B theory of time and free will vs determinism debate

I think a lot depends on you definition of free will, and a stance on theory of mind, and not so much if determinism is true.

As for determinism, it depends a lot on your QM interpretation: The cat is both dead and alive, and it is probably (Bohmian mechanics excepted) not determined what will be seen when you look at the cat. But unless you can will the cat to be alive or dead, it seems like determinism or lack of it plays an insignificant role in the debate.

As for definition of free will, that is usually given in A-series terms which leads to nonsense when discussing a B-series view. So "could have done otherwise" is an example of an A version of the definition.

My point: Get the ducks in a row first before you draw conclusions, else the discussions go past each other as people are working off different premises.

The only answer I can really give is "I'm not sure" because I can't manage to make sense of the B theory of time really. It just seems ridiculously incoherent and kind of stupid to me.

Reply to Terrapin Station To be fair, the A theory has logical problems as well, like having no well defined start, being an infinite regress.

Reply to Devans99

With B time, you still have the problem (for intuition) that it either appeared "out of nowhere" or always existed. You don't have an infinite regress, but the intuitive problem isn't the regress so much as either appearing "out of nowhere" or always existing.

But that wasn't what I was referring to. Time (in my ontology) is simply change or motion. Claiming that it's "just an illusion" then is incoherent, because the "illusion" involves change (it seemed like that, then it seems like this--that's a change) and hence it's not an illusion after all. Something changes or moves. That is time.

Quoting Terrapin Station

With B time, you still have the problem (for intuition) that it either appeared "out of nowhere" or always existed. You don't have an infinite regress, but the intuitive problem isn't the regress so much as either appearing "out of nowhere" or always existing.

Something always existing makes sense. You can't get something from nothing so something must have always existed. Could it be what always existed is the B theory version of time and space?

Quoting Terrapin Station

Something changes or moves. That is time

I see it more as time is something that enables change and enables cause/effect. Time flows even when nothing changes. If you have a clock and empty space next to it, time is changing equally for both.

As I mention here (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/245002) Einstein's equations suggest that something in the universe is time aware so it can assign mass to objects.

Quoting Devans99

Something always existing makes sense. You can't get something from nothing so something must have always existed. Could it be what always existed is the B theory version of time and space?

If that makes intuitive sense to you then there's no problem with infinite regress.

And no, it can't be the B theory because the B theory is incoherent.

Quoting Devans99

I see it more as time is something that enables change and enables cause/effect. Time flows even when nothing changes. If you have a clock and empty space next to it, time is changing equally for both.

Obviously I don't agree with this. I don't buy that there is something, "space," that can be empty, either, by the way. In my ontology space supervenes on extension and extensional relations. It doesn't exist "independently" so to speak. (I also don't agree with necessarily linking time to cause and effect or to entropy.)

Reply to Terrapin Station But A theory is incoherent also because an infinite regress is incoherent. B theory can be combined with finite spacetime to avoid any need for an infinite regress.

Reply to Devans99
I'd say that an infinite regress is counterintuitive (and only because of the "always existing" notion), not incoherent. I'd ask you to explain how it's incoherent to you, but I'd understand if it's something you can't explain, as incoherence will often naturally be.

I explained above why B theory is stupid, because it doesn't get rid of change. It just moves it to so called "illusion"

Reply to Terrapin Station I'll adopt an axiom of cause and effect and then argue that an infinite regression in time is impossible:

1. By the axiom of cause and effect, there would be an infinite regress of events into the past
2. The number of events in an infinite regress is > any number
3. Thats a contradiction (can’t be both a number and > any number)
4. Making up magic numbers is not allowed (can break any theory if magic is admissible)
5. An infinite regress is impossible

Or a more simple argument; time is a series or sequence, it must have a first member for the whole sequence to exist. An infinite regress is missing a first member, so logically the whole thing does not exist.

Reply to Devans99

The problem there would be that you're saying that an infinite series has to be a (definite) number that's greater than any number. There wouldn't be a specifiable number, it would be an infinity.

Also, why would there have to be a first member for it to exist? That's contrary to what we'd be positing in the first place.

(Not that I want to focus on this issue, again--it's not the problem I'm referring to)

Quoting Terrapin Station

There wouldn't be a specifiable number, it would be an infinity.

