Philosophical Investigations, reading it together.
I propose reading Philosophical Investigations as a group for the sake of discussing the work.
It cannot be said I am a "leader" of the enterprise. This book has not been the center of my studies and I am not well read in a number of the contemporaries Wittgenstein must surely have understood to be among those who are being addressed. On the other hand, his approach invites all to consider his remarks. Count me as one of them.
As a starting point, I propose reading up to remark 155 over the next week or so and confining forum responses to address what is to be found therein. As your "leader", I will be looking for some kind of consensus to move on. If a coup d'é·tat were to occur during the process, things happen.
I chose remark 155 as a stopping point because it is the last one concerning "understanding" before Wittgenstein takes up "reading" in remark 156.
It cannot be said I am a "leader" of the enterprise. This book has not been the center of my studies and I am not well read in a number of the contemporaries Wittgenstein must surely have understood to be among those who are being addressed. On the other hand, his approach invites all to consider his remarks. Count me as one of them.
As a starting point, I propose reading up to remark 155 over the next week or so and confining forum responses to address what is to be found therein. As your "leader", I will be looking for some kind of consensus to move on. If a coup d'é·tat were to occur during the process, things happen.
I chose remark 155 as a stopping point because it is the last one concerning "understanding" before Wittgenstein takes up "reading" in remark 156.
Comments (1796)
You start out by saying that certainty is inessential to understanding, but end up saying that without certainty we only have a partial understanding. Let's be clear: the idea of exact understanding is yours, not mine. You may not have used that phrase, but you are speaking in those terms.
Furthermore, the issue is not why he's telling you to "stand roughly there". The reason for his direction is irrelevant. The point Wittgenstein is making is that "stand roughly there" makes perfect sense as a direction despite being imprecise. More importantly, the more precise we try to make this direction, the less sense it makes. You are critical that Wittgenstein does not direct you to stand at "this point or that", but if it were a very precise point, how would you stand at it? On one foot? On which part of the foot? With how much surface area of that part of the foot? Or, maybe you are thinking of outline drawings for both of your feet:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As Fooloso4 said, Wittgenstein "is not arguing that it is possible to eliminate doubt but that the role of certainty in our lives and language is not the certainty that Descartes and others sought".
Therefore, Wittgenstein is not seeking some ideal certainty. Whereas you are seeking some ideal understanding where all doubt has been eliminated.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Where does Wittgenstein describe understanding as a matter of degree?
No, that's your phrase, not mine, that's why I said to you, I don't know what you would mean by "exact understanding"..
Quoting Luke
Did you not read 88 yet? Exactness is relative to the goal. The "reason for his direction" is the goal. Therefore, the reason why he says "stand roughly there", instead of marking a spot, and saying "stand exactly there", or some other thing, is relevant. The exactness required to fulfill the goal intended by "roughly there", can only be known by apprehending the goal. So to fully understand what is meant by "stand roughly there" requires understanding the reason for saying those words. To go where the sign-post directs (the goal), requires apprehending the goal.
Quoting Luke
I don't see how Descartes is relevant. If Wittgenstein is seeking a certainty which is other than the exclusion of doubt, I haven't yet seen this other type of certainty described. And he did mention at 85, that sometimes there is no room for doubt. Simply saying that Wittgenstein is seeking a type of certainty different from the type of certainty Descartes was seeking doesn't tell me anything; especially since Wittgenstein is telling me that he's seeking a certainty which leaves no room for doubt.
Why the obsession with certainty? Certainty is an ideal. Wittgenstein is arguing here that these ideals are not real, and ought not be sought. Forget about certainty, there is no such thing, discussing it is a waste of time. What we need to discuss is doubt.
Consider this proposition. There is a certainty which is foundational to Christian society, certainty in the existence of God. But don't you see that it's not a real certainty at all? It's a false certainty. There is no certainty there at all, in fact it's an uncertainty, a fundamental doubt, which is foundational to Christian society. However, this fundamental uncertainty, this doubt which is foundational to our society, somehow managed to get itself disguised as certainty. Confidence allows us to overcome our doubt, and that's often a virtue, like courage, but when confidence makes what is uncertain appear to be certain, that's a vice. So if, when you say that Wittgenstein is looking at a different type of certainty, you mean that he is looking at a type of certainty which is really not a certainty at all, it's really an uncertainty, a form of doubt, then I might believe you.
Which is why, if you had read the next sentence, I said "You may not have used that phrase, but you are speaking in those terms."
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You originally used the "stand roughly there" example in the context of doubt/certainty, which is irrelevant to Wittgenstein's usage of it. Now you want to pretend that you were originally using the example in the context of exactness as he does at §88? Please.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Seriously? You were the one who introduced the line of questioning and discussion about certainty a few pages ago.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There definitely is such a thing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We don't need to discuss anything. However, the purpose of this thread is to discuss Wittgenstein's philosophy and his Philosophical Investigations. You appear to have no interest in either, and only seem interested in discussing your own personal philosophy about Christianity or something.
It seems you still haven't read 88. His reference to doubt at 87 is in the context of understanding, and his reference to inexact at 88, is likewise in the context of understanding. Therefore the two are related through the means of the context, "understanding". But this relationship does not necessitate the claim that doubt is anything like "inexact understanding". As I said already, doubt relates to the possibility of misunderstanding.
As he explains at 88, "inexact" and "exact" are expressions of judgement (reproach and praise), as to whether the words used are sufficient to achieve the intended goal. Notice the necessity of a judgement in application of the terms exact and inexact, and therefore the possibility of doubt in making that judgement. It is very similar to the earlier judgement referred to at the end of 87:
"The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose."
What he is talking about in both of these instances is a judgement as to whether the sign-posts (the words used) are sufficient to fulfil the purpose. A judgement of sufficiency would constitute a judgement of understanding, but this requires knowing the purpose. Your attempt to exclude "doubt" from this judgement is totally unjustified. Likewise, Wittgenstein's attempt to put an end to the infinite regress of explanation which is required to ensure understanding (by removing the possibility of misunderstanding), with this principle which itself is a judgement subject to doubt, is a failure.
Quoting Luke
If you really believe that there is such a thing as certainty, then you ought to be able to show me this thing empirically. Doubt can be seen in a person's actions. Confidence can be seen in a person's actions. Certainty cannot be seen in a person's actions. Where do we see, or perceive certainty in any way?
I would argue that Wittgenstein' characterization of logic at 89 is completely backward. Logic does not seek to see the bottom of things. It relies on premises, and can only proceed outward (or upward) from the premises. The premises are the bottom, and logic proceeds from that bottom. The premises dictate the conclusions. So logic is not at the bottom of the sciences at all. What is at the bottom is the empirical descriptions (the propositions), which provide the premises from which logic may proceed.
Of course, Wittgenstein says logic "seemed" to be like this, so I would think that his effort is going to be to dispel this backward opinion of what logic is.
To disagree with the effectiveness of my example is one thing, but the conclusion you've made about my purpose is absurd, so I think this serves as a good example of what Wittgenstein is calling misunderstanding.
Reminds me of Kripke's quip that all philosophical theories are wrong.
Banno, did you see my response or did it get lost in all the noise?
I support your attempt to try and move things forward.
I will not pursue that, but take it as a different way of using 'theory'.
I think you captured most of 109: look without theorising.
This part of the PI is a critique of the Tractatus, so this is an interesting section. The Tractatus sought to find the deep meaning of sentences by explicitly displaying their propositional content. Here Wittgenstein explicitly disclaims such depth...
If we can just grasp bits of his method, I think that would be progress.
You posted this right before I finished asking if you had seen it. My post was originally longer but I decided to edit out comments about the discussion getting bogged down.
Now I see that you have posted again before I finished this.
Quoting Banno
Right. Elsewhere (115) he talks about a picture getting in the way of seeing.
Quoting Banno
Are you referring to the Greek idea of theoria? The term has undergone an interesting historical change. If you mean theory in the contemporary sense of explanation, I take Wittgenstein's point to be that this stands in way and occludes what is to be looked at. If you mean "seeing as" it is not that looking implies some set of assumptions or practices by which we see something as this or that, that does raise some interesting questions about whether we can ever simply look at something without some sort of framework or context, and whether we can ever simply see something rather than conceptualize it.
You introduced an absurd "doubt" into Wittgenstein's example of "stand roughly there", which is that you don't know why he would give this direction to someone. Maybe that's relevant to your philosophy or to some point that you're trying to make, but it has nothing to do with Wittgenstein's philosophy or to the text. It is not Wittgenstein's point that there is some doubt about the phrase "stand roughly there".
That's right, it's the point I've been trying to make for days now, Wittgenstein's method for restricting doubt does not fulfil its purpose. Clearly the doubt is not at all absurd. If someone told me "stand roughly there", I'd wonder why they were saying "roughly there" instead of "stand there". I'd have doubt as to where they actually wanted me to stand, and for what reason they phrased it in that strange way. I'd think perhaps it's a trick, to see if I would stand there, or some other place which I thought qualified as "roughly there". To apprehend where that person actually wanted me to stand, I'd ask for an explanation, "what do you mean by 'roughly there'". We can't limit doubt by saying that we need as much clarity as the situation calls for, because we are all different, and see the situation differently. As Sam26 says, we have different IQs, so what is cause for doubt for me may not be cause for doubt for you, but this does not mean that my doubt is absurd.
Quoting Sam26
That's why it's best to take our time and consider each passage individually, most of them contain an important point. This way we can lower that number substantially.
Quoting Sam26
Whose head can you get into at any time? No one but your own. That's why doubt is justified. And, no matter how high one's IQ is, we all make mistakes, and sometimes it's the person with the low IQ who points out the mistake of the person with high IQ. It's just a matter of how we see the same things in different ways.
What method?
Ya, and if we look throughout history it's the people with the low IQ's who have corrected the Newton's, the Beethoven's, the Einstein's, and the Plato's of the world. Even on something so obvious as this your wrong. What a silly thing to say. And of course everyone makes mistakes, that's obvious, but according to you, you know so much more, right, MU?
I'm not quite sure what you mean by this post. Are you implying that because Wittgenstein had a high IQ we should presume he was right and any misunderstanding is probably ours? That does seem a little idolatrous. Christopher Langan had an IQ of around 200 but produced nothing of any philosophical interest, and was, by all accounts a brash self-publicist. I have had my IQ measured, would you be prepared to treat what I say with more reverence if it turns out to be higher than yours?
I think your argument is post hoc. You like what Wittgenstein has to say (as you understand it), you'd like others to agree with it too, but want to bolster the chances of that by adding some kind of "... and if you don't agree it's probably you that's wrong" device, and I don't think that's helpful.
I'm a huge Wittgenstein fan, I think, along with Frank Ramsey, he's a mile above any other philosopher, but I'm not going to pretend that's not in the most part because they say things which simply sit well with my gut feeling on the matter. Even if I thought otherwise at first, I buy what they have to say because of its persuasive power to me. My initial world-view, and my own disposition is what makes this more or less likely, Wittgenstein's evident intellect is not the key factor.
Now that is perhaps revealing. If we say that doubt and certainty are psychological, states of mind, and that Wittgenstein is describing, not prescribing, then perhaps it becomes clear to anyone that when Mrs un says "wait here while I go to the toilet", it is inappropriate for me to look for exactitude, and inappropriate for her to mean it. As a matter of fact, descriptively, I have no doubt she means something like 'well with eyesight and earshot'. It's not that I cannot doubt, but that I do not.
And if you want a reason, it is that doubt is expensive. If you doubt the reality of every experience, the meaning of every word, it paralyses, it prevents any understanding, any actual thinking and any reasoned action. Mrs un needs the toilet, and not a philosophical debate. There is no boundary between here and there, because we find it more useful for there not to be. Sometimes here is the whole UK, and sometimes here is this armchair. When we want a boundary, we make one just as precisely as we need it to be. we devise a method, and doubt may have a part in it - Is this tree Dutch or Belgian? And this blade of grass?
You know they weren't even using IQ tests back then, don't you?
Quoting Luke
There is definitely a method which is being described here. That's what learning is, a method for restricting doubt, and this is what Wittgenstein is focused on, that method. He started off the book with simple descriptions of ostensive definition, and showed how these description were deficient. Now he has progressed to the point of addressing doubt in the same context, the context of learning. If we learn rules, the rules are like sign-posts, and we must learn how to restrict the doubt we have in relation to what the sign-post is telling us, to have confidence in understanding, in order to proceed.
What I am pointing to, at this place in the text, is that he is reversing the perspective. At 87 he speaks from the perspective of the person learning, or attempting to read the sign-post. This person, to restrict one's own doubt in one's own understanding of the sign-post, asks for explanation. But by the end of 87 he has reversed the perspective to the third person observer, to say "The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose." This third person perspective does not assist the person at the beginning of 87 who is asking for explanation, so it does not suffice as a principle to remove the threat of infinite regress implied at 87. He does a similar thing at 88 with the concept of "exact".
We can see the root of this procedure, of reversing the perspective, well exposed at 85.
[quote=PI 85]
85. A rule stands there like a sign-post.—Does the sign-post leave
no doubt open about the way I have to go? Does it shew which
direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road
or the footpath or cross-country? But where is it said which way I
am to follow it; whether in the direction of its ringer or (e.g.) in the
opposite one?—And if there were, not a single sign-post, but a chain
of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the ground—is there only one
way of interpreting them?—So I can say, the sign-post does after all
leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for
doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical
proposition, but an empirical one.[/quote]
If we take "the sign-post sometimes leaves room for doubt, and sometimes does not leave room for doubt" as an empirical proposition (third person perspective of the observer), it cannot be justified. That the person proceeds from the sign-post does not justify "the sign-post has left no room for doubt". The person reading the sign-post may or may not proceed with doubt, so the observer cannot conclude that the one who proceeds has no doubt.
So the point is that Wittgenstein is describing a method for limiting doubt, a description of learning. And, his description of how doubt is limited, and certainty is produced is inaccurate. There is exposed here, a relationship between the first person perspective (my experience of learning), and the third person perspective (me as the observer), which is not properly drawn out. It is a very important relationship because it is how we move from our own experience of possibility, toward making inductive conclusions about the way things are, as an observer. We first approach the sign-post with doubt, 'what is it telling me, I need an explanation'. With experience, we approach the sign-post with confidence, 'under normal circumstance its purpose is this'. What happens in between is the means by which doubt is restricted.
We can proceed in our reading of the text, to switch perspectives, from the perspective of the learner, the reader of the sign-post attempting to reduce doubt through the process of learning, to the perspective of an observer, if that's the way that the text goes. But the perspective of the observer has not yet been supported with any firm principles, and we ought not proceed with any false premises, such as, that inductive conclusions which are the basis of the third person perspective (observer) have removed doubt. And the distinction between learner (one who doubts) and knower (one with confidence), if there even is such a division, has not yet been laid out.
Here is a thread that is based on the surprise felt by @Purple Pond. It seems to me to serve as an example of the sort of thing mentioned in §110.
Would that @Metaphysician Undercover would reply to you.
A bit more on depth.
I had thought that the depth to which he was referring was the structure hidden in ordinary language; but then there is the reference to a deep grammatical joke.
I have in mind something like Antigonish, a poem that I read as a commentary on many things philosophical, including the arguments for the existence of god. The broken grammar brings the little man into the conversation, even thought he wasn't there. Philosophy often does the very same.
The most prominent example of a simile producing a false appearance is for me the Mashed Potato thread. "There's the potato, and then there's the mashing of it". this is like "There's the meaning, and then there's the expressing of it".
But this isn't how it is! But @S says yet this is how it has to be!
There will be other examples on the forums. And examples of other errors. I suggest one way to proceed wit this thread is in identifying such examples.
That's not the way it is!
See: two expressions, one meaning.
113 & 114: we feel it must be like this, but we are only looking at the frame.
and the resolution: 115: A picture held us captive.
I think it is something like that. His points always seem off-target.
And you've been emancipated from the picture. That's great.
Davidson, On the very idea...
I don't know if Wittgenstein thought pictures and language games incommensurable, but I think Davidson has shown that they can't be, that if there is a contradiction between them, then one is wrong; or more likely, one is talking past the other.
Is the picture Cartesian?
Luke sees boundaries, I just see the picture. Targets might be what creates boundaries within the picture, but there is no such thing as "the target", because that's an ideal. The only targets are individual goals.
[quote=PI..88]"Inexact" is really a reproach, and "exact" is praise. And that is to
say that what is inexact attains its goal less perfectly than what is more
exact. Thus the point here is what we call "the goal". Am I inexact
when I do not give our distance from the sun to the nearest foot, or
tell a joiner the width of a table to the nearest thousandth of an inch?
No single ideal of exactness has been laid down; we do not know
what we should be supposed to imagine under this head—unless you
yourself lay down what is to be so called. But you will find it difficult
to hit upon such a convention; at least any that satisfies you.[/quote]
There's no such thing as off-target or on-target, except in relation to a goal. So consider this:
[quote=P.I.98]98. On the one hand it is clear that every sentence in our language
'is in order as it is'. That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal,
as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable
sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us.—On the
other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect
order.——So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence.[/quote]
Every sentence, every statement, exists in relation to its own individual purpose. That's how it has meaning, it has purpose, and in the sense that it has its own purpose, a purpose which is proper to itself and nothing else, it has its own perfection in that existence. It is perfect. So it doesn't make sense to say that someone's remarks are "off-target", because each remark has its own target, proper to itself. It is the notion that there is an ideal "the target", which is not in line with what Wittgenstein is saying.
Quoting Banno
[quote=P.I.]76. If someone were to draw a sharp boundary I could not acknowledge
it as the one that I too always wanted to draw, or had drawn in
my mind. For I did not want to draw one at all. His concept can then
be said to be not the same as mine, but akin to it. The kinship is
that of two pictures, one of which consists of colour patches with
vague contours, and the other of patches similarly shaped and distributed,
but with clear contours. The kinship is just as undeniable as
the difference.
77. And if we carry this comparison still further it is clear that the
degree to which the sharp picture can resemble the blurred one depends
on the latter's degree of vagueness. For imagine having to sketch a
sharply defined picture 'corresponding' to a blurred one. In the latter
there is a blurred red rectangle: for it you put down a sharply defined
one. Of course—several such sharply defined rectangles can be drawn
to correspond to the indefinite one.—But if the colours in the original
merge without a hint of any outline won't it become a hopeless task
to draw a sharp picture corresponding to the blurred one? Won't
you then have to say: "Here I might just as well draw a circle or heart
as a rectangle, for all the colours merge. Anything—and nothing—is
right."——And this is the position you are in if you look for definitions
corresponding to our concepts in aesthetics or ethics.
In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning
of tliis word ("good" for instance)? From what sort of examples?
in what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to see that the
word must have a family of meanings.[/quote]
The blurred picture is incommensurable with the one that has sharp boundaries, at least it is a "hopeless task" to try to make them commensurate.
Have a look at §99.
This is the other voice, answering §98.
Then look at §100. Perfection does to belong here.
Are they incommensurate? Or are they doing different things? Talking past each other. They do not contradict each other.
By consulting with a know-it-all on reddit, I can officially say that Wittgenstein was talking about how the logical structure of language and the logical structure of the world are the same.
How do we know this, though? The statement implies a transcendental vantage point. Or maybe Wittgenstein was an anti-realist.
Of course there is room for perfection here, that's what 98 says, even the vaguest sentence is in its own way perfect. There is no room for "ideal" though. What he has done at 98 is separate "perfect" from "ideal", such that we can have perfection without "ideal". The notion of "ideal" is distorting the way we see things, we are dazzled by it. But notice at 103, he implies that we might take off these glasses (the ideal).
Quoting Banno
Two things don't need to contradict each other to be incommensurable, it just means that the two cannot be measured by the same standard. I would say that if they are doing different things, then they are incommensurable, because the standard for measurement here is the goal, or purpose.
In a voice countermanded in the surrounding sections.
Well, we might start by working through the books...
That's not true, in this section 95-105 he is telling us that the notion of "ideal" is distorting the way that we see things. Go back and read what he says about logic at 81. Then at 107, the ideal is a "requirement" which we hold for logic, it is not derived from a description of what logic really is. That's what he's leading into here, the separation between what we think of logic, based on what we want to get from it, that it is somehow "ideal", or "sublime", and what it really is, by description.
Yes, notice Fooloso4's reference to 108. "The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round." That's what I'm talking about, removing the ideal.
Well merely [i]saying[/I] that it's wrong isn't interesting at all. You've linked me in on a post which doesn't contain any support of your assertions.
Clearly I agree with early Wittgenstein on this, even if the later Wittgenstein himself disagreed. Also, I doubt your understanding of the later Wittgenstein. Was he [I]really[/I] so unreasonable as to deny that there's the meaning, and then there's the expressing of it? Or is this just [I]your[/I] misunderstanding? I'm heavily leaning towards the latter, but perhaps you'll surprise me.
@Luke, @Sam26, help us out here, please.
The know-it-all you consulted appears to have had W's Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus in mind. (Cool story about that book - apparently W began writing it in the trenches in WW1. I just saw that Peter Jackson documentary about the war - hard to imagine someone in those circumstances doing that. Though... it might make sense in another way. There's something protective, bubble-like about the book. I say that because-->) you're right that TLP implies a transcendental vantage point. To the point where it might also imply solipsism. Which is troubling. And Wittgenstein was duly troubled. Enough to change his whole approach entirely.
He wrote Philosophical Investigations in large part as an ultra-self-conscious repudiation of the TLP. Which is why your post seems misplaced 36 pages into a reading group thread of PI. If you'd read up to this point, you'd have registered the multiple places he chastises his earlier self and ideas, quite explicitly.
He changed his mind, and owned that his brash, fuck-you-everyone treatise (the one the reddit know-it-all seems to have been referencing) was wrong. Pretty admirable, even if he repudiated it with another brash, fuck-you-everyone treatise.
The frame - if proper - outlines the language use. The resolution is the complexity of use. Pictures built upon descriptions of that which exists prior to the description are prone to be wrong. The frame is broken, but the resolution is immaculate.
Flies and bottles.
Quoting Banno
He disregarded meaning in favour of use.
I don't see how this might be compatible with a segregation of expression and meaning. And it's a long way from the topic here.
He regularly volunteered to observe enemy movements from one of these:
I guess writing the Tractatus kept him occupied.
Then don't bring it up here, genius. Is this not a topic for discussing the text of the PI? One obvious way of doing that is by contrasting it with the text of the TLP, and by discussing your own examples. I think that you're just letting your feelings get in the way of good sense, so you try to shut out anything of relevance I might have to say. You expect me to remain silent. Yet, of course, you still continue to use what I'm saying as an example.
That meaning is use, is, by my interpretation, compatible with what I'm saying. Or, if the wording is problematic, then the phrase can be suitably qualified. I'm not setting out to make the views of the later Wittgenstein contradict the views of the early Wittgenstein, which doesn't seem like a productive approach at all. I'm seeking to get the best of both worlds, a sort of compatibilism.
And it doesn't show that, because I came back with a challenge which you've decided to ignore. It only shows that you're not really bothered.
No, I'm not bothered. It was the place of your OP as an example that interested me, not the resulting walk up a garden path.
That's great on a practical level, in a sense of what we mean [i]by[/I] this or that. But it doesn't help resolve the problem that I was getting at in my discussion, and which the early Wittgenstein recognised as a problem, and which he and I share a logical resolution to. But if you want to misapply his later method in inappropriate contexts which lead to irresolvable logical problems, then be my guest.
Note that he doesn't deny the abstract there. On the contrary, he tacitly acknowledges it. He doesn't deny, at least in [i]that[/I] quote, that there is a concept of meaning as a separate and logically distinct entity.
You're the one leading [i]me[/I] down the garden path! You seem to confuse your own interpretation for something greater than that. Step one would be to show more of a recognition of the fallible nature of your own ability to interpret Wittgenstein - or me for that matter!
And what do you intend to do to go about redressing this?
Quoting Banno
Thanks. Thanks for dragging me into it in such an infuriating manner. :lol:
Nothing.
Well, you had better reconsider. Or else... I'll... [I]write a formal letter of complaint![/I]
§119 Philosophers get bumped on the head by running up against the limits of language. Ubiquitous quote.
Ok. So he wasn't saying that we project our logic on the world. I wonder what he was saying, then.
So, Wittgenstein's "method" for "restricting doubt" is...learning? And that's Wittgenstein's method? Hmm.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Deficient in what respect?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is not obvious to me that his remarks to this point, on (e.g.) language games, family resemblance, meaning is use, simples/complexes, sharp/blurred boundaries, all share "the context of learning". Does W state somewhere that the purpose of the book (thus far) is learning?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As far as I can tell, so far W has made only a few remarks on doubt from §84-§87. You are placing a lot of emphasis on these few sections.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's funny, because you appear to talk about doubt and certainty in ideal terms. Would you be satisfied if Wittgenstein told you the reason for his direction "stand roughly there" (e.g. so that he can take your photograph)? Would that be enough to remove your doubts in this case? If not, what would remove your doubts?
He referenced this in a comment about Heidegger. So maybe their views were similar in regard to a separation between the realm of language, which slices and dices experience, dismantling the cuckoo clock, and the realm of action, in which there is no subject/object divide.
Where?
I've described that so many times now, in so many different ways, at least three, so if you still don't understand, then I guess that's the way it will stay.
Quoting Luke
That's right, because the section has made me doubt. When I understand what he is doing, and everything appears consistent, I can breeze through the section without discussing it, confident that I understand. But in this section, he brought up the possibility of misunderstanding, and doubt, along with the apparent need for explanation, along with the notion of removing doubt. He seems to be rejecting explanation as the means by which we remove doubt as to what the sign-post is telling us, because explanation is not grounded, it would produce infinite regress (87). He is replacing explanation with the observation that the sign-post fulfils its purpose. When we observe that the sign-post fulfils its purpose, doubt is remove. However, I see this as insufficient because doubt is prior to the action, while observation is posterior.
This problem makes me wonder why he is even concerned about removing doubt. I think that "On Certainty" is a good example of when being obsessed by an ideal obscures one's perception of reality.
Quoting Luke
Doubt is clearly not an ideal. Certainty, in the sense of "leave no room for doubt", is an ideal. That is why I am arguing that it is inconsistent for Wittgenstein to be seeking certainty, in "On Certainty", when he is telling us here, that there is something wrong with this approach of seeking the ideal, it clouds our perception of reality. This attitude, the one which seeks "the ideal" explanation, which removes the possibility of misunderstanding and doubt, distorts the way we see things. It's like looking through glasses (103). We need to take off the glasses and describe the way that we really perceive things, as they are, instead of trying to explaining things through the lens of the ideal (what we want).
In the context of Wittgenstein, you might be correct in your arguments about “eliminating the possibility of doubt” being untenable. I have not read him so I don’t know.
In the context of philosophical skepticism, the subject matter changes tremendously. Here’s one reference to this point:
Quoting SEP (Ancient Skepticism)
Pyrrhonism is arguably the most extreme form of non-Cartesian philosophical skepticism. And, as stated in the quote, it does not involve doubt. Rather, it upholds a fallible subjective certainty (i.e., a consciously entertained confidence) that its methods result in eudemonia. No non-Cartesian philosophical skeptic ever expressed holding the stance of global doubt. If you disagree, please provide a credible reference to the contrary if such exists.
As to your more detailed observations concerning my stance:
Going by common usage of the term, doubt is well defined as “to call into question”—as per the definition given in the quoted text —thereby being a cognitive activity, and not a mood or generalized attitude. You also want to pigeonhole the term “certainty” to in all cases signify “the property of being indubitable”—which is not how the term is commonly used: e.g., I’m very certain (rather than somewhat certain) that the term holds the synonyms of sureness and certitude. To the extent to which we disagree about the semantics of these terms—which currently seems significant—we then have no bearing for a proper argument concerning the terms’ referents.
Meta is the one who involved the word "possibility" in this discussion. Wittgenstein was content to remove the practicality of doubt. When doubt becomes irrational, Meta keeps doubting.
He is not rejecting explanation. He is only rejecting the philosophical misconception of a complete and final explanation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Signposts also require explanation or training in their use. What did you make of Fooloso4's example of the male/female bathroom signs?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Your doubts appear to be ideal and endless. You appear to have an axiomatic rule that doubts can be restricted but not removed. You also appear reluctant to address any specific examples which may challenge this rule. You did not address Fooloso4's bathroom signs example, nor respond to my latest example offering a reason for Wittgenstein's direction to "stand roughly there" (to take a photograph), and my questioning of what would remove your doubts in that particular case.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, your ideal. This is not quite Wittgenstein's account of certainty.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Perhaps he is being inconsistent with your idea of certainty, but he is not contradicting himself.
However, we should refrain from turning this into a discussion about On Certainty.
I think that explanation in general, as the means by which we remove doubt, is being rejected, for the reason that explanation cannot remove doubt unless it is the final explanation. Consider the section we've moved up to now, at 109 he says "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place."
Quoting Luke
There's two different approaches to how one might learn a rule, which Wittgenstein has been stressing almost from the beginning of the text. One is that the rule is told to us (explanation), and the other is that we might learn simply by observation. I think that this is first mentioned at 31, where he says one might learn the rules of a game just by watching. Explanation is not required to learn signposts, because we might learn simply by observation, and this is the case with bathroom signs. I don't think that anyone has every explained to me the meaning of bathroom signs.
I think it is important to note that Wittgenstein is trying to get to the bottom of language, the foundations. We can't simply assume that we learn rules through explanation because explanation requires language, and so the language by which we learn the fundamental rules, could have no rules at all. But how could there be such a language without rules? So he is pointing us toward the possibility that we might learn rules simply through observation, without any explanation required, as his effort to avoid this problem. I think that this would be like a basic form of inductive reasoning. Only females are observed to go through the door with this sign, and only males are observed to go through the door with that sign, so what is meant by the sign-posts, may be produced with inductive reasoning without any explanation.
Quoting Luke
I am not claiming explicitly that he contradicts himself, only that there is some inconsistency evident, which may produce ambiguity, or confusion as to which way he is pointing with his words. At 85 he says the sign-post "sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not". I find this to be misleading because inductive reasoning, it has been argued, always leaves some room for doubt because it is based in probability. So Wittgenstein's description would be more accurate if he said that sometimes the probability of mistake appears to be so low, that we do not doubt. However, there is always room for doubt, in every instance of inductive reasoning, but sometimes we do not doubt, for reasons such as those described by unenlightened.
I see no reason to disagree with you. If, to proceed into an activity, confidence is required, and this confidence is by definition "certainty", and doubt is by definition an activity, then it follows logically that certainty is required for doubt.
Quoting javra
I am trying to deal with Wittgenstein's expression at 85, in which he implies that sometimes there is no room for doubt, which I find misleading. So I'm not trying to pigeonhole the term "certainty", but I find your definition (certainty as defined by confidence) insufficient to account for the situation described by Wittgenstein, when there is no room for doubt.
The problem specifically is that I often have the confidence required to proceed with an action, while I am actively doubting whether I will be successful in that procedure. This confidence I would not call certainty, because I am doubtful. So I am really calling into question your definition of certainty. If certainty is a type of confidence, as you claim, then it must be a type of confidence in which doubt is excluded, because it makes no sense to say that I proceed with certainty and with doubt concerning the same action. But as described, I can proceed with confidence and with doubt concerning the same action. Therefore I find your definition of "certainty" unacceptable. We must disassociate "certainty" from "confidence", to allow that I have confidence in relation to an action which I am doubtful about (this is courage), yet I do not have certainty concerning that action.
Would you agree that confidence is required for activity, and doubt being an activity therefore requires confidence, but certainty is a special type of confidence which is not required for doubt?
Got it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I look upon it this way: all subjective certainties will entail respective states of confidence, but not all states of confidence will entail certainties. This to me gets into the complexities of human consciousness—which, imv, always entwines with our sub/unconscious mind, from where emotive states result. Hence, for one example, we can be emotively confident of an activity while consciously doubting ourselves in terms of this very activity. And yes, ditto to certainty being a type of confidence wherein the mental activity of doubt is absent—this for the timespan of the given certainty.
Debating definitions of certainty I think is deserving of its own thread, especially since folks here want to get on with their analysis of Wittgenstein. I’m hesitant to currently start one. Still, for accuracy’s sake, I personally define certainty so (this in the most general way possible): the state, or an instance, of givens that do not compete with alternative givens and thereby hold determinate presence. For example, an idea X which we consciously hold in manners devoid of alternative ideas that compete with idea X for what in fact is shall, then, be a held certainty concerning idea X—this for the timespan in which idea X holds a determinate cognitive presence within our minds; again, this on account of not competing with credible alternatives for what in fact is. As a more concrete example, Pyrrho held a certainty, thus defined, that his methods lead to eudemonia (rather than being uncertain or doubtful about this being so).
Let me know if you’d like me to start a thread dedicated to definitions of certainty, uncertainty, and doubt. I have an online chapter that addresses this very subject which I could link to, and which could do with some criticism. But I doubt I’ll partake in the thread as much as would be appropriate. I might start it next weekend if there is a call for it.
yes
p.s. I should say "yes" with certain caveats, but these would amount to the same overall summary I'm thinking.
I agree.
This is inconsistent with his statement at §87: "an explanation serves to remove or to prevent a misunderstanding". He is not rejecting explanation here. Also, he states that an explanation removes misunderstanding, not doubt.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein uses the word in two different contexts at §87 and at §109. At §87, he is talking about explanation in general, and distinguishes everyday (non-philosophical) explanations from "complete" and "final" (philosophical) explanations. Whereas at §109 he is talking about explanation as the traditional solution to philosophical problems. His use of "explanation" at §109 is made in the context of the surrounding sentences. Just prior to your quote, he states: "And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations." And later: "The problems are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with." He is not talking about just any explanation here, but specifically hypothetical, theoretical explanations involving "new discoveries".
Wittgenstein eschewed the traditional view of philosophy as queen of the sciences, and rejected the accepted wisdom that the philosopher's role was to advance theories and hypotheses in a manner akin to the scientist. Hence: "It was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones." This follows from his remarks at §89 onwards, in which he is working to dispel widely-held philosophical assumptions, such as that "The essence [of language] is hidden from us" (§92). See also §126.
A description of how our language actually works is not necessarily an explanation of this type (i.e. an hypothesis or theory). However, it is another way of removing misunderstanding, which can therefore be considered as a more general type of explanation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think you have misread. He says at §31 that we can imagine someone who has learnt the rules without ever having been shown a chess piece (therefore, not by observation); or we can imagine someone having learnt the game "without ever learning or formulating the rules". The purpose of this example is to support what he says at §30, that an ostensive definition can only explain the meaning of a word "if the role the word is supposed to play in the language is already clear".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This sounds a lot like the Augustinian assumption at §1, of which Wittgenstein is critical. At §32, Wittgenstein clearly describes his criticism:
You appear to assume, along with Augustine, that a child can reason before it has been taught language; that it can already think, only not yet speak. Your attribution of this "possibility" to Wittgenstein is antithetical to the text.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think it is important to note that Wittgenstein is not trying to do any such thing, assuming that by "bottom" or "foundations" you mean something like the "essence" of language; something beneath the surface or hidden from view. As Wittgenstein states at §97: "We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential to us in our investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language."
Quoting Luke
Do you not see, that he has made a distinction between explanation and description? That was the purpose of my quote above. "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place." Notice he says "all explanation", not this or that type of explanation, and recommends replacing explanation with description. It is incorrect for you to characterize description as a type of explanation.
Quoting Luke
He clearly states at 31: "One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game without
ever learning or formulating rules. He might have learnt quite simple board-games first, by watching, and have progressed to more and more complicated ones." It is incorrect for you to say that this is "not by observation".
Quoting Luke
This is an incorrect interpretation of what I said. It isn't even close.
Quoting Luke
It is incorrect to say that the foundation of a thing and the essence of a thing are the same.
It appears to me like you are just disagreeing with whatever I say, for the sake of disagreeing. You've shown nonsensically incorrect interpretations of what I've wrote, combined with nonsensically incorrect interpretations of passages from Wittgenstein's Philosophical investigations to support your disagreement with me. If you prefer to disagree rather than to understand, then my efforts
are pointless.
Suppose our everyday language is inadequate to answer the questions asked by philosophers. We might consider constructing a new language in which to set out such issues with complete clarity.
But how could such a language be constructed, except in using our existing language?
You said that "he is pointing us toward the possibility that we might learn rules simply through observation". To learn the game without ever learning the rules, as W states, is not to "learn the rules simply through observation" as you claim. Read the bloody text.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You suggested that we could learn rules (I assume this includes language?) through observation and/or inductive reasoning. Therefore, you are suggesting that a child can learn language through inductive reasoning, and that, therefore, a child can reason before it can think (i.e. talk to itself - see §32). That's precisely what you are saying.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Then explain what you mean.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't have Fooloso4, Banno, unenlightened, Sam26, and others telling me that I have misunderstood the text. It is you who does not understand and refuses to listen.
Consider it this way: The type of explanation that Wittgenstein says must disappear at §109 is the same sort of "complete" and "final" (i.e. philosophical) explanation that he mentions at §87.
Russel thought we could build a faultless language could be based on sense data. Wittgenstein I thought it could be built from names for simple objects. Davidson thought we might translate English into a first order language.
SO, could it be done?
What use is money? you can't eat it, you can't milk it, you can't wear it or warm yourself with it.
If it had any use at all, it would be less useful.
Could this thought be expressed in a perfect language so as not to be paradoxical?
Money is a bit like the standard metre - one cannot say that it is either useful or useless, it is the measure of usefulness. If it had any other use than as a measure, it would not be the medium of exchange, but another object of exchange.
Wittgenstein is saying that it cannot be done, and implying that we're fools for trying. That's the point about the ideal, we cannot make language into something which it is not. Our description of what language is, tells us that it is not idealistic like that. The very nature of language disallows the possibility that it could be ideal. No degree of explanation can take away that fundamental aspect, that it is not ideal, because such explanation would only be carried out in language which is not ideal.
See how he is distinguishing between what we require of language (it must be like this) through the lens of the ideal, and what language is really like ( the description: it is like this). The point being that what we want language to be like (the ideal) clouds our vision with respect to our description as to what language really is like. So we must discard that ideal, and produce a true description of what language really is like.
This subject of an ideal, faultless language, is related to the point Aristotle made about logic, it can only lead us from the more certain to the less certain. Adhering to this principle, we can conclude that if there is some degree of uncertainty in the fundamental aspects of language, and language is what is used to express logic, then we cannot produce a logic with an ideal (faultless) certainty. Since such an ideal, faultless language, would be produced from existing language which is not faultless, such an effort is impossible and therefore useless.
He said we must do away with "all explanation", to be replaced with "description". The point being that explanation is always intended to clarify some meaning, so it is always to some extent, clouded by an ideal. It's intentionality is grounded in the ideal. Only by opting for description instead of explanation can we free ourselves of the ideal, and get a true understanding of language as based in our "real needs" (108), rather than the false description as based in an ideal (notice the influence of Karl Marx). Language is derived from real material needs, not from some ideal.
Sorry MU but I found Luke's explanation of different kinds of explanation clear and correct.
I am not going to argue the point.
I think that there is another issue here having to do with the limits of language. Why is it that one can't put certain things into words? But just what is it that one wants to put into words? Are they already understood with complete clarity without words? Can we do that? Can something be thought clearly and not said clearly?
He is not referring to those ethical and aesthetic experiences of the Tractatus that cannot be put into words, but to philosophical questions that only arise because the language is misunderstood. It is not a matter of the inadequacy of language but of a philosophical assumption about a metaphysics of meaning.
This is a grammatical joke. Suppose I wanted to say something but could not find the words. I make them up. What do they mean? That thing that I had not been able to put into words. And what is that? There is no connection between the words and anything else except something in my mind that I still have not been able to convey.
Do you agree with Wittgenstein here?
The point though, is that Wittgenstein is making no such distinction between types of explanation at 87. Luke is making this distinction. So that distinction is misleading, and ought not be considered in the context of this text.
Quoting Banno
The term "ideal" has gotten a lot of use in this section, and we need to grasp the way that Wittgenstein is using it. That's what I'm trying to do. Remember at 98, he created a separation between "ideal" and "perfect". And there was a similar reference at 81 There is a related metaphysical separation between "good" and "beauty", which also manifests sometimes in the division between ethics and aesthetics. It seems to me, that at this point in the text, the separation between "ideal" and "perfect" corresponds roughly to the separation he has now made between "explanation" and "description". An explanation is related to an ideal, following definite rules like logic. But a description, being other than an explanation, may be unclear, and vague (which is not permitted of an explanation), yet the description still has a perfection about it, just by being a description, as 98.
Quoting Banno
For me, the principal point for judgement is consistency. A point of inconsistency would be a point to disagree with. I don't think I see anything to disagree with here. But if we assume that he is trying to describe something here at this part of the text, I haven't quite put my finger on it, because I don't think he's done a good job of pointing out what it is that he is describing. He seems to be pointing to a fork in the road, or something like that, two distinct ways in which language is used. One way is to assume ideals, and proceed in the manner of using language in relation to the ideals (explanation). This, I think, amounts to "the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language". The other way, is the way of true philosophy, which is to use language in description, to describe what is. Until I get a firm grasp of what he is trying to describe here, I cannot say whether I agree description.
Consider the inquiry at 88. It appears like there might be a distinction between an exact explanation and an inexact explanation, as two distinct types of explanation. In reality though, "exact" and "inexact" are judgements (reproach and praise) concerning the relationship between the explanation and the goal. The "final explanation" is not a different type of explanation, it simply has a different relationship to the particular goal, being the "ideal" for that particular goal. If you could choose the ideal explanation for a particular purpose, from all possible explanations, this would not make the one designated as "the ideal" into a different type of explanation.
Consider 98. Every sentence has perfection proper to itself on account of being a sentence. If you judge one sentence as the ideal, or "the final explanation" for a particular purpose, that judgement does not place the sentence into a different category of type. That judgement is determined in relation to the goal, so any sentence may be "the ideal", depending on what the goal is..
I will have a look at Grayling.
Wittgenstein never thought that there could be a perfect language. Russell thought that Witgenstein was trying to construct a perfect language in the Tractatus, but Wittgenstein commented somewhere that Russell misinterpreted the Tractatus. Any language for everyday use will have some of the same problems that our current language has. I'm not sure what you meant by faultless, I interpreted it to mean perfect.
Think of a language in which no problems or errors are purely linguistic.
The whole scenario (really, his whole life) couldn't possibly lend itself better to a screenwriter. I'm surprised W hasn't gotten the biopic treatment yet ala The Imitation Game or A Beautiful Mind.
For a different kind of treatment, if you haven't seen it yet -
h/t tgw
Orthography or orthografy?
After telling us to take care with metaphors, he uses one.
The remarks at §121 regarding orthography I consider to be an extension of this line of thinking: that philosophy should treat all language as being on the same playing field, and not treat some terms (e.g. "super-concepts") as being more important or meta- than others. Philosophers have tended to ask questions such as 'What is beauty?' or 'What is truth?', but not questions such as 'What is a door?' Philosophers have misguidedly placed concepts such as these above other more mundane concepts, have sought the essence of these things, and have tended to think that a more perfect language is required (or that our everyday language is inadequate) to capture that essence. Wittgenstein proposes instead that ("we") philosophers "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use."
I would like to see a thread called "What is a door?". Will you start one? The point of course would be to display all the ways philosophers can define things...
This question assumes essentialism. If there is such a thing as what a door is, that is the essence of "door". For Aristotle this essence becomes the basis for deductive logic. There is for example, a specific definition or formula, which is correct, and therefore forms the essence of "man". If the thing we call Socrates fulfils that essence, then by deductive logic, Socrates is a man. Deductive logic requires such essences to be applicable.
What Wittgenstein is arguing is that this representation of language is false, created with some sort of ideal in mind, an ideal which cannot be upheld in practise, and is not evident in common usage. So as much as we might use language in this way, as though there is such a thing as what a door is (essence), it is a fundamental deception, because there really is no such essence. Therefore in our inquiry as to what language is, we must put aside this type of language use, the deception based in the illusion of an ideal, to describe how language really is.
Here's another issue which has since come to my mind. If we have these two fundamentally different ways of using language, the one assumes an ideal, and proceeds in that way, in logic and explanation, and the other, common usage, assumes no such ideal, and does not proceed according to theoretical rules of essentialism, but by practise, then doesn't an accurate description of language require considering both of these branches of language use?
It wouldn't suffice as a description of language use, to simply reject the one form of language use, the one which assumes an ideal, as a form of deception and therefore not true language use, when it really is a form of language use actually in practise. At issue is the accuracy of Wittgenstein's description. And, to "describe" is an intentional act, with a goal, so even description as a way of using language, is reducible to the way of using language which assumes an ideal. If this is the case, then the division is annihilated as inaccurate, the assumption of an ideal has not be removed from any language use, and it has not been demonstrated that it is possible that there is any language use which does not assume an ideal. Then all language use is of the sort which assumes an ideal, so that Wittgenstein's enterprise here is undermined.
This too "really is a form of language used actually in practise". It uses language to discuss a man who isn't there.
Just like "assuming an ideal".
Looking to use rather than meaning allows a treatment of the philosophical language game of finding ideals. Like the little man in Antigonish, ideals are supposed into the discussion, where they put on the show of taking a place in a language game. Like the little man, we look for them but they are not there.
So I disagree that we have "two fundamentally different ways of using language". We have a view of language derived from looking at its use, and a game of finding ideal meanings that, like Antigonish, does not mesh with the world.
The reason for invoking an ideal was that they explain how words get their meanings. Looking to use instead of meaning removes this need.
Nice post!
How do you account for the 'Whereas' at §87?
Not really, because the (non-common) "usage" which assumes an ideal is only found in philosophy. Wittgenstein is attempting to illustrate that this way of thinking leads to misunderstanding and is the wrong way to do philosophy, or to solve philosophical problems. Wittgenstein refers to himself making this ideal assumption with his Tractatus at PI §114. Keep in mind that it is the assumption (of an ideal) - the thinking - that is misguided.
As I explained in the post, if it is all just one way of using language, that way assumes ideals. So if all forms of language use are reducible to one fundamental way, that way has inherent within it an assumption of ideals, whether or not the ideals are real. And, whether or not the ideals are sought, or found, is not relevant. What is relevant is that they are assumed to exist, and so we must respect this in our description of language.
Quoting Luke
This depends on your definition of philosophy, but the so-called non-common usage exists throughout logic, science, and is fundamental in educational institutions. So its status as "non-common" is questionable.
Quoting Luke
You may insist that this assumption of an ideal is misguided, but the effort here is to describe the way that language is, not to dictate how language ought to be. To say that our goal is to produce a real description of language as it is, but also say that we ought to leave out of the description all language use which assumes ideals, because this is misguided language use, is self-defeating. So if the assumption of ideals is fundamental to a large part of language use, we cannot neglect this in our description of language. Nor ought we neglect this part of our language use from our description simply because we think that this is misguided language use. And, as I explained to Banno above, it's quite possible that the assumption of ideals underlies all language use. The question would be whether all language use is goal oriented, and whether a goal can exist without the assumption of an ideal. If a person has a goal, then obtaining that goal is the assumed ideal. Notice that even to have the goal of describing language implies the assumption of an ideal, if a goal implies an ideal.
No you didn't, and it doesn't.
But keep thinking about it.
A goal implies an ideal, obtaining that goal is the ideal. Anytime there is a goal, an ideal is assumed. So unless we can get to a description of language such that language is not goal oriented we cannot have a description of language which does not describe language as assuming ideals. It is the natural outcome of describing language use as an intentional activity that the assumption of ideals will be inherent within language use. Only if we can remove the intentional aspect of this activity (language) in our description, can we remove the assumption of ideals from our description.
But I really do not know how this would leave our description of language use if we completely removed intentionality from this activity.
[quote=PI]69. How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine
that we should describe games to him, and we might add: "This and
similar things are called 'games' ". And do we know any more about
it ourselves? Is it only other people whom we cannot tell exactly what
a game is?—But this is not. ignorance. We do not know the boundaries
because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary—
for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable?
