to’, ‘different from’, ‘less than’, and so on, we’re making use of our capacity for rational abstraction, without the requirement of being aware of doing so. This capacity is anticipated by a discussion in Plato’s Phaedo called ‘The Argument from Equality’. In it, Socrates argues that in order to judge the equal length of two like objects — two sticks, say, or two rocks — we must already have ‘the idea of equals’ present in our minds, otherwise we wouldn’t know how to go about comparing them; we must already have ‘the idea of equals’. And this idea must be innate, he says. It can’t be acquired by mere experience, but must have been present at birth.
I don’t know if it’s necessary for us to accept the implied belief in the ‘incarnation of the soul’ to make sense of the claim: the fact that it’s innate is what is at issue. It is the innate capacity which provides us the ability to make such judgements, which we as rational creatures do effortlessly. It is just this kind of innate capabiiity which empiricism tends to deprecate (subject of Steve Pinker's book The Blank Slate).
On a larger scale, the same kind of capacities of abstraction are brought to bear on formulating the mathematical bases of theoretical physics. Science sees the Universe through such mathematical hypotheses, which provide the indispensable framework for making judgements (in accordance with the oft-quoted Galilean expression that ‘the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics’).
Thus intellectual abstractions, the grasp of abstract relations and qualities, are quite literally the ligatures of reason — they are what binds rational conceptions together to form coherent ideas.
Reply to Banno You did ask me once what I meant by that expression.
There's no such time. Time came into existence along with the universe; the Big Bang is not an event in time but a boundary of time.
Huh. Interesting. I was not focally aware of that. There's no semi-equivalent (I get it's not a matter of simple terminology or verbatim but a truly transcendental concept altogether—somewhat)? There's no hypothetical future where humans have mastered time travel (and beyond?) that any matter currently in existence can be somehow "placed" or otherwise "end up" at such a point? Why is that? (It's honestly fascinating to ponder, is all)
This sort of speculative physics makes for poor threads.
Perhaps. That said, I don't need to remind anyone here that all generally-accepted theories as well as most if not all scientific facts began as mere speculation. I fail to see an intrinsic evil in the practice per se, though I can see how it can be a bit disfavored and come off as irrelevant.
Either way, I appreciate the newfound knowledge. :smile:
Yes, I think we're all in accord that the culprit here is the word "reality," no surprise. "Stuff we can know as humans" and "all the stuff that can be known" are fine with me instead, as long as the two aren't supposed to mean the same thing.
These guys are idealists masquerading as physicalists. They just want to shut down the debate and confine the physical material to their idealism. If they were true physicalists they would have brought the Many Worlds Theory to the table by now, but they haven’t.
The simplest answer to the OP is we don’t know what else there is. There might be all sorts of weird and wonderful stuff, that we can’t see. We just can’t see it.
This can then be elaborated by saying we know that there is a lot we don’t know about the world we find ourselves in. So we know that we don’t know things about things that we [B] can[/B] see. Therefore we are not in a position to say, or know anything about what we can’t see. So we can’t say what else isn’t there, just like we can’t give a full account of what we know is there.
You and I are selves, and selves do stand out ... this to the consciousness embedded in each which, as consciousness, does not. One does not see "consciousness" in the mirror but only one's own physiological self.
I find myself floundering here. There is a regrettable tendency to think of anyone's self - including one's own - as if it were an object of some sort. If it is, it is remarkably elusive for something that is omni-present in one's life and experience. What's worse, is that one tends to find oneself positing more than one - a physiological self, as opposed to various others; none of these can possibly be one's true self - whatever that means. In addition, while I can supply some sort of (metaphorical) meaning to "stand out" as a description of what existent objects do, I can't grasp a meaning clear enough to be sure that I'm making the right sense of what you are saying. I am confused by the fact that if something "stands out" in my experience, I find that it does so against a background, which also exists.
I might question whether the word was ever "perfectly useful," but other than that, you've said it well.
Perhaps. "perfectly" was really a rhetorical flourish, meant to underline that there are uses of "real" and of "reality" that are not problematic in the way that this peculiar, specifically philosophical, use, is.
We could, for instance, create "Peirce-marks" to indicate when the word is being used as Peirce defined it.
Well, yes, "P-real" could become a (real) word. There would be a swarm of other, similar, words. It would be interesting to see which of them would survive for, say, ten years. Definitions can only work if there is a consensus about how the term is to be used. But there is no such consensus in philosophy about "exists", so there is no sound basis for evaluating any definition. I'm also deeply suspicious of any definition that sets out to define a single word. (Dictionaries nowadays recognize the relationships of a given word to others.)
Curious if you disagree with this: In commonsense language, then, Superman, the comic-book character, exists (in our culture) but is not real.
I think that's right. But it's perhaps worth adding that he is a real comic-book character, just not a real person. As a cautious generalization, I would say that the problem with "real" is that things are often real under one description and unreal under another. "Exists" seems to be binary (unless you are Meinong).
Speculative physicists don't seem to think so (sc. that speculation is a waste of time)..
That may be because they are working in a context that gives some traction to discussion and argument. On the other hand, it may be that that kind of response is not really appropriate. The speculation may be fun or exciting or something. Truth is, perhaps, only relevant when the speculation gets tied down into a
critical framework. It may or may not be true that Kekule came up with the carbon ring after he had a dream, which then gave him the idea of the benzene ring, which sent him into the laboratory. But it illustrates the point. No-one is concluding that dreams are a reliable source of scientific hypotheses.
The transition may involve a high casualty rate and a good deal of fruitless discussion. Is it worth it? I don't know.
There's no hypothetical future where humans have mastered time travel (and beyond?) that any matter currently in existence can be somehow "placed" or otherwise "end up" at such a point? Why is that? (It's honestly fascinating to ponder, is all)
I can see your point. But I think it is important to recognize that the fascination is not the same thing as truth. If you don't, you'll find yourself believing in dragons and world conspiracies. "What if.." can be great fun. But it doesn't always play into truth and falsity. (Who cares that Superman is impossible? We all understand the context and can enjoy the stories, but let's not get carried away into political philosophy.)
That is the sense in which I hold they (sc. abstract objects) are real (in the noumenal or intelligible sense) but not existent (in the phenomenal, spatiotemporal sense.
Well, they are not phenomenal or spatiotemporal objects. But why does that mean they don't exist? Or, why do you restrict existence to such objects?
This capacity (sc. to grasp abstract objects) is anticipated by a discussion in Plato’s Phaedo called ‘The Argument from Equality’. In it, Socrates argues that in order to judge the equal length of two like objects — two sticks, say, or two rocks — we must already have ‘the idea of equals’ present in our minds, otherwise we wouldn’t know how to go about comparing them; we must already have ‘the idea of equals’. And this idea must be innate, he says. It can’t be acquired by mere experience, but must have been present at birth.
Yes, but Plato is wrong to think that the idea of equality must be innate. We learn how to measure things and so when things are the same length or weight - and even when there are two sticks or rocks. True, we are born with the capacity to learn, but that's not the same thing.
The simplest answer to the OP is we don’t know what else there is. There might be all sorts of weird and wonderful stuff, that we can’t see. We just can’t see it.
This can then be elaborated by saying we know that there is a lot we don’t know about the world we find ourselves in. So we know that we don’t know things about things that we can see. Therefore we are not in a position to say, or know anything about what we can’t see. So we can’t say what else isn’t there, just like we can’t give a full account of what we know is there.
Yes. That seems straightforward and right to me. It also seems to me that the difficulties arise only when we insist on trying to drag "reality" and "existence" and a metaphorical use of "beyond" into it.
That is the sense in which I hold they (sc. abstract objects) are real (in the noumenal or intelligible sense) but not existent (in the phenomenal, spatiotemporal sense.
— Wayfarer
Well, they are not phenomenal or spatiotemporal objects. But why does that mean they don't exist?
If I ask you to point to the number 7, what would you actually point to? At most, you could indicate a token—a mark on paper, a glyph on a screen, or the word “seven.” But the number itself is not any of these tokens. We both understand “7” because we can perform the intellectual act of counting and grasping numerical relations. The token is a symbol, not the referent, which is a numerical value.
This is why I say that numbers, logical principles, and laws of nature are intelligible rather than phenomenal. They are not given in sensation the way tables, colours, or sounds are. You don’t encounter the number 7 in space and time; you grasp it by a capacity of the intellect. That makes them real, but not existent in the empirical sense.
Of course, we say colloquially that the number 7 exists, and I wouldn't take issue with that. But this is a philosophical distinction and in this context such distinctions are significant.
I'm not making arbitrary distinctions - I’m distinguishing two modes of existence. Phenomenal things exist as objects of sense. Intelligible things are real insofar as they can be grasped by a rational intellect, but they are not phenomena, in the way that sense objects are.
This distinction between phenomenal and intelligible objects isn’t something I’ve invented; it’s a well-established feature of the classical philosophical tradition. From Plato and Aristotle through the medievals and into early modern rationalism, the difference between what is apprehended by the senses and what is apprehended by the intellect was taken to be fundamental. It’s only with the rise of empiricism and the narrowing of “existence” to what can be observed or measured that this distinction began to fade from view.
I’m simply trying to keep both modes of understanding in play, because collapsing everything into the empirical domain obscures the reality of the intelligible structures we rely on in logic, mathematics, and science itself. And it is actually germane to the subject under discussion.
The set of true sentences is never complete, if that helps.
If the set is not complete, then you imply that there are more true sentences which are not in the set. So, do you mean by this, that "the set of true sentences" does not refer to all the true sentences?
Because what 'is' for us is all there is for us. Anything beyond is not anything. (again, Kantian noumenon).
But tomorrow isn't here yet.
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded time;
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.
there are uses of "real" and of "reality" that are not problematic in the way that this peculiar, specifically philosophical, use, is.
Maybe. Even in ordinary conversation, it can get vague really quickly. I guess I'd agree that we know how to use "real" in the context of "Simone de Beauvoir was real" vs. "Santa Claus is not real".
"P-real" could become a (real) word. There would be a swarm of other, similar, words. It would be interesting to see which of them would survive for, say, ten years.
Yes, it would! Have there been other philosophical definitions which had to compete for survival against competitors using the same term? I feel there must have been, but I can't think of one at the moment. Maybe "logic"?
I'm also deeply suspicious of any definition that sets out to define a single word.
In philosophy, yes, since we lack a reliable means to go and check whether we've got it right. Binomial nomenclature, in contrast, seems a noble and successful task.
Because what 'is' for us is all there is for us. Anything beyond is not anything.
I'm not being stubborn, but I just don't see how it follows. If you said, "Anything beyond is not anything for us," I'd see your point. But why would you assert that "for us" encompasses all there is?
I'm not being stubborn, but I just don't see how it follows. If you said, "Anything beyond is not anything for us," I'd see your point. But why would you assert that "for us" encompasses all there is?
Have you read Kant? If you have then refer to what he says about negative and positive noumenon.
Nothing more to say (you can search this very site to find examples of myself and others pointing out this difficult obviousness).
I wouldn’t want to name names as I feel cheeky enough saying what I said.
There is a point though, only an idealist, of some kind, would restrict what is to what can be said, or known by a person. Surely by contrast, a physicalist of some kind would allow any of an infinite number of other possibilities and the fact that we cannot observe them directly doesn’t preclude their existence.
Reply to Punshhh OK, I see what you're saying. Yes, a physicalist would probably agree there are things that humans can't know, but fortunately you don't have to be a physicalist to reach that conclusion!
The idealism question is a little harder. A hardcore Wittgensteinian/Davidsonian position on what we can talk about meaningfully isn't idealist, by my definition. That position raises doubts about going beyond human experience on what I'd call methodological grounds, rather than a skepticism based on some interpretation of Kantian idealism, say.
There is a point though, only an idealist [immaterislist], of some kind, would restrict what is to what can be said, or known by a person. Surely by contrast, a physicalist [materialist] of some kind would allow any of an infinite number of other possibilities and the fact that we cannot observe them directly doesn’t preclude their existence.
If the reality we experience is the only thing that we have experienced, how do we know that there isn’t anything beyond our reality?
We can't "know" there's more (in the strict sense of "knowlwdge"). But we innately have a sense that there is a world beyond ourselves, and this constitutes a rational basis. Given that we have this belief, it is rational to maintain it unless it is defeated by other facts and valid reasoning. The mere fact that it is possibly false is not a defeater.
The token is a symbol, not the referent, which is a numerical value.
Just a small point. What I "actually" point to is a mark on wall or paper. That mark is a token of the type "7". It is a sign or symbol for the number, which is an abstract object. We often refer to tokens as numbers, but I agree that they are not.
This is why I say that numbers, logical principles, and laws of nature are intelligible rather than phenomenal. They are not given in sensation the way tables, colours, or sounds are. You don’t encounter the number 7 in space and time; you grasp it by a capacity of the intellect. That makes them real, but not existent in the empirical sense.
I'm surprised you are bothered about the empirical sense of "existent". I'm not, at least if you think that sense is "to be is to be perceived". The issue is whether inferences from what we perceive to things that are not (directly) perceived are allowed.
I’m distinguishing two modes of existence. Phenomenal things exist as objects of sense. Intelligible things are real insofar as they can be grasped by a rational intellect, but they are not phenomena, in the way that sense objects are.
Well, that's true. But it doesn't follow from the fact that intelligible objects are not phenomena that they do not exist.
From Plato and Aristotle through the medievals and into early modern rationalism, the difference between what is apprehended by the senses and what is apprehended by the intellect was taken to be fundamental.
Perhaps so. But even Berkeley, for all his rhetoric, had to concede exceptions. The existence of his own self, other people, and God were all inferred from his perceptions (ideas). Physics and other sciences have no trouble with that - so far as I know. Microscopes, telescopes, dials and meters of all sorts.
I think that our language here leads us in to unnecessary difficulties. At first sight, it seems that "what we perceive" and "what is apprehended by the intellect" are two distinct sets of objects. But perception and intellect do not work separately, in distinct silos. They are both involved in everything. Perception involves understanding and understanding involves perception. It's not an accident that "I see" or "I hear you" can mean "I understand".
I’m distinguishing two modes of existence. Phenomenal things exist as objects of sense. Intelligible things are real insofar as they can be grasped by a rational intellect, but they are not phenomena, in the way that sense objects are.
The awkward thing here is that there is a gap between phenomenal things like sights and sounds, smells and tastes, etc. on one hand and intelligible things like circles and squares and numbers and functions. Ordinary life relies mostly on objects that involve both perception and understanding.
But there are lots of different kinds of object. Do we really need a "mode of existence" for each kind? I don't see that as necessary, though I'm not dogmatic about it.
I guess I'd agree that we know how to use "real" in the context of "Simone de Beauvoir was real" vs. "Santa Claus is not real".
Santa Claus and Pegasus &c. are a bit atypical. Standard cases are quite clear. Forged money is not real money, but exists; it is real in that it is a copy of real money. A model car is not a real car, but it exists because it is a real model of a car. A fisherman's fly is not a real fly, but it is exists because it is real bait. An actor is not a real policeman, but exists because they are a real person.
The last of these illustrates the peculiarities of fictional characters. Santa Clause is not just not a real person; he exists as a fictional or mythical character, which is to say that he does not exist.
how do we know that there isn’t anything beyond our reality?
We know that there are things we don't know about, because we have questions we cannot answer. We also know that there are things we don't know about because we know that we know things that people in the past didn't know.
Of course none of those things are beyond our reality. Or at least, if they are, they will become part of our reality as soon as we know about them.
Does that help?
If the reality we experience is the only thing that we have experienced, how do we know that there isn’t anything beyond our reality?
Who is "we"?
If you're referring to "mankind" and assuming it's somehow unified and uniform, then you're clearly wrong.
Secondly, there's no need to get all exotic and extraterrestrial. Let's rephrase your question to, "If the reality Tom experiences is the only thing that Tom has experienced, how does Tom know that there isn’t anything beyond Tom's reality?"
How about the internal states of Dick and Harry? Are they a reality for Tom? Does Tom care about the about the internal states of Dick and Harry? Does Tom even acknowledge the possibility that the internal states of Dick and Harry might be other than what Tom supposes?
And not a valid one. The mark is a symbol. What it represents is a mathematical value, not an object.
Yes. You are right. My main point, though, was the structure of type and token that enables to say that it is the same symbol in many places and many occasions. Or at least, I thought that was what you meant.
The system, begun by Linnaeus, of identifying creatures by genus and species, e.g., Homo sapiens. I offered it as an example of a single, useful definition that can save everyone a lot of trouble. It has to be agreed to, of course.
We can be more specific. We can't assess physical theories without doing the maths.
And there is no maths here.
Quite so. That gives us some ground to treat the speculative physics that we hear so much about as somewhat different from this game. The speculations are at least candidates for the status of a hypothesis.
But it's not a free-standing game like noughts and crosses or tic-tac-toe. It's an extension of the language-game that's played in everyday language, and it is a puzzle game, not a competition between the players. Solving the puzzle is what it is all about. The solution is to understand the extension and see not only that it can't be played but why it can't be played. (Or, just possibly, to see whether there is a way that it might be playable.)
The system, begun by Linnaeus, of identifying creatures by genus and species, e.g., Homo sapiens. I offered it as an example of a single, useful definition that can save everyone a lot of trouble. It has to be agreed to, of course.
Of course. I should have understood. However, definitions like that are contextualized in a specialized field where the definition is a stipulation rather than a codification of an existing practice. Another advantage in the context of zoology is that it is possible to nominate a specimen as a reference, to supplement the words and help make decisions about borderline cases. So they are not like the philosophical attempts to define words that already have a use.
Reply to Ludwig V Yes, yet through all that, my initial comments stand. Reality is what there is, hence to posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more of what there is, and "beyond reality" is a grammatical error. And what I experience is not the very same as what is real, what we know is not the very same as what I experience.
My main point, though, was the structure of type and token that enables to say that it is the same symbol in many places and many occasions. Or at least, I thought that was what you meant.
It is indeed a part of what I meant! But the additional point is that what is denoted by the symbol is an intellectual act, not a phenomenal existent. And I say that is a real, vital, and largely neglected distinction.
definitions like that are contextualized in a specialized field where the definition is a stipulation rather than a codification of an existing practice.
Yes. As you say, very few philosophical terms could undergo such an evolution. It's for that reason, as I've said so often on TPF, that I'd like to see philosophers avoid terms like "reality" whenever possible. Or else put it in Peirce-marks or Kant-marks or Carnap-marks etc. if that's what you mean. :smile:
what is denoted by the symbol is an intellectual act, not a phenomenal existent. And I say that is a real, vital, and largely neglected distinction.
If I may . . . This is right, and perhaps not so neglected if we see the connection with the many discussions we've had about the status of propositions. The whole point of trying to separate out something called a proposition is to preserve that very distinction. Sentences denote propositions (when they have the appropriate form), not objects or even individual thoughts. Nor are propositions objects in the world, though they may be about objects in the world. At least, that's the standard account. See Rodl though . . .
Reality is what there is, hence to posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more of what there is, and "beyond reality" is a grammatical error.
Well I think it's implicit that we're talking about known reality.
The way I look at it is this: I think hypotheses that we are living in the matrix or whatever are vulnerable to occam's razor. They have no better explanatory power than the hypothesis that I am a Homo sapiens on earth 2025, but posit additional entities.
And I think it's also important to stay within this explantory / hypothesis space. Because sometimes people make the claim that everything around us being a dream is somehow simpler than believing in a gigantic universe. But scale, and physicality, are not complexity. Or you sometimes get allusions to a an idea of a universe being "easier"; both of these claims are baseless and/or irrelevant at this time.
The whole point of trying to separate out something called a proposition is to preserve that very distinction. Sentences denote propositions (when they have the appropriate form), not objects or even individual thoughts. Nor are propositions objects in the world, though they may be about objects in the world. At least, that's the standard account.
:up: And this ties back to Wittgenstein's statement that the world is all that is the case. He was referring to the insight that the world does not seem to be made of a set of objects, but of objects doing things. That gives us the notion that the world is a set of true propositions.
Well I think it's implicit that we're talking about known reality.
Yes, there are things we don't know. That is, there are true statements of which we do not have any knowledge. The person that realism should bother most is @Wayfarer, but he has convinced himself that he can have both antirealism and unknown truths.
Reply to frank Interesting how this connects to the previous considerations about "reality." Like "reality," the term "the world" is capable of being used in many ways. Wittgenstein's insight is valuable whether or not we want to use "the world" the way he uses it. His point is that, apart from objects, there are states of affairs, facts, construals, propositions, ways of thinking and speaking -- and when we ask "What is the case?" it is those items we're asking about, not the objects.
ADDED But propositions are made true by whether the arrangements of objects (crudely) are that way. We need the objects to help make a Wittgensteinian world.
This is right, and perhaps not so neglected if we see the connection with the many discussions we've had about the status of propositions. The whole point of trying to separate out something called a proposition is to preserve that very distinction
Which I am seeking to leverage to make a point about metaphysics…a point which I still don’t think is being acknowledged.
Reply to Banno Actually if you'd bothered reading anything I've said in this particular thread, you would see i've said nothing of the kind (although I've never said anything of the sort in any other thread, either). As the discussion had turned into a general one on metaphysics, I was trying to make the distinction between phenomenal and intelligible objects, but no avail.
Let's be clear: I'm pointing out that the OP isa a word game.
No more than your replies are a word game.
And "No".
The game seems to be, let’s insist there isn’t anything else (other than our reality), because we don’t have the vocabulary to do it’s ising justice. Meanwhile smuggling in the acknowledgement that there probably is something else (as a nod to the idea that you can’t prove a negative).
Anti-realism says: every truth must be knowable.
But you also say: there are truths we don’t and maybe can’t know.
Fitch shows you can’t have both.
If there are unknown truths, then not every truth is knowable, which just is the denial of anti-realism.
Reply to Banno Please refer to what I said in this thread. As I interpreted this discussion as being about metaphysics I responded accordingly here and here. These are not recapitulations of the ‘mind-created world’ OP, although I believe they’re compatible with it.
Reality is what there is, hence to posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more of what there is, and "beyond reality" is a grammatical error. And what I experience is not the very same as what is real, what we know is not the very same as what I experience.
In a way, I'm fine with the first sentence. My problem is that we seem to hunger for a way of metaphorically pulling everything together under one heading. I just did exactly that with "everything". and that itself reveals the fundamental issue. In normal contexts, the scope of everything is set by the context (and sometimes we talk about "domains" in this context. But here, I'm attempting to use "everything" without a limiting context. We do the same with "reality", "existence", "being", "world", "universe" and "cosmos". The catch is that we can't let go of the expectation that the scope will be limited, and so we undermine our own attempt by positing something that is outside the scope of how we are using the term - a possibility that we set out to exclude.
Your second sentence is very tempting. It turns on the fact that these terms are not synonymous, but are conceptually linked and inter-related. But we don't have a clear grasp of those links and inter-relationship, so that we get lost in them. This second sentence is tempting, but if one asks what "the very same" means (and particularly wonder what the difference is between "same" and "very same"), the meaning suddenly becomes elusive. (I'm skating over the issue how "experience" and "knowledge" relate to the terms in the first sentence, because our idealist tendencies seem to me to explain that.)
But the additional point is that what is denoted by the symbol is an intellectual act, not a phenomenal existent. And I say that is a real, vital, and largely neglected distinction.
Does the following explain why you think the distinction is so important? Quoting Wayfarer
Thus intellectual abstractions, the grasp of abstract relations and qualities, are quite literally the ligatures of reason — they are what binds rational conceptions together to form coherent ideas.
I don't want to elide the distinction you are trying to make - though I confess I don't fully understand it. I can attribute meaning to the idea of "phenomenal objects" and to the idea of "intelligible objects". But it does seem to me very important not to let go of the idea that we often understand the things that we perceive and often perceive the things we understand. I think I may be arguing for a third class of objects, which can both be perceived and understood. I hope that makes some sense.
As you say, very few philosophical terms could undergo such an evolution. It's for that reason, as I've said so often on TPF, that I'd like to see philosophers avoid terms like "reality" whenever possible. Or else put it in Peirce-marks or Kant-marks or Carnap-marks etc. if that's what you mean.
I sympathize and try not to use those terms unnecessarily. But they are so deeply embedded in philosophy, that it seems impossible to not use them - and I can't resist joining in the discussion.
This is right, and perhaps not so neglected if we see the connection with the many discussions we've had about the status of propositions. The whole point of trying to separate out something called a proposition is to preserve that very distinction. Sentences denote propositions (when they have the appropriate form), not objects or even individual thoughts. Nor are propositions objects in the world, though they may be about objects in the world.
Well I think it's implicit that we're talking about known reality.
The trouble is that by referring to "known reality" you open up the possibility of unknown reality. Any limit that you try to set, immediately creates the idea that there is something beyond or in addition to that limit. Wittgenstein tries valiantly to get round that problem in the Tractatus, but ends up with a compromise - "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." - which sits oddly beside "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world."
Interesting how this connects to the previous considerations about "reality." Like "reality," the term "the world" is capable of being used in many ways. Wittgenstein's insight is valuable whether or not we want to use "the world" the way he uses it. His point is that, apart from objects, there are states of affairs, facts, construals, propositions, ways of thinking and speaking -- and when we ask "What is the case?" it is those items we're asking about, not the objects.
Oh, surely, what he says is stronger than that. "The world is all that is the case." and "The world is the totality of facts, not things." Of course, this is related to the Fregean insistence that words only have meaning in the context of sentences and Wittgenstein's belief that sentences work in virtue of the similarity (identity?) of their structure with the structure of the world.
The game seems to be, let’s insist there isn’t anything else (other than our reality), because we don’t have the vocabulary to do it’s ising justice. Meanwhile smuggling in the acknowledgement that there probably is something else (as a nod to the idea that you can’t prove a negative).
Yes, we give with one hand and take back with the other. Berkeley is a spectacular example. He says nothing can exist unperceived and that he does not deny the existence of "any one thing" that common sense believes in. (He reconciles the two by pointing out that God always perceives everything.)
He’s doing a neat trick whereby the phenomenal has to become intelligible (therefore an intelligible object) before it can be acknowledged.
Yes, that's the price you pay for positing phenomenal and intelligible objects as distinct kinds of objects. The obvious solution is to insist that perception and intelligence deal with the same objects at least sometimes.
Anti-realism says: every truth must be knowable.
But you also say: there are truths we don’t and maybe can’t know.
Fitch shows you can’t have both.
If there are unknown truths, then not every truth is knowable, which just is the denial of anti-realism.
On a quick look-up, SEP explains the paradox thus:-
The ally of the view that all truths are knowable (by somebody at some time) is forced absurdly to admit that every truth is known (by somebody at some time).
I'm not impressed. It seems to follow that at any given time, there can be unknown truths. That these truths may be known at some other time is not particularly interesting.
On a quick look-up, SEP explains the paradox thus:-
The ally of the view that all truths are knowable (by somebody at some time) is forced absurdly to admit that every truth is known (by somebody at some time).
I'm not impressed. It seems to follow that at any given time, there can be unknown truths. That these truths may be known at some other time is not particularly interesting.
Fitch's paradox only demonstrates the obvious, that every truth must be known. Since "truth" refers to a relation between propositions and reality, and only intelligent minds can produce this relation through the application of meaning, and the process of knowing, it is very obvious that all truths must be known.
So, what Fitch does, is take a clearly false premise, that there may be a truth which is unknown, and shows how one might produce an absurd conclusion from that false premise. That's common practise in philosophy, it's a way of demonstrating the falsity of the premise, to those who do not grasp the obvious.
The issue with the possibility of truths which we as human beings do not know, involves the assumption of a higher, divine intelligence, like God. If we understand that the human mind is deficient in its capacity to know, and we assume the possibility of an actually existing higher mind with a greater capacity to understand and know, then we accept the possibility of truths which are not known by any human mind, but are known by the higher mind.
Oh, surely, what he says is stronger than that. "The world is all that is the case." and "The world is the totality of facts, not things.
I agree, it's open to several interpretations. Consider the first dictum. Is it definitional? That is, should we read it as "'The world' is 'all that is the case'"? Or is it descriptive: "The world is all that is the case"? i.e., there is nothing beyond the world. I favor the first reading, because I find it more provocative.
The same bifurcation of interpretation can be applied to the second dictum.
"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." - which sits oddly beside "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world."
This one also seems to fit with the "definitional" interpretation, where it doesn't appear so odd. The limits of my world are not the limits of the world. I may know that there are more facts, more "things that are the case," without being able to find them or speak about them. A great deal hinges on the question, "What does a limit do?" Does it prevent knowledge that there is more, or only knowledge about whatever that "more" is?
But [terms like 'reality'] are so deeply embedded in philosophy, that it seems impossible to not use them - and I can't resist joining in the discussion.
Yes. My proposal for reform is quixotic. But at least we can be more conscious of how we use them -- and maybe use them a bit less often.
Anti-realism says: every truth must be knowable.
But you also say: there are truths we don’t and maybe can’t know.
Fitch shows you can’t have both.
If there are unknown truths, then not every truth is knowable, which just is the denial of anti-realism.
"True" is a judgement. Judgements are only made by intelligent minds in the process called "knowing". Therefore all truths are known.
Interesting how this connects to the previous considerations about "reality." Like "reality," the term "the world" is capable of being used in many ways. Wittgenstein's insight is valuable whether or not we want to use "the world" the way he uses it. His point is that, apart from objects, there are states of affairs, facts, construals, propositions, ways of thinking and speaking -- and when we ask "What is the case?" it is those items we're asking about, not the objects.
ADDED But propositions are made true by whether the arrangements of objects (crudely) are that way. We need the objects to help make a Wittgensteinian world.
I agree. As you say, the idea is that the world is made of events and states.
That these truths may be known at some other time is not particularly interesting.
The argument is not tensed. It is not based on "Not known now, but could be known later."
It begins with Up(p??Kp), which is not temporally dependent. It is modal. the supposition is the antirealist one that if something is true, it is possible to know it is true. The direct conclusion is that there is no p such that p is true and not known. This follows without reference to any time or duration. There cannot be any unknown truths if every truth is knowable.
If we are to hold that we do not know everything, then there are things we cannot know.
If we do not know everything, then antirealism is not an option.
"True" is a judgement. Judgements are only made by intelligent minds in the process called "knowing". Therefore all truths are known.
“True” isn’t the judgement; it is the relative quality of the judgement;
Judgements are, but not necessarily only, made by rational intellects in the process of understanding;
All truths are known, but not because of either of those.
The necessary condition of empirical truth as such, in general, is the accordance with a cognition with its object, cognition itself being the relation of conceptions to each other in a logical proposition, re: a judgement, or, the relation of judgements to each other, re: a syllogism. It is impossible not to know whether the relation of conceptions or of judgements accord with each other, for in either there is contradiction with experience if they do not. It is not given by that knowledge the cause of such discord, only that there resides no truth in it.
It is not that all true things are known, insofar as the sum of all possible cognitions is incomplete, some of which may be true respecting their objects, but that the criterion of any truth is known, for which the sum of possible cognitions is irrelevant.
The necessary condition of empirical truth as such, in general, is the accordance with a cognition with its object, cognition itself being the relation of conceptions to each other in a logical proposition, re: a judgement, or, the relation of judgements to each other, re: a syllogism. It is impossible not to know whether the relation of conceptions or of judgements accord with each other, for in either there is contradiction with experience if they do not. It is not given by that knowledge the cause of such discord, only that there resides no truth in it.
But isn't it the case that whether or not there is "accordance" is itself a judgement? You say that truth is "accordance" but isn't accordance a judgement? That "the cat is on the mat" is in accordance with reality, is a judgement. If you don't think that accordance is a judgement, then maybe you could explain how it could be anything other than a judgement?
It is not that all true things are known, insofar as the sum of all possible cognitions is incomplete, some of which may be true respecting their objects, but that the criterion of any truth is known, for which the sum of possible cognitions is irrelevant.
If there is such a thing as "the criterion of any truth", doesn't this imply that truth is a judgement as to whether the specific criterion is fulfilled?
Yes, we give with one hand and take back with the other. Berkeley is a spectacular example. He says nothing can exist unperceived and that he does not deny the existence of "any one thing" that common sense believes in. (He reconciles the two by pointing out that God always perceives everything.)
Yes, that is the only way around it, we are part of God and God sees everything. Therefore there isn’t anything that isn’t seen.
If this isn’t the case, then there must be other things that are not seen, even by an anti-realist. Because there might be more than one anti-realist.
"The argument is not tensed. It is not based on "Not known now, but could be known later."
That wasn't my summary of the argument. I think it may be based on the point that the manifestation of a disposition or capacity is an event, therefore not tenseless.
It begins with Up(p??Kp), which is not temporally dependent. It is modal.
You won't be surprised that I don't know modal logic. But I had the impression that if it is possible to know that p, it is also possible to not know that p. So (forgive me that I can't do the formula properly,) the formula should read "For all p (if p is true then it is possible to know that p and possible not to know that p). I doubt that the conclusion would follow from that.
If we are to hold that we do not know everything, then there are things we cannot know. If we do not know everything, then antirealism is not an option.
I don't see any problem about holding that we do not know everything.
Probability. A toss of a coin. It may land heads or tails and must land one or the other and we know that. We know the probabilities of each outcome, but we do not know which it will be.
Most questions identify things that are not known to the questioner. Many of them have answers in the sense that somebody knows the answer. But sometimes research is necessary. It's not really a problem.
I have more difficulty with the idea that there are things that we cannot know. In some cases, it is just a question of technology. Discovering the speed of light may be an example. Seeing what's on the far side of the moon is another.
But I do have a problem with the idea that there are things that we cannot know in some way that is not just a technological issue. Ex hypothesi, if we knew of some such thing, it would be something we knew.
You asked, I answered. You could have just said thanks.
I’ll end with this: an invitation to the dreaded Cartesian theater in your critique of my perspective. It is self-defeating, systemic nonsense, to conflate the thing with a necessary condition for it.
You asked, I answered. You could have just said thanks.
I’ll end with this: an invitation to the dreaded Cartesian theater in your critique of my perspective. It is self-defeating, systemic nonsense, to conflate the thing with a necessary condition for it.
I didn't see anything to thank you for. But since you seem to be inviting me to critique your perspective, I will.
The substance of your reply, I see as based on incorrect assumptions which make your perspective impossible to understand.
That is the following:
It is impossible not to know whether the relation of conceptions or of judgements accord with each other, for in either there is contradiction with experience if they do not. It is not given by that knowledge the cause of such discord, only that there resides no truth in it.
It's fundamentally wrong, to say that it's impossible not to know whether a relation is a relation of accordance. More often than not, we do not know that. That is because whether or not it is a relation of accordance requires a judgement of that nature.
And, the proposed problem of "contradiction with experience" does not support that basic premise, because this phrase makes no sense. What could "contradiction with experience" even mean? What is experienced must be put into words, before anything can contradict this. So that would not be contradiction with experience, but contradiction with the description of what was experienced.
Then you mention the cause of discord, but causation is irrelevant here.
Further, you conclude with a statement about "possible cognitions". But we were talking about actual judgements or actual cognitions, and neither one of us provided any principles to establish a relation between actual and possible judgements/cognitions. You simply assumed another meaningless, nonsense principle, "the sum of all possible cognitions is incomplete".
It's nonsense because "possible cognitions", as individual items which could be counted, summed, doesn't make any sense in itself. To count them requires that they be cognized. Therefore the sum would be a sum of actual cognitions. A sum of possible cognitions is nonsensical, due to that impossibility.
So you’re saying, because how I represent my perspective, insofar as it is at least non-sensical or at most just plain wrong, I couldn’t possibly agree with you that all truths are known?
WTF, man. You shoulda just left it at thanks, and gone your merry way.
Reply to Ludwig V That doesn't seem to me to be addressing Fitch, nor antirealism, which is the epistemic position that if something is true, then it is knowable. You use ?~Kp, where Fitch uses ~?Kp.
If the reality we experience is the only thing that we have experienced, how do we know that there isn’t anything beyond our reality?
Our reality? All reality is subjective private mental state. There is no such a thing as "our reality".
Again all experience is private mental event. There is no other mind involved in an experience than "I" or "my mind.
...conflates reality and private mental states. The very fact that you are posting on this forum shows that you do not agree with this. Moreover, that you are trying to communicate, to use language, demonstrates that there is more than your private mental state. You want a reply such as this.
But on it goes, around and around, Corvus trying to prove to everyone else that there is only Corvus.
Moreover, that you are trying to communicate, to use language, demonstrates that there is more than your private mental state.
Private mental state is the core of your mind which is your perception. You build your extra mind with your imagination and belief. Remember the external world and other minds are just figment of your imagination. There is no actual concrete existence on these objects, but fleeting impressions and ideas.
It proves that Banno has never read Hume or Kant, and has been trying to discuss philosophy in the public forum with his very limited mind.
If this post does not exist, then what is it you are now reading?
I never said the post doesn't exist. Where did you get that? I see the post, and I was responding to that. But I don't see you. I am imaging you might exist. There is difference between you do exist, and you might exist. To me, you are just a author of your post, and might exist. But I don't have any more perceptual data apart from it.
It is not a solipsism. You are not understanding the difference between solipsism and foundation for perceptual existence.
...the external world and other minds are just figment of your imagination.
The post you read, and this post, are your own private mental state, on your own account. I've got nothing to do with this, being just part of your own imaginings. You are addressing your posts to yourself. You did not read my post, you imagined it. My post doesn't exist, separately to your imaginings. Nor do I. You don't see the post, you just imagine that you see it. You are responding to your own imaginations, not to me. You are inflicting this thread on yourself. I am not the author of this post - your imagined that , too. You only imagined a difference between your solipsism and the "perceptions" you imagine that you have.
Kant wrote his massive tome to show this is wrong.
Yes, I agree. But I recall a book called "Imagination in Kant's Philosophy" by a German philosopher I cannot recall his name. The book was emphasizing the fact, imagination and belief is critical part for constructing reality and the external world. I was totally agreeing with his point.
I mean Banno does exist, surely he must. But I don't have any factual perceptual data on Banno. I know Banno from his posts in the forum, and that is all what Banno is to me. The rest of Banno is my belief and imagination about Banno, which might be totally wrong and fictional in reality. And I do accept my existence to Banno must be the same.
That is the reality of our reality. It is not a solipsism.
You only imagined a difference between your solipsism and the "perceptions" you imagine that you have.
If you claim that you have more than your imagination and irrational belief on the external world, then you are pretending. It is not a philosophical account.
No I don't. I'm just your imagination, tormenting you. Jamal and Colo don't exist, either. You imagined their replies, as you did the writings of Hume and Kant.
If you have more than your imagination and irrational belief on the external word, then you are pretending. It is not a philosophical account.
But I don't exist, so I don't have an irrational belief in the external world. You are typing as if I exist, but of course I might be just your imagination. It's not me doing the pretending - you are the only one here. If my account is not a philosophical account, that's because that is what you imagined.
Or I am here, pointing to the errors in your account.
Or I am here, pointing to the errors in your account.
You may well exist, I was not saying that you don't exist. There is a difference, and you don't seem to see the difference.
I don't have the perceptual evidence on the existence apart from your misleading posts. That is the philosophical dissection of reality. I am not taking into account all the hypes in the media about the world, and refusing to be non philosophical frame of mind of the ordinary folks on the street.
You may well exist, I was not saying that you don't exist.
No, that's right - your claim is that I may not exist. This is understood. While it is good to see you move that little bit towards admitting that I might exist, the remainder of your account stands at odd with such generosity.
There is no actual concrete existence on these objects, but fleeting impressions and ideas.
You apparently think these annoying posts are "subjective private mental state", since "all reality is subjective private mental state". You also say that this post is "just a figment of your imagination", and that I have "no actual concrete existence", but am only "fleeting impressions and ideas".
The ambiguity here is in your account, in your insistence that the "fleeting impressions and ideas" you have of me are insufficient for you to conclude that I exist; that on amount of evidence could be enough to convince you that I am here, posting these annoying and rude bits of text, rather than your having just imagined them yourself, that these are some manifestation of the "private mental state (that) is the core of your mind which is your perception".
And yet you are replying to these "private mental states", in what is presumably a form of autotalk, responding consciously to this manifestation of your unconscious mind, or something along these lines. And somehow you think this at least as good an explanation as that there is an annoying Australian who keeps pestering you about your posts.
I don't have the perceptual evidence on the existence apart from your misleading posts.
What would count as sufficient evidence for you? What more do you think you need, what could be added to your perceptions that would lead you to decide that there is more to me than your fantasies? What could produce certainty for you? But more, why do you demand certainty? You will no doubt respond to this post anyway, as you have in the past, and even though you hold that I might not be here to read your post. Your actions show that, despite your "philosophical" rumination, you think me sufficiently real to warrant a response.
Your responding to me, and indeed your participation in the forum, puts the lie to your account. You do believe we are here, watching for your response. The account you have offered is dishonest.
From what I've seen the main argument in the last two pages has been that Banno thinks if there are things we don't currently know, then Antirealism can't hold.
Well... *sigh*. That is.. not reasonable.
There are plenty of things we may never come into contact with. That doesn't make them unknowable. Unknown and unknowable are simply not the same.
Now, I presume I've missed something major. But I don't see it anywhere. Someone want to help me out there?
From what I've seen the main argument in the last two pages has been that Banno thinks if there are things we don't currently know, then Antirealism can't hold.
It is difficult to follow your argument since you base it upon an interpretation of what an interlocuter has said rather than engage in the debate proffered.
There are many ways to show how the argument is not reasonable, I provided one. The argument requires a very narrow perspective to work. It works for Banno because he adopts that narrow perspective and refuses to talk to anyone who will not take it. It's like saying the argument requires these assumptions, and if you do not accept these assumptions, I will not discuss it with you. What's the point?
Reply to Banno With a simple smattering of charity you could just have offered that they are maybe trying to say that phenomenon is all we have via sensibility?
If this isn’t the case, then there must be other things that are not seen, even by an anti-realist. Because there might be more than one anti-realist.
Well, yes. But can an anti-realist know that there is more than one anti-realist? I think not, and that's why I think that the only consistent form of idealism is solipsism.
There cannot be any unknown truths if every truth is knowable.
But what is the force of "cannot"? Does it mean that we don't have the technology? Or does it mean that we have to develop a new approach (elliptical orbits instead of circular ones?
If we do not know everything, then antirealism is not an option.
I think the distinctions between known unknowns and unkowns is relevant here. lt seems to me that the former are not incompatible with anti-realism (or some forms of it). I may not know the tenth place in the expansion of pi (5), but I know that there's a method for finding it. But it also seems to me that the latter are. However, I don't see that anything prevents us from discovering at least some of them and developing new concepts in the process.
That doesn't seem to me to be addressing Fitch, .....
Perhaps not. I don't really think I'm capable of demonstrating that it is wrong. On the contrary, I think it is right, provided the context is right. IEP - Dynamic Epistemic Logic has a helpful summary of the argument:-
From ?p (p ? ¬Kp) follows the truth of its instance (p ? ¬Kp) ? ? K(p ? ¬Kp), and from that and p ? ¬Kp follows ? K(p ? ¬Kp). Whatever the interpretation of ?, it results in having to evaluate K(p ? ¬Kp). But this is inconsistent for knowledge and belief.
It is clearly true that I cannot know that p (is true) and that I do not know that p. In general, if the person who knows (K) is the same as the person who asserts the starting-point, it is self-contradictory (Moore's paradox). But it is not contradictory if the person asserting the starting-point is different from the person who knows. There's no problem about me asserting (knowing) that p is true and someone else does not know it. I'm not sure what impact, if any, this has on realism/anti-realism.
From what I've seen the main argument in the last two pages has been that Banno thinks if there are things we don't currently know, then Antirealism can't hold.
I agree with you that it is not obvious that known unknowns threaten antirealism. But unknown unknowns do. The catch is that we don't, and can't, know what they are. We only know that there are such things because we have encountered some of them before.
I'm not sure if it is relevant but @Banno doesn't assert merely that there are things that we don't currently know. Quoting Banno
It (sc. Fitch's paradox) begins with Up(p??Kp), which is not temporally dependent.
. l agree, though, that a move from "knowable" to "known" does seem to require tenses.
My reality is strictly constructed with my perception, sensation and imagination and belief. What I don't sense and perceive, I rely on my imagination and belief. There is no objectivity in there. Even my own perception and sensation can sometimes mislead me. There is no 100% guarantee that my perception and sensations are infallibly true. And what is more, what I perceive and sense is perhaps not even 0.0000000000001 percent of the world. How could I pretend to claim to know what the world is?
Now this is not a solipsism like some have been misled on the point. It is the critical nature of our perception, mind and reality under the philosophical analysis.
There is no objectivity in there. Even my own perception and sensation can sometimes mislead me.
It is true that our perception and sensation can sometimes mislead us. But "sometimes" means that sometimes they do not mislead us. That looks like objectivity to me.
But unknown unknowns do. The catch is that we don't, and can't, know what they are. We only know that there are such things because we have encountered some of them before.
Yes, I understand that obstacle. I suppose my problem with thinking this has any effect, whatsoever, on these conceptual analyses is that it is wholly fact-specific and empirical. We may never, ever, in our entire existence come across some substance which exists 60,000 light years away and further. That is, on it's face, and unknowable unknown. If the idea is that for antirealism to hold, everything knowable must be in concept, in hand, then I see only two realistic responses:
1. That's nonsense, and obviously so; or
2. Is what's actually being said is something more like "you can't claim something is unknowable conceptually" which seems wrong in it's own way but I can see the argument.
My big problem with any issue with "unknowns" is that they are simply unknown. We can't comment on them, no matter what system we ascribe to. I'm happy to presume there are plenty of things humans will never (and, physically/practically/empirically) can never know. I'm not seeing hte issue. If i've missed it (i presume I have) please help lol.
There are different varieties of solipsism? How can they be compared to each other? That would seem to cancel the isolation you are reporting
I know you exist by the language we share to communicate, art and music we share, and posts you write. But that's it. Beyond that, I don't know anything about your mind, and its content. Solipsism doesn't take into account on these points. They say that nothing else exists apart from their own mind, or some might even say, their mind doesn't exist either. That is solipsism.
My point is that as long as we exist communicating and sharing on these cultural and linguistic activities, we can infer and postulate our existence and others. But beyond that, we are still in our own world. Even if I had a very intimate discussions on many topics or shared some daily life experience with someone, I would not claim I know their deep true inside feelings, thoughts and wills. At this point, we are not talking about someone's physical existence here, like Banno has been insisting to have.
It is true that our perception and sensation can sometimes mislead us. But "sometimes" means that sometimes they do not mislead us. That looks like objectivity to me.
I am not sure if perception can be objective in any sense. In what sense what I am seeing X is same as you are?
Even if I had a very intimate discussions on many topics or shared some daily life experience with someone, I would not claim I know their deep true inside feelings, thoughts and wills.
It sounds like what you are calling "solipsism" is what other people refer to as single individuals.
In what sense what I am seeing X is same as you are?
Do you mean if I am seeing a bus and you are seeing a bus, in what sense are we seeing the same object? In one sense, if we are seeing different buses, we are seeing two objects of the same kind. If we are both seeing the same bus, we are seeing the same object. Does that help?
Even if I had a very intimate discussions on many topics or shared some daily life experience with someone, I would not claim I know their deep true inside feelings, thoughts and wills.
But if you know that they have some deep true inside feelings etc. then it must be possible, even if it is difficult, to know what they are.
I'm not seeing hte issue. If i've missed it (i presume I have) please help lol.
That's most likely because you are not wearing the right spectacles. Here's my take on it:-
Wikipedia - Antirealism:In analytic philosophy, anti-realism is the position that the truth of a statement rests on its demonstrability through internal logic mechanisms, such as the context principle or intuitionistic logic, in direct opposition to the realist notion that the truth of a statement rests on its correspondence to an external, independent reality. In anti-realism, this external reality is hypothetical and is not assumed.
This account rests on the the application of a metaphor to language - "external" and "internal". Realism asserts what antirealism denies - that there are things "outside" language and most language is "made true" by that reality. Antirealism asserts that truth and falsity are just a matter of internal coherence among the descriptions of language.
Sometimes that seems to me to make perfect sense; sometimes I cannot get my head round it.
That's one thing that makes the debate difficult. The strongest argument in favour of anti-realism is that there is no way to identify the non-linguistic, language-independent world without using language. The business about unknowns rests on the idea that if language is not complete, in the sense that there are facts that cannot be expressed in it, then there must be a distinction between language and the world it describes.
So the hope is that by identifying "gaps" in language, we'll open a door into that world. The biggest problem in that project is that you can't identify something unless you know it.
It sounds like what you are calling "solipsism" is what other people refer to as single individuals.
Solipsists will say, nothing exists apart from themselves no matter what. I am saying, we don't know something or somebody exists until we communicate, share feelings, art, music and ideas, and even meet in real life forming relationships.
If we are both seeing the same bus, we are seeing the same object. Does that help?
Nope. Not making sense at all. No two minds can see a bus exactly same. Even if you and your pal see a bus passing in front of you, your perception and his perception will be different in some way. You cannot stand on the exact position where he stands, and your eye sight wouldn't be same as his ...etc.
Nope. Not making sense at all. No two minds can see a bus exactly same. Even if you and your pal see a bus passing in front of you, your perception and his perception will be different in some way. You cannot stand on the exact position where he stands, and your eye sight wouldn't be same as his ...etc.
I didn't mean to say that your perception and my perception of the bus are exactly the same. For a start, one of them is yours and the other is mine. But that is merely numerical difference. I will stipulate that there will always be qualitative differences as well. But then, there will also be qualitative similarities too. Telling whether we are seeing the same bus is a matter of weighing those up. One example is that the one bus may well be at different points in our visual fields, which in any case can't be located in relation to each other. But we can use that information to identify where the bus is in public space. It we both locate our visual bus at the same point in our shared space, it is very likely to be the same bus. If we locate it in different points at the same time, it is almost certain to be two buses.
Reply to Ludwig V Not really. Again, my comments seem to run on from yours in a way that doesn't quite alter them.
I think the biggest argument for antirealism is the actual facts of eyes, ears, noses and mouths (and skin, I guess). I do, however, think its possible I've not come across a name for the position I actually think its reasonable, because its not idealism as antirealism might suggest.
I suggest antirealism about perception is roughly, unavoidable, but that antirealism as a metaphysical comment seems... tenuous as best, and seemingly ridiculous at worst. Maybe that clears up where I'm not understanding the issues in the previous comments.
. l agree, though, that a move from "knowable" to "known" does seem to require tenses.
I don't see why.
We can write "Kp" for "we know p", and "?Kp" for "we might know p", and "~Kp" for "we don't know p" and "~?Kp" for "we can't know p", none of which are tensed.
We can write "Kp" for "we know p", and "?Kp" for "we might know p", and "~Kp" for "we don't know p" and "~?Kp" for "we can't know p", none of which are tensed.
W can write "Kp" for whatever we like. Once we have interpreted it, however, (I think that's the right word), there are consequences.
"we know p", is compatible (awkwardly) with "we might know p". But it is incompatible with "we don't know p" and "we can't know p".
"we might know p" compatible with "we know p" and "we don't know p"; it is incompatible with "we can't know p",
In other words, we can interpret "Kp" however we like, but that does not mean we can substitute any interpretation for any other. "We know that p" and "We might know that p" are not inter-substitutable.
In addition, we have the issue of tensed or tenseless. This is complicated and doubly complicated in this context, because we have two verbs involved. But I'm stuck on "it is raining" does not follow from "It might be raining".
I might well be confused about what tensed and untensed truths.
I think the biggest argument for antirealism is the actual facts of eyes, ears, noses and mouths (and skin, I guess). I do, however, think its possible I've not come across a name for the position I actually think its reasonable, because its not idealism as antirealism might suggest.
I suggest antirealism about perception is roughly, unavoidable, but that antirealism as a metaphysical comment seems... tenuous as best, and seemingly ridiculous at worst. Maybe that clears up where I'm not understanding the issues in the previous comments.
I agree with you that we're not all that far apart. There is a truth in anti-realism; where I disagree with it is the inflation of that truth into a Grand Doctrine. In the case of perception, it is inescapable true that what we know about the world around us comes to us from our senses.