Which is not a number. Basic maths says there is no number X greater than all others because X+1>X. No infinite numbers. So my proof holds.

Quoting Terrapin Station

Also, why would there have to be a first member for it to exist? That's contrary to what we'd be positing in the first place.

Would you exist if the moment of your conception was removed from time? There has to be a first moment of time (t) for the next moment (t+1) to exist, likewise if t does not exist, t+2, t+3 etc... do not exist. So none of the infinite regress logically exists.

Quoting Devans99

Which is not a number. Basic maths says there is no number X greater than all others because X+1>X. No infinite numbers. So my proof holds.

Right, there's not going to be a number. It's infinite.

You're not being a mathematical realist, by the way, are you? (I'm not a realist on mathematics.)

Quoting Devans99

Would you exist if the moment of your conception was removed from time?

If I were to always exist, there couldn't be a moment of conception for me.

Quoting Devans99

There has to be a first moment of time (t) for the next moment (t+1) to exist,

No, there doesn't. If it extends back infinitely then there can't be a first moment.(Also acknowledging that there are no real "moments," there's just real change or motion.)

Quoting Terrapin Station

You're not being a mathematical realist, by the way, are you?

I believe nature is fundamentally logical and that it can be accurately described using logic IE maths.


Quoting Terrapin Station

If I were to always exist, there couldn't be a moment of conception for me.

Maybe I'm misunderstanding you but that's the B theory of time?

Quoting Terrapin Station

No, there doesn't. If it extends back infinitely then there can't be a first moment.(Also acknowledging that there are no real "moments," there's just real change or motion.)

I agree, no first moment in an infinite regress so the whole thing cannot exist.

Majority votes should run the country, not a single person or small group of wealthy people. 90% of the population aren’t suddenly going to say “we want the right to kill people whenever we please”.(not yet anyway)

Quoting Devans99

I believe nature is fundamentally logical and that it can be accurately described using logic IE maths.

In my view logic and mathematics are basically a way that we think about the world. They're a type of language. So it would be saying that the nature is fundamentally English-oriented, say (which I don't believe).

Quoting Devans99

Maybe I'm misunderstanding you but that's the B theory of time?

No. I was thinking of it in terms of the A theory (because I don't think that the B theory even makes any sense).

With either the A theory or B theory, you can have infinite time or not, it can either have always existed or it could have been created at some point (re the latter, with A theory, if it was created it can't also be infinite, with B theory, it can be created and infinite).

Quoting Terrapin Station

With either the A theory or B theory, you can have infinite time or not

I don't think you can have finite time with the A theory. Then there would just be a start of time with nothing (no time) before it so it requires creation ex nihilo with no time which is impossible.

With the B theory, you can have finite time. The end of time precedes and cause the start of time. The Big Crunch causes the Big Bang. An eternal circle of time.

Quoting noAxioms

A-series terms which leads to nonsense when discussing a B-series view. So "could have done otherwise" is an example of an A version of the definition.

An example below:

Quoting Terrapin Station

With B time, you still have the problem (for intuition) that it either appeared "out of nowhere" or always existed.

Both "appeared out of nowhere" and "always existed" are A-series references, which of course are incompatible with B series. The block view just is. There is no 'beginning to exist' of it, because that puts time outside the block, which is not how the view depicts time.

Reply to noAxioms

You can't get outside of it with because either the block of time always was there or there was nothing and then time suddenly appeared.

Anyway, again, the stupid "always there or something came from nothing" problem is not the issue. The B theory fails because time is change or motion, and the B theory doesn't dispense with change or motion. It just moves change/motion to psychology or the so-called "illusion" of time, which means that there is time in the A theory sense after all.

Quoting noAxioms

A-series terms which leads to nonsense when discussing a B-series view. So "could have done otherwise" is an example of an A version of the definition.

Well, what sort of non A-series terms are there? I actually think the attempt to remove A-series terms from a description of the B-series is what leads to nonsense (such as this whole "triviality problem" that people are currently discussing about the A vs. B theories of time). Just take what you said later as an example:

Quoting noAxioms

The block view just is (my emphasis).

What could the "is" mean other than that it is present, or that it exists now (both being A-series terms)? Of course, I imagine you don't want to say that you mean that by your use of the term, but what else could it possibly be? A tenseless use of the term? What could that possibly mean?

