Wittgenstein does not deny that we have mental processes or private experiences. His argument is that we do not have a private language to describe a ...
If you look back, I never said he rejected the inner. I said (new emphasis): The "way we talk about the inner" is/was by presupposing the name and obj...
Yes, he rejects the 'name and object' model that he mentions at PI 293 with regard to the Beetle in the Box. Behaviourists and mentalists both make th...
If the 'grammatical fiction' is the behaviorist's error (as you say), then why does Wittgenstein use the word 'I' at 307? He says: 'If I speak of a fi...
Is it Wittgenstein or the behaviorist who says that pain behaviour is a grammatical fiction? How is behaviour a fiction for either of them? But the be...
The behaviourist believes that everything except behaviour is a fiction. yet you interpret W to say that pain behaviour is a (grammatical) fiction? I ...
:up: It is not the behaviourist's account that Wittgenstein calls a grammatical fiction at PI 307, it is his own. Wittgenstein says that he is the one...
If you agree to this then it’s no longer clear to me where you think our disagreement lies. My reading: Wittgenstein rejects the behaviourist idea tha...
It sounds like you are not remembering. It’s like saying: ‘when I say “ouch” it does not mean I have a particular pain sensation.’ Then why do you say...
In the context of PI 307: “Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is...
I believe it does. Otherwise, why would you say it? The grammatical fiction is the assumption that the word “remember” gets its meaning from a descrip...
I believe this would mean they were no longer a behaviorist. Maybe we have different definitions. You said earlier that a behaviourist is an empiricis...
The behaviourist rejects the existence of private sensations because they are not empirical; because the behaviourist cannot see them. Wittgenstein do...
At PI 307, W is accused of being a behaviourist in disguise who is "basically saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction." W replies: ...
Oh I see. I was talking about the word "infinity", whereas you are talking about the referent of the word "infinity". Anyhow, this was the point of my...
What's grammatical about that? It sounds metaphysical. Wittgenstein doesn’t reject the reality of inner experience, but he does reject the idea that t...
Yes, exactly. I think we are in agreement. BTW, I note that in the other thread linked to by @"Banno" above, you requested links to Daniele Moyal-Shar...
In my original post, I distinguished between our inner life as a metaphysical fiction (denying that we have inner experiences) vs. a grammatical ficti...
Most fluent English speakers know what "sunset" means. The blind person I introduced to our discussion is an English speaker. Your original argument w...
I'm trying hard to think of a reason why the blind person would understand the particular word "sunset" to mean "something I have never seen", but I c...
If a blind person were to say "What a beautiful sunset", it would not make the phrase meaningless. Everyone else could still use the phrase meaningful...
Wittgenstein does not subscribe to metaphysical behaviorism; he does not say that our "internal" feelings or pains are unreal; the sensation is not a ...
That's not how I read it. He says that we should look at the grammar of 'getting to know' in relation to new uses of words/phrases such as "unconsciou...
Yes, apologies for jumping ahead (to PI). I was just trying to shed some light on Ludwig V's accusation that Wittgenstein had a "gaping hole" and a "c...
Is Rouse's point that (i) there are no rules (or social regularities or norms within a practice), or that (ii) nothing compels us to follow them? The ...
Just reading through the thread (backwards) and wanted to comment on this. Apologies if it is off the current topic and that it probably ignores the c...
In what sense is the imagined cat invisible to the cartoonist? They picture it in their mind and attempt to express their imagined cat on paper. They ...
If seeing a cat, seeing a picture of a cat, and imagining a cat, can all be reduced to feelings, and if these feelings can all be compared, then (the ...
My point is that you don't judge a resemblance by comparing your physical states (e.g. your levels of hormones and neurotransmitters) when you imagine...
Have you ever checked your hormone and neurotransmitter levels in order to be satisfied of a resemblance? I would think that the resemblance is more l...
What criteria are met (or what is required) in order for “the visible shapes of a drawn cat satisfy what you had in mind”? If it’s not some sort of re...
If there is a word for "village" in the German language then its use/meaning must be very similar to its use/meaning in English, because that's what i...
It’s an interesting question, but I think it makes little difference given @"Antony Nickles" earlier non-epistemic view of (edit: other people’s) pain...
Which of these senses of "know" is the way the word "is normally used", as W says at PI 246? If there is a sense of "know" that means "acknowledging, ...
Were you not using the word “know” as it is normally used when you said that we do not know the pain causing another to writhe in front of us (because...
This may not be the appropriate place to make this comment, but Wittgenstein says otherwise. At PI 246, he says that: “other people very often know if...
The direct/indirect realist debate concerns perceptual directness, not epistemological directness. Russellian acquaintance is concerned with epistemol...
There is no sensory perception, then, only acquaintance? Acquaintance primarily concerns knowledge. The direct/indirect realism dispute primarily conc...
My usage is consistent. Indirect realists equivocate over the meaning of "perception", using it to mean both the sensory perception of external object...
Except your explanation of what indirect realists believe is that our perceptions of material objects are not mediated by the perception of some other...
It's something I do not accept. According to what I mean by it, it is that we have sensory perceptions of sense-data. but you have been telling me tha...
Direct realists claim that we have direct sensory perceptions of external objects: DR: Sensory perception----of----external object Indirect realists c...
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