But it is what the anti-realist (idealist) makes of this mundane fact that bothers me.
The point of the discussion in that post is the idea that our perceptions (or language) are not self-contained but point beyond themselves to a mind-independent reality, which can be known by us. Which does not mean that we will ever know everything about everything, so that there are always some things that are not known.
But it is what the anti-realist (idealist) makes of this mundane fact that bothers me.
Definitely. It's taken me a while to realise that its required to claim antirealism. It makes me very uncomfortable as I need to push back hard on the likes on Banno claiming that perception is direct.
Definitely. It's taken me a while to realise that its required to claim antirealism. It makes me very uncomfortable as I need to push back hard on the likes on Banno claiming that perception is direct.
It seems to me that "direct" and "indirect" do not have a determinate application in the context of perception. So it's like "glass half full" and "glass half-empty". Which means one should not draw dramatic conclusions from either.
But do we think that noise-cancelling headphones prevent us from hearing what's going on, or do we think that they enable us to hear what is going on?
Do they distort reality? In one sense yes, in another sense no.
W can write "Kp" for whatever we like. Once we have interpreted it, however, (I think that's the right word), there are consequences.
"we know p", is compatible (awkwardly) with "we might know p". But it is incompatible with "we don't know p" and "we can't know p".
"we might know p" compatible with "we know p" and "we don't know p"; it is incompatible with "we can't know p",
In other words, we can interpret "Kp" however we like, but that does not mean we can substitute any interpretation for any other. "We know that p" and "We might know that p" are not inter-substitutable.
In addition, we have the issue of tensed or tenseless. This is complicated and doubly complicated in this context, because we have two verbs involved. But I'm stuck on "it is raining" does not follow from "It might be raining".
I might well be confused about what tensed and untensed truths.
It's hard to see the relevance of much of this.
Sure, we can't both know and not know the very same thing, and there are other similar permutations. "We know that p" and "We might know that p" are not inter-substitutable, but if we know p then it is possible that we know p.
But this is not to do with tense.
A realist will maintain that there are truths we do not know. An antirealist will maintain that every truth is possibly knowable. Fitch showed that if every truth is knowable, then every truth is known:
(p ? ?Kp) ? (p ? Kp)
That is, the antirealist cannot know that there are truths that cannot be known, without contradiction.
Fitch shows that the antirealist cannot consistently maintain both that all truths are knowable and that there are any unknown truths; the antirealist must either accept omniscience, accept unknowable truths, or abandon the unrestricted knowability thesis.
The view expressed by Reply to Ludwig V is pretty much that taken by Austin and by myself. Reply to AmadeusD, as I recall, was unable to follow the discussion. But the notion that all we know is found by perception if fraught with issues, peripheral to the question of what is real. It is a mistake to equate what we perceive with what is real.
It seems to me that "direct" and "indirect" do not have a determinate application in the context of perception.
I suppose this, somewhat, rests on something Banno's type would say v something I would say:
"When you look at a tree you see a tree".
So much seems true. But I would say...
"You factually do not see something "out there"". You see a tree, because that's what you see, we call a tree. Not because that's the same thing as what you cast your eyes upon. Something something ding en sich.
You see something in your mind (or rather, generated by it). This is what I mean when I say indirect. It may be that there is no appreciable difference between the two - looking through a dark glass doesn't necessarily have you seeing something 'untrue'. But To suggest that we see the world undistorted seems to me something which can be set aside without much trouble. I've definitely had to drop aspects of these thoughts over the last year or so though, for the reason set out in the last two comments we made to each other: I don't think the world exists in the mind. I just don't see a problem with accepting there is a real world, and a world of perception - whatever their closeness in terms of identity.
Do they distort reality? In one sense yes, in another sense no.
I don't think 'distort' anything on the basic premises here. Closing ones eyes simply has us seeing the inside of our eyelids. Putting on noise-cancelling headphones simply has us hearing a restricted selection of the sounds we might otherwise hear. The same as going into one's car, to some degree. Its not the same as, for instance, an inability to see the frequency we call red. That's where the interesting stuff comes in, and where I've truly loved Banno's comments over the couple of years i've been here.
But the notion that all we know is found by perception if fraught with issues, peripheral to the question of what is real. It is a mistake to equate what we perceive with what is real.
Mate, I followed it. I didn't agree with you (or Austin, as it has since turned out).
I agree, it's a mistake to equate what we perceive with what is real. I can't see the disagreement anymore.
Fitch shows that the antirealist cannot consistently maintain both that all truths are knowable and that there are any unknown truths; the antirealist must either accept omniscience, accept unknowable truths, or abandon the unrestricted knowability thesis.
Are you able to explain in non-formal terms how this works?
There doesn't seem to be any tension whatsoever between saying "there are things we can't know" and reality.
I also don't understand how an antirealist is committed to saying all truths are knowable. That said, my understanding (or, probably more properly my ill-labeled position) is that an antirealist has to assume there are truths we don't know. So am more than happy to have it explained to me like I'm not following - cause this time i'm not lol. I don't know Fitch.
I also don't understand how an antirealist is committed to saying all truths are knowable.
SO what is it that you think a antirealist claims, say concerning the truth of facts in the physical world... perhaps concerning Russell's teapot, for example...
Isn't it the case that they they will say something like that statements about the teapot do not have a truth value?
A realist will maintain that there are truths we do not know. An antirealist will maintain that every truth is possibly knowable. Fitch showed that if every truth is knowable, then every truth is known:
(p ? ?Kp) ? (p ? Kp)
That is, the antirealist cannot know that there are truths that cannot be known, without contradiction.
"Every Truth is knowable" is subject independent. It does not presume the existence of knowers.
"Every truth is known" is subject dependent since it presumes the existence of knowers.
Note : I'm not making a tensed argument.
So you can't claim both are represented by the same propositional form "kp" without justification.
Does Fitch justify this? If not, then it's the worst case of question begging & the formal logic showpiece is nothing short of sophistry. Symbols can only take you so far, what matters more is semantics, epistemology & metaphysics at a deeper level.
We can write "Kp" for "we know p", and "?Kp" for "we might know p", and "~Kp" for "we don't know p" and "~?Kp" for "we can't know p", none of which are tensed.
There's a big difference between
"We might know p" & "P is knowable" , but I have mentioned this in the post above
p ? ?Kp also seems strange. By what entailment would one accept this as true ?
"We know p" may not imply "We may know P" since the latter expresses a degree of uncertainty which is nullified by the earlier statement, assuming infallibility.
Even if we don't assume infallibility, It all depends on what you mean by "may know P". It clearly involves epistemic modality & I don't see why it shouldn't be dealt with in terms of subjective probabilities. There is NO absolute truth evaluation here.
"Every Truth is knowable" is subject independent. It does not presume the existence of knowers
"Every truth is known" is subject dependent since it presumes the existence of knowers
So what you are saying is “Every truth is knowable” quantifies over possible worlds and possible knowers; it does not require that any knowers actually exist? But that “Every truth is known” is a claim about the actual world and requires actual knowers?
Ok. So Fitch shows us that (p ? ?Kp) ? (p ? Kp).
Does that help? Kp is read "p is known", and ?Kp, "it is possible that p is known". They are not the "represented by the same proposition". But the latter is derivable from the former.
p ? ?Kp is the mooted supposition of the antirealist. It's they who advocated this.
Fitch is not arguing that for all p, we have p -> Kp. Fitch is arguing that if for all p, we have p -> ?Kp, then for all p, we have p -> Kp, but since it is not acceptable that for all p, we have p -> Kp, it is not acceptable that for all p, we have p -> ?Kp.
So what you are saying is “Every truth is knowable” quantifies over possible worlds and possible knowers; it does not require that any knowers actually exist? But that “Every truth is known” is a claim about the actual world and requires actual knowers?
Yes. Precisely that. The consequence of this is the term k will be different for one of the two.
To illustrate,
(K(p),x) =: There exist x which knows p, for truth is known
K(p) =: p is knowable, for truth is knowable
Now, there is no way to draw an inference from the latter to the earlier since the total variables are different
If this argument isn't mentioned in SEP (I haven't checked it yet) then it doesn't show it's invalid. It could be out there, somewhere else. I don't think I'm the first one to ever raise this rather obvious objection.
Fitch is not arguing that for all p, we have p -> Kp. Fitch is arguing that if for all p, we have p -> ?Kp, then for all p, we have p -> Kp, but since it is not acceptable that for all p, we have p -> Kp, it is not acceptable that for all p, we have p -> ?Kp.
I understand. It's a supposition. But my argument above invalidates it.
Here's another problem with this approach though, & it is related to the nature of suppositionals. Some logicians won't allow you to conflates the material & formal conditions or unite them together.
So a claim in the form of "Suppose this, then so & so, therefore that" even if conceded by your opponents, has no demonstrative power. The conclusion is simply dialectical...it remains inconclusive. For a demonstration to obtain, the material conditions of the propositions must be fulfilled. You may regard this as an outdated Aristotelian objection, but it has actually inspired modern relevance logic [which extends to modality]
If not, then it's the worst case of question begging & the formal logic showpiece is nothing short of sophistry. Symbols can only take you so far, what matters more is semantics, epistemology & metaphysics at a deeper level.
Now, there is no way to draw an inference from the latter to the earlier since the total variables are different
After years of explaining very similar issues to Banno, Banno simply chooses to ignore, rejecting Aristotelian bullshit. As you accurately point out, "known" and "knowable" are defined by distinct relations, with distinct variables. You say, one is subject dependent, the other is subject independent. This makes them categorically distinct. Therefore there is nothing within :"known" which implies "knowable". And since "knowable" is supposed to be subject independent, it must be defined by some other relation.
I explained this problem thoroughly to Banno already, as the incompatibility between what is actual, and what is possible. If, for instance, we say that X is actually the case, we cannot say also that X is possibly the case, due to contradiction. What it means to say that X is an actuality contradicts what it means to say that X is a possibility. The principles required to make it true that X is an actuality, negate the possibility that X is possible. But Banno continues to insist (sophistically), that the latter is "derivable" from the former.
You may regard this as an outdated Aristotelian objection, but it has actually inspired modern relevance logic [which extends to modality]
That's Banno's usual, reject outdated Aristotelian principles, in full ignorance of the fact that these principles were established for the purpose of combatting very similar sophistry.
@Sirius
Here's an illustration to demonstrate what I'm talking about. Suppose we take a simple proposition P, and say that it is possible. We therefore must also allow that not-P is possible. In the basic form, we have a relation of equality between them, each is equally possible. This equivalence between the two allows us to apply mathematics, 50% probability at the fundamental level. It is fundamental to the nature of "a possibility", that there is at least two, and this allows us to apply the mathematics of probability.
Now, we can add secondary propositions which would alter the weighting, making one possibility more probable than the other. We can add as many secondary propositions as we like, and apply formulae to figure probability. However, if we go to the point of saying either P or not-P is true, that it is what is actually the case, then we assign 100% probability to it. This negates all other possibilities, and since the one assigned 100% is necessarily the one and only, it loses it's nature of being a possibility.
So in Banno's example, P is actually known. But Banno wants to derive from this truth, that P is also possible to be known (knowable). But of course, by the logic of the above example, if P is knowable, (possible to be known), it is impossible that P is actually known.
Reply to Banno I'll just answer the thing, as I take it that's the meat here: I don't see why an antirealist has to say that.
Again, It's likely my position has been mislabeled (by myself, lol) - I don't think the problem of perception means there aren't things out there. Given that basis, I can accept there are truth claims to be made about Russell's Teapot. Could we know whether they're true? Not yet. But we certainly could. I think I previously confused statements that have no way of gleaning metaphysical 'truth' (i.e "I know God exists") and things we're ignorant of (i.e "There's a teapot orbiting between Earth and Mars"). "What we consider real" is probably not the same as "what is real". I think its possible to hold that we wont ever get those two things aligned, because of the problem of perception, while accepting that its a problem - not a solution. There are real things, and if there's a teapot up there, there is. If there isn't, there isn't.
Those weird shadow sculptures where you see something supposedly obvious, and then realize the shadow is caused by something entirely else seems to speak to this in microcosm.
(K(p),x) =: There exist x which knows p, for truth is known
K(p) =: p is knowable, for truth is knowable
For our purposes, Kp has been understood as "we know p", simplifying the logic somewhat. That's a pretty standard practice. If you like we can indeed introduce a relation, K(a,p), which would be read as "a knows that p". And then we might write "There exist x which knows p" as ?(x)K(x,p). And "truth is knowable" would be ??(x)K(p,x) - "in some possible world, there is someone who knows that p"
Do all this, and the actual argument presented by Fitch will stand.
Frankly is seems to me that the modal operator more than covers your quibble.
As for it's being a suppositional argument - yes, it's a reductio. Pointing out the structure of the argument is not showing that it is invalid. And to be sure, the argument is formally valid in classical modal logic. It is a theorem.
You might indeed reach for a relevance or intuitionist logic. Fill in the details, if you like. Do you really wish to reject classical logic itself? Seems a lot for an Aristotelian.
Suppose we take a simple proposition P, and say that it is possible. We therefore must also allow that not-P is possible. In the basic form, we have a relation of equality between them, each is equally possible. This equivalence between the two allows us to apply mathematics, 50% probability at the fundamental level.
This is why I ignore your posts, Meta. What you have said here is simply muddled. It contains, even in this small snippet, two distinct logical errors. First, nothing at all concerning numerical probability follows from the contingency ?p ^ ?~p. One involves probability, the other modality. You simply conflate them. Second, even if we interpret the modality epistemically - as "for all the agent knows, P may be true", we are not entitled to assigning a 50% probability. Your leap from our lack of our knowing to a presumption of equal probability is unjustified. “I do not know whether p” is not the same as "p and ¬p are equally likely."
I ignore you because you make so very many errors, that take time to explain; but also because even when the problem is explained, you habitually double down rather than correct yourself. Witness your views on acceleration and on 0.9999... and now on this, all display the same pattern.
Ok. Other anti- realists do. That's rather the point of Fitch's argument.
If you suppose that "there is a teapot in orbit between Earth and Mars" is either true, or it is false, independently of it's having been verified, you are on most accounts a realist, holding that truth-values are mind-independent.
If you think something along the lines that it is not true until it has been verified, then you are an anti-realist. If you think something along the lines that it is not true until it has been verified, and accept classical logic, then you are accepting that the existence of the teapot is true only if it is possible to verify its existence - that is to say, only if it is possible to know that it exists. And that's the p??Kp that Fitch shows commits one to omniscience. This is why anti-realists usually reject classical logic.
You obviously didn't address what I wrote. And, it appears like you didn't even attempt to understand what I wrote. Despite pretending to consider what I wrote, and adding your two cents worth, your ignorance is continuous.
Reply to Banno
It is very obvious that the difference between actual and possible indicates that if p is knowable (possible to be known), then p is not known. Conversely. if p is known, then p is not knowable (possible to be known) because it is already actually known. I illustrated this very clearly in my reply to Sirius, which it appears that you did not take the time to understand. To conflate these two is an abuse of language, which you do with the intent of sophistry.
If this were so, you would not know any things that are knowable.
That's exactly right. "Knowable" excludes "known" because knowable allows for "not-known". Every proposition which I know, is actually known, that's what "known" means. However, "knowable" means that it is possible that the proposition could be known, and this implies that it is not actually known. Therefore I do not know any propositions which are knowable, (possible to be known) because every proposition that I know is actually known, therefore not-possible that it is not-known, and knowable implies that it is possible that it is not-known.
You are treating “Possible to be known” as if it meant “not known”.
Of course, "possible to be known" is categorically distinct from "known". Therefore it is a form of "not-known", in the sense of other than known. To allow otherwise would create all sorts of epistemological problems.
Consider your example. I know something, and it is possible that I know it. We can represent these as the two following propositions P1, "I know X", and P2, "It is possible that I know X". Clearly, if we judge P1 to be true, we cannot honestly judge P2 to be true, because the truth of P2 allows that P1 may not be true. We cannot say that it is true that I know X, and also that it is true that it is possible that I know X, because the latter judgement implies that it is possible that I do not know X, thereby ruling out the possibility of former judgement, that I know X.
Therefore "it is possible that I know X" must be taken as a form of "I do not know X", because "possible that I know X" implies necessarily that I may not know X. So "I know X" and "it is possible that I know X" cannot both be true at the same time, because the latter allows the possibility that "I know X" may be false, and that would contradict "I know X". In other words, claiming both provides the premises which allow for contradiction.
Or do you know only things that are impossible to know? Perhaps you think you do.
Who said anything about "impossible"? Like you, and everyone else, I only know things which are known. I do not claim to know things which are possibly known, because possibly known implies possibly not known as well. Then I would be claiming to know things which are possibly not known, thereby allowing for the potential of contradiction.
On the bright side, it will help me to achieve my goal of 30k posts before the Great Metempsychosis.
He's conflating possibility with negation. If I know X, then it is trivially possible that I know X. “Possible to be known” does not imply “not known.” Any known proposition is both known and knowable. Claiming otherwise leads to the absurdity that nothing can be known.
Again, the alternative is that Meta only knows stuff that it is not possible to know.
This is what happens when you study a bit of Aristotle and never touch logic after the 16th century. Possibility, actuality, and knowledge start to collapse into contradictions.
If you suppose that "there is a teapot in orbit between Earth and Mars" is either true, or it is false, independently of it's having been verified, you are on most accounts a realist, holding that truth-values are mind-independent.
Fair enough. I don't quite understand why people think this, then. There's no reason to assume one must be (empirically) capable of knowing some truth x for that truth to obtain. I think you've laid out the logic here for Sirius. Being not good at formal logic (getting there!) I wont attempt to litigate that but I very much appreciate your effort to help me on this one.
I have to say I still don't see the tension. Again, likely because I've misapprehended how these labels apply, but I maintain we can't be sure of any truth values of this kind (Descartes demon and all notwithstanding - only partially interesting concepts there imo) because I think our indirect perception precludes certainty. I understand this to be uncontroversial. I think the use of "reality" is muddling things, either for you or I. I note that 'reality' can have two pretty distinct meanings as illustrating by pulling apart "what we perceive" and "what is real". This seems to me an entirely reasonable thing to say/hold in mind. It also seems to indicate we may not have access to the world which we(sic) as realists accept exists outside of what we can access. My memory tells me you feel there's a 1:1 match there, which is neat. I don't so it's hard to know what way to turn.
If the antirealist is committed to the kind of claim that results in idealistic thinking (in a non-Kantian way) then yeah, I'm not one. But I'm certainly not a realist about perception, so its hard to claim i'm a realist about reality. I don't really know what's out there - I'm just quite sure it is.
However, "knowable" means that it is possible that the proposition could be known, and this implies that it is not actually known
Fwiw, this is definitely not the case as I see it. "Known" indicates that some S knows it. It also indicates that another S could also know it but does not currently. Therefore, it's knowable as well. I think this can be illustrated by making a claim like "I know what you mean". Maybe you do. But someone else can too. My meaning is not know "unknowable". Knowledge of it has just obtained in one mind. That doesn't preclude further instances of the same.
I understand the inference you're drawing, and I think Banno's on a bit of a horse when it comes to his own frustration, which I get (and have found distasteful, particularly as pointing it out inevitably results in the charge that we're obsessed with him). But I think yours is an unwarranted inference that extends what's available on these terms to an area unavailable: singular determination. Any piece of information can be known many times over by different people or animals. So I'm with him here.
Reply to AmadeusD I'm aware that my replies to @Metaphysician Undercover are kicking down. In my defence, he interjected himself into a conversation with @Sirius, and without the curtesy of flagging mentions of me. And he is muddled.
Meta is emblematic of the poor grasp of logic found hereabouts.
I have to say I still don't see the tension. Again, likely because I've misapprehended how these labels apply, but I maintain we can't be sure of any truth values of this kind (Descartes demon and all notwithstanding - only partially interesting concepts there imo) because I think our indirect perception precludes certainty. I understand this to be uncontroversial. I think the use of "reality" is muddling things, either for you or I. I note that 'reality' can have two pretty distinct meanings as illustrating by pulling apart "what we perceive".
By "tension", you mean that between realism and antirealism? In the end they are two differing grammars, each of some use in their own place.
"our indirect perception precludes certainty" involves several mistakes, in my opinion. But we've been over that.
Reply to Banno Hmm, i think more the tension between claiming to be an antirealist and accepting there (at least in the sense that "must" comes into it, if not fully logically outlined) are objects (yes, in my view "unknowable" in some sense) which exist beyond our mind or our mind's projections.
Just take my stance on perception seriously for a second - it doesn't mean I can't also say there's a (whatever it is, but lets say..) tree outside my office to which I can cast my eyes. It just means it might not look "the way my mind conveys to me" to some other perceiving being with a different system on deck.
That said, if the logic ends up being such that I cannot claim to know there's anything out there, while maintaining that perception is indirect, I would be comfortable saying 'we cannot know anything outside the mind". I don't think that's a realist position or an antirealist position the way they're being described here. I just assume there is an outside the mind.
Reply to Banno
I see you're still having difficulty understanding. Either that or you've retreated into some form of denial. So, let me lay it out very succinctly.
Take any proposition, "the cup is red" for example. The truth of this proposition means that the situation cannot be otherwise from the cup being red. Now take the alternative proposition, "it is possible that the cup is red". This means that the situation can be otherwise from the cup being red. One says it can be otherwise, the other says it cannot be otherwise. Therefore the two contradict each other in meaning, an implicit contradiction.
We can see a very similar situation with "p is known", and "p is knowable". Truth of the former indicates that the situation cannot be otherwise from p is known, while truth of the latter indicates that it can be otherwise from p is known. Therefore one contradicts the other and they cannot both be true at the same time. One is not derived from the other, it implicitly contradicts the other.
If I know X, then it is trivially possible that I know X.
How can you honestly say something like this? If you know that Jill pushed Jack down the hill, and someone asks you about what happened, then you are being untruthful if you say that you believe it is possible that Jill pushed Jack. Obviously you do not believe that at all, because you know that Jill actually did push Jack. To say that it is possible that Jill pushed Jack, is to be deceitful, because it contradicts what you know. To insist that "I know X" and "It is possible that I know X" are consistent with one another is blatant deception.
"Known" indicates that some S knows it. It also indicates that another S could also know it but does not currently.
How does "known" indicate these things to you. If it indicates that some S knows it, it doesn't in anyway indicate that another S could know it. That would require another premise. So your argument is based in hidden premises.
The problem I see with this approach, is that if we define "known" as the property of one S, then when we introduce other Ss we have no way of validating whether what one S knows is actually the same thing as what another S knows. So, S knows something, and teaches it to another, T. Now what T knows is not the same thing as what S knows, even though S taught T. It doesn't make sense to say that another knows the same thing that S knows, in any logically rigorous sense of "same".
Any piece of information can be known many times over by different people or animals. So I'm with him here.
This is not true, for the reason i just explained. The information I receive is not the same as what you receive, because we each have distinct spatial temporal perspectives. Therefore it is false to say that many different people know the same piece of information.
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover "known" cannot apply except to an S. Unless you have a hidden premise that its known by everyone in the Universe who could possibly know it then I don't know what you're talking about. If all you're trying to say is that for S, if something is 'known" then it is not also knowable, that is empirically true. It is already known. That has nothing to say conceptually about these terms.
I don't think the rest needs treating with this in mind.
Or you're barking up a really weird and uninteresting tree. To say "the colour of the surface of Mars is known" doesn't mean anything. Known by whom?
I don't think the rest needs treating with this in mind.
The rest of my post assumes that position, that knowledge is particular to the individual subject. I described the problems with this, what is known to me is not the same as what is known to you. Reread the post.
Or you're barking up a really weird and uninteresting tree. To say "the colour of the surface of Mars is known" doesn't mean anything. Known by whom?
Look, I say that I know Mars is red, and you say that you know mars is red. The fact that we use the same words, "Mars is red" doesn't mean that we both know the same thing. The words represent what is known as proper to each subject who uses the words. What I know as "Mars is red" is completely different from what You know as "Mars is red".
The alternative... if we know that p, and yet it is not possible that we know that p... is risible.
Another fine example of sophistic abuse of language. The correct statement would be ... if we know that p, it is not possible that we know that p is possible. This is because logically, if we know that p is possible, then it is the case that we do not know that p. "We know that p" is not consistent with "we know that p is possible". Difficult to understand? I think not. Common sense will tell you that if we know that P is possible, this is consistent with "we do not know that p", and it is inconsistent with "we know that p".
This is the problem with your representation, from the start, which @Corvus very adeptly points out. You start with the subject "we", and the predicate "know that p". Then you unsoundly step outside that predication, to qualify it with "it is not possible that". Nothing that I said supports this strawman representation. The "knowable" in your representation is not a predication of any subject, because you attempt to remove it from "we". In fact, this representation is illogical, being excluded by the law of excluded middle if we adhere to the need for a subject in predication.
The two alternatives are "we know that p", and "we do not know that p". Representations such as, "possible that we know that p", are explicitly excluded by the law of excluded middle. For the umpteenth time, do you recognize this reality, that "possible that we know that P", in this basic form, violates the law of excluded middle? Therefore, if it happens to be the case that the truth of the matter must be represented with "we know that p is possible", then we must categorize this as a form of "we do not know that p", in order to remain consistent with the law of excluded middle. That is because, if you stipulate that "we know that p is possible" is consistent with "we know that P", as you do with "If we know that p, then it is possible that we know that p", you implicitly contradict yourself, because because knowing that p is possible is not knowing that p. Therefore "we know that p is possible" must be classed as a form of "we do not know that P".
This is such simple, basic reasoning, developed thousands of years ago, so I cannot honestly believe that you actually do not understand it. And especially after its been so thoroughly explained to you numerous times. Therefore I can only conclude that you intentionally deny fundamental logical principles for the sake of sophistry.
This is because logically, if we know that p is possible, then it is the case that we do not know that p. "We know that p" is not consistent with "we know that p is possible".
Curiously, Aristotle was at pains to disagree.
Metaphysics ? 3,
“Everything that is in actuality is capable of being so; for what is impossible cannot be actual.”
Metaphysics ? 1,
“That which exists in actuality exists because there is a capacity for it; for nothing impossible is actual.”
De Interpretatione 9
“If a thing is or has been, then it is necessary that it was possible for it to be.”
Physics III.1,
“For what is not possible does not occur.”
You gallantly attempt to make a coherent account in which knowing that p is possible is logically incompatible with knowing that p. But this requires a reversal of modal logic and the standard view of the last 2300 years - that what is actual must be possible.
As for your use of Excluded Middle, "It is possible that we know that P" is not a third state between "We know that P" and "We don't know that P". It is a different proposition about the modal status of Kp. It is ?Kp. You mistakenly claims that a modal statement about a proposition (?Kp) violates the binary truth-value of the proposition itself (Kp). This is a category error. LEM governs the truth of propositions, not the content of those propositions. Both Kp and ?Kp are individual propositions that are each subject to LEM on their own.
I don't see how any of your free floating quotes from Aristotle are relevant, because you and I are discussing epistemic possibility, and your quotes from Aristotle concern ontological possibility. These two are very different. Clearly Aristotle believed, as you indicate ""If a thing is or has been, then it is necessary that it was possible for it to be". But Aristotle was very interested in change, and the temporal aspect of reality, physics. So he was concerned with how a specific possibility is actualized, rather than some other possibility, and he also stipulated that the possibility of a physical thing is always prior in time to the actual existence of that thing, as your quotes indicate.
You gallantly attempt to make a coherent account in which knowing that p is possible is logically incompatible with knowing that p. But this requires a reversal of modal logic and the standard view of the last 2300 years - that what is actual must be possible.
It's not my fault if the so-called "standard view" is misguided and obviously incorrect. Your appeal to authority does not stand up very well to my well-formulated logical argument. Look again:
P1. We know shit.
P2 We do not know shit.
P3 It is possible to know shit.
If we judge 1 as true, then we know that we know shit. Further, if we then proceed to judge 3, we already know that we know shit, and 3, "it is possible to know shit" implies that shit may not be known. That shit may not be known is impossible by our judgement of 1, a judgement which makes it necessary that we know shit. So 1 and 3 are incompatible. However, if we judge 2 as true, then we know that we do not know shit. But even if we judge that we do not know shit, it might still be possible that we could know shit. So 2 and 3 are compatible.
As for your use of Excluded Middle, "It is possible that we know that P" is not a third state between "We know that P" and "We don't know that P". It is a different proposition about the modal status of Kp. It is ?Kp.
OK, now we're getting somewhere. I will agree, that "It is possible that we know that P" is a different type of proposition, categorically distinct from the pair "we know that p", and "we do not know that p". So, you need to treat them that way, and stop declaring that one is "derivable" from the other. That is your category mistake, Look:
Kp is read "p is known", and ?Kp, "it is possible that p is known". They are not the "represented by the same proposition". But the latter is derivable from the former.
I'm happy to concede that both "we know that p" and "we do not know that p" are categorically distinct from, and incompatible with, "it is possible to know p", but then you must agree that we cannot draw inferences across that category boundary.
This is why I "double-down". You say things like "It is a different proposition about the modal status of Kp", and "This is a category error", which indicates that you actually recognize the principles. But you refuse to apply these same principles to your own erroneous statements. So it's a type of hypocrisy. You make claims and assertions which are contrary to the principles which you employ in arguments against others. Doubling-down is necessary to help you to reflect.
That category mistake is what Sirius pointed out to you.
The consequence of this is the term k will be different for one of the two.
To illustrate,
(K(p),x) =: There exist x which knows p, for truth is known
K(p) =: p is knowable, for truth is knowable
Now, there is no way to draw an inference from the latter to the earlier since the total variables are different
If this argument isn't mentioned in SEP (I haven't checked it yet) then it doesn't show it's invalid. It could be out there, somewhere else. I don't think I'm the first one to ever raise this rather obvious objection.
"...it is possible to know shit" implies that shit may not be known.
...the bit where if you know stuff, then it thereby is possible to know stuff. Yes, it might have been that we did not know stuff, but as things turned out, we do know stuff. Either way, it is possible - that is, not impossible - to know the stuff that we do indeed know.
Note that it's "shit may not be known", which is quite valid, and not your "shit is not known", which implies that you only know shit that it is not possible to now.
This is the standard view, from Aristotle onward.
This is tedious, Meta. But good for my post count.
For anyone watching on, (well, there may be some...) Meta's argument relies on treating “?Kp” as if it meant “we do not know p, but could.” But that is not what the modal operator means — not in Aristotle, not in modern modal logic, not anywhere.
Look, I say that I know Mars is red, and you say that you know mars is red. The fact that we use the same words, "Mars is red" doesn't mean that we both know the same thing.
It does, for your purpose. Perhaps that's the issue... I think what you're getting at is essentially the problem of other minds. I don't even know that 'red' is the same for you, as me.
...the bit where if you know stuff, then it thereby is possible to know stuff. Yes, it might have been that we did not know stuff, but as things turned out, we do know stuff. Either way, it is possible - that is, not impossible - to know the stuff that we do indeed know.
Look at the temporality of your statements; "it might have been that we did not know stuff", refers to past time. All three of the propositions refer to current time. The propositions refer to our knowledge of "shit" at the present time. That we might not have known, in the past, what we do know now, is completely irrelevant.
Statements like "if you know stuff, then it thereby is possible to know stuff" indicate to me that common usage has corrupted your understanding of "possible". Common usage propagates ambiguity, so "the stuff" which you refer to as the stuff that is known, is not the same stuff as "the stuff" that it is possible to know. If I know 10 cars (stuff known), you might conclude that it's possible for me to know another 40 cars (stuff possible to know), but clearly "stuff" refers to something different in each case, the 10 cars that are known , and the 40 cars that are not known, are completely different things. That's ambiguity in "cars", just like the ambiguity in your use of "stuff".
So I think you need a good clear definition of "possible" which would support your usage. I've already explained my usage. The proposition "it is possible to know p" indicates that we have judged that p could be known, but is not known. This is because "it is possible that p is known" would indicate that we do not know whether p is known or not, and that would be somewhat incoherent, implying that we know without knowing that we know. So we must settle on an altered version, "it is possible to know p", but "possible" maintains the same meaning. "Possible" indicates that we do not know whether p is true or not. That is why it is inconsistent with the judgement "p is known", as this implies that we know whether p is true or not.
Can you provide me with a definition of "possible" which supports your position, so I can understand what you are trying to say?
Note that it's "shit may not be known", which is quite valid, and not your "shit is not known", which implies that you only know shit that it is not possible to now.
This is an indication of the ambiguity which is disturbing you. Shit is the subject, and known is the predicate. I believe, "Shit is not known" is a valid predication. The ambiguity described above, is making you think of "shit" as a multidimensional object, in which each dimension is called "shit", and some dimensions may be known while others not. That is very confused shit, which you are proposing.
This is tedious, Meta. But good for my post count.
Personally I don't give a damn about any thread counts or anything like that. But if it pleases you, it makes me happy too. The pleasure is ours, and it may help you to overcome the tediousness. I'm tedious by nature, so I'm pleased that you give me the opportunity to be that way. Therefore I suggest that we keep the posts short and to the point, quicker reply etc., as that would be preferrable to you. The next point would be for you to provide a definition of "possible" so that I can question you on it, to gain an understanding of what you mean. Then I can examine and analyze your usage to see if your definition is coherent and consistent with your usage.
For anyone watching on, (well, there may be some...) Meta's argument relies on treating “?Kp” as if it meant “we do not know p, but could.” But that is not what the modal operator means — not in Aristotle, not in modern modal logic, not anywhere.
OK, so let's see what "the modal operator means". Can you define "possible" in a way which makes sense of what you are claiming, without the appeal to ambiguity demonstrated above? Can you keep the subject (or object if you wish) which is referred to, as one subject, and not make it refer to many things (as you do above). After you've been informed of this ambiguity, it would be a case of intentional ambiguity if you continue to utilize it. Intentional ambiguity will surely support the charge of sophistry.
It does, for your purpose. Perhaps that's the issue... I think what you're getting at is essentially the problem of other minds. I don't even know that 'red' is the same for you, as me.
It's you who has insisted that knowledge is the property of a single subject. Look, I am happy to discuss with Banno, propositions like "we know...", which implies that knowledge is a property of "us". However, we must keep these two discussions separate, because "know" refers to two very distinct things in the two cases of "I know...", and "we know...".
So I am not bringing up any "problem of other minds", just informing you of the obvious, that the knowledge in my mind is different from the knowledge in your mind. And if you make claims, like you did, which indicate that you think that you and I have the same knowledge, I will ask you to justify such claims because they are inconsistent with your starting premise, that knowledge is the property of an individual subject.
Banno, on the other hand has started with a use of "know" which indicates that knowledge is a property of us, "we". So if Banno starts to say that I can know different things from what you know, then I can likewise ask him to justify those assertions, as they are inconsistent with that starting premise.
As a plain language person I get a kick out of these discussions. You and Banno et al are obviously very smart/knowledgeable people. That said, I cannot figure out what you are saying.
P1. We know shit.
P2 We do not know shit.
P3 It is possible to know shit. P4 It is not possible to know shit
If we know shit at time t, then clearly at some time prior to time t it must have been possible to know said shit - otherwise there's no way we could know said shit at time t. This is the plain language interpretation.
So I'm trying to figure out how P1 would not automatically imply P3 at time t. Are you saying that prior to time t we were somehow able to figure out the shit, but that at time t the situation has changed and we whatever means/mechanism we used to determine the shit prior to t is no longer applicable - and thus P1 no longer automatically implies P3?
Or (more likely) I am totally not getting what you're saying.
BTW -- If possible - a plain language response please. :smile:
Look at the temporality of your statements; "it might have been that we did not know stuff", refers to past time.
No, it doesn't. It might have been the case now that we didn't know stuff. In some other posibel world we might not have known stuff. Tensed logic, if needed, is constructed separately to modal logic. But your not seeing this is yet another example of your eccentricity.
So I'm trying to figure out how P1 would not automatically imply P3 at time t.
Yep. That we know p implies that it is possible to know p.
[hide="Technically, it's valid in any system in which the accessibility relation is reflexive - in which a possible world can access itself. So both S4 and S5. "]See https://www.umsu.de/trees/#A~5~9A||reflexivity.
The definition of ?p in Kripke's semantics is that p is true in at least one accessible world. If we drop reflexivity, then p might be true here but not in any other world, and since only other worlds are accessible, it would be invalid.
Meta denies that p??p, a sentence which will be valid only if we do not include the world in which p is true in the list of accessible worlds. His account is valid only if we cannot access the world in which p is true. And in p??p, the world in which p is true is this world.[/hide]
The technicalities are to a large extent unavoidable. In plain language, we might replace "accessibility" with "the worlds about which we can talk" and call the possible world we are in, the actaul world. Then:
The inference p ? possibly p is valid only in modal systems where each world counts itself as possible, that is, where we can talk about the actual world. In Kripke semantics, “possibly p” means that p is true in at least one world about which we can talk. If you drop reflexivity, then we can't talk about the actual world, and so p may be true in the actual world but not in any world about which we can talk. So the inference fails. Since Meta denies p ? ?p, his view amounts to saying that the actual world is not among the worlds about which we can talk. But in p ? ?p, the world where p is true is simply this world.
The tense is not usually considered in modal logic. So we can for example talk about the possibility that you did not write the post to which I am replying, by talking about a possible world in which that was so. That's not the actual world, of course, but it's still a possible world.
Meta's confusion might be the result of thinking of accessible worlds as “counterfactual” only, never including the actual world. This seems likely. But for the rest of us, the actual world is considered to be one of the possible worlds.
If we know shit at time t, then clearly at some time prior to time t it must have been possible to know said shit - otherwise there's no way we could know said shit at time t. This is the plain language interpretation.
That is not the issue. The question is whether at the same time, "We know shit", and "It is possible that we know shit", could both be judge to be true.
So I'm trying to figure out how P1 would not automatically imply P3 at time t. Are you saying that prior to time t we were somehow able to figure out the shit, but that at time t the situation has changed and we whatever means/mechanism we used to determine the shit prior to t is no longer applicable - and thus P1 no longer automatically implies P3?
The issue is if, when you judge that p is true, you can also judge that it is possible that p is true. I think that this is dishonesty and contradiction because "it is possible that p is true" contradicts "p is true". This is because "p is true" means that it is not possible that p is false, whereas "it is possible that p is true" means that it is possible that p is false. Therefore contradiction.
No, it doesn't. It might have been the case now that we didn't know stuff. In some other posibel world we might not have known stuff. Tensed logic, if needed, is constructed separately to modal logic. But your not seeing this is yet another example of your eccentricity.
For God's sake Banno, what are you talking about? "Did" is the past tense of do. "Did not know" refers to the past. It does not refer to the present, which would be "does not know".
Are you suggesting that the past tense "did" can refer to the present, but in another world? So that "we did not know" doesn't refer to us in the past, but it refers to us at the present, but in another world? So right now, we know shit, but in another world there's another us that does not know the same shit, right now. And somehow it seems reasonable to you to say that this other "we", at the present time "did" not know shit right now, because the usage of the past tense creates the illusion of a temporal separation between one thing referred to with "we" and the other as if it's a temporal extension of one thing referred to with "we". But the illusion of the temporal separation only really helps to veil the absurdity of two versions of 'we" existing at the very same time. Why not just say what you mean, there's one "we" which knows, and another "we" which does not know.
In my last post I warned you about using ambiguity. See here, "we" refers to two distinct groups of people, one which knows stuff, and the other which does not know stuff, both at the same time. Can you see that you are intentionally proposing ambiguity? That fills the criteria of sophistry.
"My eccentricity"? Is that meant as a joke? You are the one talking about the 'we" which know stuff at the present time, and another "we" which does not know the same stuff at the same time. And to cover up the absurdity of this you say that the one "we" does know stuff right now, and the other "we" did not know the same stuff right now. Don't you admit that that is very strange "stuff" which you are on about?
Please Banno, try to provide something more reasonable.
This is because "p is true" means that it is not possible that p is false
No — that conflates truth with necessity. “p is true” does not mean “p cannot be false.” It means only that p is not false in the actual world. Something can be true without being necessary, and false without being impossible.
It is true that you read this post. It is also possible that you might not have read it.
'Did' marks what happened, not what had to happen. Saying 'Jill did push Jack' tells us what actually happened, not that her pushing him was necessary, inevitable, or impossible to be otherwise. Confusing tense with modality is exactly the same mistake as treating 'true' as meaning 'cannot be false.'
And the answer, overwhelmingly, is "yes". If we know something then by that very fact it is possibel for us to know that thing.
You have not yet defined "possible" to support this, as I asked. What you are saying here is that "it is possible that we know X" is implied by "we know X". I've already explained to you over and over, why this is incoherent. The two actually contradict each other because "it is possible that we know X" means that it could be the case that we do not know X, while "we know X" means that it could not be the case that we do not know X.
I've shown you the logic. Continuing to assert something completely illogical is pointless. You need to back up your claims, show how you understand the meaning of "possible" in such a way which allows what you assert to somehow be coherent.
No — that conflates truth with necessity. “p is true” does not mean “p cannot be false.” It means only that p is not false in the actual world. Something can be true without being necessary, and false without being impossible.
Your mention of necessity is a distraction of sophistry. If p is true it very clearly does mean that p cannot be false. Notice "is" and "be" imply the present time. If p is true, p cannot be false, because that would mean that p is true and false at the same time.
Furthermore, truth and falsity are determined by the actual world, as correspondence. I'm very surprised that you, a self-proclaimed realist would suggest otherwise. If truth is not determined by the actual world, realism has no standing.
But that issue is which I told you about yesterday, your tendency to say one thing, then argue principles which explicitly undermine what you claim. It's a sort of hypocrisy on your part.
'Did' marks what happened, not what had to happen. Saying 'Jill did push Jack' tells us what actually happened, not that her pushing him was necessary, inevitable, or impossible to be otherwise. Confusing tense with modality is exactly the same mistake as treating 'true' as meaning 'cannot be false.'
I agree, "did" marks what actually happened, and this is the truth. As it is the truth, it is impossible to be otherwise. If Jill did push Jack, then that is the truth, and it is impossible to be otherwise. True does mean, precisely and exactly, "cannot be false". If what is true could be false we would have contradiction. If you really believe otherwise, you have some explaining to do.
And I don't know how "modality" is related here. You haven't provided any definitions or principles of relations. All you have done so far is made absurd assertions.
Unfortunately, no. Your ignorance of modal logic stands alongside your denial of instantaneous velocity and insistence that 0.9... ? 1.
You keep bringing up "modal logic" but you have done nothing to show how this is relevant. We have been talking about what it means to know p, not to know p, and the possibility of knowing p. That is what we are talking about, what these propositions mean. If you want to apply modal logic, then you need to provide some principles, definitions, and structure. To simply keep on asserting that what I say is contrary to modal logic is pointless if you cannot prove your claims with reference to some principles or definitions.
You have not yet defined "possible" to support this, as I asked.
Yeah, I did, you missed it. It's the standard Kripkeian definition: Quoting Banno
In Kripke semantics, “possibly p” means that p is true in at least one world about which we can talk.
All the stuff I've said here is straight forward possible world semantics and standard modal logic. Folk can check it by feeding it in to the AI of their choice. It'll also point out the errors in your posts.
"we know X" means that it could not be the case that we do not know X.
Nuh, it doesn't. We know that Branson's missus has died. But it could be the case that we did not know she'd passed on. They might not have made it public, if they had wanted. Or we might have missed the news that day.
What? How does that make sense? If it is true that I read this post, how is it possible that I did not read it?
Here's the problem, then - your incapacity to understand a simple situation; or is this the doubling-down I spoke of earlier? We can happily consider what might have been the case had you not read that post. I would not be writing this, for starters. That does make sense.
Working backwards, we got to arguing about modality after I introduced Fitch's paradox. That was introduced because it deals with the logic of unknown truths. And that relates directly to the question in the title: How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our reality?
Anti-realism says: every truth must be knowable.
But you also say: there are truths we don’t and maybe can’t know.
Fitch shows you can’t have both.
If there are unknown truths, then not every truth is knowable, which just is the denial of anti-realism.
The way that antirealism usually avoids omniscience is by rejecting classical logic. That for instance is the approach in Kripke's theory of truth, which has some merit.
In effect, in talking about the medium-size goods around us, we have a choice between using classical logic and accepting that there are truths we don't know on the one hand; and supposing that there are no such unknown truths and rejecting classical logic on the other.
Ether will do, but the former seems more intuitive, less sophistic and simpler.
Yeah, I did, you missed it. It's the standard Kripkeian definition:
In Kripke semantics, “possibly p” means that p is true in at least one world about which we can talk.
— Banno
From the perspective of truth by correspondence, these appears to be incoherent. How can we talk about things being true in more than one world, when "true" is determined by what corresponds with "the world"? I thought you were realist. No? Are you saying that there is a whole bunch of contradictory truths depending on which world we are talking about?
Regardless, I'll accept this definition as a working platform. But I'll warn you that it will be very hard to support any type of realism which could be consistent with this definition. So a "world" is a product of the imagination, and "true" means consistent with that specific product. This is a reflection of the basic idealist assumption covered in the thread called "The Mind Created World". The difficulty with this approach is to find principles which would provide "correctness". that is because my proposed world produced from my experience may differ from your proposed world produced from your experience. Each is " a world about which we can talk".
We cannot us "true", to talk of the "true world", or "real world", in the sense of correspondence, because "true" is already used in the sense of coherence, as consistent with the proposed possible world. Furthermore, we cannot refer to an independent "actual world", because all we have is the different proposals from different people, based on their experiences. By what principles would we say that one person's experience represents "the actual world", over another's, when they contradict?
We know that Branson's missus has died. But it could be the case that we did not know she'd passed on.
You are mixing up tenses and not properly representing what I said. I said "we know X" means that it could not be the case "that we do not know X". You have replaced "do not" with "did not". Sure it is possible that we did not know what we do know now, but that's not what I'm talking about. If we know X right now, it is absolutely impossible that we do not know X right now. Of course if we allow different imaginary worlds, we could have one of each, but those two different cases would not be in the same world.
Here's the problem, then - your incapacity to understand a simple situation; or is this the doubling-down I spoke of earlier? We can happily consider what might have been the case had you not read that post. I would not be writing this, for starters. That does make sense.
Your claim here is incorrect. What you insinuate is contrary to your definition of "possibly". Notice, "possibly" refers to what is true "in at least one world". It does not provide the principles to cross from one world to another. In one world I read the post. In another world I did not read the post. "True" refers to consistency within the referred to world. Therefore if it is true that I read this post, (meaning in that world where it is true) it is not possible that I did not read it. So your claim that what I said was wrong is incorrect. Your incorrectness is the reason for my doubling down.
You seem to misunderstand "true" in the context of your proposed modal logic. Notice in your definition of "possibly", "true" is relative to the specified world. Therefore if it is true that I read the post, it cannot be the case that I did not. "True" indicates what is the case within a specified world. You can go ahead and talk about other worlds, in which I did not read the post, but in those worlds it is not true that I read the post.
What to make of that. Modal logic not relevant to possibility and necessity.
The words "possibility" and "necessity" were being used long before modal logic was invented, so it is clear that those words can be used in ways not at all related to modal logic. If you want to limit use specifically to modal logic, then to avoid ambiguity we need principles or definitions. So, if you want to bring a specific form of modal logic to bear on this discussion, you need to provide some principles or definitions, as you did with "possibility" above.
However, you need to respect the consequences of these principles. Notice for instance what becomes of "true" under your definition of "possibly". "True" becomes relative to the specified world, it is not absolute, or relative to any sort of supposed independent actual world. If you use "true" in a number of different ways you likely equivocate.
The way that antirealism usually avoids omniscience is by rejecting classical logic. That for instance is the approach in Kripke's theory of truth, which has some merit.
In effect, in talking about the medium-size goods around us, we have a choice between using classical logic and accepting that there are truths we don't know on the one hand; and supposing that there are no such unknown truths and rejecting classical logic on the other.
Ether will do, but the former seems more intuitive, less sophistic and simpler.
In the way that "true" is used in your definition of "possibly", how does "truths we don't know" say anything meaningful? Since truth is relative to the specified world, and "true" means what is consistent with that world, and we can imagine any type of world, than anything, and everything is true. How does "truths we don't know" say anything meaningful, when everything and anything is a truth?
The definition provided is not mine; it is the standard definition in modal logic. It has nothing to do with correspondence, since truth in such systems is model-theoretical.
In modal logic:
“?p” means “p is true in at least one accessible world”
This does not claim that there are multiple concrete universes out there and that truth “corresponds” to each. It is a semantic model, a mathematical structure used to evaluate formulas. Model-theoretic “worlds” are not metaphysical worlds. They are semantic devices, exactly like the points on a truth table are not little universes.
You simply have a very poor understanding of the topic at hand, Meta.
It does not provide the principles to cross from one world to another.
Yeah, it does. That's exactly what the accessibility relation is for.
Frankly, your attempts to show that modal logic, and possible world semantics, which are accepted fields of study in mathematical logic, are somehow inconsistent, is just a bit sad.
In the way that "true" is used in your definition of "possibly", how does "truths we don't know" say anything meaningful? Since truth is relative to the specified world, and "true" means what is consistent with that world, and we can imagine any type of world, than anything, and everything is true. How does "truths we don't know" say anything meaningful, when everything and anything is a truth?
You are here confusing "true in a model" with "true in reality".
The definition provided is not mine; it is the standard definition in modal logic. It has nothing to do with correspondence, since truth in such systems is model-theoretical.
That's right. It's exactly what I pointed out in my post.
This does not claim that there are multiple concrete universes out there and that truth “corresponds” to each. It is a semantic model, a mathematical structure used to evaluate formulas. Model-theoretic “worlds” are not metaphysical worlds. They are semantic devices, exactly like the points on a truth table are not little universes.
I don't care what you call it, a "semantic model" if you want. However, if you choose to use "true" in that way, we must adhere to that for the purpose of our discussion here, so that we do not equivocate. That is the reason why I asked you to provide some principles or definitions, so that we have something concrete to go by.
Frankly, your attempts to show that modal logic, and possible world semantics, which are accepted fields of study in mathematical logic, are somehow inconsistent, is just a bit sad.
I am not trying to show inconsistency in modal logic, I am trying to show incorrectness in your presentation of it. And, in case you didn't notice, that is what I did in my last post.
You are here confusing "true in a model" with "true in reality".
Again, a bit sad.
Ha ha, I'm staying consistent with "true in a model". From here, there is no such thing as "true in reality", because that would be equivocation. That's the problem, your realistic tendencies make you want a "true in reality", while you argue modalities. That is your inconsistency, your incorrectness, which I am trying to help you to understand.
Are you ready to proceed with the "accessibility relation" now?
That is the reason why I asked you to provide some principles or definitions, so that we have something concrete to go by.
Here you go: Boxes and Diamonds: An Open Introduction To Modal Logic. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 cover truth at a world and truth as a model. There's a couple of sections on accessibility relations, but you might find 15.5, "Accessibility Relations and Epistemic Principles", most useful.
I am not trying to show inconsistency in modal logic, I am trying to show incorrectness in your presentation of it.
I've over-simplified much of the logic, and I'm sure that Tones or one of the other mathematicians hereabouts could have a field day with some of my phrasing. But I do not think that anything I have said here is at odds with standard, accepted modal logic. What you have said, on the other hand, is.
Here you go: Boxes and Diamonds: An Open Introduction To Modal Logic. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 cover truth at a world and truth as a model. There's a couple of sections on accessibility relations, but you might find 15.5, "Accessibility Relations and Epistemic Principles", most useful.
OK, so truth is defined as within the model, so we haven't gotten to anything to support the assumption of a real, or actual world, or truth by correspondence to the actual world. How do you claim to be realist if you believe in the principles of modal logic? How do you assume to make modal logic consistent with realism?
Truth is determined by the model,, The model is a product, imaginary. Unless you are assuming something like model-dependent realism, (which isn't actually realism, it just has that word in the name), there is no place for a real, independent world.
A model is not an “imaginary world” we’re claiming to be real; it’s a mathematical structure used to interpret a language. The whole point of model-theoretic semantics is precisely not to replace the actual world, but to give us a rigorous way to talk about it.