Not at alll (Except for that special purpose.) No more than it took
the definition: i pace = 75 cm. to make the measure of length 'one
pace' usable. And if you want to say "But still, before that it wasn't
an exact measure", then I reply: very well, it was an inexact one.—
Though you still owe me a definition of exactness.[/quote]
Consider the reference to "special purpose" here. A word like "game" could have meaning with absolutely no boundaries to that meaning. That would be like infinite possibilities for the potential use of the word. However, what if each and every time that the word is used, it is used for a "special purpose"? Then, each and every time that the word is used, a boundary is produced by that act of usage (context), and the word has meaning which is specific to that particular purpose of that context. Each instance of usage is using the word for a special purpose.
Now consider the "perfect order" referred to at 98. The sentence only has a perfect order because it has been created intentionally, for that "special purpose", in that context. The very principle by which Wittgenstein removes the ideal, here at 98, claiming that the sentence may be "perfect" without striving after an ideal, already assumes intentionality within the sentence, as creator of the perfect order which is the existence of the sentence itself. The "ideal", or "goal", is already assumed to exist within the very utterance of the sentence. Therefore the ideal is not to be sought after at all, it is already there, as evidenced by the existence of the sentence, as a perfect order..
The assumption of the ideal is not excluded. Instead of assuming that the ideal as something which we seek, and strive after in logic and such linguistic enterprises, the ideal is assumed by Wittgenstein to already inhere within language use. Each instance of language use is for a special purpose, and this gives the sentence a perfect order for that special purpose. So the ideal is right there, within each instance of use, as each instance of use is the ideal representation of that specific purpose. Maybe this is the rotation referred to at 108, the ideal is already there within, and not something we seek after.
.
You keep coming back to §98. But it is only a small part. Read §99, which has one of his alternate voices; he sets up the case you are arguing! The in §100, rejects it.
§123 "I don't know my way around"
§124 Philosophy leaves language as it was found. And mathematical logic.
I'm not so sure. I think, for example, the way Kripke uses possible world semantics to deal with modality in English does help us to find our way around, brings perspicuity to our discussion.
You have an uncanny knack for misreading. It's not about "whether all language use is goal oriented", or about "whether a goal can exist without the assumption of an ideal". Wittgenstein never mentions this. I grant you that he talks about exactness and inexactness and goals at §88, but not in the way you present it, and §88 is mostly irrelevant to the sections we are now discussing. The ideal we are now discussing is an assumption which can result from the sublime nature of logic.
"In what way is logic something sublime?
For logic seemed to have a peculiar depth — a universal significance.
Logic lay, it seemed, at the foundation of all the sciences. — For logical investigation explores the essence of all things. It seeks to see to the foundation of things, and shouldn’t concern itself whether things actually happen in this or that way. —– It arises neither from an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need to grasp causal connections, but from an urge to understand the foundations, or essence, of everything empirical. Not, however, as if to this end we had to hunt out new facts; it is, rather, essential to our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand." [§89]
Our inquiry is a grammatical one, which sometimes involves analysing our forms of expression as a method of removing misunderstandings. This procedure resembles taking things apart [§90].
However, this might lead some people (including the young Wittgenstein) to incorrectly assume that there is "something like a final analysis of our linguistic expressions, and so a single completely analysed form of every expression". In other words, some philosophers might assume that they should be aiming at a state of complete exactness, "as if this were the real goal of our investigation" [§91]. (Hint: it isn't.)
This misguided view finds its expression "in the question of the essence of language, of propositions, of thought". This view presupposes that the essence is something hidden beneath the surface (as opposed to "something which already lies open to view"), and that a philosophical analysis will unearth this essence. [§92]
Those who make these assumptions are "unable simply to look and see how propositions work". [§93]
"[O]ur forms of expression, which send us in pursuit of chimeras, prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing extraordinary is involved". [§94]
Logic presents the "a priori order of the world; that is, the order of possibilities, which the world and thinking must have in common". This order "is prior to all experience, must run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty may attach to it."
"We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential to us in our investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language. That is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, inference, truth, experience, and so forth."
"Whereas, in fact, if the words “language”, “experience”, “world” have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words “table”, “lamp”, “door”."[§97]
"§101. We want to say that there can’t be any vagueness in logic. The idea now absorbs us that the ideal ‘must’ occur in reality. At the same time, one doesn’t as yet see how it occurs there, and doesn’t understand the nature of this “must”. We think the ideal must be in reality; for we think we already see it there."
None of this is about "whether all language use is goal oriented, and whether a goal can exist without the assumption of an ideal." The 'ideal' Wittgenstein is talking about here is a presupposition or attitude that some philosophers adopt in relation to logic, language and related philosophical problems (such as in response to Augustine's question: 'What is time?').
98 is important because it is a clear and unambiguous separation between "ideal" and "perfect". This separation was started at 81, where he discussed logic as an "ideal language" following fixed rules of calculi. Notice that he says here, that following these fixed rules does not make logic a "better", or "more perfect" language.
In the meantime, in the sections between these two passages, he has associated "ideal" with the idea of achieving the goal. At 88, we look for the exactness which is appropriate to the goal, we do not look for "the ideal" exactness. "There is no single ideal of exactness". It is implied that the "ideal" is that which achieves the goal. At 87, the sign-post is in order if under normal circumstance it serves the purpose. Serving the purpose is the real ideal, as expressed at 88.
The point being, that if we remove the notion of "ideal" as meaning the perfect, best, most exact, etc., as useless and misguided, as Wittgenstein is doing, yet we continue to use the word "ideal", as Wittgenstein does, then "ideal" must still have meaning, according to that usage. So he is not deny the reality of the ideal, in the sense that would leave the word "ideal" as totally useless, he is still allowing it to be a useful term, but misunderstood by those who use it to signify that crystalline purity, or absolute exactness, which he talks about. At 100, "But I want to say: we misunderstand the role of the ideal in our language.".
Accordingly, I maintain what I said in the last post, as 100 is clear support of it. he doesn't dismiss "ideal" he says we misunderstand it. So he has positioned the word "ideal" (defined it you might say), such that it does not refer to some sort of perfect exactness, or crystalline purity, which we might seek after with "ideal languages" like logic, "ideal" refers to whatever serves the purpose. And if logic is an ideal language, it is because it serves the purpose, not because it seeks some absolute exactness. Whatever suffices to achieve the goal, is the ideal. And those who seek some form of absolute perfection as "the ideal" really misunderstand the role of "the ideal", within language, which is just to fulfill the goal. Consider the game analogy. To win the game is the goal, therefore whatever brings this about is the ideal. It makes no sense to say that it is better, or more ideal, to win by a score of 10-0, than a score of 1-0. To win is the goal and it makes no sense to think of one as a more perfect win than another.
Quoting Luke
Right, this sense of "ideal" is what he is dismissing as "misunderstanding the role of the ideal in our language", at 100. To think that logic seeks after some pure crystal, perfect exactness, as "the ideal", is to misunderstand "the ideal". This preconceived idea is what bewitches us (109). It is the glasses which distort the view at 103. However, he does not reject "ideal" as a totally useless word which people are going around using when it really has no use. He calls it a misunderstanding of "the ideal". He still allows that "ideal" has a role in language. But it really means, as described at 87-88, that which serves the purpose. At 87, there is no room for doubt, whenever the sign-post serves the purpose. We can take this as the true understanding of "ideal", the goal being fulfilled, not that absolute exactness, which the example of time demonstrates is completely unreal. The "ideal", what we are striving for, is what serves the purpose, it is not an absolute.
This principle, if you bear it in mind, will become more and more evident as we proceed from this point in the book.
He is not referring to "the ideal" at §88; he is referring to ideal exactness. Furthermore, he is criticising, not defining, the unspecified notion of ideal exactness. He says "we don't know what we are to make of this idea". He goes on to talk about other kinds of ideals (other than ideal exactness) from section §89 onwards.
Baker and Hacker, in their exegesis of §103, detail various misconstruals of 'the ideal':
Quoting Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Volume 1 of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations : Part II: Exegesis §§1–184, Volume 1
These are not all about 'serving a purpose' or 'achieving a goal'.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know where you got the idea that W was possibly attempting to"reject "ideal" as a totally useless word".
Whether you call it "ideal exactness", or "the ideal exactness" is not relevant, we are talking about the same thing. And yes, he is criticising this notion, we agree on that. But if we look back and apply the term in retrospect, at 87, the final explanation, the one which requires no further explanation to avoid misunderstanding would be the ideal explanation. At 85, the sign-post which leaves no room for doubt would be the ideal sign-post.
but that is where I found some inconsistency. He is criticising this notion of "ideal", as if it is misguided, and we ought not use it, but he does not seem to be capable of restraining himself from using it. In On Certainty he seeks that very ideal certainty, which is described as no room for doubt.
Now, at this section which Banno was referring to, around 108, 109, I am starting to notice a very similar inconsistency. He is critical of this use of "ideal", but at the same time he is telling us as philosophers our task is to describe language usage, not to tell people how to use language. So to adhere to the principle he is stating, he ought to describe this role which "ideal" has in our language, without being critical of it, as if he thinks it is wrong.
The point being that this sense of "ideal" which Wittgenstein is critical of actually plays a very important role for us. When we keep in mind the ideal, as a perfection which can never actually be achieved, we are inspired to always better ourselves. This is an acknowledgement that if I am doing something in a particular way, it is never the best way. The way I am proceeding is never the ideal way. Despite the fact that my method serves the purpose, I ought to always be open to the possibility that someone will come and show me a better way. This what the notion of "ideal", as a perfection which is unobtainable, gives us, the attitude that there is always a better way possible. This is the principle by which we better ourselves, rather than settling for what serves the purpose. It is what musicians do in practise, and what athletes do, accept that there is always a better, and this allows them to continually better themselves.
Quoting Luke
The point I was making is that Wittgenstein appears to be trying to replace the notion of "ideal", in the sense that he is critical of, the perfection, best, crystalline purity, with the notion of "serves the purpose". He introduces this notion of "serves the purpose" at 87-88. Now notice at 105, he says that if we are always thinking that we must find the ideal, we get dissatisfied. I would call this a frustration, like the athlete who for a period of time is working hard but doesn't see any improvement. So he proceeds at 106-107, looking into this problem, of seeking the ideal when it is actually impossible to achieve the ideal. The more we understand the nature of "ideal", the more we recognize that by its very nature, it is what is impossible to achieve, so this is the slippery slope at 107. We must get our feet back on solid ground But if we let go of the ideal (108), where does this leave logic, which appears to have derived its rigour from assuming the ideal? What Wittgenstein suggests (108) is that we rotate our investigation around our "real needs". So this brings us back to that earlier principle (87), "fulfils its purpose". This is why I say that he is replacing the sense of "ideal" as that impossible to obtain perfection, with another sense of "ideal", which is more like "fulfils the purpose". Notice at 81, and 98, he drives a wedge between "ideal", and "perfect".
,
I made a distinction between "ideal exactness" and "the ideal", and referenced other types of ideal than ideal exactness.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This has already been addressed: "an explanation serves to remove or to prevent a misunderstanding —– one, that is, that would arise if not for the explanation, but not every misunderstanding that I can imagine." You have in your mind some ideal explanation that accounts for every imaginable doubt, but this is not Wittgenstein's idea. Then you accuse him of being inconsistent based on your own ideal.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Where do you get the idea that Wittgenstein is trying to reject any form of language use? As I stressed earlier, it is about particular assumptions, presumptions, preconceptions, misconceptions, or misguided ways of thinking. Wittgenstein diagnoses particular forms of wayward thought in philosophy, including those listed by Baker and Hacker:
- the strict rules of the logical structure of propositions;
- that the sense of every sentence must be absolutely determinate;
- that every proposition must have the form ‘Such-and-such is thus-and-so’;
- that the real name must be simple;
- that the sentences and words of ordinary language are merely crude surface manifestations of the real propositions and names hidden in the medium of the understanding.
These misconceptions are "like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off." (§103) These misconceptions can be cured by simply looking at how language actually works (§93). Nowhere does Wittgenstein advocate that we ought not to use the word "ideal", or any other word. Wittgenstein is trying to dispel particular philosophical dead ends of thinking.
Move on with what? Because what MU has had to say here is the only thing of philosophical interest. I disagree with virtually everything he's had to say, and most of it sounds batshit crazy to me, but at least he's had the guts to say it instead of trotting out bland paraphrasing of standard interpretations out of fear you might say something wrong.
If you need this space just to repeat yourselves ad nauseum, then I'll stop attempting to move the thread on to the more interesting parts of the book.
We've all read the bloody book. No one needs to 'move on' to get to more interesting bits because everyone has copy of the more interesting bits which they can read for themselves any time they like. By virtue of the Internet, everyone also has access to the interpretation of the more interesting bits by various experts in their field, taking various different approaches, which, again, they can read any time they like.
The one thing that requires an Internet forum to achieve is discussion. The raising of questions, personal ideas for critique, disagreements for resolution (or not). I'm not literally saying that nothing of any philosophical interest has even been tried here (my language was unapologetically rhetorical), many of your recent comments have at least raised an issue, but then it goes nowhere. The moment it gets into territory where some actual independent thinking needs to be done it peters out. The reason why MU's disagreements and misunderstandings have dominated the thread is simply because no one's been talking about anything else.
This book is, in my opinion, the single most important philosophical text ever written. It has, if it is taken seriously, ramifications for every discussion on this site, and it's very frustrating that, instead of discussion about the implications therein, it's being used as a dick measuring competition based on who knows what Wittgenstein 'really' meant.
I don't see your distinction. How is ideal exactness any different from any other ideal, qua 'ideal"? So how is "ideal" in the sense of ideal exactness any different from "ideal" in "the ideal"? I suppose you're trying to make the same distinction as we did with "red". There are red objects, and also an imaginary red, the latter being only in the mind. The problem here is that there is no such thing as an ideal object, so the ideal, whatever it is, ideal exactness, ideal explanation, or ideal certainty, is always in the mind. Therefore there is no such distinction to be made.
Quoting Luke
The problem, is that doubt is in the mind, it is imaginary. What is called for at 85, is to leave no room for doubt, and this implies removing every misunderstanding which I can imagine, because its this recognition of the possibility of misunderstanding, by the mind, which is doubt. Therefore, if he moves on to say, "but not every misunderstanding I can imagine", he is being inconsistent with "it sometimes leaves room for doubt, and sometimes not". Either there is no room for doubt, and this implies every misunderstanding I can imagine, or we accept "not every misunderstanding that I can imagine", and allow that there is room for doubt. But we can't have both because that's contradictory.
Quoting Luke
This is actually very simple and straight forward, so I can't understand why you don't see it. In philosophy, if we diagnose a particular form of thought as "wayward", we are rejecting the way that the philosopher is using language. This is common, and called disagreement.
Quoting Luke
Yes, this is exactly the point, to dispel a philosophy as a "dead end", is to reject the way that the philosopher uses language, demonstrating that this is a dead end usage of language. Then that material gets tossed aside as unproductive, and may disappear forever. The problem, in this particular instance, as I described in my last post, is that the role of "ideal" is the very opposite of the dead end. Accepting that there is an ideal, which has not yet been obtained, is what leaves us open to continually bettering ourselves. If, instead of "ideal" we accept "fulfils its purpose", as our goal, then we have no inspiration to find a better or more efficient way to do what we are doing. Therefore, rejecting "the ideal", in favour of "fulfils its purpose" is really what is the dead end, because the end, or goal, is already reached when the purpose is fulfilled, and there is nothing further, no ideal, to strive for.
Quoting Banno
As you might know by now, I don't take orders very well, I tend to misunderstand them. So what exactly are you telling me? Am I preventing you from reading or talking about other parts of the book? Or are you telling me that I ought to read faster, and get on with it? Tell the slowpoke to hurry along, the herd's getting ahead, you might get lost to the wolves. If it's the latter, you're wasting your effort trying to change the way that I read. At my age if the wolves haven't gotten me yet, I'm not too worried about it.
The issue is that Wittgenstein is discussing other particular types of ideal that you are failing to acknowledge.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is very simple. Wittgenstein is attempting to dispel misconceptions; he is not attempting to dictate any changes to the use of the word "ideal".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The problem is that you make sweeping abstract generalisations about the word "ideal", without regard for how Wittgenstein is using this term or to what he is referring.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein offers no positive determination or definition of "the ideal" (especially outside of any particular language game), yet you are hellbent on trying to find one.
Could you expand upon this (or anyone else who happens to agree)? I'm genuinely curious. I have no philisophical knowledge of Witty at all.
No, he's not talking about different types of ideals. He is talking about striving after "the idea". If he talks about ideal this, or ideal that, ideal exactness, ideal languages, or ideal logic, "ideal" is the adjective. These are not different types of ideals. They are different types of things described by the same adjective, "ideal", and therefore we ought not assume that "ideal" refers to a different type of ideal in each case. Read 100 -110 and tell me how many times he mentions "the ideal".
But the only clear step he has taken to define "ideal" is to call for a separation between "ideal" and "perfect", at 81 and 98. And this is inconsistent with the way that "ideal" is commonly used.
Quoting Luke
Then why is he calling for a separation between "ideal" and "perfect" at 81 and 98? Such a separation is completely inconsistent with the way that "ideal" is commonly used.
Quoting Luke
To the contrary, I have paid very close attention to the way that he has used "ideal". That's how I've noticed this odd separation between "ideal" and "perfect" which is inconsistent with common usage. You, clearly have not paid any attention, claiming that he is talking about different types of ideals, and not "the ideal". He wants to investigate what role "ideal " plays in our language, and we clearly talk about "the ideal this", or "the ideal that". For some strange reason though, he also wants to separate "ideal" from "perfect", which is inconsistent with the role that "ideal" plays in our language.
Quoting Luke
"Ideal" is an important term in this part of the book. In order to understand what Wittgenstein is saying here, we need to understand how he is using this term. I'm trying to understand what he is saying. If to you, being hell bent on trying to understand what he is saying appears like being hell bent on trying to find a definition of "the ideal", then so be it. Can you offer an explanation for why he drives a wedge between "ideal" and "perfect"? It's clearly not a case of describing how we use language.
You were previously only willing to acknowledge that the "ideal" adjective applies to exactness, whereas I repeatedly noted that Wittgenstein also applies it to many other things. You have otherwise treated "the ideal" as a catch-all noun, and have largely disregarded Wittgenstein's particular uses.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein references "the ideal" in regard to the ideal language, the ideal sentence, the ideal exactness, the ideal (purity of) logic, the ideal game, the ideal application of the word "game", and the ideal order between sentences, words and signs.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I disagree that W makes a distinction between "ideal" and "perfect" at §98 or §81. To be charitable, he appears to use two different senses of "perfect" in those sections: an ideal perfection of which he is critical, and a non-ideal perfection of which he is not critical.
The non-ideal perfection of which he is not critical is found where he says that "there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence" (§98). Here, the "order" of the vague sentence is already "perfect" as it is. This is contrasted (in the same section) with the ideal meaning of "perfect" where he says: "we are not striving after an ideal, as if...a perfect language still had to be constructed by us."
This does not help to support your claim, however, since he uses "ideal" only in a critical sense. This is consistent with W's other critical references to "the ideal" which are made to denounce common preconceptions regarding the once lofty aims of traditional philosophy, such as that it should seek to make new discoveries, to invent new languages, to provide a final analysis, to reveal hidden essences, etc.
It's because it tries to show that a statement does not have some sublime meaning simply by virtue of being sayable. That the surity we have that some proposition we have constructed has grasped the "facts of the matter" is nothing to do with reason but is just a psychological artifact of the way language works. In essence it digs what's left of philosophy out of the massive pit it had burrowed itself into and gives it a purpose in an age where 'reckoning' how the world is from an armchair no longer passes muster.
OK, so do you recognize that these instances do not refer to different types of ideals? There are different types of things referred to here, language, sentence, exactness, but "ideal" is used in the same way, so it is not a different type of ideal. Like when I say there's a red book and a red piece of cloth I am not referring to different types of red. The question is, why does he say it's misleading to associate "perfection" with "ideal" at 81. And also, at 98 he implies that there is a perfection which is something other than ideal. How is it possible that there is a perfection which is not ideal?
Quoting Luke
The problem here, is that he is saying that we are not striving after an ideal, we are not trying to construct a perfect language. If he is calling logic an ideal language, as at 81, it is "ideal" in some sense other than striving after perfection. So "ideal' has a meaning here other than as a perfection which we strive after. Now at 98 he gives "perfect" a meaning such that if a thing has been ordered, it is perfect simply by the fact that it has been ordered, regardless of how well ordered it is. The result is that "ideal" means something other than a perfection which we strive after, and anything we say is perfectly stated because it has been ordered by the act of saying it.
How is this a realistic description of how we use language? Do we not always recognize the possibility of a better, more perfect way of saying things? Do we not use "ideal" to indicate the belief that there is a better way? You might insist that Wittgenstein is simply describing these two distinct ways of using "ideal", and "perfect", but the way that he describes them excludes the possibility of accepting both ways. One contradicts the other, and to use them both would result in a very messy equivocation. So it is quite clear that he is opting for one over the other.
Quoting Luke
For Wittgenstein to be critical in this way is hypocrisy. He is distinctly saying that the work of philosophy is to describe the use of language, not to criticize it. To criticize it is to pass judgement, and this implies that one ought, or ought not use language in a particular way. Where does Wittgenstein show any principles to give this criticism any repute? Such hypocritical criticism is nothing more than a potential for ridicule.
Perhaps he is not using these terms synonymously despite your preconception that he must.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You have it backwards. It is the ideal which we are not striving after at 98.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You again have it backwards. Stick to what's written instead of speaking in abstract terms.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This makes no sense. You state that W distinctly says that the work of philosophy is not to criticise the use of language, but you then appear to imply that W criticises language use. Where does he do so? Your abstract bombast is tiring.
On a personal note, I will be undergoing extensive medical treatment for a few months so I possibly might not be around for a while. However, on the plus side, I had Daniele Moyal-Sharrock follow me on academia.edu today for some unknown reason.
Interesting. Perhaps it's because I read mostly continental stuff, yet this doesn't seem like a unique vision. Maybe this was a bigger deal in the analytic tradition. I have heard that Witty crossed the analytic/continental divide though.
Right, this is the point. If we are not striving after an ideal, then what are we striving after? If any vague, unclear, or ambiguous sentence is in itself perfect, then why would we ever strive to produce better, more clear sentences, which would better facilitate understanding?
There is an inconsistency between saying that vague and ambiguous sentences are perfect, and also saying that there is a goal of avoiding misunderstanding. A vague or ambiguous sentence supports misunderstanding, and therefore cannot be perfect in relation to this goal. Some metaphysicians, such as Aristotle and Aquinas have resolved this issue by referring to degrees of perfection. In this way, even the most vague or ambiguous sentence would have some degree of perfection, by the very fact that it exists in an ordered way, but it does not obtain the highest degree of perfection which is only afforded by the ideal. This allows two senses of "perfect", "perfect" in the sense of having been given order, and also "perfect" in the sense of the best possible order (ideal). But as you pointed out earlier, Wittgenstein does not mention "degrees" and so he seems to be unfamiliar with this potential resolution to that problem. Therefore he is left with the inconsistency which stems from the difference between the perfection of the ideal, and the perfection which things have by the very fact of having an ordered existence. And, he seems to be critical of associating "perfect" with "ideal". But this is simply how we use those words, and it cannot be denied. Nor does it make sense to say that it is misguided, or a misunderstanding of any sort to associate "ideal" with "perfect".
Quoting Luke
I was replying to your statement:
Quoting Luke
It is you who has stated that W was being critical of others' use of "ideal" (aims of traditional philosophy). So there is no need for me to point you to where he criticizes the language use of others, you must already know, because you are the one whose made that assertion.
I actually do not think that he is being critical in the way that you claim. And I was only pointing out that if he is being critical in the way that you claim, it is a case of being hypocritical.
However, even if he is not being critical of others, as you claim he is, and not being hypocritical in that way, there is still the matter of inconsistency in his use of "ideal" and its relationship with "perfect".
Quoting Luke
All the best, and take good care of yourself.
Would like to ask something regarding “use” and “meaning”. I am curious as to how you may, or may not, differentiate between these two in terms of both “language” and “experience”. Meaning between communication and actual practical use of some item - a chair/seat is that which we use primarily for sitting on, although obviously a “chair” may be used for other purposes.
And is the meaning of “language” revealed in its use? I’m taking the use of the term “language” to be framed as Wittgenstein framed it (this here thing we’re using now), as opposed to the broader linguistic context that can refer to bee dances or bird calls.
Have some context. In days of yore, before the invention of the round table, there were long narrow tables, because that's the way trees grow, and along each side were benches for sitting on and at one end was the chair, also for sitting on but a solitary and privileged position that gave a view of all the guests.
Thus a chair is indeed a thing to sit on, but also a position of status and hence an act. Chairing the Bard is a ceremony equivalent for poets to a coronation - except instead of (actually as well as) decorating the poet's head, his arse is decorated. And chairing meetings is still generally performed by arses to this day.
I sometimes use a chair to reach the top shelf instead of a ladder or stilts.
But when I say "chair" in the previous sentence, you are to understand from your knowledge of the world that in this case I do not mean that I sit on the shoulders of the conductor of a meeting.
And when I say, "the chair brought the meeting to a close", I am not claiming that furniture is animated.
A word might be used to refer to a piece of furniture, a ceremony, or a person and the meaning is determined by the use.
So when philosophers ask what "chair" means, or "nature" means, having no use in mind but assuming it must always be used the same way, or else that any way other than one particular way is wrong, long pointless threads tend to ensue.
Anyway, from what I can see of your response I don’t see any clear differentiation between “use” and “meaning”. You can be perched on a tree-stump and I may say “Get out of my chair!” and be perfectly understood. Of course social contexts come into play such as the “Chairperson,” and this will have greater weight for each person given their profession and standing among other factors that don’t initially spring to mind - maybe some fable or whimsical tale perhaps?
We can for more specific terms used for a more specific purpose in day-to-day speech. The difference between “chair” and “seat” where one is an item usually used to refer to a specific item created for an explicit purpose (the chair) whilst the other means the same and something different. Both can beused as verbs (“to chair” and “taking a seat”) yet the “meaning” and “use” of either terms don’t see to me to be different.
I am suggesting that the “meaning” is the “use”. Language being limited doesn’t allow us to explicate every instance in an atomised fashion though so we’re left with a “gist” where we stretch the use/meaning of the terms presented.
I agree. @Banno seemed elsewhere to demur a little, I'm not sure. The only caveat I would make is that it is always a social use; I can decide to call myself 'unenlightened', and folks will learn that usage, but if i try and insist that Banno is 'Bono', that is a misuse, I must in general follow the social use and keep my idiosyncacy within bounds, even as a poet. Meaning is use in communication.
I think this generalises quite well with a modicum of charity. Once a language has only one speaker, it has become effectively private and thus useless for communication. It only becomes meaningful again when someone else learns it, and likewise the lost ancient writing has only the potential for meaning until it is deciphered.Until then it is like those bits of stuff one keeps in the garage, that might be useful one day... a bricloleur's theory of language.
So, can I ask what timescale you apply to this approach? I mean, there's a chance (a slim one I admit) that "antidisestablishmentarianism" is not currently being used in any language game, not right now. So has it temporarily lost its meaning until it is used again? I presume that's not what you're saying.
If it's something more like "there are people who could successfully use the word in some language game, then it has a meaning, then the question I'd ask is - how much effort are you allowing this 'could' to take? Afterall, people 'could' successfully use parts of an ancient language in a language game, they just have to decipher them first.
No you bloody well can't! As it happens, there are plenty of people who well understand that position of being against the disestablishment of the church of England as the official denomination of our great and glorious nation. Or something like that. However, half an hour ago I came across the word "Tartuffery". And when I looked it up, I was referred back to the very passage from whence I had come. Further research led me to a satirical play by Moliere. I'm am simply not prepared to tolerate Nietzsche, a German, making use of a French satire of all obscurities, in one of his usual tirades against every other thinker in the world. It shall not pass into the English language!
No, actually I don't make the rules and I don't make the timescale; I simply observe that one can have no use for whereof one has no understanding. Nevertheless, I shall regard anyone who bandies "Tartuffery" about as a pathetic poseur until the play has been revived and adapted for television.
Well then I think I have my answer as to the question of the amount of effort you are prepared to accept within your use of the word 'could'. Up to, but just short of, the staging of a television adaptation of a 17th century play. I don't see any problem with that being the standard measure, so long as we're clear.
But are we clear? Specifically, are we clear about what it means to be clear?
This is a game we can play forever, to pick on a word, and make it the crucial piece in the game. We are only finished when we stop, and there is no standard measure unless we invent one for our own convenience. And since I do not find it convenient, I refuse to accept your suggestion that my rhetorical flourishes be the measure of anything. You may think you have your answer, but I think I have refused to answer, and I think those two together mean we are not clear.
Well, yes, obviously. Am I supposed to guess in advance when you are clear enough to stop. You posted on a philosophy forum, it's not unreasonable to expect that you might be open to discussion.
Quoting unenlightened
Absolutely. Again, you seem to be suggesting that such invention is done and dusted, rather than the very thing we are discussing, but this is a philosophy discussion site, is that not the exact place for talking about such measures and their convenience to us?
Quoting unenlightened
Again we are agreed. You have indeed refused to answer and evidently do not find it convenient at all to use any such a measure, I therefore do not have my answer.
But despite my rhetorical style (in asking you a direct question) this is a discussion forum, not a 'find out about unenlightened's personal conveniences' forum, so whilst the above is self-evidently true, it's not really worth writing publicly unless you want to actually discuss it.
Quoting Isaac
Ah, then we are clear, have reached an understanding, and nothing more need be said. Oh Happy Day! :)
I think there is a problem with "meaning" is "use". "Use" does not seem to capture all of what meaning is. When someone is sitting on the stump, and you say to them "get out of my chair", it may in some cases serve the purpose of getting the person off the stump. But there is many other phrases which could have the same effect, and we can't really say that if each of them would get the person off the stump, it has the same meaning. Furthermore, there are nuances in the way that we say things. If you said that to me, I'd ask what the hell are you talking about, why is that stump your chair? Perhaps you'd do better to throw in the word "please". I say to my dog "want to go out?", and she runs for the door. The phrase serves the purpose, but I could have taught my dog to do that with any phrase. Doesn't "use" miss something, as a description of what meaning is?
You make an implicit connection there between dog and man, as if they do or even could have the same way of experiencing meaning. Dogs do not understand significations. I doubt they conceptualise their reality in the way we do. They react to tone of voice, not the words themselves. They learn that 'sit' means move my body this way, but it drilled into them through repetition and the promise of treats. It is an auditory stimuli they respond to. They are reacting to stimuli but not forming meaning in the nuanced way of the anthropocene. It is their own animalistic way of making meaning. But in that sense, taken to the extreme, the flower finds meaning in the event of photosynthesis. Meaning as an interpretive reaction to an encounter with other. When the ameoba is prodded by a stick there is a kind of proto-meaning. It reacts to touch but there is no thought process there. I would say the dog is somewhere on this spectrum and man is the apex. Man has evolved beyond sensory reactions, in that, a gap has emerged between stimuli and reaction that allows for, and is in fact, thought.
If you are an expert in animal psychology, then please ignore the following, otherwise...
We're very much stepping outside of the bounds of philosophy as soon as we start making claims about what animals are and are not thinking from the comfort of our armchairs. Basically all of your statements require empirical evidence, in most cases they are perfectly amenable to obtaining it, and in many cases I suspect experts in the field already have done so. Perhaps we should reserve judgement until we quote, or hear from one.
... Unless you are one, in which case, thanks for the info.
No problem. I look forward to reading the next installment of "wot I reckon".
Yeah, I know, but next time you need a doctor I bet you'll go see one who has empirical evidence rather than ask your mate what they reckon is wrong with you. When you want a bridge built you go to an engineer who has empirical evidence that their design works, not just some guy who reckons his design might hold up.
You already admit in everyday life that empirical evidence, where it is possible to obtain it, is better than guesswork, so why abandon it in philosophy?
Quoting Metaphysician UndercoverI have some sympathy with this, though I disagree.I'll try and explain.
My mother told me that my first word was "more" (this might be more revealing than I want it to be). You can imagine the scenario, She says (habitually), "do you want some more?", waving the spoon , and at some point I copy, she recognises my meaning along the lines of 'yes please, another mouthful of dinner would be very nice'.
When one only has one word, one has to work it hard. She understands what I mean, even though I do not understand the 'true' meaning of the word I have uttered. In my little mind it could mean a spoonful, a mouthful, food, feed me, these things are not distinct. Though in the end, I have it about right as the demand 'Encore' - 'Play it again, Sam'.
And the same kind of thing goes on here at TPF. Someone asks 'is X racist?' And we have a discussion about the exact scope of the term 'racist' as if there is a truth of the matter independent of how we decide to use it. And there is such a truth, but it is only the truth of how the wider community happens to use it and how it and its root-words have been used by the community in the past. Ha, see what I did there? Root - racine - race. And so to a discussion of the tree of life, root and branch of the family/ tribe/nation, and the notion of inheritance... until we are satisfied that we have the fullness of understanding of all the possibilities of 'racism'. But there is no truth of meaning beyond the way a word is used...
Your first paragraph references mastery over our empirical environment. Your second paragraph assumes we should shoehorn metaphysics into an empiricist lens or way of thinking, when that is merely one way for us to approach our experience of reality.
You weren't referencing metaphysics, you were making statements about how the brains of animals work. The statement I objected to the introduction of was...
"They react to tone of voice, not the words themselves. They learn that 'sit' means move my body this way, but it drilled into them through repetition and the promise of treats. It is an auditory stimuli they respond to."
A cursory Google search reveals this from the Independent.
" Brain scans discover evidence that dogs process language in a similar way to humans and are only truly happy if a praising tone of voice is matched by the actual words spoken".
Took me all of 30 seconds to actually check whether what you 'reckoned' was true was actually the case.
Here's a study that states the opposite:
(brain scans that show dogs process language in a different way to humans)
https://www.inverse.com/amp/article/49944-dog-brains-language-words&ved=2ahUKEwjekb_wvpPhAhUD1uAKHaGBBtoQFjAMegQIAxAB&usg=AOvVaw1HRGN5PvHMq_yGqNsJZVhD&cf=1
Anyway, I was not referring to neuroscience. You are stuck on that empiricist train
The point was not to establish uncontested truth. The point was to show that your presumption is open to question and that the method you use to resolve that question in other areas of life, is empirical.
Quoting emancipate
A necessary fact to support that section of your argument was that dogs do not respond to the actual words of language the way humans do. Unless you are making a massive, unspecified, presumption of solipsism, that is not a metaphysical proposition, it is an empirical one. The response of a dog to the sound a human makes is an empirical observation. There are no metaphysical positions that I'm aware of which claim to be able to deduce the workings of animal brains in response to linguistic commands.
Im not interested in tit for tat, or a game of 1upmanship.
I disagree with this. Meaning goes far beyond, and is much deeper than "the way a word is used". There is meaning in human relations, we have meaningful relationships. So what's this thing you are talking about called "the community"? The very existence of a community is dependent on special relations. Therefore there is no such thing as the way that words "have been used by the community" without these special relations which form "the community". The true nature of "meaning" is to be found in these meaningful relationships, not in the use of words. The use of words just facilitates meaningful relationships.
Reconsider I like sushi's example of "get out of my chair". So you're sitting on the stump, and I like sushi says "get out of my chair". If this is successful, and get's you off the stump, you'll probably go away thinking "what an arse hole". But if I like sushi brought you another chair, and explained to you why that particular stump was I like sushi's favourite spot to sit, and asked you to please consider sitting in this other chair instead, you might stick around, engage in conversation, and who knows, you may become best friends forever. That's something meaningful, and a better example of what "understanding" really is.
When we think about "meaning", at first blush it seems like we are talking about creating relationships, relationships between words and objects, or even words and ideas. But this is difficult and doesn't properly pan out, we cannot account for meaning with such relationships. So we might consider that meaning is just the way that we use words. But what are we really doing when we use words? We do not use words to get what we want from others, we use words to create and maintain special (meaningful) relationships with others. Think of the discussion above, concerning how dogs understand human beings, "understanding" and "meaningful relationship" are like two sides of the same coin. If we bring "use" into the picture, we create an imbalance.
Well sure.you're talking to Mr 'identity-is-relationship. And that explains why one can have a meaningful relationship with a dog and not with Siri.But we are considering the meaning of words here where their meaning comes from and where it goes to, and it comes from their social use, and of course social relations are prior to language.and meaningful without language, otherwise one could not learn their meaning.
But your example is infelicitous. Of course if one uses different words to act in a different manner the relationship and the meaning will be different. And an inflection can turn the same word(s) from a question into a command with very different meaning because different use, and the meaning of the inflection is conventional too.
So when one says 'meaning is use', it is saying that the scope of what is and is not a chair is set by the ways in which the word is used in the community, and not set by any property of the object, nor by the use one makes of the object, (doll's houses have chairs), nor by any property of the sound or sight of the word.
So if one says "please kind sir be so good as to vacate my inconsistency. for it is precious to me" one is liable to get a puzzled look and not the restoration of one's favourite stump, because 'inconsistency' doesn't mean anything like 'stump'. 'Chair' would work, or 'seat' or probably 'place'. and the work it does , the use, is to convey to, not to manipulate the other. If the response is 'No it's my turn on the stump', the words have still done their job.
The point though, is that to be courteous, polite, and friendly (and I believe this is what social relations are based in), cannot be classified as "use". I do not behave in a kind and considerate way because it is of some sort of use to me. To the contrary, if I took time to think about what was more useful to me, and behaved in that way, I'd be more deceitful and cheating. Sure it's true that we use words to be courteous, kind and polite, but the word use is not the attitude, it is a representation of the attitude, and the attitude is meaningful with or without the word use.
So let's be consistent. social relations are prior to word use, as you say. And social relations are meaningful. But we are talking about the meaning of word use. Isn't it true that the meaning in word use is just an extension of the meaning in social relations, taken to a new level? Just like when the person sitting in the chair becomes "The Chair", it's just an extension to the same family of meaning.
Quoting unenlightened
You're only looking at one side of the coin here, and you seem to have things inverted, like looking into a mirror where the right appears on the left, you see the cause as the effect. In reality (as opposed to your representation), it is the individual instances of use, which create what you call "the ways in which the word is used in the community". Therefore, the ways in which the word is used by the community cannot dictate or determine the scope of what a chair is, because people are free to use words how they please, and this free usage causes the existence of "the ways in which the word is used in the community". That's why "the Chair" can refer to a person, because some people started using it that way, and it caught on, despite the fact that at the time when it started being used that way, it was beyond the scope of what a chair is. There really is no scope to what a chair is, we're free to use the word how we please. So, the way the word is used in the community cannot set the scope of what is and is not a chair, because it has no capacity to restrict the free usage of the individuals.
Quoting unenlightened
I can't relieve you of your inconsistency unless you see that it is an inconsistency. Let's assume "the use, is to convey to, not to manipulate the other". Now you say that we use words to convey something. What is conveyed? The use of words, and the thing conveyed must be two distinct things if we use words to convey something. It cannot be meaning which is conveyed if meaning is the use itself. So if meaning is use itself, then we have an empty, void conveyor. There's an empty vessel, and to say that the use is to convey, is false because nothing is conveyed. We are not conveying anything, we are simply using words, and this is meaning. But if we are simply using words, we are using them for our own goals, our own intentions, and manipulating the other is inevitable.
*sigh*. But you use words, you use gestures, you use the conventions of society to express your
politeness.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No they mustn't. I use words to convey meaning and the meaning of the words is the use to which they are put.. Words have no use but to convey meaning, and no meaning apart from the use to which they are put. Meaningless words are useless and convey nothing.
Right, but using words is not the same as "meaning" because meaningful relations exist where words are not used. Using words is one type of "meaning". And if we divide, or separate the "meaning" of word use, from the deeper "meaning" of meaningful relations, we have cut it off from the family tree. And this gives us a false impression of what "meaning" is.
You are conflating "meaning" and "meaningful". Words have meaning, they do not have meaningful. And although words can be meaningful, they do not have "meaningful relations" which "exist where words are not used".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Your use of "use" here has a meaning of personal benefit, such as that it is useful to you. This is a different meaning to Wittgenstein's use of "use" which has a meaning of employment, such as that it has a shared use by the speakers of a community.
P.S. I have not technically returned; just not suffering the anticipated effects of treatment yet.
Luke, I appreciate your continued attempt to bring clarity, but it appears to be a fool's errand. There is always some way in which something can be misunderstood. MU seems intent on demonstrating that fact.
That's irrelevant, words are not the only things with meaning. There is meaning in meaningful relations, that's why they're meaningful.
Quoting Luke
I haven't yet seen Wittgenstein talk about a "shared use". I don't see how that's possible. I speak and type words, you speak and type words. My activity with my intentions, and your activity with your intentions. How could we do this as a shared activity? Anyway, as I explained to unenlightened, the existence of a community is dependent on the meaning within the relations between the people. So any meaning which might be attributed to a shared language use (whatever that might mean) is only a branch from the family of "meaning" which exists in the community, and upon which the existence of the community is dependent.
Quoting Fooloso4
Yes, misunderstanding is always a possibility isn't it? That's why doubt can never be ruled out. We went through this already. But since the vague, unclear sentence is conducive to misunderstanding, by what premise do you think it is that Wittgenstein says such a sentence if "perfect" (98)? Is understanding not what we are aiming for when we use words?
Understanding evidently comes much easier to some than to others.
Wittgenstein speaks of "meaning" and "use", whereas you speak of "meaningful" and "useful". Apples and oranges.
I think the later Wittgenstein is great too, though he may only be especially important for those with a tendency to get lost in form on their way to content. While some perhaps understand him to offer theories about language, I like to understand him as destroying theories about language that get in the way of just using it effectively. These bad theories are destroyed by paying attention to what we actually say and do all the time --comparing the theories to what's actually going on and finding them wanting.
It's maybe not that simple, because some of us really want to be masters of reality without having to get off the couch. While this quote oversimplifies the situation, I like the spirit of it:
[quote=Graham]
The real lesson here is that the concepts we use in everyday life are fuzzy, and break down if pushed too hard. Even a concept as dear to us as 'I.' It took me a while to grasp this, but when I did it was fairly sudden, like someone in the nineteenth century grasping evolution and realizing the story of creation they'd been told as a child was all wrong. [2] Outside of math there's a limit to how far you can push words; in fact, it would not be a bad definition of math to call it the study of terms that have precise meanings. Everyday words are inherently imprecise. They work well enough in everyday life that you don't notice. Words seem to work, just as Newtonian physics seems to. But you can always make them break if you push them far enough.
I would say that this has been, unfortunately for philosophy, the central fact of philosophy. Most philosophical debates are not merely afflicted by but driven by confusions over words. Do we have free will? Depends what you mean by "free." Do abstract ideas exist? Depends what you mean by "exist."
Wittgenstein is popularly credited with the idea that most philosophical controversies are due to confusions over language. I'm not sure how much credit to give him. I suspect a lot of people realized this, but reacted simply by not studying philosophy, rather than becoming philosophy professors..
[/quote]
http://paulgraham.com/philosophy.html
I'd personally change 'most philosophical debates' to 'most bad philosophical debates.' It also responds to what you said:
Quoting emancipate
Personally I don't think it's a terribly unique vision either. He's just clearing out some cobwebs. Taoism comes to mind. We are mostly on the way without trying to be. Wittgenstein offers some tips and reminders for keeping on the way. Not the righteous or holy or true way, just a somewhat less annoying and more efficient way.
What might offend some in the Graham quote above is the idea that those who reacted 'by simply not studying philosophy' might have had the gist of the later Wittgenstein without having read him or conferred with the professional Wittgenstein scholars. In any case, Wittgenstein is often inflated so that experts are needed to decode his profundities, which is not to say that some of those experts don't enrich a reading of the book, but only that there's a danger in turning a quality anti-guru into a guru all over again. Yet if he wasn't such an interesting personality, he might have just been ignored. Is he some theorist to be debated or ultimately offering koans? Or something else?
What do you think about (81 & 98), old? Is a fuzzy, imprecise, vague concept, which readily gives misunderstanding, just as "perfect" as a precisely defined mathematical concept? if so, how would you understand "perfect" in this context?
But if we accept the principle at 98, then we ought to accept what is implied by it, and that is that language may be used for any goals whatsoever, including cheating and deceit.
The issue is whether or not language use is an activity which may be governed by principles of good and bad, morality. If it is, then there is a moral basis for the judgement of better (more perfect) or worse (less perfect) language use. If it is not, then any way of using language is just as good (perfect) as any other way.
Which "principle"?
You have a perverse way of reading the text. It is pointless to take the words "ideal" and "perfect" as being used in a contradictory manner while giving scant consideration to the context. At §98, Wittgenstein is talking about the sense of sentences being in perfect order, yet you continually disregard the "order" part and focus only on the "perfect" or "perfection" part.
Perhaps Wittgenstein's use of "On the one hand" and "On the other hand" at §98 confuses you, since he really only continues one line of thought rather than comparing two.
To paraphrase §98, he says "it is clear that every sentence in our language ‘is in order as it is’." That is, we do not require the construction of a perfect language with an exceptional sense that our ordinary language is lacking; i.e. we are not striving after this ideal. Moreover, "it seems clear that where there is sense, there must be perfect order. —– So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence."
He continues this thought at §99, where he says that a sentence must have a determinate sense, because an indeterminate sense "would really not be a sense at all". In other words, no matter how vague the sentence, it must have a determinate sense or else it wouldn't have a sense. As such, it is in perfect order.
If you disagree, then explain in context, rather than speaking in abstract terms about "ideal" and "perfect".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Still unsure of the "principle" here, but it is uncontroversial that language may be used for cheating and deceit.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein makes no mention of morality in the text. Why are you?
§1-§88, Summary
Before moving on, I want to do a quick structural summary of what’s been covered so far between §1-§88. In it’s broadest sense, this large section can itself be broken up into two parts: §1-§45, and §45-§88. To put it all very roughly, §1-§45 covers issues of what I would call differentials, while §45-§88 covers issues of roles. The two ‘parts' compliment each other, with the second section on roles ‘answering’ certain questions opened up by the first section on differentials.
Anyway, what do I mean by all this? This: that what I’m calling the first part (§1-§45) deals with issues of words (the ’same’ words) that may mean many different things in different circumstances. This is what makes them ‘differentials’, the most obvious being ostensive words like ‘this’ or ‘that’, which are about as general as you can get when it comes to words with differential meaning. A big focus here is on types of words: the fact that words differ not only by ‘degree’, but by kind, if I may put it that way.
Part of the motive here is to get us to understand the heterogeneity of language, of the very many different kinds of words and of all the different things we do with them. This is turn is done in order to show just how deeply connected - unthinkable without understanding how - language is with our lives: that a word has 'this’ meaning meaning rather than ‘that’ meaning is deeply bound up with the role that word plays in the context of our actions, of our concrete lived situation(s) at the time at which we employ that word (what Witty calls ‘language-games’, which really should be called something like, the ‘life-games' instead in order to emphasise just how big a part ‘non-linguistic’ elements play in it).
The second most important thing that the focus on kinds does is to get us to attend to the errors which arise when we mix up kinds of words: when we take different kinds of words to be the same, and all the issues and false which result from our not paying enough attention to kinds of words.
-
What I’m calling the ‘second section’ on roles (§45-§88), tries to bring this out even further and develop some implications of the first section. Basically, the idea is something like this: if there really is such a rich heterogeneity to language so that the same words can mean different things, how is it possible that language has any ‘structure’ as all? Why it is not just one big chaotic mess where the meaning of words swap and change all the time? How is it that we can understand each other at all?
Part of Witty’s answer here is through recourse to roles. Language may be rich in many and various kinds of words, but what helps us navigate this bristling field of word-kinds are the roles these various kinds of words play. The most important of these roles are those which are paradigmatic (examples): paradigmatic words (or even paradigmatic things) serve as points of orientation, which ‘fix’ (temporarily) our way of proceeding with language. For once we have examples in place, and we agree that such and such are examples of such and such, (such agreement is always open to reassessment), we can begin to develop shared language-games.
