Shared Meaning
What is it, and what does it take?
Clearly it requires meaning. Generally speaking, we're talking about language users when discussing shared meaning. So it seems safe enough to say that shared meaning requires a plurality of language users.
So, what is it that is being shared between language users? To answer "meaning" is not at all helpful nor informative.
What say you?
Clearly it requires meaning. Generally speaking, we're talking about language users when discussing shared meaning. So it seems safe enough to say that shared meaning requires a plurality of language users.
So, what is it that is being shared between language users? To answer "meaning" is not at all helpful nor informative.
What say you?
Comments (161)
I doubt that this "answer" fits all uses of language, as there is probably more than one answer depending on the use.
Note that neither (1) nor (2) can be held by nominalists, although (2) is maybe not too far removed from trope nominalism if we don't insist on identity.
You'll find it hard to get agreement on this, so let's start with something simple. Words are shared. Are they not? Anyone disagree?
Understanding.
I'd agree in my sense (3) above, at least.
I'm a nominalist, so I have issues with someone having in mind my (1) or (2) above.
As I'm sure you all agree. But perhaps you do not know that you agree?
Ond, gall unrhyw un ddeall unrhyw beth os oes ganddynt Google yn cyfieithu?
With regard to shared (intersubjective) meaning, whether communicated verbally, or non-verbally:
1) Communication requires message vocabulary and syntax which is understood by both message source and destination.
2) Semantic message encoding and decoding requires knowledge of the code used, corresponding mental representations, and the communication context.
3) A semantic message may be encoded differently and have the same (or similar) meaning in each code.
In addition to intersubjective (social group) meaning, there is also: universal (innate or inherent), subjective (personal), and unknown meaning.
Yes, when I looked at the English translation in Google it said.
"I share some words with you, but unless you are already familiar with the Welsh language, you will not understand what is being said."
Mostly fine, but I immediately raised an eyebrow at "I share some words with you", just doesn't sound natural in English. But if someone had said that to me, word for word, in English, I would have presumed they meant something by their odd phrasing. With Google, I just presumed it was an error.
Perhaps we should pass everything a couple of times through Google? Translate it to Welsh and back to even out any idiosyncrasies in an individual language style.
This, of course, requires value. In general, we talk about language users when discussing common concepts. It is safe to say that many language users need general purposes.
If so, what is common to language users? The answer to "meaning" is usually not useful.
What do you say;"
___
The 'purified' version of the question. English - >Korean - >Russian - >Greek - >Finnish - >English.
I think it makes just as little sense as the original.
It’s what facilitates cooperation within social groups. It primarily requires shared values and goals.
I think this has a lot to do with the bidirectional nature of shared speech. I utter some words, and I intend for them to carry a particular meaning. You hear my words, and you discern from them a meaning. But the meaning I intend and the meaning you receive might be two quite different things. I think this is the core of the sharing question. :chin:
They might be, or they might only be as different as two slices of a shared pizza. Some philosophers claim that a meal is only shared if the mouths connect to the same stomach, but I think they are mistaken.
I did, but no one got the, admittedly obscure, method. If I keep going translating paragraphs into other languages, each step is perfectly understandable (with the odd awkward wording), but before long it becomes nearly unrecognisable. Like a game of Chinese whispers. So if there is some "external" thing being 'shared' then why isn't it preserved through translation. I'd say it's more like a process, than an extant thing.
Good points.
It is just the sort of error a non-native speaker might make, because the distinction between the present simple and present continuous is not marked in most languages, but is derived from context, which in google's case it does not have.
But I see you understand this already, or at least that you understand how the meaning that is shared can be 'to an extent'. Sometimes we might be 'of one mind' about things, but mostly we sort of agree, mostly or at least understand how we agree and how we disagree.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Do we? Can you pinpoint for me the sense of pinpoint here? No, I don't want you to, really. I think we are better off allowing our pins to be microscopically blunt and rough, and likewise meaning of the points we make to each other - d'you see what I mean?
I think your (1) and (2) are expressed in a way so as to be contradictory.
You mean so that one wouldn't hold both (1) and (2)? Sure. They're different options about what one might have in mind with "shared." The idea isn't that someone would have all three options in mind about the same thing.
Each one is contradictory in its own right. The first, I assume one thing "multiply present" means one thing that is a multiplicity of itself, which is contradictory, and the second, multiple things which are the same thing, is just a different way of stating the same contradiction.
Ah--well, that's up to realists on universals to try to make sense of. It's their doctrine. :wink:
Well thanks for sharing that opinion, but why can we only share things? People talk about shared responsibility; is communion not shared? I think the thought police are over-stepping their remit here.
But you're not making much sense. When the builder says "slab" and the assistant passes a slab, they are both using the language in the same way to do the same thing together. And meaning is use, so meaning is co-operation, and cooperation is sharing.
Meaning is shared only insofar as the context demands. Even words that seemed to create shared meaning in one context may, when used in a different context, demonstrate that the meaning was never shared to begin with.
Yelling "slab" may get a house built, but it could just be that in the context of a construction site, it was sufficient for the yeller to mean "hand me what is next on the pile" and the receiver to have understood the word to mean "hand me the hard rock thing cut into a manageable shape."
I suck at pithy.
Let me see if I can understand this. The builder and the assistant are doing something together, building something. This is cooperation. I would say that the act of building, in this instance, is something which is shared. So "cooperation" refers to a sharing, and in this case what is shared is the act of building.
Let's suppose that "meaning" refers to an act of cooperation, so it is also a type of sharing. What is the act which it is a sharing of? In the example above, the act of building is shared. In the case of meaning, is it communication which is the act that is shared? If we share in the act of communicating, then I think that the question of the thread is whether meaning is a property of the act of communication (and therefore shared), or is "meaning" something particular, something which each individual who shares in the act of communicating contributes.
So back to the example. Each builder adds something to the act of building, and also each assistant adds something to the act. However, each of these individual acts only has significance in relation to the overall, cooperative act of building. Does "meaning" refer to something like this, something that each individual adds to the act, but only has importance in relation to the overall cooperative act of communicating? Or, does each individual act contain meaning within itself, regardless of the act's relation to the overall, shared act of communicating?
The overall “conversation” has meaning, and so do the individual contributions of the participants. “Meaning” is what words, thoughts, representations, etc. refer to. My two cents.
A pen without thought/belief has no user. It's just a pen.
