Luke

So you're saying that a person's name is an example of a name that is used without the involvement of a sample or paradigm? What about Buddha or Gengh...

I question whether this is not more of a rule than an exception. Firstly, note that Wittgenstein is specifically discussing names at §55 and not simpl...

Not that I disagree, but it's also worth noting that at §51, immediately before W counsels the reader to "look at what really happens in detail", he a...

Very nice. I overlooked the important distinction between uses (2) and (3) in my reading. This gives a lot more sense to the final sentence. Thanks. J...

As I said in my previous post, I'm now using the 4th edition.

§54. W asks us to consider cases "where we say that a game is played according to a particular rule". W states that the rule might be used to help to ...

Yes, that seems to make more sense. Thanks.

Thanks Isaac, but unfortunately I'm not satisfied with that explanation. You seem to have jumped ahead to §54. He doesn't mention paradigms at §53 (bu...

§53. W here treats language game (48) as though it were in a foreign language that we are trying to understand. He states that there are "a variety of...

It literally is.

Everywhere. No, but an object can be an example or a sample of a type. Perhaps a dictionary definition will help: paradigm /?par?d??m/ noun 1. a typic...

I just thought it was an unusual argument.

But what if the meaning of "one metre" is the length of the stick? :joke:

How could it not? Anyway, I'm just trying to make sense of the text and of Wittgenstein's puzzling statements about the standard metre. I welcome your...

I've tried my best to explain my understanding of Wittgenstein's use of 'paradigm', MU, but it seems I've failed. A paradigm is more like a type than ...

Is it? Yes, because the name is not the object. If an object is destroyed, we can still use the name. "When Mr. N. N. dies one says that the bearer of...

Agreed. I only wanted to highlight that the literal reading of Wittgenstein on the standard metre has some scholarly support. Firstly, it needs to be ...

I've found an online copy of the book, for those interested. The article I've been citing is Chapter 3 of the book.

Actually, Wittgenstein is. At least, that's how I read it (at §50). More precisely, it makes no sense to say either that the standard metre is or that...

Hi Isaac, welcome. The statement we have recently been discussing is the seemingly paradoxical and/or law-of-excluded-middle-defying: Good question. T...

The way I read it, after posing the initial question of how signs and colours correspond, W states that it was presupposed that the correspondence ass...

Without quoting the entire article, I think that the author of the article on the polarity principle sums up the (or my) main point as: "To say that t...

Paradigms, exemplars, samples, standards: all have a similar meaning.

I think he does really believe it. The standard metre's only role is to set the naming convention; to use its length to define the "metre" unit. It ma...

You've used this term more than once. What do you consider to be the paradox? I don't think Wittgenstein views it or intends it as a paradox.

Thanks for the clarification, . I think I agree (but maybe I still don't get it?). In relation to the reading of the text, I think you pretty much nai...

Don't we already know that?

Hi . At first, I thought I was in agreement with your post, but something doesn't sit right, so I hope you can clarify. Is the C1 comparison simply co...

§51. Wittgenstein reminds us of his description of language game (48) where the words "R", "B", etc. correspond to the colours of the squares. He asks...

Right, and I also think it's important to note the following section of §50, which possibly shows that the application is to much more than just the s...

It makes no sense to assert that the standard metre is one metre long, because this proposition implies that the standard metre might not be one metre...

Yes, I think so. ETA: although I think the standard metre is a special case as its purpose is only to set the convention.

I feel as though I've fallen behind, but things are getting serious (and more difficult) now. I've also spent a little longer on §50 to try and get cl...

Stop pretending then. What do you think Wittgenstein means when he says that the standard metre is the one thing of which we can say neither that it i...

What happened to your latest post?

Have you even read the book? If you'd like to join in, then follow along. If all you have to offer are grand pronouncements about the book as a whole,...

Do you know why we're discussing the standard metre?

I never said anything about "more real".

Wittgenstein is talking about the stick, the standard measurement, the yardstick; not "one metre".

I'm sure that some people care about precision of measurement other than shed-builders. Also, who knows what havoc the elements have likewise wreaked ...

Are you talking about "one metre" or the standard metre? The standard metre is a stick which has the sample/standard length that defines "one metre".

Kripke's suggestion that the length of the standard metre may change over time does not alter Wittgenstein's insight. Perhaps the length of the standa...

The tape measure's metre is defined by the standard metre "stick", the same as all other metres. Which other metre are you thinking of?

But it's the yardstick! (The metre-stick, but you get my drift.) How could it "might not have been" a metre? It's the definition of a metre!

The point is, you're simultaneously saying that it is a metre long (because it was baptised as such) and that it is questionable whether it is a metre...

I typically measure them with a ruler.

I'm trying to change your mind, but you didn't answer my question: how will you verify whether it is really one metre long?

But we already know that it is a metre long - it was "baptised" as such. If you proceed to ask the question, then how do you intend to measure it; to ...

Or, as Robert J. Fogelin succinctly puts it in his 'Taking WIttgenstein at His Word: A Textual Study', in reference to the sepia example at §50:

If we're quoting experts, then I like Stephen Mulhall's take in his book 'Wittgenstein's Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense, and Imagination in Philo...