One important issue that this all serves to bring out (for me anyway), is the relation between necessity and arbitrariness: in some sense, the ‘fixing’ of an example is purely contingent: that a meter is ‘this’ long and not ‘that’ long could very easily be otherwise. On the other hand, given a certain use, such fixing is also absolutely necessary: the fixing of our paradigms is driven or motivated by the use to which they are put. One might even invoke here the way in which evolution among species occurs by way of 'random-walks’ though an evolutionary landscape, before settling on ‘local minima’ determined by developmental constraints: such is the case also with words and meanings, with Witty’s ‘forms-of-life’ occupying an analogous conceptual position to ‘environments’ in evolution.
The biggest import of all of this for Wittgenstein is that, if we recognise that such fixing of paradigms is ultimately governed by our life-contexts, then this renders all attempts at ‘analysis’ - in the sense of breaking-apart meanings into simples out of which complexes are built’ - utterly useless. Meaning is not ‘vertically’ structured, which elemental bases on the bottom and complex meanings on top; rather meaning is always ‘horizontally’ structured: the meaning of things is always appropriate to their use in a certain life-context, and attempts to break meaning down into pieces out of which they are constituted is always doomed to failure. Meaning is always irreducibly ‘synthetic’. Hence the very important closing of §: "The signpost is in order a if, under normal circumstances, it fulfil its purpose.”
The next few sections will attempt to ‘apply’ these insights to what Wittgenstein calls ‘philosophy’.
I read those passages as us being cautioned against projecting some kind of exact, quasi-mathematical meaning 'behind' language. The fact that we can ask Joe to elaborate on his 'feeling shitty' doesn't imply that his feeling-shittiness has some exact nature that we can approximate with arbitrary precision by talking about it long enough. Joe doesn't even know exactly (ideally, perfectly) what he means. He doesn't need to. Maybe he's explaining why he wants or does not want to walk in the park.
As far as your question goes, I'd say that ideal languages like math are better for certain purposes. Still, we have to construct them using vague concepts. For instance, we have a vague sense of what an algorithm is. Various people have defined the concept precisely (in terms of Turing machines, for instance.) But whether Turing machines conform to our intuitive sense of what an algorithm is ...is not a mathematical question. What formal/ideal languages 'mean' in the context of our existence as a whole is not a formal question. In short, our fuzzy language is something like our basic situation. It's what we build everything on, despite its fuzziness. A distaste for this fuzziness encourages the questionable notion that maybe it has some exact skeleton beneath the fuzz that can serve as a foundation for a superscience. Such a superscience would allow us to say exactly what science is or whether a statement is meaninglessness or not, restoring the philosopher to a position above all others. This philosopher would know what others were trying or failing to say better than they do.
The one stated at 98: "So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence."
Quoting Luke
You left out the word "perfect", he says that it has "perfect order". And he's very clear about this, he uses "perfect order" twice in that short section. This is the way he denies that we are striving after an "ideal language", by saying that even the vaguest sentence already obtains a "perfect order". We do not have to strive for an ideal language, because perfection is already there, in even the vaguest use of language. So "perfect" plays a very important role here. It is only by saying that language is already "perfect", as it is, even in the vaguest sentences, that he gets away from the notion that we are striving after some ideal perfection in language.
If he simply said that every sentence has order, we might still strive for a better order, and therefore still be striving for an ideal language. But this is not what he said, he said that even the vaguest sentence already has a perfect order. And it is only by this assumption, that perfection is already within even the vaguest of sentences, that he supports the notion that we are not striving after an ideal.
Quoting Luke
Morality concerns the goodness and badness of human actions. Using language is a human action. "Perfect" implies without deficiency, faultless, so morality is implied anytime "perfect" is used in relation to human actions. A human act cannot be perfect if it is morally deficient. To say that a human act creates something perfect (a perfect order), is to judge that act as morally good, because it creates something which is without deficiency. Therefore morality is implied at 98. The order which is created could not be said to be perfect if it was created by a morally deficient act. The order of the vague sentence cannot be said to be a "perfect order" if the sentence is created as part of an immoral act.
Quoting old
But when he says, at 98, that even the vaguest sentence has "perfect" order, isn't he saying exactly what you are saying that he is cautioning against? But instead of saying that the perfect order is something we seek with ideal languages such as mathematics and logic, he is saying that perfect order is already right there, in even the vaguest sentence.
.
Here's the passage in context.
[quote=Wittgenstein]
Thought is surrounded by a halo.—Its essence, logic, presents
an order, in fact the a priori order of the world: that is, the order of
possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought.
But this order, it seems, must be utterly simple. It is prior to all
experience, must run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness
or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it——It must rather be of the
purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction;
but as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it were the
hardest thing there is (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus No. 5.5563).
We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound, essential,
in our investigation, resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable
essence of language. That is, the order existing between the concepts
of proposition, word, proof, truth, experience, and so on. This order
is a super-order between—so to speak—super-concepts. Whereas, of
course, if the words "language", "experience", "world", have a use, it
must be as humble a one as that of the words "table", "lamp", "door".
98. On the one hand it is clear that every sentence in our language
'is in order as it is'. That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal,
as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us.—On the
other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect
order.——So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence.
99. The sense of a sentence—one would like to say—may, of
course, leave this or that open, but the sentence must nevertheless
have a definite sense. An indefinite sense—that would really not be a
sense at all.—This is like: An indefinite boundary is not really a
boundary at all. Here one thinks perhaps: if I say "I have locked the
man up fast in the room—there is only one door left open"—then I
simply haven't locked him in at all; his being locked in is a sham.
One would be inclined to say here: "You haven't done anything at all".
An enclosure with a hole in it is as good as none.—But is that true?
100. "But still, it isn't a game, if there is some vagueness in the
rules".—But does this prevent its being a game?—"Perhaps you'll call
it a game, but at any rate it certainly isn't a perfect game." This means:
it has impurities, and what I am interested in at present is the pure
article.—But I want to say: we misunderstand the role of the ideal
in our language. That is to say: we too should call it a game, only we
are dazzled by the ideal and therefore fail to see the actual use of the
word "game" clearly.
[/quote]
I wouldn't make too much of 'perfect order.' Making too much of that little choice is perhaps to be 'dazzled by the ideal.' If you zoom in on this or that phrase looking for awkwardness, you will indeed find it. I don't see how writing a perfect PI is possible. Anyone who gets the gist could do their own imperfect version. As I see it, it's a fuzzy insight communicated fuzzily. I'd caution against losing the spirit in the letter. Most people don't need the book in the first place. It's aimed at those with a peculiar itch that drives them to talk about their talking when they might be better served by talking about the wide world outside of talk where the less itchy get things done, somehow doing so without a profound theory of language.
[quote=W]
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither
explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view
there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no
interest to us.
One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible
before all new discoveries and inventions.
127. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders
for a particular purpose.
128. If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never
be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.
129. The aspects of things that are most important for us are
hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to
notice something—because it is always before one's eyes.) The real
foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact
has at some time struck him.—And this means: we fail to be struck
by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.
[/quote]
For 'philosophy,' I think we can substitute 'what I'm about.' There is an important tension here. On the one hand, nothing is hidden. And yet aspects of important things are hidden after all because of their familiarity. They are too close to our eyes for us to see them clearly. So nothing is hidden...except the fact that nothing is hidden. As an aphorism out of context, it's just mystification. Fortunately the cumulative effect of the reminders and some grasp of who Wittgenstein is trying to be in the text can give that mystification some anti-profound content. To be fair, getting the anti-profound message can feel pretty profound at first. Other good books are the same way. Then it wears off and becomes taken for granted, leaving us perhaps with better habits.
Actually, it was a direct quote; the first line of §98.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Exactly. You get it now?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not necessarily. The "perfect" order Wittgenstein speaks of here has the sense of 'suitable', 'apt' or 'appropriate', rather than 'faultless', 'flawless' or 'ideal'. The same distinction that you made above.
The point is that he uses "perfect". And, as I explained to Luke, it is only by employing this concept, (the order in common language is perfect), that he has reason to dismiss the notion that we are seeking the ideal. It is only if this order is "perfect", that we may reasonably dismiss 'striving after the ideal'. If the order were less than perfect, then we might still strive after a better order, the ideal. Clearly, "perfect" plays a very important, pivotal role here.
If anyone is dazzled by the ideal, it is Wittgenstein himself. This is analogous to Plato's cave allegory. But when Wittgenstein comes out of the cave to see the sun, ("the good" in the cave allegory), he's dazzled by it, and wants to retreat back into the cave without apprehending its significance. Wittgenstein is trying to reason away the significance of the ideal, by claiming that the order in common language is already perfect. It's a case of "rationalizing". He doesn't want to face the ideal, so he thinks up a reason to turn away from it. By saying that the order in common language is already "perfect", he asserts that seeking the ideal is misguided. But if it is really the case that the order in common language is less than perfect, then seeking the ideal is justified.
if seeking the ideal is justified, then Wittgenstein's premise "meaning is use" is overruled. This would mean that the ideal itself has significance, meaning, as that which is sought after. But the ideal is something outside of actual use, something which actual use never obtains. Then, meaning would be derived from something above and beyond actual use, such as "the good" in Plato's analogy.
Quoting Luke
That is very clearly untrue. The terms you have proposed allow for the possibility of something better, or more complete, which "perfect" does not allow for. If Wittgenstein was using "perfect" in the way you suggest, it would not serve his purpose. His purpose is to demonstrate that we are not striving after an ideal language, perfection is already there, within our common, ordinary language. So if "perfect" here is anything less than the ideal, it does not serve the purpose because then we could still be striving after the ideal. It is crucial that "perfect" is equivalent (in value) to "ideal", in order to dismiss as unjustified, 'striving after the ideal'.
Why should I accept your assertion that there is only one possible meaning of the word "perfect"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's right: the kind of perfection under discussion is already there within our ordinary language, but it is "perfect" in the sense of 'suitable', 'apt', or 'appropriate', rather than the ideal sense that you are attempting to stipulate.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is true only if you stipulate that "perfect" must have the one (ideal) meaning. Whereas Wittgenstein is counselling the reader to abandon such a philosophical pursuit of sublime chimeras (§94).
As I explained, it doesn't matter how many possible meanings of "perfect" there are, it is the only one that serves Wittgenstein's purpose, of dismissing 'striving for the ideal'.
Quoting Luke
If that perfection is suitable to render 'striving for the ideal' as unwarranted, it must be of equivalent value to the ideal perfection.
Quoting Luke
Unless he can show how 'striving for the ideal' is unwarranted, then his "counselling" is rather pointless. He would be counselling against something which may be very appropriate. That is why "perfect" must be used at 98 in a sense which is equivalent in value to "the ideal". If that perfection does not have a value equivalent to "the ideal", then any assertions that 'striving after the ideal' is misguided, are unjustified.
It does matter, because your whole argument hangs on the fallacious assumption that the word "perfect" must always mean "ideal".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Then I'll leave it to you to explain why you apparently believe that our ordinary vague sentences have not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language still has to be constructed by us.
You've misunderstood the argument then. "Perfect" here doesn't have to mean "ideal". In fact, it clearly is other than ideal. However, as I've explained, to serve Wittgentein's purpose of demonstrating that there is no need to strive for the ideal, "perfect" here must have equal value to "ideal". We have no need to strive for the ideal because we already have perfect order in what comes without that effort.
Quoting Luke
Quite obviously, misunderstanding is still possible, as Fooloso4 wisely pointed out above. Therefore the ideal language, where misunderstanding is avoided, still has not yet been constructed by us. To say, forget about that ideal language because even the most vague sentence (which is very easily misunderstood) is already in its own way perfect", is nothing but fool's play.
You might think that we can either play the language-game for fun or play for keeps, and it would be better if we would all just play for fun and forget about playing for keeps. It doesn't matter who wins or loses, we're playing for fun. The problem though, is that in reality we all play for keeps, and that's why we continually strive to better ourselves (strive for the ideal). Ever see a chess player who says it doesn't matter which move I make, because any move is going to create a perfect order? The chess player strives for the ideal move.
I don't understand what you mean by "playing for keeps" in the context of language games.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If I understand your analogy, are you saying that everyone is somehow trying to win the language game?
I hear you, but I don't think anything is going to be proved in either direction. It seems like you want to knock Wittgenstein down, which is fine. But isn't it also valuable to understand his appeal? Gellner's attack seems related to yours.
[quote= Gellner]
One might say that G.E. Moore is the one and only known example of Wittgensteinian man: unpuzzled by the world or science, puzzled only by the oddity of the sayings of philosophers, and sensibly reacting to that alleged oddity by very carefully, painstakingly and interminably examining their use of words. . . The philosophical job is to persuade us of the adequacy of ordinary conceptualisations. It is the story of Plato over again–only this time it is the philosopher’s job to lead us back into the cave.
[/quote]
An exaggerated/profound reading of the underlined phrase is suspiciously easy to criticize. Give the people that like W some credit, after all. It's unlikely that they're all dummies. It's not that the fuzziness of our talk should never be improved. Wittgenstein was doing that himself. What he criticized was the leap from often possible improvement to the postulation of some non-fuzzy kernel of meaning, an idea that tempts philosophers away from better uses of their time.
Better for whom? It's a value judgment, a matter of character. Those wrapped up in a game that depends on the non-fuzzy kernel (who think that some kind of superscience of meaning is possible) are naturally going to resist his project. Others who want philosophy to hurry on to the good stuff might agree and stop pretending that they can't hear one another. I think you're getting hung up on a single word and missing the big picture. For me Wittgenstein is useful for helping one not do that. Arguments probably won't resolve much though, no more than those between theists and atheists. There's a certain amount of boo/hooray on a gut level in play with a writer like Wittgenstein.
Not necessarily everyone is trying to win, but there are varying goals which people have behind their use of language. This is why it's a moral issue, because language serves as a means to achieving various goals. If it were an organized game, we'd all have the same goal, trying to win.
But if we can look at language and say that language serves a purpose, whether it's to understand each other, or for communion, unity, or communication, whatever then we impose that ideal onto language, just like we impose ethical principles on other human actions. That ideal allows us to make judgements as to good or bad, in relation to that supposed purpose. So for instance, if we say that the purpose of language is for us to understand each other, then we can judge the vague or ambiguous sentence as a bad sentence because it is not conducive to understanding, and therefore not consistent with the designated purpose of language.
But if we allow that language is sometimes for this purpose, sometimes for that purpose, and sometimes for another purpose, then we have no ideal by which to judge language use, and the goodness or badness of each instance of language use must be judged in relation to that particular purpose. The problem is that the particular purpose may itself be morally wrong. Now we have an instance where the language use is good, because it serves that particular purpose, but the purpose is morally wrong. So that instance of language use is both good and bad at the same time, and this is contradictory. The contradiction points to an inconsistency within the structure of the governing ideals. What is good or bad in language use is judged by an ideal which is inconsistent with what is good and bad in morality.
Quoting old
I might be trying to knock him down a few notches, but that's my approach to every philosopher, look for weaknesses as well as strengths, to me that's what philosophy is. And when it's a philosopher with high esteem, much appeal, the challenge is just as much to find the weaknesses as it is to understand the strengths. The two become one and the same, understanding the strengths reveals the weaknesses. The real challenge though is to understand what the person is saying, not simply knock down everything the person says because you're jealous that the person gets all the attention. Wittgenstein says very much which is very interesting, with very deep insight into the activity of conceptualization. But like with every philosopher, you reach a point where deficiencies become evident, because the entirety of reality has not been revealed, and then it's time to move along and see how others might deal with that problem.
Quoting old
I agree, and I think that this is where his insight is deep. The philosopher seeking the kernel of meaning is like the physicist seeking the particle of matter. In reality, meaning is produced by the context, like in QM the particle is produced by the environment. The inevitable conclusion is that there is no kernel of meaning, there is no particle of matter. The materialist has been mislead by this assumption. The problem though is that this insight leaves a giant question mark where that assumption stands. If we drop that assumption, then there is no substance. Uh oh, better get our feet back on solid ground (107). But this turning back is the philosopher's mistake, it's a lack of courage, fear of the unknown. Notice that he's not looking for solid ground at 107, he's looking for traction. Why the need to go somewhere? There's no empirical necessity here, a philosopher might just contemplate that lack of substance, as described by Aristotle in his ethics, not going anywhere, interrupted only by the earthly needs of subsistence. Contemplating the kernel of meaning reveals its non-existence. Why warn other philosophers to stay away from this revelation? He's guarding the door to the secret, saying there's no need to look in there because everything's outside of there. Aren't you inclined to ask, why are you guarding the door then, show me that there's nothing there?
Quoting old
That the kernel is a fuzzy kernel is a cop-out, a refusal to acknowledge the reality of the situation, that there is no such thing as the kernel, and seeking the kernel is a lost enterprise. Assuming a fuzzy kernel only leads one into the contradictions of dialectical materialism, or Peircean vagueness. That's why you need to push Wittgenstein aside, look behind that door yourself, contemplate the kernel of meaning for yourself, and truly realize that there is no such thing. If you hearken back to Aristotelian metaphysics, the idea of prime matter is simply unintelligible, and needs to be relinquished. Together we can muster up the courage to proceed into the unknown, what can fill that gaping hole where the assumption of the kernel used to stand.
I agree (with reservations below), yet you write as if I'm purveying some theory of the non-fuzzy kernel. My position is roughly that it's not worth the trouble to try to create or appeal to a superscience of meaning. This is not to say that such a thing is impossible, for that would be to fall right back into linguistic metaphysics. Instead one can just market a different approach which is not justified in terms of the old approach. Just as a certain kind of atheist doesn't take the God issue seriously enough to debate about it, so an anti-profound 'Wittgensteinian' might no longer bother engaging in a stripe of theorizing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I tend to agree, especially with pushing Wittgenstein aside. I quoted Graham to emphasize the possibility that the later Wittgenstein is something like a representative of ordinary wisdom who happened to make explicit within philosophy what others implied by not taking a certain kind of philosophy seriously in the first place. To sell Wittgenstein as a must-read guru looks like more linguistic metaphysics. If Wittgenstein is profound and difficult, then I increase my own status by translating him for the mystified.
As for realizing that there is no such thing, I mostly agree there too, but I'd be careful not to frame it as the result of a method (like a 'theologically' justified atheism.) This is why I think it important to emphasize the wisdom of ordinary 'dummies' who aren't caught up in the game in the first place. It's the same with Taoism. If it's only possible with some particular book or the word 'Tao,' then it's bogus. To 'unknow' some kind of silliness is not to learn a secret but to stop pretending that one has one. (In vague terms like this we're already knee-deep in remystification. Maybe that's the risk of aphorism.)
It is still entirely unclear what counts as 'winning' in this analogy, and you also didn't explain what you meant by "playing for keeps" in the context of a language game. Just a reminder, too, that not all games have the goal of winning (§66).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So, understanding each other (without any doubts?) counts as winning?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What purposes other than understanding do you mean? A lie is still understandable, isn't it? Likewise, jokes, stories, orders, reports, and all of the other language-games (or purposes of language-use) that Wittgenstein lists at §23 may be understood. To include understanding as a similar "purpose" of language appears to be a category error.
Is it the purpose of telling a story that the storyteller is understood or that the story is enjoyed (or both/neither)? What if I understood the story but I didn't enjoy it? Did the storyteller win?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is irrelevant. We are here to discuss Wittgenstein's philosophy, not yours. Wittgenstein is talking about the sense of a sentence at §98, and that's all. There is no need to drag morality into it just because the word 'ideal' has been used.
I agree. I guess a certain suspension of disbelief is necessary in order to feel the strengths of a philosopher, but then an arrogance or restlessness is useful for not being caught in the mystique of a persona in a way that halts progress and further exploration. Of course just getting older helps too. The real world doesn't care much about flavors of opinion but rather about what one can do and refrain from doing. Then there's the realization that plenty of people who have never read the great philosophers are undeniably wise and impressive.
Thanks! That's very kind.
All I can say to this, is that each person has one's own approach, one's own interests. What one takes seriously, the second might not take seriously, But then the first might not take seriously what the second takes seriously. Like what I said to Luke, the same game that one plays for fun, another will play for keeps.
Quoting old
The pushing aside is meant to have a look for yourself. If someone is guarding a door, and claiming there is nothing behind that door, so don't even bother trying to look, doesn't it make you want to have a look for yourself?
Quoting old
It is a method though, a descriptive method, and as such it's not unlike the empirical method which justifies atheism. The wisdom of the ordinary "dummy" is to approach without knowing anything, no preconceived notions, only the desire to describe what is, that's the "wonder' of Socrates, the root of philosophy. The problem though is that the descriptive method uses words, and there are preconceptions inherent within word use, so we need first to rid ourselves of these preconceptions which seem to inhere within the way that we use words. We might try to describe language and word use first, but the issue cannot be avoided, there's no such thing as not being caught up in the game, we're in it already, whether we like it or not. So there is no such thing as proceeding without a method, because a method is already inherent within the language use, and we can't get out of those preconceptions without a method for this.
Quoting Luke
Playing for keeps is to play with seriousness. Whatever one's objective might be, that person would take seriously obtaining that goal. In the context of language games, we use language to help and obtain our goals. That's what I mean by playing for keeps, we have serious goals and we use language seriously as a means of obtaining those goals. So it's not about "winning the game", it's about achieving my goals.
Quoting Luke
Your examples here are called "kinds of use". They are not purposes of use. So for example, an order is a kind of use, but an order is done for a purpose, it is not the purpose itself. Likewise with the other kinds of use. So it only appears to you as category error, because you haven't gotten into the category of "purposes" you are in the category of "kinds of use".
Suppose for example, that a lie is a kind of use. The purpose of the lie is to make the other person misunderstand what you are doing. The words misrepresent your aims. That is deception, to intentionally make another misunderstand what you are doing, or what your aims are. And deception comes in many forms other than lying. So the purpose of lying, and other forms of deception, the goal or intent of lying, is misunderstanding. If the person understood what you were doing you could not deceive them. Between having understanding as a goal, in which the intent is to have the other understand my actions or purpose, and deception, in which the intent is to have the other misunderstand my actions or purpose, there other kinds of use. Ambiguity, vagueness, and obscurities may be intended to leave the other person in a state of neither understanding nor misunderstanding my actions or purpose, more like in a state of uncertainty.
Quoting Luke
It's not irrelevant at all. If we are dealing with human acts, following rules etc., then morality is relevant. If a philosopher proposes a system of philosophy in which a human act may be both bad and good at the same time, this is a problem for that philosophy which needs a resolution.
.
You did not answer the question: What purposes other than understanding do you mean?
When is the purpose of language use "for us to understand each other"? If it is not always the purpose of language use, then what other purposes are you talking about? Provide an example.
According to you, a lie is a kind of use, it is not the purpose itself.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But not to make them misunderstand what I am saying. Otherwise, the lie would not fulfil its purpose. All that is relevant here (to §98) is understanding what is said.
Yeah, I'd want to look. The guard says it all. I just wanted present the anti-profound reading as a current favorite that I didn't already see on the thread. I'm always looking for better words, a slight further clarification. I'm glad I joined the conversation.
I gave you the example, misunderstanding. In deception the purpose, or goal is misunderstanding. Meaning is use, and the person being deceived does not understand what the person deceiving is doing with the words, how the person is using the words, therefore the person being deceived misunderstands. And that is the deceiver's purpose, goal, to make the other person misunderstand how the words are being used. It doesn't matter if the one being deceived thinks that the sentence has "a meaning", and assumes to understand the meaning, meaning is use, and the one being deceived really does not understand how the words are being used.
Quoting Luke
You're forgetting the premise. Meaning is use! If meaning is use, there is no such thing as "what I am saying", there is only "what I am doing". We cannot have a "what I am saying" here, as if there is a set meaning to the words which are spoken. That's the purpose of the premise, "meaning is use", to remove this false idea. This is why it is necessarily a moral issue. Meaning is attributed to the act, "use", not the words. So we are now trying to understand language through human acts, "games". But human acts are subject to moral judgements. Now we need to create consistency between what is "good" morally, and what is "good" linguistically. Otherwise we'll have human acts which are both good and bad at the same time.
Quoting old
Good, I hope you continue with us, I appreciate your input. it may be a long slow process though.
You're saying that there are only two "purposes" of language use: for understanding and for misunderstanding; for good and for evil? Yeah, okay.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
First you say that there is no saying and only doing, but then you say that we need to create consistency between saying and doing. How do we create consistency between saying and doing if they are the same thing?
If I lie and tell you that "I cannot attend your party today because I am ill" (when I am not ill) do you not understand what "I cannot attend your party today because I am ill" means?
Again, you need to understand what I am saying in order for a lie to fulfil its purpose (i.e. to lead you to "misunderstand what I am doing" - or however you describe it).
This reminds me of something Wittgenstein says in Culture and Value:
As long as you keep pushing you will remain trapped by your own efforts.
And this, from a draft of a foreword to his book Philosophical Remarks:
No I didn't say that, those were examples, not the "only two" possibilities. I also said the purpose of language, in general, might be communication, etc..
Quoting Luke
Again, I didn't say that. I said we need to create consistency in what is determined as "good", so that the same thing would not be both good and bad..
Quoting Luke
No you do not understand. Because you do not understand what the speaker is doing with the words, you do not understand the use of the words in that instance. And meaning is use.
Quoting Luke
It's not the case that you need to understand what I am saying in order for a lie to fulfil its purpose. You need to think that you understand what I am saying. Misunderstanding is when you think that you understand and you really do not.
If meaning is use, there is no such thing as the meaning of "what is said", other than what the person is using the words for. The words are sign-posts. The deceiver misleads you. Therefore you only think that you understand what the words mean when you are being deceived, you are being misled. In reality you do not know how the person is using the words, therefore you do not know the meaning of the words, and that's why you are deceived. It is the assumption that the words have a meaning (independent from what they are being used for), which allows you to think "I know what those words mean", and come to a conclusion about the words' meaning, which is other than what the person is actually using the words for. And that's what deception is. When a person thinks that words have a meaning which is independent from what the speaker is doing with the words, then they might think that they understand what the words mean, without even trying to understand what the speaker is doing with the words, and this thinking that they understand the meaning, when they do not understand what the words are actually being used for, is deception.
If what I've described, is somewhat accurate, and Wittgenstein is accurate in his description of "the honourable thing" here, then he's faced with a sort of dilemma at this section of "Philosophical Investigations". He's leading us right to the door of what he calls 'the ideal", "the preconceived idea of crystalline purity", what old called 'the kernel of meaning". But then he says let's turn things around (107), so that we won't see the need to look behind that door. I'm going to lead you away from the door now.
The problem is that now he has already shown us the locked door, talked about it. It's too late to turn us away from it, or not talk about it to those who do not hold the key. And it's probably impossible to talk about the locked door in such a way that only those with the key to open it will know of its existence. The question is, how would you keep a secret, allowing some people access to that secret, and at the same time completely hiding the existence of the secret from all others. It can't be done, so perhaps allowing that some people have the key, and others do not, is itself a dishonourable thing.
How can the same thing be both good and bad? What same thing?
Your attempt to collapse the distinction between "saying" and "doing" is bullshit, designed only to try and maintain your theoretical house of cards. You have claimed that "There's no such thing as 'what I am saying'." Honestly? Nobody really says anything - is that what you're saying? Also, this is hardly the main insight of "meaning is use".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I see. If the speaker is being honest then you can understand the sentence, but if they are lying then you can't understand the (same) sentence. But how do you know when they're lying? Do you suddenly become unable to comprehend English?
He is not faced with a dilemma, he has solved a dilemma. His solution is an age old one. I took the quote from the online appendix to Arthur M. Melzer's excellent book "Philosophy Between the Lines: The Lost History of Esoteric Writing". This should not be confused with occult or hermetic esoteric writings. It was a common and well documented practice of the philosophers. The appendix can be found here: https://www.press.uchicago.edu/sites/melzer/index.html
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There is no secret, only things that only a few will understand. Rather than say: "you will not be able to understand this" he simply keeps these things from view, locked behind a closed door that only a few will even notice is locked and that it requires a key to open. In other words, he is saying that what any reader who opens the book will find on the page is not what those who have the key will find. The majority of readers will not understand him.
But if we look at the other metaphor, there are things we are prevented from seeing because we push rather than pull, as if it is just a matter of exerting sufficient mental force.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is not a matter of allowing some people to have the key, but rather that only a few will find the key.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There is no door behind which we find hidden the preconceived idea of crystalline purity. The idea of crystalline purity refers to the Tractatus. He is not leading us there, he is saying that the idea is misleading, that he was misled.
Do you understand Wittgenstein's premise, "meaning is use"? The meaning of any particular instance of words is what the speaker is doing with those words (use). The speaker uses the words like a tool, doing something, so that the meaning (use) represents the speaker's purpose. This is why "meaning" is what is meant, what is intended. Saying is a form of doing. Language is a game. I don't see how you can say that this is bull shit, at this point in the book when it's the premise of the book
Quoting Luke
The honest speaker gives an accurate indication of how the words are being used. The dishonest speaker does not. Meaning is use, therefore you cannot understand the meaning of the dishonest speaker. Simple isn't it? Often we do not know when the speaker is lying, and we think we understand how the speaker is using the words, when we really do not. This is not a case of the hearer not being able to "comprehend English", it is a case of misuse of English by the speaker.
Quoting Fooloso4
He doesn't keep these things from view though, he discusses them. And that, according to your quote, is not the honourable thing. That's why I said it's a dilemma. How can he show it only to those who will understand, without showing it to those who will not understand. As per your quote, the honourable thing is not to show the door to those who do not have the key. How can he show the door only to those who have the key, when he doesn't know who's going to have a key?
Quoting Fooloso4
Yes, I already went through this with old. The problem is that when we attempt to get down to that crystalline purity, or what old called the kernel of meaning, in analysis, (look behind the door where it might be) it's not there, and all that is left is this attempt to find it. This process, the attempt to find it is nothing other than striving for an ideal. Then it appears like striving for an ideal might be the only thing which supports the idea of that crystalline purity. We can slam the door and retreat, saying that the crystalline purity is not real, non-existent, and the striving for the ideal is equally useless because that ideal is non-existent, but then there is a gaping whole in the structure of meaning, where that assumption of the fundamental elements stood . Wittgenstein seems to want to do this, retreat with a gaping hole in the structure of meaning. But we do not need to do that, we can stay and contemplate the relationship between the fundamental elements of crystalline purity, and the ideal.
What if it's as simple as coming to see a certain style of argumentation as no longer cool? No longer the way to go? What if there's no gaping hole because for the most part we get along just fine? What if a certain habit is just made to look slightly ridiculous? Perhaps we not only don't miss that habit but are even slightly embarrassed that it was ever ours and that we were ever so pretentious.
[quote=Wittgenstein]
I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again "I know that that's a tree", pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell them: "This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy."
[/quote]
The temptation might be to say ' I know that [s]that's a tree[/s] we are only doing philosophy' (that metaphysics is metaphysically impossible) in a way that makes Wittgenstein something more than the tone of this 'only.'
Something related in my mind is logical positivism. I think that logical positivism was right in spirit but erred in practice by insisting on an impossible foundation for their otherwise good sense.
I didn't say this was bullshit. I said that your attempt to collapse the distinction between "saying" and "doing" was bullshit. Yes, saying is a form of doing, but that doesn't imply that "there is no such thing as 'what I am saying'." You have apparently retreated to this absurd position only because you cannot answer my questions or respond to my specific examples. Repeating "meaning is use" does not address my criticisms or questions.
For example, you didn't answer: 'How can the same thing be both good and bad?' and 'What same thing?'
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are creating confusion via your attempted collapse of the distinction between "saying" and "doing". It is not about understanding the speaker; it is about understanding the language. Yes, speakers can use language differently and give different meanings to the same words across various occasions. But we all learn the same language for the most part and we learn that words can have different meanings in various contexts along with it. Wittgenstein is merely reminding philosophers of this fact.
You never answered my question of whether you understand what "I cannot attend your party today because I am ill" means. But I'm certain that you do, whether it's told as a lie or not.
Well, I guess we've come full circle, because I'm basically going to repeat what I first said about this issue. The problem is in how this all relates to striving for the ideal. Striving for the ideal is a beneficial way of proceeding, it's an attitude of recognition that we are less than perfect, thus allowing ourselves to be bettered. The histories and development of specialized languages like mathematics and logic demonstrate that the attitude of striving for the ideal is very useful. So this attitude is not something that we ought to relinquish. To avoid the situation of describing a foundation which is actually an impossibility, we need to assign to "the ideal" a type of existence which avoids this problem
Quoting Luke
I already explained about the same thing being both bad and good, at least twice. It is in relation to two distinct purposes. The same thing is good for one purpose but bad for another purpose. Anyway, you don't seem to have any grasp of what I'm talking about, probably because it is a difficult thing to explain. But this is way off topic so I suggest we give it up, and drop it.
I agree. I'd say that the ideal in this case (from my reading) is 'spiritual' or a matter of character. Who wants to be pretentious? Who wants to be bewitched by language? I see no escape from the ideal. All that varies seems to be its representation. Is it cooler to chase after a superscience or let go of what may come to look like a pseudo-scientific or pretentious pursuit and get real?
I don't at all claim to have an authoritative answer. Personality is a risk. I'd say that some philosophers present their own personalities for possible emulation. The arguments may be secondary to their example as a creative revelation of possibility. If so-and-so is religious but ashamed to be unscientific, he may come up with a system of words that allows him to have his cake and eat it too. Or maybe an artistic/visionary personality finds scientism cramped and one-eyed. Same deal. If this system is slick, he may become an intellectual celebrity. Kant, Hegel, Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche..Their value is not perhaps reducible to propositions and arguments.
Thanks for the reply. We probably agree more than we disagree. By 'spiritual' I meant something like a matter of character. For instance, I am an atheist for 'spiritual' reasons. I'll try to clarify what I mean by superscience and the profound reading.
This 'linguistic endeavor' (innocent sounding, right?) has been associated with philosophers calling the statements of other philosophers meaningless. But that's about as 'metaphysical' or 'superscientific' as it gets. Our linguistic metaphysicians claim a position so lofty that they don't even have to argue. Their system assures them that there is nothing there to argue with.
This is the 'profound' reading that I find questionable. It repeats the mistake of logical positivism (crystallizing good sense into the 'nonsense' it hopes to control). Instead of appealing to a theory of what's meaningful or not, I prefer to just respond on a case by case basis, with the same automatic knowhow that gets me through the rest of life. For me PI is one book among others that encourages this attitude, but Wittgenstein was a complex personality, and other interpretations will tempt others.
Because I prefer to read the book as a return to 'automatic knowhow,' I frame it more in terms of unlearning than learning, so that it's more anti-profound than profound. The difference is that a profound book makes you feel smarter than those who haven't read it, while an anti-profound book makes you feel like other people who maybe haven't read it are smarter than you wanted to give them credit for. This hurts at first but feels like progress later. This is the spiritual junk I had in mind.
No. The use of a screwdriver is to drive screws. If I use it to open a can of paint, it doesn't stop being a screwdriver and become a can opener. If you use words to deceive, you destroy meaning. The boy cries 'wolf' but eventually, it means nothing and has become useless. But you know this - why are you playing tricks?
I wouldn't describe Wittgenstein as a 'linguistic metaphysician', so I'm not sure who you are describing. I don't think that he has a philosophical "system" to speak of in the PI, either. If anything, he gestures at the futility of engaging in metaphysics and philosophical systems, and demonstrates that many traditional philosophical problems can be dissolved by remembering how language is typically used in actual situations, that we are taught how to use language by other people and likewise enculturated into a community of speakers, etc. While a lot has seemingly been made of the younger Wittgenstein's use of 'meaningless' or 'senseless' in the Tractatus, his usage in the PI is a return to the rough ground.
Quoting old
Yes, it looks like we agree more than we disagree. Thanks for clarifying.
Wasn't aimed at you, just to clarify.
Quoting Luke
I tried, but I just can't find anything to disagree with here.
Quoting Luke
Thanks, and we do indeed seem to be on the same page, which is nice.
You really have made a mess of all of this. There are no elements of crystalline purity. Crystalline purity refers to the Tractarian assumption that there is a logical structure that underlies both the world and language that makes it possible to represent the world in language. Wittgenstein came to see that this picture is wrong and abandoned it.
In the Tractatus logic is form. The elements or substance or the world are simple objects. The elements of language are the names that correspond to those objects. There is no relationship between
the fundamental elements of crystalline purity, and the ideal. They are not two different things. The crystalline purity is the ideal, an ideal which once again he came to reject.
In order to understand this we must look at the role of the logic of language in the PI. It is no longer some independent structure, but the rules of the language game. Those rules do not exist independently. They are determined by how the game is played. Different games different rules.
Using language to deceive does not completely destroy meaning, if meaning is use. It creates an inconsistency between the general and the particular, just like using the screw driver to open the paint can creates such an inconsistency. The language is still being used, so there is still meaning there. The problem is in the inconsistency between the general purpose "a screw driver is to drive screws", and the particular purpose, "the screw driver is used to open a paint can". We can say that the screw driver is "good" for the purpose of opening the can (serves the purpose), but when the particular purpose is inconsistent with the general purpose, an argument for "misuse" can be made. And misuse is bad despite the fact that it serves the purpose. Likewise, we can say that language is "good" for deceiving people in particular instances, because it is very useful toward that purpose. But if there is a general principle, "the purpose of language", then an argument might be made that deception is misuse.
Since these are human acts we're dealing with, there are moral implications. You wouldn't commonly argue that using the screw driver to open the paint can is a misuse, and therefore bad, but if the screw driver slipped off and stabbed your wrist, you might see that it really is misuse and therefore bad. A person engaged in misuse is culpable. And if someone misuses a screw driver to stab another person we want without doubt, the moral universal judgement that stabbing a person is bad, to overrule the particular judgement that the use of the screwdriver is "good" for this purpose.
So in using language we choose our words according to the needs of our particular purposes, in particular situations. We choose the words as they are deemed "good' for those particular purposes, and the words derive meaning unique to the situation, according to that particular use. But if the words are good for a particular purpose, and that purpose involves an immoral act (analogy of stabbing the person with the screw driver), then we need the principles whereby we can say that this is a misuse of language and therefore bad.
To say that the misuse of words (deception for example) just renders the words useless or meaningless is naivety in its prime. The misuse of the screw driver doesn't leave it as a useless tool, it renders it as a dangerous weapon.
Right, so you do not see the gaping hole now? Wittgenstein has dismissed what he had assumed made it possible to represent the world with language. Is it now impossible to represent the world with language. Is all language use just a big misunderstanding?
Quoting Fooloso4
They are two distinct things, because in the Tractatus, he posited the fundmental elements of crystalline purity as existing things which language is composed of. But in the Philosophical Investigations,"the ideal" is something we might strive after. One is already existent, inherent within the foundations of language, the other not, as a precision, exactness, or certainty, which we might strive after.
Notice at 107 where he describes a rotation around our real needs. The suggestion is to move away from this striving for an ideal (which in itself is an inversion from the position of the pure elements of the Tractatus), back toward what serves our purpose. So language ends up as inherently vague and ambiguous, whatever serves the purpose, because he dismisses both the existing elements and the striving for an ideal. There is no crystalline purity underlying it, nor do we strive for an ideal language, we are simply satisfied with what we have, imperfection in language, which at 98, he calls a "perfect order". Now he is left with nothing but inconsistency.
Quoting Fooloso4
The rules are sign-posts. We cannot say that logic is the rules, because reason and logic is how the mind deals with the rules. We can say that different games have different rules, but we have no principle whereby we can say that the logic differs.
Yes it does. It is happening right now to the media. If you sometimes use language to deceive, you will not be trusted, if you do so as often as not, you won't be listened to at all and your talk will become meaningless because it is no use to anyone else, and thus no use to you either, even as a means to deceive.
The only gaping hole is the one in your understanding. If he concludes that this is not the way language works that does not mean language does not work or that there is some unsolved mystery of language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In the PI he is referring to the Tractarian assumption not some other thing. It is this structure that would make possible precision, exactness, or certainty. Since that structure does not exist, precision, exactness, and certainty are never perfect, but typically sufficient.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There is inconsistency in language but that does not mean we are left with nothing but inconsistency. We do, after all, communicate and make ourselves understood.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Blame it on the inconsistency of language but you have completely misunderstood this. Sign-posts must be read according to rules. They do not contain the rules for reading them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Logic is not some independently existing entity that is employed in order to deal with rules.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is not a matter of determination by principle. The logic of the game is the rules by which the game is played. If you do not understand the logic of the game you could not know how to play.
As your example, of the media shows, it does not become meaningless. Meaning is use. Serving one's own purpose is inherently meaningful. Using a screw driver to kill someone is still meaningful to the person who does that, despite the fact that others judge it as a senseless, or meaningless act.
Let me explain my opinion a bit more clearly. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein posited the fundamental elements of language, pictures of the world, as the foundations of language and conceptualization. He later came to see how naive this was, that these fundamental pictures do not even exist, and that what is at the foundation of language is vague unbounded concepts. This is what he describes in Philosophical Investigations, such vague concepts where we might create boundaries to produce clarity for specific purposes. But in this description he now comes across the notion of seeking an ideal, some sort of absolute precision, or clarity in defining terms, to give an unmistakable understanding.
As I described to old, "the ideal" here in PI is similar, if not the same as Plato's "the good" in the Republic. So Plato's cave allegory is applicable. Wittgenstein frees himself from the cave, to see the sun, the ideal. In Plato's allegory, the philosopher is supposed to go back into the cave, to lead the others to the same revelation, toward the ideal. Instead, Wittgenstein goes back in the cave and tells the others not to look out there at the ideal, that we ought to stay within the cave and settle for what serves our purpose, instead of seeking the ideal.
So that is my opinion, at this point in the text. I see this as a deficiency in Wittgenstein's philosophy, but I may be inclined to change my opinion as things develop further in the text.
Quoting Fooloso4
The gaping hole is that he replaces the fundamental pictures at the foundation of language with vague, boundless concepts, families of meaning. Now there is nothing to account for any precision or clarity within language, except for a striving for clarity with regard to some purpose. So language only "works" in relation to a striving to achieve some purpose. The premise of the Tractatus, that it works because it consists of fundamental pictures of the world has been dismissed.
Quoting Fooloso4
The striving to achieve a purpose is absent from the Tractatus, but it is central now in PI. Without the premise of the Tractatus, the existence of any precision or exactness within language cannot be accounted for, unless it is produced from the desire to fulfil a purpose. The problem I see is that simply serving the purpose does not suffice for us, we always seek better, or more efficient ways of doing things. Therefore we cannot dismiss "striving for the ideal" as unreal, because it is very real, and highly evident.
Quoting Fooloso4
It is you who has misunderstood, please reread the 80's. The rule is a sign-post, that's why there may be ambiguity as to what the rule tells us. And this is how he avoids the infinite regress of requiring rules to read rules, which you and I discussed earlier. You seemed to not be concerned with that infinite regress. Wittgenstein was, and rightly so. "85. A rule stands there like a sign-post--"
What is at the foundation of language is, as he makes clear in On Certainty, quoting Goethe, is our acting in the world.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No. The ideal of absolute precision and clarity is based on the assumption of a logical structure underlying both language and the world. It is a holdover from the Tractatus, not something new and different. It is this structure that was presumed to allow for precision and clarity. The rejection of such a structure is not a rejection of precision and clarity. Unmistakable understanding does not require such precision and clarity, but that does not mean that we always understand things unmistakably. Whether we have understood can only be determined by the specifics of the case.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If I say "wait here" this does not mean that if you move an inch in one direction or another you are no longer standing here. If I am teaching you to play the violin, on the other hand, and I say "put your finger here" this requires a great deal more precision. If you do not put your finger in the right place you are not playing the right note, but on the other hand, microtonality might or might not be important. What is considered to be within the tolerable range of frequencies is not set. In fact, many musical instruments are designed and tuned to a compromise, that is, they use a tempered scale. One can, nevertheless, play music on a piano or guitar. To use another analogy, one does not use a micrometer to measure a piece of wood used to frame a house.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am not going to pursue that tangent, but this simply wrong.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A basic premise of the allegory is that the majority will never leave the cave. It is not that the philosopher will make philosophers of the unphilosophical but that he or she (Plato allowed for female philosophers) will rule the city based on his or her knowledge. The noble lie is essential to the city.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
To continue the cave analogy, the ideal is an image on the cave wall. An image the philosopher would recognize as such if he were able to break the chains.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He replaces it with observations about the actual practices of language. There is no foundation of language, just as there is no foundation of action.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is fundamentally wrong. The purpose is to see the limits of language and how they leave unsaid what lies beyond those limits, the ethical/aesthetic.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am not going to rehash that. My intent is to move forward, to get passed the stall that threatens to be terminal.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
An infinite regress is avoided by the correction of one's actions. If you have not followed the rule then corrective measures are necessary - the knight in chess moves like this and like this but not life that or that. Once the rule is followed correctly then nothing more is required. One could, as you seem to be doing, always find some possible exception, some perverse way of reading the rule that leaves it unclear what one is supposed to do, but this is not a deficiency of language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Standing there like a sign-post does not mean that it is a sign-post, but that it functions as a sign-post does. A pointed finger does not tell us in what direction to look. We learn how to read the sign. We learn the rule - look in the direction the finger is pointing. Those who have raised children and/or dogs knows that there is nothing inherent in the pointed finger, the sign-post, that tells us how to read it. They may look at the finger or back at the person pointing. One does not then look to other rules to explain how this rule is to be followed, but rather you may direct their attention by turning their head in the right direction or walking over to the thing you are pointing to. It is possible, however, that some may never get it. This does not mean that pointing is ineffectual even though it may be in this case.
I tend to agree with you here. Deception is a successful communication of meaning. In my view, it's better to read 'meaning is use' not as a theory (which is tempting) but rather as one of many pointers toward our automatic knowhow. Meaning as use, if taken too seriously, is one more metaphysical theory of meaning.
Thank you, and great post!
I'm starting to get the impression that you haven't read the Philosophical Investigations. He describes a striving for the ideal, check 98-110. The assumption that the ideal is there, made him strive to find it. So the assumption of the Tractatus then turns into a striving for the ideal expressed in PI. This becomes even more evident in On Certainty where he strives for the ideal of overcoming doubt, an objective certainty.
"105. When we believe that we must find that order, must find the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called "propositions", "words", "signs"."
Quoting Fooloso4
In Plato's cave allegory, the philosopher very definitely goes back into the cave to teach the others. The noble lie is irrelevant to this part of The Republic, and is related to Plato's proposed eugenics.
Quoting Fooloso4
You are placing the rule within the mind, a principle learned. But Wittgenstein places the rule outside the mind, like the sign-post. So the words we hear and read are themselves the rules, just like the sign-post itself. The rule is the finger pointing, it is not "look in the direction the finger is pointing". Looking in the direction the finger is pointing is the person's response to the rule, which is simply the finger pointing.
Please do not insult me. I do not generally discuss my background, but let it suffice to say my credentials say otherwise. I went against my better judgment by getting into this and so now I am getting out.
My apologies Fooloso4, insult was not intended. I was just stating an observation, and you did not supply your credentials as evidence of your credibility.
Thanks Luke, the issue with the self-proclaimed accredited Fooloso4 (insult intended) is the difference between "striving after an ideal" (expressed in PI), and the assumption of fundamental elements (Tractatus). Clearly there is a description of "striving after an ideal" in the PI which is absent in the Tractatus. It is absent in the Tractatus because the fundamental elements required for clarity in understanding are assumed to be right there, existing within our concepts. Now Wittgenstein has realized that they are not there, and the only thing which can take their place, to account for any existence of clarity in understanding, is a striving for such. That Wittgenstein directs us away from this notion of striving after an ideal, by "turning our whole inquiry around", instead of guiding us toward the ideal (as the philosopher in Plato's cave analogy does), is what I conclude as a deficiency in Wittgenstein's philosophy.
A surveyable representation, an übersichtlichen Darstellung, a representative overview is said to be of fundamental importance. For it is from this vantage point that we see connections between things, how they relate to each other.