Reply to Banno
But your "rigorous way to talk about it" assigns truth to the talk not the actual world, and it provides no principles to even support the reality of an actual world. Look at the definition of "possibly" you gave me:
In Kripke semantics, “possibly p” means that p is true in at least one world about which we can talk.
Clearly these are "imaginary worlds". Consider that I may produce a world based on my experience, and you may produce a world based on your experience. Despite each of us claiming that mine is the actual world, based on my experience, they are both imaginary worlds derived from our memories and other parts of our minds, and there may very well be contradiction between us. So we may establish modalities, and ways to cross reference between your world, my world, and numerous others, to produce "a model". This model which is produced is just another imaginary world though.
You say "The whole point of model-theoretic semantics is precisely not to replace the actual world, but to give us a rigorous way to talk about it", but that is not correct. It gives us a rigorous way to talk about our experiences, compare them, apply logic, and seek consistencies and inconsistencies. It does not give us a way to talk about the actual world, nor do the principles of modal logic claim we talk about the actual world. That's why it leads to ontologies like model-dependent realism. It provides principles to talk about possible worlds, and produce conclusions concerning these possible worlds, and then we might stipulate some principles whereby we'd choose the best possible world (the one we think could qualify as the actual world), but it is not working with descriptions of the actual world. Nor does it claim to be. It cannot, or the possible worlds structure would be negated.
Notice the inversion. Modal logic does not provide a way to talk about the actual world. It provides a way to talk about possible worlds. Then, through principles, and logical proceedings, it stipulates "the actual world". So instead of the classic approach, talking about the actual world (propositions judged for truth and falsity), and proceeding logically from there to determine what is possible within that actual world, modal logic talks about possible worlds, and proceeds to make a logical determination about the actual world. That is not a matter of giving us a rigorous way to talk about the actual world. It is a way to make logical conclusions about the actual world. The descriptions, therefore what we are talking about is possible worlds, not the actual world. Therefore, a rigorous way to talk about the actual world is what is really missing here.
But your "rigorous way to talk about it" assigns truth to the talk not the actual world, and it provides no principles to even support the reality of an actual world.
That's pretty hopelessly confused. As is the rest of that post.
The best way to think of possible worlds is not as imagined, but as stipulated. We can consider the possible world in which we did not know Bransons wife had died, and consider the consequences thereof - such as that I would not be using it in this example. That's quite sensible.
And, to add to your confusion, we make such stipulations in the actual word... As indeed, I just did.
The difference with the actual world is that it is not stipulated. It's already there.
You continue to muddle semantics and ontology, and blame logic for your own muddle.
The best way to think of possible worlds is not as imagined, but as stipulated.
Sure, "stipulated". But I don't see how this change of words makes any significant difference. A stipulated world is nothing other than a special type of imagined world, one put to words, and proposed for agreement. But I'll use your word if you think it adds some significance.
We can consider the possible world in which we did not know Bransons wife had died, and consider the consequences thereof - such as that I would not be using it in this example. That's quite sensible.
So you are suggesting two distinct stipulated worlds, one in which Branson's wife died and one in which Branson's wife did not. I have no problem with this, those are two possible worlds.
And, to add to your confusion, we make such stipulations in the actual word... As indeed, I just did.
Yes, that definitely confuses me. The way you phrase that, "to add to your confusion", creates the appearance that you are doing this intentionally. Why would you strive to confuse rather than to clarify?
You are stipulating that we make such stipulations in the actual world. But that stipulation you make, just produces another stipulated world. Just because you stipulate that we make stipulations in the actual world, doesn't give that stipulated world any special status as anything other than another stipulated world, just like all the rest of the stipulated worlds. I could stipulate that there is another world, "the real world", within which you make the stipulation that we make such stipulations in the actual world. Then someone might stipulate that there is a "physical world" within which I made the stipulation about the real world. And someone could stipulate an "existing world" within which the stipulation about the physical world was made. As long as people could keep coming up with new terms, we'd approach an infinite regress. All the while, we'd only be dealing with stipulated worlds, which are just a special type of imaginary world.
The difference with the actual world is that it is not stipulated. It's already there.
I don't understand this at all. How could that even be a "world", what's already there? Very clearly, a world is what is stipulated. If there is anything which has not been stipulated, then this is very obviously categorically distinct from what "a world" is. We cannot now use "world" to refer to something "not stipulated", when "a world" very clearly refers to what is stipulated. I agree that there is much more to reality than what is stipulated, but if worlds are what is stipulated, we sure as heck cannot talk about what is not stipulated as if it is a world. That would be extremely confusing.
Now I think I understand very clearly why I am hopelessly confused. You use the word "world" in an extremely confusing way. You suppose worlds which are stipulated, and also a world, or perhaps a multitude of worlds (I really can't know, because everything you say about this "world" would just be stipulated, therefore a stipulated world) which is/are not stipulated. How could we even know that there is such a world, or worlds?
Can you see the inherent contradiction here, which is confusing me immensely? You are stipulating that there is an actual world, which is not stipulated, but is already there. If we remove this stipulation, of an actual, not stipulated world, which is already there, because it is self-contradicting, a stipulated not stipulated world, how can we know, or even say, anything about this supposed contradictory world, because that would be to make the contradiction of stipulating the not stipulated?
What I suggest to you Banno, is that it is actually you who misunderstands modal logic. In modal logic there cannot be any such thing as the actual, not stipulated world, which is already there. This realist assumption contradicts the very principles of modal logic. This is why we have ontologies like model-dependent realism, which the adherents recognize is not consistent with traditional realism, but they give it that name anyway, to create the illusion of consistency. And, you either get deceived by this illusion, or grasp it, and propagate it in intentional deception, by insisting that modal logic is consistent with realism.
This is why we have ontologies like model-dependent realism, which the adherents recognize is not consistent with traditional realism, but they give it that name anyway, to create the illusion of consistency.
Why would anyone want to create an illusion of consistency? Most often, it seems to be the primary aim of philosophy to puncture illusions.
You are stipulating that there is an actual world, which is not stipulated, but is already there.
I don't know about modal logic. But I understand the concept of a possibility as inherently allowing that there is something that would count as its realization. It is possible that it will rain tomorrow is incomprehensible unless there are circumstances in which it is raining and others in which it is not. In the context of probability we call this requirement an outcome. It refers to the result of the coin toss or whatever. When we formulate a possibility we are stipulating the circumstances in which the stipulated possibility will be realized, but not whether they obtain or not. Actuality is what realizes some possibilities and kicks others into touch. If there were not such things, both probability and possibility become meaningless.
But for the rest of us, the actual world is considered to be one of the possible worlds.
That seems to me a bit confusing, because it suggests that the actual world is merely a possible world. Surely one needs to say something to the effect that the actual world is different from all the possible worlds. Compare the difference between an image on a screen, which gives us a possibility, and the actual/real scene, which is in a different category. Perhaps the point is that an image is always an image of something. What is actual is that something.
So you are suggesting two distinct stipulated worlds, one in which Branson's wife died and one in which Branson's wife did not. I have no problem with this, those are two possible worlds.
The question is how do we get to an actual world?
You are already in the actual world, Meta.
True in model M is a bit of semantics, but true in the actual world is a bit of metaphysics. You are confusing the two. The semantics is built within the actual world.
While semantics talks about many possible worlds, metaphysics tells us that only one is the actual world - the one that is fixed by empirical facts. The actual world is one in which Branson's wife died.
You seem to think that somehow the actual word ought be deducible form a modal logic. That's a profound confusion of semantics and metaphysics. While logic and semantics constrain what can be inferred, it's looking around that tells us how things are. Modal logic does not identify the actual world.
It presupposes it.
Possibly, as that is what you stipulate, but we're right back to where we were, days ago. Remember, I told you how "actually known" is distinct from "possibly known", incompatible because the two are contradictory? You could not understand that and kept arguing otherwise. Maybe you'll understand the logic now:
Possible worlds are stipulated.
The actual world is not stipulated.
Therefore the actual world is not a possible world.
While semantics talks about many possible worlds, metaphysics tells us that only one is the actual world - the one that is fixed by empirical facts. The actual world is one in which Branson's wife died.
By the logic above, if there is an actual world, it is not one of the possible worlds. That would be contradictory.
You seem to think that somehow the actual word ought be deducible form a modal logic.
If the actual world is one of the possible worlds, then it ought to be deducible from modal logic. However, the actual world could not be one of the possible worlds because that would be contradictory. That appears to be a problem with your metaphysics, you accept contradiction.
That seems to me a bit confusing, because it suggests that the actual world is merely a possible world. Surely one needs to say something to the effect that the actual world is different from all the possible worlds.
Well, the actual world is either possible or impossible (necessarily not actual) - this is the equivalent of the law of excluded middle in standard modal logic. It would be absurd to maintain that the actual world is impossible, so you are left with the actual world being possible (indeed, this is a theorem in all but the weakest modal logics). And yes, the actual world is different from all the other possible worlds - it is actual!
In informal speech, we sometimes want to put possibility on one side and actuality on the other, as you suggest, but not always. For example: "things, as phenomena, determine space; that is to say, they render it possible that, of all the possible predicates of space (size and relation), certain may belong to reality" (CPR).
That seems to me a bit confusing, because it suggests that the actual world is merely a possible world. Surely one needs to say something to the effect that the actual world is different from all the possible worlds.
This is the issue. Banno's been arguing that if it is actual it must be possible. I've been trying to show him how we must accept that this is contradictory. But Banno seems to be influenced by some sort of common language intuition which makes him think that it's nonsense to say that what is actual is not possible.
Possible worlds are stipulated.
The actual world is not stipulated.
Therefore the actual world is not a possible world.
:gasp: Cute. This shows your error nicely. Semantically, we can of corse stipulate that we are talking about the actual world - one in which Branson's wife is dead. Metaphysically, the actual world is the one we are in. Your neat syllogism mixes the two.
Well, the actual world is either possible or impossible (necessarily not actual) - this is the equivalent of the law of excluded middle in standard modal logic. It would be absurd to maintain that the actual world is impossible, so you are left with the actual world being possible (indeed, this is a theorem in all but the weakest modal logics). And yes, the actual world is different from all the other possible worlds - it is actual!
What is actual is not possible in the sense that it is a distinct category. Since "impossible" is defined relative to "possible", what is actual is just as much not impossible as it is not possible. If we try to bring "actual into the category of "possible" as Banno does, and you do, this results in the contradiction which I've been demonstrating to Banno.
This shows your error nicely. Semantically, we can of corse stipulate that we are talking about the actual world - one in which Branson's wife is dead. Metaphysically, the actual world is the one we are in. Your neat syllogism mixes the two.
You stipulate that you are talking about the actual world, and this means that the world you are talking about is a possible world, it is stipulated. By your own words, the actual world is "not stipulated".
What you propose here is just ridiculous, because one could just as easily stipulate that the world which Branson's wife did not die, is the actual world. How do you propose that in any stipulated world (possible world), stipulating "I'm talking about the actual world", makes that stipulated world (possible world) into a not stipulated world?
You stipulate that you are talking about the actual world, and this means that the world you are talking about is a possible world, it is stipulated. By your own words, the actual world is "not stipulated".
We are in the actual world. Metaphysics.
We might stipulate that we want to talk about the actual world, and not some other possibel world. Semantics.
You are mixing the two.
If you stipulate that the world which Branson's wife did not die, is the actual world, you would be mistaken.
OK, let's get this straight. I hope you are not trying to confuse me.
We are in the actual world.
Possible worlds are stipulated though.
The world we are in is not a stipulated world
Therefore the actual world is not a possible world.
What proof do you have of such that a person in a stipulated or even flat-out simulated world wouldn't be able to "show" or otherwise "point to" as well, though? This is the root of the argument that words and misplacement of words ultimately fail to address. :chin:
A very important metaphysical point, I might add. Failure to recognize this might lead one to think that the actual world is one of the possible worlds. And one might think that what is actually known is also possibly known. But a good metaphysician will recognize the category division, and the danger of contradiction if we allow that the actual is also possible.
Speaking semantically, the actual world can be stipulated. Which is just to say we can talk about the actual world as one of the possible words.
Sure, but this is problematic due to the possibility of mistake. If we stipulate that a specific possible world represents the actual world, then we take that special status assigned to "the actual world", for granted, even though it might not be a correct representation. Therefore, the title "the actual world" requires more than simple stipulation, it requires justification.
"things, as phenomena, determine space; that is to say, they render it possible that, of all the possible predicates of space (size and relation), certain may belong to reality" (CPR).
I agree with most of that. I can see that we need to say that the actual is possible - even if that is a bit awkward in some ways. It certainly beats saying that the actual is not possible.
I'm not sure I understand this sentence. But if you mean that things determine space, rather than the other way round, I'm with you.
But Banno seems to be influenced by some sort of common language intuition which makes him think that it's nonsense to say that what is actual is not possible.
There's a false dilemma there. There's something wrong with saying that the actual world is possible and something wrong with saying that it is not possible. I am trying to express that by saying that the actual world is not merely possible and that it is different from all the other possible worlds in that respect.
What you propose here is just ridiculous, because one could just as easily stipulate that the world which Branson's wife did not die, is the actual world.
You are missing the point. You cannot stipulate which possible world is actual. That's not a decision that we can make. We can only recognize the status of the actual world.
You are missing the point. You cannot stipulate which possible world is actual. That's not a decision that we can make. We can only recognize the status of the actual world.
You are missing the point. You cannot stipulate which possible world is actual.
That's Banno's claim. Banno said we stipulate which world is the actual world. I addressed that in my last post. If one of the possible worlds is supposed to represent the actual world, this needs to be justified rather than stipulated. But then the justification will be be judged.
That is why Banno's claim that modal logic gives us a rigorous way to talk about the actual world is incorrect. To apply rigor to the way that we talk about the actual world requires strict rules on the use of descriptive language, and also for justifying the claims of "actual". But this is outside the purveyance of modal logic.
Banno said we stipulate which world is the actual world.
Banno said we are int he actual world. He also said that we can stipulate that we are talking about the actual world - a bit of semantics. We do not get to stipulate that we are in the actual world.
You are playing on the difference between the metaphysical truth that we are in the actual world, and the semantic truth that we can stipulate whatever possible world we want. That failure to recognise the difference between semantics and metaphysics runs right through the confusion you show here.
By definition, the actual world is the one we are in. Is that what you are asking?
Or are you asking for proof that you are in the actual world?
Right now, as I post this, I am in the actual world of TPF. As are you when you are participating in it. It is very real. It psychically exists. It can be measured by both of us by observing not only our interactions but if we were to physically meet at whatever server or computer infrastructure contains our interactions. Someone who has never heard of TPF would have no knowledge or reason to believe in this "actual" world we are both present in, without visiting it themself, or visiting the underlying location this interaction is made possible by.
Now, say if me and another member were engaging in a private message. That's, in affect, it's own world. That only the two of us would know about and you would not be privy too. Naturally, you could say it's simply a function of the larger world of TPF and furthermore beyond that, a feature of the larger physical world we could both meet.
The fact remains, in each smaller world, each participant knows only what they're able to access, leaving that larger than it unknown, as if it didn't exist. Yet it does, but only those able to access it would know that.
So again, we go back to the original question. How do you know there's not a larger world than what you're able to access?
Or are you asking for proof that you are in the actual world? What could that look like?
I'm sure you and I are in the same world, as we're two entities able to communicate within it. But that doesn't mean, for certain, there's not a larger world in which only one of us may be able to access. That would, in theory, make that hypothetical larger place the "actual" world. No different than how a private message between myself and another is a "world" or "reality" that while myself and the person I'm speaking to could access, you yourself could not access. Just as this forum is a "world" that we can both "access" but someone who does not have access to a computer nor it's physical server location would not consider an "actual" location.
Reply to Outlander Seems to me you are playing on various differing uses of "world" here. The use of "world" in modal logic is clearly set out in the formal systems that use it. It need not be the same use as that found in describing the world of TPF.
I agree with most of that. I can see that we need to say that the actual is possible - even if that is a bit awkward in some ways.
Well, I did select a rather awkward quotation for my example - this is Kant, after all, so of course, of all the ways he could have expressed his thought, he did it in the awkwardest way possible (see what I did here?)
There's something wrong with saying that the actual world is possible and something wrong with saying that it is not possible. I am trying to express that by saying that the actual world is not merely possible and that it is different from all the other possible worlds in that respect
I think that the difficulty here is that in ordinary speech, we are expected to make the strongest warranted assertions. There is even a word in English for failing to do that: understatement. Sometimes, understatement is used intentionally to convey more than what is being literally said, such as sarcasm or playfulness. But when an understatement is unwarranted, it can lead to misunderstanding and even offense. If, when asked what I thought about Ludwig V, I said: "well, he is not a hopeless fool," that would surely be rude and unfair, even if true in a literal sense. But if in a different context I said "Ludwig V is no fool," such an understatement would carry the opposite meaning. Ah, the vicissitudes of language!
All that is to say that the reason we don't usually say that the actual is possible (except as in my examples above) is that it goes without saying - and so it goes unsaid.
Banno said we are int he actual world. He also said that we can stipulate that we are talking about the actual world - a bit of semantics. We do not get to stipulate that we are in the actual world.
What do you mean we don't get to stipulate that we are in the actual world? You personally, have stipulated that we are in the actual world, numerous times just today.
You are playing on the difference between the metaphysical truth that we are in the actual world, and the semantic truth that we can stipulate whatever possible world we want. That failure to recognise the difference between semantics and metaphysics runs right through the confusion you show here.
If you stipulate (say) that we are in the actual world, which is an unstipulated world, and you also stipulate (say) that the actual world is one of the stipulated possible worlds, you very clearly contradict yourself.
Which do you have it to be? Are we in the actual world, or is the actual world one of the possible worlds? You cannot have both without contradiction.
What do you mean we don't get to stipulate that we are in the actual world? You personally, have stipulated that we are in the actual world, numerous times just today.
Going where? I've laid bare your contradictions and now you say no more. Seems you can't write anything without it being contradictory, so you've shut up.
The actual world is a possible world. The actual world is the one in which we may empirically verify statements as true, as opposed to other possible worlds, where we stipulating them to be true.
The actual world is the one in which we may empirically verify statements as true, as opposed to other possible worlds, where we stipulating them to be true.
So "the actual world" is not the world we live in, (where we live, work, and play, does not consist of statements), it is a world of empirically verifiable statements. And the actual world is not one of the possible worlds which consist of stipulations rather than empirically verifiable statements. Therefore the actual world is not a possible world. Agree? Obviously, it would be a mistake to say that what is actual is also possible, because you've provided clear principles to distinguish the two, and the actual is known to be actual, and distinct from the possible.
But are your principles really clear? "We may empirically verify statements"? Are you saying that "the actual world" consists of statements which are possible to verify empirically, but are not necessarily verified empirically? If we do not actually verify the statements, how would we distinguish a statement of the actual world, from a stipulation of a possible world? Suppose I present you with two statements/stipulations, S1 "it snowed here yesterday", and S2 "it did not snow here yesterday". How would we know which one is an empirically verifiable statement of actuality, and which one is a stipulation of possibility?
Furthermore, if we do actually empirically verify the statements, then how are the "stipulations" truly "possible"? Do you see the dilemma? If we do not empirically verify S1 or S2, then we have two stipulations of possibility. If we empirically verify S1 or S2, we have a statement of actuality, but the other has been ruled as contrary to actuality, and no longer possible.
Your proposal of empirically verifiable statements sucks, as completely useless.
The issue is if, when you judge that p is true, you can also judge that it is possible that p is true. I think that this is dishonesty and contradiction because "it is possible that p is true" contradicts "p is true". This is because "p is true" means that it is not possible that p is false, whereas "it is possible that p is true" means that it is possible that p is false. Therefore contradiction.
If it is possible that p is true, then this means that either p is true or p is false. So this gives us (p or ~p). But we have asserted that p is true. Therefore (p or ~p) is also true.
The “actual world” is not a special kind of world. It is simply this world—the world we inhabit. Every world can call itself “actual” from its own viewpoint. No, it doesn't "consist" of verified statements.
There's been a cold snap, and it might have snowed in Jindabyne overnight. I haven't checked the weather, so both "It snowed in Jindabyne overnight" and "It did not snow in Jindabyne overnight" are possible, so far as I know. Either is epistemically possible.
Now I've just checked, and there was no precipitation in Jindabyne overnight. So it didn't snow. It is not epistemically possible that it did snow, since we now know it didn't.
But we can consider what things would have been like had it snowed overnight in Jindabyne. The roads might be closed, the school shut, and so on. It remains metaphysically possible that it snoed there overnight.
Notice the two differing modalities, metaphysical and epistemic. Your account, as I've said before, fails to differentiate these. It makes the error of thinking that because epistemically, we know it did not snow in the actual world, it is not metaphysically possible that it might have snowed.
In more formal terms, consider to worlds w? and w? and "p"= "it snowed in Jindabyne last night", such that p is true in w? and false in w?. Epistemically, prior to our checking the truth of p, we can access both w? and w? - either might be the case. After checking, we no longer have access to w?.
But metaphysically speaking, we continue to have access to both w? and w? even after checking.
Note that in all cases the actual world is one of the possible worlds.
On your account, Meta, because it did not snow, we could consider the possibility of what things would be like if it had snowed. But this is false. We can consider what things would have been like had it snowed.
This is because "p is true" means that it is not possible that p is false
is the source of Meta's confusion. If we apply Meta's logic to the example I just gave, then because it did not snow last night in Jindabyne, we cannot give any consideration to what may have been the case had it snowed in Jindabyne last night.
But I hope this is obviously not true. We can talk about what it would be like in Jindabyne, had it snowed, even though it did not.
But a good metaphysician will recognize the category division, and the danger of contradiction if we allow that the actual is also possible.
I'm sorry, but I don't understand what you mean by "the danger of contradiction". I'm used to contradictions existing or not - contradictions as a risk are new to me.
But I hope this is obviously not true. We can talk about what it would be like in Jindabyne, had it snowed, even though it did not.
Yes, it is obviously possible to discuss the consequences of a counterfactual. But "p is true" rules out "p is false"; or that p is incompatible with not-p. It seems natural to say that, in some circumstances, that there is no possibility that p is false - not that naturalness is the final court of appeal. So I think that this needs a little more clarification. Perhaps we need to say something like before the race is run, it is possible that my horse will win and possible that it will lose, but that after my horse has won, it was possible. Alternatively, we could explain a counterfactual as positing a context in which to consider various possibilities (I would have won my bet)
It seems natural to say that, in some circumstances, that there is no possibility that p is false
Seems to me that the notion of accessibility does just this.
In a world in which p is false, not-p is indeed impossible. That is within the one world. In other worlds, not-p might be true.
(That's why, as mentioned earlier, Meta's account can be made consistent if we presume that a world cannot access itself - if we reject reflexivity. But this is false in both S4 and S5.)
Perhaps we need to say something like before the race is run, it is possible that my horse will win and possible that it will lose, but that after my horse has won, it was possible.
Yes: before the race is won, we can (epistemologically) access both the world in which the horse wins, and the world in which it doesn't. After the horse wins, it is no longer (epistemically) possible to access the world in which it lost. All of which is a fancy way of saying that once we know the horse wins, it is no longer possible for us to know it to have lost.
But we can still access it metaphysically - "If it had lost, I would not have been able to make the rent!"
As a basically plain language person, the word metaphysically seems out of place.
Yeah, I wasn't too happy with it either, but it's what is use din the literature when making this point, so I used it too. Go ahead and use your own terms.
The SEP article The Epistemology of Modality goes in to this is great detail, if you have sufficient interest. The first part gives a prety straight forward account of distinctions between metaphysical modality, logical modality, conceptual modality, epistemic modality, physical modality, technological modality and practical modality...
If it is possible that p is true, then this means that either p is true or p is false. So this gives us (p or ~p). But we have asserted that p is true. Therefore (p or ~p) is also true.
If this is supposed to be an argument for p -> ?p (if p then possibly p), then it does not work.
Notice that (p or ~p) is a tautology: it is true regardless of the value of p. So, you might think that you could make a parallel argument for ~p -> ?p (if p is false, then it is possible that p is true). But that is, obviously, not the case, since p could be necessarily false, and therefore not possibly true.
You can't reduce modality to classical non-modal logic. If you want a formal proof of p -> ?p - well, this is considered to be such a basic modal intuition that it (or an equivalent principle ?p -> p) is usually taken as an axiom.
Notice the two differing modalities, metaphysical and epistemic. Your account, as I've said before, fails to differentiate these.
From everything that I've read, one's metaphysics must be consistent with one's epistemology, or else there is contradiction within the person's philosophy. So the distinction between "metaphysical" and "epistemic" does not excuse your contradiction.
Note that in all cases the actual world is one of the possible worlds.
For the reasons I explained in prior posts, this is contradictory. You provided a distinction. Possible worlds consist of stipulations, the actual world does not consist of stipulations. Therefore it is contradictory to say that the actual is one of the possible worlds. Will I have to point this out to you an infinite number of times before you accept it?
If we apply Meta's logic to the example I just gave, then because it did not snow last night in Jindabyne, we cannot give any consideration to what may have been the case had it snowed in Jindabyne last night.
Why not? What's your problem here? We could give the very same consideration to "what may have been the case if it had snowed", while still acknowledging that it is impossible that it actually did snow. Is that difficult?
If we do not know whether it snowed or not, we consider that both are "possibilities". If we know that it did not snow, then that is known as an actuality; and the alternative is known as a counterfactual. There are no possibilities with respect to this situation in that case, because what is actual is known. I think that is what Reply to Ludwig V already pointed out to you
I'm sorry, but I don't understand what you mean by "the danger of contradiction". I'm used to contradictions existing or not - contradictions as a risk are new to me.
There is an implied contradiction, in saying that the actual is also possible. This is the one I've been explaining to Banno, who continues to refuse to acknowledge this. Check the above. I called it a "danger of contradiction" because I am still giving Banno the benefit of the doubt, to see if he can provided definitions which would establish consistency.
The point is that "actual" can be made to be one of the possibilities, but that annihilates realism. We must instill principles other than realist principles to distinguish the actual from the possible, if the actual is to be one of the possible. This is the case with model-dependent realism for example, which claims "realism" in the name, but is not realism. The glaring problem being that realism denies the priority of the possible, therefore the actual cannot yield logical priority to the possible, which is required to conceive of the actual as one of the possible. The actual, real, must be distinct from, and logically prior to, the possible, for true realism.
Banno's problem is that he does not want to relinquish his realist ontology, but he wants at the same time to accept the priority of modal logic. Now he is starting to propose a division, a boundary, between metaphysical principles and epistemic principles, so he can hide the contradictory principles, one on each side of that boundary, thereby having an epistemology which is inconsistent with his metaphysics. "The actual world" means something different in Banno's metaphysics, from what it means in his epistemology.
Claude:Banno argues that Metaphysician Undercover fundamentally misunderstands modal logic and conflates distinct concepts. The core errors are:
**1. Conflating Truth with Necessity**
Meta treats "p is true" as meaning "p cannot be false," but this confuses truth with necessity. Something can be actually true without being necessarily true. For example, it's true you read a post, but it's also possible you might not have read it.
**2. Mixing Metaphysical and Epistemic Modality**
Meta fails to distinguish epistemic possibility (what we know) from metaphysical possibility (what could have been). Using the Jindabyne snow example, after checking weather reports we know epistemically that it didn't snow, but we can still consider metaphysically what would have happened if it had snowed.
**3. Reversing the Actuality-Possibility Relationship**
Meta claims knowing something is actual excludes it being possible, violating 2300 years of logical tradition from Aristotle onward that "what is actual must be possible". If you know something, it's trivially possible to know it—the alternative would mean Meta "knows only things that are impossible to know."
**4. Confusing Semantics with Metaphysics**
Meta conflates semantic stipulations (how we talk about worlds in models) with metaphysical claims (what world we're actually in). Possible worlds are semantic devices for evaluating formulas, not claims about multiple concrete universes.
**5. Misunderstanding Modal Operators**
Meta treats "?Kp" (it's possible to know p) as meaning "we don't know p," when it simply means "Kp is not impossible"—an error that would render all knowledge impossible.
Point me to one place where you showed error in my reasoning please.
However solid your reasoning may be, you just have to accept the usage of whatever possible world semanticist you're reviewing. They generally say that actuality is a brand of possibility, the intuition being that all events of the actual world are logically possible.
Claude:Banno argues that Metaphysician Undercover fundamentally misunderstands modal logic and conflates distinct concepts. The core errors are:
1. "For example, it's true you read a post, but it's also possible you might not have read it."
That speaks for itself.
2. Just because we can consider counterfactuals, doesn't indicate that it's possible that what is false could be true.
3.No demonstration here, just appeal to authority, and disregard of my logical demonstration.
4.Doesn't make sense, or perhaps is just irrelevant.
5.False.
Poor effort Claude, so I'll have to give you an F for failure. And please do not try again.
In all that AI babble you haven't yet addressed my reasoning. Are you going to show me errors in my reasoning, or just continue with the misrepresentations.
Start with the following, which follows directly from your definitions:
Possible worlds consist of stipulations.
The actual world does not consist of stipulations.
Therefore the actual world is not a possible world.
Please show me where that reasoning is erroneous. Or, is it the case that your definitions are erroneous?
However solid your reasoning may be, you just have to accept the usage of whatever possible world semanticist you're reviewing. They generally say that actuality is a brand of possibility, the intuition being that all events of the actual world are logically possible.
As I said to Ludwig V in the prior post, we can make the actual world one of the possible worlds, but this contradicts realism. Banno wants both, realism, and the actual world to be one of the possible worlds, and doesn't seem to understand the incompatibility. So he continues to define "actual world" in a way which contradicts how he defines "possible world", to support his realism, but also making it impossible that the actual world is one of the possible worlds.
Possible worlds consist of stipulations.
The actual world does not consist of stipulations.
Therefore the actual world is not a possible world.
I did this the other day, but it's easy enough to do it again. A possible world does not consist of stipulations, so much as a complete description of a state of affairs - which statements are true and which are false. In an informal sense it is convenient to think of possible worlds as stipulated, by setting out how, if at all, a possible world differs form the actual world.
The actual world can for logical purposes be set out in the same way, as statements setting out what is the case and what isn't. But of course the actual world doesn't consist of such statements, nor of stipulations.
So both premises are muddled, and so is the conclusion.
we can make the actual world one of the possible worlds
I will count that as progress. But your views on realism appear similarly confused. But by all means, set out the account clearly and I might address it.
Anne is working at her desk. While she is directly aware only of her immediate situation — her being seated in front of her computer, the music playing in the background, the sound of her husband's voice on the phone in the next room, and so on — she is quite certain that this situation is only part of a series of increasingly more inclusive, albeit less immediate, situations: the situation in her house as a whole, the one in her neighborhood, the city she lives in, the state, the North American continent, the Earth, the solar system, the galaxy, and so on. On the face of it, anyway, it seems quite reasonable to believe that this series has a limit, that is, that there is a maximally inclusive situation encompassing all others: things, as a whole or, more succinctly, the actual world.
Most of us also believe that things, as a whole, needn't have been just as they are. Rather, things might have been different in countless ways, both trivial and profound. History, from the very beginning, could have unfolded quite other than it did in fact: the matter constituting a distant star might never have organized well enough to give light; species that survived might just as well have died off; battles won might have been lost; children born might never have been conceived and children never conceived might otherwise have been born. In any case, no matter how things had gone they would still have been part of a single, maximally inclusive, all-encompassing situation, a single world. Intuitively, then, the actual world is only one among many possible worlds.
I did this the other day, but it's easy enough to do it again. A possible world does not consist of stipulations, so much as a complete description of a state of affairs - which statements are true and which are false. In an informal sense it is convenient to think of possible worlds as stipulated, by setting out how, if at all, a possible world differs form the actual world.
The actual world can for logical purposes be set out in the same way, as statements setting out what is the case and what isn't. But of course the actual world doesn't consist of such statements, nor of stipulations.
The following is based on your latest description of possible worlds and actual world. Can you point out what's wrong with my reasoning?
A possible world consists of statements setting out what is the case and what isn't.
The actual world consists of statements setting out what is the case and what isn't.
Every possible world is the actual world.
I will count that as progress. But your views on realism appear similarly confused. But by all means, set out the account clearly and I might address it.
Take a moment to read through the first two paragraphs of the SEP article on possible worlds:
Can you explain the point you are trying to make with that passage?
Anyway, the realist assumes that there is a world, and a way that the world is, which is independent from us, the human knowers.
So to reply to your SEP article, human beings think that "things might have been different in countless ways". These different ways that human beings think that things might have been different, are thought up by human beings, and so they are not independent from us. Therefore, "possible worlds" are worlds which are not independent from us, they are dependent on us. If, "the actual world" is said to be one of the possible worlds, then the actual world is not independent from us. Possible worlds are not independent.
That the actual world is a possible world is contrary to the realist assumption stated above.
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover
The actual world is an abstract object like any other possible world. A realist says the actual world contains true statements that are beyond our knowledge.
What is a true statement that's beyond our knowledge?
You've never accidentally walked into a 9th grade math class (one with an equation on the board) by mistake when you were in 5th grade? :wink:
An important distinction is, much like a child, we assume either we—or someone we know—knows all there is to know (that is to say, can simply be "exposed" to such knowledge, such as walking into a room where it's written and automatically understand it in full depth and detail as others do; this is merely the ego at work, the driving force and cause of all human suffering). There, of course, per nature of the topic is the idea of an "unknowable" knowledge. But that concept rests largely on the one who perceives it. If humans evolved, we now possess knowledge those before us were incapable of knowing (ergo, the "unknowable" knowledge). Yet, it became knowable. So, one might reasonably hold the belief that unless one can predict or perceive the future, there is a concept of "unknowable knowledge" that may change and become knowable.
Not unlike how—not that long ago—only a madman would consider braving the seas in search of nourishment or freedom. Yet now even the average person does so for recreation via the form of an affordable cruise. Something to think about. Perhaps, with any hope, to calm your turbulent mind. :smile:
An important distinction is, much like a child, we assume either we—or someone we know—knows all there is to know (that is to say, can simply be "exposed" to such knowledge, such as walking into a room where it's written and automatically understand it in full depth and detail as others do; this is merely the ego at work, the driving force and cause of all human suffering).
Speak for yourself. I don't see why anyone would ever assume that there is someone who knows all there is to know. Since knowledge varies from one person to another, it's very counterintuitive to think that there would be one person who knows everything. Since much knowledge is context dependent wouldn't this require someone who is everywhere, all the time?
Since knowledge is the property of knowers, are you proposing God to support the idea of knowledge which is unknowable to current human beings?
Speak for yourself. I don't see why anyone would ever assume that there is someone who knows all there is to know. Since knowledge varies from one person to another, it's very counterintuitive to think that there would be one person who knows everything. Since much knowledge is context dependent wouldn't this require someone who is everywhere, all the time?
All I was trying to say is, even a child can come across "true knowledge"—he or she simply might be "incapable of knowing (processing it?)" at the time (but might, given enough time, thus illustrating the concept of the unknowable becoming knowable, at least in one valid manner of thinking). Adults too. You're a mortal being, aren't you? Yes? That means time is relevant as far as how one reasonably perceives things in the world we live. Is that ice bridge solid enough to walk on? At that moment it is, so we might choose to. Do we instead go by some "set apart" (albeit deterministically equal) reality that since it will melt in, who knows, a century from now we consider it water and not able to traverse? No, it's either there or not there based on the circumstance of my present being. Let "traversable" represent "knowable."
Since knowledge is the property of knowers, are you proposing God to support the idea of knowledge which is unknowable to current human beings?
Perhaps information or the even the general "concept of understanding" (whether ever actually attained or achieved by anyone ie. the would-be "knower") is what my statement was focused on. I'm not proposing anything only reiterating the fact that since human beings (or intelligent life itself) regularly go from periods of light and dark respectively (in terms of knowledge and understanding) there are reasonable arguments to be made in support of the idea of some "knowledge" being "unknowable". If not due to a given circumstance (observable reality) that may or may not change within the given period of a person's life (applicable period of "knowing" or "being a knower").
As far as some "unknowable knowledge" that the human mind is somehow not capable of processing (knowing), say the full digits of Pi, for example (but hypothetically might in the future, since we do not know the future). Well, that's one example it would seem. Or is it? Seems easy to get caught up in semantics with this one.
If this is supposed to be an argument for p -> ?p (if p then possibly p), then it does not work.
Not my intention. I was simply adding my voice to the litany for folks here who are trying to metaphorically knock some sense into MU's head. AFAICT MU does not do modal logic, so I was trying a different approach.
It makes sense to realists. Apparently you aren't one.
I think I'm realist, that's why I have difficult making "possible worlds" (worlds which are not real), consistent with "the actual world" (a world which is real).
Care to explain what you're talking about? As far as I'm aware of, only human beings make statements, and only human beings make judgements of true and false. That is why "a true statement that's beyond our knowledge" makes no sense to me. It has nothing to do with whether I'm realist or not, it's a matter of how I understand the terms you are using. You appear to be using these terms in a way which I am not familiar with. Maybe you could define "statement" and "true"?
All I was trying to say is, even a child can come across "true knowledge"—he or she simply might be "incapable of knowing (processing it?)" at the time (but might, given enough time, thus illustrating the concept of the unknowable becoming knowable, at least in one valid manner of thinking).
Knowledge is the property of knowers. Is this knowledge which no human beings possess supposed to be possessed by God?
If so, how does that make the "actual world", as known by God, consistent with "possible worlds" which are statements made by human beings?
A possible world consists of statements setting out what is the case and what isn't.
The actual world consists of statements setting out what is the case and what isn't.
Every possible world is the actual world.
Again, a world does not consist of a set of statements.
But in addition, this argument is an obvious undistributed middle. B is A, C is A, therefore B is C.
What is a true statement that's beyond our knowledge?
As Fitch showed, antirealists know everything that is to be known. There are no true statements outside of what an antirealist knows. Unless they reject classical logic.
I think I'm realist, that's why I have difficult making "possible worlds" (worlds which are not real), consistent with "the actual world" (a world which is real).
As Fitch showed, antirealists know everything that is to be known. There are no true statements outside of what an antirealist knows. Unless they reject classical logic.
Again, a world does not consist of a set of statements.
What does a possible world consist ofthen?
You said:
" A possible world does not consist of stipulations, so much as a complete description of a state of affairs - which statements are true and which are false."
Doesn't that mean to you, that a possible world consists of a set of statements? No wonder I'm confused, you keep contradicting yourself.
Maybe @Metaphysician Undercover's point is to understand something, real or not, you have to have an abstraction of it. The philosopher's argument being the point of their craft: "to show the person they are a fly in a bottle, without realizing the nature of their containment, they can't ever escape from it." For example.
Abstractions or concepts are required to know what it is you're interacting with. If you have no understanding of the concept of, say, a solar eclipse, and have never seen one before, you might reasonably and rationally assume the world is ending or some cataclysmic celestial event is otherwise occurring if observed for the first time. It doesn't make a thing more real or less real, it simply reasonably (but not necessarily accurately) defines and describes something that you would otherwise either not be aware of or think to be something that it's not.
Reply to Banno
You have not addressed the issue. That is to define "the actual world" in a way which is consistent with "a possible world", and also realism. I explained it to frank here:
So to reply to your SEP article, human beings think that "things might have been different in countless ways". These different ways that human beings think that things might have been different, are thought up by human beings, and so they are not independent from us. Therefore, "possible worlds" are worlds which are not independent from us, they are dependent on us. If, "the actual world" is said to be one of the possible worlds, then the actual world is not independent from us. Possible worlds are not independent.
Care to explain what you're talking about? As far as I'm aware of, only human beings make statements, and only human beings make judgements of true and false. That is why "a true statement that's beyond our knowledge" makes no sense to me. It has nothing to do with whether I'm realist or not, it's a matter of how I understand the terms you are using. You appear to be using these terms in a way which I am not familiar with. Maybe you could define "statement" and "true"?
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover Your obsessed with definitions. I've explained what possible worlds are and how the actual wold is a possible world. If there is a problem set it out. The view I've set out it quite standard. If you see it as problematic, set out how.
I don't understand this. The possibility that it will rain tomorrow does not depend on whether we recognize it. Framing possibilities as possible worlds is something that we do. Compare the platypus, which came into existence independently of is and lives mostly independently of us. How we classify the platypus is up to us.
A realist says the actual world contains true statements that are beyond our knowledge.
The trouble is that we cannot know what they are. So we have to argue that what we already know is not self-contained but leads us to look for and sometimes to happen upon things that we did not know before. I have much more trouble with the idea that there are things we cannot know. I cannot know the exact value of pi, but that's a fact about pi, which I can know. It is not a deficiency of mine.
Seems to me that the notion of accessibility does just this. In a world in which p is false, not-p is indeed impossible. That is within the one world. In other worlds, not-p might be true.
The actual world is an abstract object like any other possible world. A realist says the actual world contains true statements that are beyond our knowledge.
If they are beyond our knowledge, they are not statements.
A possible world does not consist of stipulations, so much as a complete description of a state of affairs - which statements are true and which are false. In an informal sense it is convenient to think of possible worlds as stipulated, by setting out how, if at all, a possible world differs form the actual world.
The actual world can for logical purposes be set out in the same way, as statements setting out what is the case and what isn't. But of course the actual world doesn't consist of such statements, nor of stipulations.
The actual world doesn't consist of statements, although statements do exist in it. The actual world, as the Tractatus recognizes, consists of states of affairs which are what statements refer to, if they are true.
So, going back to the first sentence, it is true that one can define a possible world by describing it, i.e. making a number of statements about it. It is also true that one could describe the actual world in the same way. But this way of defining a world leads us to think of lining up all the possible worlds (including the actual world, of course) and then asking what the difference is. But there is no difference of the kind that we can see in the lists.
But the actual world is the world is the world in which you are carrying out the thought-experiment. To put it another way, although the actual world is exactly like the possible world, in that it can be defined by a series of statements, it is importantly different in that it is actual and the others are not. But this is a difference of status, which doesn't show up in the lists. Compare the difference between the concept of a horse and an actual horse; It is not something that could show up in the concept. Perhaps being actual is like existing - not a predicate.
Reply to Ludwig V Yes - that's pretty much correct. The actual world is the one we are in, and it might have been any of the possible worlds. There is no modal difference between the actual world and the other possible worlds... That'll confuse Meta no end.
Because the difference is not modal. It's metaphysical.
And Meta, as I've pointed out, has failed to see this distinction.
Because the difference is not modal. It's metaphysical.
I wouldn't argue about that. But I don't thoroughly understand either or metaphysical. So I prefer to say that it's a question of how you look at it - or represent it.
The philosophy behind actual versus possible is lengthy and complex. If you want to walk through two SEP articles on it we can examine the views of all the interested parties. There's even a tie-in to negative dialectics!!!
I've explained what possible worlds are and how the actual wold is a possible world. If there is a problem set it out. The view I've set out it quite standard. If you see it as problematic, set out how.
I did set it out. This will be the third time I post the very same paragraph. Please, could you read it and reply accordingly. This is it:
So to reply to your SEP article, human beings think that "things might have been different in countless ways". These different ways that human beings think that things might have been different, are thought up by human beings, and so they are not independent from us. Therefore, "possible worlds" are worlds which are not independent from us, they are dependent on us. If, "the actual world" is said to be one of the possible worlds, then the actual world is not independent from us. Possible worlds are not independent.
Of course we cannot know what they are because they cannot exist. The existence of statements is dependent on human beings. How could there be statements which we cannot know what they are, when a human being must have made the statement?
If the actual world was not a possible world, then it could not exist.
That's nonsense. The possibility for something, precedes in time the actual existence of that thing. Once it is actualized, it is not longer a possibility, but an actuality. Suppose president Trump is actually assassinated. At this time, Trump has been assassinated, is a true statement of the actual world. At this point it is not possible for him to be assassinated, because he already has been.. So it's nonsense to think that if, in the actual world, Trump has been assassinated, it must be possible that Trump could be assassinated, because it is actually impossible, as he has already been assassinated. The same must be true of every actuality, and "the actual world" in general. Once it is actual, it is false to claim that it is possible.
There is no modal difference between the actual world and the other possible worlds... That'll confuse Meta no end.
It doesn't confuse me, I fully understand this, and it is the base of my argument. If you understand this, then it is undeniable that realism is incompatible with modal logic. Obviously, realism requires a difference between possible worlds and the actual world.
ecause the difference is not modal. It's metaphysical.
And Meta, as I've pointed out, has failed to see this distinction.
As I've told you, to have inconsistency between your metaphysics and epistemology is to have contradictory philosophy. To say that in my epistemology "the actual world is the same as any other possible world", but in my metaphysics "the actual world is completely independent and different from possible worlds", is nothing but contradiction within your concept of "actual world".
The philosophy behind actual versus possible is lengthy and complex. If you want to walk through two SEP articles on it we can examine the views of all the interested parties. There's even a tie-in to negative dialectics!!!
The philosophy behind actual versus possible is lengthy and complex. If you want to walk through two SEP articles on it we can examine the views of all the interested parties. There's even a tie-in to negative dialectics!!!
— frank
Reply to Banno
Here's an example of the contradiction you fed to me in that link:
CHAT GPT:They [possible worlds] are semantic or metaphysical constructs used to interpret modal statements.
They exist (or are defined) independently of human imagination.
"Constructs" which are independent from human imagination. Who constructs these metaphysical constructs if not human beings?
CHATGPT:From the fact that humans think about alternative possibility-structures, it does not follow that those possibility-structures depend on human thought.
Duh, the possibility structures are the thought ("constructs"), produced by the minds that think them. Are you arguing Platonism now? 'From the fact that human beings think ideas, it doesn't follow that ideas are dependent on human thought''. What about the "construct" part boss?
Come on Banno, quit the bullshit and say something real.
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover Why should a semantic model commit us to the existence of the things quantified over? Your whole edifice still depends on an equivocation between what is and what is said. It's as if you were to chastise Tolkien because Hobbits are not real. nThe confusion is yours.
If the actual world was not a possible world, then it could not exist.
Something is very puzzling on what is being said here. It suggests colorful scene, as if I should go to a private room close by eyes and think about three possible worlds, then, upon opening them I realize that one of the three was the actual world around me and thus, I conclude, all in one fell swoop, one of the possible worlds I consider was the actual world and it exist too. Now I can say to myself, "If the actual world was not a possible world, then it could not exist."
It reminds me of what Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus in section 5.5303 "Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all.
It seems to me that the what is be said, that "If the actual world was not a possible world, then it could not exist." seems to fall in the latter camp, that it is to say nothing at all.
Why should a semantic model commit us to the existence of the things quantified over?
The semantic model does not commit us to the existence of its content. But if the actual world is affirmed to be a part of that semantic model, as you and others here continue to insist, then this is contrary to realism which assumes that the actual world is independent from any semantic model. Why is that difficult to understand? You can't have it both ways, assert that the actual world is a part of a semantic model, with no claims to existence, and also assert that there is a real independent, existing actual world.
Your whole edifice still depends on an equivocation between what is and what is said.
The point is, that when you claim that the actual world is one of the possible worlds, you deny that there is a distinction between what is said and what is. If you assert that there is another "actual world" which is independent from what is said (realism), as well as the "actual world" which is part of the semantic model, then you equivocate. The equivocation in my "edifice" is just a reflection of the equivocation in what you are telling me, which my edifice is built upon. You are telling me that there is a metaphysical "actual world" and an epistemic "actual world", and the use of these contradict each other.
The solution to this problem is to maintain the distinction between the actual world and the possible worlds, i.e. the actual world is not a possible world. But as soon as we accept the proposition "if it is actual, it is possible" we negate that distinction and we are left with either a denial of realism, or a contradictory equivocation.
The possibility for something, precedes in time the actual existence of that thing. Once it is actualized, it is not longer a possibility, but an actuality.
Someone in the next room flips a coin. We cannot see the result. Now we ask the question - is it possible that the coin is showing heads? The answer is of course yes. Then we walk into the next room and indeed the coin is showing heads.
So while it is not necessarily so (the coin could be tails), something can be both possible and also be real/actual at the same time.
So while it is not necessarily so (the coin could be tails), something can be both possible and also be real at the same time.
I am a little unclear on what you mean here. When you say “something can be possible and real at the same time” what are you referring to when you say “something” The real coin? So, a real coin that landed on heads is the same as a possible coin that may land on heads.
The possibility for something, precedes in time the actual existence of that thing. Once it is actualized, it is not longer a possibility, but an actuality.
MU is using a very loose definition of the word "something" here - I take it to mean a state of affairs (e.g., a coin displaying heads at a particular place and point in time). MU is stating that it is impossible for "something" to be a possibility as well as an actuality at the same time. I am simply pointing out what appears (at least to me eyes) to be a very obvious exception.
If you need further clarity as to what "something" refers to, you'll have to go to the source: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1028434
Now I can say to myself, "If the actual world was not a possible world, then it could not exist."
One of the ways of seeing this is more or less what you describe. One can think of possibility as a kind of ante-chamber to existence. So all sorts of possibilities (possible worlds) hang about in there, waiting to be promoted. It does capture, in a metaphorical way, that our actual world has had a previous quasi-
life.
It seems to me that the what is be said, that "If the actual world was not a possible world, then it could not exist." seems to fall in the latter camp, that it is to say nothing at all.
You could say that. It's not exactly analytic, but it is trying to capture (express/show) a conceptual relationship.
The possibility for something, precedes in time the actual existence of that thing. Once it is actualized, it is not longer a possibility, but an actuality.
I'll give you this - I cannot win the 2025 Kentucky Derby twice. But that's not because I won it, but because it has happened that the result - win or lose - is settled. But if whatever the result of the 2025 race, it remains possible for me to win the 2026 race. So the possibility of my winning the Kentucky Derby does not cease when I win it.
So while it is not necessarily so (the coin could be tails)
That's a nice example. But it needs a bit of caution. While I do not know what the result is, I can say "The coin could be tails", but if I say it while I'm looking at the result, I'm falling into the sceptical morass. After you know the result, you need to say "the coin could have been tails".
The existence of statements is dependent on human beings.
That's true. But the fact that the existence of the statement that Mount Everest is 29,000 ft high depends on human beings, does not show that the existence of Mount Everest depends on human beings at all. De re and de dicto.
The semantic model does not commit us to the existence of its content. But if the actual world is affirmed to be a part of that semantic model, as you and others here continue to insist, then this is contrary to realism which assumes that the actual world is independent from any semantic model.
You can't have it both ways, assert that the actual world is a part of a semantic model, with no claims to existence, and also assert that there is a real independent, existing actual world.
Because, as explained many times, it's not the semantic model that shows which possible world is actual.
But you cannot see this. That's about you, I suppose.
That's true. But the fact that the existence of the statement that Mount Everest is 29,000 ft high depends on human beings, does not show that the existence of Mount Everest depends on human beings at all. De re and de dicto.
Ok. I'll post chunks of the SEP articles and comment. The goal will be to sort out the different perspectives on possible worlds and the ontological status of possibilia.
Someone in the next room flips a coin. We cannot see the result. Now we ask the question - is it possible that the coin is showing heads? The answer is of course yes. Then we walk into the next room and indeed the coin is showing heads.
So while it is not necessarily so (the coin could be tails), something can be both possible and also be real/actual at the same time.
I went through this all, way back. When we know that the coin is showing heads, it is incorrect to saying it is possible it is heads. When we do not know that the coin is showing heads it s correct to saying that that it is possible the coin is showing heads. Your example refers to two different times, before walking into the room, and after, so your conclusion of "at the same time" is incorrect. Before walking into the room we say it is possible, and after, we say it is actually showing heads, and we can no longer say it is possible. There is no "at the same time" indicated.
I'll give you this - I cannot win the 2025 Kentucky Derby twice. But that's not because I won it, but because it has happened that the result - win or lose - is settled. But if whatever the result of the 2025 race, it remains possible for me to win the 2026 race. So the possibility of my winning the Kentucky Derby does not cease when I win it.
How's that relevant? You change from a specific possibility to a more general, so it is a different referent.
That's true. But the fact that the existence of the statement that Mount Everest is 29,000 ft high depends on human beings, does not show that the existence of Mount Everest depends on human beings at all.