The meaning of the pen is always determined by the connections drawn between it and something else. The meaning of the X, follows the above. Always. I've let X be "the pen". Let X be whatever you like.
The pen shares one's own thought/belief. All thought/belief is meaningful. The pen shares one's own meaning. This sharing of meaning comes in the form of thought/belief statements. However, what is attempted to be shared is not always well-received. Sometimes the listener draws correlations between the language use and something else... something other than the speaker. That is case of misattributing meaning.
The pen is a tool that is used for all sorts of things. Sometimes it's use results in mistakes that the user is completely and totally unaware of.
What are the grounds upon which one denies that meaning is the sort of thing that can be shared?
A composite is a thing.
Huh? What do you mean? Serious question.
In my view, the word “pen” has meaning. It refers to a writing utensil with ink. A picture of a pen can also have meaning. It refers to that particular writing utensil in the picture. The picture may also have private meaning in that it may call up all kinds of associative thoughts. A physical pen has no meaning on its own. Have you ever asked, “What does this pen mean?”
Meaning is not properly accounted for in such terms. There are external things that become both sign and symbol. There are external things that become significant, symbolic and/or symbolized. There are also internal things that become so. All things that become sign, symbol, significant, symbolized, and/or symbolic exist in their entirety prior to becoming a part of the meaningful correlation drawn between different things; prior to their being a part of the correlation itself.
I would concur that the attribution of meaning is a process.
Rhetorically, metaphorically, allegorically, etc...
We are talking about meaning here.
Sorry Noah, I'm not familiar with it. Got a rough outline?
When doing analytic philosophy, it is always good to avoid metaphor whenever and wherever possible. As long as one can still convey one's meaning.
Poetry operates by virtue of the same internal mechanisms at work. All attribution of meaning consists of the very same three necessary elemental constituents... poetic meaning notwithstanding.
Is symbolism a name?
Not all symbols refer.
None of those always refers. There are other times when they all do.
I'm unsure what to do to help.
Share... Like a pizza? Or like a house? Or like Brexit? Or like an investment? Or like a story?
Like one's thought/belief about the world and/or one's self.
My position adequately accounts for both.
Bald assertions do not garner much warrant when they conflict with sound argument/reasoning.
I’m sorry. Where can I find that?
Well yes, if the pile was arranged right, one could manage with a single word that I would prefer to translate as "next". But that is another story. I'm referring to W's story in which there are words for slab and block used to identify 'what's next'. We discover the meaning by seeing the use they are put to, which is to coordinate action. We see that the meaning is shared by observing that the assistant presents and the builder is satisfied with what is presented in harmony with the word use. If there was a misunderstanding, or a mis hearing, one would see the disharmony that resulted as slab was thrown back at the assistant , along with some remonstration. Compare this with the use of a sea shanty to coordinate action rhythmically - the meaning is reduced to a series of 'nows', or 'heaves'.
Well I'd better use the terminology if you want to go into it. I think we say that there is a 'form of life' which is Jones & Son, Builders in their functional mode, and there is a language game such that the idea of the game is to coordinate the actions of builder and assistant, and the rules are that when the builder needs a slab, he says 'slab' and the assistant passes him a slab and so on. It seems obvious that this very sparse vocabulary and simple repertoire of moves does not make a distinction between object and action - 'slab' means the thing and the act of passing it, just as 'Halt!' means 'take one more step and come to attention.' or 'Scalpel!' means 'Please pass me a new scalpel, nurse.' each in their own game in their own form of life.
If I were to describe this in general terms, I could say that language is a tool of social coordination that requires a mutual understanding in order to function. that is the builder and assistant must both know how the words connect to each other's actions, in order for the language to work, and this sameness of understanding is practical rather than conceptual. and in this sense the mean is not merely demonstrated by the act but consists of the act being the appropriate one.
This is annoying for philosophers, to find that words are not really for arguing the toss, or exploring the mind, but for getting stuff done. Maybe consider the referee's one word whistle language. The one word means 'stop the game' if the game is in progress, or 'start the game' if the game is stopped. And every player has that same functional understanding, though perhaps none have ever thought about it in those terms. the meaning is shared, in the same way that every poster shares the fundamentals of English, and does not have to resort to google translate.
If I understand correctly, you are saying that there is an understanding which is shared (mutual), and this understanding concerns some rules about actions. What do you think is the relationship between meaning and rules? Are they the same thing, meaning is rules, and rules are meaning? Or, are rules a type of meaning, or is meaning a type of rule? Or is there some other relationship?
Quoting unenlightened
Isn't exploring the mind an instance of doing something? Here's a little problem that Aristotle uncovered. A goal, the end, is an object, the thing desired. Activity is the means to the end. So getting to the end constitutes "getting stuff done". But Aristotle found that it is the activity itself which is judged as virtuous or vicious, so the highest goal, the final end, as the most virtuous thing desired, must itself be an activity, rather than an object, as thing desired. This is why he posited thinking about thinking, as the most virtuous, divine activity. But this is an instance of doing something without ever getting anything done.
What are you doing here? You pick me up on my inexactitude, and then retreat to the only difference being some unknown possibility. We read the same thread, we speak the same language; why do you want to have a problem with "share", suddenly?
My suspicion is that there is an implication here that might be dangerous for a certain philosophical convention - that ethics cannot be discussed?
Well the rules are a formal description of the game. I described the rule of the referee's whistle, that give the meaning as varying according to context - 'start', or 'stop'. The players share a practical understanding of this but probably could not say very clearly 'what the whistle means'. So contra Banno above, I want to say that meaning is being able to play the game, or in this case, stopping playing the game when the whistle blows, and restarting when the whistle blows again. Exactly as one says that a dog understands 'sit' just in case it sits when the trainer says 'sit'. We don't require that the beast can explain itself. I suppose I would say something like that meaning is how the rules play out in the form of life.
I imagine W's builders reaching an impasse. The builder says 'Block!' but the assistant has run out of blocks. The game has become unplayable, and something new has to happen. Perhaps the assistant speaks - 'Slab!!' And the rules have changed, the game has changed and the meaning has changed.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover Sure it is, and we do it with language, but it's secondary, and parasitic on the practical uses of language to coordinate social action. First we hunt, then we tell hunting stories, and then we theorise hunting.
I quite agree with what you're saying. :up: :smile: But your sense doesn't quite come through (to me!) in the above text. The external thing isn't preserved through translation because the communications medium (speech/words) is imperfect, and we know that this is so. Because the shared external thing isn't safe in simple transmission, it just gets worse in the case of translation.