An examination of grammar does not show these connections. The rules do not yield a representative overview. A representative overview, rather, makes clear how we have become entangled in the rules. The last remark regarding civil life may seem puzzling until we make the connection between language and life. The overview encompasses not just language but its place and function within our forms of life. Meaning is not determined by an analysis of grammar. Meaning is not in the rules.
The fundamental importance of an übersichtlichen Darstellung is something that Wittgenstein will continue to develop. He is no longer concerned with the Tractarian question of the conditions for the possibility of representation, but rather with the ways in which representation, how we picture things, is how we look at them, and can both stand in the way of and lead to new ways of seeing connections.
Perhaps I'm taking this out of context, or perhaps I'm just misunderstanding Wittgenstein, but this strikes me as not completely true.
What I have in mind is something like the following:
The order '+3', for example, has the meaning of taking the same step at the same point in one's caluclations. A Stop sign or a red light means you move or react accordingly - "green means go". Although I'm not trying to say that this sort of behavioural reaction to language/signs is always the case.
I know I haven't explained it very well. Maybe I'm just unclear on why you move from discussing the representative overview to discussing meaning.
He says at 125:
If one is entangled in the rules and the rules prevent one from saying what he means, then the meaning is not the rules. The survey, that is, the representative overview, throws light on this.
If one is able to follow the rule then he knows what he is to do, but we know that there are some who have a great capacity of misunderstanding. The rule says +3 but they interpret this perversely. They don't follow the rule because they do not understand what is meant by +3. Repeating the rule does not make its meaning clear to them.
What I think, is that the rule is "+3", as you indicate, the sign-post itself. According to the premise, "meaning is use", the meaning of the rule is what is intended (meant) by the speaker, in the particular instance of use, as per 117. We have no premise yet to assign universality, or generality to use, such as "green means go".
"117. You say to me: "You understand this expression, don't
you? Well then—I am using it in the sense you are familiar with."—
As if the sense were an atmosphere accompanying the word, which it
carried with it into every kind of application.
If, for example, someone says that the sentence "This is here"
(saying which he points to an object in front of him) makes sense to
him, then he should ask himself in what special circumstances this
sentence is actually used. There it does make sense."
The question now might be why am I inclined to do what the speaker intends of me, when the speaker uses the words, and I hear the words. Or, why am I inclined to use specific words in particular situations. At 139 this is expressed as "understanding" the word. Understanding the word might be like associating a picture with it. And at 140 there is a "force", or "compulsion" described, which may incline one to associate a particular picture with a particular word, rather than associating some other picture with that word, which would still be a possibility. Further, 141, we might remove the picture and replace it with a process, a "projection" or "application".
The full article can be found here, for those interested.
With regard to connections, I think there is a connection between what Wittgenstein says in the draft of Philosophical Remarks about writing only for the few, the key to the lock, and the importance of seeing connections. There are connections made in the text that are not made explicit, connections that we have to make if we are to unlock the door.
One suggestion is to pay attention to where there is a paragraph or two that seems out of place, disconnected with the issue that seems to be under discussion.
I trust that you are using the generic "you" here, as I was only trying to get a better handle on the section. I thought the article might be helpful to anyone else who might have had difficulty with the section.
Quoting Fooloso4
Just to return to this, would you agree that meaning can be found in the rules (perhaps even typically)? That is, unless one is entangled in the rules or interpreting them perversely? As I said initially, I did not want to take your comment out of context.
§89
§89 marks the beginning of a whole new line of discussion which deals with what Witty calls 'philosophy', and some of its methods, in this particular case, logic. The remarks from here on out can be thought of as something like 'applications' of the big discussions of simples and complexes and so on that have come before.
The crucial distinction that §89 institutes is that between logic, 'essences', and foundations on the one hand, and 'facts' and 'the empirical' on the other. This distinction will be crucial to Witty's understanding of philosophy's role and significance. What seems important to Witty is that in the realm of logic, no new facts can be learnt, at least, not in the way that one learns that, say, this fruit is round. Instead of new facts, a logical investigation, or an investigation into 'essences' reveals a new 'understanding'. So:
Logic : Understanding :: Empirical : New Facts
§90 continues to trade on the distinction between facts and logic introduced in §89, and firmly situates Witty's 'grammatical' investigations on the side of logic: "Our inquiry is therefore a grammatical one. And this inquiry sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away". Based on the remarks here we can expand the analogy I wrote for §89:
Logic : Understanding : 'Possibilities' of phenomena : Grammar : kinds of statement
::
Empirical : New Facts : Phenomena
§91 aims to head off a possible misunderstanding that §89 and §90 might foster: the idea that the 'understanding' gained by grammatical investigation might ever 'come to an end' - as though an exhaustive grammatical investigation might disabuse us our misunderstandings once and for all. Witty doesn't come right out and say it, but the obvious implication is that this is not at all the case.
One should relate this to the discussion of simples and complexes in the previous section: there, to recall, Witty notes that what counts as a simple and what counts as a complex is never absolute but always relative to a particular use of language: one can never exhaustively build-up the complexity of language from some given units/simples of language. If this is so, then no grammatical investigation - such as Witty's - would similarly be able to exhaustively 'analyse' language once and for all: the analysis itself would be parasitic upon the use.
§92 deals, somewhat, with the metaphorics associated with the misunderstanding detailed in §91, contrasting 'depth' and 'surface', and associating the desire for reaching a final, exahustive, understanding with the desire to uncover a hidden 'depth'. Key here, I think, is the idea that the depth is fixed, unshifting - or as Witty says: "given once for all, and independently of any future experience."
In contrast, one imagines, the 'surface' - what grammatical investigation really deals with - is not given and fixed, but shifting, open to change. Note that this means that the following correlation is not correct:
logic (grammar) : fact :: depth : surface
Grammar itself already lies on the 'surface'. In any case, the attempt to fix, either in advance or 'after' an exhaustive investigation (they amount to the same), 'what a proposition is' or 'what language is' (Platonic questions, both), is an error.
§36: "Where our language suggests a body and there is none: there, we should like to say, is a spirit."
"You" in this case meant me and "someone" is Sluga.
Quoting Luke
If one understands the rules then one knows what to do, but a set of rules is meaningless if one does not understand them. The meaning is not in the rules but in some larger activity. If, for example, the rules for how a knight or bishop moves in chess cannot be understood without knowing what these pieces are, that they are moved on a chess board, etc. The meaning of a word is found in its use. Rules or grammar determine proper and improper use.
I'm sure it's been mentioned (I know @Banno has), but the next few sections cannot be understood outside of the context of a self-critqiue of the Tractatus. It's this which helps understand the full import of §93 and §94, which otherwise come across - indeed, came across to me on first reading - as a rather thin effort to do nothing more than shift the rhetoric and poetics associated with propositions from 'remarkable' to 'ordinary'.
Yet while this effort to shift the language takes up most of the written real estate, the key term which explains what motivates Witty to argue for this shift is that of is that of 'uniqueness' (also found in §95, §96 and §97): the proposition as 'unique', as doing something that nothing else in the world does. Specifically - as that which allows language to be correlative of the world (§96: "Thought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, picture, of the world.").
It's precisely in the Tractatus that the proposition has exactly this 'unique' role attributed to it by Witty, in which the proposition 'pictures' reality by sharing the same 'logical form': this being the proposition's 'unique' characteristic which makes it 'remarkable' (hence the summary of Tractatus, not yet named in §96: "These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each.")
Compare, Tractatus:
2.026: There must be objects, if the world is to have unalterable form.
2.0271: Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is unchanging and unstable.
2.15: The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.
2.1514: the pictorial relationship consists of the correlations of the picture's elements with things.
2.1515: These correlations are, as it were, the feelers with which the picture touches reality.
As such the nincompoop who, in §93 and §94, remarks upon the 'remarkableness' of propositions is of course Witty himself. Of course this becomes absolutely clear in §97 where the Tractatus is mentioned by name, with the language even mirroring, and hence subverting, a passage that Witty himself cites 5.5563).
One of the really interesting things that happens in these PI sections is then to realize just how explosive the 'relativization' of the simple and the complex undertaken in the sections before (§48-§7xx) are to the Tractatus, which instead treats their relation as 'absolute', or, as Witty says in §97: "The order... which the world and thinking must have in common ... must be utterly simple. It is prior to all experience". Lots more to say about all these, but will stop for space's sake. Will only remark that the distinction between 'concepts' and 'super-concepts' at the end of §97 is lovely, and @Bannos reading of §95 is exactly what'd I'd mention, so I simply refer to that.
So, beyond the critique of the Tractatus that looms over this section (§89 onward), another unwavering thematic thread here is a critique of ideality. Witty's skepticism about the ideality and purity that certain views accord to language are on display all throughout the previous paragraphs, all generally invoked in a cynical rhetorical mood:
§97: "purest crystal"; §95: "purity" [of propositons]; §92: "essence"; §91: "final analysis" [of linguistic expressions], "complete exactness" [as a goal of investigation]; §89: Logic as "sublime", etc.
§98 takes up this theme explicitly, or rather, returns to §91, where Witty already voiced his dissatisfaction with ideas that analysis could lead to a state of "complete exactness" and finality. Here his skepticism is reiterated and affirmed: "we are not striving after an ideal". Yet despite all this, he wants to affirm a certain notion of perfection: "every sentence in our language ‘is in order as it is’. ... So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence."
So the question here is: what is the index or measure of Witty's renovated understanding perfection? One thing is clear: it does not have to do with perfection with respect to some a fixed/given/essence of language. One wants to say - although Witty does not yet at this point - that a proposition is instead perfect with respect to its use - and that uses are unfixed, not given/not grounded in 'essences'. Recall §87: "The signpost is in order a if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose." More to say about this 'positive' sense of perfection in the next paragraph.
But "perfect", "ideal" and "infinite" aren't passive and objective descriptions of my observations, rather they are expressions of active speech-acts I commit (including cravings I may have) in relation to my observations. For example, If I am hungry then A Big Mac might seem the "perfect" burger.
Presumably, this is how the later Wittgenstein understood ideality. Any advice he gives is therapeutic advice whose objective is to prevent cravings for cravings sake.
For example, this imagined polygon doesn't satisfy my striving for symmetry and smoothness. So i imagine a "limiting polygon" that I call a "perfect circle", where "limiting polygon" is my vague imagination of the Sun which is sufficiently vague and unstable that I cannot make sense of counting its sides. The image satisfies my craving, but not the striving.
Suppose "pi" defines the perfect circle. Do you think that striving to resolve the exact mathematical value of pi would be a case of striving after the ideal? We all think that pi has no end, and to prove that it has no end is a fruitless task, like proving infinite has no end. But what if someone found the end?
There is a connection here with 90:
The possibility of new discoveries and inventions is the possibility of new phenomena. An abuse of language stands in the way of such possibilities.
This inquiry is preliminary, clearing away misunderstanding by:
Wittgenstein makes a connection between the kinds of statements we make about phenomena, how we represent phenomena, and the possibilities of phenomena. Overcoming conceptual confusion engendered by an entanglement in grammatical rules requires seeing things from the perspective of a representative overview. A representative overview is not simply a matter of what is seen from this vantage point but via representing, picturing, conceiving, imagining.
The "fertile point of view" of "a Copernicus or a Darwin" is a conceptual revolution, the displacement of the Earth as the center or the rejection of kinds in favor of variations. We do not simply see things as the are but according to the way we represent or picture them.
With regard to himself, Wittgenstein says:
This is another way in which phenomena are made possible. Another way in which connections are made. Another way of seeing things.
One’s way of seeing things was of central importance to Wittgenstein:
http://waysofseeingwaysofseeing.com/ways-of-seeing-john-berger-15.7.pdf
If §98 tried to rescue a sense of perfection divorced from an ideal (where an ideal has the sense of a fixed 'essence' of langauge), §99 tries to specify in what way there may be a 'perfect order' of sense without that sense having to be what Witty calls 'determinate'. It harkens back to previous discussions about boundaries (§68-§88) and exactness (§88 in particular), where Witty says that words need neither in order to 'work. Recall:
§88: "If I tell someone “Stay roughly here” - may this explanation not work perfectly?"
In particular, §99 tries to head-off the objection that an 'indeterminate' sense - one without a strict boundary, like 'stay roughly there', is not 'good enough' to have, as it were, its own measure of perfection. In terms of §98, one can say that 'stay roughly here' 'is in order as it is'. It needs no further specification to be 'perfect' ... but not ideal.
More attempts to shore up how Witty's sense of perfection can quite easily abide by indeterminancy and vagueness. Strong theme of how the idea 'dazzles' us (§100), 'absorbs' us (§101), appear as 'something in the background' (§102), and seems 'unshakeable' (§103). I wonder how much of this is Witty again reacting against his former self. The glasses metaphor makes it all feel like a matter of trying to induce a gestalt shift, where either one's whole view (on the ideality of language) changes, or not at all.
Another theme that makes a reappearance here are rules (§100, §102), which also work perfectly fine when they are 'vague', and not 'strict and clear'.
Fair enough, and it's a caveat worth noting. However, I had already adopted this Wittgensteinian viewpoint when asking the question, so I had already assumed that our rules are embedded in "some larger activity". This leaves me to question the idea of a rule that you appear to be referring to which is somehow removed from this "larger activity".
Quoting Fooloso4
Right. Therefore, rules or grammar determine proper and improper meaning. In some sense, then, doesn't this indicate that meaning can be found in the rules?
<Wales| |England>
There might be a rule for signposts that a pointed end is used for direction indicators, and a flat end for boundary markers (along with the rule about how the point works). Equivalent to '<' = 'this way to' & '|' = 'This is".
|Wales| |England|
So these would have different meanings. But neither would mean the rule, and neither would mean anything much without the writing.
Sorry if I'm being dense, but it appears that the rule for the signposts is also what the signposts mean. For example, 'England>' means 'this way to England'.
Quoting unenlightened
That's kind of my point. Language is a part of the 'larger activity' into which rules (and signposts) are woven, taught and shared. It would be difficult to teach someone to play chess or the meaning of signposts if they did not speak the language.
This is the rule: '<' = 'this way to' & '|' = 'This is".
And it is nothing like what the signpost means. The rule is the thing you need to understand the signpost, and it is the thing, therefore, that the signpost cannot tell you.
" the rule for the signposts is also what the signposts mean". I know you are not dense, so I know you did not mean what this exactly says, so I hope you will excuse my lack of charity as an attempt to tease out something rather difficult to express, and avoid leading anyone else astray.
Incidentally, if folks will excuse the excess of reflexivity, look at the different uses in my previous post.
Punctuation used as elements in a picture (of a signpost)
Punctuation used in a semi-algebraic defining formula.
'Conventional' writing.
Amazingly, I never even thought about the complexity of this, and I just assumed that the intelligent reader would immediately pick up these three different systems, with entirely different rules and transpose between them with no difficulty, even though nowhere, I would imagine, is there any exposition of the rules of the 'unconventional' usages.
It also occurs to me to mention, in case it has escaped attention, that as with music theory, grammar is extracted by pedants from pre-existing communication. It starts as description and becomes prescription - we convene, and from there comes convention.
Perhaps this is different to what I was saying in my previous post, or different to what you took me to be saying, but couldn't you substitute "means" for "=" in your above explanation to maintain virtually the same meaning? i.e. This is the rule: '<' means 'this way to' & '|' means 'This is'.
Doesn't this indicate that there can be meaning in the rules?
This is where I believe Wittgenstein has gone off track. It appears like "stay roughly here" serves the purpose, but it really does not. if someone said that to me, I'd ask "What do you mean? Where are my boundaries? How long must I stay roughly here? Can I stray to the right, can I stray to the left? Can I go get lunch? What do you want from me? How do I know if I've complied with what you want? Is what you want something that I am willing to give?"
So, back at 68-69 he describes how we "we can draw a boundary—for a special purpose". I believe that each particular instance of use involves a special purpose, that's what defines a particular instance of use, its special purpose. And, each instance of use requires boundaries designed for that purpose. Therefore it is implied that boundaries are inherently necessary for each instance of use, and it is those boundaries which make the language useful.
Wittgenstein's attempt to remove the necessity of boundaries would render language completely useless. So boundaries are necessary and they are tailored to the circumstances. In the process of tailoring the boundaries we always seek the ideal. We seek the boundaries which are ideal for the particular situation.
That might be the case when someone who is unfamiliar with the larger activity comes across the rule, an anthropologist, for example, studying a tribe.
Quoting Luke
The syntactical rules determine word order or structure of a sentence but the understanding of the those rules do not tell us what it means to put the cat on the mat. If I do not know the grammar I might say: "Put you out the cat". You may understand each of the words but not the combination. If, on the other hand, the direction was grammatical you will not understand what you are to do unless you understand the meaning of each of the words. Then again, you might understand the words but still not understand what you are to do. What does it mean to put the cat out? Out of the room? Out of the house? Anesthetize? Are you to put the cat out just now or every time the cat is in?
What sort of rule might this be?
Quoting Fooloso4
Then how can it be that:
Quoting Fooloso4
If the meaning of a word is found in its (proper?) use, and if the rules determine proper use, then understanding the rules should lead to proper use/meaning...?
Quoting Fooloso4
Is this proper or improper use? On the one hand I understand each of the words (proper use?), but not the combination (improper use?).
Quoting Fooloso4
Is this proper or improper use? On the one hand the direction is grammatical (proper use), but I do not understand the meaning of each of the words (improper use?).
Quoting Fooloso4
Is this proper or improper use? On the one hand I understand the words (proper use?), but not what I am to do (improper use?).
You appear to be saying that rules and meaning come apart in the exceptions, in improper use, but we should expect to lose meaning (misunderstand) with improper use. My claim was minimally that there can be meaning in the rules. This appears to be so in cases of proper use: If rules determine proper use and if (proper?) use determines meaning, then one's proper use/meaning would demonstrate that one understands the rule(s).
I would also like to repeat unenlightened's insight which (I think) assists my claim, by blurring the distinction between the rules/grammar and "the larger activity" in which they find their home:
Quoting unenlightened
Edit: might have been this.
A troupe of monkeys has two alarm calls, one for raptors - a sky alarm - and one for ground predators. So a 2 word language - there's probably more, but never mind. So 2 sounds are differentiated, and used according to circumstances, and the use creates the association, and the association gives the meaning such that 'eek!' means 'beware above!', and 'ook!' means 'beware below!'. And understanding is shown by individuals' differentiated behaviour in response, moving down in response to 'eek!' and up in response to 'ook!'
And the functionality of this language allows an exploitation by an anti-social individual, who spots something tasty on the forest floor, and calls "Ook!". Everyone else climbs up and the liar has first dibs on whatever treat is on the ground. But if this becomes at all common, then the meaning of 'ook!' changes from 'beware below!' to 'something interesting below!' (might be a tiger, might be a pineapple).
Just as a path is made by walking on it, so a rule is made by following it. If breaking the rule becomes the rule rather than the exception, then the rule has changed. And the rage of grammarians is largely impotent.
So, for example, whenever I hear someone say "I genuinely believe..." I now expect whatever follows to be a fully conscious, deliberate lie, intended to deceive.
Any of the innumerable things the anthropologist observes the people doing that she does not understand the reason for or purpose of. Why does everyone turn in a counterclockwise circle three times before entering?
Quoting Luke
"Drive the nail with a screwdriver" is grammatically correct, but the grammar does not tell us what a nail or screwdriver or drive means. Correct grammatical usage is not the same as the use of the words nail, screwdriver, and drive. Correct grammatical usage does not tell us that hammers are used to drive nails. Grammar is structural, form without content. Without content there can be no meaning.
Quoting Luke
I do not see how this blurs the distinction. When we learn to speak we do not learn grammatical rules explicitly. And this may be sufficient. We do what others around us do, put words in the same order as others do, and are corrected when we don't. The grammatical convention already exists as part of the "pre-existing communication". Prescriptively, the study of grammar standardizes different conventions.
This is not Wittgenstein's idea of grammar.
What is his idea of grammar?
Quoting SEP article
Quoting G. P. Baker P. M. S. Hacker
And really - just go through the PI: every mention of 'rules' is saturated with a kind of scepticism and cynicism that the whole enterprise comes across warning against any kind of hypostatization of rules. Rules are everywhere spoken about with suspicion, if not outright derision (§81-§86 is full of just such skepticism, you can almost breathe it, reading those passages).
I'm reading Stanley Cavell right now, and his take on Witty and 'rules' seems much more apropos:
"In order for there to "be" such things as rules, we have to agree in our judgment that a rule has been obeyed (or not). (The rule itself is dead.) In order for there to be such things as (what we call) measurements, we have to agree in our judgment that a particular thing turns out to have such-and-such measurements. It is one thing to know that you measure length by successive layings down of a stick; it is some thing else to know that this object is just under fourteen sticks long. (The stick itself is dead. It doesn't tell you where to begin laying it down; what counts as succession; and when, and what to do if, the last laying down goes just over.)" (The Claim of Reason, p.36, my emphasis): the rule itself is dead - this seems to me far more in the Wittgenstinian spirit than 'language is governed by rules'.
If Wittgenstein shows that "rules can and do play different roles in language", then clearly there are "rules...in language". These rules must govern the language, given that is the purpose of rules.
Also, I don't really see much difference in the roles played by rules at §54. Wittgenstein identifies a particular rule being used (i) as an aid in teaching the game, or (ii) as a tool of the game itself. Otherwise, he notes that an observer might be able to detect the rules of the game "from the way the game is played". That's not a whole lot of different roles, and the role of (i) is only to prepare the pupil for the role of (ii) when they start playing the game.
Quoting StreetlightX
Wittgenstein is right to ridicule "rules governing rules ad infinitum". But you have provided no evidence that he somehow views "rules 'governing' language" in a similar fashion.
Quoting StreetlightX
This appears to be a Cavellian, not a Wittgensteinian view. There is some evidence in the text that Wittgenstein considers language to be governed by rules, even if you think that this is a heavily conditional claim to the point of being empty. For example:
Furthermore, if Wittgenstein does not consider language to be rule-governed, then why does he spend much time discussing rule-following (§185-242)? Why does he mockingly ask: "Are the rules of the private language impressions of rules?" (§259)
Perhaps further clarification can again be provided by the Stanford Encyclopedia:
Quoting SEP article
Quoting StreetlightX
[quote=W]There can be no debate about whether these or other rules are the right ones for the word “not” (I mean, whether they accord with its meaning). For without these rules, the word has as yet no meaning; and if we change the rules, it now has another meaning (or none), and in that case we may just as well change the word too.[/quote]
Rules of use, (grammar) determine sense. Without these rules a word has no meaning, meaning is use.
A path is made by walking on it; a language is made by speaking thus and not so. If Batman says "Holy Wittgenstein, Robin!" every time he is confused, we will soon enough come to understand what he means.
If I state that there is a rule "I must not tread on the cracks in the pavement", but then, on finding my step too ungainly I make another "I must not tread on the cracks in the pavement, except every third step, when I may", are the rules 'governing' my walk? Clearly not. There are rules, that much is evident, but it wouldn't be right to say they 'governed' my walk. What's clearly governing my walk is my desire for it to be gainly. As soon as some rule clashes with that desire it is modified to suit.
The fact that rules have roles is what Wittgenstein is using here to try and show that it is the role, not the rule, that governs language.
Exactly. So the satisfaction of some other objective is what truly governs play. If the rules no longer suit it, they are changed. The rules are a convenience, an aide memoir for what worked last time.
This is a muddle. Witty never speaks about 'rules of use'. You won't even find the three words, in that order, in the text. There's good reason for that: specifically, rules do not govern use. Second, rules are not (Wittgensteinian) grammar. They are not synonyms and you won't find that equation in the text either. Meaning is use in a language-game; not, meaning is use governed by rules.
Quoting Luke
That there are rules in language is not under debate. The question is about their role in language. That rules can 'govern language' is also not under debate. The question is whether such 'governance' - another word that appears nowhere in the PI with respect to rules - exhaustively characterizes language, on Witty's view.
--
I mean seriously, if the PI amounted to 'language is a rule governed activity', one wouldn't need to read a jot of it. One would just need to listen to your grade school teacher. As if Witty were just some philosophical enforcer for grammar school disciplinarians. Hopefully we get to the sustained rule following discussions further on in the text, with an eye to these questions. It might clear things up.
You are right, but you cited unenlightened saying: "grammar is extracted by pedants from pre-existing communication. It starts as description and becomes prescription - we convene, and from there comes convention." He is not referring to Wittgenstein's idea of grammar and I was responding to this.
The article describes grammar as a:
Rules and actions are not the same. It is not some network of rules but what we say and do that determines usage. It is not so much a network of rules but a network of beliefs and practices. The difference between the Tractatus and the PI is that in the Tractatus the structure is transcendental, but in the PI the rules are arbitrary, part of a form of life.
When he says that:
He does not mean that there are rules that tell us what kind of thing something must be, what God or soul is or how we must use the terms, but rather that an overview of the way in which the terms are used indicates what is meant by the terms in this or that language game. Seeing how the terms are used requires an overview of the literature, prayers, practices, etc.
Quoting Luke
Consider the builder's language. How does "slab" come to mean "bring me a slab"? The rule is established in practice. It is the practice that governs the language. When we do as others do it might be said that we are following a rule, but we are simply following along. Suppose we learn what to do by following someone whose actions include a tic. It is not hard to imagine a generation that thinks copying the tic is part of the rules for what to do, and it becomes so.
I don't think this is correct, context is what determines sense, not rules of use. This is what Wittgenstein is getting at, each instance of usage is a particular case, with a specific purpose, and the meaning of the words used is unique to that particular instance of use. That's the basis of "meaning is use".
[quote=PI]125 ... The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique,
for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not
turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled
in our own rules.
This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e.
get a clear view of).
It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those
cases things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is
just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: "I didn't
mean it like that."
The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is
the philosophical problem.
126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither
explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view
there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no
interest to us.
One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible
before all new discoveries and inventions.
127. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders
for a particular purpose.[/quote]
That cannot be true.There must be some consistency of use, to be able to use words at all. Even my lying monkey is using 'ook' ground-wise. 'Slab' means slab, the same every time. it might mean pass a slab, I want a slab, have you a slab, look there's a slab, slabs are the greatest, this is a slab... it always means slab-wise.
{Here is a thing, let me describe it to you. It's somewhat blockblockblock or else somewhat
slab
slab
slab.
Don't drop it on your foot! Let's call it a lintel, it might come in handy for something. } There might be some uniqueness here, but also much conformity.
Good point Streetlight. This is why it's difficult to develop a theory that fits Wittgenstein's ideas, that is, there are too many variables involved. To say that language is governed by rules, is like saying chess is governed by rules. It's tautological, and it doesn't tell us much about the game itself. There is much more to a good move in chess than just understanding the rules. One must be careful not to turn Wittgenstein's words into dogmatic jargon.
Even when we do an exegesis of Wittgenstein's writings the tendency is to interpret his words in a way that violates the very things he is fighting against. In other words, our analysis of what he's saying tends to be the kind of analysis that Wittgenstein is criticizing, not always, but much of the time. We tend to look at his thinking in terms of - is this true or false, but there is a sense where it goes beyond this kind of bipolar thinking.
Exactly. A problem which has dogged much of this thread. Wittgenstein writes a book which intends to point the way to a method of thinking which goes beyond the finding of facts...and generations of philosophy students immediately spend years trying to discover all the 'facts' in it.
Not at all. Words evolve into meanings radically different from their original use and they would not be able to do so if they were so constrained.
Chimpanzees use sticks to extract ants, but what they use to do this job could just as easily be used to comb hair. It's just a stick. A screwdriver is actually designed to drive screws. Whilst it could be used to do other things, the purpose is discernable from an analysis of its structure.
Tractatus Wittgenstein saw language as the screwdriver, Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein sees it as the stick.
Yes. In my 2 word monkey-language example, I described such an evolution through the use of a word to deceive. And by that I mean ...
When things evolve they are related. Have a slab of cake and calm down. Don't cement it into the wall though.
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein sees language in very precise terms, that is, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the names within a proposition and the objects that make up facts. So, he sees propositions in very exact terms in the Tractatus, that is, it's more of an a priori investigation. His aim is to justify the vagueness of propositions (Nb p. 70), which is also his aim in the Investigations, although the method in the PI is more of an a posteriori investigation. His goal is the same, but the methods are very different (to repeat).
It's probably the case that teaching children in the early 20's helped him view language in a much more pragmatic way. We know that children have understood a word by how they use the word in a variety of situations and contexts.
It wasn't so much your monkey language as your contention that "'Slab' means slab, the same every time. it might mean pass a slab, I want a slab, have you a slab, look there's a slab, slabs are the greatest, this is a slab... it always means slab-wise."
'Naughty' used to just mean impoverished, now it means badly behaved. 'Clue' used to refer to a ball of wool, now it is some data indicating a conclusion. 'Silly' used to mean blessed, now it means facetious.
These are not words that even continue to mean x-wise. They just mean something completely different, occasionally almost opposite. Nor is this process a gradual evolution. Practically overnight Michael Jackson made 'bad mean 'good'.
Yes, that's kind of what I meant by my analogy. That a proposition, correctly worded, represents one thing and one thing only, like the screwdriver does one thing and one thing only.
Quoting Sam26
Yes, but does he not go on to say "It is clear that I know what I mean by the vague proposition", I think the one-to-one correspondence is part of the aim, and I would probably say that makes a significant enough difference.
Quoting Sam26
Yes, that's an interesting idea. Afterall, children are also where one can see what adults consider to be nothing more than a block of wood stand in for anything from a spaceship to a football goal.
If you're asking this in reference to the Tractatus, the answer is, I believe, yes, that is, even a vague proposition in the Tractatus had a very precise nexus to the world of facts.
§104
I'm slightly stumped on this and wonder if anyone might provide some extra commentary and thoughts: when Witty speaks about the possibility of comparison, what two things are being compared? (1) The thing and (2) The mode of representation? If so, in what does this comparison consist? And when he speaks of 'a highly general state of affairs', my assumption is that a distinction is being made between that and a 'specific' or circumscribed state of affairs. But how to characterise the difference between the two?
Apart from these the general gist I get is something like: don't confuse our use of grammar for the 'way things are'. Or: don't project our grammar, which bears upon our 'mode of representation', onto the things themselves. I'm not comfortable with these formulations which smell too much of metaphysics. And they seem out of keeping with the paragraphs both before and after it. Any thoughts?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/261068
I don't know about that, "consistency" is something other than simple use. It might be an attribute, a type of use. But meaning is restricted to use here, as the premise, and if consistency enters the picture, then that is another thing. This is the problem of "types" which Wittgenstein exposed earlier. What is exposed is a lack of consistency. If I point to a particular rock and call it "slab", then to maintain consistency, every time I say "slab" I ought to be referring to that particular rock. But that's not the case, "slab" is used to refer to a type, and therefore many different rocks. So the notion of "consistency" is misleading to us, and we ought to move away from that. Now we move to a family of different meanings, different uses, and this difference demonstrates a type of inconsistency. It appears like Wittgenstein is focusing on inconsistency in use, rather than consistency.
I think that's the point of the passage I quoted, 125-127. We get caught up in this idea that everything goes according to rule (consistency), but that's really not the case, as every instance of use is unique.
I agree, 104 seems to be right out of context. I'll see if I can make sense of it.
I believe that in this section, 100-108, he begins by referencing the primary elements of the Tractatus. He has already dismissed this idea of material elements of fundamental clarity, upon which language and logic is based, but he still references them as "ideals", which we, for some reason, think must be there. At 100, a game can exist without them. But what kind of "game" could that be? It seems like logic would be impossible -101. The fundamental elements of clarity must be there somewhere, hiding in the background -102. It appears like we cannot dispense the notion, like glasses we cannot take off -103.
I think that what is described at 104 is the primary act of abstraction. Predication is that fundamental act by which we take the particular thing, and say something general about it. This is what allows comparison. To put this in context of the ideal which he is discussing, I would say that "highest generality" implies this ideal. So I think he is saying that we are mislead into believing that this fundamental abstraction, this act of predication is an ideal, the highest form of generality, upon which the strength of logic is based. But really, when he turns things around at 108, it may turn out to be the lowest form of generality. What we thought was the most ideal, the fundamental predication, is really the least ideal.
At 105, we don't find the purity of the ideal, here in the fundamental abstraction of the predication, and this dissatisfies us because now we cannot support the rigour of logic. So at 106 he wants to turn way from this highly formal mode of thinking (logic) to everyday thinking because the ideal which was required of logic is just not there. So we need to look at everyday thinking to see what really supports logic. And this is very evident at 107, what was required of logic, that it proceeds from pure, solid principles, is just not there, and our everyday thinking shows us that our thinking is really the opposite of this, we proceed from vague uncertainties, attempting to clarify them. And this is the turning around which he speaks of at 108. Aristotle stated that logic proceeds from the more certain toward the less certain, but maybe he really had things reversed.
The comparison is [edited] a mode of representation - we see the thing in relation to what we are comparing it to. But this is not "the perception of a highly general state of affairs". What we see is the thing as it stands in relation to whatever it is we have compared it with. If we did not make the comparison we would not see it in that way.
It is not a question of whether it is right or wrong to do this. Such a comparison can be misleading but it could also lead to some insight. It is exactly what Wittgenstein does with his multiple examples.
I think 104:
should be read in the context of 101->103, and the broader context of Wittgenstein's critique of idealised approaches to language. I think 'we predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it' is fleshing out how we 'find' the ideal in language in the sense of 101:
our 'absorption' in the problematic of a pure philosophical language of expression, or a universal logic, invites us to 'see' or 'perceive' (note the two perceptual terms in 101 and 104!) the linkage between 'the thing' and 'the method of representing it' as logically prefigured/framed in terms of such an ideal language. Specifically, this ideal logical structure is posited 'of the thing' through 'the method of representing it', and this positing opens (and invites exploration of) a 'background' for us to uncover (under the problematic of idealised logic/language):
I read it like the 'background' and 'the method of representing it' are collapsed into logical formalism by this 'idealised language' interpretive habit that Wittgenstein diagnoses of philosophers. But the link between the two isn't interpreted as a logical or rational pivoting about a concept, the link is 'seen' -or posited prior to inquiry- through the drive to abstract/ideal logical formalism. Wittgenstein likens this drive towards the ideal in 103 to putting on a pair of spectacles:
I think a more precise metaphor would be rose tinted glasses, where 'seeing things in a rose tint' is a constraint placed on philosophical discourse to idealise/abstract towards logical formalism capturing the 'essence' of language. The 'essence' of language, the ideal of it, plays the role of the inescapable rose colour implicated in seeing all things; but no argument demonstrates that all is rose tinted, it's 'put there' by one's style of philosophical thought. For one who believed that all philosophy requires arbitrarily donning such glasses; that philosophy begins with a confused and limited apperception;, it is not surprising that they would reject the entire enterprise.
Edit: perhaps another good analogy is this:
[math]p \wedge (p \rightarrow q) \vdash q[/math]
show that to someone who hasn't learned to process propositions in logical syntax and it wouldn't mean a damn thing. We have to 'learn to see' the connections between natural language argument forms and the modus ponens. The 'representation' of our argument forms (in terms of validity, soundness, truth functionality and so on) consists in fabricating rules for propositional calculi spurned on by real argument patterns, and then we may say that the above formula is modus ponens. Even someone who understood how to argue using the modus ponens syllogism would not necessarily immediately 'map' it to the representation of it in the theory. We have to do a lot of conceptual prefiguring to analogise reasoning with a logical calculus; and if we 'see' language as logical in the sense of a calculus, this consists in a 'comparison' of the thing (modus ponens argument forms in natural language) with its means of representation (the above formula) - a good fit between the two invites us to study more. Even though we had to lose a lot of the structure of arguments to 'reveal' their propositional form. Thus the revelation is, too, of a constrained domain of concepts; reading back the means of representation into the thing we represented using them always suggests 'depth' in the sense of a background to explore; why is it that arguments bear a relation to the notion of truth functionality? Why is it that meaningful language [s]in propositional calculus[/s] consists of truth functions of propositions? There is always the danger of forgetting the constraints or simplifications we take to embark upon an inquiry when we discover a 'background' which underlays everything within the constrained conceptual space whose boundaries are those set by our inquiry.
eg, the idealised language philosophy criticised doesn't 'pivot' around any adequate apperception of the structure in language. In my example, what is determinative for propositional calculi is a filtered representation of the elements of language and their relationships in argument; there's no room for questions, doubts, beliefs, appeals to emotion, reframing attempts and so on, because they are excluded from the 'philosophical grammar' applied to language through the rose tinted glasses. What was excluded from the logical artifice of 'crystalline purity' was the broader structure of language and behaviour; ratiocination in this realm of purity consists in the production of well formed formulae - none of which can be questions, reframing attempts, metaphors, analogies or appeals to structural similarity.
By treating the means of representation of propositions and their logic as the idealised representation of propositional calculi (or the more general one in the Tractatus), much of the world becomes thought of only in category errors - how can any expression have sense if it does not resemble only those things which were posited to?
There's probably an interesting analogy to Kant here, with regard to transcendental illusions.
[quote="SEP" article on Kant's Critique of Metaphysics]Kant identifies transcendental illusion with the propensity to “take a subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts…for an objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves” (A297/B354). Very generally, Kant’s claim is that it is a peculiar feature of reason that it unavoidably takes its own subjective interests and principles to hold “objectively.” And it is this propensity, this “transcendental illusion,” according to Kant, that paves the way for metaphysics. [/quote]
Wearing the 'rose tinted glasses' or the 'spectacles' invites us to see 'the connection of our concepts' (in the ideal domain of an abstract logical language) as of 'objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves' (the rough ground of ordinary language)- rather than as a limitation of the vantage point we viewed 'the things' (language) from.
In the version I've been using, just below 109 is the comment:
the inappropriate substitution of our conceptual links and tokens within an account for the real structure of the desired topic is exactly the logic of seeking such an 'ideal' and therefore seeing it everywhere; it is not a simple mistake, the conceptual structure of ideal language is very rigorous and its internal links are self consistent - but the endeavour of trying to picture language (and language as a picture) in this way is misguided when dealing with all the ambiguities and subtleties of the huge scope of natural language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If you shout 'banana', when there is a wolf, it is no use, no one will come to your aid to fight a banana; you have to shout 'wolf'. On the other hand, if you make a habit of shouting 'wolf' when there is no wolf to fight because you like to see folks running, then that consistency will be learned, and when there is a wolf and you shout, no one will come. Every wolf is unique, and every wolf attack is unique, but every wolf attack demands the same call, and every non wolf attack demands the same call not be made (where 'same' is roughly but recognisably - 'Woolve' would probably be near enough, and it is the near enough ness that allows language to be mutual. And being mutual (and thus consistent) is necessary to language being useful, rather than decorative.
The way I read it, is that one compares, maybe, red and green and becomes (overly) impressed with the significance of 'colour', as if does some work as the generality of how things can look, as opposed to marking out another possible look of things as 'colourless'.
I agree, but as with much of Wittgenstein, this is one aspect of a larger issue. Note, for example:
It seems problematic to say that one knows something but cannot say it when thinking of the first example, but not the third.
Going back a bit further:
Note how frequently in the passages between 66 and 78 (and elsewhere as well) he not only says "compare" but makes comparisons. It is this method of comparison that is of central importance. There is a clear connection with questions of language, but if one is looking for an übersichtlichen Darstellung, a representative overview or surveyable representation or perspicuous representation, then limiting the comparison to linguistic matters foreshortens one view. The Tractarian distinction between seeing and saying is still at work here, although it functions differently.
I did not mean to suggest otherwise, to the bolded statement. Wittgenstein's analysis of language in the PI always has a certain context (behavioural, social, game-inspired, later perspectival) in mind, and the context varies over the examples he uses. He uses the examples to reveal general features of language use, and portraying the commonalities between them is as much his 'method' of analysis as it is the bulk of our exegesis of the text. His emphasis on examples is what I was trying to ape by using the example of propositional logic - to highlight what it leaves out, and what a view from it looks like.
And I did not mean to imply that you did. It is a common misconception though, so I wanted to address it.
I also used it as an opportunity to continue the development of the theme of a surveyable representation.
So, at any point in the text he might be talking about something very specific but it is the landscape he wants us to see.
But we're talking about meaning, "use", and when I shout "banana" it has meaning regardless of whether anyone understands my use,and comes to my aid, or not. That "banana" is not the best thing to shout in that situation is the reason why I argue that we ought to always be seeking the ideal when choosing our words.
Quoting unenlightened
This is the matter of "serving the purpose". If shouting "banana" does not serve the purpose, then I have a problem. I am using "banana" in a certain way, but it is proving to be not a very useful way, like hitting a nail with the screwdriver is not very useful. It would be incorrect to say that I am not using the screwdriver to hit the nail, when I actually am, but still that particular use is turning out to be not very useful. A word like "woolve" might serve the purpose, but then again, it might not, so it is clearly less than ideal. A hammer might appear to be the ideal tool for banging nails, until someone shows up with an air-nailer. Then we have a distinction to make between "serving the purpose" and "ideal".
Google dictionary defines a rule as: "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity."
Rules govern procedure. What "other objective" do you have in mind that "truly governs play"? You seem to assume that when I speak of a rule, that it must be something permanent and immutable. If we alter the rules as we go along, this doesn't mean that there are no longer any rules.
Quoting StreetlightX
Why is that the question? Nobody has made such a claim.
Quoting StreetlightX
So you're saying that "rule" is an empty concept and that "the rule is dead", but also that "obviously there are rules in language - just ask your grade school teacher"?
Quoting Fooloso4
Perhaps, but this was before I realised what sort of "grammar" you had in mind and before the topic changed, while I was arguing that meaning can be found in the rules. I was trying to find some support that meaning, grammar and form of life were more closely interwoven and less distinct than you appeared to allow. I was referring in particular to unenlightened's statement that "grammar is extracted...from pre-existing communication". I think this is close to Wittgenstein's view - perhaps not so much that it is "extracted", but that we should look to pre-existing communication to determine what it is.
Quoting Fooloso4
Therefore, the practice is the rule?
Quoting Fooloso4
What's the difference?
Paraphrasing §199: To follow a rule...is a custom (usage, institution).
§50: "This sample is an instrument of the language, by means of which we make colour statements. In this game, it is not something that is represented, but is a means of representation ... : if this thing did not exist, we could not use it in our language-game. a What looks as if it had to exist is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our game; something with which comparisons are made. And this may be an important observation; but it is none the less an observation about our language-game - our mode of representation".
In this light, I read §104 something like this: insofar as a great deal of our grammar involves 'fixing' our samples around which our language-games are built ("this is a meter. Now we can talk measurement") it is a mistake to project this fixing of grammar into nature itself, as it were. That we measure like so and not otherwise is a function of our grammar (itself a function of our forms of life), and is an index of human involvement.
This index, the fact that it is we who fix the terms of our grammar, marks our use of language as irreducibly 'specific', rather than (a) 'general' (state of affairs): our use of language does not reflect some underlying, eternal structure of the world (qua the Tractatus), but only our specific, human, purpose-bound use of language. So that's the 'general' bit, and how §104 fits in with the rest of the sections around it.
Last, the comparisons we make (this is one meter, that is two), seem, after the fact of fixing, to be a natural, fixed (read: general) state of affairs. Somehow, everything can be measured in meters and bits thereof! How wonderful! We are 'impressed' by this. And our being impressed leads us, once again, to generalise and see language as reflecting an underlying essence of the world, effacing the specifically human contingencies and necessities that govern our use of language.
There's a vignette, either in the PI or the Remarks on Mathematics - I can't remember - where Witty speaks of teaching someone how to count by adding n+1, which he does perfectly fine up to 200, at which point he starts adding 2; then adding 3 at 300, and so on, all the while insisting that he is adding n+1. Witty insists that at this point, this is 'just what that person does': here is where 'reasons give out': this way of counting is nor more or less 'correct' than ours, and is as 'specific' and 'not general' as our own way of counting. The mistake once again is to project our 'mode of representation' into the thing itself: to imagine that counting must be this way and not that, reflective of some underlying essence of counting.
Ok, I can move on now :D
Why do you think these are somehow incompatible? Maybe that might throw light on where, if anywhere, we disagree.
These sections seem to elaborate on the metaphorics of 'depth' first mentioned in §89. The rough idea seems to be that we want to look 'beneath' language (in all its messiness) to find the ideal. "What we ordinarily call 'sentences', 'words', and 'signs'" (§105), when measured against this (fantasy) of ideality, seem to come up short, as though they were not good enough. The "real sign" (Platonic?) must be found amid (beneath?) the jungle of appearances.
So there's a divergence, a splitting of paths, between the ideal and the actual, as it were: "the greater becomes the conflict between it [actual language] and our requirement" (§107). Witty emphasizes, importantly, that the ideal is, in fact, a 'requirement': it is not something found or 'discovered', but rather posited, or projected from without.
And so §107 ends with the famous exhortation to go "back to rough ground!", to give up the requirement that language meet our (unreasonable?) expectations of ideality. Pay attention to the actual, not the ideal: 'from close up' (§51). We must stop measuring the actual by the standard of the ideal. The glasses must come off (§103).
§108 can be partly read as a rejoinder to §93/95/96 where Witty was making fun of those who - like his previous self - insisted on the 'uniqueness' of the proposition. Here, Witty makes the complimentary claim that "propositions" and "language" are, instead, "a family of structures" - there is no 'formal unity' that underlies them.
It then goes asks to ask after the consequences of this shift for logic, and concludes that once again, it's simply a 'preconception' that must be removed, a preconception that does not make logic lose any of it's rigor. I'm reminded of dumbo, who can fly without his feather. Also, randomly, the last remark about 'real need' reminds me of Marx. Maybe @fdrake might be able to make a more substantive conceptual connection.
I'm not going to play a guessing game regarding your views, particularly since you provided only a very brief reply to my previous post on the matter. I have already provided a response to your claims regarding the "differential nature of rules" and Wittgenstein's alleged ridicule of the notion that "using words in speech is a rule-governed activity", as per the quote from Baker and Hacker.
There's a bit of a problem here philosophically though, because "our real need" is just another ideal. You'll find this ideal if you study Christian moralists. You'll see a distinction between the apparent good, and the real good (wants and needs). I believe this distinction dates back to Aristotle, more fully developed by Aquinas. The "real good", here "our real need", is an ideal, despite the material basis of this idea. The chimeric characteristic of "our real need" is a product of the uniqueness of material beings, evident in the concept of life forms.
So as much as it may appear like Wittgenstein has removed "the ideal" from the description, as a false requirement, he has really just superseded the ideal which is required for sound logic (epistemological ideal) with the ideal which is required for sound moral principles (ontological ideal). This is completely consistent with his description of language as a human activity rather than as a system of symbols for representation. Now meaning is based in fundamental, material human needs (the Marxist social structure) rather than relations between symbols and what is represented.
[quote=Philosophical investigations]133. It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for
the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But
this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping
doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy
peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself
in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples;
and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
... [/quote]
"The ideal" is right back in the picture in a different guise. One ideal has been replaced by another as the philosopher moves from epistemological problems to moral problems. The former being unresolvable due to the existence of the latter.
Suppose I ask: "What are they doing?" and you answer "Following the rule". "What is the rule?" "What they are doing".
Quoting Luke
If I see a group of people walking and decide to follow them what rule am I following? Is the rule: 'follow these people'? You point to 199, but it asks:
And his answer is that it is not possible.
Are they following a rule by going wherever it is that they are going? Am I also following this rule even though I do not know where they are going? What if they are just wandering about. Is the rule to wander? How does one know in which direction to wander? Is there a rule for wandering?
Quoting Luke
But this is not what it says. He does not say simply to follow a rule is a custom but:
To play a game of chess is not follow a rule or set of rules. There is no rule that says I must move this piece rather than that. The game is played in accord with the rules.
