Luke

Because what I and several others have happily been doing on this thread for the past 28 pages is what you want to change. I take it that you want me ...

I got that impression from your expressed dissatisfaction with the point of this discussion on several occasions throughout the thread, including when...

Should I stop posting? I thought the point of this discussion was in the title.

What do you mean by "properly determined"?

§72. The section is headed 'Seeing what is in common', and reintroduces similar themes to those raised in the discussion of pointing (at the shape, co...

§70. W's interlocutor expresses concern that "if the concept 'game' is without boundaries in this way, you don't really know what you mean by a 'game'...

This is clearly not what I was referring to as your "error". Your error was your repeated claim that a) use creates a boundary; and that b) instances ...

B-theorists tend to speak in the tenseless terms of earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than, instead of the tensed terms of past, present and ...

You claim that my talk of conventional use distorts the matter, but you fail to mention how. You say here that W distinguishes having and not having a...

Yet it seems unavoidable according to your claim: "The boundary is produced when the word is used."

What? You said that the use produces a boundary. Wittgenstein says it can be used without a boundary, so you're wrong. Also, W says it's the boundary ...

Im not sure whether Newton had much to say about how the human body functions. It does, at least according to some definitions.

It would seem to run counter to our understanding of how the body (including our experiences) functions, which relies on actual motion.

I'm not asking you to read a 42-page article. I was talking about the brief Wikipedia article I linked to: the block universe theory.

I'm not sure whether you didn't read the link or didn't understand it, or whether you think that pretending not to understand it constitutes an argume...

That everything at all times exists (some say exists "simpliciter"); i.e. the block universe theory. The link above will probably explain it better th...

I understand. I was actually defending eternalism/B-theory in my first post (if only a little). B-theorists hold that the flow of time is an illusion ...

I have no idea. Maybe we could just say "There is motion" or "Everything is in motion", and time is a way that we measure or mark that. Perhaps more s...

Couldn't it equally be said that the tensed version of existence is reducible to the tenseless version? Your argument strikes me as somewhat unfair to...

§68. The interlocutor summarises what he takes to be Wittgenstein's position: the concept of number is "the logical sum" of all the different kinds of...

Wittgenstein is referring to the conventional use of the word, not to a special purpose use. ("To repeat, we can draw a boundary - for a special purpo...

The point of this thread is to discuss and understand what Wittgenstein is saying in the text. Therefore, I'm not adding an "extra condition" by talki...

No, I don't see him saying that the concept has no definition whatsoever, as you claim; only that the concept is not everywhere circumscribed by rules...

Hi sime. I had to replace your use of 'optical red' with 'the word "red"' to make sense of this. It was unclear to me which section you were referring...

Nowhere does he say or even imply: 'There is no need for a definition or boundary of the concept "game"'. Rules are boundaries. When the interlocutor ...

§66. What is common to all the activities that we call "games"? Wittgenstein urges the reader not to automatically assume the answer, but to "look and...

There is a difference between real horses and fictional horses. But is there a similar difference between real unicorns and fictional unicorns? No, be...

Where does Wittgenstein speak of an "imaginary red"? As I explained in my previous post, and as is clear from the quote, he does not speak of imaginar...

Maybe I'm just misreading, but this seems to overlook that one of Wittgenstein's main motivations in the Tractatus was the discovery/development of th...

Okay, but it's just not clear to me what you're arguing for or against here. Is it something in particular that Wittgenstein has said? Something seemi...

I don't see what you're getting at here except that we can make up a name for a non-existent colour (when would we ever use such a name?). Anyhow, wha...

I'm not sure whether your views have changed in the interim, Meta, but here's my belated response. I don't see that we ever really say "red exists", t...

I also skimmed through this collection prior to my first post on section 58, and I agree that it sheds little light on these concerns. Thanks for the ...

Yes. I won't quote it all, but the Hacker and Baker exegesis of 58 opens with: . and concludes: So I think StreetlightX and yourself got it just about...

See also and .

Agreed! This section was difficult. I'm not sure about the thesis-antithesis reading, even though that's how I originally read it. I wasn't satisified...

Yes, I was also questioning this while writing the post. However, it seems to me that there is no clear boundary unless/until we decide to give it one...

§65. Wittgenstein now anticipates criticism that despite all his talk of language-games, he has not yet defined a clear boundary of what is and is not...

§61. At §60, Wittgenstein considers a language-game in which someone is ordered to bring or move about objects which are composed of several parts. He...

§59. The idea that a name signifies some indestructible element of reality is a presupposition; a "particular picture" that is not given to us by expe...

I have also just returned from holidays and I wanted to provide a more comprehensive exposition of §56 and §57 in response to the latest discussion be...

58. Wittgenstein (in the role of his interlocutor) states that one cannot say 'Red exists' because "if there were no red it could not be spoken of at ...

Context is key. At 56 he states that memories can be unreliable, however a (e.g. colour) sample can be used as the criterion of correctness (e.g. to h...

No problem Sam. I very much agreed with the rest of your post; just thought I might be missing something.

Hi Sam I'm not sure if I follow this. You say that "meaning...may not have any one property" corresponding to it, except in some cases such as a trian...

56. Having rejected the illicit presumption that the meaning of a word is its (external) object at 55, Wittgenstein now attacks the equally illicit pr...

55. At 40, Wittgenstein told us that "the word "meaning" is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word." H...

You're talking about whether a name (or its bearer) can be a standard, whereas my question and your original statement were about whether a name requi...