And then there is the question in the OP: what exactly is the external thing?
If we're talking about rules for getting things done, then I think ethics is unavoidable. If there are rules for getting things done, which are incompatible with ethical rules, this would be a problem.
Quoting unenlightened
Wouldn't this put meaning into the minds of the individuals then, and not something shared? The rules are shared, but the meaning of the rules is what is in the individual's mind. So if one person misunderstood what the whistle is supposed to mean, that person might keep playing, having assigned a different meaning to the whistle.
Quoting unenlightened
Yes, I think that's the point which puts practise ahead of theory in Aristotle's ethics. First, he was moved to assign a theoretical thing as the ultimate end, "happiness". But a further analysis of human nature revealed that we are fundamentally active, involved in activity first and foremost, and the highest good must be an activity because an inactivity is inconsistent with what it means to be human. So the so-called ultimate end is overruled, as incompatible with human nature, which is to be active, and therefore the new ultimate end would have to be an activity.
Notice in your example, "then we theorize hunting". You might have said we theorize ways to make hunting more efficient, or to avoid having to hunt altogether, in order to do more important things. But if you said that we theorize ways to spend less time having to hunt, so that we could sit around and do nothing, this would outstep the boundaries of this sort of ethics which dictates that good is found in activity. Practise is given a higher priority to theory. This provides the principles to judge theory through practise (empirical method). And theory is not coming from the truth of eternal forms, rather it comes from the activity of thinking.
Well if you don't understand, you're not sharing, and you're not playing the game properly. But sharing a pizza does not require sharing a stomach, we each have some. And likewise we can share thoughts, rules, meanings, in separate minds. Let's not make it a problem because it isn't one. Maybe your slice of pizza is bigger and has more salami, maybe your understanding is sharper. Still, we share...
Meaning is explanation (clarification) by attribution, reference, or relation. So, it is a product of categorisation (predication), hence; associated with a particular (physical and/or mental).
It is stored in memory as a mental representation (cognitive symbol).
Minds which possess similar mental representations (sets of intersubjective meaning) can be said to share meaning.
Yes. Language can be used for many things, and saying "Block!" is to use language as a means for acquiring something. I think it safe to say that if the helper/listener brings something else, then the meaning was not shared/understood. The meaning of "Block!" is the mental correlation between the language use and something else. In this instance, the something else is a particular entity/object and it's being given to the speaker after the language use.
The insight of Witt, it seems to me, focuses upon the context surrounding language use and what it shows us. It helps differentiate between different senses of the same term. "Block" without the builder's context does have the same locutionary force. It's more of a namesake only.
Are those the only three options?
Requires them [i]in what sense[/I], and [i]for what[/I]? I hate problematic ambiguity like that. Especially when I've pointed out the problem before.
Quoting creativesoul
Meaning is use. And the way that I use the word "meaning" doesn't logically imply that a bunch of language users need to be standing around at the time doing a bunch of stuff.
I find my usage useful for a number of reasons which I've spoken about at length. I find your usage problematic, again, for reasons I've mentioned before, and elsewhere.
And when I say that meaning is use, funnily enough, I don't mean that meaning is necessarily literal use at the time by language users. I don't think that Wittgenstein meant that either. But whether he did or didn't is a digression. The interpretation that I go by is a better interpretation than the linguistic idealist's interpretation.
It takes being set through the creation of a language rule, which can be implicit or explicit.
For it to be shared is for it to be made public, like publishing a newly coined meaning. I can do that using language through a medium such as this forum. Think of social media: as soon as I click the "share" button, lo and behold, it has been shared.
In my language, which I call Sapientish, the word "shlebab" is to mean "a large horse-like creature, only with fluffy fur and claws".
Now that I've shared, you either play the language game or you don't, and it's as simple as that.
And therefore shared meaning does not require understanding. He just shared his meaning through the expression of it in language, and yet I do not understand what he meant.
Yes! And yet some people have said that analogies about meaning mislead. No, they can do, but then some people mislead themselves and blame it on the analogy. I caught your shared meaning, and I agree with your point.
But now I really want pizza.
Which really only says that it's contradictory as a result of his interpretation, which is his never-ending problem. And the obvious solution? Don't interpret it that way! Remove the blinkers. I think that they call this the principle of charity.
Indeed. Not to mention that he's undermining his own "meaning is use" here! All he's really telling us is how he is using the word "thing". Do we all use the word in your way, @Banno?
Early Wittgenstein used "thing" in a way whereby it both makes sense and is true to say that we don't share [i]things[/I] through expression in language, we share their [i]names[/I].
Nice post, and welcome back. Long time, no see.
Quoting unenlightened
We share a language - OK. We share meaning -
Quoting creativesoul
...but here, how does shared meaning differ from meaning? A meaning that has not been shared... a meaning that cannot be shared?
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting Terrapin Station
Not like that...
You've named some different kinds of meaning. Would you elaborate a bit upon universal and unknown meaning?
Quoting Mww
Can we unpack this a little bit more? While I would not disagree at all that there are times and situations where sharing meaning creates a bridge of mutual understanding, so to speak. I'm hesitant about the consequences of sticking to that equivalence. If we claim that sharing meaning is sharing understanding, we're faced with a bit of a problem when a listener completely understands and readily agrees with what a speaker is saying but what's been said amounts to falsehood.
Certainly meaning is shared here. Can understanding consist of falsehood?
Can I understand that Trump places what's best for the average American citizen above and beyond his own personal interests? I think not, although I can readily understand what the sentence means. I know what it would take in order for it to be true. So, in such cases the meaning is certainly shared, but I'm quite hesitant to say in such cases that understanding has been as well.
Are you disagreeing that meaning is shared?
Hmmmm...
It would seem to me that there are at least some values that cannot be conceived and/or agreed upon without meaning. If shared meaning requires shared values and goals, then shared values and goals would have to be prior to shared meaning.
I've read you enough to conclude that I've misunderstood. Can you help me out here? How does shared meaning require shared values and goals?
Very good. Point well made, and quite relevant to the OP.
The only thing that seems problematic to me is talking in terms of "receiving meaning". Meaning, it seems to me, is not the sort of thing that one can receive. Rather, meaning is attributed, and I would say that the misattribution of meaning is often if not always the source of confusion and/or misunderstanding, particularly regarding an other's terminological/word use.
The term "tree" does not refer to meaning.
Indeed. This highlights whether or not we actually do share meaning, or at least questions the exactitude of doing so, or if there can even be such a thing.