To follow a rule may be a custom but a custom is not simply following a rule. Here's a quick story to illustrate, something I heard on the radio. A cookbook author was talking about her mother's recipe for brisket. Following what her mother always did, before putting the roast in the pan she would cut off a piece at the end. After doing it this way for years one day she asked her mother why she did it that way. Her mother answered: "Because otherwise it would not fit in the pan". The daughter was not following a rule that one must cut off the end. If her mother had a larger pan or a smaller brisket she would not have had to cut off the end. But the daughter thought she was following a rule by doing what her mother always did.
Quoting StreetlightX
Wittgenstein often circles back in this way. There is so much going on that it is easy to forget the connections.
More on the theme of a surveyable representation:
Suppose I ask: "What are they doing?" and you answer ''Following the practice", "What is the practice?" "What they are doing". No less clear, but no different.
Quoting Fooloso4
What is the practice supposed to be here?
Quoting Fooloso4
To play a game of chess is to follow a set of rules. The set of rules, or the practice, constrains the possible moves, determining what move is allowed and what isn't. In other games, they might determine what makes sense and what doesn't. The rules or the practice of playing chess does not involve the millions of permutations that the game can be played out.
Quoting Fooloso4
What does this example have to do with a custom? It's not really the kind of communal custom that I think Wittgenstein had in mind.
As a preamble to this endeavour, let me say that the concept of "understanding" seems to have fallen through the cracks in modern philosophy. It's neglected by epistemology which deals with the difference between knowing and not knowing, and neglected by philosophy of mind which deals with the thing which is supposed to know. "Understanding" may be characterized as the process whereby a mind moves from not knowing something, to knowing that thing.
In the classical Aristotle-Aquinas tradition this would be a process of habituation. Knowledge, as what a mind has, can be described as a habit of the living active human being. It's the tendency to think in a particular way. Aristotle first described "habit" in this way, as a property of a living being, the propensity for a certain type of potential to be actualized in a particular way. Aquinas developed theory concerning all sorts of habits, including the habits of the intellect. "Habit" was a very important concept in philosophy, being used to explain the properties of living beings, until the arrival of evolutionary theory. A great rift developed, between Lamarckian evolutionary theory which grounded evolutionary changes in habit, and Darwinian theory which grounded changes in chance variations. It appears that as a result of this great divide, and the western world's adoption of Darwinism, "habit" has been relegated to the furthest limits of respectable science.
I believe we will find a resurgence of the concept of "habit" (though not under that name), in this section of the Philosophical Investigations. We might find that Wittgenstein seeks to replace the notion of learning a principle, with the idea of developing a particular habit.
§109 makes good on the distinction - first drawn in §89 - between facts and understanding. Recall:
§89: "Not, however, as if to this end we had to hunt out new facts; it is, rather, essential to our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view".
It's in this sense, that 'our considerations' do not uncover new facts, that they "must not be scientific ones" (§109). They bear, that is, upon what Witty in §89 referred to as 'logic', rather than 'the facts of nature' or 'causal connections'. §109: "Philosophical problems... [are] not empirical problems; but they are solved through an insight into the workings of our language"
And as far as what should happen to that 'logic', or the 'workings of our language' its a case of removing any normative content from it: of getting rid of any 'requirement' (§107) or expectation to which logic ought to aspire to (§101: "The idea now absorbs us that the ideal ‘must’ occur in reality. ... [one] doesn’t understand the nature of this “must”. We think the ideal must be in reality; for we think we already see it there). In removing any aspirations to normativity (to an ideal which logic 'ought to' or 'must' conform to) we are left with only description:
§109: " All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place".
This is why "we may not advance any kind of theory": the 'method' of the investigations is to 'look from close up' at the 'actual' workings of language, and not advance ideas about how it should (the ideal) (Recall the distinction in §107 between the actual and the ideal: "the greater becomes the conflict between it [actual language] and our requirement [the ideal]").
This helps explain the otherwise perhaps enigmatic comments about how "The feeling ‘that it is possible, contrary to our preconceived ideas, to think this or that’ - whatever that may mean - could be of no interest to us": I read this saying that it's not a case of replacing one theory by another, but as displacing 'theory' altogether. Ending, of course, on the (in?)famous definition of philosophy as "a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language." ('Understanding' here being a more 'technical' term for Witty than might often be supposed).
---
Pneuma
Lastly, as a note of interest, I did some quick research on the strange and parenthetical remark about the 'The pneumatic conception of thinking': Witty's understanding of pneuma here seems to be less about 'air', as our modern understanding of it tends to be (Anscombe's translation runs: 'The conception of thought as a gaseous medium') than it has to do with an older meaning related to pneuma as a kind of body, or rather spiritual body: in the ancient understanding, the pneuma was understood to be the medium that allowed communication between body and soul, as might be glimpsed in the cognate phantasm, as a kind of 'substance'.
There's alot more to it, but the 'pneumatic conception of thinking' seems to relate to the idea of thought as being 'substantial', of having a body or scaffolding which is structured as such. Joachim Schulte puts it as such: "The central idea is that the core of language contains a scaffolding of rules whose ("pneumatic") substance is the same as that of our thought." Elsewhere (I lost the link and cbf to find it again), Witty is said to have preferred the word 'ephemeral' to translate 'pneumatische'). In any case, this also links this idea to what Witty elsewhere in the PI criticises as 'spirit' and 'illusion' (again, 'phantasm').
Brilliant account.
The question of practice comes from my comment:
Quoting Luke
My example of following was intended to get at the distinction between following along and following a rule. There may have been no practice of following along and it is not clear whether what they are doing is part of a practice. It may have simply been what they all did on that one occasion.
Quoting Luke
Let's play. I have white and go first. d2-d4 (King's pawn advanced two spaces). What does the rules tell you about what move you must make?
Quoting Luke
Right, but knowing what moves are allowed and not allowed do not determine which of the many possible moves are made when one plays the game.
Quoting Luke
The practice of playing chess means playing chess. This is not the same thing as the rules of chess. The rules in accord with which one plays chess is not to play chess.
Quoting Luke
She thought that this was part of her family's Jewish customs. If she had not asked it may indeed have become a custom. Imaginative explanations would be invented to explain the meaning. But there was no rule that the end must be cut off, and thus no meaning in her following along and doing what her mother did.
From page 34 of this discussion:
What he means by the pneumatic conception of thinking? Pneuma means breath, and by extension, soul, life, spirit (spirit is Latin for breath). In other words, the pneumatic conception of thinking is one that presupposes some condition that makes thought possible in the way that breath or soul makes life possible. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein though that logic was this condition. Invoking Kant, he called it "transcendental" (it differed significantly from Kant's conception but that is another story).
In 108 he says:
This too reminds us of Kant, the Copernican Revolution. Rather than the turn to transcendental conditions, however,he turns to language in practice, language in its role in a form of life.
He draws our attention to what we say and do with language. If we attend to how language is actually used rather than trying to discover something yet unknown about it, something still hidden from us, then we can untangle the tangles philosophy has become entangled in through the bewitchment of language. To be clear, it is not language that causes the entanglement but the misguided activity of philosophy generated by a misuse of language.[/quote]
Perhaps I was not clear enough, but when I asked "What's the difference?" in response to your distinction between following a rule and following along, I assumed we were both speaking within the context of rule following. This is why my question was accompanied by the paraphrase of §199 that to follow a rule is a custom. I agree that there is obviously a distinction between following a rule and merely following along outside of this context.
Quoting Fooloso4
Perhaps if you take "the practice" to mean the application, exercise, action or rehearsal, but not if you take "the practice" to mean the method, way, procedure or convention. Which did you intend when you stated "It is the practice that governs the language"? I had assumed it was the latter, given our discussion of rule following.
We get in a muddle due to our need to be precise, that is, we want to turn our philosophical ideas (expressed in language) into a kind of science, as if we’re doing a kind of mathematics. This kind of philosophy, which Wittgenstein fell prey to in the Tractatus, is very attractive, and can hold us within its power. We think we’re doing something empirical, that is, we think we’re extracting something from language that must be dug out through a logical investigation - as if the meaning is something hidden. Language has a kind of mystical quality due to the inner workings of the mind, but much of the confusion is simply “grammatical illusions.” Why? Because we tend to misinterpret the forms of our language, as if there is something deep within, but it’s simply (at least some or much of the time) a chimera, we tend to chase shadows. Wittgenstein’s method helps dispel these shadows, not all, but much of what passes as philosophical problems. Understanding the method is the medicine that dissolves some of the problems that hold us captive.
This doesn’t mean that there aren’t genuine philosophical problems, it just means that we should be careful of our analysis, which takes hold of us as if we’re doing an empirical investigation. And even when we’re doing an empirical investigation these philosophical problems, some of which are chimeras, can invade and confuse the investigation.
I will hold off saying more about §199 for now.
Quoting Luke
I mean the activity. To practice is to do. In this case, to play.
What is at issue is your claim:
Quoting Luke
It is my contention that it in not the rules that determine meaning, it is the practice or activity, that is, how words are actually used that does.
Quoting Fooloso4
The practice is not the rule, the rule is part of the practice, part of what we do, part of how the language game is played. In chess the rules put constraints on what moves are possible, but do not determine what moves will be made. In the same way, in language games the rules do not determine what will be said. But unlike the rules of chess, the rules of a language game are not fixed. Words can be used in new ways, the constraint on usage is looser. If the usage is novel then it cannot by determined by the rules for previous usage. Rules that cover the novel usage come after the fact.
Ah, I missed this. Still alot of catching up to do!
--
Also, to chime in on the post above: the very idea of 'proper and improper' meaning is, I think, a very unfortunate category mistake. There either 'is' meaning or there is not: either what is said has some significance that can be cottoned on to, or there is not. 'Improper meaning' is not a thing.
I have decided not to push ahead for that reason.
Quoting StreetlightX
Improper meaning would not be the absence of meaning but a meaning that was not what was meant:
You've littered your understanding with caveats and constraints which are not there in most of Wittgenstein's writing, particularly the PI. I just wonder why you feel the need arises. Through these five or six related aphorisms, there is no such restraint. Wittgenstein does not claim that explanation must be mostly replaced with descriptions. He does not say that philosophy discovers some new facts, just not that many. He is exhaustive and yet you hold back from being. Are you sure you're not just clinging to the rudder, not realising that the rest of the boat has gone down?
I still think it's an improper formulation. Meaning is in no way predicated on intention in Witty, and this includes when it doesn't conform to intention.
Where did I say any of that?
I didn't claim you did. I said, your exposition is littered with caveats which are not present in the text. 109 says we must do away with all explanations. 110 declares our problems to be the illusion that language is unique, one-to-one related to the structure of the world. 111 likens the depth of philosophy to the problems arising from our misinterpretations of our forms of language. He doesn't hold back.
And yet you have interpreted them as "some or much of the time) a chimera", "not all, but much of what passes as philosophical problems", "dissolves some of the problems".
You've introduced a limitation to the scope which is not there in the text. I just wondered why is all.
Meaning is not predicated on any one thing, but in some cases it is predicated in part on intention.
In a previous post you said:
Quoting StreetlightX
Who or what determines the meaning? What is said may mean different things to difference people. If I am the speaker and you take what I said in the wrong way then what you thought what I said meant was an improper meaning, it was not without meaning.
If you are given safety instructions on how to exit the plane and you thought the instructions meant pull in the window rather than push out the window, then that was not the proper meaning, which means, that was not what you were supposed to do.
In this context, 'picture' makes me think Escher. He has several pictures that point out in various ways how a picture can try, but always eventually fails, to be three-dimensional.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drawing_Hands
Here we are, trying to get the perspective just right in our verbal picture of how language functions in the world, but always failing to escape the flatland of language and enter the world. And the effort to make language do what it cannot do produces paradoxes that are the equivalent of impossible objects; elements that make sense as 3d objects put together in a way that makes no sense as a 3d object.
But this directly contradicts the private language argument. You can't claim that the thing you intended is what the word 'means' else words have meanings inside individual minds and so become impossible to use consistently in a community.
But that is not what I claim. It is not a question of mind or the problem of a private language. When I say something I mean something by what I say. Don't you?
I could do (depending on how you're using 'mean'), but that would not, cannot, be the 'proper' meaning. The meaning of a word is conferred by its use in the language game. If I say" apple" but mean the orange coloured citrus fruit, unless we are paying some game, the word I have said means the shiny fruit of the Malus sylvestris tree, what I meant by it has no bearing on the matter. It cannot do because otherwise language, as a means of communication, would cease to function.
Quoting Fooloso4
In this second example the failure to escape the plane is irrelevant to the meaning of the instructions. If the flight attendant had been consistently saying "pull", then the meaning of the word "pull" would remain completely unaffected by even the most fervent desire that you push. So if, on the other hand, the flight attendant had been saying "push" (and you interpreted it as "pull") how has her intention to help you escape the plane suddenly become foundational to the word's meaning when it wasn't before.
Yes, as Alice was told: say what you mean or mean what you say. If you do not use words as they are commonly used that means you will have a hard time conveying your meaning. It does not mean that words mean whatever you intent them to.
Quoting Isaac
Correct usage and correct understanding of that usage is not here a theoretical matter. But the example is not about the flight attendant's intention but about what those instructions mean to a passenger. He either gets the meaning right or wrong. The meaning is determined by whether he is to push or pull, greatly increasing his chances of escaping or not.
If it ain't shared, it ain't meaning. If I say 'apple' but mean android, I've made a mistake. If you mistake my intention , then your mistake is caused by my mistake, and meaning is lost. If you understand my intention despite my mistake, then meaning is not lost and you get to call me Mrs Malaprop.
I am writing to you to let you know that I like your example of wrong usage and right meaning.
You both seem to be arguing against the exact opposite of what I said. Have I missed a 'not' out somewhere, or is my writing that unclear?
Perhaps I have not understood your meaning properly. Perhaps it was not what you intended to say.
I wasn't aware this was at issue, given that it was an inference I made from your statements:
Quoting Fooloso4
You initially stated that rules determine proper and improper use, not me.
Your inference is not correct. The rules for use is not the same as the actual use. There will other opportunities to look at what W. says about the rules. I think I will leave it here for now.
Not for Witty, it isn't.
Quoting Fooloso4
Maybe so - but this has nothing to do with the PI. 'Improper meaning' is still an awful locution. One mistakes what is meant, or gets a meaning wrong by doing contrarywise to what is expected: but 'meaning' cannot be qualified as 'proper' or 'improper'. The mistake is not - never is - with 'meaning'.
Quoting Fooloso4
Exactly as Issac said: that you have mistaken the meaning of 'pull' says everything about your inability to understand a meaning, and nothing about meaning, or its 'im/properness'.
In any case, nowhere in the PI is meaning qualified as 'proper' or 'improper'.
How would you explain 125:
without intention? How do we make sense of not meaning it like that if there is no intended meaning?
Quoting StreetlightX
When I do not understand you then what is the mistake with?
Quoting StreetlightX
Not understanding a meaning has nothing to do with meaning? I do not understand what you mean.
A mistake in and of comprehension. An inbility to understand something has to do with one's understanding - education, brain capacity - not 'meaning'. One comprehends the meaning mistakenly; not: one comprehends the 'improper meaning'. Mistake qualifies comprehension, not meaning. The fault is with 'us', not meaning. We misunderstand, not 'mismean'. All so many ways of saying the same thing.
Meaning is never - cannot be because a category mistake - improper.
We'll get to 125 soon enough.
I would appreciate if you could explain how rules can determine use but not meaning. I don't recall Wittgenstein discussing this later in the text.
I don't like these sections at all, and find them more ranty than substantial. The thematics we've come across before in more interesting contexts rear their head again although in far more a flaky manner: illusions of depth, the mistake of uniqueness, false appearances of essence, the way in which we are 'impressed' by these illusions, etc. One interesting connection to be made - I think these remarks actually shed light on one of the more enigmatic passages earlier in the PI, namely, §38:
"Naming seems to be a strange connection of a word with an object. - And such a strange connection really obtains, particularly when a philosopher tries to fathom the relation between name and what is named by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name, or even the word “this”, innumerable times. For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. And then we may indeed imagine naming to be some remarkable mental act, as it were the baptism of an object. And we can also say the word “this” to the object, as it were address the object as “this” a a strange use of this word, which perhaps occurs only when philosophizing."
It was hard - for me anyway - to get a clear sense of these comments at the time, but the sections here (§110-§115 and its neighbours) make certain things about it clear, I think. Specifically, the 'strange connection' and 'repetitive staring' has to do with the (illusion) of uniqueness, first mentioned in §93, in contrast to the (reality) of diversity, or what Witty thematizes under the rubric of 'family resemblances'. The 'repetition' here has to do, I think, with trying and (importantly) failing to 'see' the (apparently hidden) 'essence' of language. It's a kind of repetition compulsion, in the Freudian sense of repeating failure in order to try and 'work through' it:
§113: “But this is how it is ---- ” I say to myself over and over again
§114: "That is the kind of proposition one repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is tracing nature over and over again..."
§115: "language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably."
So the key conceptual link - as I understand it - is that between uniqueness (or 'remarkableness') and repetition, and how the illusion of the former gives rise to the fixation of the later. It might be said that 'philosophy', for Witty, just is a pathological repetition compulsion in the psychoanalytic sense. Another important connection that begins to be linked here is that between uniqueness and 'generality': although Witty has invoked (critically) the notion of generality before (esp. the 'general form of the proposition' - cf. §65, §74, §104). Also interesting - and significant - that Witty primarily employs perceptual and specifically visual metaphors (something @fdrake already pointed out):
§113: "If only I could fix my gaze absolutely sharply on this fact and get it into focus".
§115: "A picture held us captive". ; Note the connection with earlier sections:
§90: "We feel as if we had to see right into phenomena"
Can't yet expound on why this insistence of visuality and pictures is important, other than to simply make note of it at this point.
I realise we're not there yet, but I think it might be useful to look at 125 to clear this up a bit. You seem to be reading 125 as saying that a person's intention has some bearing on the 'proper' meaning of a word, that "I didn't mean it like that" indicates to us that the meaning of 'to mean' is related to intent.
But this is not what Wittgenstein is saying at 125. This aphorism is central to the section applying his thought to the practice of philosophy, he is no longer describing language. He is talking about the effect of laying down a set of rules (of our own devising) and then, when those rules do not produce the result we expect, we claim "I didn't mean it like that". But the next sentence says that the philosophical problem is the civil status of this contradiction. By this he means that it is not sufficient for one person to have their "this is the way it is..." and call any discrepancy a philosophical problem.
So the reference to a personal form of "that's not what I meant" at 125 is not intended to give authority to intention, but to highlight how the discrepancies therein are often (but erroneously) seen as philosophical problems.
So, this is a fun one if only because I think it's one of the most misunderstood - and widely quoted - bits of the PI. It also helps to bring to a head much of what has been discussed so far.
Everything about §116 turns on how to understand the phrase 'everyday use' and (paraphrased) 'home language'. Here's what I think the common - and disastrously bad - mistake of reading this is: that we need to 'return' words to how they are used in actual, real life communities of speakers. One might call this the anthropological reading. This reading of §116 makes it as though we simply need to conduct a poll among speakers, ask them something like 'do you use the word X in this way, in your everyday life?', and then approve or disapprove of a use of a word based on the answer to this imagined poll.
This reading is awful. It disregards everything that has preceded this section, which makes every effort to distinguish between facts and logic, empiricism and ideality, while explicitly making clear that the investigations within bear upon the latter of each pair (logic, ideality). Explicitly:
§89: "[our investigations] shouldn’t concern itself whether things actually happen in this or that way... as if to this end we had to hunt out new facts; it is, rather, essential to our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it".
§81: "Logic does not treat of language - or of thought - in the sense in which natural science treats of a natural phenomenon".
§109: "Our considerations must not be scientific ones."
§109: "The problems are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with".
The idea that to 'bring words back ... to their everyday use' means 'bringing them back to how they are in fact used by empirical communities of speakers' (as might be discovered) by conducting a poll contravenes all of the above. Witty's investigation is not an anthropology of language which seeks to return words back to their anthropological use, in contrast to their 'metaphysical use'. The sense of 'everyday' that Witty employs is not the same as '(actually) used daily'.
--
So - If not this, then what? What is an 'everyday use' if not an empirical use of language in an anthropological setting? Well, look first to its contrast: the 'ideal' or 'metaphysical' use that Witty has just spent the last 100 pages detailing and arguing against: the key to this 'metaphysical' use of language has to do with its normative content: the sense of how language 'ought' (§39), 'should', 'must' (§66, 97, 98, 101) or 'has to' (§112) be - to do with requiring (§107) something of language, and striving (§98) after that ideal, towards which language must 'aim at' (§91).
The 'metaphysical use of language' imagines that there is an essence/ideal of language which the actual use of language must/ought/should conform to. By contrast, the everyday use of language is any use of language which does not have this requirement. That's it. In this sense, the 'everyday use of language' is primarily defined negatively: a use of language which does not make it strive after an ideal. It is what we might call a subtractive view of language: language minus something, not language plus something (cf. the later comments on Witty's 'ground clearing' - §118).
All of which is to say, once again, that the 'everyday use' of language has nothing to do with an empirical use of language. This is the significance of the sharp distinction drawn between 'understanding' and 'fact' that was previously stressed (§89: "We do not seek to learn anything new by it [our investigations]. We want to understand something that is already in plain view.")
That should be plenty to chew on.
What is not comprehended or understand is the meaning.
Quoting StreetlightX
I would say that one does not comprehend the meaning mistakenly, I would say one does not comprehend the meaning. It does not mean what she thought it did. One has attributed to it the wrong or improper meaning.
Quoting StreetlightX
Comprehension of what if not the meaning?
Quoting StreetlightX
Meaning is not something that exists independent of us. If something means something it means something to us. Without 'us' there is no meaning.
Apologies for hijacking your response to someone else, but this point exactly explains what I tried (and clearly failed) to express in my previous comment to you. The meaning of a word cannot exist independently of us, the community of language users. 'Us' being the key word, not me, or you, not the air stewardess or the passenger, but some collective of us.
Intention within a language game, however, is an individual thing, not a collective. The intention of the builder might be to obtain a slab, the intention of the builder's mate might be to pass up the correct object. The intention of the community of language users in that game is to build a wall.
I realise metaphors are a great risk, and this one probably more so than most, but... Imagine language were not the long drawn out evolving and cybernetic system it is, and we had to somehow try to replicate the evolution of a word's meaning (for a particular game) in a single meeting of language users. The way I imagine intent would play its role would be that everyone wrote down their meaning on a piece of paper, chucked it in the middle, and the most popular few were read out and a consensus arrived on.
So the intention of the air stewardesses in using the word "pull" gets to play a part in the development of what the word 'means', but it doesn't get an executive role.
I don't see why the anthropological reading cannot also be the subtractive reading. I consider it strange that Wittgenstein would have some specialised technical meaning for the phrase "everyday use". This everyday use could very well have the meaning of bringing words back to how they are in fact used by empirical communities of speakers, but we could more easily consult a dictionary rather than conduct a poll. That's the point about the philosopher's quest for the essences of (what turns out to be) merely the use of particular words: they cannot simply accept a dictionary definition, i.e. the everyday use, but are compelled to search for some ideal meaning. I find §116 to be closely related to §97: "if the words “language”, “experience”, “world” have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words “table”, “lamp”, “door”."
It would also be utterly, hilariously, falsifiable - every half-wit knows that there are plenty of words that mean things that are not (yet?) in dictionaries; most idiots can even make up words with meanings that make perfect sense that have never been heard before. If the PI meant even less than that, it's only value would be as the ash at the bottom of a fire.
Use comes first. Rules are established by use. The rules maintain that use, that is, they determine the common use, how you or I will use that word according to its established use. The rule is the standard, but it is the use not the subsequent rules of use that determine meaning.
Agreed.
Quoting Fooloso4
And also its established meaning. The rules that determine the use also determine the associated meaning, i.e. the established meaning which accompanies that use (in that way, in that context).
Quoting Fooloso4
Yes, it is the use that determines the meaning. The subsequent rules are established by, and maintain, both the use and the meaning.
If a child points to a dog and says "cat" we correct him. "Cat" is not the proper name for the animal. That has nothing to do with intention. If I say, "Give the dog a pet", the child might become confused. The dog is a pet, but is to be given its own pet? Here intention plays a role.
Quoting Isaac
The entanglement in the rules is not limited to the rules of mathematics. But since different members are in different places in the text I will hold off on saying more.
Quoting Isaac
If you mean that words do not mean whatever we intend them to mean then I agree. But this does not mean that meaning has nothing to do with intention. If I say: "Meet me at the bank" it matters whether I mean a financial institution or the bank of the river.
This is why I said that "some" of what I said pertains to 109,110, and 111. I'm looking at what Wittgenstein says from a wide range of his texts, not just what's in those particular quotes. I try, unsuccessfully or not, to look at his writings from beginning to end. And I'm sure all of you are trying to do the same thing.
I just went back over the discussion to find where the phrase 'improper meaning' came from. I used the phrase 'improper use'. Luke took this to mean that since meaning is use improper use means improper meaning. You then claimed that 'improper meaning' is not a thing, that there either is or is not meaning.
It was not my intention to defend the use of the phrase 'improper meaning', it is not a phrase I would use, but rather to address the larger questions of meaning. It is my contention that meaning is not something that exists on its own. I have no problem jettisoning the phrase improper meaning.
We are in agreement on this. It is because of this that we can say that the passenger did not understand what the instructions meant.
Quoting Isaac
What one intends to do does factor into it, but I was referring to the intended meaning. If you were to say that I did not understand what you meant, then whether or not I did understand you depends on your intended meaning. If we are both given a set of instructions and cannot agree on what we are to do, then the disagreement can be resolved by asking the person who issued the orders what it is she intends for us to do. If such a person cannot be consulted then there may be no way to resolve the issue in some cases, but in others it might be resolved by the success or lack of success that follows from what we take it to mean to follow the rule. In the case of the plane example the window either opens or it does not depending on whether one pushes or pulls. In other cases, however, as unenlightened says (quoting Zhuangzi?), "a path is made by walking on it".
Quoting Isaac
The meaning of the word "pull" has already been established. There is nothing novel in her use of the word. It is actually not even her use, she is repeating the rules for how to proceed if one needs to exit the plane. Once again, the example was about the passengers understanding or lack of understanding of what he is to do.
An important element of understanding speech is the ability to couple with the speaker's frame of reference. This is what many autistic people lack and it manifests as an inability to understand others. It's not a failure to understand dictionary meanings. It's that there are multiple meanings, shades of meaning, and too many variables in social encounters for there to be a clear set of rules for each one.
At the end of the day, you have to be able to see the world through the eyes of a speaker. It's then that rules for word usage come into play.
I agree. I would add to this meaning in the sense of significance, importance, and value.
Street, what do you think is outside of Luke's conception of 'everyday language' that he's not accounted for? And how does this excess relate to how you see your understanding of W. contrasting his?
Quoting StreetlightX
What is this everyday use, if not the anthropological use of language? Where is this imaginary language ("which does not have this requirement") ever to be used given that Streetlight has excluded its actual use by real people?
If one excludes the actual anthropological use, then it becomes difficult to make sense of Wittgenstein's advice at §116: "one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home?"
But I haven't at all 'excluded' that anthropological use; on the contrary, I see Witty as including that and more. The everyday use that Witty speaks of is more general than anthropological use; anthropological uses are (largely) instances of everyday use, but the equation the two is a complete disaster of reading.
Quoting fdrake
Novelty, invention, creativity: basically all the richness of language and our abilities to make use of it. The anthropological reading turns Witty into some shitty conservative of language, a taxidermist who'd like to stuff it and keep its dead remains as is. But as I said previously, it utterly ignores the last hundred pages of the book: it takes the phrase 'everyday use' entirely out of the context of its employment and reads into it a banality that is nowhere prepared for in any remark that comes previous to it.
On the one hand you say that everyday use has "nothing to do with" the empirical use, i.e., excludes the empirical use. On the other hand, you say that everyday use includes but is more than the empirical use.
Have you changed your position, or which is it?
The same. After all, Witty consistently and repeatedly stresses that what he has to say has nothing to do with discovering new facts, nothing to do with the empirical, and bears entirely on the understanding. He says this, over and over.
Quoting Luke
To say that everyday use has nothing to do with empirical use is not to exclude it. Putting it in the language of set theory might help: latter falls under the extension of the former but has nothing to do with its intension. For reference, in case you're unfamiliar: https://www.britannica.com/topic/intension
Yes, but this is aimed more at philosophers who have been misguidedly seeking the ideal, than it is at philosophers who he encourages to look at actual language use, which he suggests should be done in detail "from close up".
Quoting StreetlightX
Well, again, this seemed to be what you were clearly indicating in your initial post, with comments such as:
Quoting StreetlightX
If your view has now changed, then okay.
Furthermore, my reference to a dictionary was in no way meant to exclude any new uses of language, It was only to try and moderate your extreme example of the need to conduct a poll. Yes, there are always novel and creative uses - I never denied that - but the bulk of our words can still be found in a dictionary. And these are regularly being updated, including resources such as urbandictionary.com.
I understand our disagreement now. You were referring to intention playing a part in the correct selection from a number of already existing possible meanings and I thought you were talking about intention determining one or more of those meanings.
All clear now, thanks.
No, I don't tend to myself and I think doing so is a mistake. Only a very small proportion of Wittgenstein's writing was published and I think that is the proportion which reveals to us what Wittgenstein thought, particularly the latest. The remainder of his writings, letters, notebooks etc are fascinating historical documents, but they are like travel journals, where what we're interested in philosophically is the destination. Many of the notebooks contain Wittgenstein's 'wrong turns' in his journey to framing an issue and it's not easy to distinguish them from necessary steps on the road. If we trust the man to give us insight we may not ourselves have found, then we should also trust him to discard that which is not so insightful, and yet with his notebooks we have not afforded him that opportunity.
I fully understand the temptation. He is such a fantastic writer, and I've found much of interest in the non-published works, but it would be extremely naive to claim that the message within them was anything like consistent, nor should we expect it to be. The first half of 'On Certainty', for example, was written during a time when he himself describes his philosophy in very negative terms, and if you remove the first half from the second, the overall conclusion of the work is markedly different.
"Use" implies "for the purpose of", and "serves the purpose" plays an important role in the Philosophical investigations. In everyday usage, to say that something serves the purpose is to say that it does what it was intended to do. Wittgenstein makes no attempt to divorce "intention" from "purpose".
The only work that was published during his lifetime was the Tractatus.
Quoting Isaac
The same could be said of the Tractatus.
Quoting Isaac
The Philosophical Investigations were published posthumously.
Quoting Isaac
I do not want to get sidetracked with a discussion of OC, but I see no plausible reason to divide the text based on what he said about his frame of mind at the time. I question the idea that there is an overall conclusion. There are a great many books that if you divide them in two the conclusions one draws from them would be different. After all, half the book is missing.
Absolutely. I would hesitate also to glean too much from a book the author themselves later rejected some conclusions from.
Quoting Fooloso4
Yes, but the vast majority was ready for publication. Part 1 was completed by 1946, so there's every reason to think it his final draft. Obviously the succeeding remarks are less complete, but he definitely had the opportunity to revise them at some length. It hardly comes into the same category as the notebooks. I get that there is a gradation where I have perhaps given the impression of mutual exclusivity, but I don't think that undermines the point.
Quoting Fooloso4
Well, I reach a very different conclusion about On Certainty, but as you say, that argument would very much be off topic.
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Quoting Isaac
What about the manuscripts, typescripts, and dictations? Where do the collections entitled Bemerkungen or Remarks stand? Or the slips of paper he collected that was published as "Zettel" (German for notes or slips of paper).?
As I said, I wouldn't want to suggest a mutually exclusive boundary between published and unpublished works, nor between earlier and later works, nor between works he was evidently pleased with and those less favoured. But there is without doubt a gradation to be considered and interpreting a finished draft (of sorts) using a notebook entry which we have no reason to believe was anything more than a rejected idea, requires great caution.
In an impartial investigation, I suppose such care is possible, but attaching the authority of Wittgenstein to any notion is too great a temptation, in my experience, for people not to simply find whatever support they're seeking within the widely varying scope of the unpublished work.
StreetlightX seems to have an allergic reaction to "intention", breaking out in rash statements any time the word is used. Generally, Streetlight would prefer to change the subject to intension, thereby removing the end from intend. But in the context of this text, "intension" does not serve Wittgenstein's purpose. It's quite clear that the sign-post must be read in the way intended in order that it serve the purpose. The only way we have to judge whether a person followed a rule or not is to judge whether the person behaved as intended.
Intended by whom? Not the signpost maker, he will have simply presumed, made a sign with a pointy end and pointed it at Dublin, because that's what one does. Not the town planner, he commissioned a sign to be made without even specifying which way the pointy end should point.
What if a moronically stupid sign maker had decided that the blunt end would point to Dublin, and he expected that one follow that. Who's made the mistake, the person now walking away from Dublin, or the sign maker?
I suppose it must be the intention of the sign-post maker we're talking about, maybe the intention of the town planner plays a role too, and even others. Is there a common intention? I don't think It's God's intention because the sign-post is artificial. Wittgenstein clearly talks about the sign-post fulfilling its purpose. (87..."The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils
its purpose.") I don't see any way that there could be a purpose for that sign-post being there unless it was put there with intention. Perhaps someone might just randomly plant the sign, but that's not what Wittgenstein is talking about, he's talking about purpose. It's very simple, "use" implies intent. There is no "using" without intent.
Quoting Isaac
Then the sign-post did not fulfil the purpose. Right?
It is a matter of convention that the blunt end does not point in the direction one is to go. The convention may have been based on the shape of an actual arrow or spear, but in any case its meaning is a matter of convention. Those who know the convention know how to read the sign. The sign maker's intent may be simply to make a functional sign, that is, one that will be read according to the convention. He does not have to intend for the pointed end to point in the direction one is to go. That has already been established by convention.
But not all signs are meant to be read by everyone. If one intends to lead some in the right direction and others in the wrong direction, he might make a sign with the blunt end pointing toward where he intends those who know how to read this sign will go, but not those who read it according to established convention. He cannot, however, simply intend the sign to be read this way or that, he must either establish or make use of an exclusive convention .
The question was rhetorical (I seem to be having an inordinate amount of trouble making my posts understood on this thread), but your answer is pretty much what I was getting at.
MU seemed to have raised the zombie of personal intent creating the rule again with the ambiguous "The only way we have to judge whether a person followed a rule or not is to judge whether the person behaved as intended.". It is important, I think, to stress (as you have done in your post) that a single person's intent does not make a rule. I realise we haven't yet reached the private language argument, but things have once or twice seemed to be heading down that dead end.
I don't see intent having such a leading role. Imagine a sign actually being made and put in place. Who really intends for the pointy end to point to Dublin? I doubt very much if anyone involved actually does, they just do. If anyone really has an intent, it would be to get paid.
Intent is not limited to what a single person intends. If we come across a sign and do not know how to read it, we may ask about its intended meaning, which means, "what are we supposed to do?" We might also ask "what is the convention that determines the meaning of the sign?".
It is only when someone knows how to read the sign that a judgment can be made as to whether the rule is being followed. Here we are not talking about some idiosyncratic intent that stands opposed to the convention, but about what one is to do in accord with the intended meaning as determined by convention.
What does a yellow traffic light mean? If one's answer is based on observed practice he might conclude that it means to speed up to get through the light before it changes to red. This, however, is not its intended meaning, which is to proceed with caution. It's intended meaning is set by law.
I don't see the authority law has to determine its meaning. The amber light means what it means to the community of light-users. I don't see how the intention of the law-maker somehow gets imbued into reality. It's intended meaning is nothing more than an historical footnote. It's meaning (which is what matters philosophically) is its current use.
The meaning of the light is determined by law. The community may have some say in what the law should be, but this is not so straight forward. The laws are part of the community. Members of the community might push to have the law changed, but drivers do not get to decide what the traffic laws will be simply because they use the roads.
Quoting Isaac
If some percentage of drivers speed through a yellow light this does not change the meaning of the light. They are breaking the law, even if they are the majority of drivers. The law is not simply what "everybody does". The law is does not take into consideration only what people do, but what they should do to ensure the safely of everyone who uses the road.
The traffic light is intended to regulate the flow of traffic. It does not leave it up to the drivers of motor vehicles to determine what the light means.
How? The law-makers say "amber means get ready to stop" how does their saying so make it mean that?
Personally if pressed on the meaning of the amber traffic light, I would suggest it functions roughly as a punctuation mark - a change warning between stop and go, having no instructional content of its own.
Perhaps we should, but as with the light, I should also want to know how that which determines the meaning of meaning enforces such a determination.
Because that is the standard that was set up and enforced.
Yes, but how does their setting up a standard and legally enforcing it make it 'mean'?
What word would be left to describe the rules of an urban race gang -
"when you see the amber light go as fast as possible",
"right" says the other gang member, "so amber means go as fast as possible",
"no" says the first, "amber 'means' get ready to stop"
The conversation doesn't make sense.
Are you asking what makes a standard a standard? Its general acceptance by the community. The United States does not use the metric system. I cannot tell you how that came about. From time to time there is talk of changing to the metric system, but it has not happened.
Quoting Isaac
Meaning is not monolithic. What a traffic sign means as a matter of law may not be what it means in the rules of a race. Different activity, different rules.
Right, so if 'the community' dynamically evolve a standard which differs from that of the people who created or instigated the lights, then that is what the meaning is, not the intent of the instigator. The intent of the instigator (law-maker, traffic light designer, whatever) may incidentally cause the meaning, or it may not. Acceptance by the community is the final arbiter, and if the community say amber means 'rush to get through' then that's what amber means.
Quoting Fooloso4
Exactly, but what is the commonality? Community acceptance. So it is not correct to say that the meaning of an amber light is determined by the law-makers. It may or may not be depending on how law abiding the community is. They could theoretically ignore their wishes completely.
The only common thread joining all these potential origins of a particular meaning is the acceptance and use of a community, so it is simple to say that the communities accepted use determines meaning, the role of any other factors is incidental only.
The intent is to regulate the flow of traffic. That does not change even if the standard by which the flow of traffic is regulated changes. To use one of Wittgenstein's tribe examples, a colorblind tribe would not have color coded traffic lights. They would have some other standard, but the intent would still be to regulate the flow of traffic.
Quoting Isaac
If it becomes the law then that is what it will mean. If it is found that there is an increase of accidents at the light, they may revise the law. It is still a matter of established standards and the intent to regulate traffic.
Quoting Isaac
In a community governed by law the community accepts the law or attempts to change it.
Quoting Isaac
In that case the issue is not the color of the light but the lights themselves. They would no longer function as they are intended to. Without consent, either voluntary or involuntary, the law cannot be enforced. Suppose at some time in the future the traffic laws are ignored and not enforced, but the traffic lights still change color. If I were to ask what it means for the lights to change color the answer might be, "it does not mean anything" or "when people obeyed the traffic laws amber meant proceed with caution". There is no inherent meaning in an amber light, it is part of a practice, what Wittgenstein would call a way of life.
Quoting Isaac
This does not mean that intent plays no role in the practice. It is not as if traffic lights came first and then the community decided what the meaning of these lights would be. Traffic lights are installed with an intended purpose.
I didn't say the intent would change or go away, I said the meaning would no longer be related to it. The intent of the law-makers might have been to regulate traffic flow, the intent of the wider community might just be to get to work on time.
Quoting Fooloso4
So you keep saying, but I've yet to see how. I get that the law becomes what it means if the community assents to using it that way, but then it is the community's assent which causes meaning.
Quoting Fooloso4
No, it absolutely doesn't, people break the law all the time and it doesn't mean that they have declined to be governed by law in general. It just means that law is only seen as set of proscription, not the final word on the meaning of life.
Quoting Fooloso4
It is absolutely that. Traffic lights came first (with the intention of controlling traffic flow), then the community learns the pattern (amber indicates its about to turn red), and derives a meaning (rush to get through) depending entirely on it form of life, not on the original intention of those who made the lights.
But it is still related to it, that is, to regulating the flow of traffic.
Quoting Isaac
The wider community interested in getting to work did not install the traffic light.
Quoting Isaac
The community assents to give the law makers power to make and enforce the law. If they do not like the law they attempt to change it. But until the law is changed members of the community can be fined or jailed for breaking the law.
Quoting Isaac
You have lost me here. I said nothing about declining to be governed by law. And I have said nothing about the meaning of life. We were talking about traffic lights, not the meaning of life. Or at least that is what I was talking about.
Quoting Isaac
The lights did not come first. They did not appear before the intention or simultaneously with the intention of controlling traffic.
Quoting Isaac
The lights have a legal meaning. If you run a red light because you rush to get through, it does not matter what meaning you or others derive. You have broken the law. The meaning of the light is clear and unambiguous. No judge would buy your story.
The problem here is that only individual people have intent. We can generalize, take a vote or something, and say it is "the will of the people" or some such thing, but to say that numerous people have the "same" intent is very sketchy, and highly improbable. Here's a good example of that very problem in Fooloso4's post:
Quoting Fooloso4
Whose intent is it to regulate the flow of traffic? It's obviously not the intent of the traffic lights. You might say that it's the intent of the state, or the city, but these aren't the type of things which have intent. It would make more sense to say that it's God's intent, at least god is supposed to be a being with intention. And as described above, a group of people do not have a single, "same" intent, so "it's the will of the people" doesn't make sense either.
Quoting Isaac
The issue is that with "meaning is use", Wittgenstein has clearly referenced purpose and therefore deferred to intention. To understand a word's meaning is to understand its use, which means that we need to understand its purpose and therefore the intention behind it. Normally, in questions of intention (which are often moral questions), we hold a person responsible for one's own actions. Therefore the person who plants the sign is responsible for which way it is pointed. If it points to Dublin, then it is the person who planted it, who intended it to point that way. I don't see how you could think that the person who planted the sign just planted it randomly without intending to have it point the way that it does, regardless of whether or not that person was getting paid to plant it.
As I said in my earlier post, Wittgenstein has decided that the fundamental principles of language are moral principles, rather than logical principles. He has dismissed those elements of crystalline purity required (the ideal) for ideal understanding, to be replaced with "serves the purpose". But now, by describing language use as a human activity, intended to serve a purpose, he has stumbled into the field of moral philosophy. The fundamental principles which support language are the same principles which support morality.
[quote= Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations]132. We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use
of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many
possible orders; not the order. To this end we shall constantly be
giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of
language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we
saw it as our task to reform language.
Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in
our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice,
is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with.
The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine
idling, not when it is doing work.
133. It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for
the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But
this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping
doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy
peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself
in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples;
and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed
methods, like different therapies.
Notice, he has not really dismissed "striving for the ideal". Our aim is complete clarity, which will make philosophical problems disappear. But now the philosophical problems have become much more complicated because we have to deal with "serves the purpose", and therefore intention. There is not one "purpose", but a complex, and philosophy takes the characteristics of therapy.
You are making some very strange assertions which seem completely unrelated to the point at hand. We are discussing the meaning of signs, yes? Signs in the broad sense of the word, as in symbols or structures to which people respond in a manner not directly resultant from the physical form of the object. A signpost was one example, the amber traffic light another.
The meaning of the sign is the message contained in its structure. As if we could translate the structure to a sentence - "walk in the direction of the pointy end if you want to get to the place written on the flat bit", "slowly bring your car to a halt if it is safe to do so".
The reason why this is all relevant to the PI, is because (amongst other things) Wittgenstein says that there is a problem with these 'translations' in that they themselves are just symbols, and to say their meaning in further translations becomes circular. To say their meaning with further signs (such as ostension or samples) becomes circular, hence the conclusion that our form of life teaches us how to respond.
Just checking we're on the same page with this because some of the comments seem to be completely unrelated, as if I needed teaching how town planning works, or the function of law in a democratic society. If you extend me the courtesy of assuming I already know these things, we can move on to the reason I mention them. If instead you're just going to repeat platitudes as if I was five, then we might as well just stop now.
So, are you actually interested in the position I'm holding, or are we just going back to the same pissing contest which has dogged this thread thus far for the prize of sitting in the 'teacher's chair'?
Really? Why do you think it's 'sketchy' the London Marathon is run by a few thousand people each year, I think it's pretty safe to say they all at least have in common he intent to run as much as they are able along the set route. Unless you're going to get into some totally unnecessary sorties paradox, I don't see the problem with saying these people all have the same intent.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well. If you seriously think it would make more sense to say that it is the intent of a supernatural being who created a billion planets only to populate one of them, mostly with bacteria, but with one species whose main purpose it seems is to sing to him on Sunday, then you clearly have a very different definition of 'sense' to me.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Clearly you've never had any dealings with the public sector. I've seen signs hung the wrong way round. I've seen pdf forms which are not even fillable. I had to complete a spreadsheet only last week where one of the columns was supposed to contain two numbers separated by a comma, rendering all calculation on that row entirely false. I don't know what utopia you live in, but here in the real world people just unthinkingly do stuff to get paid, get home and do it all again the next day.
Different runners run the marathon for different reasons, I've seen them interviewed. So I don't see any common intent there. Many may have a similar intent, but if we hold to a strict sense of "same" which is common in philosophy, and called for by the law of identity, their intentions are not the same.
Quoting Isaac
It makes more sense to say that a being who is assumed to have intention has intention (even if that being is fictional), than it does to say that a thing which is known not to have intention has intention. That is my opinion, and that is why "God" makes more sense to me in that particular context. The idea of panpsychism does not make sense to me, neither does the idea of a world-soul, or universal-soul make sense to me. Maybe you reason to think otherwise.
Quoting Isaac
OK, "wrong way round" implies that a mistake was made. Now who would you hold responsible for the sign being hung the wrong way around? Unless the sign-hanger was instructed to hang it that way, the responsibility for that mistake rests on the sign hanger. Or would you prefer to blame the state-soul? The state-soul made the mistake. Saying that the person did it "unthinkingly" does not remove the intentionality from the act. Habitual acts of human beings are still classified as intentional acts. "Unthinkingly" does not absolve one from blame.
There's a lot said by Wittgenstein in the upcoming section 137-200, about what you might call the "unthinkingly" way of doing things. I'm going to read that section again, and take some notes. I'll get back to you on this subject, perhaps we can discuss it further.
Hence my reference to the sorties paradox. We simply cannot proceed with any investigation if we hold such a high standard for 'the same'. We cannot talk about anything, because all terms are artificial groupings of things which are only similar, not truly 'the same'. In order to show the relevance of what you're saying here you'd need a supporting argument as to why the level of similarity in intent I'm referring to was not acceptable for the type of investigation this is.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A fictional being is also not known to have intention. God may or may not have intention in exactly the same way a community may or may not have intention, or a rock, or my ideas. We simply have no data whatsoever to go on, and to presume such a thing even exists requires an acceptance of the supernatural, which then easily allows for anything else to have intention by the same special pleading "it does so supernaturally".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Responsibility depends on circumstance. Like Foolso you seem to be just assuming the rule of law/society. If the sign-hanger didn't give a toss about their job, just wanted to get home quickly and 'the wrong way round' was quicker than the right way, then he didn't make a mistake. He achieved exactly what he set out to do. A mistake is only judgeable from a perspective.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think there's considerable feeling here that we progress in order, so perhaps this should wait until the others get there.
At the moment, we are or were talking about traffic lights. It is, however, part of a larger discussion that includes the relationship between intention and meaning. You asked:
Quoting Isaac
You rejected the claim that the meaning is established by law and said it was a matter of community assent. But yellow does not mean caution because the community assented to that meaning. What they assented to is the law. And that does not mean the law that yellow means caution but assent to the establishment and enforcement of law, which includes traffic laws, which include use caution when the light is yellow.
Quoting Isaac
And what is the meaning of the message? Clearly a sign contains a message. The question we have been dealing with is what it means.
Quoting Isaac
It is not our form of life that teaches us how to respond, but rather what we are taught as part of our form of life. And this happens in a variety of different ways - training, explanation, following the example of others, and so on.
Quoting Isaac
First, I did not think it was a pissing contest. If you are vying to sit in the 'teacher's chair' then have at it. As far as I am concerned Wittgenstein holds the chair. As to the position you are holding, I cannot say if I am actually interested in that position until I know what it is. As of now, I do not know what that position is.
Yes, and I said that consent to the establishment of law does not seem to imply a necessity abide by it, so I'm still at a loss to see how law makes what I wants a thing to mean actually have that effect in an unwilling/uncaring community.
