Luke

You did not answer the question: What purposes other than understanding do you mean? When is the purpose of language use "for us to understand each ot...

It is still entirely unclear what counts as 'winning' in this analogy, and you also didn't explain what you meant by "playing for keeps" in the contex...

I don't understand what you mean by "playing for keeps" in the context of language games. If I understand your analogy, are you saying that everyone i...

It does matter, because your whole argument hangs on the fallacious assumption that the word "perfect" must always mean "ideal". Then I'll leave it to...

Why should I accept your assertion that there is only one possible meaning of the word "perfect"? That's right: the kind of perfection under discussio...

Actually, it was a direct quote; the first line of §98. Exactly. You get it now? Not necessarily. The "perfect" order Wittgenstein speaks of here has ...

Which "principle"? You have a perverse way of reading the text. It is pointless to take the words "ideal" and "perfect" as being used in a contradicto...

Wittgenstein speaks of "meaning" and "use", whereas you speak of "meaningful" and "useful". Apples and oranges.

You are conflating "meaning" and "meaningful". Words have meaning, they do not have meaningful. And although words can be meaningful, they do not have...

Perhaps he is not using these terms synonymously despite your preconception that he must. You have it backwards. It is the ideal which we are not stri...

You were previously only willing to acknowledge that the "ideal" adjective applies to exactness, whereas I repeatedly noted that Wittgenstein also app...

The issue is that Wittgenstein is discussing other particular types of ideal that you are failing to acknowledge. It is very simple. Wittgenstein is a...

I made a distinction between "ideal exactness" and "the ideal", and referenced other types of ideal than ideal exactness. This has already been addres...

He is not referring to "the ideal" at §88; he is referring to ideal exactness. Furthermore, he is criticising, not defining, the unspecified notion of...

You have an uncanny knack for misreading. It's not about "whether all language use is goal oriented", or about "whether a goal can exist without the a...

Not really, because the (non-common) "usage" which assumes an ideal is only found in philosophy. Wittgenstein is attempting to illustrate that this wa...

How do you account for the 'Whereas' at §87?

The remarks at §121 regarding orthography I consider to be an extension of this line of thinking: that philosophy should treat all language as being o...

There are a variety of different language-games, as Wittgenstein notes at §23 of PI, but one thing that may be shared between language users across at...

Consider it this way: The type of explanation that Wittgenstein says must disappear at §109 is the same sort of "complete" and "final" (i.e. philosoph...

You said that "he is pointing us toward the possibility that we might learn rules simply through observation". To learn the game without ever learning...

This is inconsistent with his statement at §87: "an explanation serves to remove or to prevent a misunderstanding". He is not rejecting explanation he...

He is not rejecting explanation. He is only rejecting the philosophical misconception of a complete and final explanation. Signposts also require expl...

So, Wittgenstein's "method" for "restricting doubt" is...learning? And that's Wittgenstein's method? Hmm. Deficient in what respect? It is not obvious...

What method?

You introduced an absurd "doubt" into Wittgenstein's example of "stand roughly there", which is that you don't know why he would give this direction t...

Which is why, if you had read the next sentence, I said "You may not have used that phrase, but you are speaking in those terms." You originally used ...

You start out by saying that certainty is inessential to understanding, but end up saying that without certainty we only have a partial understanding....

Exact understanding is where there is no doubt; where there is certainty. You state that we need to limit the possibility of misunderstanding to an ac...

You complain that doubt can always remain; that we can always fall short of an exact understanding, but these are merely imagined possibilities. The l...

You simply repeat the interlocutor's concern at §87: "But then how does an explanation help me to understand, if, after all, it is not the final one? ...

The Wikipedia article defines Foundationalism thus: "Foundationalism is an attempt to respond to the regress problem of justification in epistemology....

How so?

I didn't say it wasn't philosophical thinking; I said it wasn't foundational philosophical thinking. See Foundationalism. I'm not going to argue with ...

Wittgenstein in no way attempts to "establish the foundations for an epistemology in which doubt has been removed". This type of foundational philosop...

Not really, because in the very next sentence of §85 - which is unchanged in both the third and fourth editions - W says: "Or rather, it sometimes lea...

The third edition has it as "leave no room for doubt", but the fourth edition has it as "leave room for doubt" (at §85). But what would I know, since ...

Firstly, it isn't a consequence of Wittgenstein's ontology or position; it is only your misreading. Secondly, you were presenting radical doubt as you...

You should ask yourself this question, given that you are the one making claims of radical doubt. Are you certain that your words mean what you think ...

The point is that having a reason quells your doubt, but removing your doubt does not remove doubt?

What sort of a reason?

Does that somehow make motion impossible?

If space (or the number line) is continuous, and motion is analogously continuous, then there shouldn't be a first position. Our inability to define t...

is there no start to the sequence or no first step after the start of the sequence? It makes a difference.

I thought the problem was in determining the first step after the start of the sequence (or after 0)?

I still don't see how it prevents motion. I reject the assumption that motion requires counting or requires determining a first position. You (and Zen...

But there is a first position to pass through, regardless of whether you can calculate it.

Sounds odd. It's a bit like saying that since there is no highest number to count to, I can't ride a bike. How does one have any effect on the other?