Now as for my own views on the matter, I think that the B-theory of time does make alot of A-series terms irrelevant, but does not eliminate them altogether. The idea that things "will happen" or "did happen" make no sense in a world where time doesn't pass.

Quoting Terrapin Station

You can't get outside of it with because either the block of time always was there or there was nothing and then time suddenly appeared.

That would be two times: The one in which the block is created, and another that is a dimension of the block. Eternalism is not a view of there being two kinds of time.

I really don't care if you understand it or not. The comment was directed to the OP as an example of what happens when you mix both views as you continue to do.

Quoting Mr Bee

Well, what sort of non A-series terms are there?

No tensed verbs for starters. The universe cannot be a created object for instance. There is no 'there was no universe, and then later there was'. If that happens, there are two kinds of time, and you're talking a different view. The other kind if time is the one that the deity lives in, except then the deity lives within something he didn't create, so that's a problem, but not my problem.

I actually think the attempt to remove A-series terms from a description of the B-series is what leads to nonsense (such as this whole "triviality problem" that people are currently discussing about the A vs. B theories of time). Just take what you said later as an example:

The block view just is (my emphasis).
— noAxioms

What could the "is" mean other than that it is present, or that it exists now (both being A-series terms)?

There is no 'the present' or 'now' in the view, so I'm not sure what is being referred to with that comment. OK, you use 'present' as a verb, so perhaps you mean some other declaration of being. To be honest, the view doesn't assert 'presence' at all since none of the view seems to require it. The angles of a square are all right angles whether or not the square is present. I've thus never really asserted it. I'm quite in the minority on that point since everybody presumes that presence, but it is a premise, not something that can be proven without assuming the conclusion.

So I don't mean hardly anything when I say it 'just is'. I don't feel I have to.

Of course, I imagine you don't want to say that you mean that by your use of the term, but what else could it possibly be? A tenseless use of the term? What could that possibly mean?

B-series descriptions should simply not make reference to the present, which has no meaning in the view. All of Terrapin Station's comments made reference to it, so they're A-descriptions.

Now as for my own views on the matter, I think that the B-theory of time does make alot of A-series terms irrelevant, but does not eliminate them altogether. The idea that things "will happen" or "did happen" make no sense in a world where time doesn't pass.

I've also seen 'proofs' that the presentist view cannot be, but they all seem to be faulty.
I have my own, one I've not seen elsewhere, but in the end I make presentism pretty silly, but not impossible.

Quoting noAxioms

There is no 'the present' or 'now' in the view, so I'm not sure what is being referred to with that comment.

What I am saying is that first part of your sentence, that there is no "present" or "now" doesn't make sense. There is no meaning to the idea that the "block universe exists" without stating that it either exists now, did exist, or will exist.

We cannot eliminate the present from our discussion, especially if we are talking about what exists (which is by the way, a present tense term). Just look at our conversation right now, for instance which is embedded in the now.

As a result, I believe that all views about time are "presentist" to the extent that everything that is said to "exist" is presently existing. It is sort of trivial, but that is what "exists" technically means (as again, it is a present tense term). Of course, this is not to say that we cannot distinguish the views about time in a substantive way, as I do believe that there is a deep disagreement between them, but such a difference shouldn't be based upon a rejection of the above statement.

Reply to Walter Pound Whether B theory is right or not, you do not know what you will do next. Hence, you must choose.

So what's the problem?

Quoting Mr Bee

What I am saying is that first part of your sentence, that there is no "present" or "now" doesn't make sense. There is no meaning to the idea that the "block universe exists" without stating that it either exists now, did exist, or will exist.

I can agree that I find little meaning to the block universe existing or not. I see no need for distinction between the two. But as for the run of the mill B-theorist, they'd not ever say that the universe exists now, or it once existed, or will exist. Any of those is like saying it is located to the left of the invisible pink unicorn: a relation with an entity not acknowledged.

Just look at our conversation right now, for instance which is embedded in the now.

History is littered with such statements. Are you the only one that is correct about it?
I'm not saying it is wrong for a B-theorist to use tensed verbs in everyday language. They serve a very useful purpose. But describing the universe in the same manner as an object existing within the universe is wrong. I think a lot of people see the universe as an object like that, coming into being somehow from non-being, just like every actual object in the universe. I don't. I think it contradicts what a universe should be.