Quoting Fooloso4
This is the kind of condescending comment I was referring to. Have I really given the impression that I'm not at least fairly well versed in Wittgenstein? So what is the relative liklihood that I... a) didn't know that teaching how to respond takes many forms and is within a form of life, or b) just used "our form of life teaches us" as a shorthand for the situation explained by Wittgenstein that I presume we are all familiar enough with that I don't have to spell it out each time I refer to it?
A little charity in reading rather than constant presumption of ignorance about the subject would really make the conversation go a lot smoother.
Quoting Fooloso4
A fact which doesn't surprise me as you haven't even asked yet, just pedagogically listed some facts related to things I've said.
And this is why I think it is best that I no longer respond to you. Being well versed in Wittgenstein does not mean that you cannot be mistaken. There is a great deal written about "form of life" by well regarded scholars of Wittgenstein that is in dispute.
Quoting Isaac
I am not here to solicit opinions. If you have a position you want to present then do what everyone else does, present it. Why would you wait for me to ask? If you do present it, I think it best, given your sensitivity to my criticism, that I simply ignore it.
Yeah, that pretty much sums up 90% of my experience on this forum. You do know what a 'forum' is, what 'discussion' is? What are you posting on a public forum for if not to solicit opinion? As I said, nothing but a pissing contest for the teacher's chair.
That's not true at all, "same" has a very useful purpose, it refers to one identical thing, one and the same. And, similar things can be members of the same group, so can different parts be parts of the same whole. But similar things are never the same thing. If two things are similar, then call them "similar", or perhaps members of the same group. There is no need to say that similar things are "the same", no purpose to that. We have two distinct words, "similar" and "same", each with its own purpose. What's the point in calling two similar things "the same" unless your intent is to deceive?
So, the very opposite of what you propose is what is really the case. There's no point in proceeding with any such investigation if we allow ourselves to refer to similar things as the same? All we could do is confuse ourselves. That's why we distinguish "similar" from "same", to avoid the confusion which results from thinking that similar things are the same thing. We need high standards of identity if we have any desire to make progress in a philosophical investigation such as this, and this means maintaining the distinction between "similar" and "same".
To reply to your claim then, no degree of similarity is acceptable for calling two distinct things "the same", because "similar" refers to a multitude of things and "same" refers to one thing. So it is impossible that similar things are the same thing. Therefore please do not say that similar things are the same, because we know that this is impossible.
"In the work of Wittgenstein ... appeals to "what we ordinarily say" take on a different emphasis [from Moore]. In [Wittgenstein] the emphasis is less on the ordinariness of an expression (which seems mostly to mean, from Moore to Austin, an expression not used solely by philosophers) than on the fact that they are said (or, of course, written) by human beings, to human beings, in definite contexts, in a language they share: hence the obsession with the use of expressions. "The meaning is the use" calls attention to the fact that what an expression means is a function of what it is used to mean or to say on specific occasions by human beings ... Wittgenstein's motive (and this much is shared by Austin) is to put the human animal back into language and therewith back into philosophy." (Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason).
This is a bit tough and I have to go a bit beyond what's just there to make sense of this one, but here's what I make of it: the metaphysician insists that she is using an expression in just the same way that it is used in an 'ordinary' circumstance (or what Witty refers to as a 'special circumstance'): "I’m using it with the meaning you’re familiar with."
And Witty's response is something like: you can't just say this. If meaning is use in a language-game, the language-game needs to be in place if that 'same' meaning is to be preserved - and it's not at all clear that, in the metaphysician's use, that language-game (or any language-game) is in place.
This is why Witty is critical of the idea that the meaning of terms is retained in "every kind of use": but Witty's whole point is that there is no 'every kind of use': use is always 'language-game relative' - use in this or that language-game, not "every kind of use".
And this in turn leads to Witty's critique of the idea that a word's meaning is separable from a word's use: "As if the meaning were an aura the word brings along with it and retains in every kind of use." Which, is some sense, follows analytically from the equation of meaning and use that Witty's attempted to establish (if meaning is use, it obviously cannot be otherwise than that use).
When writing pi as 3.14159... the dots "..." do not abbreviate the numeric [I]result[/i] of an algorithm, rather the dots express that pi is a sequence generating algorithm, as opposed to referring to a particular numeric result of using such an algorithm. Hence "pi has no end" is true in referring to a sequence generating process.
All that said, Wittgenstein wrote remarks on several occasions that indicated his recognition of a theological sense in which mathematicians like Georg Cantor thought of the infinite cardinal numbers as representing platonistic "completed " infinities; namely in Wittgenstein's acknowledgement of the "giddy feelings" that accompany thinking about set-theory from the platonistic perspective, and that have psychologically motivated it's development. Wittgenstein, while clearly recognising this theological motivation and use of mathematics, forewarned that it led to the unnecessary development of confusing and over-complicated formalisms of logic that were misleading when it came to the practical application of logic and mathematics.
And yet words do have a aura that is the ghost of all the uses in all the games of the ancestors. This supernatural meaning is employed by poets and advertisers who say literally meaningless things that nevertheless convey - something that perhaps cannot be said explicitly. We talk about 'subtext' as well as 'context'.
The inseparability of meaning from use must work both ways, so when I use 'supernatural' in this game, the aura of the Roman gods is somehow invoked, whether I intend it or not.
"Language-game" is a substitute for "context" here. "Context" has two very distinct connotations, each of which are very important to meaning. The first is the position of a word in relation to other words in an act of use. The second is the special circumstances which constitute the environment of the act of use. "Language-game" as StreetlightX uses it here, acts as a substitute for both of these, "meaning is use in a language-game". So "language-game" provides us with a third sense of "context". "Context" does not refer here to a static position, or state of things in relationship to each other, it refers directly to the act, as a move with context, within a game.
The first sense of context (the positional relations of words) may be subsumed as part of the language game, a move within the game. The move is to put words in relations to each other. But as StreetlightX points out, the metaphysician's game is unfamiliar, perhaps as a sort of personally created, private game, though the metaphysician insists that the game ought to be familiar to you. When the game is unfamiliar to you, meaning cannot be determined by the first sense of context (positional relations of words), so we are left with context in the second sense, "special circumstances" as the only means to determine the meaning.
Quoting unenlightened
That is because it is the game we are familiar with. But if a philosopher used "supernatural" in a context (relation to other words) in which the invoking of Roman gods was out of place, and therefore the use of that word seemed like nonsense, then we'd complain that the philosopher was using the word in a nonsense way, because we couldn't understand that context. Then to understand what the philosopher was talking about, we'd have to turn to the "special circumstances" of that use. What exactly is it, according to the context of that particular act of use, in its special circumstances, that the philosopher is referring to?
Quoting sime
So those mathematicians like Cantor, think that they have attained God's perspective, and this is the source of the giddy feelings?
When the philosopher says “This is here”, I think he is referring to Moore's claim "here is one hand". Moore's point is that it exists, it is real. But when not doing philosophy does such a statement make sense? It would make no sense for me to walk up to someone and say "here is one hand, and here is another". The example in §117 is some object. Now it might make sense to say “This is here” if we are looking for the object, but in this case the object is right in front of him. In this case, "here" does not mean in this place, as if a hand could be misplaced, but intends something metaphysical - I know irrefutably that it exists. But that is not how the word 'here' is ordinarily used, except perhaps if we are looking for something whose existence is in question; but not as confirmation of existence in general.
I agree.
Wittgenstein said:
Husserl points to the sedimentation of meaning. Words accrue meaning over time. We see this clearly with the term 'soul'. Whole mythologies became part of its meaning.
In the example, "this is here" means nothing more than "this object is in this place", exactly as it sounds. Notice a pointing motion is indicated. The problem is that "this is here" is only meaningful if the special circumstances (the context of the act of use) are considered. When the special circumstances are considered (the pointing to an object), it refers to a particular object in a particular place. Without consideration of the special circumstances it could refer to any object in any place, and therefore looses its meaning. The phrase makes no sense outside the context of the special circumstances.
There's a sort of paradox indicated because the phrase is extremely useful (able to be used to refer to any object at any place), but it really has no meaning (makes no sense), other than what is given to it by the special circumstances of the particular instance of use. That's a peculiar aspect of language, the more useful phrases are the ones which are allowed to derive their meaning from the special circumstances of their use. This relates back to when he described the concept of "game" as unbounded. Being unbounded makes the word "game" very useful (may be used in many different cases), but we may create a boundary for a special purpose.
But when would we use this expression? A context could probably be provided/imagined, but I can't think of one easily. "This is here" is an unusual expression, which is why (I think) Wittgenstein considers that its actual use would require "special circumstances".
The context is given, someone says "this is here" as he points to an object. There's a sort of paradox involved because one might point to any object and utter that phrase, and it would make sense. Yet without context the phrase makes no sense . So it is not required that the circumstances are "special", because the phrase is applicable in all circumstances. However, it is only meaningful in the sense that it indicates special circumstances. You might say that the phrase (in the context) creates special circumstances.
If that were the case, then why does Wittgenstein state: "he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used"?
Compare this to how he presents the form of a proposition at 114, "this is how things are". The one, "this is how things are" is a generalization, it creates something general. The other "this is here", creates something specific (special). Wittgenstein is directing us away from the use of language for creating something general (what philosophers do), toward its use for creating something specific (special). That's what ordinary language use does, creates something special, it specifies. Ordinary language use is very specific to the circumstances, we refer to particular things in particular locations, and that's where language's usefulness is based. Talking about specific things in specific places is ordinary use, and that's the foundation of language.
The philosophical type of language use, generalizations ("this is how things are", or "essences"), is a special type of language use, created for special purposes. As we'll see in 120-135 this dissolves the generalized idea that philosophy is done for 'a purpose', rendering it as philosophy is done for a variety of different special purposes. That's because all forms of language use are based in specification, as the foundation of language, mentioned above. Now what is specified is the particular purpose.
The term translated as "special" is Besondere. It can also be translated as particular. In some cases it makes sense to say "This is here". It is not being used in the same way however, when "This is here" is meant to point something metaphysical (§116). In this case "here" means exists or is real, which is not what the word means when used in those circumstances where it does make sense.
In what circumstances does it make sense? If we are looking for the object and find it: "This (the car key) is here. Or if mapping the location of objects in the room. Or giving an inventory of the things in the room. There is nothing "special" about these circumstances. They are all quite ordinary, but they are not the same circumstances in which one claims "This is here" and means something metaphysical.
I don't see how it could be both "used in absolutely any circumstances" (general) but also "something specific" (particular). By "special circumstances" Wittgenstein does not mean just any context. It is not made into a context or some set of "special circumstances" simply by adding that he also points at the object.
I don't disagree with this, but "This is here" still sounds unnatural to me in your examples.
I don't think he meant that one would actually say "This is here" but rather the particular object is here: "The key is here".
"This is here" might be used in response to the question: "What happened to the things on the table?". In that case someone might say "This is here and this is here" while pointing to the items. Or, when doing an inventory to check if anything is missing: "This is here and this is here, but where is 'x'?"
Well thanks for pointing that out un, I hadn't noticed. :roll:
It seems a fucking weird thing to say, to me. The circumstance that makes it seem slightly less than totally redundant would be making a comparison between the parts diagram and pack contents of an Ikea bookcase, such that 'this' and 'here' are different 'realms'. "This (points at paper) is here (points at object)". Or conversely, pointing at the spire in a picture of Notre Dame, "this is not here", pointing at the remains of the cathedral.
I disagree. Firstly, I find no reason to question Wittgenstein's example. Secondly, I think it may be another case similar to "Here is a hand" or "I know there is a sick man lying here" (OC10), which could be metaphysical uses, as you say, and/or they could also be seemingly sensible expressions which don't make very much sense upon closer scrutiny. (ETA: unless we can find a suitable context, or "special circumstances", for them.)
I think you are right with regard to what "someone" actually said. What I was getting at is that "this" means the object that is pointed to. I don't think he was drawing our attention to the use of "this" but of "here".
Quoting Luke
But he says the sentence does make sense in the circumstances in which it is actually used. If those circumstances are "special" in the sense of extraordinary then the use of the sentence in any circumstance other than that exceptional one would not make sense. But I take this to be an example of bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. The sentence: "This is here" does have an everyday use. "This is here (pointing to the table) and this is here (pointing to the chair) but where are the dishes?"
Think of this. Someone could point to absolutely any object, at any particular place whatsoever, and say "this is here". Therefore, the sentence in itself, is very general in its usability. However, if or when, someone actually points to an object and uses the sentence, its meaning is very specific in its use, to indicate that special object in that special place.
So, the circumstances are not unique, or special at all, as they are in themselves, because it could be absolutely any circumstances. That is, until the sentence is applied, and this transforms the circumstances into something special. The sentence, in the context of the pointing, specifies this object in this place, creating special circumstances from circumstances which were not special at all. It is this act of individuating an object, "this here", which the law of identity is based. Following this the object may be named.
Yes, eloquently put. :grin:
Yes, but he also prompts the reader to question what are those "special circumstances". As I said in my initial post on §117, we probably could provide/imagine such circumstances, but I haven't found it easy to do so.
Quoting Fooloso4
No, I take "special" to mean particular, like you stated earlier.
Quoting Fooloso4
Maybe that works, but the sentence has been changed from "This is here" to "This is here but where is X?"
It appears like the sentence does not make sense to Luke, nor does it make sense to unenlightened, so these two move to deny that the sentence is ever actually used. The sentence does make sense to myself, and Fooloso4, so we move to question the special circumstances in which it is actually used, i.e. at 117 in the Philosophical Investigations.
When philosophers publish philosophical musings, like Wittgenstein has, they are full of things which make sense to some, but do not make sense to others. As he says, it depends on whether or not the words are being used in a way that you are familiar with. I am familiar with this type of philosophical statement, so "This is here" makes sense to me. But when I see algebra it does not make sense to me, because I am not familiar with it.
I think that within a particular context (where the meaning is unambiguous), it is as though the other possible meanings of a word disappear. Obviously, one can intentionally use a word in an ambiguous manner (e.g. double entendre). However, perhaps some might suggest that there is no such thing as an unambiguous meaning.
Insofar as this 'prior knowledge' amounts to knowledge of the language-game in which a particular ostensive act figures in to, when someone says: "You understand this expression, don’t you? Well then - I’m using it with the meaning you’re familiar with." - one can read this as an effort to appropriate or rather expropriate a language-game without the form-of-life which gives it meaning, or makes it 'work'. An attempt to take the language-game out of its lived context and claim it in the abstract: but to do this is just to deprive a language-game - and thus a word - of the very thing which makes it operative.
I've always disliked calling language-games 'contexts', and on reflection I think I know why: the idea of a language-game captures something that the word 'context' seems to miss, which is a distinction among types or kinds of words. A language-game determines not 'just' the meaning of a word, but also, the kind of word any particular word is: the role it plays in that game.
'Contexts', to me anyway, seem to make words differ only be degree - ("in this context, this means that; in another context, something else"). Contexts are more general than language-games; they don't discriminate as much. It doesn't capture, in the same way, the typification at work when 'language-games' are employed. I suspect that it may be considerations of this kind that led Witty to invent the slightly clunkly neologism of the 'language-game', rather than resort to the already-available word 'context' to get his point across.
Sorry, it was probably me that brought that in as something of a fudge between 'language game' and 'form of life'. I wonder if you might say a word about that distinction?
This would be done on the occasion of making a philosophical demonstration, as Fooloso4 points out, it's similar to when Moore says "here is one hand". Notice that Wittgenstein is trying to "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use". He is doing this by showing that a philosophical use (such as the demonstration of "this is here") is no different from any instance of ordinary use, each one being a particular instance, of "special circumstances". Each instance of use, whether philosophical, mathematical, scientific, mundane, or whatever, may be classed in the same category, as a particular instance of special circumstances. So the instance of philosophical use is no different in the sense of aiming for "the ideal", it is just another instance of use, and like any other, it has a particular purpose specific to itself.
Quoting StreetlightX
Notice the two distinct senses of "context". I think that the second sense accounts for the kind of word by relating to the particular circumstances of use. Both senses of "context" are important to meaning, but you're right, neither can account for a word playing a role. So "language-game" encompasses and supersedes both senses of "context".
Where I think "language-game" really excels is in the fact that it refers to activity (movements within a game). We therefore attribute meaning to human actions, rather than assuming that meaning is associated with static, defined relations, like "context" does. The difference is significant because classically the act is understood as the means to the end, while the end is a static object (what is intended), but meaning was always associated with the end (what was meant, intended). One might say that classically the act only had meaning by being related to an end. "Language-game" gives us the principles whereby we can associate meaning directly with the act itself, rather than the end, so that meaning is inherent within the act, being derived from the game, not the end.
I would say I do. But this is where we are led astray.
But this may not be the way it is being used. Just because it made sense when used in some other situation does not mean it makes sense under these circumstances. It is not:
Under the circumstances in the example given - pointing to something and saying "this is here" is pointless. Of course the object is there, otherwise one could not point to it.
To point to an object and say "this is here" is superfluous, but that is not the problem. The problem is that the meaning is not determined by the situation. It is the situation that renders the statement meaningless. The sentence is in need of a determination. As he asks elsewhere:
What is the sentence: "This is here" supposed to be doing? It cannot be used to inform us that the object is here. We may know what the statement means is some other situation, but here it is idle. Yet, it is here that the philosopher leaves behind everyday use and asserts metaphysical meaning.
I don't think this is right. Wittgenstein gives the example, which includes the pointing, and says that in the "special circumstances" in which the sentence is actually used: "There it does make sense."
I find OC 348 a little unclear, which may be confusing things, but this is how I read it:
348. Just as the words "I am here" have a meaning only in certain contexts, and not [in this context, e.g.] when I say them to someone who is sitting in front of me and sees me clearly, - and not because [the words] are superfluous, but because their meaning is not determined by this unsuitable situation, yet [the meaning of the words] stands in need of such determination [by a suitable situation].
Hopefully I haven't made it more unclear, but I think you are mistaken to infer that Wittgenstein is saying that the meaning is not (ever) determined by the situation. I think he is referring to his own unsuitable example (of someone sitting in front of him) when he says this, and that is why he goes on to say that the meaning of the words "stands in need of such determination" (but by a different, suitable situation).
I thought my example in the context of pointing to a map worked okay with "this is here".
Quoting Fooloso4
That's just it though: Wittgenstein has not provided any context/circumstances/situation for the sentence "This is here", so it needn't necessarily have the particular meaning you have attributed to it ("to inform us that the object is here"). That's just one possible meaning that occurs to you when you hear/read it.
Form-of-life > language-game > use > meaning.
Greengrocery >banana wholesale purchase> "About how many hands to a box?"> how big are the bananas?
Philosophy>realism demonstration> "Here is a hand," > meaningless.
Primary school> naming of parts> "Here is a hand." > This part is called a 'hand'.
Is this about right?
The particular circumstances in which the sentence is actually used is meant to compare with the example. It is in those circumstances that the sentence makes sense. The example illustrates the point that the meaning is not something that carries "in every kind of use". 'There', as in "There it does make sense." does not mean here, that is, in the example, but those circumstances in which the sentence is actually used.
Quoting Luke
The same holds for the object in front of him in 117.
Quoting Luke
I did not say that meaning is not (ever) determined by the situation. It is undetermined in the examples given though. It is by comparing these situations with those in which it makes sense to say "this is here" or "I am here" that we see that the expression is not being used in the familiar way in these examples.
Quoting Luke
I did not attribute any meaning to it. I said:
Quoting Fooloso4 [emphasis added].
The question is: what is the expression supposed to be doing? There is no determinate answer to that question in these examples.
I'm not exactly sure what you mean by "compare with the example" but it looks as though we are in agreement here. However, I don't know how to square this with your previous post () where you stated that pointing at the object should not be included, and that it was not a matter of adding context to the example in order to make sense of it.
The example is what he describes in the text, someone who points to an object in front of him and says "this is here". This is to be compared with those circumstances in which this sentence is actually used, for there, in those circumstances, it make sense.
Quoting Luke
Pointing is not part of the sentence. If we are to think of circumstances in which the sentence "This is here" makes sense we do not have to include the act of pointing at an object that is in front of you. In other words, we do not have to start with the circumstances described in the example and add something in order to have it make sense.
I don't understand why you want to exclude the pointing when it is part of the example described at §117.
Quoting Fooloso4
Don't we need to "add" the "special circumstances" in which "this sentence is actually used", given that "there" is where "it does make sense"?
I think the problem starts here:
Quoting Luke
As I read it, Wittgenstein finds the example problematic. It does not make sense to point to something in front of you and say "This is here". He then asks us to consider circumstances where it would make sense to say "This is here". He is not asking us to consider circumstances in which one points while saying it. If in those circumstances one does point, that is incidental.
Quoting Luke
I don't think so. It is not a matter of adding circumstances to the example but of replacing the example with some situation in which it does make sense to say "This is here".
You don't think that my example of pointing at a map and saying "This is here" makes sense?
Quoting Fooloso4
Are we reading the same book? Of course he asks us to consider pointing at the object while saying it:
See the parenthetical remark.
Quoting Fooloso4
What does "replacing the example" mean? The example is just someone saying "This is here" while pointing to an object in front of him. You want to replace this?
I've reconsidered what I said yesterday about language-games taking the place of context. Language-games cannot completely take the place of context because there is always a multiplicity of language-games which each word is involved in. Therefore we have to appeal to context in order to determine the appropriate language-game. This is why, in the following section, Wittgenstein starts to talk about numerous possible purposes. If there was only one language-game it would be possible to understand meaning according to the game. But since there are numerous games, we need a procedure to determine which game is at play in any particular circumstances. So the second sense of "context", particular circumstances, cannot be superseded by language-games, because we need to refer to these particular circumstances in order to determine which language-game is at play.
In your example:
Quoting Luke
You are doing what Wittgenstein suggests we do, consider circumstances where it does make sense to say "This is here". In Wittgenstein's example "this" would refer to the object, the map.
Quoting Luke
In his example someone points to an object. The person pointing might think it makes sense to say that the object he is pointing to is here, but Wittgenstein does not. He is asking us to compare this case with others in which one actually says this, cases in which it does make sense to say "This is here".
Quoting Luke
Your own example replaces the one Wittgenstein rejects. Although someone is still pointing, he is not making a claim about the object, the map, being here.
That's right.
Quoting Fooloso4
In both examples, the person points at an object. In my example, the object is a map.
Quoting Fooloso4
You are presupposing a meaning of 'This is here' which is not part of Wittgenstein's example. You have determined in advance that 'This is here' must have the meaning of 'this object is at this location in front of me' (or similar). However in Wittgenstein's example no such meaning has yet been determined because he has not provided the circumstances which would give the sentence its particular meaning. The meaning depends on how those words are used. You seem to assume that 'This is here' makes sense to you. But you should ask yourself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.
Quoting Fooloso4
The person in Wittgenstein's example is not necessarily making a claim about the object "being here", either. No such determination has been made about the meaning of 'This is here' at 117.
In your example you are pointing at a map but you are pointing to a location on the map:
Quoting Luke
In Wittgenstein's example someone is pointing to the object. In this example "this' refers to the object he is pointing to.
Quoting Luke
Wittgenstein says that he is pointing to the object in front of him. While it is possible that he is pointing to something about the object, there is nothing in the example that indicates that this is the case.
Quoting Luke
I have said just the opposite. Wittgenstein's example does not make sense. It makes no sense to point to something in front of you and saying "this is here".
Quoting Luke
Yes, that is what Wittgenstein says. Whatever those circumstances are in which it makes sense to say "this is here" might be, his example is not one of those cases.
Quoting Luke
When he points to the object and says "This is here" I see no reason to conclude he is not talking about the object he is pointing to.
Quoting Luke
There is a difference between the question of what he is referring to when he says "This is here" and making a determination about the meaning of pointing to something in front of you and saying "This is here". As with the example "I am here", the problem is not with understanding the words but with why someone would say it. As Wittgenstein asks:
His example does not contain any circumstances, so there is insufficient information to determine this.
Quoting Fooloso4
But you are doing more than that. You are assuming that "this is here" has a specific meaning; of the object "being here" or that 'this object is in front of me' or something similar. That is, you are assuming that the meaning of 'This is here' is like "an aura the [sentence] brings along with it and retains in every
kind of use."
In my map example, I am also talking about the object I am pointing to, but the meaning of 'This is here' in that scenario is not 'this object is in front of me', and it need not be.
Agreed, which is why I distinguished between suitable and unsuitable contexts/situations.
Yes, I believe we are in agreement.
The problem though, is that the same words may be involved in a multitude of different language-games. Therefore there cannot be such a thing as "the correct context" because the proper context would be dependent on which language-game is involved.
That's why at 117, if "This is here" makes sense to you, it is because you are familiar with a language-game which others whom it does not make sense to, are not familiar with. And so the person who is familiar with that language-game can imagine circumstances in which it actually makes sense to use that sentence, and the person who is not familiar with that language-game cannot.
The circumstance is him pointing to the object in front of him and saying this is here.
Quoting Luke
I don't know why you would assume that I have assumed any such thing. Everything I have said runs counter to the idea that it has a specific meaning.
Quoting Luke
The example clearly states that he is pointing to an object in front of him. He says "this is here" while doing so. Further, Wittgenstein says that if the person saying and doing this says that this makes sense to him he should look to an example where it "this is here" is actually used, there it makes sense.
Quoting Luke
Please stop telling me what I assume. I assume no such thing. I have no idea how you could reach that conclusion based on what I have said. You even quoted me as saying:
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Luke
Right. And that is why I said:
Quoting Fooloso4
I would say it is not that statements get there meaning from correct context, but that it is only in a correct context, that is to say, particular circumstances or situations that a statements has a meaning.
That's not a circumstance. Wittgenstein asks us to consider in what circumstances the sentence (and pointing) are actually used.
Quoting Fooloso4
From what you have said:
Quoting Fooloso4Quoting Fooloso4Quoting Fooloso4
I have not seen you suggest that it could have any other meaning. And you criticised my map example because it fails to have this meaning.
Quoting Fooloso4
Yes, that is the context I have provided.
Of course it is a circumstance, a circumstance in which the sentence does not make sense. That is why he says to consider circumstances where the sentence is actually used.
Quoting Luke
How does any of this imply that I assume "this is here" has a specific meaning? The first statement refers to your example. In your example "this is here" does not mean the map is here. Here refers to a location on the map. I did not think this was in dispute since you said "this" refers to a location on the map. The second statement says nothing about a specific meaning, it says that even thought the person saying "this is here" while pointing to an object may think it makes sense, it does not. It is analogous to saying "I am here" to someone sitting in front of you who can clearly see you. The third statement does not say anything about a specific meaning either. It asks what the sentence is doing in this example.
Quoting Luke
Any meaning other than what? I have said repeatedly that it has no meaning. It does not make sense to point to something in front of you and say "this is here".
Quoting Luke
And Wittgenstein provides a context for his example as well. The problem is, the context is not one in which the sentence "this is here" makes sense.
Quoting Fooloso4
It is clear from this that you have a specific meaning of 'This is here' in mind (i.e. "the object...being here"). Furthermore, you have criticised my example because it fails to have the meaning you have presupposed. This is your presupposition about the meaning of 'This is here'.
Quoting Fooloso4
That's right, because I haven't made your presupposition about the meaning of 'this is here'.
Quoting Fooloso4
That's right, but I have provided a scenario in which I point to an object (map) and say 'This is here', precisely as per Wittgenstein's example. Wittgenstein has not stipulated that "this" must or must not refer in a particular way to the object at which I am pointing. That is, Wittgenstein has not stipulated the meaning of 'This is here'. Yet, you have presupposed a meaning, and criticised my map example for failing to meet it.
I would agree with that.
Isn't this a misleading statement though? Suppose a word like "game" has a family of meanings, and therefore is involved in a multiplicity of different language-games. Now a statement would be similar, having numerous possibilities for a useful context, depending on the language-game involved. Where do you jump from numerous possibilities to "a correct context"?
If someone points to an object and says "this is here" I assume he means the object he is pointing to is here, but he might be pointing to something else. He might mean a scratch on the object, for example. That does not mean I have a specific meaning in mind, it means that I assume he is pointing to the object and not something about the object. As I said in an earlier post:
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Luke
I did not criticize your example. What I said is:
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Luke
The reason it does not mean the map is here is because you are pointing to a location on the map not the map. This has nothing to do with any presuppositions you imagine I have made. My point was that your example makes sense because it provides the further context that Wittgenstein's lacks.
Quoting Luke
If you mean as per what Wittgenstein says should be considered - circumstances where this sentence
is actually used then I agree. But his example was of circumstances where it does not make sense - pointing to something in front of him and saying "this is here".
Quoting Luke
There is nothing I have said that indicates he has stipulated this. Once again, your example provides a determination that his does not. This is not a criticism. It is, as I have said, doing what he says should be done.
Quoting Luke
It is not a matter of stipulating the meaning of the sentence, but rather, that the sentence does not make sense in the example he provides. It is because it does not make sense that he says particular circumstances in which it is actually used, circumstances in which it does make sense to say "This is here" should be considered.
A correct context would be any context in which it does make sense, that is, any context in which it is actually used. Which is to say, the special or particular circumstances in which it is actually used.
Yes, it does. The specific meaning you have assumed, as you yourself have just clearly stated, is that "the object he is pointing to is here".
Quoting Fooloso4
Right?
Quoting Fooloso4
The criticism I was referring to was this of yours: "Although someone is still pointing, he is not making a claim about the object, the map, being here."
This indicated to me that you thought that my map example had failed to provide a suitable meaning for 'This is here', because it did not comport with your assumed meaning of 'This is here'.
Quoting Fooloso4
The pointing is the same in either case. It is the meaning of 'This is here' that is different.
Quoting Fooloso4
I don't believe that his example at 117 contains any circumstances. Therefore, I don't think that it doesn't make sense. Instead, I think that 'This is here' in his example lacks sense or has an indeterminate meaning. It requires some suitable circumstances to give it that meaning. But maybe we mean something similar by this.
I am assuming that when Wittgenstein says he [edit - the person in Wittgenstein's example] is pointing to the object in front of him that he is pointing to the object in front of him. I am assuming that when he says "this here" while pointing to the object in front of him he means the object in front of him is here. He assumes this makes sense. Wittgenstein does not. I do not. He assumes:
He is not. I am not assuming a specific meaning. Following Wittgenstein I am questioning his use of the expression. Hence the question: "And what is it supposed to be doing?"
Quoting Luke
That is not a criticism, it is a statement of fact. You were not making a claim about the object, that is, the map. You were not saying that the map is here. If you were pointing to the map in front of you and saying "this is here" then your example would be the same as Wittgenstein's, and would be just as senseless.
Quoting Luke
I have no assumed meaning of the sentence. Again, following Wittgenstein, in the circumstances described it makes not sense to say "this is here". That is not because I assume the sentence has a particular meaning, but because in this situation it makes no sense. The question is: what is the sentence doing in this example?
Quoting Luke
It is the same in that you are both pointing, but you are pointing to a location on a map and he is pointing to an object, say, the map. In your example 'this' means the location, in Wittgenstein's this means the object in from of him. You have provided a determine meaning, the person in Wittgenstein's example has not.
Quoting Luke
I am not going to try to convince you otherwise, but consider this: if I were to ask in what circumstances he said "this is here" the answer would be, while pointing to an object in front of him.
Quoting Luke
What distinction are you making between doesn't make sense and lacks sense?
So that would be in the context of a language-game then? If the word is use in the context of a game, it is a correct use, if it's outside of all games, it would be incorrect. How would one know whether the use is outside of all games, or just outside of the games that the person is familiar with? I couldn't say that a particular use is "incorrect" just because I'm not familiar with the particular game, so how could anyone say that any particular usage is incorrect?
If, actual usage is what determines correctness, then any and all usage is correct, so what's the point in calling it "correct" usage, or "correct context" if usage is inherently correct, and therefore any context of usage is thereby correct context?
The context in which it is actually used, as opposed to some metaphysical claim.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Just because someone says something that does not mean that is how the word or statement is actually used. Wittgenstein gives several examples that fall outside of actual usage, including "this is here" and "I am here". They make sense in some contexts but not in the circumstances Wittgenstein describes.
I don't think that you should make that assumption, but thanks for finally admitting that you are making it. You formerly said: "I don't know why you would assume that I have assumed any such thing."
Quoting Fooloso4
But you just said that you were. Again.
Quoting Fooloso4
Then why did you say that my example "replaces the one Wittgenstein rejects"? It does not replace Wittgenstein's example. It is the same sentence and pointing, only with added context (i.e. special circumstances).
Quoting Fooloso4
See the quote at top of this post.
Quoting Fooloso4
Why does it make no sense in Wittgenstein's example? You formerly said: "It is not a matter of adding context to the example in order to make sense of it."
Quoting Fooloso4
Right, the meaning of "this" (or "this is here") is different in each example, but the pointing is not different. That's why pointing at the object does not make it a circumstance.
But thanks for once again including the pointing. You formerly said: "He is not asking us to consider circumstances in which one points while saying it."
It is frustrating when you act as though your position has remained unchanged all along. It would be nice if you could acknowledge the changes to your views.
Quoting Fooloso4
What does 'This is here' mean in these "circumstances"?
Quoting Fooloso4
In Wittgenstein's example, "This is here" does not yet have a sense. It's not that it doesn't make sense, but that its sense has yet to be determined. It is not meaningless; it could mean a number of things, but there is currently insufficient information to decide its meaning.
The thing I make no assumptions about is what he means when he says "this is here". I do not know why he would say that.
Quoting Luke
The specific meaning refers to what he means when he says "this is here". I don't think Wittgenstein intends for us to question what he is pointing to or that what he is saying refers to what he is pointing to. Isn't that the way pointing works?
Quoting Luke
Because that is what Wittgenstein says he should do:
Why someone would point to something in front of him and say it is here makes no sense. Under other circumstances the sentence "This is here" does make sense. Wittgenstein is asking us to consider those case.
Quoting Luke
Right. The circumstances are different. That is why your example makes sense and Wittgenstein's does not.
Quoting Luke
For one, he says it doesn't. "There it makes sense" In this example it doesn't. What would someone mean by it?
Quoting Luke
Right. He is suggesting looking at particular circumstances where it makes sense. One might concoct a story in which his example does make sense, but that is not what he is suggesting. If you think that pointing to something in front of you and saying "This is here" then ask yourself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.
Quoting Luke
Once again, what you are pointing to is not the same. You are not pointing to the object, the map, but to something on the map.
Quoting Luke
Your example is one in which you point. Not all examples of where it makes sense to say "this is here" involve pointing. Here are a few:
We are playing chess and someone bumps the board. I put the knight back where it was and say "this is here".
I am expecting a package and when if comes in the mail someone who knows I am expecting it brings it to me and says "this is here".
I find an novel in the reference section of the library. I pull the book out and show it to the librarian standing with me and say "this is here".
Quoting Luke
I am sorry that you are frustrated but my position has remained the same, but for some reason I cannot figure out you have not understood me. And that is frustrating!
Quoting Luke
I take the example as given. There is no reason to think that there is information that is being withheld.
As I see it, 117 is a continuation of 116. It is an example of someone mistakenly ascribing metaphysical meaning to the claim "this is here". But that is not how the sentence is actually used, and so, despite what he intends, it is meaningless.
I do not think there is any value in continuing this. Perhaps as we move forward things will become clearer.
Then why have you said:
Quoting Fooloso4
and
Quoting Fooloso4
Aren't they assumptions about what he means, just as you say here?
Quoting Fooloso4
Exactly. Look at your quotes above. They refer to what he means when he says "this is here".
Quoting Fooloso4
"What he is saying" (i.e. the meaning of "this is here") depends on the use. Remember Wittgenstein's earlier comments about pointing to the shape, colour, etc? We cannot presume that there is an obvious meaning here.
Quoting Fooloso4
Am I not pointing to the map in my scenario?
You are trying to make a distinction between pointing to and pointing at, but it is all the same pointing. What differs between my example and what you assume he means in Wittgenstein's example is the meaning of 'This is here'.
Quoting Fooloso4
Your claim was that Wittgenstein "is not asking us to consider circumstances in which one points while saying it". The other examples are irrelevant to this claim.
Quoting Fooloso4
I also take the example as given. The information that is missing are the particular circumstances that will give the sentence a particular meaning.
Quoting Fooloso4
I agree that it is a minor issue, but I think it is important to get clear on several facts that you have denied, namely that:
But making a metaphysical claim is a context of actual use, just like any other special circumstance of use. You can't say that making a metaphysical claim is not an instance of actual use, that would be untrue.
Quoting Fooloso4
Yes it is. When someone says something, that is exactly how the statement is used. An instance of someone saying something is a particular instance of actual use, in particular circumstances. What else could special circumstances of actual use ever mean? Each instance of use is particular to the special circumstances of that instance of use. So that instance of someone saying something is exactly how the word or statement is actually used. and another instance would be another instance of how it is used.
How the word or statement is actually used, refers to particular instances of actual use, "special circumstances", as opposed to a generalization such as "this is how the statement is actually used". So for example the statement of 117, "This is here", we might make the generalization that this statement is used in the context of pointing to an object. But that would be incorrect because it really does not indicate how the sentence is actually used. We would have to refer to particular instances of use, in special circumstances, to see how the sentence is actually used. We cannot see how the sentence is actually used through a generalization. because we have to look at actual instances of use.
Wittgenstein says:
He contrasts metaphysical use and everyday use. When he says in 117:
he is not referring to any use but everyday use. It is everyday use that he means by actual use. It is only the philosopher who would point to something in front of him and say "This is here". That is not actual use, that is, everyday use. In everyday use it makes sense, its metaphysical use does not.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The special circumstances are particular circumstances. Particular circumstances are not just any circumstances.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Both 'special' and 'particular' are translations of the German term Besondere.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If the answer to the question at 116:
is yes, then what does he mean when he goes on to say:
?
And what does he mean when at 117 he says:
if the metaphysical use is actual use? If the use in the example is actual use then why would he say that this person should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used?
As per what I said about §116, §118 and §119 are best understood in light of the distinction between the understanding on the one hand, and the empirical on the other. Recalling that the investigation here does not 'uncover new facts', and equally, does not offer any new theories (where theories are understood to be theories of how language 'ought' to function (ideally), apart from how language does function (actually)), Witty's takes the import of the Investigations to be mostly negative in character. They tell us less 'what to do' than they tell us what not to do when investigating language.
So when Witty says, in §119, that "the results of philosophy are the discovery of some piece of plain nonsense and the bumps that the understanding has got by running up against the limits of language" (my emphasis), 'the understanding' here must be understood in the quasi-technical sense that Witty has given this term, as that relating to our expectations about language, and not facts or empirical discoveries about it. Similarly, the 'ground-clearing' of §118 refers too to this effort to divest ourselves of idealized notions of what language ought to be, should be, or strive after and aim at, apart from what language 'actually' is.
To anticipate a bit, this is why Witty will say, a little later down, the these investigations thus "leaves everything as it is" (§124); - in terms I used earlier, the Investigations are subtractive, not additive.
He's not making a contrast, by bringing the metaphysical use back to everyday use, he is dissolving that contrast. As I explained to Luke, his method of bringing it back is to show that the metaphysical use is a particular instance of use, just like any other particular instance of use (special circumstances).
Quoting Fooloso4
As I said, you cannot point to an instance of actual use and say that is not actual use. That is pure nonsense. So what you are claiming here is pure nonsense, and not what Wittgenstein is doing. Wittgenstein does not attempt to say that metaphysical use is not actual use, that would be nonsensical.
If there is a distinction between everyday use, and metaphysical use, these are both classes of actual use. Wittgenstein wants to close this separation, and bring metaphysical use into the same fold as everyday use. He does this by showing that any instance of use, is a particular instance of use (use under special circumstances), and so all instances of use, be it metaphysical, or everyday, are classed similarly.
Quoting Fooloso4
Every instance of circumstances is unique and peculiar, particular, specific, as "that set of circumstances". Therefore any set of circumstances is "particular circumstances". When you point to a set of circumstances, saying "this, here", you individuate that particular set of circumstances, and no other set of circumstances is that particular set of circumstances. This is the basis for the law of identity. Pointing to an object and saying "this, here" is what identifies the object according to the law of identity. However, you may point to any set of circumstances, and say "this, here". So any set of circumstances is particular circumstances, and may be thus identified, according to the law of identity. A particular is unique.
Quoting Fooloso4
What he means is that when we look at a metaphysical use of the word, it may or may not make sense to us. If one knows the language-game which that particular instance of use is derived from, its home, then it makes sense. This making sense of the word can only be done if one is familiar with that particular language-game (the home game), and in the case of metaphysical use, this might require that the person is educated in metaphysics. That is why I said, the terms of algebra make no sense to me, but it is only because I am not familiar with that place in the language (the language-game) that these terms are used.
That is to treat the metaphysical use exactly as we would treat any other instance of use. Any word may make sense to you, in its particular instance of use, if you are familiar with the language-game which is home to that particular instance of use. But if you are not familiar with the way that the word is used it will not make sense to you. There is a generalization according to a way of using the words (language-game). If you are familiar with this way, the use makes sense. The metaphysical use, is the actual use, and the author is using the words in a way, a metaphysical way. The special circumstances in which the words are actually used like that are the particular instances, just like the algebraic use is a way, and the actual use, the special circumstances, where those words (terms of algebra) are used like that are the particular instances. Each and every instance of use is an instance of using words in special circumstances, but each displays a way of use (a language-game). The particular instances of use are "everyday use", because every day is a new day with new special circumstances. So every instance of use is use according to special circumstances, but the same individual will employ many different language-games each day depending on the special circumstances..
Quoting StreetlightX
You can't subtract and leave everything the way it is, so the Investigations must be neither subtractive nor additive, to fulfill that purpose. Pointing to ideas as wrongful guidance is just as normative as pointing to ideas as rightful guidance.
Yes you can; it's called cleaning.
Obviously, cleaning is not leaving everything the way it was, or else cleaning would be doing nothing.
If you eat the food off the plate, you are not leaving things the way they were. You are leaving the plate the way it was, but not the food. Therefore you are selective in what you are referring to as "things". It's called "cherry picking", the fallacy of incomplete evidence. This thing stays the same therefore I am leaving things the way they were. Call me a pedant if you like, but it's a matter of fact, and one which is important to this philosophical investigation. If you think that we ought to overlook this fact then you are the one who is an idiot.
Here's the point, after spending a section of the Philosophical Investigations describing an act of striving after an elusive ideal, Wittgenstein insinuates that we ought not strive after that ideal, in the subtractive manner described by StreetlightX. Then at 133 he introduces another ideal, which he says we are striving after. So if he were giving a simple description of language, leaving things the way they are, he'd describe this aspect of language, this striving after an ideal, whether it be this ideal or that ideal, without passing judgement that such and such ideal ought not be striven after, and then proceeding to introduce a different ideal which should be striven after. He says that philosophy ought to be descriptive rather than normative, but this itself is a normative statement. So he has no escape from the fact that philosophy is normative, and if his intent was to produce a true description he would describe it as such, rather than implying that it ought to be other than it is.
"Wittgenstein himself wished to publish the Tractatus and the Investigations together because, as he puts it, '...the latter could only be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking. For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again..., I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in the first book' (P.I. p. x).
"The relation between the Tractatus and the Investigations is a matter of controversy. On the one hand the passage just quoted has been interpreted to mean that 'Wittgenstein himself viewed...[the Investigations] as a development or deepening of [the Tractatus], and in fact, ... both the one and the other only makes sense when they are seen as complementary.' On the other hand, the majority of commentators seem to agree with Hartnack in maintaining that 'No unbroken line leads from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations; there is no logical sequence between the two books, but rather a logical gap. The thought of the later work is a negation of the thought of the earlier.'
"One asserts that the Investigations, as a whole, is a 'development' of the Tractatus while the other claims that they are 'negations' of each other. Both interpretations are radically mistaken. Wittgenstein himself used to say that the Tractatus was not all wrong: it was not like a bag of junk professing to be a clock, but like a clock that did not tell you the right time. It is important to distinguish clearly the part of the Tractatus which was repudiated from the part which was not. Wittgenstein merely advises us to contrast his later work with his old way of thinking - i.e. his old method of philosophizing. It is quite true that his new and old ways of thinking are poles apart. The Tractatus follows the methods of traditional theoretical construction (even though to construct only a 'ladder' to be abandoned at the end) while the Investigations employs what can best be described as the method of dialectic. However, there is an important continuity in Wittgenstein's conception of the nature and tasks of philosophy. The views arrived at in the Tractatus (that philosophical problems arise from our misunderstanding of the logic of our language, that philosophy is no science but an activity of elucidation and clarification, etc.) continued to serve as the leading thread in Wittgenstein's later works. Thus, Wittgenstein's later conception of the nature and tasks of philosophy can best be seen as a 'development' of his earlier views, while his later method should be regarded as the 'negation' of his earlier method. This, I think [K. T. Fann], is the key to a clear understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole (Preface p. xii, xiii)."
I think this is important.
So, philosophers have a tendency, as did the philosopher of the Tractatus, to analyze language as if one is doing mathematics. This method of analysis rears its head all the time. In fact, when interpreting the PI, as is done in this thread, and in my thread on OC, we are making the same mistake. We are looking for that precise exegesis, which leads to a discovery of Wittgenstein's meaning. It does not mean that the work is all bad, it means that sometimes we are searching for the very thing Wittgenstein is criticizing. We think we eliminate misunderstandings by making our analysis more exact. When what we need is a general idea of his method, the PI method. Wittgenstein criticizes philosophers often for looking for the real artichoke beneath the leaves or layers (BB, p. 125). This criticism only goes so far though, because much of the time we are re-wording his writings to look at it from a different angle.
"“The meaning of an expression” is not something which an expression possesses already on its own and which is subsequently imported into a context of use ... What we are tempted to call “the meaning of the sentence” is not a property the sentence already has in abstraction from any possibility of use and which it carries with it—like an atmosphere accompanying it— into each specific occasion of use. It is, as Wittgenstein keeps saying, in the circumstances in which it is “actually used” that the sentence has sense. This is why Wittgenstein says in the previous passage from On Certainty: the words “I am here” have a meaning only in certain contexts— that is, it is a mistake to think that the words themselves intrinsically possess some sort of meaning apart from their capacity to express a meaningful thought when called upon in a context of use. The problem with the pseudo-employment of “I am here” under consideration in the passage above is that the meaning of the words “is not determined by the situation”; that is to say, it is not clear, when these words are called upon in this context, what is being said—if anything.
The philosopher, Wittgenstein says, tends to think that he understands “the meaning of a sentence” apart from and prior to any concrete occasion of use ... The philosopher takes there to be something which is the thought which the sentence itself expresses. He takes himself already to know what it means: what it means is a function of what these words combined mean. To consider the use of the sentence for such a philosopher, is to consider an additional dimension of meaning. An investigation of “use,” for such a philosopher, is an investigation into the relationship between “the meaning of the sentence”—which we are able to grasp independently of its contexts of use—and the sorts of things this sentence can express or imply (over and above what it means taken by itself) when brought into conjunction with the various contexts of use into which it can be intelligibly imported. Questions can be raised about why what is said is said and what the point of saying it on a particular occasion of use is.
But the very possibility of asking such questions presupposes that it is already reasonably clear what thought is expressed, and thus what it would be for the truth to have been spoken on this occasion of speaking. Cavell’s Wittgenstein is concerned to contest such a conception of the relation between meaning and use. What your words say depends upon what they are doing—how they are at work—in a context of use".
§120 largely trades on the distinction between the ideal (what language 'ought' to be) and the actual (what language 'is') that Witty has previously set up in a few places (§101, §105, §107). The general gist of it is: you're going to have to use actual language (in all its messy coarseness) to set-up your ideal language, so exactly how are you meant to set it up as ideal to begin with? Once again it's worth noting that when Witty says: "And your scruples are misunderstandings" - the sense of 'understanding' here is once again the quasi-technical sense of it: as relating to the understanding - that is, not facts, but to our expectations of language (of what it 'should' be).