Again, I don't see the relevance. What I was responding to was unknown true statements, not unknown things.
If we look at EricH's example of the coin, there is implied an unknown real thing, the coin before looking at it. But that is not a statement, it is simply something unknown.
Why does what I say to you indicate that we cannot talk about the actual world? How can you make such a conclusion from what I wrote? What I said, is that if we are realist, we cannot put "the actual" into a semantic model in which it is a possible world. That would contradict our realist principles. In no way does it imply that we cannot talk about the actual world. It only implies that we cannot talk about the actual world in that specific context, because that would contradict our realist principles.
Because, as explained many times, it's not the semantic model that shows which possible world is actual.
That doesn't matter. By the principle upon which the semantic model is produced, we cannot conclude that any of the possible worlds is the actual world without contradicting realist principles. If you take a set of possible worlds, and apply some realist principles to deduce "the actual world", then you must relinquish the claim that the others are possible. You are then not within the constraints of the semantic model, so the other worlds are no longer "possible". "Possible" is a word applied in a very specific way, within that model, and you have moved outside that model, so the application is not valid.
Look what you said already yesterday:
"There is no modal difference between the actual world and the other possible worlds... ".
That is the very issue with modal models, by what principles do we produce an actual world. When you apply some principles to designate "the actual world", you violate the modal model by assigning special status to one of the worlds, placing yourself outside the model, and no longer correct in referring those other worlds as "possible". We only have those "possible worlds" within that semantic model which denies any such special status to any world. Assigning special status violates the model.
If you take a set of possible worlds, and apply some realist principles to deduce "the actual world"...
Again, again, again, That's not what is being proposed. Any of the possible worlds could be the actual world - hence, "there is no modal difference between the actual world and the other possible worlds". Modal theory does not tell us which possible world is actual.
Your presumption that it does is exactly your confusing the modal and the metaphysical, your denial of p??p.
This is a pretty tedious conversation. You make the very same error, repeatedly. The actual world is one of the possible worlds. If you deny this, you must also deny reflexivity, which is to say you deny that we can talk about the actual world. You restrict yourself to quite simplistic and unusable modal systems.
All of which was set out formally, last week, and remains unaddressed.
How's that relevant? You change from a specific possibility to a more general, so it is a different referent.
So for some p, the possibility of p ends when p occurs and for other p it doesn't. Furthermore, the ending of the possibility of my winning the Kentucky Derby 2025 does not depend on whether I win or lose or even take part. It depends only the the race happening. The disappearance of this specific p depends only on the date, not on whether I win or not.
What I was responding to was unknown true statements, not unknown things.
Yes. You are right about that. I took the original claim in a generous senses, that would see it as equivalent "unknown truths" Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If we look at EricH's example of the coin, there is implied an unknown real thing, the coin before looking at it. But that is not a statement, it is simply something unknown.
So do you accept that there are some unknown things?
So for some p, the possibility of p ends when p occurs and for other p it doesn't. Furthermore, the ending of the possibility of my winning the Kentucky Derby 2025 does not depend on whether I win or lose or even take part. It depends only the the race happening. The disappearance of this specific p depends only on the date, not on whether I win or not.
Yep. This is formalised by accessibility relations. metaphysically, before the race is run, both the worlds in which you win and those in which you do not are accessible; any might become the actual world. After you win, only the worlds in which you win are accessible. Semantically, both before and after the race is won, we can access both the worlds in which you won and those in which you did not.
Conflating these is the exact error Meta repeatedly makes.
Any of the possible worlds could be the actual world - hence, "there is no modal difference between the actual world and the other possible worlds". Modal theory does not tell us which possible world is actual.
That's an incorrect interpretation, for obvious reasons. None of the possible worlds could be the actual world, as that would constitute an invalid difference, within the collection of possible worlds, one would be the actual world. Therefore it is clearly not the case that one of the possible worlds is the actual world because that would invalidate the model. Therefore we must interpret that none of the possible worlds is the actual world.
So for some p, the possibility of p ends when p occurs and for other p it doesn't.
Yes, this acknowledges the difference between a particular and a universal. So you use "p" in an equivocal way. "When p occurs" refers to a particular, while "other P" refers to a type. It is clear that "when p occurs" must refer to a particular, because if it was a type, an instance of p occurring would not preclude the occurrence of another instance of p. But, the occurrence of a particular precludes the possibility of that same particular occurring again. So, we must clear up the equivocation in that statement, where "p" refers to a particular, and also to a type.
So do you accept that there are some unknown things?
I believe there is a lot which is unknown. Strictly speaking it would not be correct to call the unknown "things", because that implies some sort of knowledge of the unknown, knowledge that the unknown consists of things. In other words, saying that there is "unknown things" wrongly projects knowledge onto the unknown. This is similar to, but more subtle, than saying that there is unknown statements. "Unknown statements" is obviously a problem, even to those without metaphysical education. But "unknown things" requires metaphysical understanding to recognize as fundamentally incorrect.
None of the possible worlds could be the actual world, as that would constitute an invalid difference, within the collection of possible worlds, one would be the actual world.
Your example refers to two different times, before walking into the room, and after, so your conclusion of "at the same time" is incorrect. Before walking into the room we say it is possible, and after, we say it is actually showing heads, and we can no longer say it is possible. There is no "at the same time" indicated.
The person who flipped the coin knew it. At the same time.
Within the modal model, we now have two possibilities, "one of the possible worlds is the actual world", or "the actual world is not possible". Since it violates the rules of the model for one of the possible worlds to be the actual world, then within the modal model, the actual world is not possible. Therefore model logic is not consistent with realism.
I'm glad you are at least starting to consider this as a possibility.
That's why ontologies like model-dependent realism are not true realism. Here's an analogy which might help you to understand. Under relativity theory, any rest frame is a valid rest frame, and each frame is made to be consistent with each other, as a valid "possibility". Each is a "possible" frame of reference, but none provides a true rest frame, which would be the "actual rest frame". In order that all the frames of reference may equally be valid rest frames, it is imperative that none is the "actual rest frame". Likewise, in modal logic it is imperative that none of the possible worlds is the "actual world", or the possibility of the others is invalidated.
You are changing to a different definition of "know", a subjective one, claiming that one person knows what others do not. We have been discussing this issue under the premise that knowing is a property of "we", not the property of one individual subject. I cautioned against equivocating between these two senses of "know" a few days back, because the conditions are completely different.
So in your example, there is a number of people, and discrepancy between what one person thinks that they know, and what others think that they know. Therefore it does not qualify as "we know", and is not a valid example. Anytime that it is proposed that there is inconsistency between what one knows and another knows, or between what some know and others do not, it is not a case of "we know", and not a valid example for the purpose of this discussion.
his is formalised by accessibility relations. metaphysically, before the race is run, both the worlds in which you win and those in which you do not are accessible; any might become the actual world. After you win, only the worlds in which you win are accessible. Semantically, both before and after the race is won, we can access both the worlds in which you won and those in which you did not.
This is hard to decipher into my idiolect. Before the race I can access two possible worlds, the one in which I win and the one in which I don't. After the race, only the world in which I win is accessible. Going by what you said to Meta "One of the possible worlds is the actual world", that world - in which I win - has become the actual world.
I don't understand the bit about semantics, and how they enable me to do something I can't do metaphysically. I think you may be referring to the point that after the race, "I might have lost" is true. ?
So, we must clear up the equivocation in that statement, where "p" refers to a particular, and also to a type.
Yes. No more "a possibility" or "an actuality". We'll need to specify whether we are speaking about a particular or a general/universal possibility/actuality.
Strictly speaking it would not be correct to call the unknown "things", because that implies some sort of knowledge of the unknown, knowledge that the unknown consists of things.
I take your point. Perhaps we should restrict ourselves to talking of "the unknown". It might clearer to change tack and only talk about the possibilities of discovering new knowledge.
If we look at EricH's example of the coin, there is implied an unknown real thing, the coin before looking at it. But that is not a statement, it is simply something unknown.
That's an example of using thing in a generously vague way. It is useful because it avoids annoying debates about what is a thing and what is not, etc;
So while it is not necessarily so (the coin could be tails), something can be both possible and also be real/actual at the same time.
I'm afraid this doesn't address the problem, but it is a nice try. The possibility and the actuality exist in different contexts. From outside the room, it is possible and from inside the room, not. What's at stake is the P implies possibly P. That means within a single context.
"There is no modal difference between the actual world and the other possible worlds... "
Therefore if we assign to one of the possible worlds the status of "actual world" by realist principles, (which would constitute a modal difference), we would be attributing a difference to this world which violates the modal system which dictates "no modal difference".
No wonder I'm so confused, you keep making contradictory assertions without backing any of them up. Without the proper support for these assertions, I can 't tell which of the contrary claims you actually believe. Therefore I can only conclude that you just don't understand what you're talking about.
I take your point. Perhaps we should restrict ourselves to talking of "the unknown". It might clearer to change tack and only talk about the possibilities of discovering new knowledge.
This is good. Now we have the basic separation between Platonic realism and non-Platonic types of realism to navigate. Notice you mention "the possibilities of discovering new knowledge". That knowledge is something independent from human beings, which is "discovered" by us implies Platonism. This form of realism is conducive to the idea that there is unknown true propositions, which exist independently from us, which we "discover".
The alternative, non-Platonic realism would say that we create, produce or "construct" knowledge while something other than knowledge is what is independent from us. There are also forms of realism which blur the boundary between these two by invoking concepts like "information".
That's an example of using thing in a generously vague way. It is useful because it avoids annoying debates about what is a thing and what is not, etc;
It might avoid such debates, but if we want to understand the metaphysics, and the possibility of the reality of an independent world, we need to engage these difficult subjects. Mundane life, and common language use in general, for communication, has no need for metaphysics. So habits of language usage are developed in ways of ambiguity, the ambiguity providing for a difference in underlying world-views. The ambiguity is effective in allowing me to interpret by my world-view, and you to interpret by your world-view, such that we can effectively communicate and move along in our day to day projects without the need for consistency between our ontological foundations.
So we can avoid "annoying debates about what is a thing and what is not", and move along with our mundane communications without the need to address metaphysical differences. If however, metaphysics is the subject of discussion, then avoiding these annoying discussions is a mistake conducive to misunderstanding.
Therefore if we assign to one of the possible worlds the status of "actual world" by realist principles, (which would constitute a modal difference), we would be attributing a difference to this world which violates the modal system which dictates "no modal difference".
I don't know what realist principles are. The thing is, there is a system of modal logic which, I understand works reasonably well by the relevant standards. I've no desire to interfere in something I don't understand. So, if the logic says there is no modal difference, I shall treat that in the same way that I treat the logical operators of implication, conjunction and disjunction - as technical concepts which do not need to mirror ordinary language. That mutual tolerance seems to work quite well.
However, it seems that it is not a question of two worlds, with a difference between them, but a difference of the same world. If the difference involved here is not a difference in the description of the possible world, it must be a difference in status of that same world. (Compare Kant's argument that existence is not a predicate, because to assert that X exists is not to identify that there is any difference between X as conceived (or even possible) and X as existent (or actual).
The alternative, non-Platonic realism would say that we create, produce or "construct" knowledge while something other than knowledge is what is independent from us. There are also forms of realism which blur the boundary between these two by invoking concepts like "information".
I don't think that any of the critical terms in this debate are at all well defined and there's a wide range of choice available. It can make it very difficult to know just what label applies to oneself.
So we can avoid "annoying debates about what is a thing and what is not", and move along with our mundane communications without the need to address metaphysical differences. If however, metaphysics is the subject of discussion, then avoiding these annoying discussions is a mistake conducive to misunderstanding.
H'm. Maybe. I agree, however, that more would need to be said about what "discover" means. But I like the implication that discovery presupposes an independent pre-existing something. It's not difficult with the empirical, but the a priori needs careful handling.
However, it seems that it is not a question of two worlds, with a difference between them, but a difference in the same world. If the difference involved here is not a difference in the description of the possible world, it must be a difference in status of that same world.
Ok, let's consider this perspective then. The representations of modal logic, are different possible descriptions of an independent actual world. It should be clear to you that none of the possibilities is the actual, independent world. Therefore it should also be clear to you that none of the possibilities is the actual. To think such would be a case of what is commonly called confusing the map with the terrain. We can establish some principles for judgement, criteria of truth or whatever, but that produces a judgement of truth, it does not make one of the possibilities into the actual.
H'm. Maybe. I agree, however, that more would need to be said about what "discover" means. But I like the implication that discovery presupposes an independent pre-existing something. It's not difficult with the empirical, but the a priori needs careful handling.
Well, the issue is what exactly is the nature of what is termed here as "an independent pre-existing something". If we talk about discovering knowledge, then we imply that the independent something which we discover is knowledge. If we talk about discovering true statements, then it is implied that the independent something discovered is statements. If we talk about discovering information than it is implied that the independent something is information.
Conventionally, we would assign "matter" to the independent something. But Aristotle demonstrated that matter on its own is completely unintelligible, therefore unknowable. It is actually the form which the matter is in which is intelligible. But this poses the question of what exactly is "form", and how does it make something unknowable, matter, into something knowable.
if we assign to one of the possible worlds the status of "actual world" by realist principles...
We are stipulating that that one world is the actual world, not deducing it. Any world can counted as w?. It's built in, not contradictory. There is no modal difference between the actual world and other possible worlds. The difference is metaphysical, not modal.
We are stipulating that that one world is the actual world, not deducing it. Any world can counted as w?. It's built in, not contradictory. There is no modal difference between the actual world and other possible worlds. The difference is metaphysical, not modal.
So within the modal model there is no actual world, just possible worlds. When you stipulate that one of the worlds is the actual world, that is metaphysics. But when you stipulate an actual world, then the others are no longer (metaphysically) possible.
Within the modal model there is not consistency between actual and possible, because all are possible and there is no actual. And within the metaphysics there is not consistency between the actual and the possible. You only claim that the actual is possible by incorrectly conflating the modal with the metaphysical.
I ignore you because you make so very many errors, that take time to explain; but also because even when the problem is explained, you habitually double down rather than correct yourself. Witness your views on acceleration and on 0.9999... and now on this, all display the same pattern.
What happened here is that you attempted a critique of modal logic without first getting an idea of how it works. When I attempt to set out how possible world semantics clarifies and explains the issues here, you jump to further unfounded criticisms rather than try to understand. that's the "doubling down".
So, going back, p??p is valid in S4 and S5, the systems almost universally used for metaphysical speculation. These systems are reflexive, meaning that they permit us to talk about the possible world we are in. Denying p??p, as you do, blocks that reflexivity.
Going back a bit further, if we allow p??p and so Kp??Kp, then Fitch shows that antirealism directly implies that there are no true statements that is not known.
The out for antirealism is to set aside classical logic.
And going right back to the OP and title, for an antirealist who accepts classical logic, there isn't anything to be known beyond what is known; which some might understand as that there isn’t anything beyond our reality. However that view is fraught with metaphysical and logical problems.
So, going back, p??p is valid in S4 and S5, the systems almost universally used for metaphysical speculation. These systems are reflexive, meaning that they permit us to talk about the possible world we are in. Denying p??p, as you do, blocks that reflexivity.
As I said, your interpretation is incorrect. The world we are in is not a possible world.
As I said, your interpretation is incorrect. The world we are in is not a possible world.
It's not my interpretation. It's the consequence of possible world semantics and the associated modal logic.
That's just you asserting, again, that ~(p??p), which is invalid in any system that is reflexive.
Again, if it is true, you cannot talk about the actual world within possible world semantics - which is just to put yourself at odds with the accepted logic.
Which I suppose, in your eccentricity, is what you are indeed doing.
One thing you have not demonstrated is that ~(p??p); you have simply assumed this. Indeed it's not the sort of thing that one can demonstrate.
In an attempt to be as charitable as possible, I fed your criteria into an AI and asked it to put together a coherent account. Here's what I got.
Logic
A non-reflexive modal logic (NRML)
Actual world not in the modal domain
No p ? ?p
No Fitch paradox
Modality applies only to counterfactual models, not reality
Metaphysics
Actual world is primitive, not one among possibilities
Possible worlds are conceptual constructions
No metaphysical modality, only hypothetical modelling
No essentialism or counterfactual identity
Semantics
Two-tier structure: reality vs. fictional modal space
What you have done is to deny that there can be systematic modal reasoning, without offering any clear alternative.
One thing you have not demonstrated is that ~(p??p); you have simply assumed this. Indeed it's not the sort of thing that one can demonstrate.
I believe I've demonstrated this to you about four or more times already, in different ways. The "actual world" which you represent with your formulation here, is not at all consistent with (it is contradictory with) what "actual world" means for realism.
Here, I'll demonstrate it once more for you, in a slightly different way, even though I have no doubt that you will just continue to "double down" with your contradictory nonsense.
1.Metaphysical realism holds that there is some sort of real independent world.
2.We may produce statements or propositions which we judge, in our belief to be true, i.e. we judge them to be a true representation of the supposed real independent world.
3. If we take this representation, and make it a part of a structure of modal logic consisting of "possible worlds", and designate it "the actual world" amongst those possibilities, this so-called "actual world" is not consistent with the "actual world" of realism. It is as I've demonstrated, contradictory, because it is a human dependent representation rather than something independent.
Do you see the point? In realism, "the actual world" refers to something independent of human beings. In your formulation of modal logic, "the actual world" refers to a representation, which is produced by, judged to be true by, and therefore dependent on human beings.
Can you apprehend the contradiction in "actual world" here? In the case of realism "actual world" refers to something independent. In the case of your formulation of modal logic, "actual world" refers to a human construct, something dependent. Therefore the two meanings of "actual world" are contradictory.
The difference is very obvious if you consider that the human designated "actual world" which is a part of the modal construct might be mistaken. Therefore it is definitely not the same as the "actual world of realism. And as I've demonstrated countless times, in countless ways, the two are contradictory.
In an attempt to be as charitable as possible, I fed your criteria into an AI and asked it to put together a coherent account. Here's what I got.
Logic
A non-reflexive modal logic (NRML)
Actual world not in the modal domain
No p ? ?p
No Fitch paradox
Modality applies only to counterfactual models, not reality
Metaphysics
Actual world is primitive, not one among possibilities
Possible worlds are conceptual constructions
No metaphysical modality, only hypothetical modelling
No essentialism or counterfactual identity
Semantics
Two-tier structure: reality vs. fictional modal space
Sorry, I don't recognize this as my criteria. Either you, in your bad interpretation, the AI, or both, have greatly distorted things, creating the worst straw man I think I've ever seen.
What you have done is to deny that there can be systematic modal reasoning, without offering any clear alternative.
How do you ever make that conclusion? I have nothing against modal reasoning, it's very useful. What I say is that it is not consistent with realism. Many useful principles, such as my example of relativity theory yesterday, are not consistent with realism. That's just the way things are. And it does direct skepticism toward realism.
So, going back, p??p is valid in S4 and S5, the systems almost universally used for metaphysical speculation. These systems are reflexive, meaning that they permit us to talk about the possible world we are in. Denying p??p, as you do, blocks that reflexivity.
Following @frank's thread about the SEP article on possible worlds, we can understand the problem as the difference between what is extensional and what is intensional. In realism, "p" in your example has an extensional referent. In modal logic it has an intensional referent. The extensional referent is a necessary condition of realism therefore modal logic contradicts realism. That the referent of "p" is in fact intensional in modal logic, and not extensional, as required for consistency with realism, is indicated by the following passage:
SEP:Supplement to Possible Worlds
The Extensionality of Possible World Semantics
As noted, possible world semantics does not make modal logic itself extensional; the substitutivity principles all remain invalid for modal languages under (basic) possible worlds semantics. Rather, it is the semantic theory itself — more exactly, the logic in which the theory is expressed — that is extensional.
In other words, the supposed extensionality of modal logic is an illusion created by representing modal logic itself as an extensional thing. This is the same problem I covered in this forum with the proposed extensionality of mathematics. The extensionality of mathematics is an illusion created by treating numbers and other so-called "mathematical objects" as extensional referents, when they are really intensional. That is the basis of Platonic realism, which produces all sorts of problems such as eternal object etc..
3. If we take this representation, and make it a part of a structure of modal logic consisting of "possible worlds", and designate it "the actual world" amongst those possibilities, this so-called "actual world" is not consistent with the "actual world" of realism. It is as I've demonstrated, contradictory, because it is a human dependent representation rather than something independent.
All you have done here is restate your thesis.
Tedious in the extreme.
That a model of gravity talks about the Earth does not entail that the Earth is human-dependent. That a modal modal talks about the actual world does not entail that the actual world is human dependent.
You continue to confused the metaphysical actual world with our representation of it inside a modal model. That confusion is the whole mistake, and repeating it does not amount to an argument.
The extensionality of mathematics is an illusion created by treating numbers and other so-called "mathematical objects" as extensional referents, when they are really intensional.
What to make of this nonsense. Numbers are extensional, but you do not appear to have a firm grasp of what extensionality is. Extensionality in logic and in mathematics is simply defined in terms of substitution. Intensional contexts are those in which substitution fails. Extensionality is substitutivity of co-referential terms without changing truth. Numbers are extensional by this definition. Modal statements are intensional because substitution can change truth. Possible world semantics provdes an extensional model of this this intentionality. You conflates the two, which is the source of your confusion.
Yes, since you are having such trouble understanding, and continue to double down on your contradictory nonsense, I have to keep thinking of different ways to tell you the same thing.
That a model of gravity talks about the Earth does not entail that the Earth is human-dependent. That a modal modal talks about the actual world does not entail that the actual world is human dependent.
You continue to confused the metaphysical actual world with our representation of it inside a modal model. That confusion is the whole mistake, and repeating it does not amount to an argument.
How are these two statements consistent for you. In the first you speak about an object called "the Earth". Then, you talk about something "inside a modal model". Obviously, the thing inside the modal model is not the thing we talk about as "the earth" This is your mistake, your confusion, not mine. I am trying to relieve you of this mistaken attitude. You have "the actual world" within a modal model, and you talk about it as if it is a real independent thing.
I'm extremely surprised that a seemingly intelligent person like yourself, really cannot see the difference here. This is so hard for me to grasp, that it inclines me to believe that you are intentionally rejecting the reality, as a form of denial, because the reality of the situation is contrary to what you already believe.
So, here is a simple explanation. I assume that you understand the map/territory analogy. When someone "talks about the Earth", there is an aspect of the territory which is being talked about, and it's named "the Earth". When a modal model talks about the actual world, what "actual world" refers to is a description which is known as a possible world. You tell me that you recognize this distinction, so please adhere to it.
That description of the actual world is the map, not the territory. This is what is referred to within the modal model, as "the actual world" a description. That specific description is known as the actual world. And, it cannot be anything more than a description, because all the other possible worlds are descriptions. It you assume that "actual world" here refers to something other than a description, an independent object, then you produce inconsistency within the modal logic, because all the other possible worlds are descriptions, and you'd be claiming that this refers to something other than a description.
One way of alleviating this problem is to assume that the maps themselves (the descriptions), are actually a part of the territory. This is known as Platonism, and it is the route that set theory takes. The descriptive ideas are real objects in the world. This provides extensionality to mathematics. That's also the route that possible worlds semantics takes, the possible worlds (descriptive ideas) are real objects, and this provide extensionality.
However, the possible worlds semantics is much more problematic than the set theory semantics of mathematical objects. This is because we now have two very distinct things which are called "the actual world". One is the real physical reality (the territory), and the other is the descriptive idea (the map), which is supposed to be "the actual world" as one of the possible worlds. Obviously we need to distinguish between these two senses of "actual world", to avoid equivocation, and the contradiction which I have demonstrated is the inevitable consequence. Therefore one or the other cannot be called 'the actual world. Some ontologies like model-dependent realism (which I would say are unacceptable) deny a real world beyond the descriptive "actual world". My approach is to deny that the descriptive so-called "actual world" of modal logic ought to be called by that name.
What to make of this nonsense. Numbers are extensional, but you do not appear to have a firm grasp of what extensionality is. Extensionality in logic and in mathematics is simply defined in terms of substitution. Intensional contexts are those in which substitution fails. Extensionality is substitutivity of co-referential terms without changing truth. Numbers are extensional by this definition. Modal statements are intensional because substitution can change truth. Possible world semantics provdes an extensional model of this this intentionality. You conflates the two, which is the source of your confusion.
I have much experience discussing extensionality with mathematicians in this forum. It forms the basis of the equality relation, what mathematicians incorrectly (contrary to the law of identity) know as identity. This is how they know mathematical objects as "objects", they give them identity. But this is contrary to the law of identity which was designed to distinguish between so-called "Platonic objects", and physical things.
You on the other hand demonstrate here, a very inadequate understanding. Here is what the SEP article of Possible Worlds says:
SEP:The extension of a denoting expression, or term, such as a name or a definite description is its referent, the thing that it refers to; the extension of a predicate is the set of things it applies to; and the extension of a sentence is its truth value. By contrast, the intension of an expression is something rather less definite — its sense, or meaning, the semantical aspect of the expression that determines its extension.
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover Again, Meta, what I have been espousing here is not "mine" in the way that what you have been saying belongs so specifically to you. The account I have been using is standard, accepted modal logic; and now, because of your extended eccentricities, standard accepted mathematics.
Take the Earth (real world) as the territory and the “Actual world” in a modal model as map (description).
You continue to conflate the two. You treats the representational construct inside modal logic (the “actual world” symbol in a Kripke frame) as if it is the metaphysical actual world. The model’s “actual world” is a description; it is not the metaphysical actual world.
I've been pointing this put for pages. Quite literally.
Numbers are extensional objects - you can substitute them in equations, which is the very definition of extensionality. Modal logic uses an intensional syntax, modelling it extensionally. If you continue with the other discussion, instead of seeking to pervert it, you might actually see how this happens.
Take the Earth (real world) as the territory and the “Actual world” in a modal model as map (description).
You continue to conflate the two.
Are you kidding? I am the one who has repeatedly demonstrated how you equivocate between "the actual world" of realism (real and independent), and "the actual world" of modal logic.
If you are now ready to accept this difference, then you might be able to understand what I've been saying. Let's assume that the real independent world of realism is called "the actual world" and the one in modal logic is called "a representation of the real world".
Do you now agree that it would be contradictory to say that the actual world is a possible world? If so, then it may be the case that we've resolved our differences.
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover Your "resolved difference" is based on an equivocation. There is no logical contradiction in saying that the actual world is a possible world inside the model, while also treating the metaphysical actual world as mind-independent.
Your "resolved difference" is based on an equivocation. There is no logical contradiction in saying that the actual world is a possible world inside the model, while also treating the metaphysical actual world as mind-independent.
Yes, my proposal to resolve the difference is based on rectifying your equivocation. Giving the same term "the actual world" two distinct meanings within an argument, as you have done throughout this discussion, is equivocation.
In the quote above, you insist that there is "no logical contradiction" in this equivocation. And, generally equivocation, though it is a recognized fallacy, does not necessarily result in contradiction. However, in this case it does produce contradiction, like I've shown. In your usage "the actual world" refers to something independent (realism), and also something dependent (modal model). Therefore this equivocation is a very significant fallacy.
We are stipulating that that one world is the actual world, not deducing it. Any world can counted as w?. It's built in, not contradictory. There is no modal difference between the actual world and other possible worlds.
So, since you appear to recognize the equivocal nature here in the use of "actual world", I am proposing that we continue the discussion on better terms. Can we call the real independent world "the actual world", and the one in modal logic we will call "a representation of the actual world"? The difference being that when we talk about "the actual world" a real independent thing is referenced, but in modal logic, a representation is referenced. Therefore we need to make this difference clear.
Under these terms we can agree that the actual world is not a possible world. However, a representation of the actual world, in modal logic, can be a possible world. Do you agree?
If so, then we can go back and analyze your proposal from Fitch. Notice that if "kp" indicates "we know p", it means that we have a representation of p which we know, in this modal model. We know the representation itself. Since it could be the case that the representation, even though we know the representation as a representation, may be a wrong representation, what "kp" really means relative to the actual world, is that it is possible that we know what is represented by p. Knowing the representation does not necessitate knowing the thing represented. Therefore, relative to the actual world, "kp", and "?Kp" really mean the same thing, they both mean that it is possible that we know what p represents. Do you see this?
To facilitate understanding, consider the difference between the actual world and the representation of the actual world. The representation may be wrong, even though it has been judged to be correct. Therefore relative to the actual world, the representation, which is employed in modal logic, is really just a possibly correct representation. So it has no intrinsic difference from all the other possible worlds, It has just been assigned a special status. That is the same with "kp". The p signified has no intrinsic ontological difference from any other p mentioned by "?Kp", it has just been assigned a special status.
I went through this all, way back. When we know that the coin is showing heads, it is incorrect to saying it is possible it is heads. When we do not know that the coin is showing heads it s correct to saying that that it is possible the coin is showing heads. Your example refers to two different times, before walking into the room, and after, so your conclusion of "at the same time" is incorrect. Before walking into the room we say it is possible, and after, we say it is actually showing heads, and we can no longer say it is possible. There is no "at the same time" indicated.
I think I see what you're saying, but let me echo it back to you using a slightly revised scenario.
You (MU) see me (EricH) on the street staring intently at my cell phone. The following dialogue ensures:
MU: "HI EricH! What's going on?"
EricH: "Hey MU. This is really important. I just bet my life savings on the lottery. I just know that my numbers are going to come in. See - I picked 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. That's going to be the winning numbers!"
MU: "Jeez EricH, that's crazy. You know the odds are way against you."
EricH: "Yeah, MU - but it's possible, yes?"
MU: "Well yes it's possible, but you're taking a terrible risk here"
EricH: "Wait a minute, here come the numbers. One, two, three, four, five. . . . come on six . . . SIX! Yes! See MU - it's possible!"
MU: "No EricH. It is not possible"
EricH: " WTF MU? You just said 2 seconds ago that it was possible."
MU: "Yes, but now that it's actual, it's no longer possible. That would be a logical contradiction."
EricH: "Huh? That's crazy. If it ain't possible then it couldn't have happened. "
At this point MU starts into a long detailed explanation of the distinction between possibility and actuality. Meanwhile EricH edges slowly away . . .
EricH: "Hey MU, that's, umm, really interesting - maybe another time. I have to go see my financial advisor."
- - - - - - - -
So here's my take on this. Philosophy can be useful for digging below the metaphorical surface of our everyday speech & thoughts and can help us avoid logic errors and to think & talk more precisely. I've learned a lot from TPF. But when a philosophical statement contradicts the plain meaning of our everyday speech, there has to be a really good reason. And while I think I understand what you're saying, I just don't buy into it.
MU - I've said it before - it's clear that you're intelligent & highly knowledgeable, but speaking as a plain language person this strikes me as very obscure & eccentric. Just my 2 cents.
I'm afraid this doesn't address the problem, but it is a nice try. The possibility and the actuality exist in different contexts. From outside the room, it is possible and from inside the room, not. What's at stake is the P implies possibly P. That means within a single context.
Yeah, I see that. If I had enough time I could likely get up to speed on this modal stuff, but I'll leave that up to you and Banno et al. :smile:
In modal logic, “the actual world” is a designated element of a model, usually called w?. It is not the metaphysical world, not the planet, not the territory.
A Kripke frame is a representational device, and every world inside it is a representational device.
Even w? is just another node in the model.
Calling one of those nodes “the actual world” introduces no metaphysics. It is merely a stipulation in the model: "let this node represent the actual world".
Hence, there is no contradiction in saying "The metaphysical actual world is mind-independent" and "A model contains a representational node we can call "the actual world".
Meta is arguing:
Banno uses “actual world” for both the mind-independent world and the representational node w?
Therefore Banno is equivocating.
Therefore modal logic contradicts realism.
But this rests on a category mistake. Two homonymous terms do not produce a fallacy unless they appear within the same argument, and they are treated as though they refer to the same thing.
Meta treats representational dependence as ontological dependence. His argument is that the map is human-dependent, therefore the territory is human-dependent.
Meta claims it is contradictory to say the actual world is a possible world, but in modal semantics a “possible world” is just a node in a model, and the “actual world” is one node among others.
Keep in mind that the equation he rejects, p??p, is valid in both S4 and S5. In rejecting it he rejects the two most useful systems of modal logic. Meta’s rejection of the principle amounts to rejecting reflexivity, which means rejecting T, and thereby rejecting S4 and S5, which means rejecting every ordinary epistemic, doxastic, and metaphysical modal logic used in philosophy.
So here's my take on this. Philosophy can be useful for digging below the metaphorical surface of our everyday speech & thoughts and can help us avoid logic errors and to think & talk more precisely. I've learned a lot from TPF. But when a philosophical statement contradicts the plain meaning of our everyday speech, there has to be a really good reason. And while I think I understand what you're saying, I just don't buy into it.
When good philosophy is contrary to everyday speech, there is a really good reason for that. It indicates a fundamental problem with everyday speech. You can say, "I don't buy into it", and decide to stick with the everyday speech, but that only indicates that you're not a good philosopher.
n modal logic, “the actual world” is a designated element of a model, usually called w?. It is not the metaphysical world, not the planet, not the territory.
Are you saying then, that you'd prefer to use "the actual world" to refer to that aspect of the modal model in this discussion? Then what should we call the place where we live. In this discussion, we cannot say "we are in the actual world" then, because that would be equivocation, unless you are trying to say that we really live within a modal model.
Notice, the topic of the thread. It's very important to this topic that we do not conflate the two.
Hence, there is no contradiction in saying "The metaphysical actual world is mind-independent" and "A model contains a representational node we can call "the actual world".
It's not sufficient to qualify "actual world" with "metaphysical", because for the purposes of rigorous logic, "actual world" must always refer to the same thing. If we call the representation "the actual world", and then we qualify this with "metaphysical", it implies that we are using the same representation called "the actual world", and using this for metaphysical purposes. But this is not the case, metaphysics deals with something distinct which is assumed to be independent of the representation.
Meta is arguing:
Banno uses “actual world” for both the mind-independent world and the representational node w?
Therefore Banno is equivocating.
Therefore modal logic contradicts realism.
But this rests on a category mistake. Two homonymous terms do not produce a fallacy unless they appear within the same argument, and they are treated as though they refer to the same thing.
Clearly, your argument in this thread constitutes "the same argument", and so we have a fallacy.
The question of whether modal logic contradicts realism, I readily admit, is much more complicated. Used properly it does not, because it is a principle of epistemology, and it need not, and ought not, be applied to metaphysics at all. But when it is applied to metaphysics, as you have done in this thread, contradiction with realism is inevitable. So we can keep modal logic right out of metaphysics, without a problem, or we can apply it to produce a metaphysics which will not be consistent with the type of realism we are discussing. It may be consistent with types of realism which you and I would not consider to be true realism (Platonic realism, and my example of model-dependent realism).
Meta treats representational dependence as ontological dependence. His argument is that the map is human-dependent, therefore the territory is human-dependent.
The problem is that in possible worlds semantics, the map is the territory. That's how they get extensionality. It's just like extensionality in mathematics, the sets, numbers, etc., are the objects referred to. In possible worlds semantics, the possible worlds are the things referred to (the territory) by the modal logic. Otherwise there is no territory, because the possibilities may be fictional, so there would only be intensionality, meaning, without any actual territory being referred to.
Meta claims it is contradictory to say the actual world is a possible world, but in modal semantics a “possible world” is just a node in a model, and the “actual world” is one node among others.
A "node", is a thing referred to. The possible world is the territory. It must be, to allow extensionality for something fictional. Without this there is only intensionality because there is no things referred to, only meaning, for any proposed possibility.
When good philosophy is contrary to everyday speech, there is a really good reason for that.
H'm. How to we decide which contradictions are good philosophy and which are not? In other words, there may be a reason for it, but it does not follow that it is a good reason. The point about ordinary speech is that it is inescapable, at least as a starting-point. Specialised dialects presuppose it and develop out of it. That's because ordinary life is inescapable.
There is no logical contradiction in saying that the actual world is a possible world inside the model, while also treating the metaphysical actual world as mind-independent.
It all seems perfectly clear. I'm thinking of each description that defines a possible world as contained in a book, so that I can line up all the possible worlds on a shelf; I might call it an encyclopaedia. One of those volumes is identified as the actual world; the possibility of being actual is contained in every description, but the identification of a specific volume as actual cannot based on any criterion within the books and from that point of view is arbitrary, Does this make sense?
I had the impression that identification as actual is not based on, and does not cause, any change in the description contained in the book. That is, it is a change in the status of that world, not a change in the world. The actual and possible worlds are not two worlds, but the same world with a new status, in a context that is independent of the books. The other worlds have the status of being possible, which I understand as something like the status of a work of fiction.
The discussion between you and @Metaphysician Undercover seems to me to centre on the question what each of these worlds consist in. I don't see this as a killer problem, because there is no determinate answer to the question what a work of fiction consists in.
There is a different issue about what world my project (and Kripke's) takes place in. Clearly, it must be a God's Eye view. But are they to be contained in the description of each world? If they are, that would undermine the idea that the actual world is exactly the same as all the other possible worlds. But the idea of the God's Eye view seems to be inherent in formal logic, so, again, it is not a killer problem.
Might be more of a surprise that ?p?(p?¬p) is also true.
I hadn't thought of that, but it makes sense. If one element of a disjunction is true, the whole disjunct is true. Presumably, then, we can also write ?¬p?(p?¬p) and (?p?(p?¬p) & ?¬p?(p?¬p)). No surprise, since ?(p?¬p).
In modal logic, “the actual world” is a designated element of a model, usually called w?. It is not the metaphysical world, not the planet, not the territory.
Kripke himself regretted his choice of "worlds" terminology for that very reason: he acknowledged that it invited a conflation of metaphysical worlds with model-theoretical worlds. He blamed this misleading terminology for inspiring modal realism, i.e., thinking of possible worlds as "foreign countries" or "distant planets," which he rejected.
Repeating the same errors over and over dosn't much help your case.
It appears like we're not as close to agreement as I thought. If you continue to insist that you can use the same term to refer to different things, within the same argument (to equivocate), and to insist that there is no logical inconsistency in doing this, and also assert that the person who points out this equivocation to you, is the one making the error, then I think there is not much point in proceeding.
H'm. How to we decide which contradictions are good philosophy and which are not? In other words, there may be a reason for it, but it does not follow that it is a good reason. The point about ordinary speech is that it is inescapable, at least as a starting-point. Specialised dialects presuppose it and develop out of it. That's because ordinary life is inescapable.
I don't see that contradiction is ever good. And, I think that might be reasonable as an expressible starting principle for good philosophy.
Also I don't accept your proposal that ordinary speech is the inescapable starting point for philosophy. Human nature has inescapable features, instincts and intuitions, which go much deeper than language, and serve to guide us in decision making. The rejection of contradiction for example is a manifestation of a deeper intuition, rejecting contradiction as an impediment to the capacity to know and understand. As are infinite regress and other similar things known by intuition to be detrimental to the will to know (philosophy).
Language on the other hand is a sort of surface feature of the highly developed conscious mind. In other words, beings were living, and developing features which we've inherited, long before we learned how to speak, and these features make a more natural, therefore I believe better, starting point for philosophy. So it is natural that if common speech is producing philosophy which is deceptive and misleading to these inner intuitions which guide us in the will to know, then we ought to reject it as a poor starting point for philosophy. This is why logic is based in placing special restrictions on language, it curbs the tendency to fall back on ordinary language, which misleads.
Also I don't accept your proposal that ordinary speech is the inescapable starting point for philosophy. Human nature has inescapable features, instincts and intuitions, which go much deeper than language, and serve to guide us in decision making. The rejection of contradiction for example is a manifestation of a deeper intuition, rejecting contradiction as an impediment to the capacity to know and understand..
Humanity has come into existence in a particular place & time through a multi-billion year process of evolution. Our "inescapable features, instincts and intuitions" are baked into us - but this does not mean that these qualities can help us resolve these issues.
There was a long time poster - Bartricks? (I think) who was banned - who maintained that since God was omnipotent that meant that God was not bound by the law of non-contradiction. What a fascinating notion. So is our intuition correct? I cannot rule out the possibility that our intuition is wrong.
As another example - we have not yet grasped the "nature" (for want of a better word) of quantum physics. Are photons particles or waves? My thinking is that if people much smarter than me cannot make up their minds then we're missing something. Maybe the question is wrong and we need a whole new method of thinking that somehow re-frames the issue. What that could possibly be beats me.
If you continue to insist that you can use the same term to refer to different things,
@Banno must speak for himself. But it is possible that he is not doing that. I may have misunderstood, but I think the idea is that the actual world is regarded as a possible world, which does not imply that there are two worlds here.
When good philosophy is contrary to everyday speech, there is a really good reason for that.
This is the context for the remark you quoted. I was referring to contradictions between philosophy and everyday speech, and your acceptance that such differences needed to be justified.
Language on the other hand is a sort of surface feature of the highly developed conscious mind. In other words, beings were living, and developing features which we've inherited, long before we learned how to speak, and these features make a more natural, therefore I believe better, starting point for philosophy. So it is natural that if common speech is producing philosophy which is deceptive and misleading to these inner intuitions which guide us in the will to know, then we ought to reject it as a poor starting point for philosophy. This is why logic is based in placing special restrictions on language, it curbs the tendency to fall back on ordinary language, which misleads.
We're getting sucked in to all-or-nothing positions. Ordinary language sometimes misleads and sometimes doesn't. One of the tasks for philosophy is to sort out the misleading bits and those that are not. I notice, however, that many major issues in philosophy are precisely based on misleading features of ordinary language - such as the pursuit of "Reality" and "Existence".
I don't think of language as a sort of bolt-on extra that human beings possess and other creatures don't (on the whole). In the first place, many animals have communication systems that are recognizably language-like and look very like precursors of language. In the second place, language is something that humans developed under evolutionary pressure, and hence no different from any other feature developed in the same way by other creatures. In the third place, you seem to think that our "inner intuitions" are not as liable to mislead us as language is; I see no ground for supposing that.
Coming in late to the discussion, but just adding one key note… the fact we only experience reality in the way we do is not evidence there’s something more beyond our reality.
H'm. Did he, by any chance, suggest a better term?
Yes, Kripke suggested "possible states (or histories) of the world" or "possible situations." The latter may seem most vague, but that's for the better, in my opinion. In a model, we consider only relevant possibilities, whereas a metaphysical world is intractably rich in possibilities. A model does not aspire to completeness - only to pragmatic relevance. We stipulate what the model-theoretical "worlds" should be, based on what we expect from the model.
Consider dice, for example. In a 2d6 dice game, there are 11 possible scores in any round (2 - 12). So, if we only care about the score, then there are 11 possible worlds to consider. (Of course, these scores are not all equally likely. One shortcoming of modal logic is that it has nothing to say about probabilities.) If, in addition, we care about combinations, but consider individual dies to be indistinguishable for practical purposes, then the number of possible worlds increases to 18 (36 / 2). If we want to know the outcome on each individual die, then we are stipulating 36 distinct worlds.
But what if the die throw never occurs? Or a die is lost? Or it balances on its corner instead of landing on a side? And what of all the "extraneous" possibilities - the weather conditions, the configurations of air molecules in the room, the possible ways the Battle of Waterloo could have played out, the possible alternative endings to the Game of Thrones series? None of these real (or imaginary) world possibilities need be taken into account. We stipulate what goes into the model and what stays out. And although we cannot effectively control the outcome of a die throw, it will be up to us to translate it into the "actual world" in our model - and that is not always as straightforward as in this toy example.
One shortcoming of modal logic is that it has nothing to say about probabilities.
I've often wondered how possibilities and probabilities fit together. No-one seems to be interested. But here's an analysis of the possibilities of a dice game when we already have an analysis of the same game in terms of probabilities.
But what if the die throw never occurs? Or a die is lost? Or it balances on its corner instead of landing on a side? And what of all the "extraneous" possibilities - the weather conditions, the configurations of air molecules in the room, the possible ways the Battle of Waterloo could have played out, the possible alternative endings to the Game of Thrones series?
Quite so. But can't we just lump all these together as "no throws", which is what would happen in real life. Not that we can ever know all the possible outlandish outcomes that might possibly occur.
Good. Following your analogy, one of the books in your encyclopaedia is about the actual world. You might take it out and read it. In another possible world, another possible you can take out a different book about their world, treating it as their actual world, and read, it perhaps with as much satisfaction as you derive from reading yours.
An example of Modal realism, David Lewis' ideas were quite sophisticated, and far from Meta's misunderstandings. In brief, Lewis held that since someone in another possible world would consider their world to be the actual world, we should treat it as an actual world; that it was as real as our own. Such a view is annoyingly coherent, leading to a large literature.
Most philosophers will differentiate between treating a possible world as if it were real, and treating it as real.
Meta's idea, so far as I can make out, is that the node in a model (w?, the designated “actual world”) though it is claimed to be the metaphysical actual world rather than one of many semantic artefacts, w?, w? and so on. He takes these model-theoretic objects as claims about reality then accuses the logician of contradiction because the formal “actual world” differs from the metaphysical actual world.
If you continue to insist that you can use the same term to refer to different things, within the same argument (to equivocate), and to insist that there is no logical inconsistency in doing this, and also assert that the person who points out this equivocation to you, is the one making the error, then I think there is not much point in proceeding.
There is no such equivocation. The problem is your inability to differentiate between a model-theoretic object and a metaphysical one.
But it is possible that he is not doing that. I may have misunderstood, but I think the idea is that the actual world is regarded as a possible world, which does not imply that there are two worlds here.
Reply to SophistiCat, Reply to Ludwig V, For better or worse, the term is now embedded in the literature. One needs must learn instead to use it correctly.
Reply to Banno This got complicated. For the non-philosophers, is there a 2 or 3 sentence answer to the OP from your perspective? From my perspective we can’t ‘know’ but I guess it depends upon what’s meant by know… or ‘beyond’.
Yes, indeed. I'll stand by what I said in my first post: Quoting Banno
How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our reality?
Because reality is what there is.
To posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more of what there is. It is to extend reality.
This is why the extent of our language is the extent of our world.
Hopefully, replacing "limit" with "extent" will head off some of the misplaced criticism of that phrase.
The other mistake here is to equate what we experience with what is real, and so to conflate "How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our experience" with "How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our reality".
"Beyond reality" is not a region; it is a grammatical error.
I may have misunderstood, but I think the idea is that the actual world is regarded as a possible world, which does not imply that there are two worlds here.
In our discussion, Banno more than once explicitly said that the actual world is the world that we live in. This is completely different from any representation of the world we live in. And, numerous times it is implied that he is referring to what he now calls the "metaphysical actual world" with "the actual world", yet other times he insists that "the actual world refers to a representation..
The reason why the argument which Banno presented from Fitch fails, is that it requires this conflating of the independent world, and the "actual world" of the modal model. It can only succeed through that fallacy of equivocation. I proposed to Banno that we revisit this argument and analyze it while maintaining the appropriate separation separation. Banno so far has refused, simply asserting that his error is mine.
We're getting sucked in to all-or-nothing positions. Ordinary language sometimes misleads and sometimes doesn't. One of the tasks for philosophy is to sort out the misleading bits and those that are not. I notice, however, that many major issues in philosophy are precisely based on misleading features of ordinary language - such as the pursuit of "Reality" and "Existence".
I don't think of language as a sort of bolt-on extra that human beings possess and other creatures don't (on the whole). In the first place, many animals have communication systems that are recognizably language-like and look very like precursors of language. In the second place, language is something that humans developed under evolutionary pressure, and hence no different from any other feature developed in the same way by other creatures. In the third place, you seem to think that our "inner intuitions" are not as liable to mislead us as language is; I see no ground for supposing that.
My point was simply that when ordinary language contradicts good philosophy, we ought to accept this as a flaw in ordinary language, rather than rejecting the philosophy because it contradicts ordinary language.
There is no such equivocation. The problem is your inability to differentiate between a model-theoretic object and a metaphysical one.
That's so wrong. You, in the very same argument use "the actual world" to refer to a model-theoretic object, and also to a metaphysical object. When a person demonstrates to you that this is the fallacy of equivocation, you claim that it is that person's error for not distinguishing the two.
As I told, the argument from Fitch which you provided, fails if we maintain that separation. Are you ready to look over your argument, and see how it depends on equivocation?
How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our reality?
Because reality is what there is.
To posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more of what there is. It is to extend reality.
This is why the extent of our language is the extent of our world.
This makes sense. But from my perspective reality is a vexed term to begin with. What exactly do we mean by this word - the totality of facts, not things?
In a not untrivial way, some people's reality (on account of language acuity and education) is definitely larger than others who have more limited capabilities. I don't think this is an equivocation on the word, but you may think so?
Is it not the case that what we call reality today is "beyond" what we called reality 500 years ago?
Reply to Tom Storm At the risk of being overly formal, have a think about the difference between what is true and what is known to be true.
To explain the idea, lets' suppose we can list all the facts, every true statement: {f1, f2, f3...} Those facts, taken together, list everything that is the case.
But while you and I know maybe the first few thousand facts, little Jimmy over there only knows the first few hundred.
Will we say that he is living in a different world to us? That he has a different reality? Well, we could, if we restrict facts to only those things that are known, and not toe those things that are true, whether known or not.
So in that way of talking, Little Jimmy's reality is smaller than yours and mine.
Btu notice that this is a different sense to all the facts, taken as a whole.
So we have two different things - what is known, and what is true. On the first, folk can have different realities. On the second, we all share the same reality.
Not an ambiguity, but we should take care as to which sense we are using and be consistent in that use.
We are stipulating that that one world is the actual world, not deducing it. Any world can counted as w?. It's built in, not contradictory. There is no modal difference between the actual world and other possible worlds.
— Banno
the fact we only experience reality in the way we do is not evidence there’s something more beyond our reality.
No, but it is also not evidence that what we experience is all there is. We evolved as these creatures with a finite set of senses. Our reality consists only of what we can detect. Doesn't follow that that is all there is.
@Banno
Now, are you ready to address the so-called Fitch's paradox, and accept that it doesn't say anything about any supposed independent, metaphysical world? It says something about our representation of the actual world in the modal model. To me it says nothing other than the trivial tautology, that everything which is known is known. Where's the paradox?
Links to my posts rather than your own would be preferred, when you are trying to demonstrate a problem with something I said. The bit where I pointed out that responding to your rubbish requires more time than it is worth.
...in the very same argument use "the actual world" to refer to a model-theoretic object, and also to a metaphysical object.
And yet the evidence you provide is from two quite different posts, which in context make it clear that one is about metaphysics and the other about modality.
A pathetic response, even for you. This is why, if I wasn't chasing posts, I'd have long ago gone back to ignoring you.
Is it not the case that what we call reality today is "beyond" what we called reality 500 years ago?
If the question asks is there a possibility that there is an aspect of reality beyond our known reality, how could we rule this out? I don't think this is a useful frame however since hypothetical aspects of reality are moot.
If the question asks is there a possibility that there is an aspect of reality beyond our known reality, how could we rule this out?
I think we can guarantee that "there a possibility that there is an aspect of reality beyond our known reality". It seems to me that wha this says is "there are things we do not know", and I'm pretty confident that we do not know everything.
But is there something here, some other understanding of "an aspect of reality beyond our known reality" that I'm missing?
if not, then this appears to be a classic case of language leading us astray.
Reply to Tom Storm Thanks for getting us back on track. The digression with Meta has gone on too long. But it did spawn another thread, thanks to @Frank, which I'm enjoying. More opportunities for me to show off, of course. :halo:
And yet the evidence you provide is from two quite different posts, which in context make it clear that one is about metaphysics and the other about modality.
My entire discussion with you in this thread is "the same argument". When finally persuaded to clarify your use, you admitted to equivocation. At some times you used "actual world" to talk about the metaphysical world, at other times you used "actual world" to refer to a modal world.
Then you had the gall to insist that your equivocation was my error, of not being able to distinguish when "actual world" meant metaphysical world, and when it meant modal world.
Let's start by having you demonstrate that you understand the paradox by setting it out.
Like I said, I don't understand the paradox as a paradox. This is because it appears to require that some conclusion about the independent metaphysical world, is derived from a modal model. If this is the case then it is very clearly the fallacy of equivocation, which I've charged.