The same terminological use can have different meaning depending upon the situation. This shows the importance of context in the attribution/recognition of meaning.
That’s clearly not what I said.
Is "tree" a word?
Yes. We discover the meaning by knowing what correlations are being made between the language use and other things.
Both builder and assistant draw correlations between the language use, the builder's wants/demands, and the block or slab. That is how meaning is shared. That is how it happens. We discover that meaning is shared, and learn what the language use means, by virtue of watching the language use in action or actually participating in it ourselves.
Trees are meaning?
Interesting... He did?
Have a link?
Well you said that meaning is what words refer to. "Tree" is a word. It does not refer to meaning. It refers to trees.
The last reply of yours is heading in the right direction.
That is what the meaning of "tree" amounts to, although the 'in the mind' part is unacceptable on my view. It presupposes spatiotemporal location. Meaning is not the sort of thing that has one, for it is a composite, a complex 'entity', of which a mind is not always necessary, unless one is willing to call the most rudimentary basic thought/belief such.
A mind, to me, requires being mindful... rudimentary level thought/belief doesn't have what it takes.
Meaning is neither external nor internal. It consists of both. It is existentially dependent upon both. What is being shared, can be, as a result of this.
Nope. Not like that.
There are plenty of situations where "shared meaning" could be replaced with "meaning".
The questions about meaning that has not been shared and/or cannot be shared may yield something useful and/or interesting.
Shared meaning must be shareable. That's obvious. We do that with language use. What would meaning that cannot be shared amount to?
I think that that's what you're after? Maybe?
Correlations drawn between different things by a language less creature. Correlations drawn between different things by a language user, but not understood by the user.
That creature cannot share it's own thought/belief about the fire and pain, and yet everyone who has been burned by touching fire has drawn the same correlations. We can talk about it.
Private meaning is the mental association I mentioned earlier.
Well, Noah I'm not sure how long you've been interested in philosophy, but this particular topic is not at all one that is simple to understand. Academia has, for multiple reasons throughout history, caused it to be much more confusing and complex than it actually is. On top of that, the rhetoric lovers tend to invoke it for less than honourable reasons/purposes. At least, that's my opinion...
The relation aspect is crucial to grasp.
I find it helpful to avoid talking in terms of "the meaning of X" is...
Earlier I offered a bit on that.
The referent of the word "tree" is a tree. The meaning of the word "tree" is determined solely by virtue of correlations drawn between it and something else.
I never actually read anything on the topic of meaning, but I have interest in it.
It's a hot mess...
:wink:
Til next time...
Cheers!
I can only understand the word 'shared' in terms of division, or joint ownership, or maybe joint possession (as in some property is shared). I can only make sense of 'meaning' as in the use a word is put to, or maybe the responses it brings about when it's read or heard.
I have no idea what putting the two together in the same sentence might be intended to cause me to think.
Do we use words for the same purposes as others? Yes, obviously.
Do words of a common language have similar effects on all language users? Similar, yes. Identical, no.
But these are trivially obvious things to say.
You asked, what is it that is being shared between language users? As if there were a single thing that had some significance over others.
If 'shared' is to be used to indicate joint possession or membership, then we share the words themselves, we share a broad collection of the uses they're put to, we share some (but not all) of the responses they generate in our minds. But this is all trivially true. What's the point of the question?
Refer to the last book of "Nichomachean Ethics". The entire NE is an extremely good read, which all human beings would benefit from reading. The highest pleasure, most perfect happiness is found in contemplation. Also you'll find the same principle in Metaphysics Bk.12 Ch.7. Here, the principle looses credibility as he uses this idea to support his notion of eternal circular motion, as unmoved mover, which is really untenable. The act of thinking is in contact with itself, as the best thing to think about. And so the act of thinking, and the object of thought become one and the same in God, so that God is always in this most virtuous condition, which human beings are only sometimes in. In God, the act of thinking and possession of the object of thinking, are one and the same thing, in this eternal circular motion. His mistake is that he has taken what he has determined as the highest human activity, contemplation, and tried to describe God's activity based on this description of the highest human activity. But hat's a huge gap he jumps across without providing a bridge to support the assumed relation, as human beings are temporal, mortal beings, while God is non-temporal, eternal.
Quoting unenlightened
It's easy to say that if you misunderstand, then you're not playing the game right, but who determines which interpretation of the rules qualifies as understanding, and which interpretation of the rules qualifies as misunderstanding? Is there a referee in this game scenario to make that judgement? And if the referee does not have the status of God, what would make the referee's judgement more authoritative than yours or mine?
Since meaning is possessed by a mind (or minds), being knowledge (semantic information), it may be:
1) Universal (innate or inherent) if all neurotypical organisms of a particular type possess it. Human examples would include expressions of basic emotion (Plutchik, 1980) and morality (Brown, 1991). So, universal meaning is shared among a species by means of genetic predisposition (nature) rather than communication.
2) Unknown if not possessed by a mind (or minds). For example: Egyptian hieroglyphs prior to the discovery of the Rosetta Stone and their subsequent decoding.
Some groundwork: All understanding, both pure from mere thought with no real object, or empirical from perception which requires real objects, follows from the judgement whether or not certain concepts belong to corresponding thoughts or perceptions, such that the logical law of identity holds, and suffices for that which rational agents call “meaning”. It is the same as, “because of this, this is the case”.
That being said, the thesis asks after shared meaning, which is the same as, for at least two rational agents, each understanding is asked to summarize whether or not “does this correspond to this”. That which is being shared does not necessarily arise from either of those understandings, but it just as easily could, re: two people interpreting a common object, or two people interpreting each other. Either way, whatever is being shared does not contain the meaning, it merely contains the properties which enable understanding to judge the applicability of concepts which will then identify the meaning.
In addition, if it is the case that judgement uses the logical laws, from which identity is given necessarily and thereafter validated by experience, given from rational epistemology, it follows that the properties of shared objects subject to mutual understanding may not necessarily be the source of meaning itself, for the simple reason experience may not be extant such that concepts are not even available to judge identity. Insufficient experience may still suggest certain arrangements of properties indicate a possible meaning inherent in it and susceptible to being understood, but can say nothing whatsoever as to what that meaning actually is.