This theme, of shedding expectation and ideality in order to deal with actuality ('alone'), helps explain the critique that closes §120: a critique of the distinction between word and meaning. For the distinction only 'works' if one posits an ideal of how language 'should be', as distinct from how language is actually used: only if you have this distinction in place, can one subsequently distinguish between a word and its meaning. But abolish or disactivate the former distinction, and so too is the latter distinction abolished or rendered inoperative as well.
This insofar as, if only actual use matters, then a word is a word only insofar as it has meaning - only insofar as it is used in a language-game (without which, one might say, it's just a scribble on a page). This also helps explain (again) §117, where Witty also critiques the idea that meaning were distinct from a word ("As if the meaning were an aura the word brings along with it").
Does Conant agree with Cavell's reading?
Why would you assume this, that we are looking for a precise meaning? Have you not attended philosophy seminars? The goal is to discuss the variety of interpretations, in an attempt to understand the various perspectives of understanding, brought to the table by the different backgrounds of the different participants. Sometimes we may be influenced to alter our understanding based on the perspective of another.
The way (method) of the author of philosophy is often the way of poetry, and that is the way of ambiguity. The intent of the poet is to say something which will be received as significant by a very wide audience. If you and I come from completely different backgrounds, then different sayings will be significant to me, from what will be significant to you. But if the author uses words with sufficient ambiguity, the same phrase may be significant to both you and I, but significant in differing ways. This means that we may each derive meaning, but different meaning. The poet (also sometimes the philosopher) uses ambiguity as a tool, to say something which appears to be significant to the very different members of a very wide ranging audience. When the commentators and critics discuss the poetry, they will rarely agree on the meaning. But such discussions are a very useful exercise to help one understand the variations in understanding, and this aids us in understanding being human.
Quoting StreetlightX
When we, as poets and philosophers, use ambiguity (as described above), what we are doing takes a completely different form from "the thought which the sentence itself expresses", because it is assumed already, within that mode of usage that there is no such thing as the thought being expressed.
That was my impression as well, but I wondered about him saying "Cavell's Wittgenstein", "according to Cavell", Cavell's reading", and so on. In the opening paragraph he says:
Does he intend to leave this "if" an open question, as though interpretation is never settled? He does, however, reject certain interpretations.
What are we to make of the parenthetical remark? He rejects the idea that meaning is a thing of the same kind as the word; I do not, however, think he is rejecting the distinction between a word and its meaning. Buying a cow is not the only thing one can do with money. What can be done with words is like what can be done with money, but we can do more with money than just buy cows.
The question of money and what can be done with it is analogous to the question:
When at PI 117 he says:
we need to pay attention not only to the image of an aura but to the notion of an aura that is retained in every kind of use. "In every kind of use" would be the equivalent of money being used only to buy cows. Words may have an aura (e.g.,"loaded words"), but that aura is not inherent in the words themselves, and it is not retained in whatever circumstances the word is used.
I'm saying that it's easy to get so involved in what Wittgenstein is saying that you forget that he's putting forth a method, so it's the method, and not so much what he's saying in this passage or that, although it's that too. Sometimes it's about the right balance between what he's saying here or there and the overarching picture of his method of linguistic analysis.
There's actually two "methods" which we have to keep an eye on here. One is what you call his method of analysis, the other is his method of writing (the way he uses words). There is really no such thing as "what Wittgenstein is saying". But if we were to look for "what he is saying", wouldn't that just be the theory he puts forward, "his method of linguistic analysis"?
Or would you say that there are three distinct things here, his method of analysis, his way of using words (i.e. his philosophy), and what he is saying? We cannot dismiss "the way he uses words", as a method in itself, and this refers to things like, he speaks clearly or ambiguously, he speaks honestly or deceptively, etc.. These, and similar judgements, are judgements we make concerning the way that people use words, which is a reflection of their personal philosophy.
To me, it doesn't make sense to say, "There is really no such thing as 'what Wittgenstein is saying.' I think it's plainly contradictory, at least in terms of how we normally use the word say. Also, Wittgenstein is not putting forth a theory, that seems clear also. As usual MU we are far apart on Wittgenstein, but you seem to thrive on living in your private world. Whatever floats your boat.
Finally, someone else said it. It's really a great saying IMO. Somewhere up there with a rising tide lifts all boats, and there's no free lunch. And maybe even topping, you can't have a cake and eat it too.
I just ate my cake. Chocolate, with a think layer of chocolate frosting.
Oh, did you. Do you think it is possible that Wittgenstein would have thought highly of these insightful sayings? I find them irresistibly concise and worthy of admiration to say something like "there is no free lunch". Something about them strikes a person as a bedrock and unshakable "truth or belief".
I really do wonder what impressed Keynes so greatly that he exclaimed that God [Wittgenstein] stepped out of the train [at some time].
He was just much smarter than your average bear. The whole family was a bunch of geniuses, mostly in music though.
If a group of people like us cannot agree on an interpretation, and the author of the material intentionally ensured such disagreement through the use of ambiguity, then it is correct to say that there is no such thing as what the author is saying.
Consider his example, "stand roughly here". What does "roughly" add to the statement "stand here", other than ambiguity? If he says "stand here", you know exactly where he wants you to stand, where he's pointing. If he says "stand roughly here", you do not know exactly where he wants you to stand, because he is saying that there are many possibilities of places where you might stand in that area. The author implies that there is a place where you are wanted to stand, yet adds "roughly" to say that there is really no such place. What "roughly" does, is pass the choice of where to stand to the hearer, so that there is no such thing as the exact place where Wittgenstein wants you to stand. This is what the intentional use of ambiguity does, it gives to the reader a choice in interpretation, so there is no such thing as what the author says because the author is giving you a choice of what is said. You decide what the author said, and different people can decide on different things, because there is no such thing as what the author really said, as the author plays a game of possibilities. Likewise, when the speaker says "stand roughly here", there is no such thing as the place where the speaker wants you to stand, there are many possibilities, and the speaker has used ambiguity to allow you to choose the place where you ought to stand.
The use of that example by Wittgenstein, to demonstrate the use of ambiguity indicates that he is intentionally using ambiguity. If a word is recognized as having a family of meanings, and interpretation of that word will depend on one's background (the language-games which one is familiar with), and the author proceeds to use that word in a way which "fits" with a multitude of different language-games, without indicating a specific language-game as intended, then ambiguity is intended.
This one's pretty straightforward on the surface but I just want to quickly relate it to the passages around it, because it can seem to come a bit out of left-field (as it did for me). I'm admittedly cribbing a bit from Hacker and Baker, but §121 needs to be read in light of the distinction established previously between theory/explanation and description (§109).
To deny that there can or ought to be 'second-order philosophy' is to deny that there can be a 'theory of philosophy': any account of philosophy would or can only remain at the level of description. We can only describe this or that (actual) philosophy as it stands, not provide a theory of philosophy (a metaphilosophy) that would account for what philosophy 'is'. Or rather: philosophy is as philosophy does.
A lot of ink has been spilt on Witty's understanding of the 'survayability of grammar' (@Fooloso4 linked to a nice article on it here), but I want to try my hand at reading it on my own terms.
In particular, I want to link the idea of survayability with Witty's comments on explanations and boundaries, in the sections around §70-§90 or so (the comments on 'staying roughly here' and on defining names). Recall that in those sections, Witty argued that boundaries and explanations were always adequate to the degree that they fulfilled their purpose. To say 'stay roughly here' would fulfil it's purpose, for example, were I to go away and come back and were able to find you again (you didn't wonder off while I was away). That the exact borders of 'here' were not exhaustively defined is irrelevant (§87: "The signpost is in order - if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose".)
Now, another way to put this is that all explanation is local. The grammar of 'staying roughly here' only needs to be as 'deep' as it needs to be to facilitate the activity of me being able to find you again later on. It doesn't ramify any further, so that, say, I can pick out the ring of atoms that 'here' 'ultimately constitutes' or whatever. Explanation doesn't go 'all the way down' - it is not global. Now, to say then, that "we don't have an overview of the use of our words" is to say that you can't 'zoom out' to a global level and see how the grammar of our words is every laid out in some a priori fashion; grammar is 'purpose relative' and our purposes are always 'local', beyond which they change (if I'm doing a scientific experiment, I may indeed need to know where the 'exact', 'atom-level' boundary of 'here' is).
In this regard, to create a 'surveyable representation' is to create a kind of 'local map of grammar': it is to understand how the/a grammar of use relates to the particular activities (forms-of-life?) in which that grammar finds its purpose. Importantly, it is also to recognise that that grammar does not extend beyond that purpose: there is no grammar that would encompass all instances of use: there is only ever this or that use, in this or that language-game. This is what is means to say that "our grammar is deficient in surveyability": there is no Archimedean point from which one could survey (all?) grammar from without (no ideal) - one must only ever work with actual (local) grammars.
One of the reasons I'm employing these cartographic terms (map making terms) like 'local' and 'global' is that it helps account for §123, which talks about how philosophical problems consist in 'not knowing one's way about'. It is to be 'lost', to not have a 'map', to not understand the local grammar, and how that grammar relates to the purpose and activity from which it gains its life. A few things I've left out in this exposition ('Weltanschauung', 'intermediate links', 'seeing connections'), but will leave off here for space's sake.
In my translation we are talking about a "perspicuous representation". The perspicuous representation is said to be "of fundamental significance for us", and it is implied at 123 that we are lost (have a philosophical problem) without it. So philosophy, if we can say "what philosophy is", is the way that we understand the use of words. We often say that a person has "a philosophy", and this for Wittgenstein means a way of understanding the use of words. Hence the oddness of understanding the use of the word "philosophy". But this, one's understanding of the use of the word "philosophy", is incorporated within, as part of one's philosophy.
The overall picture which Wittgenstein is putting forward is exactly as the perspicuous representation StreetlightX has provided. Ways of using words are developed, evolve from particular instances of use (the local). From this comes distinct language-games, and distinct meanings for the same words (thus a family of meanings). This is exactly opposed to, or an inversion of the Platonic ontology of meaning which positions eternal Forms (universals) as prior to particular instances, imparting reality (real meaning) to the particular instance of use through participation in the universal. In the Wittgensteinian ontology of meaning there is no need for an overriding universal concept to give any instance of use meaning, but this creates a gap between particular instances of use and the well-defined language-games (complete with rules), because the particular instance which evolves into the game, is prior to the game. The gap needs to be filled to support a proper understanding because existing within the gap would be like being lost (present us with philosophical problems). Therefore we have a need for "intermediate cases".
The intermediate cases are like the commonly quoted "missing links" in evolutionary theory, which would provide the connections, the relations required to fill the gap between one species and another, or one language-game and another. Logic dictates that the properties or features of the intermediate cases, the missing links, must be attributed to the individual instances, because there is no species, or "universal" there (Platonism denied), to attribute them to. .
It was Luke who provided the link.
Quoting StreetlightX
I agree with the distinction between local and global. In terms of language games it is the distinction between a surveyable representation of a language game and a surveyable representation of all language games. As I read it the former is not only possible, it is "of fundamental significance for us", and is what Wittgenstein is attempting to provide. The latter, however, is not. When he says that our grammar is deficient in surveyability I take this to mean the grammar of the language game being played rather than the grammar of language games in general or in toto. This deficiency is not a necessary condition, but one that can be rectified.
Quoting StreetlightX
A couple of examples I cited earlier of what might be called the "surveyor's language" :
§124 comes in something like two parts, with the first part acting as somewhat of a recapitulation of a lot of what has been said so far, and the second part linking what has been said with mathematics.
So: The first part underscores, again, the distinction between facts and understanding that has been operative all throughout these sections, along with affirming that philosophy only ever works at the level of the understanding - that is to say, at the level of idealisations about what language should be, or ought to be. Given then, that Witty has argued all along that all such idealisations should be expelled, and that philosophy only ought to describe language, it follows that philosophy ‘leaves everything as it is’. It does not 'contribute’ in any way to language as it is actually used. Language is, or would be, indifferent to anything philosophy has to say about it.
--
Just before going on, it’s perhaps worth pausing to do a quick comparison to some of Witty’s views on philosophy in the Tractatus. For, despite the heavy critique of the Tractatus here (re: idealisation and so on), Witty’s understanding of philosophy remains strikingly similar. For, recall that in the Tractuatus that "Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences” (TLP 4.111: i.e. does not deal with facts, or the empirical); and that famously, one who has ‘climbed the ladder’ of the TLP ought to throw it away; In the PI, philosophy has a similar role, but unlike the TLP, it cannot be done away with so definitively: philosophy in the PI is always something of a standing threat (§109: "a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language”), against which one must remain, in some sense, ever vigilant.
Where philosophy in the TLP ought to self-immolate once and for all, in the PI, philosophy is both cure and disease, and one always needs philosophy in order to ‘cure’ oneself of philosophy, indefinitely. If the illusions in the TLP were Cartesian, in the sense that, like the illusions of Descartes’ evil demon, they could be overcome once and for all, the illusions of the PI are Kantian, in the sense that they are always looming. Philosophy in the PI is a pharmakon, to use one of Derrida's terms if anyone is familiar with it.
—
The second half of §124 extends Witty’s point about philosophy and language to mathematics. Just as philosophy does not ‘interfere’ with the actual use of language, so too does philosophy not ‘interfere’ with the workings of mathematics. Witty doesn’t really explain himself much here - the bulk of the good stuff is to be found in the Remarks, Lectures, and Philosophical Grammar - but there is one important point that I think is worth noting. If the reason that philosophy leaves everything in language ‘as is’ because it only deals with the understanding and not facts, this cannot be the same reason it leaves everything in mathematics ‘as is’: this is because mathematics, for Wittgenstein, is also not empirical: that is, math also does not deal with facts, or at least, facts in the empirical mode.
This isn’t something that Witty insists upon here in the PI - at least, not that I can recall - but he makes the point almost everywhere that he explicitly deals with math. All of this is simply to say that despite the fact that Witty says that philosophy does not ‘interfere’ with either language or math, this lack of interference does not happen for the same reason in both cases. Something is slightly different about math. This gets brought out somewhat in the next passage, but all I want to do here is mark or take note of this not-so-obvious asymmetry between language and math.
My bad! It was quite a few posts back. And yeah, the conception of language as a maze of different (kinds of!) streets is a very nice one and well worth invoking in the reading of §122-123.
I agree, and I find this to be very odd. The TLP is extremely naïve in its simplistic representation of philosophy. In the PI Wittgenstein appears to recognize this naivety, and the fact that philosophy is much more complex than he originally thought. But for some undisclosed reason, he refuses to recognize, in his writing, the implications of these complexities. The glaring deficiency is that philosophy really does deal with morality, and how human beings ought to be behave, and language use is described by Wittgenstein as a form of human behaviour. So the fact that philosophy deals with how people ought to use language cannot be avoided.
Now he has created a real dilemma for himself. If he is to accurately describe what philosophy is, it is required that he include moral philosophy which prescribes what people ought to do. And if he excludes moral philosophy from his description, saying that philosophy ought not include this, then he is practising that very form of philosophy which he is saying ought not be done.
Quoting StreetlightX
Here is a fine example of the hypocrisy which Wittgenstein has forced himself into by refusing to bring his criticism of the TLP down to the root of the problem, its representationalism. Instead of beginning at the true base of language use, what he himself has exemplified as "orders", instances of telling someone what to do, he still wants to begin with representation, description. He now jumps the ought/is gap, to maintain his mistaken starting point of representation. But that jump is an act of hypocrisy.
I know this is definitely an exegetical thread, but I wanted to chime in because of how wrong this conception is.
That's reasonably intuitive from the perspective of pure math or logic (though still debatable), but it's very wrong for applied math/physics and statistics.
If you drop an object from distance [math]h[/math] to the ground, ignore air resistance, you get that the time [math]t[/math] of impact on the ground is [math]t=(2h/g)^2[/math] where [math]g[/math] is the acceleration due to gravity. If you want to find [math]t[/math] you take the square root. But you ignore the solution for negative time because it's not 'physical'. Here you have the interpretation of nature interfacing with math to constrain the adequate solutions to a law of motion.
Similar things can happen in experimental design. If you apply 1 of 3 fertilisers to different plots in a field, in amounts 0, 0.5 and 1g per square inch, the standard algebra for analysing this experiment will not tell you that you actually only have 5 possible treatments applied to the plots, you have to intuit that applying no fertiliser is the same thing if you apply none of A or none of B. And the inference from the experiment depends on recognising this extra-mathematical fact to constrain the calculation.
In both cases 'mathematical thinking' and 'facts of nature' interact inextricably, and to do the analysis correctly in each case is to understand the subject matter of the equations.
I see a move of inconsistency in this section. Prior to 127, he describes philosophy as just laying things out, "to make it possible to get clear view" -125. That would be the goal of philosophy, to lay things out for viewing, analysis, whatever. But then at 127 he says that this is done for a "particular purpose", so he introduces the notion that the philosopher is actually laying things out for a further end. "To get a clear view" is something general, and we might describe the philosopher as doing this. But now he moves toward what is the particular purpose of an individual philosopher, in doing this (laying things out), and this is something beyond "to get a clear view".
There is always intention behind the "laying things out", which influences the way things are laid out by the philosopher. So at 132 it is not "the order", but one of the many possible orders, which describes how the philosopher lays things out. So even in the philosopher's act of laying things out to get a clear view, there is a particular view (intended by that philosopher) which is behind the philosopher's particular way of laying things out.
Notice that from 130 he proceeds to talk about a comparison of distinct language-games, with the end goal (purpose) of producing a prominent order, "an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible" -132. So that when we obtain complete clarity there will be no more need, or urge to philosophize -133. Now he has moved to his particular goal, complete clarity, no need to philosophize, and he is no longer talking about the general goal of just laying things out.
The precise inconsistency is found at 132 where he introduces his particular purpose. If the goal of the philosopher were simply to lay out all the different language-games for analysis, this would be consistent with what is said about philosophy prior to 127. However, at 132 he starts to talk about a particular way (his way) of comparing language games, and this is inconsistent with simply laying things out "to make it possible to get a clear view". He has now stated that we lay things out for a further purpose, but that purpose is his, not ours.
This seems to be the basis for your claim of inconsistency, but where does he describe philosophy as "just laying things out"? Where does he say that this is the goal of philosophy?
"125. It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved.
...
126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither
explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view
there is nothing to explain."
Then, at 127 he shifts, to talk about "assembling reminders for a particular purpose". So here has already gone beyond simply putting everything before us, to talk about assembling things for a particular purpose. Assembling things for a particular purpose is completely distinct from putting everything before us.
Now, 132 presents the biggest problem because of some ambiguity. We want to establish a particular order, not the order, but one order out of many possible particular orders. To do this we give prominence to certain language-games which are not necessarily ordinary or common usage. This appears to be a task of reforming language. "Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible.
However, it appears like he might be dismissing such an effort altogether, by saying near the end of 132 "these are not the cases that we have to do with." And then he presents a metaphor, of an engine idling, implying that the cases we are looking for is cases when language is doing nothing. But this doesn't really make sense, because it's hard to imagine a case when language is being used to do absolutely nothing. And then at 133 he seems to go back to the earlier part of 132 again, looking for a particular order which will prevent misunderstanding, "complete clarity", as if this is the particular goal which when obtained, will solve all philosophical problems.
There is no "shift" if you understand Wittgenstein's philosophy to be therapeutic. Hence the quote of §309 in my previous post. Rather than being the goal of philosophy [your unsupported assertion], getting a "clear view" is a means to an end; it is used to resolve a philosophical problem, which has the form: "I don't know my way about" (§123). Since "assembling reminders for a particular purpose" also has a therapeutic purpose, and since these reminders are most likely to be of a "clear view" of a particular philosophical problem, then there is no "shift".
I'm not going to reply to your comments on 132-133 at this stage. There's too much to untangle in your misrepresentation of the text.
No, it is succinctly stated at 133 that clarity is the end of philosophy. "For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear."
Does that imply quietism?
The disappearance/resolution of philosophical problems is the goal. The complete clarity is the means to achieve that goal. The statement you have quoted does not say otherwise.
I believe so.
When someone says we are aiming at something, as is the case in 133, "the clarity we are aiming at", then that thing is a goal.
Whether this clarity aimed at is a means to a further end is irrelevant to the inconsistency which I am pointing out. The inconsistency is that prior to 127 Wittgenstein is describing philosophy as simply putting things in front of us, not explaining anything, but after 127 he switches to say that the philosopher will arrange things into a particular order, for a particular purpose. He then proceeds to identify that particular purpose as clarity at 133.
To arrange things into a particular order, for the sake of clarity is an act of explanation. To "explain" is to make clear, and this is obviously inconsistent with 126.
"126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain."
The point being that there is a radical difference between laying everything out in front of us for the sake of observation, and arranging things in an order for the sake of clarity. The latter being a form of explanation.
Complete clarity is the goal, for that is when the philosophical problems completely disappear. You originally said that the goal of philosophy for Wittgenstein was "just laying things out...to get a clear view". However, the process of getting a clear view is not the goal, for it is not the end of that process. The goal is the final achievement of that clear view: complete clarity.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There is no "switching" or inconsistency. Arranging things into a particular order for a particular purpose is the process of getting a clear view.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He never says "for the sake of observation". Also, you have omitted important context from your quote of §126, namely: "For whatever may be hidden is of no interest to us. The name “philosophy” might also be given to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein is signalling here that philosophy should not be treated like a science in which hidden aspects of nature can be discovered. Our language is not a mystery. That is, I believe he is referring to a scientific type of explanation at §126. Regardless, I have no interest in arguing over the word "explanation".
Yes, do you see the inconsistency there? Complete clarity is what Wittgenstein says is the goal of philosophy after 127. Prior to 127 the goal of philosophy is just laying things out.
Quoting Luke
The aim is complete clarity, as stated at 133. If you choose to ignore this that's your choice. If the complete clarity is for the purpose of something other than philosophy, then this further goal is irrelevant to this discussion of philosophy.
Quoting Luke
Of course it's inconsistency, you seem to be in denial. At 126 it is stated that there is no need for "explanation". To "explain" is to make clear. Therefore to arrange things for the purpose of getting a clear view, is the very definition of "explain". To arrange things for the purpose of getting a clear view is completely opposed to what is stated prior to !27.
"126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain."
If you must, go right back to 98: "So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence.". By what principle is one order better than another order? If a philosopher is creating an order for the purpose of clarity, then that philosopher is explaining. But Wittgenstein has introduced no principle whereby explaining is what a philosopher ought to do. In fact, he has explicitly denied that there is any need for a philosopher to explain. Any order is a perfect order, even the vaguest of sentences, and there is no reason why any philosopher ought to arrange things in any specific order, for any specific purpose, because all orders are equally "perfect".
Therefore all this talk which occurs after 127, about arranging things for the purpose of clarity, is completely inconsistent with what was said prior to 127.
Quoting Luke
I know, because rather than take a good look at how "explanation" is used, you'd rather simply deny the glaring inconsistency.
This is your unsupported assertion. He never states this is the goal of philosophy. But maybe if you say it enough times it will become true.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It appears you did not understand my distinction between the process of working to attain complete clarity and then actually attaining it. The former is not the goal of philosophy. The goal of philosophy is the resolution of philosophical problems, which is why he focuses on the source and resolution of philosophical problems from §119-133.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
False.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
These are different uses/meanings of the word "order".
I just came across this article which argues that Wittgenstein was not a quietist, so perhaps I was a little hasty to label him as one. I consider the distinction made in the article for why he is not a quietist to be somewhat subtle, although I do agree with it. The article also contains pertinent remarks on the current passages under discussion and on my recent discussion with Metaphysician Undercover. It is a little lengthy, but worth the read.
I quoted 126 at least twice and 125 at least once. I'm not here, to teach you how to read. I would expect that anyone partaking in this discussion would have already ascended to a basic level in that. Making it possible to get a clear view of things (which is "the business of philosophy" 125), and, arranging things for the purpose of clarity (after 127), are two distinct things. These two are mutually exclusive.
Quoting Luke
Actually, the use of "order" in these two instances is very similar. At 98 he is talking about the ordering of words in a sentence. This order is given in the act of creating the sentence. At 130-133 he is talking about the ordering of language-games. This is an order given by the philosopher, who sets up the language-games as objects for comparison (the creative act known as platonic dialectics).
In each of these cases we choose from a vast selection of objects, arrange the selected ones in an order, and give them public existence for the purpose of saying something. In the first instance (98), he is talking about a selection of words which are given order as a "sentence". The person says something through the means of the sentence. In the second instance he is talking about the philosopher selecting language-games which are given order to create a "model" (131). The philosopher says something about "the facts of our language" (130) through the means of the model.
The problem is that at 98 he says that any order is "perfect", as if clarity is unimportant in the creation of sentences. And this is simply the way that language is, whatever order is necessary to serve the purpose is the perfect order. Clarity is not necessarily the aim, because language aims at efficiency (getting things done as unenelightened said), and clarity is not very efficient. Wittgenstein was stating in this earlier part of the book, that this is the way language is. That is his description. Yet at 130-133, when it comes to the philosophical act of modeling language-games for the purpose of demonstrating "the facts of our language", all of a sudden clarity is of the utmost importance to the philosopher.
If clarity is of the utmost importance to Wittgenstein the philosopher, then Wittgenstein is not adhering to the principles of description which he has himself laid down. He has described language as serving many possible purposes, and therefore being vague because of this, but when he moves to model language as a philosopher (stating that the philosopher ought to only describe), he appears to choose one purpose, one aim, the goal of clarity. If he has in fact chosen the goal of clarity, he is inconsistent. But, as I said in the earlier post there is still some ambiguity at 132 as to whether he has truly chosen clarity as his aim.
You could at least quote the parts of §125 and §126 which support your claim that "just laying things out" is the goal of philosophy.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No. When he speaks of "order" at §98, he is talking about the sense of a sentence. This is quite obvious from the context of §98 and §99.
I did. If you cannot understand, then so be it.
Quoting Luke
He says "On the other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect order". This does not say that the sense is the order. It says that order is necessary (as determined by some sort of logic) for there to be sense. The order, which produces sense, is what I described above. At this point in the book (130-133), we have moved from "sense", to what underpins sense (as has been determined to be required for sense at 98), and that is "order".
Thanks, I'll have a read. I've come recently to the conclusion that the later Wittgenstein was more of a neo-pragmatist in his adherence to forms of life, language games, and communal use of language to express thoughts and feelings. Would you perhaps, agree with this assessment?
He makes no mention of the "goal of philosophy" in either of those sections. If you want to pretend like you've already proven otherwise, then so be it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Your claim that "he is talking about the ordering of words in a sentence" at §98 is ridiculous.
I don't know. You're throwing a lot of -isms at me which I'm not completely familiar with, to be honest. And I didn't do very well the first time around, either. But I highly recommend reading the article.
109 We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.
And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems.
124. Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is.
125. It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved.
126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain.
Take it as you will, but if "the business of philosophy" is to do such and such, then I would assume that its aim or "goal" is to do that. Don't you think?
If one describes philosophy such that the business of philosophy is to explain nothing, yet it is the goal of philosophy to clarify (which is to explain), there is a problem with the description.
Quoting Luke
A sentence consists of words and nothing else. If a sentence has perfect order within it, then that order must be the order of its words. If you happen to think that the "perfect order" which is "in the vaguest sentence", could possibly refer to something other than the ordering of its words, perhaps you could try your hand at explaining this.
There is a distinction to be made - which I have tried to make it in my previous posts - between the work of philosophy and the goal of philosophy. I think that the work of philosophy, per Wittgenstein, is to lay things out to get a clear view, but that this is not the goal of philosophy. The goal of philosophy is to make the philosophical problems disappear, which is achieved when we attain complete clarity (§133). The process of arriving at that goal (i.e. the work of philosophy) is not the goal.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
My reading: On the one hand, we don't need to provide some unexceptionable sense to our ordinary (vague) sentences or to construct a perfect language. On the other hand, the sense of our ordinary vague sentences is already in perfect order. So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest (i.e. in terms of sense) sentence.
In his book, Wittgenstein's Investigations 1-133: A Guide and Interpretation, author Andrew Lugg comments about §98:
Hmm, I think Witty's point deals more with facts 'of' math: things like Goldbach's conjecture, the 'neverendingness' of transcendental numbers, how to deal with negation, the Riemann hypothesis and so on. I imagine that Witty's response to the formula your provided is that it isn't a 'mathematical' one, but a physical one. So there, you're dealing with a fact of how long it takes for an object to drop - and therefore an empirical fact, and not a mathematical one (even as it employs mathematical 'means'). The idea (in §124) is that you can't 'philosophize' your way to, say, a proof or disproof of Goldbach's conjecture. Only actually doing the math can furnish such a proof. This is the sense in which philosophy 'leaves mathematics as it is'.
I know it seems a finicky distinction, but I think that's the 'range of application' of what Witty is saying. One should also read these passages with Witty's intellectual context in mind: he's responding here to Frege, Russell, Cantor and the like: the 'atmosphere' in which his words are being set out are against these debates on the status of math qua math. Some of this might be brought out in read §125. Let me move on to that and see.
§125 is a slightly deeper exploration of math that was broached in §124. In particular, it takes contradiction in math as a working example. If, in §124, it was asserted that it isn't philosophy's job to extend math in any way ("it leaves everything as it is"), here in §125 philosophy cannot, or rather, is "not in the business" of solving mathematical contradictions. So what does, or can, philosophy do?
I read §125 as saying that what philosophy can do is show how contradictions can arise: we lay down rules, and in following the rules, we end up with a contradiction. Note the 'deflationary' import of this: contradictions result from the rules we lay down - they are not, as it were, mathematical 'facts', like 'this stone is grey'. No change of rules will change the (empirical) fact that the stone is grey. Changing the rules however, will change whether or not a contradiction results. This is all to emphasise (again) that philosophy works at the level of the understanding, and not at the level of facts.
The philosophical 'problem' is in understanding just this 'status' of contradiction: to understand that it results from our 'entanglement in rules': that it has this status, is just what philosophy can show - can do (as distinct from what it cannot do: 'solve' the contradiction). So this is not a 'mathematical discovery': one might call it instead a 'discovery about math'.
Not much to say about these other than they recapitulate, again, that philosophy is descriptive and subtractive, and not explanatory. That said, I'm not sure what it is that the philosopher 'marshalls' when he or she 'marshalls recollections': recollections of what? Any ideas?
You're missing a key part of the description, which is explored at 128-132. This is the method by which philosophy proceeds toward its goal of making philosophical problems disappear. And the method is an arrangement of the order (a hierarchy) in language-games. The method described by Wittgenstein is known as platonic dialectics. Prior to this point in the book, the strategies of platonic dialectics have been dismissed, because the method of philosophy described by Wittgenstein has been just to look at things and describe things. The point I'm making is that at 127 there is a shift in the description of the method of philosophy, from simply describing things and even doing things (laying things out) to provide a clear look at things, to now, actively arranging things for the purpose of clarity. The latter might be called explanation.
Quoting Luke
Right, the sentence is vague in the terms of sense. I agree. Bit the sentence only has a sense because it has an order. The order, within the sentence is what gives it a sense. If it had no order it would have no sense.
As I said, the sentence consists of words. If the order is not the order of the words, then what is it? To say that the order is somehow "buried in it" does not answer the question. We could break down a spoken sentence and analyze the individual syllables and sound patterns (which Plato actually did), or we could break down a written sentence and analyze the individual letters, looking for the buried order, but the point is that we ought not invoke some sort of mystical spirit to account for "the sense". "The sense" must be discoverable from the physical "order".
I'll just say that I believe the problem with this way of looking at "sense" is that it neglects "context" as contributing to the sense. So if we attribute sense to order, then we have to bring context into order, such that the context of the sentence is part of the sentence's order. Wittgenstein deals with context in terms of language-games, so now at 128-130, he is discussing the ordering of language-games which a philosopher might do. But this still does not give us everything which is necessary, to describe context in the sense of the particularities and peculiarities of individual situations.
This is true not only of mathematics, but of any language we use to describe reality. Part of language's function, as I see it, is to describe reality, and we create language-games (governed by rules) to do just that. The contradictions, may not be contradiction of facts in the world, but the contradictions arise in the way we describe things, and the rules involved in the language-games used.
"A whole series of confusions has arisen around the question of consistency.
"Firstly, we have to ask where the cotnradiction is suppose to arise: in the rules or in the configurations of the game.
"What is a rule? If, e.g., I say 'Do this and don't do this', the other doesn't know what he is meant to do; that is, we don't allow a contradiction to count as a rule. We just don't call a contradiction a rule - or more simply the grammar of the word 'rule' is such that a contradiction isn't designated as a rule. Now if a contradiction occurs among the rules, I could say: these aren't rules in the sense that I normally speak of rules. What do we do in such a case? Nothing could be more simple: we give a new rule and the matter's resolved (Philosophical Remarks, p. 344, Notes of December 1931)."
It isn't so clear, but it seems that in context it's reminders of (you must have a different translation, mine uses reminders, not recollections) of just what it is that philosophy, as Wittgenstein sees it, is trying to do (PI 126). This is where I part company with Wittgenstein.
Did you have any further defence for your claims about the goal of philosophy? I directly responded to your question. Don't insult me with this crap.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Read the latest article I posted re: explanation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It might surprise you that there is more to a sentence than its words; sentences also have a meaning or a sense. Furthermore, the word "order" can have more than one meaning. At §98, "order" refers to the sense/meaning of a sentence. (How many times do I need to say that?) At §132, "order" refers to the arrangement of grammatical evidence.
That said, I think there's a grammatical ambiguity that might be helpful to exploit. Is it:
(1) "The work of the philosopher consists in [marshalling recollections] [for a particular purpose]."; Or,
(2) "The work of the philosopher consists in marshalling [recollections for a particular purpose].
That is, what does the 'for a particular purpose' qualify: the marshalling ('assembling' in Anscombe's translation), or the recollecting ('reminding' in Anscombe's translation)? I suspect it's the second: what is recollected is the purpose - the use - of words in a language-game. And the philosopher needs to recall that, so as to not to attempt to provide theses or theories of language. So if this reading is correct, one recollects (remembers) the purpose of a word (I think here again of §87: "The signpost is in order - if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose"; the philosohper's job consists in recalling these purposes). I think that works.
I have Anscombe's translation (third edition). I'm not sure exactly what Wittgenstein's is saying, you may be right.
That seems clear enough to me, thanks.
I pointed out that your response missed a key point. The so-called goal of philosophy requires a process, or work, described at 130-132, which is inconsistent with the described work of philosophy prior to 127. Why does that insult you?
Quoting Luke
Meaning is use in the context of this book, and the way a sentence is used (therefore its meaning) is distinct from the sentence itself. We cannot say that the meaning is a property of the sentence, it is the use.
Quoting Luke
Order does not refer to sense or meaning, I went through this already. Order is what is required for a sentence to have a sense. 'If there is a sense there must be order' does not indicate that "order" refers to sense.
Quoting Luke
Right, and at 98, "order" refers to the "grammatical evidence" of the sentence. That's why the two uses of "order" are comparable. If you read from 130 on toward 132 you'll see that this order, which you call "grammatical evidence", is understood by comparing language-games, similarities and differences.
Referring back to 98, how an individual composes a sentence, the choice and ordering of words, and what follows, the "sense" of the sentence, depends on the language-games which the individual is involved in. So the "grammatical evidence" (order) of the sentence (98), which allows the sentence to have a sense, is the very same "grammatical evidence" (order) which underlies our knowledge of the use of language: It is an understanding of the order of language-games which allows one to know the sense of a sentence, as well as to have knowledge of the use of language. Knowing how to grasp the sense of a sentence is the very same thing as having knowledge of the use of language.
I think it refers to "the actual use of language" (124) "to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use (116)"
You said that the business (work) of philosophy was the goal of philosophy, and I painstakingly pointed out to you that this was incorrect. What I found insulting was that you made no acknowledgement of your error, you adopted the distinction I made which demonstrated your error, and then you proceeded to tell me that I had overlooked something. Furthermore, what you claim I had overlooked was virtually a change of subject which had little to do with our prior disagreement regarding the goal of philosophy.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's how Wittgenstein is using it, whether you agree or not. I supported this with quotes from a secondary source reading of the text. In another reading, Baker and Hacker offer (my bolding):
Quoting Baker and Hacker
See the association of order and sense? Wittgenstein repudiated the view that the good (or perfect) order of ordinary language requires a determinacy of sense. This is why he says at §98 that there is perfect order even in the vaguest sentence (i.e. a sentence with weakly determinate sense). "Order" here refers to sense, or determinacy of sense; it does not refer to an arrangement of words.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, it doesn't. I'm not going to argue about §98 any further.
Despite your pains, there is no such error. If the work of philosophy is to do X, then the philosopher's goal is to do X. You are incorrectly arguing that if this work is used for some further end, then that end is the goal of philosophy. It is not. That further end is the goal of some other discipline which might use the work of philosophy toward that further end. The goal of each discipline is to do the work which is proper to that discipline, and nothing else. That's why these distinct fields of study are called "disciplines", we are disciplined not to have goals outside the boundaries which define the work of the field.
Quoting Luke
There's a big problem for you though, none of your quotes support your claim. They support mine.
Quoting Luke
Yes, the association is exactly as I said, and as Wittgenstein said, sense is dependent on order. If there is a sense, then there is an order. But it is not the case that order requires sense. So order is independent from sense. Your quoted passages say nothing about the order, I did say something about the order. And if it is an order, something can be said about it.
Your latest post is full of complete jibberish and unsupported assertions. I'm not going to bother responding to you any further.
I support that. But that's just an assertion.
I believe the multitude of purposes is represented as a multitude of language-games at 130. Often a specific game has a particular object, goal or end.
But this is where we have the inconsistency which I've been discussing with Luke. He now (131-133) proceeds to talk about arranging and ordering the recollections for a particular purpose which he names as "clarity". This is to create an order, or hierarchy of purposes, not "the order", but one order out of many possible orders. But this act of creating an order is completely inconsistent with simply laying things out to view, with no explanation. Ordering for the purpose of clarity is explanation.
Quoting Sam26
Why does Sam26 part company with Wittgenstein at this point, while I see the opposite, this is where Wittgenstein becomes more reasonable? I find that he becomes more reasonable, in the sense that he recognizes that things get ordered towards a particular goal, but I do not necessarily agree with his stated goal of philosophy, "clarity".
Language is limited by purpose, because it is subjugated by purpose, is it not? I think maybe this is the essence of the shift that he has made at this point in the text. Earlier, the concept of game was described as inherently unbounded. Wittgenstein wanted to describe all concepts as essentially unbounded, yet boundaries could be created for a specific purpose. Now, he seems to be positioning purpose, and consequently the boundaries associated with purpose, as immanent within the order which is necessary for meaning. So purpose, and the boundaries which come with it, are necessary for meaning. Now the unbounded really has no place in language.
This is the logical consequence of his premise "meaning is use". This premise forces purpose as a logical necessity. "Use" implies purpose, as there is never a use without a purpose. So if meaning is use, the limitations and boundaries associated with particular purposes are necessary for any meaning. The only way I can think of to avoid this would be to associate meaning with something other than use, something limitless, without an end. This would free language from the limits of the particular purposes of sentient beings.
There's a lot to be said on this subject because it strikes to the deepest level of ontology.
§128
This is another very tough one, thanks again to any lack of elaboration on Witty's part. The immediate remark that comes to mind is §109: "We may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place" (emphasis in the original).
So in §109 it is held that we cannot (should not?) advance theories (theses). Here it is held that even if one were to advance any, "it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them".
A theory, on Witty's account so far, is one that sets out what language 'should' be - an idealized account of how it 'should' function. Witty denies that any such theory can (should?) be advanced. If so, what would it mean to say that 'if' one were to advance a theory, everyone would agree to it? There's a paradoxical air to this, like: 'You can't do the Thing. And even if you could do the Thing, it wouldn't be the Thing you think you're doing': after all, what is a 'thesis' that no one could debate? Would it even be a thesis? Maybe that's Witty's point. But it seems a clunky way to put it.
Does Witty simply mean that all theory collapses into description? But surely people can describe 'wrongly' - we can be wrong about descriptions, and therefore there is room for debate? Questions to provoke some replies, hopefully.
---
I will also mention that I can't help but feel a very strong connection here to TLP 7: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" - another paradoxical statement, if not an outright tautology: if we can't speak of it, why the imperative ('must') to be silent about it? So too with §128: if we can't advance theses, what would it mean to say that if we could, everyone would agree to them? There's something, I think, to this oscillation between "can't" (a 'descriptive') and "mustn't/shouldn't" (an 'imperative'), but I don't know what to make of it. Hmm...
Why do you say that Wittgenstein circumscribes what 'a theory' is in this way? Most exegesis assumes these sections refer to philosophy in general, but you've taken a very much narrower interpretation here.
I'll only add that I too think that these sections refer to 'philosophy in general', with the caveat that Witty has just such a circumscribed notion of what 'philosophy' consists in.
I've a lot of sympathy for the the approach you've outlined there, but a lot if what Wittgenstein has to say about what philosophy consists in seems to me to be prescriptive too. Not in the sense that we 'must' do things this way as opposed to some other, but that we 'must' realise that things are this way (as opposed to some other). The 'must' remains, and so the normative force remains.
As such, whilst I agree with your opposition to the anthropological approach, I think that it makes more sense (to me anyway) to say that Wittgenstein denies that there can be any such theory (one that does not constituted of linguistic exposition) and that such theories can be meaningfully adjudicated on (because there are no facts therein). But, he is not saying that we can't try nonetheless, hence the normative element 'must'.
It's a conclusion of the theme that because we can say something, it does not mean that that something can be interrogated out of the context in which it is performative.
So my personal answer to the seeming paradox you present is that Wittgenstein is simply using the hypothetical philosopher's own terms here. He's saying in 109 that we (the enlightened philosophers) may not advance anything they (the benighted philosophers) would call a 'theory', because there must not be any a element of adjudication to our model. But in 128, he's saying that if there were to be such a thing as a thesis in philosophy (ie, if we were to keep the term and proceed to determine what type of activity would fit it) such a thing would be nothing more than a description with which all would agree.
Quoting StreetlightX
That people can be wrong about description does not mean that there can be room for debate, the two are not necessarily linked. The possibility of being wrong only implies that a fact of the matter exists. Debate implies that additionally some means of adjudication exists (otherwise debate is pointless). It is this second element to which I think Wittgenstein refers.
Going back to, for example, 125. See the references to 'us', 'we', 'our'... It is not the extra-mental facts that Wittgenstein is talking about here, but our own, personal entanglement, to which philosophy then gives a civil status.
Mmm, that 'theory' simply collapses into description is the most strightforward reading - especially if your counter-objection holds - but for whatever reason it also feels like a very disappointing reading. I think because it simply feels like word-play to me, 'too-clever-by-half' kinda thing.
--
With respect to normativity, I largely agree that there is a normative force to Witty's own strictures about what philosophy 'is' or 'ought to be', and if I drew too sharp a distinction it was for brevity's sake. A more nuanced take might distinguish two 'sources' of normativity: idealizations and actual use.
I think 128 is meant to be paradoxical. The only thing which cannot be debated is tautology, allowing freedom for skepticism. But tautology is to say the very same thing in two different ways, and this is literally impossible. It's actually contradiction when taken literally. So tautology has no foothold against the skeptic. Therefore, the thesis, or proposition which everyone agrees with, (the tautology), is in fact impossible so the philosopher ought not even attempt this. There is no point to the philosopher even putting forward a thesis (assuming that agreement is a goal of philosophy).
In any case, take 128 as a pretext to what follows. What is hidden from us (129) is the differences between language-games (130). We make translations, for example, and state tautologies, assuming to say the very same thing twice, but this assumption obscures the fact that we are not actually saying the very same thing with the two distinct sayings, due to the differences between language-games.
I believe this is a very important indication of Wittgenstein's distinction between what is and what must be. A philosopher might say that the translation (the copy) must say the very same thing as the original, or else there would be misunderstanding. This is what he referred to as the "requirement" in relation to logic. It must be this way or else the result is absurdity. But it's merely a prejudice toward what it means to understand that forces this requirement on us. Understanding does not require exactness, sameness, what is required is to serve the purpose.
It's a Platonist assumption that two distinct sentences symbolize one and the same idea. But when we take the original and the copy for "what is", they are very clearly physically different from each other. And, the meaning of each is understood through language-games which are different from each other. So we must get rid of this Platonist prejudice which inclines us to think that two distinct statements "must" say the very same thing in order for logic to exist, and for human beings to communicate and understand each other.
Perhaps we have been inclined to misread Wittgenstein's "must" as "ought". He seems to use "must" to refer to some logical conclusion which is forced on us by prejudice and presupposition. So we look at mathematics, logic, and language, with the attitude that they "must" be this way, in order to do the work that they do. But this "must" is forced by a prejudice concerning what they are actually doing. And this prejudice may itself be a misunderstanding. So Wittgenstein is saying that we ought to release this prejudice which makes us look at language, logic, and mathematics through the lens of what they must be, to look at them as they actually are.
I do not think theory collapses into description. I take the point to be that attempts to establish a theory of language or a theory of meaning, questions of the essence and foundations of language that must be uncovered misleads and confuses us. We are not in need of a theory of language. Description serves to point to what he wants us to see: “Don’t think, but look!” Wittgenstein does not describe language as a whole but language games, that is, not a theory of language but descriptions of language use in practice.
I agree that this is a point that Witty makes, but is that the point being made here?: How does one derive the above (what I quoted of you), from this?:
"If someone were to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them."
How is what you've said, the point of this? Something still needs to be said about the possibility of debate, as well as agreement.
I'm probably sticking my neck out too far in this, but there's a considerable amount of artificial constraints placed around Wittgenstein's comments in these sections. We'd be naive to ignore the politics. He's taking a fairly hefty swipe at the whole philosophical establishment. There's little doubt that Wittgenstein thought he'd basically 'solved' philosophy in the Tractatus, and there's a fair reason to believe he thought he'd similarly dismissed three-quarters of what he'd missed in the investigations.
The reactions and interpretation of this work nonetheless come largely from those engaged in the very persuit against which the mortal blow has been struck.
A colleague of mine once described the effect as like that of being in the middle of a particularly engaging crossword and having someone point out that you could put any letters in any of the boxes and it wouldn't really matter.
We are not told what such theses might be, but we are told what they would not be - they would not be theories of the essence of language. As he says in the next paragraph:
Given their simplicity and familiarity they are not things that would be called into question. But, of course, there will always be "that guy" who does question them. And so, debate may ensue. And with that we start down the path of endless confusion.
He continues:
Where we seem to be in disagreement is with regard to the meaning of 'the everyday use of language'. As I understand it, he is referring to actual language games, that is, what we say and do within our forms of life.
'We don't allow it ' means there is a rule against it. The rule of rules.
Quoting StreetlightX
Here we are - the rule of non-contradiction. Everyone agrees because disagreement cannot be understood. Is it not the case that a theory of language is the rules? And the rules as expressed in the language.
[edit]
What I take him to be saying is that given the simplicity and familiarity of aspects of things that are most important for us, one does not question them. Unless,of course, one is a philosopher.
It is not that there is a rule against it, but that if it is contradictory it cannot be followed, and if it can't be followed it can't count as a rule to be followed.
No, it is that there's a rule against it. Either there's a rule against it, or there's no rule against it. that's the rule.
Actually, a lot more needs to be said about debate and agreement. Wittgenstein falls short here. By 133 he is talking about "clarity" as if clarity is the sole cause of understanding, and the resolution to all philosophical problems. However, "agreement", the attitude required for agreement,, how agreement is derived through discourse, and its relation to understanding, is completely neglected by Wittgenstein here.
It's as if he takes it for granted that a clear description will automatically produce agreement. A philosophical theses must be a description, and if it's a clear description, it will be agreed upon. He may revisit this issue later. For example, it's clearly a duck, therefore not a rabbit, and the clarity of the description ought to lead necessarily to agreement. Even"'clarity" does not seem to be capable of resolving philosophical problems because a clear description cannot change a person's attitude.