So I suggest that you present it in a way which appears to make sense to you, while recognizing the separation between the actual world of modal logic, which is a human produced representation, and the independent metaphysical world. How do you propose to say something about the independent metaphysical world, from within the modal model? Or, does the paradox not say anything at all about the independent metaphysical world?
But is there something here, some other understanding of "an aspect of reality beyond our known reality" that I'm missing?
if not, then this appears to be a classic case of language leading us astray.
I think then, that you and I are in agreement. We certainly know that the phrase, beyond our known reality, is often code for the Platonic realm or any number of alternate worlds. Let's not go there.
No, but it is also not evidence that what we experience is all there is. We evolved as these creatures with a finite set of senses. Our reality consists only of what we can detect. Doesn't follow that that is all there is.
Yes, but that’s not what I’m getting at. We know that reality looks and behaves vastly different than our senses and limited perspective can perceive, but the question asked is about the possibility of something beyond our reality, based on our limited perception. Such a question becomes a form of wishful thinking, utilizing the limited perception we have as an unknown factor to project a fantasy of existence beyond our reality. It’s existential comfort.
It’s more likely asked because we want it to be true. We entertain the idea as a form of science fiction. Because if we look at what we lack in perception, it’s rather about frequencies of light and sound waves, of energy levels and the ability for higher dimensional reasoning. Neither of it speaks of concepts of other realities, only elevated perceptions of the same reality we’re already in.
The right question would rather be… if we were able to perceive everything, what would we perceive?
And if we want to ask if there’s anything beyond our reality, the answer is most likely, nothing that would help us understand ourselves, this reality, or function as any comfort at all because it would probably be so dramatically different from everything we understand of our own reality that it would be a useless glimpse. There wouldn’t be anything recognizable, there wouldn’t be a perception level able to comprehend anything as it would be different from even perceiving everything in our own reality, which in itself would overload our minds.
In the end, the question becomes a cry for god, not a question of perception or understanding. We are limited to this reality, for which we still have lots more to discover and understand about. Anything beyond our reality becomes white noise to us, as our existence itself is bound to this reality, as nothing of us is proven to function outside the reality we are part of. To ask about realities beyond our own is to ask for some other plane of existence we could enter into. But we can’t, as doing so would untangle the very being of our existence. It becomes as meaningless as if there is nothing at all beyond this reality.
A good example is the holographic theory of our universe. That our reality is due to a projection from some event horizon in some elevated reality. But it’s not a projection of our existence as people seem to believe, it’s a projection of whatever is originally there that due to being projected has formed the parameters of our reality. It projects the conditions that forms everything we know and our reality becomes something else entirely because of it. The conditions of our reality change the projected original into not resembling anything of itself at all and the process itself giving rise to conditions that transforms the very nature of it.
By entertaining the though truthfully, the idea breaks, as our parameters of definition for something beyond our reality is dependent on our own reality, which differs from anything beyond.
It’s a hard limit to our existence, as any answer of the beyond becomes meaningless to any of our conditions.
We simply want it to be there because it would entertain the thought of all our religious fantasies.
At some times you used "actual world" to talk about the metaphysical world, at other times you used "actual world" to refer to a modal world.
Yep. I can do that. The same term is used for two different things. That's not equivocation. It's your error to conflate metaphysics with modality. Think I mentioned that. A few times.
So I suggest that you present it in a way which appears to make sense to you,
No. If you would proceed, set it out for us. I've set it out multiple times, and you disagree with it each time. Your turn. Set it out for us, and how it goes astray.
I've set it out multiple times, and you disagree with it each time. Your turn. Set it out for us, and how it goes astray.
That's right, each time I offer terms of interpretation, you assert that they are erroneous, and you reject them. Then you provide none of your own, simply insisting that your conclusion is valid and my interpretation is erroneous. So, I suggest that we proceed from clearly defined interpretive terms, whether they are produced by you or I does not matter to me, so long as we craft acceptable definitions.
Ok, then can you at least explain why Fitch and others think it a paradox? Why is it worthy of it's own article, in the Stanford Encyclopaedia, in Wikipedia, in Oxford Academic, and so on. What is it that the folk who wrote this stuff think is happening?
It seems to me like the paradox appears to these philosophers because they are making the mistake of assuming that the model modal says something about the real independent metaphysical world, when it does not. The separation between the "modal actual world", and the "independent metaphysical world" makes the semantics of terms like "know" and "true" extremely difficult and ambiguous.
So, to sort out the apparent paradox requires that we clearly define such terms, and adhere strictly to the definitions. I will make a proposal for definitions here, but you are free to reject them and offer your own. The point is to have rigorous terms of interpretation. Remember, from the SEP article on possible worlds, there is no extensionality inherent within the modal model, true extensionality is provided only by the interpretive terms. This makes interpretation extremely important, and produces the possibility of significant flexibility, if the interpretive terms are confusing or ambiguous.
Here are my proposals. "True" signifies a judgement which is made concerning a proposition. It is a very specific type of judgement which is incompatible with the judgement of "false", the opposing judgement of the very same type. To "know" a proposition means that a judgement of this type has been made, the proposition has been judged as either true or false. Note, that for the sake of the modal model we must allow for both judgements, "p is true", "p is false", to adequately represent the possibility of knowing p.
Lets now consider the meaning of the follow two propositions:
1. If p then p is possible.
2. If p is known then it is possible to know p.
The first implies that if p is true (has been so judged), then it is possible that p is true (has been judged that way). The second implies that if p has been judged as either true or false, then it is possible that p has been judged as true or false.
Due to the likelihood that you will not agree, and would prefer to use your own definitions, I will not proceed further with the analysis at this time. If you agree to the definitions, then we can continue, if not, then you can produce alternative definitions for these terms, and we can proceed from those definitions.
This has not been my experience. I recognize that reality may consist of planes that I am unable to detect, but I believe they would be as "natural" as what I am able to experience.
I am having some trouble following the logic of your reasoning, which appears to be this:
1. Human senses are limited.
2. There may exist parts of reality humans cannot detect.
3. It must be god.
1. Human senses are limited.
2. There may exist parts of reality humans cannot detect.
3. It must be god.
First two correct, but not the third. What I meant is that the act of asking the question in the way the OP does, is a form of cry out for God. It’s a cry out for a meaning beyond the reality we have. My argument is that this kind of question is a form of circular reasoning in which the usage of the fact we face a hard limit to know the unknown conditions beyond our bubble of reality, becomes the reason to question if “this is all there is”. The question rather expose the intention underneath to be about the fantasy of something beyond our reality, rather than engaging with the possible scientific reasoning about what would likely exist outside our reality.
And with the example of the holographic theory, the problem we run into if we entertain the question scientifically is that the conditions of our reality makes it impossible to comprehend any other reality and likely impossible for that reality to comprehend our own.
Reality is not the same as our bubble of the universe, it is the definition of the parameters that allows this universe to exist. If those parameters change or are different, it not only changes the resulting universe, but also perception itself, leading to a hard limit for which there is no comprehension of the other.
So, I’m not talking about “God”, but that the way the question is asked reveals an underlying fantasy of a state of reality beyond our own, that would somehow be accessible by us. Because if we can imagine it, it is in a way accessible to us. My answer to that is that it isn’t. The question itself becomes nonsensical as the answer is that we cannot access it, not even through imagination based on our best scientific theories. It is fundamentally inaccessible. Imagination of it relates more to our religious beliefs of a realm beyond our own, a heaven and a God etc. so the discussion often just takes the form of a religious one, rather than a scientific one. Metaphysics leading to a craving for heaven and God, rather than reasoning about the physical properties of a reality outside our own.
so the discussion often just takes the form of a religious one, rather than a scientific one. Metaphysics leading to a craving for heaven and God, rather than reasoning about the physical properties of a reality outside our own.
I understand better now, thank you for explaining.
However, as I mentioned, this is not the path that this takes me on. And I don't think I am alone in viewing the possibility in purely scientific terms.
And I don't think I am alone in viewing the possibility in purely scientific terms.
As do I, but we still run into the hard problem, that our imagination of another reality is dependent on the physical properties of our own, thus making our imagination unable to comprehend any of it. We can try and theorize it, but it will mostly boil down to extrapolations of how it relates to our reality, rather than form an actual understanding of the other reality.
Here are my proposals. "True" signifies a judgement which is made concerning a proposition. It is a very specific type of judgement which is incompatible with the judgement of "false", the opposing judgement of the very same type. To "know" a proposition means that a judgement of this type has been made, the proposition has been judged as either true or false. Note, that for the sake of the modal model we must allow for both judgements, "p is true", "p is false", to adequately represent the possibility of knowing p.
You are conflating the epistemic notion of ‘judging’ with the metaphysical or semantic notion of truth. Truth doesn’t require anyone to make a judgment; it exists independently of whether anyone knows or judges it.
It is not that the act of judging that is "incompatible", but that the semantic structure does not allow something to be both or neither true and false. Hence we can construct non-classical logics. You are mistakenly making the epistemic act do the logical work.
Your definition collapses knowledge into the merely epistemic act of judgment. Knowledge is not reducible to judging; one could judge falsely or incompletely. Your definition might lead to our knowing this that are not true.
Modal semantics works with truth conditions of propositions across possible worlds, not with human acts of judging. There’s no need to posit ‘both judgments’ to represent epistemic possibility; you only need to track where the proposition is true or false.
2. If p is known then it is possible to know p.
...The second implies that if p has been judged as either true or false, then it is possible that p has been judged as true or false.
Nuh. It just says that it is not possible to know stuff that is impossible to know...
Sure, you reject my definitions, as I knew you would. So, what does "know" mean to you in this context, and what does "true" mean in this context? Then we can look at interpreting Fitch's argument under these conditions.
Lets' use the definition of knowledge in the SEP article...
I don't see a definition of "knowledge" there. It says "The operative concept of 'knowability' remains elusive...". That's the problem I mentioned, why the appearance of paradox is created, there's too much ambiguity in key terms like "know" and "true".
So, I'll tell you again. Approaching with clear definitions for these terms, and adhering to them will resolve any apparent paradoxes. I proposed definitions already, which would dissolve the appearance of a paradox. You did not accept them. Now it's time for you to propose some definitions.
I will not proceed without definitions, because my thesis is that it is a lack of definition which is the problem. Therefore we need definitions to try my thesis. If every time that we try a set of definitions, the paradox disappears, this is good evidence for my thesis.
Comments (402)
We know for a fact there are things we do not, and perhaps cannot, currently experience that we will be able to sometime in the future. I don’t think that’s what you’re talking about.
If, instead, you were talking about aspects of reality that we will never have access to, even in theory, then the question is meaningless. Or maybe metaphysics.
OK, pretend I'm a well-meaning philosophical novice, and explain to me, as simply as you can, why the question is meaningless. It looks to me as if it's referring to aspects of reality that humans can't access; there may be none we can ever know of, making the question unanswerable, but why is it meaningless?
I didn’t say it was meaningless. I said it was meaningless or metaphysics. Metaphysics doesn’t have to be true or false. As a matter of fact, as I understand it, it can’t be. Something that is metaphysical becomes meaningless when there is no possible use for it. I don’t classify making people say “golly geewhilikers” as useful.
:confused: (e.g. north of the North Pole)
You don't dream? How do we know dreams are really just our mind "attempting to work out" problems and conundrums even in unconsciousness like the prevailing theory claims? Sure, it can be measured with an EEG, but all that proves is the mind is being stimulated by activity, not that the activity is a contained system.
I take this as a fun thread, which is refreshing every now and then. Conversely, however, how do we know there isn't a horrible swamp monster under our bed at all times that goes away once we look under it? We don't, now do we? Not really. Like the prevailing sentiment of the replies thus far suggests, it seems there are much more "relevant" affairs and states of matter to tend to. But never let someone tell you what and what not (or how) to think.
Identity is knowledge. You likely thought you knew all there was to know at six years old. Your entire set of knowledge and view of the world likely (or at least should have) changed significantly from then by age 12. As it did in comparison to when you became 18. And then again at 21. And 30. And so on and so on. Effectively, we become a new person with a new understanding of reality (effectively, a new reality altogether) every time we learn something. Can this not be said and argued as fact?
But surely the statement, "There is a reality that humans can't experience" is either true or false, isn't it? I still don't see the leap from "unanswerable" to either "meaningless" or "neither true nor false."
@T Clark’s motto—If there is no way of knowing whether a statement is true or false, even in theory, then it’s either metaphysics or meaningless.
If you ask any more questions, I’m going to give you my prerecorded RG Collingwood metaphysics lecture, which you’ve probably heard before.
Because if it would be something than it would literally be 'some thing', meaning a thing we can identify. Something beyond our reality is exactly that, beyond our reality and then it would not be recognizable as something for us. The speculation therefore is idle. Of course there may well be a lot of things that are not part of our reality yet, just like iron was beyond the reality of the people in the stone age. At such a point though, it is not 'not part of our reality per se', but 'not yet part of our reality'.
Does your question only assume we “know” something that is inside our reality? You drew a line in reality and said we are in reality over hear, and over there is beyond our reality. You also only mentioned how we can’t know anything beyond our reality. This implying we can know reality, but only know the reality that is not “beyond”.
So is your issue here merely a version of the Kantian phenomenal/noumenal distinction? Is it essentially epistemological about “knowing”, or is it getting ant something metaphysical or ontological about the nature of reality?
Aaaaaa! :wink:
Quoting T Clark
OK, no more questions, just pointing out that your motto, while no doubt useful, isn't likely to convince someone who hasn't already adopted it as a motto. (The question I would have asked is, Why does the lack of a definitive answer drain the meaning from a question? But I won't!) (Also, if I understand you, it's not really a matter of "either metaphysics or meaningless." You're saying that metaphysics doesn't have to be true or false. But the statement in question does have to be. Ergo, it's not metaphysics. Ergo, it's meaningless. But see my [unasked!] previous question -- where did the meaning go away to? It seemed perfectly meaningful when it was posed.)
"How do we know that Frodo was on the balcony with a torch as described by Cicero in his testimony?"
The request to confirm what cannot be reported upon is a diving board extended over an empty pool.
I really wasn’t trying to convince anyone, I guess I was just pointing out that we were headed off into a more complicated discussion which is probably outside the intended scope of this thread.
Quoting J
What value, meaning, is there in a question that can’t be answered, even in theory? What do you do with it? What does it teach you? What implications, consequences does it have? How do I use the OP’s opening question?
Quoting an-salad
Do something with that. Show me what value it has. Let’s go further than that. We’ll assume there is something beyond the reality we can experience that is not accessible and never will be. How does that change anything?
These are the kinds of questions that make philosophy look ridiculous. I guess that’s why they bother me so much.
This, me thinks, is the arbitrarily-placed, obsequious stipulation that when removed makes the entire topic just a tad bit more open to conversation, no? :smile:
No.
:up:
When it strikes back.
An OP can't be clickbait; only a thread title can be, eager beavers.
Because reality is what there is.
To posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more of what there is. It is to extend reality.
This is why the extent of our language is the extent of our world.
Hopefully, replacing "limit" with "extent" will head off some of the misplaced criticism of that phrase.
The other mistake here is to equate what we experience with what is real, and so to conflate "How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our experience" with "How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our reality".
"Beyond reality" is not a region; it is a grammatical error.
I know what you mean, but I don't think @an-salad is defining it that way. They're making a distinction between "our reality" and "reality = our reality + whatever else there might be". The last thing we need is a debate on how to use the term "reality"! :smile: Using the word in the way an-salad uses it, wouldn't you agree that the question is a sensible one? And if you'd rather not use "reality" in the more restricted way an-salad means, we can come up with a different term, it doesn't matter.
Maybe put the question this way: Could there be anything that humans will never be able to know or experience?
Wow... I find that more ... idealist than I would ever dare to be ... :wink:
Not that we know of.
:wink:
How rude. :wink:
The set of true sentences is never complete, if that helps. I suspect that is what and are trying to capture - that there is always more to be said.
This is unexpectedly profound, perhaps that was your intent, perhaps not. For the average person, even those who claim to have found the charms of love or who otherwise remain placated by the juvenile pleasures life has to offer (wealth, physicality ie. "the flesh" or "pleasure", feeling of esteem and respect from strangers, hollow as these things are, they remain the sole driving force behind most of life's actions and ambitions, and of course, naturally, most of life's suffering) all have the same thing in common. We inevitably want more. No, we delude ourselves, often passively with empty gratitude shared in public (ie. "I'm so grateful, I couldn't ask for more") so as to sell an image to an ultimately uncaring world. But this inevitability manifests in "mid life crises", peculiar hobbies, marital strife, microaggressions, and more if left unexamined and unaddressed. Not to mention those who have yet to find peace and purpose.
Regardless of our status in life—perceived, real, deluded or anything in between—we all have one sobering dynamic in common. We all hunger and thirst. Both physically and of course symbolically, for that which we do not have, and even that which we do have. This is clear as day and does not require any sort of explanation for someone living in abject poverty or afflicted with a debilitating condition or ailment, naturally. But what of an upperclassman with everything the average man (or woman) reasonably strives for in life? Stable, high-paying job, big house, loving partner, beautiful family, good friends, respect from his or her peers, an abundance of wealth (including time)—and above all—that ever so elusive feeling of true peace at the very last moments of one's day to be followed by true purpose and drive at the start of the following, only to repeat indefinitely until the last of one's days. What of that man? Is he simply deluded? Or are those who compare his life and status to imprisonment merely jealous and disappointed with their own (projection, perhaps)? Surely this must be the only relevant dynamic (a binary "one or the other") in relation to the aforementioned questions posed. Mustn't it?
Surely he (and anyone else with half a mind) would never attempt to equate such a charmed and privileged existence to that of a "prison", would they? No, not in a million years. Or so it seems. One argument—and not a particularly good one (without the right biases in my opinion)—would be to start by taking a page from the stereotypical "anti-materialism" playbook. Along the lines of "one doesn't own possessions, one's possessions own the person, requiring constant and daily vigilance and occasional villainy to ensure one continues from one day to the next living in the manner in which one has become accustomed, all the while knowing, deep down, he would be not only hopelessly lost but simply destroyed if he were to lose any one of these things many men live life without, for even the slave with golden shackles undoubtedly remains but a slave." No, it's not particularly great, but it has merit given the right context.
I notice you go one further by saying all existence is a prison, so even an enlightened anti-materialist who has given up all worldly desire is still "imprisoned" due to him being conscious of himself. No different than a historical wealthy monarch in charge of vast swathes of lands, armies, and treasure. This would seem to betray an almost "antinatalist" or "anti-human" sort of world view, along the lines of "all life is bad and the less of it, the better." Not a very popular position to hold, quite dangerous even, yet the philosophical validity is not lost entirely.
The brevity (or simplicity) or your remarks, while profound, do leave much to interpretation. "All of existence" is a very broad term. Perhaps a bit broader than one initially realizes. Logically speaking, if "all of existence" is a prison, that would mean, the only thing beyond "existence" and "not a prison" would be... non-existence? This makes your remark astonishingly less profound, or at the very least, less vast in terms of philosophical context. There would seem to be two possible dynamics that can follow from that point. A sort of spiritual or metaphysical reality that transcends (has existed before and will exist after) the life and death of the body. Or, as mentioned previously, a sort of, in my view rather myopic, "anti-life" or "antinatalist" view of the world.
Either of which are valid—if not somewhat tired and largely titular—positions to hold, sure. Life, particularly the majority of human existence before the modern age of science and technology that largely alleviated the prevalence and tenacity of human suffering, is seemingly skewed in disproportionate favor of opportunity of things like pain, injury, illness, suffering, death, etc. Simply put, there's more things that can go wrong than go right as far as the human experience goes in the context of existence as we know and define it. But what of it? Where do you make the leap from "I think, therefore I am" to "I think, therefore I am not?" Was this intended or merely an adverse side affect? :chin:
But - we can't know much - if anything, about it.
But the fact that we don't know of it could hardly demonstrate that it's impossible.
Quoting Banno
I think this is true, and I'd go further: We have no warrant for believing that "what can be said" is a perfect match for "what can be said by humans." It's a big universe out there . . .
:fire:
Quoting Banno
Assuming the alien got here by traveling faster than the speed of light in some contraption (an impossibility given the physics we know of) there’s some good reason to presume some form of communication might be attempted. In line with how we teach dogs and, to lesser extents, cats to understand us via the things we say. Yes, all they hear are meaningful grunts, but they’re still meaningful to them as far as communication goes.
Then again, what idiot believes him/herself capable of linguistically communicating complex thoughts to lesser beings of comparatively minuscule intelligence? Like, anyone earnestly trying to communicate the laws of physics or the aesthetics of a Rembrandt to an ant, dog, etc., is bound to be missing some marbles (and not the non-human animal for not understanding). Given the greater intelligence of the alien, they might want to communicate complex thoughts to us telepathically, or via some other weird manner, but not in the language they themselves speak. Otherwise, they’d be missing marbles (yes, this is conceivable: we all know that the greater the intelligence, the greater the likelihood and intensities of possible insanity).
Yup, my deep thought of the day.
------
“The smiles you’ll give/and the tears you’ll cry/and all you touch/and all you see/is all your life will ever be” -- lyrics from “Breathe” by Pink Floyd
We cannot even speculate about what we cannot ever comprehend. This is basically Kantian Noumena (a term which defies itself!). Obvious, but confusing if you get hold of the wrong end of it.
Quoting Banno
Are we to understand you reject the Big Bang hypothesis, then? What theory as to the origins of this universe might you favor, pray tell? :smile:
...and this and the rest is comprehensible - since you are here comprehending it.
Quoting Outlander
What?
Why would you suppose that? Do you think the big bang is beyond comprehension?
:angry:
My implication was, based on said theory, there was a point before what is commonly referred to as "the universe." A point (no pun intended) where "reality" or "all there is" was substantially different than what it is currently. So much so it can barely even be discussed and remains but a humble, albeit generally-accepted theorem.
If, hypothetically, one could place themself, as they are, prior to the "Big Bang", everything we know now, the entire Universe as we know it, would, in theory, be "outside" or "beyond" reality. Wouldn't it? It didn't exist at that point. Not in any conceivable or fathomable form. Not really. No different than saying consciousness existed before intelligent beings came about.
The current universe would be "beyond reality" at the time prior to the Big Bang. Just as consciousness would be "beyond reality" prior to the first intelligent being. Is this not correct?
Quoting I like sushi
Even if that's (more or less) true, how do these follow?:
We can only experience what we experience; therefore there is nothing else.
We can discover only what is available to us via experience; therefore there is nothing else to discover.
That is all there is for us; therefore that is all there is.
We cannot even speculate about what we cannot ever comprehend; therefore, there is nothing we cannot speculate about or comprehend.
I think you made a mistake there.
I meant all of the "therefores" to be mistakes, trying to show that they don't follow from the initial statements. For this one, the idea is that we can't speculate about anything we can't comprehend, which is quite true. But why would that mean that what we can speculate about and comprehend is all there is?
Thanks. I’m glad to hear that what I said was comprehensible, if only to me. :grin: :wink: But then, so too is comprehensible the notion that there is yet more to discover and understand than humanity, and any individual within. has to date discovered and understood. And that some of these yet to be made discoveries and understandings might require new terminology so as to be properly linguistically communicated between us humans. (I’m with on this one.)
That said, what you mentioned about it only being an extension of reality, rather than it being outside of reality, I find very valid.
Indeed - notice that my objection is to the way the issue is phrased. As "there is stuff beyond our reality" when it should be "there is stuff that is true but unknown". (It's actually positing realism, or at least showing up some of the limitations of idealism.)
Quoting Banno
Yes, I think we're all in accord that the culprit here is the word "reality," no surprise. "Stuff we can know as humans" and "all the stuff that can be known" are fine with me instead, as long as the two aren't supposed to mean the same thing.
(All sorts of implications here, making it an interesting area of logic. Like that we can write down the set of all the integers in a finite set of words - I just did; but by stepping outside the rules for writing down the integers and using sets instead.)
Again, the payoff is that there is always more to be said.
Peirce distinguishes reality and existence. For Peirce the real is that which is what it is independent of what any one person or definite group of people may think it is. It is the object of the final opinion of the indefinite community of investigators. But note this does not refer to material objects as such, as for example the law of conservation of energy is real, because its action is independent of what any one person or group thinks about it. It would hold true even if all humans vanished. It is a stable, general pattern or "habit" of the universe (although personally, I believe that the fact that human intelligence is alone capable of grasping such principles is itself metaphysically significant.)
Existence (or Actuality) refers to the primitive dyadic fact of an object reacting against or related to something else. It corresponds to Peirce's category of Secondness (Action/Fact/Brute Force).
Scope: Existence is limited to particular, individual, spatio-temporal facts, occurrences, and things that are actually here and now, having a brute impact on us or on other things. What is real extends far beyond that.
For Peirce, something can be real without existing (e.g., a universal law or a potential quality), but anything that exists is also real. The existing things are just the particular instances where the real generalities (laws and habits) are manifested in brute, immediate interaction.
I find the reality of potentialities or possibilities are particularly interesting in this respect. There are real possibilities, such as the fact that one out of 12 horses will win a race tomorrow, and impossibilities, such as that it might be won by some animal other than a horse. Some possibilities or potentialities are real, but others are not. A range of possibilities may be impossible to determine. The Schrodinger equation in physics is basically a strictly-formulated range of possible outcomes.
Being is not something specifically addressed in Peirce's lexicon in the same sense that it is in (for example) philosophical theology or 20thc existentialism. A large topic in its own right, but I would just observe the fact that we ourselves are beings (rather than existents or objects) is a clue to the nature of any enquiry into the nature of being, insofar as we ourselves are part of what we are seeking to understand.
Right. Presuming that the human species doesn’t bring about its own extinction (the pressing of a few red buttons could be sufficient for this to occur), then there’s bound to someday be a future species of life that evolves from that of the human species (no transhumanism required). Such that as regards intelligence relative to this future species we might be just as modern day chimps are relative to us. Their more refined conceptualizations and understandings then being out of reach to the human species not only in practice but also in principle.
Otherwise, there will always be something of reality which dwells beyond our own individually unique umwelt, this just as much as our collectively shared umwelt(s). This since no one individual umwelt can of itself be omniscient as regards all aspects of reality in general.
If I read you right, I can only address the issue by pointing back to newly coined English terms that express complex enough concepts in manners that typically would otherwise require, at minimum, an entire sentence to properly express, and some requiring vast bodies of English language to so do: a meme (noun), copesetic (adjective), and words imported into English from other languages, such as the Germanic “umwelt” and “zeitgeist”. Devoid of at least some of these newly minted English terms, the concepts they convey could not be succinctly conveyed and manipulated within thoughts.
Then, so too will occur for concepts that are out of reach for the human species, as per my most recent reply to J on this thread. Language is reducible to semantics and the signs used to convey and manipulate these. So, I via reasons such as these find grounds to uphold that not everything which is an aspect of “that which is” can be currently said by us humans. Here’s but one example:
Suppose that in ontological fact time is neither linear nor recurring (i.e., circular, as in Nietzsche’s and other’s eternal return) but, instead, is a conflux of both that thereby amounts to neither. Not only would this require volumes to properly express in validly justified coherent manners (philosophically to not mention empirically) but, furthermore, the entire notion could not be pragmatically, succinctly, communicated and manipulated in thoughts devoid of an accordant term for this metaphysical understanding of time … a term which currently cannot be said for it does not yet (to the best of my knowledge) exist.
Now consider a vast spectrum of terms we've never heard of each with its own deep enough conceptual meanings all being stringed together in grammatically correct sentences so as to convey and manipulate concepts. These thoughts we, at the very least at present, have no access to and cannot express in words that we ourselves have at our disposal.
I grant that reality, existence, and being overlap while having different referents. But, finding little to no use for Pierce’s tripartite system of firstness/secondness/thirdness myself, I don’t subscribe to the definitions you’ve provided.
Following common speech and understandings, I deem reality to consist of what is real, with real being synonymous to actual (and with real and actual sharing a common Latin root). And you’re right: when so conceived, actual/real potentials (in contrast to unreal and hence impossible potentials) and the like get very interesting, and at times frustrating, to further enquire into.
Existence, as per its etymology, I then find consists of those aspects of reality which in any way, manner, or form stand out to us as conscious observers: thoughts thereby exist, just as much as rocks do. We as conscious observes, though an aspect of reality at large (for we as conscious observers are indeed actual, hence real), however do not exist, not in this formal means of understanding the term, for we don’t stand out to ourselves, not even conceptually via the concepts that do exist for us. As another example of common speech, think of Tillich's notions regarding the existence of God, such that to affirm the existence of God is to deny the actuality/reality of God. Were existence to be synonymous to actuality, this notion could not be properly conveyed via the terms used.
Being, on the other hand, at core to me specifies all that in any conceivable way “in fact is (and is hence real)” –this to include was and will be, though how so will be contingent on metaphysics adopted. Being, though, gets tricky in certain metaphysics wherein it is not synonymous to reality, this on account of a division between “what in fact is real in an ultimate sense” and “what in fact is illusory in an ultimate sense of reality (e.g., the maya of Indian religions ). Which then chimes with the English understanding of beings being sentience-endowed, unlike anything else which is within reality at large (reality at large consisting of both maya and that which is not maya).
I am curious if you find substantial reason to prefer Peirce's account of "real" and "existing" over those I've just presented, this given common speech understandings of the two terms.
In addition to 'res potentia', we also have to consider the reality of abstractions, such as the natural numbers. Here my sympathies lie with Platonism, although much of the debate around 'platonism in philosophy of math' is abstruse. But I take the point in the SEP article on same, that:
I find the 'this would be an important discovery' unintentially ironic, as according to many, this was already evident to the ancient Greeks and probably the ancient Egyptians. But, in any case, the whole reason that this is such a controversial topic is straightforward: if number is real but not material, then it undercuts philosophical materialism and a lot of empiricist philosophy:
Me, I'd take the mile.
Do you disagree?
Yes. But the challenge is to explain exactly what the word "reality" is guilty of - or, better, what we are guilty of when we misuse the word "reality", if it is possible to misuse something that we have created. (I mean the word. not the reality.)
"Reality" is an example of the common philosophical mistake of over-generalizing, or perhaps better, of decontextualizing a perfectly useful word, which then becomes virtually useless. What counts as "real" and "unreal" depends on the context, which is specified when you complete a sentence and specify what the context is. The idea that you can lump everything real into one group and everything unreal into another group is just wrong. Things are often unreal under one description and perfectly real under another. Similarly, what existence depends on what kind of thing you are thinking of. Superman exists - as a character in comic books, but not as someone you might meet at a bus stop.
Quoting Banno
Yes. It is often possible to do something impossible by changing the rules. I'm not sure that proves anything - except that we wrote the rules in the first place. So we can change the rules or invent new ones any time we want to. Even mathematicians have been known to indulge in that - especially where infinity is concerned. But I don't think that really undermines the point you originally made.
Quoting Wayfarer
That's all very neat and tidy. But I don't think it reflects the complexity of the relationship between reality and existence. On the contrary, it looks like reading in a real distinction - between laws and generalities on one hand and the particular and individual on the other - into the difference between real things and things that exist. I think it is perfectly reasonable to say that there is a natural law about conservation of energy. If that's true, the law exists. Superman is a well-known comic-book character, but everyone knows that he is a fictional character and so not a real person.
Quoting javra
Perhaps so. But each umwelt is a part of the same reality in general, isn't it?
Quoting javra
Fair enough. Our languages, natural and artificial, are not closed. There is plenty of room for new concepts. I don't see a problem.
BTW - isn't the existing theory of quantum physics an example of what you are talking about? Something that is both a wave and a particle?
Quoting javra
Well, you are welcome to define a new use for "exists", but if it means that we, - you and I - do not exist, I think you might find it rather difficult to sell.
Quoting Wayfarer
I agree that there is a neglected distinction between "real" and "existent". But I don't think Peirce remotely captures it.
Quoting Wayfarer
I agree with that. The problem with platonism is not so much about the reality of abstract numbers and shapes but the denial of the reality of physical objects. Both exist and are real; but they are different knds of object, that's all.
`
Of course.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yea, neither do I.
Quoting Ludwig V
No. Just keeping things philosophical.
Quoting Ludwig V
That's not what I said, is it? You and I are selves, and selves do stand out ... this to the consciousness embedded in each which, as consciousness, does not. One does not see "consciousness" in the mirror but only one's own physiological self.
Nicely summarized. I might question whether the word was ever "perfectly useful," but other than that, you've said it well.
Nabokov said, "'Reality' is the one word that should always appear in quotation marks." He meant pretty much what you mean here. We could, for instance, create "Peirce-marks" to indicate when the word is being used as Peirce defined it.
Curious if you disagree with this: In commonsense language, then, Superman, the comic-book character, exists (in our culture) but is not real.
There’s actually a vast literature on whether or in what sense scientific laws exist, whether they’re laws etc.
If you were to somehow—right now—go back in time to a few moments before the Big Bang—with no idea that it was about to create what we call "the known Universe"—yet retain your knowledge of the known Universe, such knowledge would technically be "beyond reality" since the known Universe hasn't been created at that point.
The "known Universe" doesn't exist in reality at that point in time, other than in your head. Yet a few moments later—unbeknownst to you—it would. This is an explicit example (albeit hypothetical and per current scientific knowledge, currently impossible) of not only a valid posit of something "beyond reality" but a (theoretically) factual occurrence of reality being extended to something it was not previously.
Trivially, maybe "Big Bangs" happen all the time (in an "eternal" sense or context of frequency/occurrence) and another might happen in the future, removing all traces of the current Universe (this one) in favor of a new Universe that currently does not exist in any form (which technically, may have been what happened and may very well be the origins of this Universe, one simply does not know). Run it through ChatGPT if for whatever reason I'm not communicating to you sufficiently.
I'm basically saying there was a time this Universe (rather everything that we consider part of this Universe) didn't exist in any sort of recognizable form like it is now (ie. "pre-Big Bang" reality). At that time, talking about the Universe would be referring to something "beyond reality", yet would eventually become reality. It's the only example I got, but one example is all it takes to turn something from "100% absolute every single time" to "well, in most cases..." Which is a crucial distinction in philosophy (and basically anything else).
I mention consciousness arising from simplex organisms in case you say something like "but this Universe DID always exist, it was just all inside of the Singularity!", which I would respond by saying "that would be like saying consciousness always existed inside the first single-celled organism it just 'became active' once organisms evolved highly-functioning brains and resulting intelligence", which would be patently false.
There's no such time. Time came into existence along with the universe; the Big Bang is not an event in time but a boundary of time.
This sort of speculative physics makes for poor threads.
But time is a conceptual scheme embedded in our total belief network, hence asking about “time before time” is a misuse of those concepts, a confusion generated by stretching the scheme beyond its application to the world’s causal structure. The physics describes causal structure; those structures fix what makes sense to call “earlier” or “later.” If the causal structure doesn’t extend, neither does the temporal vocabulary.
What's south of the South Pole?
Maybe. There's a theory that we're in a black hole, which is inside a bigger universe. Instead of one Big Bang, there are Big Bounces that spawn universes. So our universe is in a bigger one, and our's is spawning more universes, which we detect as black holes.
The philosophical import being that we really don't know.
Outside of GR, anything goes, so again the idea of a time outside the universe is undefined.
Either way, such speculation is a waste of time.
That's not true. The GR math doesn't say anything about a singularity. The idea of a singularity is just a product extrapolation.
So the black hole cosmology theory isn't outside GR.
@SophistiCat. is that correct?
Quoting Banno
Speculative physicists don't seem to think so.
Yeah it is - it's an extension of GR to another universe.
I'll leave you to it. :roll:
I think you meant "Wow. I read the article you posted, and that's an amazing possibility. Thanks for sharing."
You're welcome.
Here, I want to come back to the reality of intelligibles. Scientific principles, mathematical relations, and the natural numbers are not dependent on any individual mind, yet they can only be grasped by a mind. That is the sense in which I hold they are real (in the noumenal or intelligible sense) but not existent (in the phenomenal, spatiotemporal sense. This is nearer to the pre-Kantian sense of 'noumenal', which Kant adapted, and changed, for his own purposes.)
This isn’t meant as a full metaphysical system, but as an heuristic:
* existent = that which appears in space, time, and causal relations; what can be encountered as a phenomenon
* real = that which has objective validity or logical necessity, but is not a physical particular
This is very close to Peirce’s schema: laws, generalities, and mathematical structures are real even though they do not exist as phenomena of Secondness. On those grounds, I don’t think “reality” can be collapsed into “existence” without erasing the ontological standing of intelligibles altogether.
Furthermore language depends on such abstractions. Whenever we use the terms ‘same as’, ‘equal to’, ‘different from’, ‘less than’, and so on, we’re making use of our capacity for rational abstraction, without the requirement of being aware of doing so. This capacity is anticipated by a discussion in Plato’s Phaedo called ‘The Argument from Equality’. In it, Socrates argues that in order to judge the equal length of two like objects — two sticks, say, or two rocks — we must already have ‘the idea of equals’ present in our minds, otherwise we wouldn’t know how to go about comparing them; we must already have ‘the idea of equals’. And this idea must be innate, he says. It can’t be acquired by mere experience, but must have been present at birth.
I don’t know if it’s necessary for us to accept the implied belief in the ‘incarnation of the soul’ to make sense of the claim: the fact that it’s innate is what is at issue. It is the innate capacity which provides us the ability to make such judgements, which we as rational creatures do effortlessly. It is just this kind of innate capabiiity which empiricism tends to deprecate (subject of Steve Pinker's book The Blank Slate).
On a larger scale, the same kind of capacities of abstraction are brought to bear on formulating the mathematical bases of theoretical physics. Science sees the Universe through such mathematical hypotheses, which provide the indispensable framework for making judgements (in accordance with the oft-quoted Galilean expression that ‘the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics’).
Thus intellectual abstractions, the grasp of abstract relations and qualities, are quite literally the ligatures of reason — they are what binds rational conceptions together to form coherent ideas.
You did ask me once what I meant by that expression.
Huh. Interesting. I was not focally aware of that. There's no semi-equivalent (I get it's not a matter of simple terminology or verbatim but a truly transcendental concept altogether—somewhat)? There's no hypothetical future where humans have mastered time travel (and beyond?) that any matter currently in existence can be somehow "placed" or otherwise "end up" at such a point? Why is that? (It's honestly fascinating to ponder, is all)
Quoting Banno
Perhaps. That said, I don't need to remind anyone here that all generally-accepted theories as well as most if not all scientific facts began as mere speculation. I fail to see an intrinsic evil in the practice per se, though I can see how it can be a bit disfavored and come off as irrelevant.
Either way, I appreciate the newfound knowledge. :smile:
Schopenhauer says time began with the first eye opening.
These guys are idealists masquerading as physicalists. They just want to shut down the debate and confine the physical material to their idealism. If they were true physicalists they would have brought the Many Worlds Theory to the table by now, but they haven’t.
The simplest answer to the OP is we don’t know what else there is. There might be all sorts of weird and wonderful stuff, that we can’t see. We just can’t see it.
This can then be elaborated by saying we know that there is a lot we don’t know about the world we find ourselves in. So we know that we don’t know things about things that we [B] can[/B] see. Therefore we are not in a position to say, or know anything about what we can’t see. So we can’t say what else isn’t there, just like we can’t give a full account of what we know is there.
Perhaps you are right. Quantum physics always seem to shroud everything in a fog, anyway.
Quoting javra
I may well have misunderstood you.
Quoting javra
I find myself floundering here. There is a regrettable tendency to think of anyone's self - including one's own - as if it were an object of some sort. If it is, it is remarkably elusive for something that is omni-present in one's life and experience. What's worse, is that one tends to find oneself positing more than one - a physiological self, as opposed to various others; none of these can possibly be one's true self - whatever that means. In addition, while I can supply some sort of (metaphorical) meaning to "stand out" as a description of what existent objects do, I can't grasp a meaning clear enough to be sure that I'm making the right sense of what you are saying. I am confused by the fact that if something "stands out" in my experience, I find that it does so against a background, which also exists.
Quoting J
Perhaps. "perfectly" was really a rhetorical flourish, meant to underline that there are uses of "real" and of "reality" that are not problematic in the way that this peculiar, specifically philosophical, use, is.
Quoting J
Well, yes, "P-real" could become a (real) word. There would be a swarm of other, similar, words. It would be interesting to see which of them would survive for, say, ten years. Definitions can only work if there is a consensus about how the term is to be used. But there is no such consensus in philosophy about "exists", so there is no sound basis for evaluating any definition. I'm also deeply suspicious of any definition that sets out to define a single word. (Dictionaries nowadays recognize the relationships of a given word to others.)
Quoting javra
I think that's right. But it's perhaps worth adding that he is a real comic-book character, just not a real person. As a cautious generalization, I would say that the problem with "real" is that things are often real under one description and unreal under another. "Exists" seems to be binary (unless you are Meinong).
Quoting Banno
I agree with you. But see below.
Quoting frank
That may be because they are working in a context that gives some traction to discussion and argument. On the other hand, it may be that that kind of response is not really appropriate. The speculation may be fun or exciting or something. Truth is, perhaps, only relevant when the speculation gets tied down into a
critical framework. It may or may not be true that Kekule came up with the carbon ring after he had a dream, which then gave him the idea of the benzene ring, which sent him into the laboratory. But it illustrates the point. No-one is concluding that dreams are a reliable source of scientific hypotheses.
The transition may involve a high casualty rate and a good deal of fruitless discussion. Is it worth it? I don't know.
Quoting Outlander
I can see your point. But I think it is important to recognize that the fascination is not the same thing as truth. If you don't, you'll find yourself believing in dragons and world conspiracies. "What if.." can be great fun. But it doesn't always play into truth and falsity. (Who cares that Superman is impossible? We all understand the context and can enjoy the stories, but let's not get carried away into political philosophy.)
Quoting Wayfarer
Well, they are not phenomenal or spatiotemporal objects. But why does that mean they don't exist? Or, why do you restrict existence to such objects?
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, but Plato is wrong to think that the idea of equality must be innate. We learn how to measure things and so when things are the same length or weight - and even when there are two sticks or rocks. True, we are born with the capacity to learn, but that's not the same thing.
Quoting Punshhh
Yes. That seems straightforward and right to me. It also seems to me that the difficulties arise only when we insist on trying to drag "reality" and "existence" and a metaphorical use of "beyond" into it.
If I ask you to point to the number 7, what would you actually point to? At most, you could indicate a token—a mark on paper, a glyph on a screen, or the word “seven.” But the number itself is not any of these tokens. We both understand “7” because we can perform the intellectual act of counting and grasping numerical relations. The token is a symbol, not the referent, which is a numerical value.
This is why I say that numbers, logical principles, and laws of nature are intelligible rather than phenomenal. They are not given in sensation the way tables, colours, or sounds are. You don’t encounter the number 7 in space and time; you grasp it by a capacity of the intellect. That makes them real, but not existent in the empirical sense.
Of course, we say colloquially that the number 7 exists, and I wouldn't take issue with that. But this is a philosophical distinction and in this context such distinctions are significant.
I'm not making arbitrary distinctions - I’m distinguishing two modes of existence. Phenomenal things exist as objects of sense. Intelligible things are real insofar as they can be grasped by a rational intellect, but they are not phenomena, in the way that sense objects are.
This distinction between phenomenal and intelligible objects isn’t something I’ve invented; it’s a well-established feature of the classical philosophical tradition. From Plato and Aristotle through the medievals and into early modern rationalism, the difference between what is apprehended by the senses and what is apprehended by the intellect was taken to be fundamental. It’s only with the rise of empiricism and the narrowing of “existence” to what can be observed or measured that this distinction began to fade from view.
I’m simply trying to keep both modes of understanding in play, because collapsing everything into the empirical domain obscures the reality of the intelligible structures we rely on in logic, mathematics, and science itself. And it is actually germane to the subject under discussion.
If the set is not complete, then you imply that there are more true sentences which are not in the set. So, do you mean by this, that "the set of true sentences" does not refer to all the true sentences?
But tomorrow isn't here yet.
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded time;
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.
Maybe. Even in ordinary conversation, it can get vague really quickly. I guess I'd agree that we know how to use "real" in the context of "Simone de Beauvoir was real" vs. "Santa Claus is not real".
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes, it would! Have there been other philosophical definitions which had to compete for survival against competitors using the same term? I feel there must have been, but I can't think of one at the moment. Maybe "logic"?
Quoting Ludwig V
In philosophy, yes, since we lack a reliable means to go and check whether we've got it right. Binomial nomenclature, in contrast, seems a noble and successful task.
Quoting I like sushi
I'm not being stubborn, but I just don't see how it follows. If you said, "Anything beyond is not anything for us," I'd see your point. But why would you assert that "for us" encompasses all there is?
Quoting Punshhh
Who are "these guys"?
Have you read Kant? If you have then refer to what he says about negative and positive noumenon.
Nothing more to say (you can search this very site to find examples of myself and others pointing out this difficult obviousness).
I wouldn’t want to name names as I feel cheeky enough saying what I said.
There is a point though, only an idealist, of some kind, would restrict what is to what can be said, or known by a person. Surely by contrast, a physicalist of some kind would allow any of an infinite number of other possibilities and the fact that we cannot observe them directly doesn’t preclude their existence.
The idealism question is a little harder. A hardcore Wittgensteinian/Davidsonian position on what we can talk about meaningfully isn't idealist, by my definition. That position raises doubts about going beyond human experience on what I'd call methodological grounds, rather than a skepticism based on some interpretation of Kantian idealism, say.
:100: :up: :up:
:up: :up:
Your replies read like a word game. But the OP is asking about what is, are you confining what is to what can be known by the use of words?
We can't "know" there's more (in the strict sense of "knowlwdge"). But we innately have a sense that there is a world beyond ourselves, and this constitutes a rational basis. Given that we have this belief, it is rational to maintain it unless it is defeated by other facts and valid reasoning. The mere fact that it is possibly false is not a defeater.
Physicalist (philosophical naturalist).
Just a small point. What I "actually" point to is a mark on wall or paper. That mark is a token of the type "7". It is a sign or symbol for the number, which is an abstract object. We often refer to tokens as numbers, but I agree that they are not.
Quoting Wayfarer
I'm surprised you are bothered about the empirical sense of "existent". I'm not, at least if you think that sense is "to be is to be perceived". The issue is whether inferences from what we perceive to things that are not (directly) perceived are allowed.
Quoting Wayfarer
Well, that's true. But it doesn't follow from the fact that intelligible objects are not phenomena that they do not exist.
Quoting Wayfarer
Perhaps so. But even Berkeley, for all his rhetoric, had to concede exceptions. The existence of his own self, other people, and God were all inferred from his perceptions (ideas). Physics and other sciences have no trouble with that - so far as I know. Microscopes, telescopes, dials and meters of all sorts.
I think that our language here leads us in to unnecessary difficulties. At first sight, it seems that "what we perceive" and "what is apprehended by the intellect" are two distinct sets of objects. But perception and intellect do not work separately, in distinct silos. They are both involved in everything. Perception involves understanding and understanding involves perception. It's not an accident that "I see" or "I hear you" can mean "I understand".
Quoting Wayfarer
The awkward thing here is that there is a gap between phenomenal things like sights and sounds, smells and tastes, etc. on one hand and intelligible things like circles and squares and numbers and functions. Ordinary life relies mostly on objects that involve both perception and understanding.
But there are lots of different kinds of object. Do we really need a "mode of existence" for each kind? I don't see that as necessary, though I'm not dogmatic about it.
Quoting J
Santa Claus and Pegasus &c. are a bit atypical. Standard cases are quite clear. Forged money is not real money, but exists; it is real in that it is a copy of real money. A model car is not a real car, but it exists because it is a real model of a car. A fisherman's fly is not a real fly, but it is exists because it is real bait. An actor is not a real policeman, but exists because they are a real person.
The last of these illustrates the peculiarities of fictional characters. Santa Clause is not just not a real person; he exists as a fictional or mythical character, which is to say that he does not exist.
Quoting J
I had the impression that philosophy was a war of all against all all of the time - in a collegial way, of course.
Quoting J
What is binomial nomenclature?
Quoting Punshhh
Of course not. We can observe them indirectly.
Quoting an-salad
We know that there are things we don't know about, because we have questions we cannot answer. We also know that there are things we don't know about because we know that we know things that people in the past didn't know.
Of course none of those things are beyond our reality. Or at least, if they are, they will become part of our reality as soon as we know about them.
Does that help?
And not a valid one. The mark is a symbol. What it represents is a mathematical value, not an object.
Who is "we"?
If you're referring to "mankind" and assuming it's somehow unified and uniform, then you're clearly wrong.
Secondly, there's no need to get all exotic and extraterrestrial. Let's rephrase your question to, "If the reality Tom experiences is the only thing that Tom has experienced, how does Tom know that there isn’t anything beyond Tom's reality?"
How about the internal states of Dick and Harry? Are they a reality for Tom? Does Tom care about the about the internal states of Dick and Harry? Does Tom even acknowledge the possibility that the internal states of Dick and Harry might be other than what Tom supposes?
Yes. You are right. My main point, though, was the structure of type and token that enables to say that it is the same symbol in many places and many occasions. Or at least, I thought that was what you meant.
Let's be clear: I'm pointing out that the OP isa a word game.
And "No".
We can be more specific. We can't assess physical theories without doing the maths.
And there is no maths here.
The system, begun by Linnaeus, of identifying creatures by genus and species, e.g., Homo sapiens. I offered it as an example of a single, useful definition that can save everyone a lot of trouble. It has to be agreed to, of course.
Quite so. That gives us some ground to treat the speculative physics that we hear so much about as somewhat different from this game. The speculations are at least candidates for the status of a hypothesis.
But it's not a free-standing game like noughts and crosses or tic-tac-toe. It's an extension of the language-game that's played in everyday language, and it is a puzzle game, not a competition between the players. Solving the puzzle is what it is all about. The solution is to understand the extension and see not only that it can't be played but why it can't be played. (Or, just possibly, to see whether there is a way that it might be playable.)
Quoting J
Of course. I should have understood. However, definitions like that are contextualized in a specialized field where the definition is a stipulation rather than a codification of an existing practice. Another advantage in the context of zoology is that it is possible to nominate a specimen as a reference, to supplement the words and help make decisions about borderline cases. So they are not like the philosophical attempts to define words that already have a use.
It is indeed a part of what I meant! But the additional point is that what is denoted by the symbol is an intellectual act, not a phenomenal existent. And I say that is a real, vital, and largely neglected distinction.
Yes. As you say, very few philosophical terms could undergo such an evolution. It's for that reason, as I've said so often on TPF, that I'd like to see philosophers avoid terms like "reality" whenever possible. Or else put it in Peirce-marks or Kant-marks or Carnap-marks etc. if that's what you mean. :smile:
If I may . . . This is right, and perhaps not so neglected if we see the connection with the many discussions we've had about the status of propositions. The whole point of trying to separate out something called a proposition is to preserve that very distinction. Sentences denote propositions (when they have the appropriate form), not objects or even individual thoughts. Nor are propositions objects in the world, though they may be about objects in the world. At least, that's the standard account. See Rodl though . . .
Well I think it's implicit that we're talking about known reality.
The way I look at it is this: I think hypotheses that we are living in the matrix or whatever are vulnerable to occam's razor. They have no better explanatory power than the hypothesis that I am a Homo sapiens on earth 2025, but posit additional entities.
And I think it's also important to stay within this explantory / hypothesis space. Because sometimes people make the claim that everything around us being a dream is somehow simpler than believing in a gigantic universe. But scale, and physicality, are not complexity. Or you sometimes get allusions to a an idea of a universe being "easier"; both of these claims are baseless and/or irrelevant at this time.
:up: And this ties back to Wittgenstein's statement that the world is all that is the case. He was referring to the insight that the world does not seem to be made of a set of objects, but of objects doing things. That gives us the notion that the world is a set of true propositions.
Yes, there are things we don't know. That is, there are true statements of which we do not have any knowledge. The person that realism should bother most is @Wayfarer, but he has convinced himself that he can have both antirealism and unknown truths.
Name one.
ADDED But propositions are made true by whether the arrangements of objects (crudely) are that way. We need the objects to help make a Wittgensteinian world.