Are you saying you don't understand the view or you simply disagree with it? It's hard to tell from your posts. T-S obviously doesn't understand it, arguing inconsistency with premises the view doesn't make.

As a result, I believe that all views about time are "presentist" to the extent that everything that is said to "exist" is presently existing. It is sort of trivial, but that is what "exists" technically means (as again, it is a present tense term).

Fine. Pick another word, and that word also probably should not be used, since it is a word used for objects. Does the last ice age exist? It is part of the history of Earth, as is the process where the sun swallows it. You seem to want a different word since you disapprove of it being said that those events 'exist' in the same way that I exist. Then I would still balk at that same word being used to say that the universe exists, since it doesn't seem to be an event or a created object or anything.

I like 'exists'. Both those events above are present in the block, so I don't see anything wrong with using the word. It means 'is a member of' [the universe], and not just 'is a current member of'. The block is not present in the block, so it seems quite circular/incoherent to say the block exists in that way.

Quoting noAxioms

But as for the run of the mill B-theorist, they'd not ever say that the universe exists now, or it once existed, or will exist.

I'd imagine that alot of them would try to say that, but that leads to an incoherent view which in turn leads to confusion and mistakes. Confusion to the point where people even question whether or not there is an actual disagreement between the A and B-theories of time. And when you have people questioning the substance of a core issue in a field of philosophy, you know that something's gone wrong.

Quoting noAxioms

I think a lot of people see the universe as an object like that, coming into being somehow from non-being, just like every actual object in the universe. I don't. I think it contradicts what a universe should be.

I don't think a creation event or beginning to time exists either, but that is irrelevant to the B-theory or the A-theory since an eternal universe is compatible with both.

Quoting noAxioms

Are you saying you don't understand the view or you simply disagree with it? It's hard to tell from you posts.

I have an understanding of the B-theory and the A-theory of time which I believe captures the essence what most people understand the view to be. That version of the B-theory I also happen to disagree with but that is not something I will go into here.

The problem that I have is how A-theorists and B-theorists describe their views, which I honestly find baffling given how confusing it can be. I feel like the reason why some people (don't know if Terrapin Station is a part of that group) say that the B-theory is nonsensical is because they hear phrases such as "all times exist, but by 'exist' I don't mean it in the way we traditionally mean it". Well what does it even mean then? Given the lack of a satisfactory response on some fourth "tenseless" version of existence, then one may conclude that the view makes no sense at all.

Quoting noAxioms

You seem to want a different word since you disapprove of it being said that those events 'exist' in the same way that I exist. Then I would still balk at that same word being used to say that the universe exists, since it doesn't seem to be an event or a created object or anything.

It's not that I disapprove of the word being used. I gave a number of different ideas of what the B-theorist idea of "all times exist" could mean, and all of them are A-series terms, which you have denied. My question is what other meaning of "exists" could there be if it doesn't refer to "presently existing", "did exist" or "will exist". Feel free to use the term, but just be clear on what it means.

Quoting noAxioms

I think a lot of people see the universe as an object like that, coming into being somehow from non-being, just like every actual object in the universe. I don't. I think it contradicts what a universe should be.

Why does this contradict what a universe should be? Do you think that a universe ought to be given a special status? Why, and what would be that special status?

Reply to Terrapin Station It fails because it can also explain A-time? Odd.

Quoting Mr Bee

I have an understanding of the B-theory and the A-theory of time which I believe captures the essence what most people understand the view to be. That version of the B-theory I also happen to disagree with but that is not something I will go into here.

I dislike calling it B-theory since that name includes growing block view, which is still presentism.
I'm an eternalist, not just a B-theorist.

My question is what other meaning of "exists" could there be if it doesn't refer to "presently existing", "did exist" or "will exist".

All three of those are circular definitions, and thus not really definitions.
I did my best to describe how I use the word in the tail of my prior post. You didn't comment on it.

Quoting noAxioms

I dislike calling it B-theory since that name includes growing block view, which is still presentism.

:brow:
Quoting noAxioms

All three of those are circular definitions, and thus not really definitions.