(Where experience fails, concepts are still available by means of pure reason. Under these conditions however, any meaning would be no more than mere imaginings, possibly even illusory, and any truth would be lost)
The problem then becomes, in the case of remote sharing, whether the understanding of the creator who imparts his conceptual identities to the eventually shared object, carries over to any subsequent perception and understanding, or, which is the same thing, whether the properties of the object hold the meaning as belonging to it. This further reduces to whether the properties, if they do hold meaning, is what the remote understanding is dealing with, or is it the original meaning of the creator who imparted the properties that the remote understanding is dealing with. Because these may not be the same thing, re: misinterpretation, where the subsequent understanding misjudged the intent of the creator, from cognitive bias or prejudice or mere expectation, the two kinds of meaning may not be the same, which indicates the true meaning must lie in the understanding of the creator and the object only represents it.
All that to say this: the notion that meaning lies exclusively in understanding does not prove meaning doesn’t reside outside it. Nevertheless, any theory that claims meaning lies outside understanding must still incorporate understanding somewhere in that theory.
Anyway......you asked, I answered. Critique as you see fit.
Quoting Noah Te Stroete
Let me clarify a bit. The meaning of the word "tree" is determined exclusively by the entire correlational process that it is an integral part of. We use "tree" to pick something out...
Trees!
That's how we use language - names in particular - to isolate, identify, and begin to think about the referent of the name. The referents all existed in their entirety prior to becoming an integral part of a mental correlation. That's how all meaning works. Sometimes referents are existentially dependent upon language, and sometimes not.
Written words - all alone - are marks on paper. At the end of the universe. Marks do not have locutionary force. Some meaningful language use does. Marks on paper are not accompanied by the facial expressions, intonation, and otherwise physically observable behaviours of the language users involved in verbal communication... Those things determine and establish the forcefulness of a speech act.
One has to look at the language use... as it is happening. A christening event...
Marks do not have facial expressions. Marks do not have behaviour. Some language use is driven by out of control emotion. The meaning of the language use is more than obvious to all who participate in such events. The behaviour was emotionally driven and great discontent was behind the wheel. All language users involved in such emotionally charge interactions draw correlations between the intonation and all the other physical behaviour put on display during the event.
All statements of thought/belief come from a living, thinking, and breathing language user. Unless there is an account such as the one you're reading, without the user there are no correlations being drawn. Where there are no correlations being drawn there is no meaning being attributed. There are common linguistic expressions which cannot be rightly understood unless one watches it happen.
"Shut the front door!"
"Block!"
"Game. Set. Match."
There are good reasons for looking at how language is being used. There are key elements of meaning contained therein.
So, he didn't?
Could you put the first point above in statement form?
Emotional expressions are not equivalent to meaning on my view, so I'm having a bit of trouble understanding how the first point amounts to something other saying "neurotypical" is synonymous with "universal".
We all have emotional expressions. Emotional expressions are universal common denominators regarding all neurotypical humans.
From there, I cannot see the connection to universal meaning.
Seems unnecessarily complex and inherently inadequate all at the same time.
Quoting Mww
Doesn't pure understanding consist of thinking about our own thought/belief?
We type or say or show a picture we drew of a tree. The computer responds by pointing the robot arm at the tree.
We type or say or show a picture we drew of a totem poll. The computer responds by pointing the robot arm at the totem poll.
Is the computer "doing meaning"? In other words, does "tree" mean something to the computer?
We humans are equipped with only one cognitive system, whatever its description. When we examine that system, it appears we are thinking about our own thinking, which is technically true, but in actuality, we are just thinking. Instead of some arbitrary object to think about, we’ve chosen ourselves as the object. We think about ourselves in exactly the same way we think about everything else.
Still, such thinking, this cognitive introspection, must remain speculative, for we have nothing in experience sufficient to falsify or sustain whatever theory we choose to describe it. But we know from experience a priori logic is sufficient for empirical truth, re: mathematics, so if we can construct a theory based on logical syllogisms or simply stand-alone subject/predicate propositional logic with respect to our thinking, even if it is not susceptible to empirical proof, it is susceptible to internal consistency and necessity, which are the criteria for logical truth.
Such theory will be inherently complex if its conditions are irreducible, or if the hypotheticals require invention of its terminology. And like any theory, replaceable with a better, more satisfactory, or even simpler, theory. As soon as one comes along.............
Anyway, bottom line: meaning resides in reason and reason resides in mankind. To say meaning resides in the object of its conveyance is a reduction too far.
Didn't what?
Your computer scenario is an example of identification, which involves remembering knowledge (semantic information), but it's not an example of predication (meaning production) per se.
It could also be an example of human (programmer) predication under supervised machine learning conditions, or of artificial (computer) predication under unsupervised machine learning conditions.
I'm not sure exactly what "semantic information" would amount to. Presumably with "knowledge" you don't have "justified true belief" in mind?
Could you set it out, this system you speak of?
Aristotle did not draw and maintain the crucial distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief.
You've offered several different kinds of meaning. What do they all have in common such that that commonality is what makes them all a kind of meaning?
We are not our thought/belief.
Are you really attempting to deny that we think about our own thought/belief?
I personally prefer the Enlightenment era Continental Idealism, particularly the Kantian variety, even if I wouldn’t bet the family farm on it. But it doesn’t matter which speculative system one chooses, if he chooses at all, which ever way the brain works is how it works, and because there’s no peer-reviewed positive evidence of the fundamental aspects of brain mechanisms, we are free to be as purely logical as we please.
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Quoting creativesoul
I don’t know what you mean by “thought/belief”. For me, a belief is a thought but a thought is not necessarily a belief, and if thinking is always and absolutely prevalent, believing is redundant. There is no epistemological or cognitive distinction between “I think.......” and “I believe.......”, and in a sufficient metaphysical reduction, the “I believe......” disappears anyway.
Still, I see you use that connectivity just about everywhere on here, so it must mean something to you. And no, I would hardly attempt to deny that we think about our own thinking, but I would submit Everydayman doesn't even recognize the mechanics of his own thinking, hence doesn’t acknowledge that there are any.
Of course he did, that's why the divine act is thinking about thinking, not just plain old thinking. Thinking requires an object, what is thought about, subject matter. In his Nichomachean Ethics, contemplation (thinking) is described as the most virtuous activity, but thinking about thinking is the highest form of thinking. This follows Plato's divisions of knowledge, which places knowledge about ideas as the highest form of knowledge.
Common denominators are shared and undivided. The world is shared and undivided. All mammals share mammary glands. Commonalites are shared and undivided.