Which I am seeking to leverage to make a point about metaphysics…a point which I still don’t think is being acknowledged.
:smirk:
No more than your replies are a word game.
The game seems to be, let’s insist there isn’t anything else (other than our reality), because we don’t have the vocabulary to do it’s ising justice. Meanwhile smuggling in the acknowledgement that there probably is something else (as a nod to the idea that you can’t prove a negative).
He’s doing a neat trick whereby the phenomenal has to become intelligible (therefore an intelligible object) before it can be acknowledged.
So it’s Multiverses all the way down then?
I see your "bothered to read" and raise you Fitch's paradox of knowability.
So yes, you did say something of that kind.
Anti-realism says: every truth must be knowable.
But you also say: there are truths we don’t and maybe can’t know.
Fitch shows you can’t have both.
If there are unknown truths, then not every truth is knowable, which just is the denial of anti-realism.
In a way, I'm fine with the first sentence. My problem is that we seem to hunger for a way of metaphorically pulling everything together under one heading. I just did exactly that with "everything". and that itself reveals the fundamental issue. In normal contexts, the scope of everything is set by the context (and sometimes we talk about "domains" in this context. But here, I'm attempting to use "everything" without a limiting context. We do the same with "reality", "existence", "being", "world", "universe" and "cosmos". The catch is that we can't let go of the expectation that the scope will be limited, and so we undermine our own attempt by positing something that is outside the scope of how we are using the term - a possibility that we set out to exclude.
Your second sentence is very tempting. It turns on the fact that these terms are not synonymous, but are conceptually linked and inter-related. But we don't have a clear grasp of those links and inter-relationship, so that we get lost in them. This second sentence is tempting, but if one asks what "the very same" means (and particularly wonder what the difference is between "same" and "very same"), the meaning suddenly becomes elusive. (I'm skating over the issue how "experience" and "knowledge" relate to the terms in the first sentence, because our idealist tendencies seem to me to explain that.)
Quoting Wayfarer
Does the following explain why you think the distinction is so important? Quoting Wayfarer
I don't want to elide the distinction you are trying to make - though I confess I don't fully understand it. I can attribute meaning to the idea of "phenomenal objects" and to the idea of "intelligible objects". But it does seem to me very important not to let go of the idea that we often understand the things that we perceive and often perceive the things we understand. I think I may be arguing for a third class of objects, which can both be perceived and understood. I hope that makes some sense.
Quoting J
I sympathize and try not to use those terms unnecessarily. But they are so deeply embedded in philosophy, that it seems impossible to not use them - and I can't resist joining in the discussion.
Quoting J
There's another term I would like to avoid.
Quoting Mijin
The trouble is that by referring to "known reality" you open up the possibility of unknown reality. Any limit that you try to set, immediately creates the idea that there is something beyond or in addition to that limit. Wittgenstein tries valiantly to get round that problem in the Tractatus, but ends up with a compromise - "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." - which sits oddly beside "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world."
Quoting J
Oh, surely, what he says is stronger than that. "The world is all that is the case." and "The world is the totality of facts, not things." Of course, this is related to the Fregean insistence that words only have meaning in the context of sentences and Wittgenstein's belief that sentences work in virtue of the similarity (identity?) of their structure with the structure of the world.
Quoting Punshhh
Yes, we give with one hand and take back with the other. Berkeley is a spectacular example. He says nothing can exist unperceived and that he does not deny the existence of "any one thing" that common sense believes in. (He reconciles the two by pointing out that God always perceives everything.)
Quoting Punshhh
Yes, that's the price you pay for positing phenomenal and intelligible objects as distinct kinds of objects. The obvious solution is to insist that perception and intelligence deal with the same objects at least sometimes.
Quoting Banno
On a quick look-up, SEP explains the paradox thus:-
I'm not impressed. It seems to follow that at any given time, there can be unknown truths. That these truths may be known at some other time is not particularly interesting.
Fitch's paradox only demonstrates the obvious, that every truth must be known. Since "truth" refers to a relation between propositions and reality, and only intelligent minds can produce this relation through the application of meaning, and the process of knowing, it is very obvious that all truths must be known.
So, what Fitch does, is take a clearly false premise, that there may be a truth which is unknown, and shows how one might produce an absurd conclusion from that false premise. That's common practise in philosophy, it's a way of demonstrating the falsity of the premise, to those who do not grasp the obvious.
The issue with the possibility of truths which we as human beings do not know, involves the assumption of a higher, divine intelligence, like God. If we understand that the human mind is deficient in its capacity to know, and we assume the possibility of an actually existing higher mind with a greater capacity to understand and know, then we accept the possibility of truths which are not known by any human mind, but are known by the higher mind.
I agree, it's open to several interpretations. Consider the first dictum. Is it definitional? That is, should we read it as "'The world' is 'all that is the case'"? Or is it descriptive: "The world is all that is the case"? i.e., there is nothing beyond the world. I favor the first reading, because I find it more provocative.
The same bifurcation of interpretation can be applied to the second dictum.
Quoting Ludwig V
This one also seems to fit with the "definitional" interpretation, where it doesn't appear so odd. The limits of my world are not the limits of the world. I may know that there are more facts, more "things that are the case," without being able to find them or speak about them. A great deal hinges on the question, "What does a limit do?" Does it prevent knowledge that there is more, or only knowledge about whatever that "more" is?
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes. My proposal for reform is quixotic. But at least we can be more conscious of how we use them -- and maybe use them a bit less often.
Quoting Ludwig V
Which one? "Proposition"?
"True" is a judgement. Judgements are only made by intelligent minds in the process called "knowing". Therefore all truths are known.
I agree. As you say, the idea is that the world is made of events and states.
Nope, afaik the quantum vacuum is the ground state of nature.
I certainly agree with that, but I’d re-state your premises justifying it.
OK, care to make that re-statement for me? Just so I can understand your perspective on this.
Righto.
The argument is not tensed. It is not based on "Not known now, but could be known later."
It begins with Up(p??Kp), which is not temporally dependent. It is modal. the supposition is the antirealist one that if something is true, it is possible to know it is true. The direct conclusion is that there is no p such that p is true and not known. This follows without reference to any time or duration. There cannot be any unknown truths if every truth is knowable.
If we are to hold that we do not know everything, then there are things we cannot know.
If we do not know everything, then antirealism is not an option.
That this is resisted hereabouts is a bit sad.
“True” isn’t the judgement; it is the relative quality of the judgement;
Judgements are, but not necessarily only, made by rational intellects in the process of understanding;
All truths are known, but not because of either of those.
The necessary condition of empirical truth as such, in general, is the accordance with a cognition with its object, cognition itself being the relation of conceptions to each other in a logical proposition, re: a judgement, or, the relation of judgements to each other, re: a syllogism. It is impossible not to know whether the relation of conceptions or of judgements accord with each other, for in either there is contradiction with experience if they do not. It is not given by that knowledge the cause of such discord, only that there resides no truth in it.
It is not that all true things are known, insofar as the sum of all possible cognitions is incomplete, some of which may be true respecting their objects, but that the criterion of any truth is known, for which the sum of possible cognitions is irrelevant.
Anti-realists don't have to explain how there are unstated statements.
Oh. :grin:
But isn't it the case that whether or not there is "accordance" is itself a judgement? You say that truth is "accordance" but isn't accordance a judgement? That "the cat is on the mat" is in accordance with reality, is a judgement. If you don't think that accordance is a judgement, then maybe you could explain how it could be anything other than a judgement?
Quoting Mww
If there is such a thing as "the criterion of any truth", doesn't this imply that truth is a judgement as to whether the specific criterion is fulfilled?
Yes, that is the only way around it, we are part of God and God sees everything. Therefore there isn’t anything that isn’t seen.
If this isn’t the case, then there must be other things that are not seen, even by an anti-realist. Because there might be more than one anti-realist.
Cool.
Yes. "Sentence" and "statement" are just about acceptable. "Thought" and "judgement" are also very dubious.
Quoting Banno
That wasn't my summary of the argument. I think it may be based on the point that the manifestation of a disposition or capacity is an event, therefore not tenseless.
It begins with Up(p??Kp), which is not temporally dependent. It is modal.
You won't be surprised that I don't know modal logic. But I had the impression that if it is possible to know that p, it is also possible to not know that p. So (forgive me that I can't do the formula properly,) the formula should read "For all p (if p is true then it is possible to know that p and possible not to know that p). I doubt that the conclusion would follow from that.
Quoting Banno
That sounds like "If it is possible that it is raining, it is raining." More generally "possible" does not imply "actual".
Quoting Banno
I don't see any problem about holding that we do not know everything.
Probability. A toss of a coin. It may land heads or tails and must land one or the other and we know that. We know the probabilities of each outcome, but we do not know which it will be.
Most questions identify things that are not known to the questioner. Many of them have answers in the sense that somebody knows the answer. But sometimes research is necessary. It's not really a problem.
I have more difficulty with the idea that there are things that we cannot know. In some cases, it is just a question of technology. Discovering the speed of light may be an example. Seeing what's on the far side of the moon is another.
But I do have a problem with the idea that there are things that we cannot know in some way that is not just a technological issue. Ex hypothesi, if we knew of some such thing, it would be something we knew.
No.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No.
You asked, I answered. You could have just said thanks.
I’ll end with this: an invitation to the dreaded Cartesian theater in your critique of my perspective. It is self-defeating, systemic nonsense, to conflate the thing with a necessary condition for it.
I didn't see anything to thank you for. But since you seem to be inviting me to critique your perspective, I will.
The substance of your reply, I see as based on incorrect assumptions which make your perspective impossible to understand.
That is the following:
Quoting Mww
It's fundamentally wrong, to say that it's impossible not to know whether a relation is a relation of accordance. More often than not, we do not know that. That is because whether or not it is a relation of accordance requires a judgement of that nature.
And, the proposed problem of "contradiction with experience" does not support that basic premise, because this phrase makes no sense. What could "contradiction with experience" even mean? What is experienced must be put into words, before anything can contradict this. So that would not be contradiction with experience, but contradiction with the description of what was experienced.
Then you mention the cause of discord, but causation is irrelevant here.
Further, you conclude with a statement about "possible cognitions". But we were talking about actual judgements or actual cognitions, and neither one of us provided any principles to establish a relation between actual and possible judgements/cognitions. You simply assumed another meaningless, nonsense principle, "the sum of all possible cognitions is incomplete".
It's nonsense because "possible cognitions", as individual items which could be counted, summed, doesn't make any sense in itself. To count them requires that they be cognized. Therefore the sum would be a sum of actual cognitions. A sum of possible cognitions is nonsensical, due to that impossibility.
So you’re saying, because how I represent my perspective, insofar as it is at least non-sensical or at most just plain wrong, I couldn’t possibly agree with you that all truths are known?
WTF, man. You shoulda just left it at thanks, and gone your merry way.
Our reality? All reality is subjective private mental state. There is no such a thing as "our reality".
Again all experience is private mental event. There is no other mind involved in an experience than "I" or "my mind.
As I said, I didn't see anything to thank you for. And to be insincere in a discussion about truth is self-defeating.
...conflates reality and private mental states. The very fact that you are posting on this forum shows that you do not agree with this. Moreover, that you are trying to communicate, to use language, demonstrates that there is more than your private mental state. You want a reply such as this.
But on it goes, around and around, Corvus trying to prove to everyone else that there is only Corvus.
Private mental state is the core of your mind which is your perception. You build your extra mind with your imagination and belief. Remember the external world and other minds are just figment of your imagination. There is no actual concrete existence on these objects, but fleeting impressions and ideas.
It proves that Banno has never read Hume or Kant, and has been trying to discuss philosophy in the public forum with his very limited mind.
If I am but a figment of your imagination, then why am I so aggravating? Some sort of self-loathing on your part?
If this post does not exist, then what is it you are now reading?
There's something quite mad in your solipsism.
Quoting Corvus
Kant wrote his massive tome to show this is wrong.
I never said the post doesn't exist. Where did you get that? I see the post, and I was responding to that. But I don't see you. I am imaging you might exist. There is difference between you do exist, and you might exist. To me, you are just a author of your post, and might exist. But I don't have any more perceptual data apart from it.
It is not a solipsism. You are not understanding the difference between solipsism and foundation for perceptual existence.
It is still in my reading list.
You said:
Quoting Corvus
Then
Quoting Corvus
The post you read, and this post, are your own private mental state, on your own account. I've got nothing to do with this, being just part of your own imaginings. You are addressing your posts to yourself. You did not read my post, you imagined it. My post doesn't exist, separately to your imaginings. Nor do I. You don't see the post, you just imagine that you see it. You are responding to your own imaginations, not to me. You are inflicting this thread on yourself. I am not the author of this post - your imagined that , too. You only imagined a difference between your solipsism and the "perceptions" you imagine that you have.
Either that, or your account is absurd.
Yes, I agree. But I recall a book called "Imagination in Kant's Philosophy" by a German philosopher I cannot recall his name. The book was emphasizing the fact, imagination and belief is critical part for constructing reality and the external world. I was totally agreeing with his point.
I mean Banno does exist, surely he must. But I don't have any factual perceptual data on Banno. I know Banno from his posts in the forum, and that is all what Banno is to me. The rest of Banno is my belief and imagination about Banno, which might be totally wrong and fictional in reality. And I do accept my existence to Banno must be the same.
That is the reality of our reality. It is not a solipsism.
If you claim that you have more than your imagination and irrational belief on the external world, then you are pretending. It is not a philosophical account.
No I don't. I'm just your imagination, tormenting you. Jamal and Colo don't exist, either. You imagined their replies, as you did the writings of Hume and Kant.
Quoting Corvus
But I don't exist, so I don't have an irrational belief in the external world. You are typing as if I exist, but of course I might be just your imagination. It's not me doing the pretending - you are the only one here. If my account is not a philosophical account, that's because that is what you imagined.
Or I am here, pointing to the errors in your account.
You may well exist, I was not saying that you don't exist. There is a difference, and you don't seem to see the difference.
I don't have the perceptual evidence on the existence apart from your misleading posts. That is the philosophical dissection of reality. I am not taking into account all the hypes in the media about the world, and refusing to be non philosophical frame of mind of the ordinary folks on the street.
No, that's right - your claim is that I may not exist. This is understood. While it is good to see you move that little bit towards admitting that I might exist, the remainder of your account stands at odd with such generosity.
You said;
Quoting Corvus
and:
Quoting Corvusand added:
Quoting Corvus
You apparently think these annoying posts are "subjective private mental state", since "all reality is subjective private mental state". You also say that this post is "just a figment of your imagination", and that I have "no actual concrete existence", but am only "fleeting impressions and ideas".
The ambiguity here is in your account, in your insistence that the "fleeting impressions and ideas" you have of me are insufficient for you to conclude that I exist; that on amount of evidence could be enough to convince you that I am here, posting these annoying and rude bits of text, rather than your having just imagined them yourself, that these are some manifestation of the "private mental state (that) is the core of your mind which is your perception".
And yet you are replying to these "private mental states", in what is presumably a form of autotalk, responding consciously to this manifestation of your unconscious mind, or something along these lines. And somehow you think this at least as good an explanation as that there is an annoying Australian who keeps pestering you about your posts.
Quoting Corvus
What would count as sufficient evidence for you? What more do you think you need, what could be added to your perceptions that would lead you to decide that there is more to me than your fantasies? What could produce certainty for you? But more, why do you demand certainty? You will no doubt respond to this post anyway, as you have in the past, and even though you hold that I might not be here to read your post. Your actions show that, despite your "philosophical" rumination, you think me sufficiently real to warrant a response.
Your responding to me, and indeed your participation in the forum, puts the lie to your account. You do believe we are here, watching for your response. The account you have offered is dishonest.
It is confusing to have you acknowledge that Kant argued against your argument immediately after you claim that he supported it.
A quandary.
From what I've seen the main argument in the last two pages has been that Banno thinks if there are things we don't currently know, then Antirealism can't hold.
Well... *sigh*. That is.. not reasonable.
There are plenty of things we may never come into contact with. That doesn't make them unknowable. Unknown and unknowable are simply not the same.
Now, I presume I've missed something major. But I don't see it anywhere. Someone want to help me out there?
It is difficult to follow your argument since you base it upon an interpretation of what an interlocuter has said rather than engage in the debate proffered.
There are many ways to show how the argument is not reasonable, I provided one. The argument requires a very narrow perspective to work. It works for Banno because he adopts that narrow perspective and refuses to talk to anyone who will not take it. It's like saying the argument requires these assumptions, and if you do not accept these assumptions, I will not discuss it with you. What's the point?
@Corvus I think that is all that is being said?
Well, yes. But can an anti-realist know that there is more than one anti-realist? I think not, and that's why I think that the only consistent form of idealism is solipsism.
Quoting Banno
That seems entirely reasonable. I guess the problems must be in the fine print.
Quoting Banno
But what is the force of "cannot"? Does it mean that we don't have the technology? Or does it mean that we have to develop a new approach (elliptical orbits instead of circular ones?
Quoting Banno
Well, I can see that perhaps we cannot know all truths. But it does not follow that there are any truths that we cannot know.
Quoting Banno
I think the distinctions between known unknowns and unkowns is relevant here. lt seems to me that the former are not incompatible with anti-realism (or some forms of it). I may not know the tenth place in the expansion of pi (5), but I know that there's a method for finding it. But it also seems to me that the latter are. However, I don't see that anything prevents us from discovering at least some of them and developing new concepts in the process.
Quoting Banno
Perhaps not. I don't really think I'm capable of demonstrating that it is wrong. On the contrary, I think it is right, provided the context is right. IEP - Dynamic Epistemic Logic has a helpful summary of the argument:-
It is clearly true that I cannot know that p (is true) and that I do not know that p. In general, if the person who knows (K) is the same as the person who asserts the starting-point, it is self-contradictory (Moore's paradox). But it is not contradictory if the person asserting the starting-point is different from the person who knows. There's no problem about me asserting (knowing) that p is true and someone else does not know it. I'm not sure what impact, if any, this has on realism/anti-realism.
Quoting AmadeusD
I agree with you that it is not obvious that known unknowns threaten antirealism. But unknown unknowns do. The catch is that we don't, and can't, know what they are. We only know that there are such things because we have encountered some of them before.
I'm not sure if it is relevant but @Banno doesn't assert merely that there are things that we don't currently know. Quoting Banno. l agree, though, that a move from "knowable" to "known" does seem to require tenses.
My reality is strictly constructed with my perception, sensation and imagination and belief. What I don't sense and perceive, I rely on my imagination and belief. There is no objectivity in there. Even my own perception and sensation can sometimes mislead me. There is no 100% guarantee that my perception and sensations are infallibly true. And what is more, what I perceive and sense is perhaps not even 0.0000000000001 percent of the world. How could I pretend to claim to know what the world is?
Now this is not a solipsism like some have been misled on the point. It is the critical nature of our perception, mind and reality under the philosophical analysis.
Some say Kant was a phenomenologist, quite understandably so.
Fair enough, I should have minded my own business.
Quoting Corvus
There are different varieties of solipsism? How can they be compared to each other? That would seem to cancel the isolation you are reporting.
It is true that our perception and sensation can sometimes mislead us. But "sometimes" means that sometimes they do not mislead us. That looks like objectivity to me.
Quoting Corvus
No, there's no guarantee. But that doesn't make them subjective.
Yes, I understand that obstacle. I suppose my problem with thinking this has any effect, whatsoever, on these conceptual analyses is that it is wholly fact-specific and empirical. We may never, ever, in our entire existence come across some substance which exists 60,000 light years away and further. That is, on it's face, and unknowable unknown. If the idea is that for antirealism to hold, everything knowable must be in concept, in hand, then I see only two realistic responses:
1. That's nonsense, and obviously so; or
2. Is what's actually being said is something more like "you can't claim something is unknowable conceptually" which seems wrong in it's own way but I can see the argument.
My big problem with any issue with "unknowns" is that they are simply unknown. We can't comment on them, no matter what system we ascribe to. I'm happy to presume there are plenty of things humans will never (and, physically/practically/empirically) can never know. I'm not seeing hte issue. If i've missed it (i presume I have) please help lol.
I know you exist by the language we share to communicate, art and music we share, and posts you write. But that's it. Beyond that, I don't know anything about your mind, and its content. Solipsism doesn't take into account on these points. They say that nothing else exists apart from their own mind, or some might even say, their mind doesn't exist either. That is solipsism.
My point is that as long as we exist communicating and sharing on these cultural and linguistic activities, we can infer and postulate our existence and others. But beyond that, we are still in our own world. Even if I had a very intimate discussions on many topics or shared some daily life experience with someone, I would not claim I know their deep true inside feelings, thoughts and wills. At this point, we are not talking about someone's physical existence here, like Banno has been insisting to have.
I am not sure if perception can be objective in any sense. In what sense what I am seeing X is same as you are?
Quoting Ludwig V
Nothing makes perception and sensation subjective. Aren't they subjective experience by nature?
It sounds like what you are calling "solipsism" is what other people refer to as single individuals.
Quoting Corvus
For most people, I think, if something can be true or can be false, it is objective. There's no truth or falsity to something subjective.
Quoting Corvus
Do you mean if I am seeing a bus and you are seeing a bus, in what sense are we seeing the same object? In one sense, if we are seeing different buses, we are seeing two objects of the same kind. If we are both seeing the same bus, we are seeing the same object. Does that help?
Quoting Corvus
But if you know that they have some deep true inside feelings etc. then it must be possible, even if it is difficult, to know what they are.
Quoting AmadeusD
That's most likely because you are not wearing the right spectacles. Here's my take on it:-
This account rests on the the application of a metaphor to language - "external" and "internal". Realism asserts what antirealism denies - that there are things "outside" language and most language is "made true" by that reality. Antirealism asserts that truth and falsity are just a matter of internal coherence among the descriptions of language.
Sometimes that seems to me to make perfect sense; sometimes I cannot get my head round it.
That's one thing that makes the debate difficult. The strongest argument in favour of anti-realism is that there is no way to identify the non-linguistic, language-independent world without using language. The business about unknowns rests on the idea that if language is not complete, in the sense that there are facts that cannot be expressed in it, then there must be a distinction between language and the world it describes.
So the hope is that by identifying "gaps" in language, we'll open a door into that world. The biggest problem in that project is that you can't identify something unless you know it.
Does that help?
Solipsists will say, nothing exists apart from themselves no matter what. I am saying, we don't know something or somebody exists until we communicate, share feelings, art, music and ideas, and even meet in real life forming relationships.
You seem to be confusing objectivity and truth. Objectivity is not necessarily truth. Subjectivity is not necessarily false.
Quoting Ludwig V
Nope. Not making sense at all. No two minds can see a bus exactly same. Even if you and your pal see a bus passing in front of you, your perception and his perception will be different in some way. You cannot stand on the exact position where he stands, and your eye sight wouldn't be same as his ...etc.
I didn't think I was, although we may have different definitions. For me, objectivity is true or false. Subjectivity is neither.
Quoting Corvus
I didn't mean to say that your perception and my perception of the bus are exactly the same. For a start, one of them is yours and the other is mine. But that is merely numerical difference. I will stipulate that there will always be qualitative differences as well. But then, there will also be qualitative similarities too. Telling whether we are seeing the same bus is a matter of weighing those up. One example is that the one bus may well be at different points in our visual fields, which in any case can't be located in relation to each other. But we can use that information to identify where the bus is in public space. It we both locate our visual bus at the same point in our shared space, it is very likely to be the same bus. If we locate it in different points at the same time, it is almost certain to be two buses.
I think the biggest argument for antirealism is the actual facts of eyes, ears, noses and mouths (and skin, I guess). I do, however, think its possible I've not come across a name for the position I actually think its reasonable, because its not idealism as antirealism might suggest.
I suggest antirealism about perception is roughly, unavoidable, but that antirealism as a metaphysical comment seems... tenuous as best, and seemingly ridiculous at worst. Maybe that clears up where I'm not understanding the issues in the previous comments.
Quoting Ludwig V
I don't see why.
We can write "Kp" for "we know p", and "?Kp" for "we might know p", and "~Kp" for "we don't know p" and "~?Kp" for "we can't know p", none of which are tensed.
W can write "Kp" for whatever we like. Once we have interpreted it, however, (I think that's the right word), there are consequences.
"we know p", is compatible (awkwardly) with "we might know p". But it is incompatible with "we don't know p" and "we can't know p".
"we might know p" compatible with "we know p" and "we don't know p"; it is incompatible with "we can't know p",
In other words, we can interpret "Kp" however we like, but that does not mean we can substitute any interpretation for any other. "We know that p" and "We might know that p" are not inter-substitutable.
In addition, we have the issue of tensed or tenseless. This is complicated and doubly complicated in this context, because we have two verbs involved. But I'm stuck on "it is raining" does not follow from "It might be raining".
I might well be confused about what tensed and untensed truths.
Quoting AmadeusD
I agree with you that we're not all that far apart. There is a truth in anti-realism; where I disagree with it is the inflation of that truth into a Grand Doctrine. In the case of perception, it is inescapable true that what we know about the world around us comes to us from our senses.
But it is what the anti-realist (idealist) makes of this mundane fact that bothers me.
The point of the discussion in that post is the idea that our perceptions (or language) are not self-contained but point beyond themselves to a mind-independent reality, which can be known by us. Which does not mean that we will ever know everything about everything, so that there are always some things that are not known.
Definitely. It's taken me a while to realise that its required to claim antirealism. It makes me very uncomfortable as I need to push back hard on the likes on Banno claiming that perception is direct.
It seems to me that "direct" and "indirect" do not have a determinate application in the context of perception. So it's like "glass half full" and "glass half-empty". Which means one should not draw dramatic conclusions from either.
But do we think that noise-cancelling headphones prevent us from hearing what's going on, or do we think that they enable us to hear what is going on?
Do they distort reality? In one sense yes, in another sense no.
It's hard to see the relevance of much of this.
Sure, we can't both know and not know the very same thing, and there are other similar permutations. "We know that p" and "We might know that p" are not inter-substitutable, but if we know p then it is possible that we know p.
But this is not to do with tense.
A realist will maintain that there are truths we do not know. An antirealist will maintain that every truth is possibly knowable. Fitch showed that if every truth is knowable, then every truth is known:
That is, the antirealist cannot know that there are truths that cannot be known, without contradiction.
Fitch shows that the antirealist cannot consistently maintain both that all truths are knowable and that there are any unknown truths; the antirealist must either accept omniscience, accept unknowable truths, or abandon the unrestricted knowability thesis.
The view expressed by is pretty much that taken by Austin and by myself. , as I recall, was unable to follow the discussion. But the notion that all we know is found by perception if fraught with issues, peripheral to the question of what is real. It is a mistake to equate what we perceive with what is real.
I suppose this, somewhat, rests on something Banno's type would say v something I would say:
"When you look at a tree you see a tree".
So much seems true. But I would say...
"You factually do not see something "out there"". You see a tree, because that's what you see, we call a tree. Not because that's the same thing as what you cast your eyes upon. Something something ding en sich.
You see something in your mind (or rather, generated by it). This is what I mean when I say indirect. It may be that there is no appreciable difference between the two - looking through a dark glass doesn't necessarily have you seeing something 'untrue'. But To suggest that we see the world undistorted seems to me something which can be set aside without much trouble. I've definitely had to drop aspects of these thoughts over the last year or so though, for the reason set out in the last two comments we made to each other: I don't think the world exists in the mind. I just don't see a problem with accepting there is a real world, and a world of perception - whatever their closeness in terms of identity.
Quoting Ludwig V
I don't think 'distort' anything on the basic premises here. Closing ones eyes simply has us seeing the inside of our eyelids. Putting on noise-cancelling headphones simply has us hearing a restricted selection of the sounds we might otherwise hear. The same as going into one's car, to some degree. Its not the same as, for instance, an inability to see the frequency we call red. That's where the interesting stuff comes in, and where I've truly loved Banno's comments over the couple of years i've been here.
Mate, I followed it. I didn't agree with you (or Austin, as it has since turned out).
I agree, it's a mistake to equate what we perceive with what is real. I can't see the disagreement anymore.
Quoting Banno
Are you able to explain in non-formal terms how this works?
There doesn't seem to be any tension whatsoever between saying "there are things we can't know" and reality.
I also don't understand how an antirealist is committed to saying all truths are knowable. That said, my understanding (or, probably more properly my ill-labeled position) is that an antirealist has to assume there are truths we don't know. So am more than happy to have it explained to me like I'm not following - cause this time i'm not lol. I don't know Fitch.
SO what is it that you think a antirealist claims, say concerning the truth of facts in the physical world... perhaps concerning Russell's teapot, for example...
Isn't it the case that they they will say something like that statements about the teapot do not have a truth value?
"Every Truth is knowable" is subject independent. It does not presume the existence of knowers.
"Every truth is known" is subject dependent since it presumes the existence of knowers.
Note : I'm not making a tensed argument.
So you can't claim both are represented by the same propositional form "kp" without justification.
Does Fitch justify this? If not, then it's the worst case of question begging & the formal logic showpiece is nothing short of sophistry. Symbols can only take you so far, what matters more is semantics, epistemology & metaphysics at a deeper level.
There's a big difference between
"We might know p" & "P is knowable" , but I have mentioned this in the post above
p ? ?Kp also seems strange. By what entailment would one accept this as true ?
"We know p" may not imply "We may know P" since the latter expresses a degree of uncertainty which is nullified by the earlier statement, assuming infallibility.
Even if we don't assume infallibility, It all depends on what you mean by "may know P". It clearly involves epistemic modality & I don't see why it shouldn't be dealt with in terms of subjective probabilities. There is NO absolute truth evaluation here.
So what you are saying is “Every truth is knowable” quantifies over possible worlds and possible knowers; it does not require that any knowers actually exist? But that “Every truth is known” is a claim about the actual world and requires actual knowers?
Ok. So Fitch shows us that (p ? ?Kp) ? (p ? Kp).
Does that help? Kp is read "p is known", and ?Kp, "it is possible that p is known". They are not the "represented by the same proposition". But the latter is derivable from the former.
p ? ?Kp is the mooted supposition of the antirealist. It's they who advocated this.
Do check out the SEP article. There are issues here, but not those of validity.
Fitch is not arguing that for all p, we have p -> Kp. Fitch is arguing that if for all p, we have p -> ?Kp, then for all p, we have p -> Kp, but since it is not acceptable that for all p, we have p -> Kp, it is not acceptable that for all p, we have p -> ?Kp.
Yes. Precisely that. The consequence of this is the term k will be different for one of the two.
To illustrate,
(K(p),x) =: There exist x which knows p, for truth is known
K(p) =: p is knowable, for truth is knowable
Now, there is no way to draw an inference from the latter to the earlier since the total variables are different
If this argument isn't mentioned in SEP (I haven't checked it yet) then it doesn't show it's invalid. It could be out there, somewhere else. I don't think I'm the first one to ever raise this rather obvious objection.
Quoting Banno
I understand. It's a supposition. But my argument above invalidates it.
Here's another problem with this approach though, & it is related to the nature of suppositionals. Some logicians won't allow you to conflates the material & formal conditions or unite them together.
So a claim in the form of "Suppose this, then so & so, therefore that" even if conceded by your opponents, has no demonstrative power. The conclusion is simply dialectical...it remains inconclusive. For a demonstration to obtain, the material conditions of the propositions must be fulfilled. You may regard this as an outdated Aristotelian objection, but it has actually inspired modern relevance logic [which extends to modality]
Just because something can be true or false, it is objective? Subjectivity has no truth or falsity? I don't agree.
Do you have some example cases for your points?
Quoting Sirius
After years of explaining very similar issues to Banno, Banno simply chooses to ignore, rejecting Aristotelian bullshit. As you accurately point out, "known" and "knowable" are defined by distinct relations, with distinct variables. You say, one is subject dependent, the other is subject independent. This makes them categorically distinct. Therefore there is nothing within :"known" which implies "knowable". And since "knowable" is supposed to be subject independent, it must be defined by some other relation.
I explained this problem thoroughly to Banno already, as the incompatibility between what is actual, and what is possible. If, for instance, we say that X is actually the case, we cannot say also that X is possibly the case, due to contradiction. What it means to say that X is an actuality contradicts what it means to say that X is a possibility. The principles required to make it true that X is an actuality, negate the possibility that X is possible. But Banno continues to insist (sophistically), that the latter is "derivable" from the former.
Quoting Sirius
That's Banno's usual, reject outdated Aristotelian principles, in full ignorance of the fact that these principles were established for the purpose of combatting very similar sophistry.
Here's an illustration to demonstrate what I'm talking about. Suppose we take a simple proposition P, and say that it is possible. We therefore must also allow that not-P is possible. In the basic form, we have a relation of equality between them, each is equally possible. This equivalence between the two allows us to apply mathematics, 50% probability at the fundamental level. It is fundamental to the nature of "a possibility", that there is at least two, and this allows us to apply the mathematics of probability.
Now, we can add secondary propositions which would alter the weighting, making one possibility more probable than the other. We can add as many secondary propositions as we like, and apply formulae to figure probability. However, if we go to the point of saying either P or not-P is true, that it is what is actually the case, then we assign 100% probability to it. This negates all other possibilities, and since the one assigned 100% is necessarily the one and only, it loses it's nature of being a possibility.
So in Banno's example, P is actually known. But Banno wants to derive from this truth, that P is also possible to be known (knowable). But of course, by the logic of the above example, if P is knowable, (possible to be known), it is impossible that P is actually known.
Again, It's likely my position has been mislabeled (by myself, lol) - I don't think the problem of perception means there aren't things out there. Given that basis, I can accept there are truth claims to be made about Russell's Teapot. Could we know whether they're true? Not yet. But we certainly could. I think I previously confused statements that have no way of gleaning metaphysical 'truth' (i.e "I know God exists") and things we're ignorant of (i.e "There's a teapot orbiting between Earth and Mars"). "What we consider real" is probably not the same as "what is real". I think its possible to hold that we wont ever get those two things aligned, because of the problem of perception, while accepting that its a problem - not a solution. There are real things, and if there's a teapot up there, there is. If there isn't, there isn't.
Those weird shadow sculptures where you see something supposedly obvious, and then realize the shadow is caused by something entirely else seems to speak to this in microcosm.
For our purposes, Kp has been understood as "we know p", simplifying the logic somewhat. That's a pretty standard practice. If you like we can indeed introduce a relation, K(a,p), which would be read as "a knows that p". And then we might write "There exist x which knows p" as ?(x)K(x,p). And "truth is knowable" would be ??(x)K(p,x) - "in some possible world, there is someone who knows that p"
Do all this, and the actual argument presented by Fitch will stand.
Frankly is seems to me that the modal operator more than covers your quibble.
As for it's being a suppositional argument - yes, it's a reductio. Pointing out the structure of the argument is not showing that it is invalid. And to be sure, the argument is formally valid in classical modal logic. It is a theorem.
You might indeed reach for a relevance or intuitionist logic. Fill in the details, if you like. Do you really wish to reject classical logic itself? Seems a lot for an Aristotelian.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is why I ignore your posts, Meta. What you have said here is simply muddled. It contains, even in this small snippet, two distinct logical errors. First, nothing at all concerning numerical probability follows from the contingency ?p ^ ?~p. One involves probability, the other modality. You simply conflate them. Second, even if we interpret the modality epistemically - as "for all the agent knows, P may be true", we are not entitled to assigning a 50% probability. Your leap from our lack of our knowing to a presumption of equal probability is unjustified. “I do not know whether p” is not the same as "p and ¬p are equally likely."
I ignore you because you make so very many errors, that take time to explain; but also because even when the problem is explained, you habitually double down rather than correct yourself. Witness your views on acceleration and on 0.9999... and now on this, all display the same pattern.
Back to ignoring you.
Ok. Other anti- realists do. That's rather the point of Fitch's argument.
If you suppose that "there is a teapot in orbit between Earth and Mars" is either true, or it is false, independently of it's having been verified, you are on most accounts a realist, holding that truth-values are mind-independent.
If you think something along the lines that it is not true until it has been verified, then you are an anti-realist. If you think something along the lines that it is not true until it has been verified, and accept classical logic, then you are accepting that the existence of the teapot is true only if it is possible to verify its existence - that is to say, only if it is possible to know that it exists. And that's the p??Kp that Fitch shows commits one to omniscience. This is why anti-realists usually reject classical logic.
You obviously didn't address what I wrote. And, it appears like you didn't even attempt to understand what I wrote. Despite pretending to consider what I wrote, and adding your two cents worth, your ignorance is continuous.
...and there's the double-down.
You, and it seems perhaps , have not understood K(p) and ?K(p). The first is "p is known", the second, "p is knowable".
But by all means, make this thread about me, again.
It is very obvious that the difference between actual and possible indicates that if p is knowable (possible to be known), then p is not known. Conversely. if p is known, then p is not knowable (possible to be known) because it is already actually known. I illustrated this very clearly in my reply to Sirius, which it appears that you did not take the time to understand. To conflate these two is an abuse of language, which you do with the intent of sophistry.
If this were so, you would not know any things that are knowable.
:lol:
You are treating “Possible to be known” as if it meant “not known”. But if you know something, then it is possible that you know it.
Or do you know only things that are impossible to know? Perhaps you think you do.
That's exactly right. "Knowable" excludes "known" because knowable allows for "not-known". Every proposition which I know, is actually known, that's what "known" means. However, "knowable" means that it is possible that the proposition could be known, and this implies that it is not actually known. Therefore I do not know any propositions which are knowable, (possible to be known) because every proposition that I know is actually known, therefore not-possible that it is not-known, and knowable implies that it is possible that it is not-known.
Quoting Banno
Of course, "possible to be known" is categorically distinct from "known". Therefore it is a form of "not-known", in the sense of other than known. To allow otherwise would create all sorts of epistemological problems.
Consider your example. I know something, and it is possible that I know it. We can represent these as the two following propositions P1, "I know X", and P2, "It is possible that I know X". Clearly, if we judge P1 to be true, we cannot honestly judge P2 to be true, because the truth of P2 allows that P1 may not be true. We cannot say that it is true that I know X, and also that it is true that it is possible that I know X, because the latter judgement implies that it is possible that I do not know X, thereby ruling out the possibility of former judgement, that I know X.
Therefore "it is possible that I know X" must be taken as a form of "I do not know X", because "possible that I know X" implies necessarily that I may not know X. So "I know X" and "it is possible that I know X" cannot both be true at the same time, because the latter allows the possibility that "I know X" may be false, and that would contradict "I know X". In other words, claiming both provides the premises which allow for contradiction.
Quoting Banno
Who said anything about "impossible"? Like you, and everyone else, I only know things which are known. I do not claim to know things which are possibly known, because possibly known implies possibly not known as well. Then I would be claiming to know things which are possibly not known, thereby allowing for the potential of contradiction.
On the bright side, it will help me to achieve my goal of 30k posts before the Great Metempsychosis.
He's conflating possibility with negation. If I know X, then it is trivially possible that I know X. “Possible to be known” does not imply “not known.” Any known proposition is both known and knowable. Claiming otherwise leads to the absurdity that nothing can be known.
Again, the alternative is that Meta only knows stuff that it is not possible to know.
This is what happens when you study a bit of Aristotle and never touch logic after the 16th century. Possibility, actuality, and knowledge start to collapse into contradictions.
Fair enough. I don't quite understand why people think this, then. There's no reason to assume one must be (empirically) capable of knowing some truth x for that truth to obtain. I think you've laid out the logic here for Sirius. Being not good at formal logic (getting there!) I wont attempt to litigate that but I very much appreciate your effort to help me on this one.
I have to say I still don't see the tension. Again, likely because I've misapprehended how these labels apply, but I maintain we can't be sure of any truth values of this kind (Descartes demon and all notwithstanding - only partially interesting concepts there imo) because I think our indirect perception precludes certainty. I understand this to be uncontroversial. I think the use of "reality" is muddling things, either for you or I. I note that 'reality' can have two pretty distinct meanings as illustrating by pulling apart "what we perceive" and "what is real". This seems to me an entirely reasonable thing to say/hold in mind. It also seems to indicate we may not have access to the world which we(sic) as realists accept exists outside of what we can access. My memory tells me you feel there's a 1:1 match there, which is neat. I don't so it's hard to know what way to turn.
If the antirealist is committed to the kind of claim that results in idealistic thinking (in a non-Kantian way) then yeah, I'm not one. But I'm certainly not a realist about perception, so its hard to claim i'm a realist about reality. I don't really know what's out there - I'm just quite sure it is.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Fwiw, this is definitely not the case as I see it. "Known" indicates that some S knows it. It also indicates that another S could also know it but does not currently. Therefore, it's knowable as well. I think this can be illustrated by making a claim like "I know what you mean". Maybe you do. But someone else can too. My meaning is not know "unknowable". Knowledge of it has just obtained in one mind. That doesn't preclude further instances of the same.
I understand the inference you're drawing, and I think Banno's on a bit of a horse when it comes to his own frustration, which I get (and have found distasteful, particularly as pointing it out inevitably results in the charge that we're obsessed with him). But I think yours is an unwarranted inference that extends what's available on these terms to an area unavailable: singular determination. Any piece of information can be known many times over by different people or animals. So I'm with him here.
Meta is emblematic of the poor grasp of logic found hereabouts.
By "tension", you mean that between realism and antirealism? In the end they are two differing grammars, each of some use in their own place.
"our indirect perception precludes certainty" involves several mistakes, in my opinion. But we've been over that.
Just take my stance on perception seriously for a second - it doesn't mean I can't also say there's a (whatever it is, but lets say..) tree outside my office to which I can cast my eyes. It just means it might not look "the way my mind conveys to me" to some other perceiving being with a different system on deck.
That said, if the logic ends up being such that I cannot claim to know there's anything out there, while maintaining that perception is indirect, I would be comfortable saying 'we cannot know anything outside the mind". I don't think that's a realist position or an antirealist position the way they're being described here. I just assume there is an outside the mind.
I see you're still having difficulty understanding. Either that or you've retreated into some form of denial. So, let me lay it out very succinctly.
Take any proposition, "the cup is red" for example. The truth of this proposition means that the situation cannot be otherwise from the cup being red. Now take the alternative proposition, "it is possible that the cup is red". This means that the situation can be otherwise from the cup being red. One says it can be otherwise, the other says it cannot be otherwise. Therefore the two contradict each other in meaning, an implicit contradiction.
We can see a very similar situation with "p is known", and "p is knowable". Truth of the former indicates that the situation cannot be otherwise from p is known, while truth of the latter indicates that it can be otherwise from p is known. Therefore one contradicts the other and they cannot both be true at the same time. One is not derived from the other, it implicitly contradicts the other.
Quoting Banno
How can you honestly say something like this? If you know that Jill pushed Jack down the hill, and someone asks you about what happened, then you are being untruthful if you say that you believe it is possible that Jill pushed Jack. Obviously you do not believe that at all, because you know that Jill actually did push Jack. To say that it is possible that Jill pushed Jack, is to be deceitful, because it contradicts what you know. To insist that "I know X" and "It is possible that I know X" are consistent with one another is blatant deception.
Quoting AmadeusD
How does "known" indicate these things to you. If it indicates that some S knows it, it doesn't in anyway indicate that another S could know it. That would require another premise. So your argument is based in hidden premises.
The problem I see with this approach, is that if we define "known" as the property of one S, then when we introduce other Ss we have no way of validating whether what one S knows is actually the same thing as what another S knows. So, S knows something, and teaches it to another, T. Now what T knows is not the same thing as what S knows, even though S taught T. It doesn't make sense to say that another knows the same thing that S knows, in any logically rigorous sense of "same".
Quoting AmadeusD
This is not true, for the reason i just explained. The information I receive is not the same as what you receive, because we each have distinct spatial temporal perspectives. Therefore it is false to say that many different people know the same piece of information.
I don't think the rest needs treating with this in mind.
Or you're barking up a really weird and uninteresting tree. To say "the colour of the surface of Mars is known" doesn't mean anything. Known by whom?
You tend to ignore mentions, so I've reverted to reverse psychology. It seems to be working.
Quoting AmadeusD
Yes, I assumed that was the perspective you were taking from the start.
Quoting AmadeusD
The rest of my post assumes that position, that knowledge is particular to the individual subject. I described the problems with this, what is known to me is not the same as what is known to you. Reread the post.
Quoting AmadeusD
Look, I say that I know Mars is red, and you say that you know mars is red. The fact that we use the same words, "Mars is red" doesn't mean that we both know the same thing. The words represent what is known as proper to each subject who uses the words. What I know as "Mars is red" is completely different from what You know as "Mars is red".
:lol: yes, indeed.
If we know that p, then it is possible that we know that p.
The alternative... if we know that p, and yet it is not possible that we know that p... is risible.
Meta knows things that are impossible to know. :smirk:
Another fine example of sophistic abuse of language. The correct statement would be ... if we know that p, it is not possible that we know that p is possible. This is because logically, if we know that p is possible, then it is the case that we do not know that p. "We know that p" is not consistent with "we know that p is possible". Difficult to understand? I think not. Common sense will tell you that if we know that P is possible, this is consistent with "we do not know that p", and it is inconsistent with "we know that p".
This is the problem with your representation, from the start, which @Corvus very adeptly points out. You start with the subject "we", and the predicate "know that p". Then you unsoundly step outside that predication, to qualify it with "it is not possible that". Nothing that I said supports this strawman representation. The "knowable" in your representation is not a predication of any subject, because you attempt to remove it from "we". In fact, this representation is illogical, being excluded by the law of excluded middle if we adhere to the need for a subject in predication.
The two alternatives are "we know that p", and "we do not know that p". Representations such as, "possible that we know that p", are explicitly excluded by the law of excluded middle. For the umpteenth time, do you recognize this reality, that "possible that we know that P", in this basic form, violates the law of excluded middle? Therefore, if it happens to be the case that the truth of the matter must be represented with "we know that p is possible", then we must categorize this as a form of "we do not know that p", in order to remain consistent with the law of excluded middle. That is because, if you stipulate that "we know that p is possible" is consistent with "we know that P", as you do with "If we know that p, then it is possible that we know that p", you implicitly contradict yourself, because because knowing that p is possible is not knowing that p. Therefore "we know that p is possible" must be classed as a form of "we do not know that P".
This is such simple, basic reasoning, developed thousands of years ago, so I cannot honestly believe that you actually do not understand it. And especially after its been so thoroughly explained to you numerous times. Therefore I can only conclude that you intentionally deny fundamental logical principles for the sake of sophistry.
Curiously, Aristotle was at pains to disagree.
Metaphysics ? 3,
“Everything that is in actuality is capable of being so; for what is impossible cannot be actual.”
Metaphysics ? 1,
“That which exists in actuality exists because there is a capacity for it; for nothing impossible is actual.”
De Interpretatione 9
“If a thing is or has been, then it is necessary that it was possible for it to be.”
Physics III.1,
“For what is not possible does not occur.”
You gallantly attempt to make a coherent account in which knowing that p is possible is logically incompatible with knowing that p. But this requires a reversal of modal logic and the standard view of the last 2300 years - that what is actual must be possible.
As for your use of Excluded Middle, "It is possible that we know that P" is not a third state between "We know that P" and "We don't know that P". It is a different proposition about the modal status of Kp. It is ?Kp. You mistakenly claims that a modal statement about a proposition (?Kp) violates the binary truth-value of the proposition itself (Kp). This is a category error. LEM governs the truth of propositions, not the content of those propositions. Both Kp and ?Kp are individual propositions that are each subject to LEM on their own.
I don't see how any of your free floating quotes from Aristotle are relevant, because you and I are discussing epistemic possibility, and your quotes from Aristotle concern ontological possibility. These two are very different. Clearly Aristotle believed, as you indicate ""If a thing is or has been, then it is necessary that it was possible for it to be". But Aristotle was very interested in change, and the temporal aspect of reality, physics. So he was concerned with how a specific possibility is actualized, rather than some other possibility, and he also stipulated that the possibility of a physical thing is always prior in time to the actual existence of that thing, as your quotes indicate.
Quoting Banno
It's not my fault if the so-called "standard view" is misguided and obviously incorrect. Your appeal to authority does not stand up very well to my well-formulated logical argument. Look again:
P1. We know shit.
P2 We do not know shit.
P3 It is possible to know shit.
If we judge 1 as true, then we know that we know shit. Further, if we then proceed to judge 3, we already know that we know shit, and 3, "it is possible to know shit" implies that shit may not be known. That shit may not be known is impossible by our judgement of 1, a judgement which makes it necessary that we know shit. So 1 and 3 are incompatible. However, if we judge 2 as true, then we know that we do not know shit. But even if we judge that we do not know shit, it might still be possible that we could know shit. So 2 and 3 are compatible.
Quoting Banno
OK, now we're getting somewhere. I will agree, that "It is possible that we know that P" is a different type of proposition, categorically distinct from the pair "we know that p", and "we do not know that p". So, you need to treat them that way, and stop declaring that one is "derivable" from the other. That is your category mistake, Look:
Quoting Banno
I'm happy to concede that both "we know that p" and "we do not know that p" are categorically distinct from, and incompatible with, "it is possible to know p", but then you must agree that we cannot draw inferences across that category boundary.
This is why I "double-down". You say things like "It is a different proposition about the modal status of Kp", and "This is a category error", which indicates that you actually recognize the principles. But you refuse to apply these same principles to your own erroneous statements. So it's a type of hypocrisy. You make claims and assertions which are contrary to the principles which you employ in arguments against others. Doubling-down is necessary to help you to reflect.
That category mistake is what Sirius pointed out to you.
Quoting Sirius
Quoting Sirius
...the bit where if you know stuff, then it thereby is possible to know stuff. Yes, it might have been that we did not know stuff, but as things turned out, we do know stuff. Either way, it is possible - that is, not impossible - to know the stuff that we do indeed know.
Note that it's "shit may not be known", which is quite valid, and not your "shit is not known", which implies that you only know shit that it is not possible to now.
This is the standard view, from Aristotle onward.
This is tedious, Meta. But good for my post count.
For anyone watching on, (well, there may be some...) Meta's argument relies on treating “?Kp” as if it meant “we do not know p, but could.” But that is not what the modal operator means — not in Aristotle, not in modern modal logic, not anywhere.
?Kp just means “Kp is not impossible.”
It does, for your purpose. Perhaps that's the issue... I think what you're getting at is essentially the problem of other minds. I don't even know that 'red' is the same for you, as me.
I don't see that this moves anything.
Look at the temporality of your statements; "it might have been that we did not know stuff", refers to past time. All three of the propositions refer to current time. The propositions refer to our knowledge of "shit" at the present time. That we might not have known, in the past, what we do know now, is completely irrelevant.
Statements like "if you know stuff, then it thereby is possible to know stuff" indicate to me that common usage has corrupted your understanding of "possible". Common usage propagates ambiguity, so "the stuff" which you refer to as the stuff that is known, is not the same stuff as "the stuff" that it is possible to know. If I know 10 cars (stuff known), you might conclude that it's possible for me to know another 40 cars (stuff possible to know), but clearly "stuff" refers to something different in each case, the 10 cars that are known , and the 40 cars that are not known, are completely different things. That's ambiguity in "cars", just like the ambiguity in your use of "stuff".
So I think you need a good clear definition of "possible" which would support your usage. I've already explained my usage. The proposition "it is possible to know p" indicates that we have judged that p could be known, but is not known. This is because "it is possible that p is known" would indicate that we do not know whether p is known or not, and that would be somewhat incoherent, implying that we know without knowing that we know. So we must settle on an altered version, "it is possible to know p", but "possible" maintains the same meaning. "Possible" indicates that we do not know whether p is true or not. That is why it is inconsistent with the judgement "p is known", as this implies that we know whether p is true or not.
Can you provide me with a definition of "possible" which supports your position, so I can understand what you are trying to say?
Quoting Banno
This is an indication of the ambiguity which is disturbing you. Shit is the subject, and known is the predicate. I believe, "Shit is not known" is a valid predication. The ambiguity described above, is making you think of "shit" as a multidimensional object, in which each dimension is called "shit", and some dimensions may be known while others not. That is very confused shit, which you are proposing.