How so? What's so circular about them?
Quoting noAxioms

I did my best to describe how I use the word in the tail of my prior post. You didn't comment on it.

Quoting noAxioms

It means 'is a member of' [the universe], and not just 'is a current member of'.

What does "is" mean here? I take it that "is" means that it currently is, but then again, I'd think you would have a problem with that so if you have an alternative conception then please take this opportunity to offer one. I still have yet to understand what other sense of "exists" there is if there is one.

Quoting Mr Bee

My question is what other meaning of "exists" could there be if it doesn't refer to "presently existing", "did exist" or "will exist".

[quote=noAxioms]All three of those are circular definitions, and thus not really definitions.
Quoting Mr Bee

How so? What's so circular about them?

The fact that 'exist' appears on both sides. 'Exist' means 'presently existing'. 'Hot' means has a hot temperature. Those are useless circular definitions.

Quoting noAxioms

It means 'is a member of' [the universe], and not just 'is a current member of'.

What does "is" mean here?

If I say a T-Rex exists, I mean it is a member of the set of objects contained in the universe. I don't mean it is a member of the set of objects currently contained in the universe.

Quoting noAxioms

The fact that 'exist' appears on both sides. 'Exist' means 'presently existing'. 'Hot' means has a hot temperature. Those are useless circular definitions.

Fine then I can substitute those terms with "is", "was" and "will be". Doesn't really change my point that those are the only senses in which I can understand something existing. There shouldn't be any problem in understanding what they mean which was what I am concerned about here.

Quoting noAxioms

If I say a T-Rex exists, I mean it is a member of the set of objects contained in the universe. I don't mean it is a member of the set of objects currently contained in the universe.

I still do not see how you're using the term "is" in a manner that isn't present tensed though. Also what exactly is in the "set of objects contained in the universe"? I assume that it is going to contain the set of objects that are currently contained in the universe. In addition, I imagine that you're also going to say that the set of objects contained in the universe also includes the set of objects that once existed in the universe, of which your T-Rex is a member of. Finally, you will probably also say that it includes the set of objects that will be contained in the universe as well, so as to include things like the 2024 Olympic Stadium, which you will say "exist" as well under the B-theory.

The problem as I see it, though, is that these are the only sets that I can think of. I do not know of any other sets that could or should be included in your set and from my point of view, those three sets mentioned above are exhaustive. And if these three sets are all that exhaust what you mean by the "set of objects contained in the universe" then to say that something "exists" under your use of the term is just another way of saying that it either "was, is, or will be", all of which are temporal forms of existence. So this doesn't really offer up a new form of existence at all, one that isn't reducible to a tensed version of existence.

Of course, you may want to say that there are actually other sets that could be included in the "set of objects contained in the universe", but this just leads us back to the original problem. Just like you want to find a fourth sense of "existence" you need to find a set of existing objects that is distinct from the ones that I've just described.

Quoting Mr Bee

And if these three sets are all that exhaust what you mean by the "set of objects contained in the universe" then to say that something "exists" under your use of the term is just another way of saying that it either "was, is, or will be", all of which are temporal forms of existence. So this doesn't really offer up a new form of existence at all, one that isn't reducible to a tensed version of existence.

Couldn't it equally be said that the tensed version of existence is reducible to the tenseless version? Your argument strikes me as somewhat unfair to B-theorists, since if language is necessarily tensed, then B-theorists are not even able to describe their view of time. I sense that you are probably aware of the issues, and I understand that the B-theory may not be strictly identical to "non-presentism", but this may help some readers (perhaps):

Quoting A Defense of Presentism, Ned Markosian

Presentism is the view that only present objects exist. According to Presentism, if we were to make an accurate list of all the things that exist – i.e., a list of all the things that our most unrestricted quantifiers range over – there would be not a single non-present object on the list. Thus, you and I and the Taj Mahal would be on the list, but neither Socrates nor any future grandchildren of mine would be included. And it’s not just Socrates and my future grandchildren, either – the same goes for any other putative object that lacks the property of being present. All such objects are unreal, according to Presentism. According to Non-presentism, on the other hand, non-present objects like Socrates and my future grandchildren exist right now, even though they are not currently present. We may not be able to see them at the moment, on this view, and they may not be in the same space-time vicinity that we find ourselves in right now, but they should nevertheless be on the list of all existing things.