Quoting Isaac
The point of the question is to see what sense can be made of it. From your position, we have word use is shared... by definitional fiat. If meaning is the use a word(or language) is put to, then there are some unacceptable consequences...
Some people convince others to take certain actions by virtue of making statements. The speaker does not believe what they say. The listeners are convinced that the speaker does.
Here, your position cannot adequately account for the meaning of the statements/language use. Their use is not equivalent to their meaning.
Yes, that's why I included those things in my list of thing I think "shared" could refer to.
Quoting creativesoul
What? I really can't make any sense of that. Your writing is like you're missing every second sentence. Is your ISP charging you by the word? If you want to engage in a discussion, at least put the effort into constructing proper paragraphs of rather than just stringing some sentences together.
My last two responses to you were based upon what I've taken to be 'fundamental'(for lack of a better word) tenets of the position you're arguing for/from. The position I'm arguing for/from differs remarkably. I suspect that you are already aware of this. Never-the-less, I do find much agreement as well. Do you agree?
I want to say that I appreciate the 'manner' in which you've taken part here, and I want to return to some of those posts. They deserve more attention than they've been given thus far. It's just that both posts began with an assertion/claim/statement that seems to be incompatible with my own view. That makes for clear difference. Clear difference is good. Crucial for both of us, as it lends itself to knowing what we're talking about and/or debating.
Quoting Mww
This skirts around the very foundation of my position. I agree with much above, but not all. All belief is thought, but not all thought is belief. The only difference between the two, it seems to me, are during times of contemplation, particularly when one is temporarily suspending one's judgment about a particular subject matter in order to follow a line of thinking regarding that matter. Even then, however, that act is chock full of thought/belief.
If there is a metaphysically based method of reduction in which "I believe" disappears, and/or belief and/or believing is rendered as redundant, then there's either something wrong with the method, or the method arrives at the inability to draw a distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief.
There is clearly a difference. Exploring that difference is key.
Could you show me exactly where he draws that distinction? I've seen nothing from him with regards to talking about "thinking about our own thought/belief"...
There are times when "We are under attack!!!" is known to be false by the speaker but deliberately used nonetheless to manufacture consent for war. The meaning is used to manufacture consent. Thus, the meaning of the statement and it's use are clearly not equivalent.
Interesting, but this is the whole problem: one could answer either way, and one could be right either way, at least in a sense. Meaning is use, including the use of "meaning".
What is shared meaning? Well, how do you use "meaning"? And how do you use "shared"? The rest will logically follow. "Logic takes care of itself; all we have to do is to look and see how it does it" - Wittgenstein.
/thread
It's used to get people to think they're under attack. That's the use of the word if they genuinely are, and that's its use if they aren't but the speaker wishes to deceive them. It's the same use.
I agree with several of your responses to others, sometimes in total, sometimes in part. I’m not sure the position you’re arguing from differs remarkably, if just because I’m not sure what it is. It seems we are close enough in the basics, at least in the understanding of shared meaning and the disastrous appeal to rhetorical heuristics of the so-called language philosophers of the early 20th century, to say the differences aren’t that far apart.
Yes, my comments, if not an outright interrogative, began and usually do begin, with either assertion/claim/statement, as you say. That’s merely to set a reference, a starting point, and support for it, from which a co-conversant will supplement or reduce as the situation warrants.
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Quoting creativesoul
I broke off your comment, quoting only the part which shows how the difference may arise. It is easy to see how idle contemplation does not necessarily have an object, which validates the suspension of judgement. Understanding can still do its job, but without the requirement for validating its correctness, and without a particular cognition as an end, there is nothing to judge.
(Look at a wall. What shade of green is that, really? Lighter than this, seems like, deeper than that, sorta like a pear but not really. I had a t-shirt almost that color once)
On the other hand, as soon as an object is incorporated in the sequence of reasoning, as in contemplation of a specific subject matter, either a priori from reason or a priori from experience, it is accompanied by a judgement, because in such case a cognition is the ends, that is to say, there is something to cognize about the subject matter.
(Look at a wall. I’m painting it green, but I don’t want my wall to look like a maple leaf or a mantis or a pear. I want....whichever shade is judged is then cognized. Wife hates it........start over)
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Quoting creativesoul
All metaphysical methods are concerned with reason, but it is reason from which all metaphysics obtains. Obviously, circular reasoning in intrinsic to this kind of system; it is inescapable, the natural functionality of being human and possessing a singular intellectual form. Epistemological idealism in general and various forms of transcendental idealism in particular, seek to expose the circularity, but never seeks to eliminate it, because it can’t. So, yes, there is an intrinsic inability to draw a distinction between thought and thinking about thought. Whether or not it is correct to call them the same thing as a means to overcome the inability to distinguish them, doesn’t detract from the overall method, even if it is somewhat unsatisfactory. It’s like, reduce this far, if you reduce any further you’re in jeopardy of contradicting yourself, or falsifying the entire method, not just part of it.
It remains a valid premise, nonetheless, that separating thought from belief is not self-defeating, and is in fact a logical rational enterprise. What can’t be separated, and what is susceptible to inability, is the determining of exactly what the “I” that has thoughts and has beliefs, actually is. THAT is the end of the line, that of which reason has nothing to say at all, with any logical consistency.
Your turn.
The meaning of "We are under attack" is the same in both situations. It means the same thing.
That meaning is not being used for the same thing.
With an insincere speaker the statement is used to deliberately misrepresent the speaker's own thought/belief(the speaker uses the statement to lie/deceive). With a sincere speaker, it is used to represent one's own thought/belief(the speaker uses the statement to be honest/sincere).
Speaking sincerely and speaking insincerely are the not the same use of the same statement with the same meaning.
If someone asked you what a screwdriver is used for would you answer "to manage financial transactions"? No. So just because in one instance it might be used to put together a computer, which is then used to manage financial transactions, does not mean the financial transaction is the 'use' of the screwdrivers. Is is used to drive screws, for whatever ultimate purpose.
The expression "we're under attack" is used to engender the response of feeling under attack. The ultimate purpose of someone wishing to engender those feelings is neither here nor there, otherwise the question "what is x used for" becomes pointlessly unanswerable.
Talking of pointless, don't bother responding to this post, I've no interest in continuing to engage in this charade.
Well, you've offered more than adequate background. From early on, I was reminded of Kant and the old British Empiricism/Rationalism debates. Those were some of my very first interests in philosophy. Kant's intellect was quite impressive. It's no surprise his writings are still revered despite the untenability of Noumena. Intro to Philo classes may still teach the idea that all we can know is our perceptions. I know at least one... a year or so back... did. I have no idea why.