Quoting Banno
Personally I don't give a damn about any thread counts or anything like that. But if it pleases you, it makes me happy too. The pleasure is ours, and it may help you to overcome the tediousness. I'm tedious by nature, so I'm pleased that you give me the opportunity to be that way. Therefore I suggest that we keep the posts short and to the point, quicker reply etc., as that would be preferrable to you. The next point would be for you to provide a definition of "possible" so that I can question you on it, to gain an understanding of what you mean. Then I can examine and analyze your usage to see if your definition is coherent and consistent with your usage.
Quoting Banno
OK, so let's see what "the modal operator means". Can you define "possible" in a way which makes sense of what you are claiming, without the appeal to ambiguity demonstrated above? Can you keep the subject (or object if you wish) which is referred to, as one subject, and not make it refer to many things (as you do above). After you've been informed of this ambiguity, it would be a case of intentional ambiguity if you continue to utilize it. Intentional ambiguity will surely support the charge of sophistry.
Quoting AmadeusD
It's you who has insisted that knowledge is the property of a single subject. Look, I am happy to discuss with Banno, propositions like "we know...", which implies that knowledge is a property of "us". However, we must keep these two discussions separate, because "know" refers to two very distinct things in the two cases of "I know...", and "we know...".
So I am not bringing up any "problem of other minds", just informing you of the obvious, that the knowledge in my mind is different from the knowledge in your mind. And if you make claims, like you did, which indicate that you think that you and I have the same knowledge, I will ask you to justify such claims because they are inconsistent with your starting premise, that knowledge is the property of an individual subject.
Banno, on the other hand has started with a use of "know" which indicates that knowledge is a property of us, "we". So if Banno starts to say that I can know different things from what you know, then I can likewise ask him to justify those assertions, as they are inconsistent with that starting premise.
As a plain language person I get a kick out of these discussions. You and Banno et al are obviously very smart/knowledgeable people. That said, I cannot figure out what you are saying.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If we know shit at time t, then clearly at some time prior to time t it must have been possible to know said shit - otherwise there's no way we could know said shit at time t. This is the plain language interpretation.
So I'm trying to figure out how P1 would not automatically imply P3 at time t. Are you saying that prior to time t we were somehow able to figure out the shit, but that at time t the situation has changed and we whatever means/mechanism we used to determine the shit prior to t is no longer applicable - and thus P1 no longer automatically implies P3?
Or (more likely) I am totally not getting what you're saying.
BTW -- If possible - a plain language response please. :smile:
No, it doesn't. It might have been the case now that we didn't know stuff. In some other posibel world we might not have known stuff. Tensed logic, if needed, is constructed separately to modal logic. But your not seeing this is yet another example of your eccentricity.
Yep. That we know p implies that it is possible to know p.
[hide="Technically, it's valid in any system in which the accessibility relation is reflexive - in which a possible world can access itself. So both S4 and S5. "]See https://www.umsu.de/trees/#A~5~9A||reflexivity.
The definition of ?p in Kripke's semantics is that p is true in at least one accessible world. If we drop reflexivity, then p might be true here but not in any other world, and since only other worlds are accessible, it would be invalid.
Meta denies that p??p, a sentence which will be valid only if we do not include the world in which p is true in the list of accessible worlds. His account is valid only if we cannot access the world in which p is true. And in p??p, the world in which p is true is this world.[/hide]
The technicalities are to a large extent unavoidable. In plain language, we might replace "accessibility" with "the worlds about which we can talk" and call the possible world we are in, the actaul world. Then:
The inference p ? possibly p is valid only in modal systems where each world counts itself as possible, that is, where we can talk about the actual world. In Kripke semantics, “possibly p” means that p is true in at least one world about which we can talk. If you drop reflexivity, then we can't talk about the actual world, and so p may be true in the actual world but not in any world about which we can talk. So the inference fails. Since Meta denies p ? ?p, his view amounts to saying that the actual world is not among the worlds about which we can talk. But in p ? ?p, the world where p is true is simply this world.
The tense is not usually considered in modal logic. So we can for example talk about the possibility that you did not write the post to which I am replying, by talking about a possible world in which that was so. That's not the actual world, of course, but it's still a possible world.
Meta's confusion might be the result of thinking of accessible worlds as “counterfactual” only, never including the actual world. This seems likely. But for the rest of us, the actual world is considered to be one of the possible worlds.
That is not the issue. The question is whether at the same time, "We know shit", and "It is possible that we know shit", could both be judge to be true.
Quoting EricH
The issue is if, when you judge that p is true, you can also judge that it is possible that p is true. I think that this is dishonesty and contradiction because "it is possible that p is true" contradicts "p is true". This is because "p is true" means that it is not possible that p is false, whereas "it is possible that p is true" means that it is possible that p is false. Therefore contradiction.
Quoting Banno
For God's sake Banno, what are you talking about? "Did" is the past tense of do. "Did not know" refers to the past. It does not refer to the present, which would be "does not know".
Are you suggesting that the past tense "did" can refer to the present, but in another world? So that "we did not know" doesn't refer to us in the past, but it refers to us at the present, but in another world? So right now, we know shit, but in another world there's another us that does not know the same shit, right now. And somehow it seems reasonable to you to say that this other "we", at the present time "did" not know shit right now, because the usage of the past tense creates the illusion of a temporal separation between one thing referred to with "we" and the other as if it's a temporal extension of one thing referred to with "we". But the illusion of the temporal separation only really helps to veil the absurdity of two versions of 'we" existing at the very same time. Why not just say what you mean, there's one "we" which knows, and another "we" which does not know.
In my last post I warned you about using ambiguity. See here, "we" refers to two distinct groups of people, one which knows stuff, and the other which does not know stuff, both at the same time. Can you see that you are intentionally proposing ambiguity? That fills the criteria of sophistry.
"My eccentricity"? Is that meant as a joke? You are the one talking about the 'we" which know stuff at the present time, and another "we" which does not know the same stuff at the same time. And to cover up the absurdity of this you say that the one "we" does know stuff right now, and the other "we" did not know the same stuff right now. Don't you admit that that is very strange "stuff" which you are on about?
Please Banno, try to provide something more reasonable.
And the answer, overwhelmingly, is "yes". If we know something then by that very fact it is possible for us to know that thing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No — that conflates truth with necessity. “p is true” does not mean “p cannot be false.” It means only that p is not false in the actual world. Something can be true without being necessary, and false without being impossible.
It is true that you read this post. It is also possible that you might not have read it.
'Did' marks what happened, not what had to happen. Saying 'Jill did push Jack' tells us what actually happened, not that her pushing him was necessary, inevitable, or impossible to be otherwise. Confusing tense with modality is exactly the same mistake as treating 'true' as meaning 'cannot be false.'
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Unfortunately, no. Your ignorance of modal logic stands alongside your denial of instantaneous velocity and insistence that 0.9... ? 1.
You have not yet defined "possible" to support this, as I asked. What you are saying here is that "it is possible that we know X" is implied by "we know X". I've already explained to you over and over, why this is incoherent. The two actually contradict each other because "it is possible that we know X" means that it could be the case that we do not know X, while "we know X" means that it could not be the case that we do not know X.
I've shown you the logic. Continuing to assert something completely illogical is pointless. You need to back up your claims, show how you understand the meaning of "possible" in such a way which allows what you assert to somehow be coherent.
Quoting Banno
Your mention of necessity is a distraction of sophistry. If p is true it very clearly does mean that p cannot be false. Notice "is" and "be" imply the present time. If p is true, p cannot be false, because that would mean that p is true and false at the same time.
Furthermore, truth and falsity are determined by the actual world, as correspondence. I'm very surprised that you, a self-proclaimed realist would suggest otherwise. If truth is not determined by the actual world, realism has no standing.
But that issue is which I told you about yesterday, your tendency to say one thing, then argue principles which explicitly undermine what you claim. It's a sort of hypocrisy on your part.
Quoting Banno
What? How does that make sense? If it is true that I read this post, how is it possible that I did not read it?
Quoting Banno
I agree, "did" marks what actually happened, and this is the truth. As it is the truth, it is impossible to be otherwise. If Jill did push Jack, then that is the truth, and it is impossible to be otherwise. True does mean, precisely and exactly, "cannot be false". If what is true could be false we would have contradiction. If you really believe otherwise, you have some explaining to do.
And I don't know how "modality" is related here. You haven't provided any definitions or principles of relations. All you have done so far is made absurd assertions.
Quoting Banno
You keep bringing up "modal logic" but you have done nothing to show how this is relevant. We have been talking about what it means to know p, not to know p, and the possibility of knowing p. That is what we are talking about, what these propositions mean. If you want to apply modal logic, then you need to provide some principles, definitions, and structure. To simply keep on asserting that what I say is contrary to modal logic is pointless if you cannot prove your claims with reference to some principles or definitions.
Yeah, I did, you missed it. It's the standard Kripkeian definition:
Quoting Banno
All the stuff I've said here is straight forward possible world semantics and standard modal logic. Folk can check it by feeding it in to the AI of their choice. It'll also point out the errors in your posts.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Nuh, it doesn't. We know that Branson's missus has died. But it could be the case that we did not know she'd passed on. They might not have made it public, if they had wanted. Or we might have missed the news that day.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Here's the problem, then - your incapacity to understand a simple situation; or is this the doubling-down I spoke of earlier? We can happily consider what might have been the case had you not read that post. I would not be writing this, for starters. That does make sense.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
:lol: What to make of that. Modal logic not relevant to possibility and necessity.
Again, I'm here for the post count. So far as I can see, you have not added anything new for a day or two. But keep going.
Working backwards, we got to arguing about modality after I introduced Fitch's paradox. That was introduced because it deals with the logic of unknown truths. And that relates directly to the question in the title: How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our reality?
I'll go back to my original answer:
Quoting Banno
to which was added:
Quoting Banno
And then to
Quoting Banno
Hence to Fitch, in which it is shown:
Quoting Banno
The way that antirealism usually avoids omniscience is by rejecting classical logic. That for instance is the approach in Kripke's theory of truth, which has some merit.
In effect, in talking about the medium-size goods around us, we have a choice between using classical logic and accepting that there are truths we don't know on the one hand; and supposing that there are no such unknown truths and rejecting classical logic on the other.
Ether will do, but the former seems more intuitive, less sophistic and simpler.
From the perspective of truth by correspondence, these appears to be incoherent. How can we talk about things being true in more than one world, when "true" is determined by what corresponds with "the world"? I thought you were realist. No? Are you saying that there is a whole bunch of contradictory truths depending on which world we are talking about?
Regardless, I'll accept this definition as a working platform. But I'll warn you that it will be very hard to support any type of realism which could be consistent with this definition. So a "world" is a product of the imagination, and "true" means consistent with that specific product. This is a reflection of the basic idealist assumption covered in the thread called "The Mind Created World". The difficulty with this approach is to find principles which would provide "correctness". that is because my proposed world produced from my experience may differ from your proposed world produced from your experience. Each is " a world about which we can talk".
We cannot us "true", to talk of the "true world", or "real world", in the sense of correspondence, because "true" is already used in the sense of coherence, as consistent with the proposed possible world. Furthermore, we cannot refer to an independent "actual world", because all we have is the different proposals from different people, based on their experiences. By what principles would we say that one person's experience represents "the actual world", over another's, when they contradict?
Quoting Banno
You are mixing up tenses and not properly representing what I said. I said "we know X" means that it could not be the case "that we do not know X". You have replaced "do not" with "did not". Sure it is possible that we did not know what we do know now, but that's not what I'm talking about. If we know X right now, it is absolutely impossible that we do not know X right now. Of course if we allow different imaginary worlds, we could have one of each, but those two different cases would not be in the same world.
Quoting Banno
Your claim here is incorrect. What you insinuate is contrary to your definition of "possibly". Notice, "possibly" refers to what is true "in at least one world". It does not provide the principles to cross from one world to another. In one world I read the post. In another world I did not read the post. "True" refers to consistency within the referred to world. Therefore if it is true that I read this post, (meaning in that world where it is true) it is not possible that I did not read it. So your claim that what I said was wrong is incorrect. Your incorrectness is the reason for my doubling down.
You seem to misunderstand "true" in the context of your proposed modal logic. Notice in your definition of "possibly", "true" is relative to the specified world. Therefore if it is true that I read the post, it cannot be the case that I did not. "True" indicates what is the case within a specified world. You can go ahead and talk about other worlds, in which I did not read the post, but in those worlds it is not true that I read the post.
Quoting Banno
The words "possibility" and "necessity" were being used long before modal logic was invented, so it is clear that those words can be used in ways not at all related to modal logic. If you want to limit use specifically to modal logic, then to avoid ambiguity we need principles or definitions. So, if you want to bring a specific form of modal logic to bear on this discussion, you need to provide some principles or definitions, as you did with "possibility" above.
However, you need to respect the consequences of these principles. Notice for instance what becomes of "true" under your definition of "possibly". "True" becomes relative to the specified world, it is not absolute, or relative to any sort of supposed independent actual world. If you use "true" in a number of different ways you likely equivocate.
In the way that "true" is used in your definition of "possibly", how does "truths we don't know" say anything meaningful? Since truth is relative to the specified world, and "true" means what is consistent with that world, and we can imagine any type of world, than anything, and everything is true. How does "truths we don't know" say anything meaningful, when everything and anything is a truth?
The definition provided is not mine; it is the standard definition in modal logic. It has nothing to do with correspondence, since truth in such systems is model-theoretical.
In modal logic:
“?p” means “p is true in at least one accessible world”
This does not claim that there are multiple concrete universes out there and that truth “corresponds” to each. It is a semantic model, a mathematical structure used to evaluate formulas. Model-theoretic “worlds” are not metaphysical worlds. They are semantic devices, exactly like the points on a truth table are not little universes.
You simply have a very poor understanding of the topic at hand, Meta.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, it does. That's exactly what the accessibility relation is for.
Frankly, your attempts to show that modal logic, and possible world semantics, which are accepted fields of study in mathematical logic, are somehow inconsistent, is just a bit sad.
You are here confusing "true in a model" with "true in reality".
Again, a bit sad.
That's right. It's exactly what I pointed out in my post.
Quoting Banno
I don't care what you call it, a "semantic model" if you want. However, if you choose to use "true" in that way, we must adhere to that for the purpose of our discussion here, so that we do not equivocate. That is the reason why I asked you to provide some principles or definitions, so that we have something concrete to go by.
Quoting Banno
Well give me the "accessibility relation" then. I don't think it's going to change the meaning of "true".
Quoting Banno
I am not trying to show inconsistency in modal logic, I am trying to show incorrectness in your presentation of it. And, in case you didn't notice, that is what I did in my last post.
Quoting Banno
Ha ha, I'm staying consistent with "true in a model". From here, there is no such thing as "true in reality", because that would be equivocation. That's the problem, your realistic tendencies make you want a "true in reality", while you argue modalities. That is your inconsistency, your incorrectness, which I am trying to help you to understand.
Are you ready to proceed with the "accessibility relation" now?
Here you go: Boxes and Diamonds: An Open Introduction To Modal Logic. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 cover truth at a world and truth as a model. There's a couple of sections on accessibility relations, but you might find 15.5, "Accessibility Relations and Epistemic Principles", most useful.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I've over-simplified much of the logic, and I'm sure that Tones or one of the other mathematicians hereabouts could have a field day with some of my phrasing. But I do not think that anything I have said here is at odds with standard, accepted modal logic. What you have said, on the other hand, is.
But you are welcome to try and show otherwise.
OK, so truth is defined as within the model, so we haven't gotten to anything to support the assumption of a real, or actual world, or truth by correspondence to the actual world. How do you claim to be realist if you believe in the principles of modal logic? How do you assume to make modal logic consistent with realism?
Odd. Can you explain how you think it isn't?
You do understand that the model theoretical account is extensional...? I guess not.
I did that already.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1027665
Truth is determined by the model,, The model is a product, imaginary. Unless you are assuming something like model-dependent realism, (which isn't actually realism, it just has that word in the name), there is no place for a real, independent world.
A model is not an “imaginary world” we’re claiming to be real; it’s a mathematical structure used to interpret a language. The whole point of model-theoretic semantics is precisely not to replace the actual world, but to give us a rigorous way to talk about it.
But your "rigorous way to talk about it" assigns truth to the talk not the actual world, and it provides no principles to even support the reality of an actual world. Look at the definition of "possibly" you gave me:
Quoting Banno
Clearly these are "imaginary worlds". Consider that I may produce a world based on my experience, and you may produce a world based on your experience. Despite each of us claiming that mine is the actual world, based on my experience, they are both imaginary worlds derived from our memories and other parts of our minds, and there may very well be contradiction between us. So we may establish modalities, and ways to cross reference between your world, my world, and numerous others, to produce "a model". This model which is produced is just another imaginary world though.
You say "The whole point of model-theoretic semantics is precisely not to replace the actual world, but to give us a rigorous way to talk about it", but that is not correct. It gives us a rigorous way to talk about our experiences, compare them, apply logic, and seek consistencies and inconsistencies. It does not give us a way to talk about the actual world, nor do the principles of modal logic claim we talk about the actual world. That's why it leads to ontologies like model-dependent realism. It provides principles to talk about possible worlds, and produce conclusions concerning these possible worlds, and then we might stipulate some principles whereby we'd choose the best possible world (the one we think could qualify as the actual world), but it is not working with descriptions of the actual world. Nor does it claim to be. It cannot, or the possible worlds structure would be negated.
Notice the inversion. Modal logic does not provide a way to talk about the actual world. It provides a way to talk about possible worlds. Then, through principles, and logical proceedings, it stipulates "the actual world". So instead of the classic approach, talking about the actual world (propositions judged for truth and falsity), and proceeding logically from there to determine what is possible within that actual world, modal logic talks about possible worlds, and proceeds to make a logical determination about the actual world. That is not a matter of giving us a rigorous way to talk about the actual world. It is a way to make logical conclusions about the actual world. The descriptions, therefore what we are talking about is possible worlds, not the actual world. Therefore, a rigorous way to talk about the actual world is what is really missing here.
That's pretty hopelessly confused. As is the rest of that post.
The best way to think of possible worlds is not as imagined, but as stipulated. We can consider the possible world in which we did not know Bransons wife had died, and consider the consequences thereof - such as that I would not be using it in this example. That's quite sensible.
And, to add to your confusion, we make such stipulations in the actual word... As indeed, I just did.
The difference with the actual world is that it is not stipulated. It's already there.
You continue to muddle semantics and ontology, and blame logic for your own muddle.
Sure, "stipulated". But I don't see how this change of words makes any significant difference. A stipulated world is nothing other than a special type of imagined world, one put to words, and proposed for agreement. But I'll use your word if you think it adds some significance.
Quoting Banno
So you are suggesting two distinct stipulated worlds, one in which Branson's wife died and one in which Branson's wife did not. I have no problem with this, those are two possible worlds.
The question is how do we get to an actual world?
Quoting Banno
Yes, that definitely confuses me. The way you phrase that, "to add to your confusion", creates the appearance that you are doing this intentionally. Why would you strive to confuse rather than to clarify?
You are stipulating that we make such stipulations in the actual world. But that stipulation you make, just produces another stipulated world. Just because you stipulate that we make stipulations in the actual world, doesn't give that stipulated world any special status as anything other than another stipulated world, just like all the rest of the stipulated worlds. I could stipulate that there is another world, "the real world", within which you make the stipulation that we make such stipulations in the actual world. Then someone might stipulate that there is a "physical world" within which I made the stipulation about the real world. And someone could stipulate an "existing world" within which the stipulation about the physical world was made. As long as people could keep coming up with new terms, we'd approach an infinite regress. All the while, we'd only be dealing with stipulated worlds, which are just a special type of imaginary world.
Quoting Banno
I don't understand this at all. How could that even be a "world", what's already there? Very clearly, a world is what is stipulated. If there is anything which has not been stipulated, then this is very obviously categorically distinct from what "a world" is. We cannot now use "world" to refer to something "not stipulated", when "a world" very clearly refers to what is stipulated. I agree that there is much more to reality than what is stipulated, but if worlds are what is stipulated, we sure as heck cannot talk about what is not stipulated as if it is a world. That would be extremely confusing.
Quoting Banno
Now I think I understand very clearly why I am hopelessly confused. You use the word "world" in an extremely confusing way. You suppose worlds which are stipulated, and also a world, or perhaps a multitude of worlds (I really can't know, because everything you say about this "world" would just be stipulated, therefore a stipulated world) which is/are not stipulated. How could we even know that there is such a world, or worlds?
Can you see the inherent contradiction here, which is confusing me immensely? You are stipulating that there is an actual world, which is not stipulated, but is already there. If we remove this stipulation, of an actual, not stipulated world, which is already there, because it is self-contradicting, a stipulated not stipulated world, how can we know, or even say, anything about this supposed contradictory world, because that would be to make the contradiction of stipulating the not stipulated?
What I suggest to you Banno, is that it is actually you who misunderstands modal logic. In modal logic there cannot be any such thing as the actual, not stipulated world, which is already there. This realist assumption contradicts the very principles of modal logic. This is why we have ontologies like model-dependent realism, which the adherents recognize is not consistent with traditional realism, but they give it that name anyway, to create the illusion of consistency. And, you either get deceived by this illusion, or grasp it, and propagate it in intentional deception, by insisting that modal logic is consistent with realism.
Why would anyone want to create an illusion of consistency? Most often, it seems to be the primary aim of philosophy to puncture illusions.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know about modal logic. But I understand the concept of a possibility as inherently allowing that there is something that would count as its realization. It is possible that it will rain tomorrow is incomprehensible unless there are circumstances in which it is raining and others in which it is not. In the context of probability we call this requirement an outcome. It refers to the result of the coin toss or whatever. When we formulate a possibility we are stipulating the circumstances in which the stipulated possibility will be realized, but not whether they obtain or not. Actuality is what realizes some possibilities and kicks others into touch. If there were not such things, both probability and possibility become meaningless.
Quoting Banno
That seems to me a bit confusing, because it suggests that the actual world is merely a possible world. Surely one needs to say something to the effect that the actual world is different from all the possible worlds. Compare the difference between an image on a screen, which gives us a possibility, and the actual/real scene, which is in a different category. Perhaps the point is that an image is always an image of something. What is actual is that something.
You are already in the actual world, Meta.
True in model M is a bit of semantics, but true in the actual world is a bit of metaphysics. You are confusing the two. The semantics is built within the actual world.
While semantics talks about many possible worlds, metaphysics tells us that only one is the actual world - the one that is fixed by empirical facts. The actual world is one in which Branson's wife died.
You seem to think that somehow the actual word ought be deducible form a modal logic. That's a profound confusion of semantics and metaphysics. While logic and semantics constrain what can be inferred, it's looking around that tells us how things are. Modal logic does not identify the actual world.
It presupposes it.
Possibly, as that is what you stipulate, but we're right back to where we were, days ago. Remember, I told you how "actually known" is distinct from "possibly known", incompatible because the two are contradictory? You could not understand that and kept arguing otherwise. Maybe you'll understand the logic now:
Possible worlds are stipulated.
The actual world is not stipulated.
Therefore the actual world is not a possible world.
Quoting Banno
By the logic above, if there is an actual world, it is not one of the possible worlds. That would be contradictory.
Quoting Banno
If the actual world is one of the possible worlds, then it ought to be deducible from modal logic. However, the actual world could not be one of the possible worlds because that would be contradictory. That appears to be a problem with your metaphysics, you accept contradiction.
Well, the actual world is either possible or impossible (necessarily not actual) - this is the equivalent of the law of excluded middle in standard modal logic. It would be absurd to maintain that the actual world is impossible, so you are left with the actual world being possible (indeed, this is a theorem in all but the weakest modal logics). And yes, the actual world is different from all the other possible worlds - it is actual!
In informal speech, we sometimes want to put possibility on one side and actuality on the other, as you suggest, but not always. For example: "things, as phenomena, determine space; that is to say, they render it possible that, of all the possible predicates of space (size and relation), certain may belong to reality" (CPR).
This is the issue. Banno's been arguing that if it is actual it must be possible. I've been trying to show him how we must accept that this is contradictory. But Banno seems to be influenced by some sort of common language intuition which makes him think that it's nonsense to say that what is actual is not possible.
Yep. I pointed out that you are mistaken. If you actually know something, then it is by that very fact possible for you to know it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
:gasp: Cute. This shows your error nicely. Semantically, we can of corse stipulate that we are talking about the actual world - one in which Branson's wife is dead. Metaphysically, the actual world is the one we are in. Your neat syllogism mixes the two.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No. It can be included in modal logic, but the logic alone does not tell us which possible world is the actual world.
What is actual is not possible in the sense that it is a distinct category. Since "impossible" is defined relative to "possible", what is actual is just as much not impossible as it is not possible. If we try to bring "actual into the category of "possible" as Banno does, and you do, this results in the contradiction which I've been demonstrating to Banno.
Yep. That is what Meta has been denying.
Quoting SophistiCat
Yep. That's not a logical or semantic difference, it's a metaphysical difference.
You stipulate that you are talking about the actual world, and this means that the world you are talking about is a possible world, it is stipulated. By your own words, the actual world is "not stipulated".
What you propose here is just ridiculous, because one could just as easily stipulate that the world which Branson's wife did not die, is the actual world. How do you propose that in any stipulated world (possible world), stipulating "I'm talking about the actual world", makes that stipulated world (possible world) into a not stipulated world?
We are in the actual world. Metaphysics.
We might stipulate that we want to talk about the actual world, and not some other possibel world. Semantics.
You are mixing the two.
If you stipulate that the world which Branson's wife did not die, is the actual world, you would be mistaken.
OK, let's get this straight. I hope you are not trying to confuse me.
We are in the actual world.
Possible worlds are stipulated though.
The world we are in is not a stipulated world
Therefore the actual world is not a possible world.
Agree?
This is a metaphysical point. The other assumptions are semantic.
Speaking semantically, the actual world can be stipulated. Which is just to say we can talk about the actual world as one of the possible words.
What proof do you have of such that a person in a stipulated or even flat-out simulated world wouldn't be able to "show" or otherwise "point to" as well, though? This is the root of the argument that words and misplacement of words ultimately fail to address. :chin:
By definition, the actual world is the one we are in. Is that what you are asking?
Or are you asking for proof that you are in the actual world? What could that look like?
A very important metaphysical point, I might add. Failure to recognize this might lead one to think that the actual world is one of the possible worlds. And one might think that what is actually known is also possibly known. But a good metaphysician will recognize the category division, and the danger of contradiction if we allow that the actual is also possible.
Quoting Banno
Sure, but this is problematic due to the possibility of mistake. If we stipulate that a specific possible world represents the actual world, then we take that special status assigned to "the actual world", for granted, even though it might not be a correct representation. Therefore, the title "the actual world" requires more than simple stipulation, it requires justification.
I agree with most of that. I can see that we need to say that the actual is possible - even if that is a bit awkward in some ways. It certainly beats saying that the actual is not possible.
I'm not sure I understand this sentence. But if you mean that things determine space, rather than the other way round, I'm with you.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There's a false dilemma there. There's something wrong with saying that the actual world is possible and something wrong with saying that it is not possible. I am trying to express that by saying that the actual world is not merely possible and that it is different from all the other possible worlds in that respect.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are missing the point. You cannot stipulate which possible world is actual. That's not a decision that we can make. We can only recognize the status of the actual world.
yep.
That's what I said, it's categorically distinct.
Quoting Ludwig V
That's Banno's claim. Banno said we stipulate which world is the actual world. I addressed that in my last post. If one of the possible worlds is supposed to represent the actual world, this needs to be justified rather than stipulated. But then the justification will be be judged.
That is why Banno's claim that modal logic gives us a rigorous way to talk about the actual world is incorrect. To apply rigor to the way that we talk about the actual world requires strict rules on the use of descriptive language, and also for justifying the claims of "actual". But this is outside the purveyance of modal logic.
Quoting Banno
Sure, all of us atheists will agree with that. We know that "god" itself is inherently contradictory.
Banno said we are int he actual world. He also said that we can stipulate that we are talking about the actual world - a bit of semantics. We do not get to stipulate that we are in the actual world.
You are playing on the difference between the metaphysical truth that we are in the actual world, and the semantic truth that we can stipulate whatever possible world we want. That failure to recognise the difference between semantics and metaphysics runs right through the confusion you show here.
Right now, as I post this, I am in the actual world of TPF. As are you when you are participating in it. It is very real. It psychically exists. It can be measured by both of us by observing not only our interactions but if we were to physically meet at whatever server or computer infrastructure contains our interactions. Someone who has never heard of TPF would have no knowledge or reason to believe in this "actual" world we are both present in, without visiting it themself, or visiting the underlying location this interaction is made possible by.
Now, say if me and another member were engaging in a private message. That's, in affect, it's own world. That only the two of us would know about and you would not be privy too. Naturally, you could say it's simply a function of the larger world of TPF and furthermore beyond that, a feature of the larger physical world we could both meet.
The fact remains, in each smaller world, each participant knows only what they're able to access, leaving that larger than it unknown, as if it didn't exist. Yet it does, but only those able to access it would know that.
So again, we go back to the original question. How do you know there's not a larger world than what you're able to access?
Quoting Banno
I'm sure you and I are in the same world, as we're two entities able to communicate within it. But that doesn't mean, for certain, there's not a larger world in which only one of us may be able to access. That would, in theory, make that hypothetical larger place the "actual" world. No different than how a private message between myself and another is a "world" or "reality" that while myself and the person I'm speaking to could access, you yourself could not access. Just as this forum is a "world" that we can both "access" but someone who does not have access to a computer nor it's physical server location would not consider an "actual" location.
Well, I did select a rather awkward quotation for my example - this is Kant, after all, so of course, of all the ways he could have expressed his thought, he did it in the awkwardest way possible (see what I did here?)
Quoting Ludwig V
I think that the difficulty here is that in ordinary speech, we are expected to make the strongest warranted assertions. There is even a word in English for failing to do that: understatement. Sometimes, understatement is used intentionally to convey more than what is being literally said, such as sarcasm or playfulness. But when an understatement is unwarranted, it can lead to misunderstanding and even offense. If, when asked what I thought about Ludwig V, I said: "well, he is not a hopeless fool," that would surely be rude and unfair, even if true in a literal sense. But if in a different context I said "Ludwig V is no fool," such an understatement would carry the opposite meaning. Ah, the vicissitudes of language!
All that is to say that the reason we don't usually say that the actual is possible (except as in my examples above) is that it goes without saying - and so it goes unsaid.
What do you mean we don't get to stipulate that we are in the actual world? You personally, have stipulated that we are in the actual world, numerous times just today.
Quoting Banno
If you stipulate (say) that we are in the actual world, which is an unstipulated world, and you also stipulate (say) that the actual world is one of the stipulated possible worlds, you very clearly contradict yourself.
Which do you have it to be? Are we in the actual world, or is the actual world one of the possible worlds? You cannot have both without contradiction.
:rofl:
Keep going.
Going where? I've laid bare your contradictions and now you say no more. Seems you can't write anything without it being contradictory, so you've shut up.
You've laid bare your own confusion.
The actual world is a possible world. The actual world is the one in which we may empirically verify statements as true, as opposed to other possible worlds, where we stipulating them to be true.
So "the actual world" is not the world we live in, (where we live, work, and play, does not consist of statements), it is a world of empirically verifiable statements. And the actual world is not one of the possible worlds which consist of stipulations rather than empirically verifiable statements. Therefore the actual world is not a possible world. Agree? Obviously, it would be a mistake to say that what is actual is also possible, because you've provided clear principles to distinguish the two, and the actual is known to be actual, and distinct from the possible.
But are your principles really clear? "We may empirically verify statements"? Are you saying that "the actual world" consists of statements which are possible to verify empirically, but are not necessarily verified empirically? If we do not actually verify the statements, how would we distinguish a statement of the actual world, from a stipulation of a possible world? Suppose I present you with two statements/stipulations, S1 "it snowed here yesterday", and S2 "it did not snow here yesterday". How would we know which one is an empirically verifiable statement of actuality, and which one is a stipulation of possibility?
Furthermore, if we do actually empirically verify the statements, then how are the "stipulations" truly "possible"? Do you see the dilemma? If we do not empirically verify S1 or S2, then we have two stipulations of possibility. If we empirically verify S1 or S2, we have a statement of actuality, but the other has been ruled as contrary to actuality, and no longer possible.
Your proposal of empirically verifiable statements sucks, as completely useless.
If it is possible that p is true, then this means that either p is true or p is false. So this gives us (p or ~p). But we have asserted that p is true. Therefore (p or ~p) is also true.
The “actual world” is not a special kind of world. It is simply this world—the world we inhabit. Every world can call itself “actual” from its own viewpoint. No, it doesn't "consist" of verified statements.
There's been a cold snap, and it might have snowed in Jindabyne overnight. I haven't checked the weather, so both "It snowed in Jindabyne overnight" and "It did not snow in Jindabyne overnight" are possible, so far as I know. Either is epistemically possible.
Now I've just checked, and there was no precipitation in Jindabyne overnight. So it didn't snow. It is not epistemically possible that it did snow, since we now know it didn't.
But we can consider what things would have been like had it snowed overnight in Jindabyne. The roads might be closed, the school shut, and so on. It remains metaphysically possible that it snoed there overnight.
Notice the two differing modalities, metaphysical and epistemic. Your account, as I've said before, fails to differentiate these. It makes the error of thinking that because epistemically, we know it did not snow in the actual world, it is not metaphysically possible that it might have snowed.
In more formal terms, consider to worlds w? and w? and "p"= "it snowed in Jindabyne last night", such that p is true in w? and false in w?. Epistemically, prior to our checking the truth of p, we can access both w? and w? - either might be the case. After checking, we no longer have access to w?.
But metaphysically speaking, we continue to have access to both w? and w? even after checking.
Note that in all cases the actual world is one of the possible worlds.
On your account, Meta, because it did not snow, we could consider the possibility of what things would be like if it had snowed. But this is false. We can consider what things would have been like had it snowed.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
is the source of Meta's confusion. If we apply Meta's logic to the example I just gave, then because it did not snow last night in Jindabyne, we cannot give any consideration to what may have been the case had it snowed in Jindabyne last night.
But I hope this is obviously not true. We can talk about what it would be like in Jindabyne, had it snowed, even though it did not.
I'm sorry, but I don't understand what you mean by "the danger of contradiction". I'm used to contradictions existing or not - contradictions as a risk are new to me.
Quoting Banno
Yes, it is obviously possible to discuss the consequences of a counterfactual. But "p is true" rules out "p is false"; or that p is incompatible with not-p. It seems natural to say that, in some circumstances, that there is no possibility that p is false - not that naturalness is the final court of appeal. So I think that this needs a little more clarification. Perhaps we need to say something like before the race is run, it is possible that my horse will win and possible that it will lose, but that after my horse has won, it was possible. Alternatively, we could explain a counterfactual as positing a context in which to consider various possibilities (I would have won my bet)
Seems to me that the notion of accessibility does just this.
In a world in which p is false, not-p is indeed impossible. That is within the one world. In other worlds, not-p might be true.
(That's why, as mentioned earlier, Meta's account can be made consistent if we presume that a world cannot access itself - if we reject reflexivity. But this is false in both S4 and S5.)
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes: before the race is won, we can (epistemologically) access both the world in which the horse wins, and the world in which it doesn't. After the horse wins, it is no longer (epistemically) possible to access the world in which it lost. All of which is a fancy way of saying that once we know the horse wins, it is no longer possible for us to know it to have lost.
But we can still access it metaphysically - "If it had lost, I would not have been able to make the rent!"
Minor quibble. As a basically plain language person, the word metaphysically seems out of place. Quoting Banno
Hypothetically possible, theoretically possible, epistemically possible (your term) work much better - at least for me.
Yeah, I wasn't too happy with it either, but it's what is use din the literature when making this point, so I used it too. Go ahead and use your own terms.
The SEP article The Epistemology of Modality goes in to this is great detail, if you have sufficient interest. The first part gives a prety straight forward account of distinctions between metaphysical modality, logical modality, conceptual modality, epistemic modality, physical modality, technological modality and practical modality...
If this is supposed to be an argument for p -> ?p (if p then possibly p), then it does not work.
Notice that (p or ~p) is a tautology: it is true regardless of the value of p. So, you might think that you could make a parallel argument for ~p -> ?p (if p is false, then it is possible that p is true). But that is, obviously, not the case, since p could be necessarily false, and therefore not possibly true.
You can't reduce modality to classical non-modal logic. If you want a formal proof of p -> ?p - well, this is considered to be such a basic modal intuition that it (or an equivalent principle ?p -> p) is usually taken as an axiom.
That's a direct reflection of what you are telling me. You are confusing me with nonsense.
Quoting Banno
From everything that I've read, one's metaphysics must be consistent with one's epistemology, or else there is contradiction within the person's philosophy. So the distinction between "metaphysical" and "epistemic" does not excuse your contradiction.
Quoting Banno
For the reasons I explained in prior posts, this is contradictory. You provided a distinction. Possible worlds consist of stipulations, the actual world does not consist of stipulations. Therefore it is contradictory to say that the actual is one of the possible worlds. Will I have to point this out to you an infinite number of times before you accept it?
Quoting Banno
Why not? What's your problem here? We could give the very same consideration to "what may have been the case if it had snowed", while still acknowledging that it is impossible that it actually did snow. Is that difficult?
If we do not know whether it snowed or not, we consider that both are "possibilities". If we know that it did not snow, then that is known as an actuality; and the alternative is known as a counterfactual. There are no possibilities with respect to this situation in that case, because what is actual is known. I think that is what already pointed out to you
Quoting Ludwig V
There is an implied contradiction, in saying that the actual is also possible. This is the one I've been explaining to Banno, who continues to refuse to acknowledge this. Check the above. I called it a "danger of contradiction" because I am still giving Banno the benefit of the doubt, to see if he can provided definitions which would establish consistency.
The point is that "actual" can be made to be one of the possibilities, but that annihilates realism. We must instill principles other than realist principles to distinguish the actual from the possible, if the actual is to be one of the possible. This is the case with model-dependent realism for example, which claims "realism" in the name, but is not realism. The glaring problem being that realism denies the priority of the possible, therefore the actual cannot yield logical priority to the possible, which is required to conceive of the actual as one of the possible. The actual, real, must be distinct from, and logically prior to, the possible, for true realism.
Banno's problem is that he does not want to relinquish his realist ontology, but he wants at the same time to accept the priority of modal logic. Now he is starting to propose a division, a boundary, between metaphysical principles and epistemic principles, so he can hide the contradictory principles, one on each side of that boundary, thereby having an epistemology which is inconsistent with his metaphysics. "The actual world" means something different in Banno's metaphysics, from what it means in his epistemology.
Yep. It's a curio.
p??p is invalid without reflexivity.
And your reasoning has been repeatedly shown to be in error.
Point me to one place where you showed error in my reasoning please.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Here.
Here's an AI generated summary:
However solid your reasoning may be, you just have to accept the usage of whatever possible world semanticist you're reviewing. They generally say that actuality is a brand of possibility, the intuition being that all events of the actual world are logically possible.
1. "For example, it's true you read a post, but it's also possible you might not have read it."
That speaks for itself.
2. Just because we can consider counterfactuals, doesn't indicate that it's possible that what is false could be true.
3.No demonstration here, just appeal to authority, and disregard of my logical demonstration.
4.Doesn't make sense, or perhaps is just irrelevant.
5.False.
Poor effort Claude, so I'll have to give you an F for failure. And please do not try again.
In all that AI babble you haven't yet addressed my reasoning. Are you going to show me errors in my reasoning, or just continue with the misrepresentations.
Start with the following, which follows directly from your definitions:
Possible worlds consist of stipulations.
The actual world does not consist of stipulations.
Therefore the actual world is not a possible world.
Please show me where that reasoning is erroneous. Or, is it the case that your definitions are erroneous?
Quoting frank
As I said to Ludwig V in the prior post, we can make the actual world one of the possible worlds, but this contradicts realism. Banno wants both, realism, and the actual world to be one of the possible worlds, and doesn't seem to understand the incompatibility. So he continues to define "actual world" in a way which contradicts how he defines "possible world", to support his realism, but also making it impossible that the actual world is one of the possible worlds.
I did this the other day, but it's easy enough to do it again. A possible world does not consist of stipulations, so much as a complete description of a state of affairs - which statements are true and which are false. In an informal sense it is convenient to think of possible worlds as stipulated, by setting out how, if at all, a possible world differs form the actual world.
The actual world can for logical purposes be set out in the same way, as statements setting out what is the case and what isn't. But of course the actual world doesn't consist of such statements, nor of stipulations.
So both premises are muddled, and so is the conclusion.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I will count that as progress. But your views on realism appear similarly confused. But by all means, set out the account clearly and I might address it.
I don't think it does. Take a moment to read through the first two paragraphs of the SEP article on possible worlds:
Quoting SEP
The following is based on your latest description of possible worlds and actual world. Can you point out what's wrong with my reasoning?
A possible world consists of statements setting out what is the case and what isn't.
The actual world consists of statements setting out what is the case and what isn't.
Every possible world is the actual world.
Quoting Banno
See below.
Quoting frank
Can you explain the point you are trying to make with that passage?
Anyway, the realist assumes that there is a world, and a way that the world is, which is independent from us, the human knowers.
So to reply to your SEP article, human beings think that "things might have been different in countless ways". These different ways that human beings think that things might have been different, are thought up by human beings, and so they are not independent from us. Therefore, "possible worlds" are worlds which are not independent from us, they are dependent on us. If, "the actual world" is said to be one of the possible worlds, then the actual world is not independent from us. Possible worlds are not independent.
That the actual world is a possible world is contrary to the realist assumption stated above.
The actual world is an abstract object like any other possible world. A realist says the actual world contains true statements that are beyond our knowledge.
Can you clarify this? What is a true statement that's beyond our knowledge? It doesn't make any sense to me.
You've never accidentally walked into a 9th grade math class (one with an equation on the board) by mistake when you were in 5th grade? :wink:
An important distinction is, much like a child, we assume either we—or someone we know—knows all there is to know (that is to say, can simply be "exposed" to such knowledge, such as walking into a room where it's written and automatically understand it in full depth and detail as others do; this is merely the ego at work, the driving force and cause of all human suffering). There, of course, per nature of the topic is the idea of an "unknowable" knowledge. But that concept rests largely on the one who perceives it. If humans evolved, we now possess knowledge those before us were incapable of knowing (ergo, the "unknowable" knowledge). Yet, it became knowable. So, one might reasonably hold the belief that unless one can predict or perceive the future, there is a concept of "unknowable knowledge" that may change and become knowable.
Not unlike how—not that long ago—only a madman would consider braving the seas in search of nourishment or freedom. Yet now even the average person does so for recreation via the form of an affordable cruise. Something to think about. Perhaps, with any hope, to calm your turbulent mind. :smile:
Speak for yourself. I don't see why anyone would ever assume that there is someone who knows all there is to know. Since knowledge varies from one person to another, it's very counterintuitive to think that there would be one person who knows everything. Since much knowledge is context dependent wouldn't this require someone who is everywhere, all the time?
Since knowledge is the property of knowers, are you proposing God to support the idea of knowledge which is unknowable to current human beings?
It makes sense to realists. Apparently you aren't one.
All I was trying to say is, even a child can come across "true knowledge"—he or she simply might be "incapable of knowing (processing it?)" at the time (but might, given enough time, thus illustrating the concept of the unknowable becoming knowable, at least in one valid manner of thinking). Adults too. You're a mortal being, aren't you? Yes? That means time is relevant as far as how one reasonably perceives things in the world we live. Is that ice bridge solid enough to walk on? At that moment it is, so we might choose to. Do we instead go by some "set apart" (albeit deterministically equal) reality that since it will melt in, who knows, a century from now we consider it water and not able to traverse? No, it's either there or not there based on the circumstance of my present being. Let "traversable" represent "knowable."
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Perhaps information or the even the general "concept of understanding" (whether ever actually attained or achieved by anyone ie. the would-be "knower") is what my statement was focused on. I'm not proposing anything only reiterating the fact that since human beings (or intelligent life itself) regularly go from periods of light and dark respectively (in terms of knowledge and understanding) there are reasonable arguments to be made in support of the idea of some "knowledge" being "unknowable". If not due to a given circumstance (observable reality) that may or may not change within the given period of a person's life (applicable period of "knowing" or "being a knower").
As far as some "unknowable knowledge" that the human mind is somehow not capable of processing (knowing), say the full digits of Pi, for example (but hypothetically might in the future, since we do not know the future). Well, that's one example it would seem. Or is it? Seems easy to get caught up in semantics with this one.
Not my intention. I was simply adding my voice to the litany for folks here who are trying to metaphorically knock some sense into MU's head. AFAICT MU does not do modal logic, so I was trying a different approach.
I think I'm realist, that's why I have difficult making "possible worlds" (worlds which are not real), consistent with "the actual world" (a world which is real).
Care to explain what you're talking about? As far as I'm aware of, only human beings make statements, and only human beings make judgements of true and false. That is why "a true statement that's beyond our knowledge" makes no sense to me. It has nothing to do with whether I'm realist or not, it's a matter of how I understand the terms you are using. You appear to be using these terms in a way which I am not familiar with. Maybe you could define "statement" and "true"?
Quoting Outlander
Knowledge is the property of knowers. Is this knowledge which no human beings possess supposed to be possessed by God?
If so, how does that make the "actual world", as known by God, consistent with "possible worlds" which are statements made by human beings?
Again, a world does not consist of a set of statements.
But in addition, this argument is an obvious undistributed middle. B is A, C is A, therefore B is C.
Poor stuff.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As Fitch showed, antirealists know everything that is to be known. There are no true statements outside of what an antirealist knows. Unless they reject classical logic.
Real? They're both abstract objects. :lol:
Quoting Banno
:up:
What does a possible world consist ofthen?
You said:
" A possible world does not consist of stipulations, so much as a complete description of a state of affairs - which statements are true and which are false."
Doesn't that mean to you, that a possible world consists of a set of statements? No wonder I'm confused, you keep contradicting yourself.
Quoting frank
Abstractions aren't real for you, frank?
Have a look at the definition and use in the Open Logic text already mentioned.
It'd do you good.
Sure, why not?
There could be an evil demon that makes me believe in numbers, but they aren't real?
:up:
Exactly.
Maybe @Metaphysician Undercover's point is to understand something, real or not, you have to have an abstraction of it. The philosopher's argument being the point of their craft: "to show the person they are a fly in a bottle, without realizing the nature of their containment, they can't ever escape from it." For example.
Abstractions or concepts are required to know what it is you're interacting with. If you have no understanding of the concept of, say, a solar eclipse, and have never seen one before, you might reasonably and rationally assume the world is ending or some cataclysmic celestial event is otherwise occurring if observed for the first time. It doesn't make a thing more real or less real, it simply reasonably (but not necessarily accurately) defines and describes something that you would otherwise either not be aware of or think to be something that it's not.
You have not addressed the issue. That is to define "the actual world" in a way which is consistent with "a possible world", and also realism. I explained it to frank here:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You have not addressed this question:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't understand this. The possibility that it will rain tomorrow does not depend on whether we recognize it. Framing possibilities as possible worlds is something that we do. Compare the platypus, which came into existence independently of is and lives mostly independently of us. How we classify the platypus is up to us.
Quoting frank
The trouble is that we cannot know what they are. So we have to argue that what we already know is not self-contained but leads us to look for and sometimes to happen upon things that we did not know before. I have much more trouble with the idea that there are things we cannot know. I cannot know the exact value of pi, but that's a fact about pi, which I can know. It is not a deficiency of mine.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If the actual world was not a possible world, then it could not exist.
Quoting Banno
Neat. Thank you.
Quoting frank
If they are beyond our knowledge, they are not statements.
Quoting Banno
The actual world doesn't consist of statements, although statements do exist in it. The actual world, as the Tractatus recognizes, consists of states of affairs which are what statements refer to, if they are true.
So, going back to the first sentence, it is true that one can define a possible world by describing it, i.e. making a number of statements about it. It is also true that one could describe the actual world in the same way. But this way of defining a world leads us to think of lining up all the possible worlds (including the actual world, of course) and then asking what the difference is. But there is no difference of the kind that we can see in the lists.
But the actual world is the world is the world in which you are carrying out the thought-experiment. To put it another way, although the actual world is exactly like the possible world, in that it can be defined by a series of statements, it is importantly different in that it is actual and the others are not. But this is a difference of status, which doesn't show up in the lists. Compare the difference between the concept of a horse and an actual horse; It is not something that could show up in the concept. Perhaps being actual is like existing - not a predicate.
Because the difference is not modal. It's metaphysical.
And Meta, as I've pointed out, has failed to see this distinction.
I wouldn't argue about that. But I don't thoroughly understand either or metaphysical. So I prefer to say that it's a question of how you look at it - or represent it.
Good, since it is a topic of ongoing discussion. Just not much in the way @Metaphysician Undercover suggests.
The philosophy behind actual versus possible is lengthy and complex. If you want to walk through two SEP articles on it we can examine the views of all the interested parties. There's even a tie-in to negative dialectics!!!
I did set it out. This will be the third time I post the very same paragraph. Please, could you read it and reply accordingly. This is it:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes it does, very explicitly, it is something very specific, that human beings draw up in words, "the possibility that it will rain tomorrow".
Quoting Ludwig V
Of course we cannot know what they are because they cannot exist. The existence of statements is dependent on human beings. How could there be statements which we cannot know what they are, when a human being must have made the statement?
Quoting Ludwig V
That's nonsense. The possibility for something, precedes in time the actual existence of that thing. Once it is actualized, it is not longer a possibility, but an actuality. Suppose president Trump is actually assassinated. At this time, Trump has been assassinated, is a true statement of the actual world. At this point it is not possible for him to be assassinated, because he already has been.. So it's nonsense to think that if, in the actual world, Trump has been assassinated, it must be possible that Trump could be assassinated, because it is actually impossible, as he has already been assassinated. The same must be true of every actuality, and "the actual world" in general. Once it is actual, it is false to claim that it is possible.
Quoting Banno
It doesn't confuse me, I fully understand this, and it is the base of my argument. If you understand this, then it is undeniable that realism is incompatible with modal logic. Obviously, realism requires a difference between possible worlds and the actual world.
Quoting Banno
As I've told you, to have inconsistency between your metaphysics and epistemology is to have contradictory philosophy. To say that in my epistemology "the actual world is the same as any other possible world", but in my metaphysics "the actual world is completely independent and different from possible worlds", is nothing but contradiction within your concept of "actual world".
Quoting frank
Whatever you wish, I'm willing to follow.
Are you serious?
I've answered already. Several times. Here's the best I am willing to do.
The song remains the same.
That's not very good. Where's the answer?
Here's an example of the contradiction you fed to me in that link:
"Constructs" which are independent from human imagination. Who constructs these metaphysical constructs if not human beings?
Duh, the possibility structures are the thought ("constructs"), produced by the minds that think them. Are you arguing Platonism now? 'From the fact that human beings think ideas, it doesn't follow that ideas are dependent on human thought''. What about the "construct" part boss?
Come on Banno, quit the bullshit and say something real.
Something is very puzzling on what is being said here. It suggests colorful scene, as if I should go to a private room close by eyes and think about three possible worlds, then, upon opening them I realize that one of the three was the actual world around me and thus, I conclude, all in one fell swoop, one of the possible worlds I consider was the actual world and it exist too. Now I can say to myself, "If the actual world was not a possible world, then it could not exist."
It reminds me of what Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus in section 5.5303 "Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all.
It seems to me that the what is be said, that "If the actual world was not a possible world, then it could not exist." seems to fall in the latter camp, that it is to say nothing at all.
The semantic model does not commit us to the existence of its content. But if the actual world is affirmed to be a part of that semantic model, as you and others here continue to insist, then this is contrary to realism which assumes that the actual world is independent from any semantic model. Why is that difficult to understand? You can't have it both ways, assert that the actual world is a part of a semantic model, with no claims to existence, and also assert that there is a real independent, existing actual world.
Quoting Banno
The point is, that when you claim that the actual world is one of the possible worlds, you deny that there is a distinction between what is said and what is. If you assert that there is another "actual world" which is independent from what is said (realism), as well as the "actual world" which is part of the semantic model, then you equivocate. The equivocation in my "edifice" is just a reflection of the equivocation in what you are telling me, which my edifice is built upon. You are telling me that there is a metaphysical "actual world" and an epistemic "actual world", and the use of these contradict each other.