Quoting Luke

Couldn't it equally be said that the tensed version of existence is reducible to the tenseless version? Your argument strikes me as somewhat unfair to B-theorists, since if language is necessarily tensed, then B-theorists are not even able to describe their view of time. I sense that you are probably aware of the issues, and I understand that the B-theory may not be strictly identical to "non-presentism", but this may help some readers (perhaps):

If time flows, as A-theory claims, what does it flow with respect to?

Reply to Inis I have no idea. Maybe we could just say "There is motion" or "Everything is in motion", and time is a way that we measure or mark that. Perhaps more simply it's the fact that we age, but that's probably circular. It's a difficult question. But so is the question of illusion for B-theorists.

Quoting Luke

I have no idea. Maybe we could just say "There is motion" or "Everything is in motion", and time is a way that we measure or mark that. Perhaps more simply it's the fact that we age, but that's probably circular. It's a difficult question. But so is the question of illusion for B-theorists.

If time flows, then it must flow with respect to something, and that something has to be an external time.

What's the question of illusion?

Quoting Luke

Couldn't it equally be said that the tensed version of existence is reducible to the tenseless version?

What is the tenseless version of existence then? That is what I am trying to get at here. I have no clue what the notion of saying something exists means other than saying that it either was, is, or will be.

Quoting A Defense of Presentism, Ned Markosian

Presentism is the view that only present objects exist.

Some people would suggest that that definition is trivial. "Of course everything that exists is present, that is what 'exists' means!", they'd claim, and in a sense they'd be right. I believe that in all views about time wouldn't disagree with the notion that what exists is present at heart, but where they differ is in really the extent of what exists (that and whether there is this thing called the passage of time). Markosian brings up the idea of listing "existing" things, which is a good place to start. The presentist's list would be much smaller than the growing block theorists, and the growing block theorist's list would be smaller than the eternalist.

Quoting Inis

If time flows, as A-theory claims, what does it flow with respect to?

This is like asking "what contains space?". It's a confused question that I think is based upon the mistake of treating the background as part of the foreground. Space and time are the setting for objects to exist and events to take place, but they are not objects and events themselves.

Quoting Inis

If time flows, then it must flow with respect to something, and that something has to be an external time.

I understand. I was actually defending eternalism/B-theory in my first post (if only a little).

Quoting Inis

What's the question of illusion?

B-theorists hold that the flow of time is an illusion and that the universe is static. How do we experience illusions in that case (or experience anything at all)?

Quoting Mr Bee

What is the tenseless version of existence then?

That everything at all times exists (some say exists "simpliciter"); i.e. the block universe theory.

Quoting Mr Bee

I have no clue what the notion of saying something exists means other than saying that it either was, is, or will be

The link above will probably explain it better than I can.

Quoting Mr Bee

This is like asking "what contains space?". It's a nonsense question that I think is based upon the mistake of treating the background as part of the foreground. Space and time are the setting for objects to exist and events to take place, but they are not objects and events themselves.

No one is claiming that space flows. If they did, then you can rest assured that that flow would need to be with respect to something.

Claiming that space and time are merely the setting for events is B-theory.

Quoting Luke

That everything at all times exists (some say exists "simpliciter"); i.e. the block universe theory.

And what does "exists simpliciter" mean here? This is just replacing one word with another. It could mean "existed, exists, or will exist", but that doesn't really get us anywhere new. Don't know what else it could possibly mean though so if you have something then now is a good a time as any.

Quoting Inis

No one is claiming that space flows. If they did, then you can rest assured that that flow would need to be with respect to something.

Of course no one isn't. All physical objects exist in a backdrop, called space. What backdrop does space exist in? Perhaps we need a hyperspace to contain space. But what backdrop does hyperspace exist in? And so on and so forth.

Quoting Inis

Claiming that space and time are merely the setting for events is B-theory.

Nope.

Reply to Mr Bee I'm not sure whether you didn't read the link or didn't understand it, or whether you think that pretending not to understand it constitutes an argument against the view. Nevertheless, I've done as much as I'm willing to to help you understand it.

Reply to Luke I'm asking you to explain it for me since that's much more faster than asking me to read a 42 page paper. I assume you read the link yourself. Or maybe you never did in which case it's probably a good idea to not chime into discussions all arrogant when you have no clue what you're talking about.