I am beginning to think/believe that the similarities between you and I revolve around personal values. I suspect our ethics are similar. That is where I still find Kant very appealing. Goodwill. The Categorical Imperative as a standard by which to measure the goodness of an act. His bit on judgment as a talent that cannot be learned at the beginning of the First Critique also left quite the impression. There are many good reasons to honor Kant and all of the other greats throughout history, especially given their knowledge base at the time along with who the most powerful people were.
The most important difference between our viewpoints is that the position you argue from/for does not drawn the crucial distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. You've acknowledged that much. The consequences of neglecting to draw and maintain that distinction are far reaching. The evidence of that neglect pervades nearly all of Western philosophy... Hume and Kant notwithstanding(his notions of apriori and a posteriori are proof positive, as is the very misconception of 'pure reason').
Thought/belief begins very simply and grows in it's complexity. At conception, there is no thought/belief and yet at the end of some people's lives the sheer complexity of thought/belief that they have/hold and/or use is downright daunting. However, the very complex ones are existentially dependent upon the simple ones. Thought/belief is accrued. Thus, to draw a distinction between empirical thought and pure reason is to show that one misunderstands how all thought/belief works. There can be no pure reason without simple thought. There can be no simple thought without an external world. There can be no pure reason without an external world. The distinction between pure reason and empirical thought is fraught with tremendous misunderstanding.
All thought/belief - from the most rudimentary, simple, and/or basic ones through the most complex - consist of common basic elemental constituents, and that is what makes them what they are.
How about you stick to the example I offered? It is one which clearly shows that use is not equivalent to meaning.
Besides that... there's an obvious tack here...
Are you claiming that we do not use meaning? I mean surely you must be. How could we do that if they were equivalent?
The ultimate purpose is precisely what the meaning of the statement is being used for.
Jeez.
This misses something...
If they are genuinely under attack, the use is for them to know it. If they are not genuinely under attack, the use is for them to believe it. So, even with the most charitable reading... not the same use.
So a perfectly normal answer to the question "what is a screwdriver used for?" would be "getting to the moon"? Because the ultimate purpose of using it to tighten screws in a rocket is to reach the moon. No wait, wasn't the space race just a tool in the cold War, so maybe screwdrivers are used to manage international politics. But then why do we engage in international politics at all, so maybe screwdrivers are used to ensure our long term security. Gosh, it's a wonder anyone can answer such a complicated question at all. What idiots they must all be for their simplistic notions that - it's used to drive bloody screws!
Because “...at the end...” is one terminus, I think it fair to say “at conception...” is the other, rather than conception as a position in the thought process, the assignment of meaning to something. If so, would it be reasonable to suggest your whole idea of thought/belief is what I would call experience? Experience does fit well in the context, you must agree, re: at conception the initial state of being there is no experience and at the end of being there is immeasurable experience. And experience is certainly accrued.
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Quoting creativesoul
I guess I must count myself amongst those ones; I understand empirical thought to mean cognizing of empirical things or condition of empirical things, the ground of which is always perception and of which there is always a conception from which experience is possible. Pure reason, on the other hand, is cognizing of possible things or possible conditions of possible things, the ground of which is imagination and of which no conception nor experience is at all possible. Herein is the negation of thought/belief being synonomous with experience, for while it seems reasonable to have experience with thought belief, it is equally reasonable to have thought/belief with no ensuing experience. Unless one considers even the internal rational process itself is an experience, which I myself do not.
So I admit to misunderstanding how your characterization of thought/belief works.
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Quoting creativesoul
I understand the basic premise here. Thought is a series of procedural steps, have an unconsciously time abiding duration, beginning with perception, ending with experience. In between are the faculties of intuition, sensibility, understanding, judgement, cognition. Pure reason begins with an idea/notion, skips the phenomenal faculties, picks up again with understanding, ends at cognition. However, this system has no degrees of complexity, it is all done the same way. I suppose it’s because mine is a regulatory system at it core, which means we are encouraged to remain logically consistent in order to prevent contradicting ourselves.
(Writing this shows me writing about thinking. But I had to think it first, which is not shown, so in effect, I am thinking about writing about thinking. But if I didn’t write it, I still would have thought it, which is....just thinking. Thinking about thinking is just thinking.)
Quoting creativesoul
What is your idea of simple thought?
Red Herrings won't do here.
Correlations drawn between different things. That is the rough outline of all thought/belief. The complexity/simplicity is determined by the content of the correlations.
I was thinking of this question with the relationship between Red (my dog) and myself in mind. I have many values and goals that Red doesn't, and vice-versa. His interest in sniffing the urine on tree trucks, for example, is of no interest to me. I have a vague notion of what that's about, a kind of canine communication about territory and perhaps other things. There's a sphere of canine meaning there that's entirely lost on me. Conversely, Red has no idea what I'm doing sitting in front of this computer typing away. The sphere of meaning that we share is entirely lost on him.
Red and I share meaning where our values and goals are congruent. For us, that centers around food and various activities, also security I suppose. We both value security and maintain a territory with the goal of security. I understand that's basically how ancient people and wolves were able to first come together. They were both social species and both valued the same kind of food and security.
Yes they will, because look, what's that over there?
Interesting.
How do you take account of the shared meaning between you and Red?
The strength of the bond, I suppose, if I understand what you’re asking.
I was thinking more along the lines of a language between the two of you. For example, your saying his name out loud. Would you say that the two of you share the same meaning? If so, how do you take account of it? What does it consist in/of such that the two of you can both understand it in the same way, by the same process, or however else meaning is shared on your view?
Gratuitous assertion that is false. It is not 'just' thinking. It is a kind of thought/belief. Not all thought/belief is about pre-existing thought/belief.
Thinking about thinking is existentially dependent upon complex written language replete with names/proxies/signs/symbols for the creature's own mental ongoings. Thought/belief exists in it's entirety prior to our becoming aware of it.
By naming, we pick out an individual thing/entity/object/subject for subsequent consideration. The same holds good for our own mental ongoings. We use the terms "understanding", "judgment", "comprehension", "thought", "belief", "propositional attitude", "feelings", "emotions", "reason", etc.
Thinking is merely a representation of brain mechanics, in the form of a subject, that which is thinking. All thought is of something; all thought has an object of thought. When the subject thinks of itself, it is the one and only possible case where subject and object are logically the same thing.