The solution to this problem is to maintain the distinction between the actual world and the possible worlds, i.e. the actual world is not a possible world. But as soon as we accept the proposition "if it is actual, it is possible" we negate that distinction and we are left with either a denial of realism, or a contradictory equivocation.
Sure, you start the thread, I'll follow.
Someone in the next room flips a coin. We cannot see the result. Now we ask the question - is it possible that the coin is showing heads? The answer is of course yes. Then we walk into the next room and indeed the coin is showing heads.
So while it is not necessarily so (the coin could be tails), something can be both possible and also be real/actual at the same time.
I am a little unclear on what you mean here. When you say “something can be possible and real at the same time” what are you referring to when you say “something” The real coin? So, a real coin that landed on heads is the same as a possible coin that may land on heads.
This was in direct response to @Metaphysician Undercovers statement:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
MU is using a very loose definition of the word "something" here - I take it to mean a state of affairs (e.g., a coin displaying heads at a particular place and point in time). MU is stating that it is impossible for "something" to be a possibility as well as an actuality at the same time. I am simply pointing out what appears (at least to me eyes) to be a very obvious exception.
If you need further clarity as to what "something" refers to, you'll have to go to the source: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1028434
One of the ways of seeing this is more or less what you describe. One can think of possibility as a kind of ante-chamber to existence. So all sorts of possibilities (possible worlds) hang about in there, waiting to be promoted. It does capture, in a metaphorical way, that our actual world has had a previous quasi-
life.
Quoting Richard B
You could say that. It's not exactly analytic, but it is trying to capture (express/show) a conceptual relationship.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'll give you this - I cannot win the 2025 Kentucky Derby twice. But that's not because I won it, but because it has happened that the result - win or lose - is settled. But if whatever the result of the 2025 race, it remains possible for me to win the 2026 race. So the possibility of my winning the Kentucky Derby does not cease when I win it.
Quoting EricH
That's a nice example. But it needs a bit of caution. While I do not know what the result is, I can say "The coin could be tails", but if I say it while I'm looking at the result, I'm falling into the sceptical morass. After you know the result, you need to say "the coin could have been tails".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's true. But the fact that the existence of the statement that Mount Everest is 29,000 ft high depends on human beings, does not show that the existence of Mount Everest depends on human beings at all. De re and de dicto.
As if we could not talk about the actual world.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Because, as explained many times, it's not the semantic model that shows which possible world is actual.
But you cannot see this. That's about you, I suppose.
Thank you.
Ok. I'll post chunks of the SEP articles and comment. The goal will be to sort out the different perspectives on possible worlds and the ontological status of possibilia.
I went through this all, way back. When we know that the coin is showing heads, it is incorrect to saying it is possible it is heads. When we do not know that the coin is showing heads it s correct to saying that that it is possible the coin is showing heads. Your example refers to two different times, before walking into the room, and after, so your conclusion of "at the same time" is incorrect. Before walking into the room we say it is possible, and after, we say it is actually showing heads, and we can no longer say it is possible. There is no "at the same time" indicated.
Quoting Ludwig V
How's that relevant? You change from a specific possibility to a more general, so it is a different referent.
Quoting Ludwig V
Again, I don't see the relevance. What I was responding to was unknown true statements, not unknown things.
If we look at EricH's example of the coin, there is implied an unknown real thing, the coin before looking at it. But that is not a statement, it is simply something unknown.
Quoting Banno
Why does what I say to you indicate that we cannot talk about the actual world? How can you make such a conclusion from what I wrote? What I said, is that if we are realist, we cannot put "the actual" into a semantic model in which it is a possible world. That would contradict our realist principles. In no way does it imply that we cannot talk about the actual world. It only implies that we cannot talk about the actual world in that specific context, because that would contradict our realist principles.
Quoting Banno
That doesn't matter. By the principle upon which the semantic model is produced, we cannot conclude that any of the possible worlds is the actual world without contradicting realist principles. If you take a set of possible worlds, and apply some realist principles to deduce "the actual world", then you must relinquish the claim that the others are possible. You are then not within the constraints of the semantic model, so the other worlds are no longer "possible". "Possible" is a word applied in a very specific way, within that model, and you have moved outside that model, so the application is not valid.
Look what you said already yesterday:
"There is no modal difference between the actual world and the other possible worlds... ".
That is the very issue with modal models, by what principles do we produce an actual world. When you apply some principles to designate "the actual world", you violate the modal model by assigning special status to one of the worlds, placing yourself outside the model, and no longer correct in referring those other worlds as "possible". We only have those "possible worlds" within that semantic model which denies any such special status to any world. Assigning special status violates the model.
Again, again, again, That's not what is being proposed. Any of the possible worlds could be the actual world - hence, "there is no modal difference between the actual world and the other possible worlds". Modal theory does not tell us which possible world is actual.
Your presumption that it does is exactly your confusing the modal and the metaphysical, your denial of p??p.
This is a pretty tedious conversation. You make the very same error, repeatedly. The actual world is one of the possible worlds. If you deny this, you must also deny reflexivity, which is to say you deny that we can talk about the actual world. You restrict yourself to quite simplistic and unusable modal systems.
All of which was set out formally, last week, and remains unaddressed.
But it's helping my post count. So carry on.
So for some p, the possibility of p ends when p occurs and for other p it doesn't. Furthermore, the ending of the possibility of my winning the Kentucky Derby 2025 does not depend on whether I win or lose or even take part. It depends only the the race happening. The disappearance of this specific p depends only on the date, not on whether I win or not.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes. You are right about that. I took the original claim in a generous senses, that would see it as equivalent "unknown truths"
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So do you accept that there are some unknown things?
Yep. This is formalised by accessibility relations. metaphysically, before the race is run, both the worlds in which you win and those in which you do not are accessible; any might become the actual world. After you win, only the worlds in which you win are accessible. Semantically, both before and after the race is won, we can access both the worlds in which you won and those in which you did not.
Conflating these is the exact error Meta repeatedly makes.
That's an incorrect interpretation, for obvious reasons. None of the possible worlds could be the actual world, as that would constitute an invalid difference, within the collection of possible worlds, one would be the actual world. Therefore it is clearly not the case that one of the possible worlds is the actual world because that would invalidate the model. Therefore we must interpret that none of the possible worlds is the actual world.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes, this acknowledges the difference between a particular and a universal. So you use "p" in an equivocal way. "When p occurs" refers to a particular, while "other P" refers to a type. It is clear that "when p occurs" must refer to a particular, because if it was a type, an instance of p occurring would not preclude the occurrence of another instance of p. But, the occurrence of a particular precludes the possibility of that same particular occurring again. So, we must clear up the equivocation in that statement, where "p" refers to a particular, and also to a type.
Quoting Ludwig V
I believe there is a lot which is unknown. Strictly speaking it would not be correct to call the unknown "things", because that implies some sort of knowledge of the unknown, knowledge that the unknown consists of things. In other words, saying that there is "unknown things" wrongly projects knowledge onto the unknown. This is similar to, but more subtle, than saying that there is unknown statements. "Unknown statements" is obviously a problem, even to those without metaphysical education. But "unknown things" requires metaphysical understanding to recognize as fundamentally incorrect.
Risible.
One of the possible worlds is the actual world.
Either that, or the actual world is not possible.
The person who flipped the coin knew it. At the same time.
Exactly.
Within the modal model, we now have two possibilities, "one of the possible worlds is the actual world", or "the actual world is not possible". Since it violates the rules of the model for one of the possible worlds to be the actual world, then within the modal model, the actual world is not possible. Therefore model logic is not consistent with realism.
I'm glad you are at least starting to consider this as a possibility.
That's why ontologies like model-dependent realism are not true realism. Here's an analogy which might help you to understand. Under relativity theory, any rest frame is a valid rest frame, and each frame is made to be consistent with each other, as a valid "possibility". Each is a "possible" frame of reference, but none provides a true rest frame, which would be the "actual rest frame". In order that all the frames of reference may equally be valid rest frames, it is imperative that none is the "actual rest frame". Likewise, in modal logic it is imperative that none of the possible worlds is the "actual world", or the possibility of the others is invalidated.
Quoting EricH
You are changing to a different definition of "know", a subjective one, claiming that one person knows what others do not. We have been discussing this issue under the premise that knowing is a property of "we", not the property of one individual subject. I cautioned against equivocating between these two senses of "know" a few days back, because the conditions are completely different.
So in your example, there is a number of people, and discrepancy between what one person thinks that they know, and what others think that they know. Therefore it does not qualify as "we know", and is not a valid example. Anytime that it is proposed that there is inconsistency between what one knows and another knows, or between what some know and others do not, it is not a case of "we know", and not a valid example for the purpose of this discussion.
:roll:
It doesn't.
This is hard to decipher into my idiolect. Before the race I can access two possible worlds, the one in which I win and the one in which I don't. After the race, only the world in which I win is accessible. Going by what you said to Meta "One of the possible worlds is the actual world", that world - in which I win - has become the actual world.
I don't understand the bit about semantics, and how they enable me to do something I can't do metaphysically. I think you may be referring to the point that after the race, "I might have lost" is true. ?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes. No more "a possibility" or "an actuality". We'll need to specify whether we are speaking about a particular or a general/universal possibility/actuality.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I take your point. Perhaps we should restrict ourselves to talking of "the unknown". It might clearer to change tack and only talk about the possibilities of discovering new knowledge.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's an example of using thing in a generously vague way. It is useful because it avoids annoying debates about what is a thing and what is not, etc;
Quoting EricH
I'm afraid this doesn't address the problem, but it is a nice try. The possibility and the actuality exist in different contexts. From outside the room, it is possible and from inside the room, not. What's at stake is the P implies possibly P. That means within a single context.
You yourself said:
"There is no modal difference between the actual world and the other possible worlds... "
Therefore if we assign to one of the possible worlds the status of "actual world" by realist principles, (which would constitute a modal difference), we would be attributing a difference to this world which violates the modal system which dictates "no modal difference".
No wonder I'm so confused, you keep making contradictory assertions without backing any of them up. Without the proper support for these assertions, I can 't tell which of the contrary claims you actually believe. Therefore I can only conclude that you just don't understand what you're talking about.
Quoting Ludwig V
This is good. Now we have the basic separation between Platonic realism and non-Platonic types of realism to navigate. Notice you mention "the possibilities of discovering new knowledge". That knowledge is something independent from human beings, which is "discovered" by us implies Platonism. This form of realism is conducive to the idea that there is unknown true propositions, which exist independently from us, which we "discover".
The alternative, non-Platonic realism would say that we create, produce or "construct" knowledge while something other than knowledge is what is independent from us. There are also forms of realism which blur the boundary between these two by invoking concepts like "information".
Quoting Ludwig V
It might avoid such debates, but if we want to understand the metaphysics, and the possibility of the reality of an independent world, we need to engage these difficult subjects. Mundane life, and common language use in general, for communication, has no need for metaphysics. So habits of language usage are developed in ways of ambiguity, the ambiguity providing for a difference in underlying world-views. The ambiguity is effective in allowing me to interpret by my world-view, and you to interpret by your world-view, such that we can effectively communicate and move along in our day to day projects without the need for consistency between our ontological foundations.
So we can avoid "annoying debates about what is a thing and what is not", and move along with our mundane communications without the need to address metaphysical differences. If however, metaphysics is the subject of discussion, then avoiding these annoying discussions is a mistake conducive to misunderstanding.
I don't know what realist principles are. The thing is, there is a system of modal logic which, I understand works reasonably well by the relevant standards. I've no desire to interfere in something I don't understand. So, if the logic says there is no modal difference, I shall treat that in the same way that I treat the logical operators of implication, conjunction and disjunction - as technical concepts which do not need to mirror ordinary language. That mutual tolerance seems to work quite well.
However, it seems that it is not a question of two worlds, with a difference between them, but a difference of the same world. If the difference involved here is not a difference in the description of the possible world, it must be a difference in status of that same world. (Compare Kant's argument that existence is not a predicate, because to assert that X exists is not to identify that there is any difference between X as conceived (or even possible) and X as existent (or actual).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think that any of the critical terms in this debate are at all well defined and there's a wide range of choice available. It can make it very difficult to know just what label applies to oneself.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
H'm. Maybe. I agree, however, that more would need to be said about what "discover" means. But I like the implication that discovery presupposes an independent pre-existing something. It's not difficult with the empirical, but the a priori needs careful handling.
I agree.
Quoting Ludwig V
Ok, let's consider this perspective then. The representations of modal logic, are different possible descriptions of an independent actual world. It should be clear to you that none of the possibilities is the actual, independent world. Therefore it should also be clear to you that none of the possibilities is the actual. To think such would be a case of what is commonly called confusing the map with the terrain. We can establish some principles for judgement, criteria of truth or whatever, but that produces a judgement of truth, it does not make one of the possibilities into the actual.
Quoting Ludwig V
Well, the issue is what exactly is the nature of what is termed here as "an independent pre-existing something". If we talk about discovering knowledge, then we imply that the independent something which we discover is knowledge. If we talk about discovering true statements, then it is implied that the independent something discovered is statements. If we talk about discovering information than it is implied that the independent something is information.
Conventionally, we would assign "matter" to the independent something. But Aristotle demonstrated that matter on its own is completely unintelligible, therefore unknowable. It is actually the form which the matter is in which is intelligible. But this poses the question of what exactly is "form", and how does it make something unknowable, matter, into something knowable.
We are stipulating that that one world is the actual world, not deducing it. Any world can counted as w?. It's built in, not contradictory. There is no modal difference between the actual world and other possible worlds. The difference is metaphysical, not modal.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You have yet to study modal logic, but insist on your opinion. That's why you are confused.
So within the modal model there is no actual world, just possible worlds. When you stipulate that one of the worlds is the actual world, that is metaphysics. But when you stipulate an actual world, then the others are no longer (metaphysically) possible.
Within the modal model there is not consistency between actual and possible, because all are possible and there is no actual. And within the metaphysics there is not consistency between the actual and the possible. You only claim that the actual is possible by incorrectly conflating the modal with the metaphysical.
Quoting Banno
You have yet to study metaphysics, and that's why you continually confuse me.
No.
It really would help if you read some logic.
Thanks for the diagnosis, and prescription, Dr..
From a week ago...
Quoting Banno
What happened here is that you attempted a critique of modal logic without first getting an idea of how it works. When I attempt to set out how possible world semantics clarifies and explains the issues here, you jump to further unfounded criticisms rather than try to understand. that's the "doubling down".
So, going back, p??p is valid in S4 and S5, the systems almost universally used for metaphysical speculation. These systems are reflexive, meaning that they permit us to talk about the possible world we are in. Denying p??p, as you do, blocks that reflexivity.
Going back a bit further, if we allow p??p and so Kp??Kp, then Fitch shows that antirealism directly implies that there are no true statements that is not known.
The out for antirealism is to set aside classical logic.
And going right back to the OP and title, for an antirealist who accepts classical logic, there isn't anything to be known beyond what is known; which some might understand as that there isn’t anything beyond our reality. However that view is fraught with metaphysical and logical problems.
As I said, your interpretation is incorrect. The world we are in is not a possible world.
It's not my interpretation. It's the consequence of possible world semantics and the associated modal logic.
That's just you asserting, again, that ~(p??p), which is invalid in any system that is reflexive.
Again, if it is true, you cannot talk about the actual world within possible world semantics - which is just to put yourself at odds with the accepted logic.
Which I suppose, in your eccentricity, is what you are indeed doing.
One thing you have not demonstrated is that ~(p??p); you have simply assumed this. Indeed it's not the sort of thing that one can demonstrate.
In an attempt to be as charitable as possible, I fed your criteria into an AI and asked it to put together a coherent account. Here's what I got.
What you have done is to deny that there can be systematic modal reasoning, without offering any clear alternative.
I believe I've demonstrated this to you about four or more times already, in different ways. The "actual world" which you represent with your formulation here, is not at all consistent with (it is contradictory with) what "actual world" means for realism.
Here, I'll demonstrate it once more for you, in a slightly different way, even though I have no doubt that you will just continue to "double down" with your contradictory nonsense.
1.Metaphysical realism holds that there is some sort of real independent world.
2.We may produce statements or propositions which we judge, in our belief to be true, i.e. we judge them to be a true representation of the supposed real independent world.
3. If we take this representation, and make it a part of a structure of modal logic consisting of "possible worlds", and designate it "the actual world" amongst those possibilities, this so-called "actual world" is not consistent with the "actual world" of realism. It is as I've demonstrated, contradictory, because it is a human dependent representation rather than something independent.
Do you see the point? In realism, "the actual world" refers to something independent of human beings. In your formulation of modal logic, "the actual world" refers to a representation, which is produced by, judged to be true by, and therefore dependent on human beings.
Can you apprehend the contradiction in "actual world" here? In the case of realism "actual world" refers to something independent. In the case of your formulation of modal logic, "actual world" refers to a human construct, something dependent. Therefore the two meanings of "actual world" are contradictory.
The difference is very obvious if you consider that the human designated "actual world" which is a part of the modal construct might be mistaken. Therefore it is definitely not the same as the "actual world of realism. And as I've demonstrated countless times, in countless ways, the two are contradictory.
Quoting Banno
Sorry, I don't recognize this as my criteria. Either you, in your bad interpretation, the AI, or both, have greatly distorted things, creating the worst straw man I think I've ever seen.
Quoting Banno
How do you ever make that conclusion? I have nothing against modal reasoning, it's very useful. What I say is that it is not consistent with realism. Many useful principles, such as my example of relativity theory yesterday, are not consistent with realism. That's just the way things are. And it does direct skepticism toward realism.
Assuming you understood my last post, I'll address this issue you mention.
Quoting Banno
Following @frank's thread about the SEP article on possible worlds, we can understand the problem as the difference between what is extensional and what is intensional. In realism, "p" in your example has an extensional referent. In modal logic it has an intensional referent. The extensional referent is a necessary condition of realism therefore modal logic contradicts realism. That the referent of "p" is in fact intensional in modal logic, and not extensional, as required for consistency with realism, is indicated by the following passage:
In other words, the supposed extensionality of modal logic is an illusion created by representing modal logic itself as an extensional thing. This is the same problem I covered in this forum with the proposed extensionality of mathematics. The extensionality of mathematics is an illusion created by treating numbers and other so-called "mathematical objects" as extensional referents, when they are really intensional. That is the basis of Platonic realism, which produces all sorts of problems such as eternal object etc..
All you have done here is restate your thesis.
Tedious in the extreme.
That a model of gravity talks about the Earth does not entail that the Earth is human-dependent. That a modal modal talks about the actual world does not entail that the actual world is human dependent.
You continue to confused the metaphysical actual world with our representation of it inside a modal model. That confusion is the whole mistake, and repeating it does not amount to an argument.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What to make of this nonsense. Numbers are extensional, but you do not appear to have a firm grasp of what extensionality is. Extensionality in logic and in mathematics is simply defined in terms of substitution. Intensional contexts are those in which substitution fails. Extensionality is substitutivity of co-referential terms without changing truth. Numbers are extensional by this definition. Modal statements are intensional because substitution can change truth. Possible world semantics provdes an extensional model of this this intentionality. You conflates the two, which is the source of your confusion.
Yes, since you are having such trouble understanding, and continue to double down on your contradictory nonsense, I have to keep thinking of different ways to tell you the same thing.
Quoting Banno
How are these two statements consistent for you. In the first you speak about an object called "the Earth". Then, you talk about something "inside a modal model". Obviously, the thing inside the modal model is not the thing we talk about as "the earth" This is your mistake, your confusion, not mine. I am trying to relieve you of this mistaken attitude. You have "the actual world" within a modal model, and you talk about it as if it is a real independent thing.
I'm extremely surprised that a seemingly intelligent person like yourself, really cannot see the difference here. This is so hard for me to grasp, that it inclines me to believe that you are intentionally rejecting the reality, as a form of denial, because the reality of the situation is contrary to what you already believe.
So, here is a simple explanation. I assume that you understand the map/territory analogy. When someone "talks about the Earth", there is an aspect of the territory which is being talked about, and it's named "the Earth". When a modal model talks about the actual world, what "actual world" refers to is a description which is known as a possible world. You tell me that you recognize this distinction, so please adhere to it.
That description of the actual world is the map, not the territory. This is what is referred to within the modal model, as "the actual world" a description. That specific description is known as the actual world. And, it cannot be anything more than a description, because all the other possible worlds are descriptions. It you assume that "actual world" here refers to something other than a description, an independent object, then you produce inconsistency within the modal logic, because all the other possible worlds are descriptions, and you'd be claiming that this refers to something other than a description.
One way of alleviating this problem is to assume that the maps themselves (the descriptions), are actually a part of the territory. This is known as Platonism, and it is the route that set theory takes. The descriptive ideas are real objects in the world. This provides extensionality to mathematics. That's also the route that possible worlds semantics takes, the possible worlds (descriptive ideas) are real objects, and this provide extensionality.
However, the possible worlds semantics is much more problematic than the set theory semantics of mathematical objects. This is because we now have two very distinct things which are called "the actual world". One is the real physical reality (the territory), and the other is the descriptive idea (the map), which is supposed to be "the actual world" as one of the possible worlds. Obviously we need to distinguish between these two senses of "actual world", to avoid equivocation, and the contradiction which I have demonstrated is the inevitable consequence. Therefore one or the other cannot be called 'the actual world. Some ontologies like model-dependent realism (which I would say are unacceptable) deny a real world beyond the descriptive "actual world". My approach is to deny that the descriptive so-called "actual world" of modal logic ought to be called by that name.
Quoting Banno
I have much experience discussing extensionality with mathematicians in this forum. It forms the basis of the equality relation, what mathematicians incorrectly (contrary to the law of identity) know as identity. This is how they know mathematical objects as "objects", they give them identity. But this is contrary to the law of identity which was designed to distinguish between so-called "Platonic objects", and physical things.
You on the other hand demonstrate here, a very inadequate understanding. Here is what the SEP article of Possible Worlds says:
Take the Earth (real world) as the territory and the “Actual world” in a modal model as map (description).
You continue to conflate the two. You treats the representational construct inside modal logic (the “actual world” symbol in a Kripke frame) as if it is the metaphysical actual world. The model’s “actual world” is a description; it is not the metaphysical actual world.
I've been pointing this put for pages. Quite literally.
Numbers are extensional objects - you can substitute them in equations, which is the very definition of extensionality. Modal logic uses an intensional syntax, modelling it extensionally. If you continue with the other discussion, instead of seeking to pervert it, you might actually see how this happens.
Are you kidding? I am the one who has repeatedly demonstrated how you equivocate between "the actual world" of realism (real and independent), and "the actual world" of modal logic.
If you are now ready to accept this difference, then you might be able to understand what I've been saying. Let's assume that the real independent world of realism is called "the actual world" and the one in modal logic is called "a representation of the real world".
Do you now agree that it would be contradictory to say that the actual world is a possible world? If so, then it may be the case that we've resolved our differences.
Yes, my proposal to resolve the difference is based on rectifying your equivocation. Giving the same term "the actual world" two distinct meanings within an argument, as you have done throughout this discussion, is equivocation.
In the quote above, you insist that there is "no logical contradiction" in this equivocation. And, generally equivocation, though it is a recognized fallacy, does not necessarily result in contradiction. However, in this case it does produce contradiction, like I've shown. In your usage "the actual world" refers to something independent (realism), and also something dependent (modal model). Therefore this equivocation is a very significant fallacy.
Look:
Quoting Banno
Quoting Banno
So, since you appear to recognize the equivocal nature here in the use of "actual world", I am proposing that we continue the discussion on better terms. Can we call the real independent world "the actual world", and the one in modal logic we will call "a representation of the actual world"? The difference being that when we talk about "the actual world" a real independent thing is referenced, but in modal logic, a representation is referenced. Therefore we need to make this difference clear.
Under these terms we can agree that the actual world is not a possible world. However, a representation of the actual world, in modal logic, can be a possible world. Do you agree?
If so, then we can go back and analyze your proposal from Fitch. Notice that if "kp" indicates "we know p", it means that we have a representation of p which we know, in this modal model. We know the representation itself. Since it could be the case that the representation, even though we know the representation as a representation, may be a wrong representation, what "kp" really means relative to the actual world, is that it is possible that we know what is represented by p. Knowing the representation does not necessitate knowing the thing represented. Therefore, relative to the actual world, "kp", and "?Kp" really mean the same thing, they both mean that it is possible that we know what p represents. Do you see this?
To facilitate understanding, consider the difference between the actual world and the representation of the actual world. The representation may be wrong, even though it has been judged to be correct. Therefore relative to the actual world, the representation, which is employed in modal logic, is really just a possibly correct representation. So it has no intrinsic difference from all the other possible worlds, It has just been assigned a special status. That is the same with "kp". The p signified has no intrinsic ontological difference from any other p mentioned by "?Kp", it has just been assigned a special status.
I think I see what you're saying, but let me echo it back to you using a slightly revised scenario.
You (MU) see me (EricH) on the street staring intently at my cell phone. The following dialogue ensures:
MU: "HI EricH! What's going on?"
EricH: "Hey MU. This is really important. I just bet my life savings on the lottery. I just know that my numbers are going to come in. See - I picked 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. That's going to be the winning numbers!"
MU: "Jeez EricH, that's crazy. You know the odds are way against you."
EricH: "Yeah, MU - but it's possible, yes?"
MU: "Well yes it's possible, but you're taking a terrible risk here"
EricH: "Wait a minute, here come the numbers. One, two, three, four, five. . . . come on six . . . SIX! Yes! See MU - it's possible!"
MU: "No EricH. It is not possible"
EricH: " WTF MU? You just said 2 seconds ago that it was possible."
MU: "Yes, but now that it's actual, it's no longer possible. That would be a logical contradiction."
EricH: "Huh? That's crazy. If it ain't possible then it couldn't have happened. "
At this point MU starts into a long detailed explanation of the distinction between possibility and actuality. Meanwhile EricH edges slowly away . . .
EricH: "Hey MU, that's, umm, really interesting - maybe another time. I have to go see my financial advisor."
- - - - - - - -
So here's my take on this. Philosophy can be useful for digging below the metaphorical surface of our everyday speech & thoughts and can help us avoid logic errors and to think & talk more precisely. I've learned a lot from TPF. But when a philosophical statement contradicts the plain meaning of our everyday speech, there has to be a really good reason. And while I think I understand what you're saying, I just don't buy into it.
MU - I've said it before - it's clear that you're intelligent & highly knowledgeable, but speaking as a plain language person this strikes me as very obscure & eccentric. Just my 2 cents.
= = = = = = = ==== = = = = = = = = =
Quoting Ludwig V
Yeah, I see that. If I had enough time I could likely get up to speed on this modal stuff, but I'll leave that up to you and Banno et al. :smile:
In modal logic, “the actual world” is a designated element of a model, usually called w?. It is not the metaphysical world, not the planet, not the territory.
A Kripke frame is a representational device, and every world inside it is a representational device.
Even w? is just another node in the model.
Calling one of those nodes “the actual world” introduces no metaphysics. It is merely a stipulation in the model: "let this node represent the actual world".
Hence, there is no contradiction in saying "The metaphysical actual world is mind-independent" and "A model contains a representational node we can call "the actual world".
Meta is arguing:
But this rests on a category mistake. Two homonymous terms do not produce a fallacy unless they appear within the same argument, and they are treated as though they refer to the same thing.
Meta treats representational dependence as ontological dependence. His argument is that the map is human-dependent, therefore the territory is human-dependent.
Meta claims it is contradictory to say the actual world is a possible world, but in modal semantics a “possible world” is just a node in a model, and the “actual world” is one node among others.
Keep in mind that the equation he rejects, p??p, is valid in both S4 and S5. In rejecting it he rejects the two most useful systems of modal logic. Meta’s rejection of the principle amounts to rejecting reflexivity, which means rejecting T, and thereby rejecting S4 and S5, which means rejecting every ordinary epistemic, doxastic, and metaphysical modal logic used in philosophy.
When good philosophy is contrary to everyday speech, there is a really good reason for that. It indicates a fundamental problem with everyday speech. You can say, "I don't buy into it", and decide to stick with the everyday speech, but that only indicates that you're not a good philosopher.
Quoting Banno
Are you saying then, that you'd prefer to use "the actual world" to refer to that aspect of the modal model in this discussion? Then what should we call the place where we live. In this discussion, we cannot say "we are in the actual world" then, because that would be equivocation, unless you are trying to say that we really live within a modal model.
Notice, the topic of the thread. It's very important to this topic that we do not conflate the two.
Quoting Banno
It's not sufficient to qualify "actual world" with "metaphysical", because for the purposes of rigorous logic, "actual world" must always refer to the same thing. If we call the representation "the actual world", and then we qualify this with "metaphysical", it implies that we are using the same representation called "the actual world", and using this for metaphysical purposes. But this is not the case, metaphysics deals with something distinct which is assumed to be independent of the representation.
Quoting Banno
Clearly, your argument in this thread constitutes "the same argument", and so we have a fallacy.
The question of whether modal logic contradicts realism, I readily admit, is much more complicated. Used properly it does not, because it is a principle of epistemology, and it need not, and ought not, be applied to metaphysics at all. But when it is applied to metaphysics, as you have done in this thread, contradiction with realism is inevitable. So we can keep modal logic right out of metaphysics, without a problem, or we can apply it to produce a metaphysics which will not be consistent with the type of realism we are discussing. It may be consistent with types of realism which you and I would not consider to be true realism (Platonic realism, and my example of model-dependent realism).
Quoting Banno
The problem is that in possible worlds semantics, the map is the territory. That's how they get extensionality. It's just like extensionality in mathematics, the sets, numbers, etc., are the objects referred to. In possible worlds semantics, the possible worlds are the things referred to (the territory) by the modal logic. Otherwise there is no territory, because the possibilities may be fictional, so there would only be intensionality, meaning, without any actual territory being referred to.
Quoting Banno
A "node", is a thing referred to. The possible world is the territory. It must be, to allow extensionality for something fictional. Without this there is only intensionality because there is no things referred to, only meaning, for any proposed possibility.
Quoting Banno
I don't necessarily reject this. I reject it in the metaphysical application you have proposed in this thread.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's a start. Good.
An excellent discussion, trembling on the brink of an agreement. I'm biting my nails here.
Quoting Banno
I'm curious. Can we also write ?p?(p v ~p)? I'm not saying that it has any particular significance for the discussion.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
H'm. How to we decide which contradictions are good philosophy and which are not? In other words, there may be a reason for it, but it does not follow that it is a good reason. The point about ordinary speech is that it is inescapable, at least as a starting-point. Specialised dialects presuppose it and develop out of it. That's because ordinary life is inescapable.
Quoting Banno
It all seems perfectly clear. I'm thinking of each description that defines a possible world as contained in a book, so that I can line up all the possible worlds on a shelf; I might call it an encyclopaedia. One of those volumes is identified as the actual world; the possibility of being actual is contained in every description, but the identification of a specific volume as actual cannot based on any criterion within the books and from that point of view is arbitrary, Does this make sense?
I had the impression that identification as actual is not based on, and does not cause, any change in the description contained in the book. That is, it is a change in the status of that world, not a change in the world. The actual and possible worlds are not two worlds, but the same world with a new status, in a context that is independent of the books. The other worlds have the status of being possible, which I understand as something like the status of a work of fiction.
The discussion between you and @Metaphysician Undercover seems to me to centre on the question what each of these worlds consist in. I don't see this as a killer problem, because there is no determinate answer to the question what a work of fiction consists in.
There is a different issue about what world my project (and Kripke's) takes place in. Clearly, it must be a God's Eye view. But are they to be contained in the description of each world? If they are, that would undermine the idea that the actual world is exactly the same as all the other possible worlds. But the idea of the God's Eye view seems to be inherent in formal logic, so, again, it is not a killer problem.
Yep. The consequent is a tautology, hence always true, so the implication as a whole is always true.
Might be more of a surprise that ?p?(p?¬p) is also true.
I hadn't thought of that, but it makes sense. If one element of a disjunction is true, the whole disjunct is true. Presumably, then, we can also write ?¬p?(p?¬p) and (?p?(p?¬p) & ?¬p?(p?¬p)). No surprise, since ?(p?¬p).
Kripke himself regretted his choice of "worlds" terminology for that very reason: he acknowledged that it invited a conflation of metaphysical worlds with model-theoretical worlds. He blamed this misleading terminology for inspiring modal realism, i.e., thinking of possible worlds as "foreign countries" or "distant planets," which he rejected.
It appears like we're not as close to agreement as I thought. If you continue to insist that you can use the same term to refer to different things, within the same argument (to equivocate), and to insist that there is no logical inconsistency in doing this, and also assert that the person who points out this equivocation to you, is the one making the error, then I think there is not much point in proceeding.
Quoting Ludwig V
I don't see that contradiction is ever good. And, I think that might be reasonable as an expressible starting principle for good philosophy.
Also I don't accept your proposal that ordinary speech is the inescapable starting point for philosophy. Human nature has inescapable features, instincts and intuitions, which go much deeper than language, and serve to guide us in decision making. The rejection of contradiction for example is a manifestation of a deeper intuition, rejecting contradiction as an impediment to the capacity to know and understand. As are infinite regress and other similar things known by intuition to be detrimental to the will to know (philosophy).
Language on the other hand is a sort of surface feature of the highly developed conscious mind. In other words, beings were living, and developing features which we've inherited, long before we learned how to speak, and these features make a more natural, therefore I believe better, starting point for philosophy. So it is natural that if common speech is producing philosophy which is deceptive and misleading to these inner intuitions which guide us in the will to know, then we ought to reject it as a poor starting point for philosophy. This is why logic is based in placing special restrictions on language, it curbs the tendency to fall back on ordinary language, which misleads.
Humanity has come into existence in a particular place & time through a multi-billion year process of evolution. Our "inescapable features, instincts and intuitions" are baked into us - but this does not mean that these qualities can help us resolve these issues.
There was a long time poster - Bartricks? (I think) who was banned - who maintained that since God was omnipotent that meant that God was not bound by the law of non-contradiction. What a fascinating notion. So is our intuition correct? I cannot rule out the possibility that our intuition is wrong.
As another example - we have not yet grasped the "nature" (for want of a better word) of quantum physics. Are photons particles or waves? My thinking is that if people much smarter than me cannot make up their minds then we're missing something. Maybe the question is wrong and we need a whole new method of thinking that somehow re-frames the issue. What that could possibly be beats me.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Infinite regress doesn't bother me. But then again I'm not a good philosopher - to which I will not deny . . .
H'm. Did he, by any chance, suggest a better term?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
@Banno must speak for himself. But it is possible that he is not doing that. I may have misunderstood, but I think the idea is that the actual world is regarded as a possible world, which does not imply that there are two worlds here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm sorry, I wasn't very clear.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is the context for the remark you quoted. I was referring to contradictions between philosophy and everyday speech, and your acceptance that such differences needed to be justified.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We're getting sucked in to all-or-nothing positions. Ordinary language sometimes misleads and sometimes doesn't. One of the tasks for philosophy is to sort out the misleading bits and those that are not. I notice, however, that many major issues in philosophy are precisely based on misleading features of ordinary language - such as the pursuit of "Reality" and "Existence".
I don't think of language as a sort of bolt-on extra that human beings possess and other creatures don't (on the whole). In the first place, many animals have communication systems that are recognizably language-like and look very like precursors of language. In the second place, language is something that humans developed under evolutionary pressure, and hence no different from any other feature developed in the same way by other creatures. In the third place, you seem to think that our "inner intuitions" are not as liable to mislead us as language is; I see no ground for supposing that.
Reassuring to know I'm not alone in having that same thought.
Yes, Kripke suggested "possible states (or histories) of the world" or "possible situations." The latter may seem most vague, but that's for the better, in my opinion. In a model, we consider only relevant possibilities, whereas a metaphysical world is intractably rich in possibilities. A model does not aspire to completeness - only to pragmatic relevance. We stipulate what the model-theoretical "worlds" should be, based on what we expect from the model.
Consider dice, for example. In a 2d6 dice game, there are 11 possible scores in any round (2 - 12). So, if we only care about the score, then there are 11 possible worlds to consider. (Of course, these scores are not all equally likely. One shortcoming of modal logic is that it has nothing to say about probabilities.) If, in addition, we care about combinations, but consider individual dies to be indistinguishable for practical purposes, then the number of possible worlds increases to 18 (36 / 2). If we want to know the outcome on each individual die, then we are stipulating 36 distinct worlds.
But what if the die throw never occurs? Or a die is lost? Or it balances on its corner instead of landing on a side? And what of all the "extraneous" possibilities - the weather conditions, the configurations of air molecules in the room, the possible ways the Battle of Waterloo could have played out, the possible alternative endings to the Game of Thrones series? None of these real (or imaginary) world possibilities need be taken into account. We stipulate what goes into the model and what stays out. And although we cannot effectively control the outcome of a die throw, it will be up to us to translate it into the "actual world" in our model - and that is not always as straightforward as in this toy example.
Either would be much better. The possible worlds model seems far too elaborate to me and quite implausible as a description of what's going on.
Quoting SophistiCat
Well, completeness is unobtainable, IMO. So why not settle for something we can do?
Quoting SophistiCat
I've often wondered how possibilities and probabilities fit together. No-one seems to be interested. But here's an analysis of the possibilities of a dice game when we already have an analysis of the same game in terms of probabilities.
Quoting SophistiCat
Quite so. But can't we just lump all these together as "no throws", which is what would happen in real life. Not that we can ever know all the possible outlandish outcomes that might possibly occur.
Quoting Ludwig V
Good. Following your analogy, one of the books in your encyclopaedia is about the actual world. You might take it out and read it. In another possible world, another possible you can take out a different book about their world, treating it as their actual world, and read, it perhaps with as much satisfaction as you derive from reading yours.
An example of Modal realism, David Lewis' ideas were quite sophisticated, and far from Meta's misunderstandings. In brief, Lewis held that since someone in another possible world would consider their world to be the actual world, we should treat it as an actual world; that it was as real as our own. Such a view is annoyingly coherent, leading to a large literature.
Most philosophers will differentiate between treating a possible world as if it were real, and treating it as real.
Meta's idea, so far as I can make out, is that the node in a model (w?, the designated “actual world”) though it is claimed to be the metaphysical actual world rather than one of many semantic artefacts, w?, w? and so on. He takes these model-theoretic objects as claims about reality then accuses the logician of contradiction because the formal “actual world” differs from the metaphysical actual world.
There is no such equivocation. The problem is your inability to differentiate between a model-theoretic object and a metaphysical one.
You have not misunderstood.
Quoting Tom Storm
Yes, indeed. I'll stand by what I said in my first post:
Quoting Banno
How's that sit with you?
In our discussion, Banno more than once explicitly said that the actual world is the world that we live in. This is completely different from any representation of the world we live in. And, numerous times it is implied that he is referring to what he now calls the "metaphysical actual world" with "the actual world", yet other times he insists that "the actual world refers to a representation..
The reason why the argument which Banno presented from Fitch fails, is that it requires this conflating of the independent world, and the "actual world" of the modal model. It can only succeed through that fallacy of equivocation. I proposed to Banno that we revisit this argument and analyze it while maintaining the appropriate separation separation. Banno so far has refused, simply asserting that his error is mine.
Quoting Ludwig V
My point was simply that when ordinary language contradicts good philosophy, we ought to accept this as a flaw in ordinary language, rather than rejecting the philosophy because it contradicts ordinary language.
That's so wrong. You, in the very same argument use "the actual world" to refer to a model-theoretic object, and also to a metaphysical object. When a person demonstrates to you that this is the fallacy of equivocation, you claim that it is that person's error for not distinguishing the two.
As I told, the argument from Fitch which you provided, fails if we maintain that separation. Are you ready to look over your argument, and see how it depends on equivocation?
Where?
Might be best to quote me. Be precise.
This makes sense. But from my perspective reality is a vexed term to begin with. What exactly do we mean by this word - the totality of facts, not things?
In a not untrivial way, some people's reality (on account of language acuity and education) is definitely larger than others who have more limited capabilities. I don't think this is an equivocation on the word, but you may think so?
Is it not the case that what we call reality today is "beyond" what we called reality 500 years ago?
To explain the idea, lets' suppose we can list all the facts, every true statement: {f1, f2, f3...} Those facts, taken together, list everything that is the case.
But while you and I know maybe the first few thousand facts, little Jimmy over there only knows the first few hundred.
Will we say that he is living in a different world to us? That he has a different reality? Well, we could, if we restrict facts to only those things that are known, and not toe those things that are true, whether known or not.
So in that way of talking, Little Jimmy's reality is smaller than yours and mine.
Btu notice that this is a different sense to all the facts, taken as a whole.
So we have two different things - what is known, and what is true. On the first, folk can have different realities. On the second, we all share the same reality.
Not an ambiguity, but we should take care as to which sense we are using and be consistent in that use.
I just did that yesterday :
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, but it is also not evidence that what we experience is all there is. We evolved as these creatures with a finite set of senses. Our reality consists only of what we can detect. Doesn't follow that that is all there is.
Now, are you ready to address the so-called Fitch's paradox, and accept that it doesn't say anything about any supposed independent, metaphysical world? It says something about our representation of the actual world in the modal model. To me it says nothing other than the trivial tautology, that everything which is known is known. Where's the paradox?
But I tracked down the originals.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We are in the actual world.
That's from this: Quoting Banno
The whole quote makes it clear I am talking metaphysically. See the word "Metaphysics" in the very next sentence? It's kinda a giveaway.
The other is from a different post, Quoting Banno
See how it refers to w?, and so is clearly modal.
SO your accusation was I Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
And yet the evidence you provide is from two quite different posts, which in context make it clear that one is about metaphysics and the other about modality.
A pathetic response, even for you. This is why, if I wasn't chasing posts, I'd have long ago gone back to ignoring you.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Always. Let's start by having you demonstrate that you understand the paradox by setting it out.
:wink:
Quoting Tom Storm
If the question asks is there a possibility that there is an aspect of reality beyond our known reality, how could we rule this out? I don't think this is a useful frame however since hypothetical aspects of reality are moot.
I think we can guarantee that "there a possibility that there is an aspect of reality beyond our known reality". It seems to me that wha this says is "there are things we do not know", and I'm pretty confident that we do not know everything.
But is there something here, some other understanding of "an aspect of reality beyond our known reality" that I'm missing?
if not, then this appears to be a classic case of language leading us astray.
My entire discussion with you in this thread is "the same argument". When finally persuaded to clarify your use, you admitted to equivocation. At some times you used "actual world" to talk about the metaphysical world, at other times you used "actual world" to refer to a modal world.
Then you had the gall to insist that your equivocation was my error, of not being able to distinguish when "actual world" meant metaphysical world, and when it meant modal world.
Quoting Banno
Like I said, I don't understand the paradox as a paradox. This is because it appears to require that some conclusion about the independent metaphysical world, is derived from a modal model. If this is the case then it is very clearly the fallacy of equivocation, which I've charged.
So I suggest that you present it in a way which appears to make sense to you, while recognizing the separation between the actual world of modal logic, which is a human produced representation, and the independent metaphysical world. How do you propose to say something about the independent metaphysical world, from within the modal model? Or, does the paradox not say anything at all about the independent metaphysical world?
I think then, that you and I are in agreement. We certainly know that the phrase, beyond our known reality, is often code for the Platonic realm or any number of alternate worlds. Let's not go there.
Yes, but that’s not what I’m getting at. We know that reality looks and behaves vastly different than our senses and limited perspective can perceive, but the question asked is about the possibility of something beyond our reality, based on our limited perception. Such a question becomes a form of wishful thinking, utilizing the limited perception we have as an unknown factor to project a fantasy of existence beyond our reality. It’s existential comfort.
It’s more likely asked because we want it to be true. We entertain the idea as a form of science fiction. Because if we look at what we lack in perception, it’s rather about frequencies of light and sound waves, of energy levels and the ability for higher dimensional reasoning. Neither of it speaks of concepts of other realities, only elevated perceptions of the same reality we’re already in.
The right question would rather be… if we were able to perceive everything, what would we perceive?
And if we want to ask if there’s anything beyond our reality, the answer is most likely, nothing that would help us understand ourselves, this reality, or function as any comfort at all because it would probably be so dramatically different from everything we understand of our own reality that it would be a useless glimpse. There wouldn’t be anything recognizable, there wouldn’t be a perception level able to comprehend anything as it would be different from even perceiving everything in our own reality, which in itself would overload our minds.
In the end, the question becomes a cry for god, not a question of perception or understanding. We are limited to this reality, for which we still have lots more to discover and understand about. Anything beyond our reality becomes white noise to us, as our existence itself is bound to this reality, as nothing of us is proven to function outside the reality we are part of. To ask about realities beyond our own is to ask for some other plane of existence we could enter into. But we can’t, as doing so would untangle the very being of our existence. It becomes as meaningless as if there is nothing at all beyond this reality.
A good example is the holographic theory of our universe. That our reality is due to a projection from some event horizon in some elevated reality. But it’s not a projection of our existence as people seem to believe, it’s a projection of whatever is originally there that due to being projected has formed the parameters of our reality. It projects the conditions that forms everything we know and our reality becomes something else entirely because of it. The conditions of our reality change the projected original into not resembling anything of itself at all and the process itself giving rise to conditions that transforms the very nature of it.
By entertaining the though truthfully, the idea breaks, as our parameters of definition for something beyond our reality is dependent on our own reality, which differs from anything beyond.
It’s a hard limit to our existence, as any answer of the beyond becomes meaningless to any of our conditions.
We simply want it to be there because it would entertain the thought of all our religious fantasies.
Yep. I can do that. The same term is used for two different things. That's not equivocation. It's your error to conflate metaphysics with modality. Think I mentioned that. A few times.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Ok, then can you at least explain why Fitch and others think it a paradox? Why is it worthy of it's own article, in the Stanford Encyclopaedia, in Wikipedia, in Oxford Academic, and so on. What is it that the folk who wrote this stuff think is happening? Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No. If you would proceed, set it out for us. I've set it out multiple times, and you disagree with it each time. Your turn. Set it out for us, and how it goes astray.
That's right, each time I offer terms of interpretation, you assert that they are erroneous, and you reject them. Then you provide none of your own, simply insisting that your conclusion is valid and my interpretation is erroneous. So, I suggest that we proceed from clearly defined interpretive terms, whether they are produced by you or I does not matter to me, so long as we craft acceptable definitions.
Quoting Banno
It seems to me like the paradox appears to these philosophers because they are making the mistake of assuming that the model modal says something about the real independent metaphysical world, when it does not. The separation between the "modal actual world", and the "independent metaphysical world" makes the semantics of terms like "know" and "true" extremely difficult and ambiguous.
So, to sort out the apparent paradox requires that we clearly define such terms, and adhere strictly to the definitions. I will make a proposal for definitions here, but you are free to reject them and offer your own. The point is to have rigorous terms of interpretation. Remember, from the SEP article on possible worlds, there is no extensionality inherent within the modal model, true extensionality is provided only by the interpretive terms. This makes interpretation extremely important, and produces the possibility of significant flexibility, if the interpretive terms are confusing or ambiguous.
Here are my proposals. "True" signifies a judgement which is made concerning a proposition. It is a very specific type of judgement which is incompatible with the judgement of "false", the opposing judgement of the very same type. To "know" a proposition means that a judgement of this type has been made, the proposition has been judged as either true or false. Note, that for the sake of the modal model we must allow for both judgements, "p is true", "p is false", to adequately represent the possibility of knowing p.
Lets now consider the meaning of the follow two propositions:
1. If p then p is possible.
2. If p is known then it is possible to know p.
The first implies that if p is true (has been so judged), then it is possible that p is true (has been judged that way). The second implies that if p has been judged as either true or false, then it is possible that p has been judged as true or false.
Due to the likelihood that you will not agree, and would prefer to use your own definitions, I will not proceed further with the analysis at this time. If you agree to the definitions, then we can continue, if not, then you can produce alternative definitions for these terms, and we can proceed from those definitions.
This has not been my experience. I recognize that reality may consist of planes that I am unable to detect, but I believe they would be as "natural" as what I am able to experience.
I am having some trouble following the logic of your reasoning, which appears to be this:
1. Human senses are limited.
2. There may exist parts of reality humans cannot detect.
3. It must be god.
First two correct, but not the third. What I meant is that the act of asking the question in the way the OP does, is a form of cry out for God. It’s a cry out for a meaning beyond the reality we have. My argument is that this kind of question is a form of circular reasoning in which the usage of the fact we face a hard limit to know the unknown conditions beyond our bubble of reality, becomes the reason to question if “this is all there is”. The question rather expose the intention underneath to be about the fantasy of something beyond our reality, rather than engaging with the possible scientific reasoning about what would likely exist outside our reality.
And with the example of the holographic theory, the problem we run into if we entertain the question scientifically is that the conditions of our reality makes it impossible to comprehend any other reality and likely impossible for that reality to comprehend our own.
Reality is not the same as our bubble of the universe, it is the definition of the parameters that allows this universe to exist. If those parameters change or are different, it not only changes the resulting universe, but also perception itself, leading to a hard limit for which there is no comprehension of the other.
So, I’m not talking about “God”, but that the way the question is asked reveals an underlying fantasy of a state of reality beyond our own, that would somehow be accessible by us. Because if we can imagine it, it is in a way accessible to us. My answer to that is that it isn’t. The question itself becomes nonsensical as the answer is that we cannot access it, not even through imagination based on our best scientific theories. It is fundamentally inaccessible. Imagination of it relates more to our religious beliefs of a realm beyond our own, a heaven and a God etc. so the discussion often just takes the form of a religious one, rather than a scientific one. Metaphysics leading to a craving for heaven and God, rather than reasoning about the physical properties of a reality outside our own.
I understand better now, thank you for explaining.
However, as I mentioned, this is not the path that this takes me on. And I don't think I am alone in viewing the possibility in purely scientific terms.
As do I, but we still run into the hard problem, that our imagination of another reality is dependent on the physical properties of our own, thus making our imagination unable to comprehend any of it. We can try and theorize it, but it will mostly boil down to extrapolations of how it relates to our reality, rather than form an actual understanding of the other reality.
So, are we ready to proceed, or are you back to ignoring me?
You are conflating the epistemic notion of ‘judging’ with the metaphysical or semantic notion of truth. Truth doesn’t require anyone to make a judgment; it exists independently of whether anyone knows or judges it.
It is not that the act of judging that is "incompatible", but that the semantic structure does not allow something to be both or neither true and false. Hence we can construct non-classical logics. You are mistakenly making the epistemic act do the logical work.
Your definition collapses knowledge into the merely epistemic act of judgment. Knowledge is not reducible to judging; one could judge falsely or incompletely. Your definition might lead to our knowing this that are not true.
Modal semantics works with truth conditions of propositions across possible worlds, not with human acts of judging. There’s no need to posit ‘both judgments’ to represent epistemic possibility; you only need to track where the proposition is true or false.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Nuh. It just says that if p is true then it's possible that p is true. Again, the alternative would be that only impossible things are true.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Nuh. It just says that it is not possible to know stuff that is impossible to know...
Can we get on to Fitch now?
Sure, you reject my definitions, as I knew you would. So, what does "know" mean to you in this context, and what does "true" mean in this context? Then we can look at interpreting Fitch's argument under these conditions.
Lets' use the definition of knowledge in the SEP article...
I don't see a definition of "knowledge" there. It says "The operative concept of 'knowability' remains elusive...". That's the problem I mentioned, why the appearance of paradox is created, there's too much ambiguity in key terms like "know" and "true".
So, I'll tell you again. Approaching with clear definitions for these terms, and adhering to them will resolve any apparent paradoxes. I proposed definitions already, which would dissolve the appearance of a paradox. You did not accept them. Now it's time for you to propose some definitions.
I will not proceed without definitions, because my thesis is that it is a lack of definition which is the problem. Therefore we need definitions to try my thesis. If every time that we try a set of definitions, the paradox disappears, this is good evidence for my thesis.
Yes, indeed. I wonder why.
Quoting Banno
SEP didn't need a definition, but you do. No doubt that's because your explanation will be so much more nuanced...