Quoting Luke

B-theorists hold that the flow of time is an illusion and that the universe is static. How do we experience illusions in that case (or experience anything at all)?

If the flow of time were an illusion, wouldn't we at least experience it? I'm not sure we do. Rather, it seems we make a mistake in the interpretation of what we actually experience.

Quoting Mr Bee

Of course no one isn't. All physical objects exist in a backdrop, called space. What backdrop does space exist in? Perhaps we need a hyperspace to contain space. But what backdrop does hyperspace exist in? And so on and so forth.

This is known as the B-Theory of space.

Reply to Mr Bee I'm not asking you to read a 42-page article. I was talking about the brief Wikipedia article I linked to: the block universe theory.

Quoting Inis

If the flow of time were an illusion, wouldn't we at least experience it?

It would seem to run counter to our understanding of how the body (including our experiences) functions, which relies on actual motion.

Quoting Luke

It would seem to run counter to our understanding of how the body functions, which relies on actual motion.

I don't think our understanding relies on the flow of time though. This flow didn't even appear in Newton's theories, despite the fact that he claimed that time "flows equably".

Also, B-theory doesn't imply that motion doesn't exist. I hope not anyway.

Quoting Inis

I don't think our understanding relies on the flow of time though. This flow didn't even appear in Newton's theories, despite the fact that he claimed that time "flows equably".

Im not sure whether Newton had much to say about how the human body functions.

Quoting Inis

Also, B-theory doesn't imply that motion doesn't exist. I hope not anyway.

It does, at least according to some definitions.

Quoting Luke

Im not sure whether Newton had much to say about how the human body functions.

The flow of time is not a feature of Newtonian mechanics, quantum mechanics, relativity, or biology. Despite Newton being an A-theorist.

Quoting Luke

It does, at least according to some definitions.

Can you point to the bit that denies the reality of motion? I don't see it, but then I am chronically averse to the absurd.

Quoting Banno

It fails because it can also explain A-time? Odd.

No idea what you're talking about there.

[quote=noAxioms]If I say a T-Rex exists, I mean it is a member of the set of objects contained in the universe. I don't mean it is a member of the set of objects currently contained in the universe.[/quote]
Quoting Mr Bee

I still do not see how you're using the term "is" in a manner that isn't present tensed though. Also what exactly is in the "set of objects contained in the universe"? I assume that it is going to contain the set of objects that are currently contained in the universe.

I thought I was pretty explicit in my comment there, so you either have no understanding, or you refuse to accept the way I am using the word. By your insistence in adding 'currently', you are assuming presentism, so of course non-presentism isn't going to be compatible with that.

So you're not trying to drive it to self-inconsistency, but merely decline to accept it, which is fine.

Quoting Inis

Can you point to the bit that denies the reality of motion? I don't see it, but then I am chronically averse to the absurd.

The B-theory of time is the name given to one of two positions regarding philosophy of time. B-theorists argue that the flow of time is an illusion, that the past, present and future are equally real, and that time is tenseless. This would mean that temporal becoming is not an objective feature of reality. [...]

The terms A and B theory are sometimes used as synonyms to the terms presentism and eternalism, [...]

The debate between A-theorists and B-theorists is a continuation of a metaphysical dispute reaching back to the ancient Greek philosophers Heraclitus and Parmenides. Parmenides thought that reality is timeless and unchanging [B-theory]. Heraclitus, in contrast, believed that the world is a process of ceaseless change or flux [A-theory]. [...]

The difference between A-theorists and B-theorists is often described as a dispute about temporal passage or 'becoming' and 'progressing'. B-theorists argue that this notion is purely psychological [read: illusory]. [...]

It is therefore common (though not universal), for B-theorists to be four-dimensionalists, that is, to believe that objects are extended in time as well as in space and therefore have temporal as well as spatial parts.

Reply to Mr Bee B-theorists tend to speak in the tenseless terms of earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than, instead of the tensed terms of past, present and future.

Quoting noAxioms

I thought I was pretty explicit in my comment there, so you either have no understanding, or you refuse to accept the way I am using the word.