No matter the method, no matter how you wish to expound it, there is only one subject that thinks, thus if the subject thinks about an object which is himself, he is still just thinking. Anything else borders precariously close to Cartesian theater.
I'd rather focus on a different word to avoid the complexities of dogs and identity, if you don't mind.
"Ball" is a word that he has an invariant representation or concept for. If I say 'ball' to him, he'll start looking for one of his toys that we sometimes fetch with. I imagine the pattern he associates with 'ball' is basically any one of his toys that we've fetched with in the past, so there's no difference between a frisbee or a tennis ball, for instance. A ball isn't necessarily spherical for him. That level of abstraction or type of meaning is lost on him. His olfactory concept of 'ball' is surely more acute than mine. He could no doubt find one blindfolded.
Though our capacities and senses are different, the process of how we both developed an invariant representation of 'ball' is the same, which is patterns of sense data processed in hierarchical auto-associative memory. Where our different concepts overlap is in fetching. Red's concept may be limited to fetching but then our concepts, on a larger scale, are similarly limited.
I don't know why dogs love to fetch, and it's not in the activity itself, they're not interested in fetching alone, so part of it must be social interaction or cooperative play. Whatever the case, I don't think it's a stretch to say that the activity is meaningful for them. I enjoy the activity as well, though I mostly do it for his exercise and to help burn off his energy. I believe it's most meaningful because we're both social species and the activity fulfills basic social needs and facilitates bonding.
That's just not true. While it is quite true that we can think about individual things - like trees and such - we can also attribute meaning and causality prior to language acquisition.
Drawing a correlation between touching fire and the subsequent pain happens everyday. That event quite simply cannot be taken into proper account with the framework you've adopted and are using. The fire example is thought/belief formation. It is meaningful to the creature. It presupposes it's own correspondence to what happened.
It required something to become sign/symbol(the fire - an 'object') something to become significant/symbolized(the pain - not an object) and a creature to draw the connection between the two. Prior to the correlation all three things, the fire, the pain, and the creature existed in their entirety. That is true of all thought/belief. The position I argue in favor of situates thought/belief, the attribution of meaning, and the presupposition of correspondence to fact(what happened) exactly where they belong. Thought, belief, meaning, and the presupposition of truth(as correspondence, of course) are inextricably entwined. They all emerge onto the world stage solely via thought/belief formation itself.
Clearly, I'm leaning very heavily towards methodological naturalism...
The term "object" carries far too much philosophical baggage, and besides that, the object/subject distinction cannot take proper account of that which consists of both, and is thus... neither.
Rudimentary thought/belief, the attribution/recognition of meaning, the attribution/recognition of causality, and the presupposition of correspondence to what happened are all such things.
Notta problem. Take it where you like. You and I haven't had many exchanges, but I remember things you've written here leaving a good impression...
Indeed, fetching is undeniably meaningful to the dog, as is his name, and the word "ball" and all sorts of other things...
I agree that physiological sensory perception plays a necessary role in the attribution of meaning, in thought, in belief, in discourse, etc. You've implied here that Red's olfactory organs play a role, but I'm left wondering if it is helpful at all to talk in terms of an "olfactory concept"...
Here's why.
It seems to us both that physiological sensory perception is necessary for conceptions. On my view physiological sensory perception alone is not at all sufficient/adequate. Venus Flytraps, for example. I mean, surely his senses play an irrevocable role in his knowing what to look for when you call out "ball". But if we were to take account of the dog's thinking in such terms, Red would need multiple conceptions for each named object, and all those different conceptions would based upon the arbitrary categorization of biological/physiological sensory perception that we use as a means to say that he possesses.
Seems unnecessarily complex. Am I mistaken? That follows from the framework you're using. Doesn't it?
Seems to be much simpler than that. I mean, if a language-less creature can attribute meaning, the ability to do that, cannot be language laden. Our reports of simple things ought be accordingly simple.
Could it be as simple as both of you drawing a mental correlation between the language use and the thing being picked out to the exclusion of all others by virtue of that language use? Is not a prima facie example of successful reference? No different - in it's basic elemental constitution - than examples of two humans involved in the same situation.
There is no good reason whatsoever to think/believe that human beings are the only creatures capable of attributing/recognizing causality, attributing/recognizing meaning, and thus forming thought/belief. It is formed via the very same basic process as all human thought/belief is formed.
A language-less creature can learn that touching fire hurts, because that is one of those events that can happen even if it is not taken into proper account and/or reported upon. It is not existentially dependent upon language. Our reports are.
The same holds good with your dog's thought/belief... wouldn't you agree?
It is not existentially dependent upon our report of it.
An odd question: can you see, hear, or touch the odor of a plastic dog toy? or, how can we recognize the scent of perfume without sight, hearing, or touch?
I don’t have a great understanding of it but the theory of biological intelligence I like claims that different categories of sense data is processed in parallel using the same basic algorithm. Red’s olfactory concept of ‘ball’, for instance, may in part be built of sense patterns representing basic components like plastic and his own slobber. When the right set of sense patterns is recognized and verified it goes up the hierarchy to a larger concept or mental representation culminating in an invariant form. The highest invariant form contains patterns from all sense categories.
The process is actually quite simple and efficient, at least compared to a computer. It accomplishes in a small number of steps what a computer would require thousands.
Welcome. Thank you. Warning:This thread is heavily language laden, but is a concerted attempt to take proper account of that which is not always.
Shared meaning(and the beginnings of common language).
No, and solely by virtue of drawing correlations between it and other things.
This presupposes that algorithms are the sort of things that are not existentially dependent upon language. I would reject such a presupposition, but am more than willing to follow an argument based upon common sense premisses for it.
Quoting praxis
All that? The "right set of sense patterns"...??? Is that an unknown set?
Verification somehow within Red's thinking/knowing what "ball" means?
Could it be just as simple as Red and you both making a connection between the utterance of "ball" and the ball?
The predicted set, based on memory. For example, 'the cow jumps over the ______.' Many people would predict the sentence to end with 'moon', and if I ended it with 'cat' or something else they would have a prediction error, their prediction having been invalidated. That's what I meant about verification.
I haven't explained the theory well. If it interests you, it's based on the work by Jeff Hawkins.
Quoting creativesoul
In a nutshell.
And in a nutshell, I guess my point is that shared meaning may be enhanced or expanded with symbols, language and cognitive thought, but it's not dependent on these things, whereas shared values and goals are essential. Maybe that's obvious.