Of course I have no understanding of the way you are using the word, and I have tried to make it explicit why in my analysis, which you have declined to comment on. If you have a disagreement with the way I have analyzed your definition, then please point out where that disagreement is.

The reason why I have been using "currently" is because that is the only way I can make sense of your claims, but I very much welcome an alternative conception, so long as it makes sense. Indeed, that is the very reason why I am having this discussion with you.

I have given some points where we may differ and what I find lacking in each of them but if you don't want to engage with them, then I would assume that either you don't have an actual response, in which I suggest you reevaluate your views, or you're just not willing to respond for whatever reason.

Quoting noAxioms

So you're not trying to drive it to self-inconsistency, but merely decline to accept it, which is fine.

It's neither. Like I just said, it's that I don't understand it. My acceptance of eternalism isn't really relevant here since my main goal is to try to understand what "tenseless existence" amounts to.

And again I must add that this isn't really just a problem exclusive to me. There is actually an entire debate centered around what eternalism even means, and I think it's this idea that there is some form of non-temporal existence that leads people to draw mistaken or confused ideas about these views about time, which includes questioning whether the eternalism vs. presentism debate is merely semantical, which it obviously isn't. I would suggest you look at the link I gave you earlier to the triviality problem, but if you don't know where that is, then here's the link again here. If you don't want to respond to my points, then feel free to respond to theirs. Or not, it's up to you.

Quoting Mr Bee

The reason why I have been using "currently" is because that is the only way I can make sense of your claims, but I very much welcome an alternative conception, so long as it makes sense. Indeed, that is the very reason why I am having this discussion with you.

Best I can explain the general stance is that eternalism gives equal ontological status to all events. What that status is isn't necessarily part of the view. My opinion on that is certainly not typical of eternalists.

As for tenseless (B-series) language, that just means that a statement about something (an event say) in what I will call spacetime does not carry an implied ordering relation with some second event. It's not that events cannot be ordered, but rather that there is no second event referenced by the statement.

Under A-series language, a similar statement typically has an implied reference to a second event, most often the event of the making of the statement. There really isn't spacetime under presentism, only space.

We're sort of getting off topic here, but the OP has not chimed in to his own thread ever, so I've been going along with this discussion instead. The OP was about how such concepts as determinism and free will fit into a block view of things.

Quoting noAxioms

Best I can explain the general stance is that eternalism gives equal ontological status to all events. What that status is isn't necessarily part of the view. My opinion on that is certainly not typical of eternalists.

Suppose I am an ontological nihilist who believes that nothing exists, including events. In that sense, all events have the same ontological status, that of not existing. Would that count as "eternalism" then under your view?

Quoting noAxioms

Best I can explain the general stance is that eternalism gives equal ontological status to all events. What that status is isn't necessarily part of the view. My opinion on that is certainly not typical of eternalists.

While I think it very clever of philosophers to discover and take a "stance" on these matters, there simply is no choice but to be a B-theorist since the discovery of relativity. Presentism simply doesn't work.

Reply to Inis
There's a problem here though. It is one of the most fundamental aspects of our experience, that past events are substantially different from future events. Past events cannot be changed, while we can influence the occurrence of future events. Therefore something is clearly amiss if relativity validates B-theory, and B-theory contradicts one of the most fundamental empirical truths.

Quoting Mr Bee

Suppose I am an ontological nihilist who believes that nothing exists, including events. In that sense, all events have the same ontological status, that of not existing. Would that count as "eternalism" then under your view?

If there is no distinction between the present and other times, then yes.
I'm no nihilist, but rather a relativist, so I think 'to exist' is a relation between things, not a property. So the moon may exist to me, but that doesn't make it just 'exist', which I find to be meaningless.

Quoting Inis

there simply is no choice but to be a B-theorist since the discovery of relativity. Presentism simply doesn't work.

I've defended the opposite side of that argument. I don't think relativity contradicts presentism, however much I think presentism is nonsense. The two view make all the same empirical predictions, and theory of relativity is an empirical theory, not a metaphysical interpretation.

Then again, I sort of thought of my own 'disproof' of presentism that basically demonstrates that if time flows, then actual time (not dilated by either speed or gravity) must flow infinitely fast, or our time (clocks on earth) are all stopped. Since presentism does not assert finite flow of actual time, my demonstration fails to disprove presentism.