Quoting Daniele Moyal-Sharrock
What 128 actually says is that the only thing philosophy can do is to state the obvious. Since it's obvious, no one will debate it. He's simply wrong though, as skepticism demonstrates. So we cannot look at 128 as anything other than a false thesis.
We may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place.
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something a because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of their inquiry do not strike people at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck them. a And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.
[/quote]
FWIW, this reminds me of phenomenology. The stuff that is usually too close for us to notice is uncontroversial, but only after someone manages to see it and point it out. And maybe it can only be pointed out a little bit here and there. ('Form of life' is something like 'by means of a faculty.')
We mostly just do it, and doing it well has been far more important for our species than knowing how we do it so well. The way Google is currently doing machine translation suggests that we'll never get a exhaustive, intelligible model of our language use. Symbolic AI isn't used for this, for example. Instead it's a big black box of numbers learned from lots of examples as the parameters in a brain-mimicking neural network --as opaque as we are. For me this connects to the spirit of empiricism. We see that mastery comes from practice and exposure, but perhaps that mastery is distributed like those millions of parameters. In isolation they mean nothing. Their meaning is entirely relational.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1JO1Pcr5rYA&fbclid=IwAR2TigXYwtjGbOtTVpGEqPWYWEK4GD_XBwtM_SMTOIiVhNvhSuil-Yo_K8E
There's still a problem here. Some people are near-sighted, some people are far-sighted, some see both well, and some don't see at all. When someone sees something, and points it out to another who does not see it, this does not necessarily make the other person agree that it is there. When an individual has deficient eyesight, you cannot make the person see something by pointing to it. And that person will only agree that the thing is there, if there is trust in the one pointing it out. You might say religion is built on this trust (faith), for every person who sees God there are multitudes who do not, but they agree, and follow on trust or faith.
That's why 128 is simply false. Pointing out to a person, something which you understand, and the other person does not understand, and even presenting it in many different ways, will not necessarily incline the other person to agree. This is very evident here at TPF. The underlying attitude which is conducive to agreement is something completely different.
I understand your concerns. Still, I read Wittgenstein as pointing to a mostly unnoticed background that makes such disagreements possible/intelligible. Were it not for this background, the debate could not continue. It looks to me that knowledge-how is deeper and prior to the knowledge-that which would like to assimilate it but can't.
I do agree that phenomenology is intrinsically controversial. If some phenomena are mostly too automatic to notice, then those who claim to notice such things can always be accused of describing something merely idiosyncratic. All one can do is point. If Wittgenstein is ultimately pointing out something elusive but mundane, then getting tangled up in the thousand arrows/reminders as they were supposed to form a system is the wrong way to go. Does he offer a system? Or is he pointing at the impossibility of a system but pointing at all the rough edges that make such a system impossible? I'm in the second camp. The conditions of intelligibility look stubbornly opaque to me. The paradigm shift in AI encourages me in this position.
This link is nice because it addresses the issue in another lingo.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/
I see what you saying, but stating it as "the background which makes disagreement possible", is only an inversion of "the background which makes agreement possible". The latter recognizes that agreement is not automatic. The problem being that disagreement is prior to agreement because agreement requires some sort of understanding, which is gained, whereas disagreement (lack of agreement) does not. So disagreement (lack of agreement) precedes agreement which is something which comes into existence in a temporal order, from a lack of agreement. There is no background required for disagreement, it is simple difference.
We see that agreement is necessary for knowledge-that. And, we see that distinct people can know how to do the same thing (produce the end result) in different ways. They therefore disagree. So agreement is not necessary for knowledge-how, and as you say, and knowledge-how is prior to knowledge-that. If you were to ask, what good is agreement, for what purpose do we agree, someone might say that it is required for Knowledge-that. But how is knowledge-that better than knowledge-how? And if this can't be shown what's the point to agreeing? Then unless we agree simply for agreement sake, agreement cannot be automatic.
Look at 129, what you call "the background", is probably what he refers to as the most simple and familiar. it is the one thing which is always there, yet unnoticed because it is the background. The background is disagreement. It is always there, everywhere, in the background. But what drives us is agreement so most disagreement goes unnoticed. Then it appears like agreement is the background and disagreement springs from agreement. That is, until it strikes you that the real background is disagreement, difference, and this is what is most striking and powerful.
IMV, the complete absence of a shared background between people wouldn't even be called disagreement. They wouldn't have anything to disagree about. It seems to me that sharing in the same reality and at least one language is presupposed in an argument. How can I disagree with Snorf from a trans-human dimension when he says
[quote=Snorf]
Dalk fadlka454df acdmlk(%df dfokmsdfbl)#$kmdsfv mldkfvmlkdfvmdfvlkdfvm )(*342
[/quote]
And what would I disagree about? When humans disagree, it's not usually an idle question. How best to do things and what should be done in the first place come to mind.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It seems to be that the coordination of action is at least one reason agreement is so important. Humans are the supreme team-player among mammals, even or especially when it comes to literally destroying some other team. I agree non-automatically that agreement is not (always) automatic. It's as if consciousness or attention is summoned to wherever habit finds itself in a jam. The jam that gets our attention has a background of smoothly functioning nonjam. To disagree with you on the issue at hand is still to agree with you about the linguistic conventions that make this disagreement intelligible. Along these lines, I can try to question myself radically, but I can't question that same radical questioning as it pours out of me. I can't get ahead of my knowing-how. I depend on it as I try without success to get a final, superior perspective on it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have a vague sense of agreeing with you, but for me you have turned the page here in a way that I can't follow. In the context that I take for our background, the background is ours. We are on the same stage in front of the same cardboard scenery, hence the metaphor. What you say above reminds me of 'war is god' and other important insights (that conflict/chaos is the mother of order, etc.)
Maybe something like the following:
Once some of these passages are understood it will not only make clear some of what Wittgenstein is doing, but also help us to get a better picture of his method/s overall. Wittgenstein's philosophy is a kind of confession, especially as he criticizes his former self (Tractatus). You can see this in passages where he says "I'm tempted here to say," or "I feel like saying." etc. We don't develop theories based on confessions, they are either helpful or honest, or not. Confessions can be seen as cures, because remember, Wittgenstein is showing the fly the way out by clarifying the obvious through a series of case histories, like a doctor might do.
All throughout the PI Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to some very important linguistic facts, and it's each of these facts should serve as reminders. Each case study has something important to tell us about how easy it is to get tied up into linguistic knots. We often forget, especially while doing philosophy, the important ideas that Wittgenstein points out. However, Wittgenstein's cure is to keep these reminders before our eyes, or at our side as cures for what ales us. Reminders are exactly what is needed to keep our philosophy down to Earth and clear, that way, we can find our way about.
We often ask ourselves the wrong questions while reading the PI, it should never be, what kind of theory is Wittgenstein espousing?
Again, what are the reminders, they are the case histories, they help us achieve clarity, as opposed to the confusion that is caused by being tormented by language (as in the bewitchment of language). Once clarity is achieved, then we can stop doing philosophy and rest our minds - we can walk out of the bottle.
You are framing "disagreement" in a very particular, and I would say peculiar way, as if disagreement only exists if it is expressed. But disagreement is to hold a difference of opinion, just like agreement is to hold a similar opinion. We ought to consider the possibility that each of these may exist without the respective opinions being expressed in language. If we do this, we should see that disagreement is the background of unexpressed opinions, while language and communication are the means by which agreement emerges.
So let's hypothesize that at a time prior to human language, there were animals who were thinking, and therefore had some sort of opinions, but those opinions were generally in disagreement. There is an issue with your expression of "sharing in the same reality", because one's reality cannot be otherwise from what is present within one's mind. If we want to make a generalization concerning "the reality", then the reality is that each of these animals has a different reality. It is only when human beings come to communicate, and agree, that there becomes such a thing as "the reality".
Quoting pomophobe
So this opinion, "the background is ours" is where the mistake lies. "Our background", is artificial, created through language and agreement. This background of commonality is the mistaken assumption which we must dispense. It is that faulty requirement Wittgenstein refers to. We tend to assume that this underlying agreement, this common background, "must" exist in order for language to work. But in reality, it's just not there, and that assumption just leads us to different forms of Platonism where the fundamental agreement, and commonality of opinion, precedes human existence. In reality human beings work with language to create an environment of agreement ("the world") from a background of disagreement. The real background consists of isolated individuals with differing cognitions (disagreement), from which agreement is cultured through training etc..
In other words:
We ought to consider that unexpressed opinions can be either an agreement or a disagreement.
If we do this, we should see that all unexpressed opinions are a disagreement.
Yeah, that follows.
This is a delicate issue. I see the value of the approach that starts within an individual brain/mind and works outward, and it's good for many purposes. But I think it might get in the way of contemplating language. In short, it's tempting but artificial. The background or framework that we are always already in seems to include an elusive sense of The World that is not theoretical. We are just always already in a world of objects that we can talk about, and our primary relationship to these objects is messing with them. And perhaps language in primarily about coordinating our messing with these objects. We don't stare at tools. We use them. And they exist differently for our use than they do for our staring. In short I'm saying that we apply this Heideggerian insight to language and get some of what I find anyway in Wittgenstein.
IMV the correspondence theory of truth, despite all its problems in the ether of speculation, is part of this automatic framework. It's so automatic that even its critics tend to use it as they criticize it. 'The correspondence theory of truth is wrong ---doesn't correspond to truth.'
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
For me it's the other way around. The automatic and therefore elusive background is genuine. The hammer in the hand that's being employed has a different kind of being than the hammer that's being stared at and described in terms of its density and shape. In the same way we use language automatically even as we construct artificial theories about what we are doing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
For me we don't even consciously assume this background. 'Assumption' is artificial here. The child learns to talk before she learns to talk about her talk philosophically. The stuff closest to us is to close for us to me without straining to notice it. Recall that a more mundane example of the background is just the ability to speak English --along with the largely unfathomed and perhaps unfathomable depths of all this means.
From my point of view, your ability to say 'it's just not there' depends precisely on its being there. You are intelligibly telling me that I am wrong about our shared world, that this background is a mirage or a superstition --- does not correspond to the way things really are. I'm claiming that we talk and act (without consciously assuming it) as if we share a world and can both understand and be understood. When we try to sort this out carefully, we find it hard to tell a consistent story. Our know-how won't fit inside our know-that. Our conscious models tend to run aground, hence the endless debates in philosophy, while the rest of the world just uses this framework that philosophers stubbornly insist on squeezing into a little system of knowing-that.
Words like 'truth' and 'know' are so easy to use when we aren't playing philosophy. They are the hammer driving a nail in a concrete situation. Pluck them out and just stare at them and a debate about these mundane things will rage for centuries. Yet within this same debate they'll be used in the ordinary-primary-easy way without anyone remembering that they don't yet know what they 'really' mean. If the joke wasn't misleading, we might say that what they 'really' mean is whatever philosophers don't mean by them, or when they use them without their thinking caps on.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I understand that approach too. It's a good model when dealing with certain issues. Certainly our collisions with others and objects shape our individual models of or perspectives on the world toward consensus. But we've been doing this a long time! Our species has been designed by the training you mentioned on the genetic level. So I'd say goodbye blank slate and goodbye isolated ego. Yes I can look at an individual human, but that's like looking at a wolf and ignoring to what degree the wolf is a 'cell' in the pack. So the individual wolf is real, but our thinking of the wolf is shallow when we ignore the pack (and then its environment, etc.) With humans the situation is seemingly even more extreme.
The conclusion is not supposed to follow logically, it is supposed to be an observation which will be made if you look at things the way I said. Your disagreement is evidence that what I say is true.
Quoting pomophobe
The problem I see with this perspective is that tools (therefore language if it is a tool) are themselves artificial. So if we describe our relationship with the world, as "messing" with it, we also need to account for the creation of the tools by which we mess with it. Therefore there is something amiss with the following statement of yours: "We are just always already in a world of objects that we can talk about, and our primary relationship to these objects is messing with them". Notice that you say we are already in a world of objects "that we can talk about". The reality is that we cannot talk about anything until we have "language" to use for that purpose.
I suggest that to understand the nature of language we need to remove the presupposition that language exists, because the existence of language is contingent. Resist the temptation to take it for granted, and consider the conditions which produce its existence.
I will grant to you, as a starting point, that prior to language, there was a world which living things were messing with, for the sake of agreement, because we need agreement for a starting point. The question of whether or not these words, "world" and "messing with" are truly adequate, I'll put aside for now so we can have a starting point. But I cannot agree with your proposition that this was a world of objects. That there are objects prior to the language which refers to objects is a critical point which some philosophers have cast doubt on. Is it the act of identifying and naming something which individuates that thing from its environment, as "an object", or do objects already have existence separate from their environment prior to being apprehended as such? I think Heidegger and phenomenology in general, supports the former, that an "object" is artificial in this sense, it is created by the act which individuates and identifies it as such.
If it is the case, that objects are artificial in this way, then all objects are themselves, in this sense created, and they may themselves be tools. Therefore the fundamental agreements of language are the agreements concerned with which aspects of the world that we are messing with, are individuated and identified as objects. Once we agree what it is that is the object we are referring to, then we can work on agreement concerning what can be said about the object. From this perspective, prior to identifying and naming things as objects, animals without language would not have apprehend the world which they are messing with as consisting of objects.
Quoting pomophobe
Consider correspondence in a slightly different way now. We would commonly think that correspondence is creating and arranging our words to correspond with the world. However, we were already messing with the world before we even created language. In this act of messing with the world, there is always the element of arranging the world to correspond with "what we want". With the advent of words, "what we want" may become truth, having our words correspond to the world. Then we might mess with the world with the intent of producing truth, or correspondence. So correspondence might be just as much involved with arranging the world to correspond with our words, as it is arranging our words to correspond with the world. Furthermore, since our "messing with the world" to produce what we want goes much deeper, extending far before the existence of language as a tool for this purpose, it is very likely that correspondence is more of an aspect of us arranging the world to match our words rather than vise versa.
Quoting pomophobe
We agree that the background provides what we call the "automatic", but where we disagree is whether the true and natural automatic reaction is to agree or disagree. I believe that the true automatic reaction is disagreement, like Luke's above, and what is evident anytime we dig down to the fundamentals of ontology, is disagreement. At the fundamental level, metaphysics, there is nothing but disagreement until we decide on principles of agreement. And agreement must be cultured and trained into us through discipline.
Quoting pomophobe
But the background must be prior to language, as what provides for the existence of language. And when we dig down through language, and see that it consists of all sorts of different language-games and vague concepts, as Wittgenstein describes, we find that the background is one of disagreement.
When we look at what is close to us we see all sorts of agreement. We might falsely conclude, and therefore assume that the background is a background of agreement. But when we step back to look at the wider picture we see a vast array of different language-games, and recognize that agreement only exists within particular, individual language-games, and the true background, which is the background of all language, is a background of difference, disagreement.
Quoting pomophobe
I mostly agree with all of this, but only because I agreed above to the proposition of "a world". But now you've added "shared" to say it's a shared world, and I don't really agree with your use of that term. Notice though, that what you are talking about is "endless debates", and this is more descriptive of a background of disagreement rather than a background of agreement. The fact that we produce agreements for particular purposes, at a particular places and times, and this allows us to talk and act as if we share a world, indicates that for these purposes we share a world. Of course this is the way things "really are", but what good does it do to assert that? Both "agreement" and "disagreement" must be shared, so saying that the background is "shared" does nothing to support the position that the background is one of agreement rather than one of disagreement.
Quoting pomophobe
It appears to me, like what you are saying here is that there is no need to analyze the foundation, the bottom, the basis of language, because it's been there for so long that we must already know it. So you look at the forest, and you know the forest like the back of your hand, but you haven't got a clue what a tree is. Nor do you have the inclination to understand what a tree is, because you assume that you must already know all about trees to be able to know the forest.
Which part is true? That unexpressed opinions can either be an agreement or a disagreement, or that unexpressed opinions can only be a disagreement?
Your disagreement is evidence that the background of unexpressed opinions is comprised of disagreement. If it were comprised of agreement, then when the time came to express yourself you would express agreement. You did not.
I'm just pointing out that you've contradicted yourself, so perhaps I agree with one statement but not the other. However, I don't think I need to agree or disagree with either of your statements to make this observation.
Each linguistic confusion has a particular cure, which is why Wittgenstein's methods are like curing an illness, that is, there is no one particular method that works for all linguistic confusions. Always ask yourself, "What is Wittgenstein doing (K. T. Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, p. 104 - 105)."
Even though Wittgenstein wants us to not think of his writings as advancing a theory, I think he is putting forth a theory, a kind of anti-theory. It's a theory of method. It's as though we're looking at the linguistic landscape from a variety of angles, which gives us a better picture of language and how clarity is achieved.
We must remember the cures as we think of the many confusions that arise in philosophical thinking. This gets back to "assembling reminders." If we forget the cures, we will continue to live with the illness (confusion). Each reminder serves a particular purpose (PI 127), that is, it untangles linguistic knots.
I once started a thread, "Does Language Deceive Us?" - this is what I had in mind, namely, linguistic knots or confusion.
To change my words from "we should see that disagreement is the background of unexpressed opinions" to "all unexpressed opinions are a disagreement", is not to demonstrate a contradiction but to exemplify a straw man. "Background" implies that there is also a "foreground", so your representation of the background as "all" is unjustified. I distinctly said that we must consider the possibility of both agreement and disagreement within the realm of unexpressed opinions.
Explain the difference. What do you mean by "the background of unexpressed opinions"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How can unexpressed opinions have a foreground and a background? What does that mean?
If you cannot see this, then I don't think there's much that I can do to help you to see it, because I cannot show you unexpressed opinions, you can only find them for yourself. It is possible that you are not the creative type, and so you derive your opinions from others, and therefore are unfamiliar with opinions which have never been expressed before. To "agree" means that the opinion is similar to another, but what makes an opinion "original" is its difference from all others.
So the foreground is expressed opinions and the background is unexpressed opinions, right? And when you said that the background of unexpressed opinions is disagreement, you were saying that all unexpressed opinions are a disagreement, like I inferred. And you are only now making the qualification that unexpressed opinions "mostly disagree with one another" to avoid the contradiction. Otherwise, explain what is the foreground of unexpressed opinions.
The problem according PI 129 is that what's hidden is what's before our eyes, it's something so familiar that we tend to ignore or miss it because of its "simplicity," or again, its "familiarity." It seems as though the answer to our question or confusion lies in the open, which means according Wittgenstein, that we fail to be struck by it. However, once seen in a new light, it becomes "striking" and "powerful."
A Note of Clarity:
In the first paragraph I speak of an ideal, but this should not be confused with the idea that there is some perfect sense to all our statements, in other words, some meaning that eradicates vagueness. No, the ideal or the clarity spoken of, is the realization the our statements of ordinary use, are in perfect order just as they are. This is difficult to grasp, because when we encounter a vague statement, the tendency is to what to explain it further, but there may not be a need for further explanation. Exactness is not always necessary.
No, I do not think you can correlate these two divisions precisely in this way. There is a foreground and a background, also there are expressed opinions and unexpressed opinions, and the two correlate roughly, but not precisely or exactly. So the background enters into expressed opinions, in things like philosophy and metaphysics, and in creative acts unexpressed opinions enter into the foreground, so there is overlap.
The appearance of contradiction which you refer to only occurs when you attempt to precisely correlate divisions of distinct categories. This is the deficiency of inductive reasoning, when we correlate distinct categories to state a rule, the exception to the rule creates the appearance of contradiction. For example, you attempted to precisely correlate the division between expressed and unexpressed opinions, with the division between agreement and disagreement, so that all unexpressed opinions would disagree, and all expressed opinions would agree. But it is clearly evident that some expressed opinions disagree and also some unexpressed opinions might agree. However, it may still be the case that expressed opinions agree to a large extent, and unexpressed opinions disagree to a large extent, so there would still be a correlation to be made, but not an exact or precise correlation. Since I claimed a correlation of sorts, and you interpreted that this correlation ought to be an exact or precise correlation, when I was really speaking in terms of rough boundaries, you apprehended a contradiction. How would you suggest a boundary between the foreground and background be drawn?
I don't know since I have no idea what these terms mean. I've asked you to explain what you mean by 'foreground' and 'background' in my last two posts.
Wouldn't the thesis (which stated the obvious) have to be advanced before we could agree on it?
Quoting Sam26
Perhaps the strikingly obvious thing is that a thesis must be advanced before it can be agreed on.
Quoting Luke
"Background" was Pomophobe's term so it probably really only makes sense in the context of that discussion. I think I understood what was meant, maybe I didn't. But you're trying to pull that term out of its context, and oppose it to "foreground". Maybe you think that might help you to understand it, but it might just create confusion if it was never used as an opposition to "foreground". I think it was used more like the context, or environment, within which something exists.
You introduced the 'foreground' concept into the discussion when you said:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So you explain it. Or else stop making shit up.
Is it not obvious to you though, that a thesis must be stated before it can be agreed to? So this statement of yours makes no sense: "we would all agree, and thus no thesis or theses to advance". You are saying that there is no point in advancing the thesis which everyone will agree with. That's like saying that there is no point in carrying out the activity which I am certain to have success at. How does that make sense to you?
I only introduced "foreground" because it was necessary to counter your claim of contradiction.
Actually Luke, I was having a very relevant and interesting conversation with Pomophobe, and the term was not used that way until you interrupted, changing the subject, with a complete straw man accusation of contradiction. Now you insist on continuing your digression into some sort of ad hom nonsense. Why did you interrupt in the first place if you had no interest in the subject being discussed?
There is tacit agreement. And there must be in relation to language, because the agreement has to be there before anything like a thesis could be stated.
I don't agree with that. And the reason is that naming is essentially random. So prior to the existence of language any particular part of the reality which surrounds us could be called by any name whatsoever. Things do not have names until after there is agreement that this will be the thing's name. And this agreement can only be produced by someone suggesting names for things. Therefore the existence of the name is prior to the existence of the agreement that this name names this thing. So in relation to things spoken about with language, agreement is posterior to the language which speaks of the things, that agreement being dependent on the language which speaks of them. This must also be true in the case of stating a thesis. Agreement concerning the things spoken of in the thesis can only occur after the thesis is stated.
This leaves the response of "I knew that already", in a precarious position. Suppose someone states, for the first time ever, the most extremely obvious hypothesis, and everyone agrees, thinking "I knew that already". How did you already know that? It's impossible that someone told it to you already. And it's not likely that everyone who says "I knew that already" had already thought up that very hypothesis, or someone else would have already stated it. So this only leaves something like Plato's theory of recollection. But that's absurd to think that we already know everything before being taught it, and learning is just recollecting what we've already known - forever, I suppose. What does it mean to be struck with something which is so agreeable to you, it's as if you already knew it, yet it's never been taught to you before, and it's just being apprehended by your mind now? We can't truthfully say "I knew that already", because that particular thing is just being demonstrated now. But it's so consistent with everything else which we already know, and therefore so agreeable, that it's as if we already knew it.
[quote=Wittgenstein]
All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments; no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which our arguments have their life.
...
I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.
...
What has to be accepted, the given, is — so one could say — forms of life.
...
One age misunderstands another; and a petty age misunderstands all the others in its own ugly way.
...
When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly.
...
An entire mythology is stored within our language.
...
If you want to go down deep you do not need to travel far; indeed, you don't have to leave your most immediate and familiar surroundings.
...
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something — because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck him. — And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.
...
At the core of all well-founded belief, lies belief that is unfounded.
...
What makes a subject difficult to understand — if it is significant, important — is not that some special instruction about abstruse things is necessary to understand it. Rather it is the contrast between the understanding of the subject and what most people want to see. Because of this the very things that are most obvious can become the most difficult to understand. What has to be overcome is not difficulty of the intellect but of the will.
[/quote]
The 'environment' or 'background' or 'form of life' is 'most powerful' because it's a 'vision' of the world we act on and speak from without even being able to 'debate' it first. It's the stuff that we don't know we know. It's our deepest form of belief, except that 'belief' suggests unconscious propositions. I can't doubt my ability to use the word 'hand,' since I need that ability before I even get started.
The last quote makes clear that what's being said is conceptually easy but emotionally difficult. The night is dark and full of terrors. It's not easy to accept a 'blind' embeddedness that makes our little torch of artificial constructions possible in the first place. 'Once out of nature I shall never take my bodily form from any natural thing....'
[quote=Wittgenstein]
I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again "I know that that's a tree", pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell them: "This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy."
[/quote]
We already know how to use the word 'know.' But that doesn't mean that such knowledge is propositional. It's instead the kind of [s]knowledge[/s] that makes propositions possible.
We'd 'all agree' that the tree was a tree. That's why it's so weird to say 'I know that that's a tree,' and that's why Wittgenstein has to explain that they are being philosophical (in his pejorative sense) instead of watching a baby learn to talk.
First sentence is fine. but how can the suggestion be made until we have agreed that 'name' and 'suggestion' mean what we agree they do? And when I say 'agree', there is of course no question of you or I having any significant impact on the naming of much other than our children, and possibly a plant variety we have developed. The distinction between a tree and a shrub, for instance, is pretty well established to the extent that you and I can argue about it with some hope of arriving at a resolution that is not based on our reaching an agreement but on our learning the agreement that has already been made by generations of yore. Heather has a branching woody stem with leaves on, and lives a long time, but there is a matter of scale... Is a sapling a small tree? (Is a foetus a small human?) We don't agree to speak English and then start speaking it; that agreement must be in place before we can speak (that, or an agreement to speak Welsh, or something).
Children have to be agreeable, and learn the language(s) they are immersed in, but that agreement cannot be expressed until they have already agree and learned.
This seems like more like rhetorical bluster than anything of conceptual import, much like his grumbling about 'depth' and 'surface' in §111: an effort to change our metaphors, our attitudes.
§130, §131
This pair of remarks are one of a few handful in this section, I think, where Witty actually goes about spelling out - making explicit - why he keeps insisting on the 'descriptive' nature of his investigations, and why there is no 'explanation' in them. They are best approached, imo, as methodological pointers.
The most important thing they insist upon is the presentation of 'objects of comparison', where the objects in question are language-games. The idea is that, by simply putting language-games 'side-by-side', as it were, this 'mere' act of showing or exhibiting, tells us something about language: "throws light on features of our language." This ought to seem puzzling: how can mere exhibition make philosophical problems "completely disappear" (§133)? (I have in mind the distinction between showing and saying; the suggestion here seems to something like: by 'showing', rather than 'telling', we make philosophical problems disappear).
But how to understand this distinction? Well, consider the alternative to the 'method of comparison': when, instead of treating a language-game as something to be compared against another language-game, we treat it as something "to which reality must correspond." That is, rather than a 'language-game to language-game' comparison, we expect a 'language-game to reality' comparison. This is the trap - the 'dogmatism' - that "we fall so easily into when doing philosophy". Reality here stands for the 'ideal' against which philosophy treats language-games as having to measure up to (like Witty in the TLP).
But Witty's 'investigations' do not proceed along these lines: his investigations simply compare language-games to other language-games. And there is no measuring-up to do in these comparisons, no ideals which to aim at: only the bringing out of "similarities and dissimilarities". This is why 'our clear and simple language-games' are not 'preliminary studies': there is nothing they are 'preliminary' to - no end result (no ideal) of which they count as the first step towards. The 'illusions' of philosophy are brought out when we forget this.
---
I think it's hard to really convey what all this means without giving concrete examples, so I think one nice one is the one provided by Witty himself in §1: Augustine's naming of objects. Witty's 'problem' with this language-game is not that it does not somehow 'match up with reality' - whatever that could mean. His problem is that it is taken for a general picture of how language works. In order to see what is 'wrong' with this generalization, one provides a different kind of language-game: a game like that of 'blocks!' and 'slabs' in §2. When you place these two language-games side-by-side, one begins to understand the limits of each, in comparison with each other, with respect to the purpose of each.
So one does not provide a 'theory' of why Augustine is wrong to generalize his language-game as he does: one simply shows another possibility, and this showing 'sheds light', though its 'similarities and differences', on the limits of generalizing the latter. One should thus also keep in mind §104: "We take the possibility of comparison, which impresses us, as the perception of a highly general state of affairs." But as §131 says, the 'model' must be presented as a model, as a object of comparison, and not a 'general state of affairs'.
This is why Witty insists that his 'method' here is descriptive: it does not offer theories to contest other theories - it simply places language-games side-by-side in order to point out the limits and utility of each, with respect to the purpose each is meant to fulfil.
I don't see the problem. People make noises without any agreement as to what the noise means.
Quoting unenlightened
I'm talking about how that agreement made by generations of yore came into existence. The spoken word must be prior to the agreement as to what the word means. Therefore it is impossible that language is built on agreement.
Quoting StreetlightX
The method described is inconsistent with "no need for explanation". To arrange things, give them an order (132) for the purpose of clarity, is to "explain".
As stated at 132, there are many possible orders, arrangements which could be made in the act of comparing the language-games, perhaps orders could be established for purposes other than clarity. Wittgenstein has chosen "clarity" as the purpose for the ordering, and so he has chosen to explanation.
Yes. one can describe the process, and I have done so in this thread. A cry of alarm comes to be understood by others as indicating danger, and then the difference between the sound made when looking up and looking down due to stretching of the throat becomes indicative of the direction of the threat. so now there are 2 words that mean danger from above and danger from below respectively. BUT no one has defined them except me; no agreement has been made explicit, but by means of memory and habit, a mutuality of understanding arises. Agreement is reached without ever being expressed.
Much later, a philosopher come along and tries to make explicit all the agreements that have been reached in this way, and finds it rather difficult.
PI 129
I think this paragraph is much more important than just rhetorical bluster. It goes to the heart of much of what he's saying. We often miss the obvious in spite of it being "always before our eyes." It's as if we have to be reminded over and over again in order to see the obvious. This is partly what Wittgenstein does with the language-games by comparing and contrasting similarities and dissimilarities.
And what you call grumbling about 'depth' and 'surface' grammar is partly what we miss, i.e., we are fooled by propositions that have the same surface grammar. For example, "All rods have length," and "All roses have thorns," have the same surface grammar (the same sentence structure) - we can imagine roses without thorns, but not rods without length (depth grammar that goes beyond sentence structure). You can also see this with sentences about time. Compare the river flows with time flows.
The point though is that the words must be expressed before they can be agreed on, so agreement follow language.
Wittgenstein has devised an ingenious way around this paradox, by seeking to describe the activity which language is involved in, rather than trying to describe language itself. The activity is called language-games. So the language-games take the place of language, as something which can be described, the activity which the tool is used for. He is describing what we are doing with language (playing games) rather than trying to describe what language is (which is impossible due to the paradox). The problem now, at this point in the text, is that he wants to treat distinct language-games as distinct objects, to be compared, instead of adhering to the principle, that what is being described is the activity which language is being used for. We ought to maintain Wittgenstein's principle, that different language-games are just different ways of carrying out the same type of activity, i.e. the sort of activity which language is used for. However, he wants to set them off as distinct objects which can be arranged or ordered. So he now falls into the trap of the paradox, setting up language-games (as distinct objects, like distinct languages) to be compared and described individually, rather than describing language-games as the activity which language is used for.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think the point is now pointing the opposite way to the way it was pointing before, so I'll leave it there.
Right. Wittgenstein's comments at §111 and §129 (and his other comments on philosophy in the early 100s) are more of a corrective to his own earlier (esp. Tractatus) 'ideal' misconceptions and views than they are a commentary on traditional philosophy in general.
I'm not sure what "conceptual import" is supposed to mean, but I doubt that it has greater philosophical import than "an effort to change our metaphors [and] attitudes". It would be unwise to reject the latter as "bluster".
Also, for what it's worth in relation to the concurrent discussion, I never agreed to speak English.
https://philosophicalthinking.createaforum.com/index.php
The distinction drawn here between 'an' order and 'the' order ('in our knowledge of the use of language'), maps, I like to think, onto the distinction I previously drew between 'surveying' grammar (§122) either locally and globally. In those terms, one can put the point like this: because there is, and therefore can be, no globally applicable grammar to cover all uses of language, the only comparisons we can make are between distinct local grammars. In other words, there can only be local-to-local comparisons, and not local-to-global comparisons.
This is one reason why the accent here is placed on 'distinctions' (and not similarities; compare §130: "the language-games stand there as objects of comparison which, through similarities and dissimilarities"). "Our ordinary forms of language ... make us overlook" these distinctions, because we tend to take language to have a global grammar that is applicable everywhere - philosophy, in particular, is prone to this mistake.
Now, what lends every 'local' grammar it's flavour, is, of course, the use to which it is put (building something, naming something, giving directions, etc). Each of these 'practical' forms-of-life will employ a different kind of grammar, corresponding to the language-games appropriate to them. 'Language in idle' is what happens when we abstract language-games from those forms-of-life, and treat grammar as being globally consistent across all of language.
"We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language:..."
Think of order in terms of an arrangement or method, not the order or the method, as if there is one way of seeing or looking at a word's use, but "...one out of many possible orders or methods. Why? Because of the complexity of language-games, and the logic of use behind each language-game. In order to see this clearly one compares language-games (similarities and dissimilarities). Think of comparing the use of the word time in one language-game (e.g. science), as opposed to the use of the word time as a poet might use it (compare and make note). As we do this we accumulate "...knowledge in the use of language," and we begin to see the distinctions within each of these language-games that are easily overlooked.
Clarity is also not a kind of generalized clarity, but a clarity that comes from understanding various uses of words within a particular language-game. It's not the clarity Wittgenstein was seeking in the TLP. Clarity for Wittgenstein in the PI is piecemeal, and each case is a reminder used for a particular purpose.
The question that arises is, "Are all philosophical problems solved using Wittgensteinian methods?" The answer, has to be an unequivocal, no! Wittgenstein's methods don't clear up everything. However, they do clear up many philosophical puzzles. In fact, as I've stated before, many, or probably most of the philosophical problems in these forums are simply misunderstandings of the sort that Wittgenstein is dealing with. Moreover, understanding Wittgenstein's methods will help you not to go down roads that lead nowhere.
Understanding Wittgenstein is not enough, one must be practiced at using his methods.
§133 can be read as a conclusion to the whole section that began around §88 or so, and it does so by bringing out the stakes of much of the discussion so far. I want to approach this in light of what I said previously about comparisons only being available at a local level: it's in this respect that I understand the comment that: "A method is now demonstrated by examples, and the series of examples can be broken off". This is because a local-to-local comparison of grammar does not generalise: local-to-local comparisons - which must always involve examples of language-in-use - shed mutual light on each other (ie. with respect to the specificity of the language-games involved, along with their grammar, and according to the forms-of-life which grant them relevancy), but they don’t ever (can’t ever, according to Witty) amount to (or lead to) a ‘theory of language’ as a whole.
The comparisons between language-games shed light on those language-games, but not, as it were, language in general. This is why ‘the series of examples can be broken off’: the comparison of examples can only go so far, before you literally start running out of material: forms-of-life and the grammar appropriate to them only extend so far, and no further. This is in contrast to the philosophical impulse to generalise (in the blue books, Witty famously laments philosophy’s “craving for generality”) and take examples as merely standing for tokens of universilizablity; to make a philosophical problem ‘disappear’, in this sense, is to make note of the local specificity of a language-game; to note where it can, and cannot be applicable, and where and when it starts to stray too far from the form-of-life which gives it it’s sense.
This is why one can “break off philosophising” when one wants to: insofar as ‘philosophical problems’ are always those of an inappropriate generalization, merely noting that inappropriateness simply 'returns words to their everyday use’ (§116), from which philosophy is always a deviation. And having done this, one no longer, as it were, needs to philosophise: the philosophical problems ‘completely disappear’. All this also accounts for why Witty here insists on the plurality of problems (“problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem"): insofar as problems are always local, they are also always specific: there are no ‘eternal’ philosophical problems, just philosophical problems brought about by the inappropriate extension or extrapolation of a language-game beyond its bounds of applicability. And this is always a case-by-case issue.
—
Woo! Glad we got through this section. It’s easily my least favourite of the PI, and from here on out for the next few sections, Witty will be addressing what he calls the ‘general form of the proposition’, introduced in §65 but taken up here in an explicit manner. It continues his self-critique of the TLP, in which such a ‘general form’ was one of Witty’s most important concepts (TLP 5.471: "The general propositional form is the essence of a proposition”). It will be useful to keep this in mind while reading the next few sections.
If language consists of distinct objects, separate language-games, and there can be no such thing as a theory of language as a whole, then it appears like the Philosophical Investigations' whole enterprise, which was to describe "language" (remember #7 ... I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the "language-game"), seems to be self-refuting. There is no such thing as "language".
It appears to me like he has proposed two completely different ways to describe language, which are distinctly incompatible with each other. One description is as a bunch of distinct objects, language-games, and the other, the various actions which comprise language as a whole. At this point in the text, he is clearly rejecting the latter in favour of the distinct language-games. But now we have no principle whereby we might unify distinct language-games to say that there is such a thing as "language".
I will stress that going forward from this point we must reject the inclination to think that there is such a thing as "language", because it is firmly denied. And to follow Wittgenstein's intention we must adhere to this principle that there is no such thing as "language". The description is of distinct language-games without a unifying principle.
I think Wittgenstein makes an illegal move by trying to on the one hand dissolve the basis for rules like math (equating it to the diagonal moves of a bishop in chess, let's say) but then shrug off any responsibility to employ empirical avenues such as evolutionary psychology which can inform the math/language system itself. Evolutionary psychological reasons for the capability of logical inferencing, for example, would negate the major thesis that all is just social convention and language-games. More over, if patterns of nature necessitate creatures with logical inferencing for survival, that is an even harder blow.
I think the following from Zettel speaks to this:
You said:
Quoting StreetlightX
Witt's theory of the foundations of math are similar to that of language, in that he thinks it dissolves once it is shown to be a game of sorts. This is related to no "eternal" philosophical problems, like that of the foundations of math.
Quoting StreetlightX
The basis would be ones that see math as something "objective" and "Platonic". Instead, he thinks it is convention that gets played out in language-games.
Quoting StreetlightX
Fine, I will play this language-game and conflate "social convention" (my sense of it at least), with your use of "forms of life" (how Wittgenstein of us). Essentially, forms of life are human perspectives of a community- how people act, behave, cultural indicators, wrapped up with how the language is used. Forms of life have a relativistic sense to them- each community has its own form of life, and none are particularly hierarchical.
However, there are language/mathematical/logical communities that DO special things. For example, the conventional math-languages used in the sciences and engineering DO solve problems of a much more complex nature than the problems that other language games solve. It creates predictive models for which other language games do not have the ability to predict. How can this language game be so useful compared with others, in mining complexity in natural phenomena and in secondarily creating synthetic technologies from those original mined complexities?
And here we can say there is perhaps a realism to the complexities of these special language-games. Perhaps a realism that is above and beyond mere forms of life only. Contingency would imply caprice- that the efficacy would work as well as any other convention.
Perhaps these complexities, or what I call "patterns", are part of a bigger picture of explanation. Language-games may be true (pace Wittgenstein), but some language-games are based in a realism of necessary pattern-recognition that is necessary by way of evolutionary necessity. Animals that do not recognize patterns, would not survive. Thus there is a realism underlying the conventionalism or nominalism of Wttgenstein's project.
Wittgenstein's methods of dissolving philosophical problems in the PI is meant to solve particular kinds of philosophical conundrums. This does not mean that every philosophical problem is solvable using these methods. If I understand you correctly, you seem to think that all philosophical problems can be solved using the language-game model. Wittgenstein is showing us how a certain kind of thinking is a misuse of language, and when it is such, then Wittgenstein's methods can be employed, otherwise never-mind.
Oh come on this is the longest of long stretches to stretch. At least be honest and say that you just wondered in here from your own recent concerns and you have zero interest in where the reading group is at.
Quoting schopenhauer1
What is it about language-games that makes you think they are somehow incompatible with this 'usefulness'? Especially since for Witty, all language-games are useful for particular purposes (that's just what language-games are). You mention caprice - but what makes you think language-games are (merely?) capricious or arbitrary? That they are not, that they are keyed at every point to purposes, is maybe the biggest lesson of the PI: language is use in a language-game.
You mention a 'realism to the complexities of these special language-games' - but what makes you think that not every language-game already involves just such a realism which not merely underwrites them, but makes of them language-games at all? That not every language-game is 'special' precisely to the degree that it is as it is for a (necessary (set of)) reason(s)? Witty's whole concern is to show when precisely such a realism is lost, we no longer even have language-games, and with their loss, can no longer mean anything at all.
And I'm ignoring entirely the idea that mathematical Platonism somehow counts as the default 'basis of math': as if it wasn't just one measly contender in a crowded, unstable field.
On necessity:
"It is not necessary that human beings should have come to engage in anything we would call calculation (inferring, etc.). But if their natural history has brought them to this crossroads, then only certain procedures will count as calculating (inferring, etc.) and only certain forms will allow those activities to proceed. It is not necessary that the members of a group should ever have found pleasure and edification in gathering together to hear the stories of their early history related; but if they do, then only certain kinds of stories, in certain structures, will provide (what we can comprehend as) that pleasure and edification. "There must be agreement not only in definitions but also . . . in judgements. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so."
In particular, I take it: It is not necessary that we should recognize anything as "logical inference"; but if we do, then only certain procedures will count as drawing such inferences, ones (say) which achieve the universality of agreement, the teachability, and the individual conviction, of the forms of inference we accept as logic. There is no logical explanation of the fact that we (in general, on the whole) will agree that a conclusion has been drawn, a rule applied, an instance to be a member of a class, one line to be a repetition of another (even though it is written lower down, or in another hand or color); but the fact is, those who understand (i.e., can talk logic together) do agree. And the fact is that they agree the way they agree; I mean, the ways they have of agreeing at each point, each step.
... Wittgenstein's view of necessity is, as one would expect, internal to his view of what philosophy is. His philosophy provides, one might say, an anthropological, or even anthropomorphic, view of necessity; and that can be disappointing; as if it is not really necessity which he has given an anthropological view of. As though if the a priori has a history it cannot really be the a priori in question. - "But something can be necessary whatever we happen to take as, or believe to be, necessary." - But that only says that we have a (the) concept of necessity - for it is part of the meaning of that concept that the thing called necessary is beyond our control.
If the wish were not mere father but creator of the deed, we would have no such concept. If upon doing a calculation I could wish, and my wish bring it about, that the figures from which I "started" become altered, if necessary, in order that the result of my calculation prove correct; and if I could wish, and my wish bring it about, that the world alter where necessary so that the altered figures are still of what they are supposed to be; then the sense of necessity (standing over myself, at any rate) is not likely to be very strong in me. What we take to be necessary in a given period may alter. It is not logically impossible that painters should now paint in ways which outwardly resemble paintings of the Renaissance, nor logically necessary that they now paint in the ways they do. What is necessary is that, in order for us to have the form of experience we count as an experience of a painting, we accept something as a painting. And we do not know a priori what we will accept as such a thing. But only someone outside such an enterprise could think of it as a manipulation or exploration of mere conventions"
On Convention:
"The conventions we appeal to may be said to be "fixed", "adopted", "accepted", etc. by us; but this does not now mean that what we have fixed or adopted are (merely) the (conventional) names of things. The conventions which control the application of grammatical criteria are fixed not by customs or some particular concord or agreement which might, without disrupting the texture of our lives, be changed where convenience suggests a change. (Convenience is one aspect of convention, or an aspect of one kind or level of convention.)
They are, rather, fixed by the nature of human life itself, the human fix itself, by those "very general facts of nature" which are "unnoticed only because so obvious", and, I take it, in particular, very general facts of human nature - such, for example, as the fact that the realization of intention requires action, that action requires movement, that movement involves consequences we had not intended, that our knowledge (and ignorance) of ourselves and of others depends upon the way our minds are expressed (and distorted) in word and deed and passion; that actions and passions have histories.
... That human beings on the whole do not respond in these ways is, therefore, seriously referred to as conventional; but now we are thinking of convention not as the arrangements a particular culture has found convenient, in terms of its history and geography, for effecting the necessities of human existence, but as those forms of life which are normal to any group of creatures we call human, any group about which we will say, for example, that they have a past to which they respond, or a geographical environment which they manipulate or exploit in certain ways for certain humanly comprehensible motives.
Here the array of "conventions" are not patterns of life which differentiate human beings from one another, but those exigencies of conduct and feeling which all humans share. Wittgenstein's discovery, or rediscovery, is of the depth of convention in human life; a discovery which insists not only on the conventionality of human society but, we could say, on the conventionality of human nature itself, on what Pascal meant when he said "Custom is our nature" (Pensees, §89)".
Thus begin's Witty's explicit attack on the 'general form of the propositon', identified in the TLP as 'This is how things are'. The first thing he points out is that 'this is how things are' doesn't actaully say anything about the world, as it were; instead, it points to, or rather 'stands for some statement or other' which does say something about the world (e.g. "the cat is on the mat").
In other words, while "the cat is on the mat" might 'agree' (or not) with reality, 'This is how things are' can do neither because on its own, it's simply an incomplete sentence. One has to supply the 'content' of 'this' for it to do so; in the absence of that content, it is simply a placeholder, and a placeholder can neither agree (or disagree) with reality. This is why it is what Witty calls a 'propositional schema'. One has to supply the 'content' of 'this' for it to do so, otherwise it's agreement or not with reality is 'obvious nonsense'.
Necessary, in the sense of required for the purpose of (in this case survival), is associated with usefulness. And usefulness is the supporting principle of pragmatist metaphysics. I see no way to make any form of pragmatism consistent with any form of realism, due to the gap between them, commonly cited as the is/ought gap. You are clearly jumping this gap, when you claim that the existence of things which exist for various purposes (language-games), support some sort of realism. Until the purpose itself is shown to have real existence, the things which exist for that purpose cannot be said to have real existence.
Therefore, in Wittgenstein's thought exercise of understanding language-games as objects to be compared, we are not dealing with real objects according to any form of realism. Language-games are activities, so Wittgenstein has taken a "process" premise, and he hasn't given any principles whereby objects have real existence.
Ok, I must clarify here- I'm not anti-Witty to be anti-Witty. I came out swinging hard. His language-games idea, I find enormously useful insofar as describing the internal agreement and history of a community and its conventions and how that historical use dictates further use, because it is useful etc.. So I am not refuting Witty's idea of language-games tout court. It adds some useful thought-tools for understanding universal anthropological tendencies (to use particular conventions), and I'm on board with that. In fact, I think that "logic" and "math" the way it is used today is indeed partly a language-game started mainly by the Greeks, continuing with figures like Leibnitz on through the 19th and 20th century logicists which essentially invented a convention/game/framework that analytic philosophers and mathematicians can use to talk with each other in an internally meaningful way. Also "cool" about Wittgenstein is how he points out that this conventionalized mathematical community starts making its own "problems" by making errors of meaning/use in their own invented game. They missapply their own game and then make problems which the game itself has to fix by integrating the problem as useful in the game again or changing the game accordingly. Bravo, I like it.
However, I was trying to map his picture of human reality with other metaphysical and epistemological conceptions- namely realism, contingency, and necessity. One can construe Witt's metaphysics of these language-games to be be in purely nominalist or conventionalist terms. However, there may be some inherent, universal aspects to them which can characterize them to be necessary. It is necessary that humans inference, for example. It can be argued that general inferencing (this story/this phenomena/this observation is a specific or general case of X... This general case of X can be applied to specific cases of Y) may be a necessary human capability, dictated by evolutionary forces. In other words, in theory, any mode of survival is possible, in reality, evolution only allows certain modes of survival to actually continue. One such mode of survival, is inferencing. Since humans have no other recourse in terms of built-in instincts beyond very basic reflexes- our general processing minds, must recognize the very patterns of nature (through inferencing, and ratcheted with trial-and-error problem-solving, and cultural accumulated knowledge) which other animals exploit via instinctual models and lower-order learning behaviors/problem-solving skills.
Quoting StreetlightX
This quote here, which I take to be a sort tie-in to my last post, seems to overextend its point. He is moving from primitive inferencing- something that is universal and even tribal cultures utilize, to Logic (capital "L") as conventionalized by Greek/Western contingent historical circumstances. Inferencing + cultural contingencies of the Greek city-states + further contingencies of history led to our current conventions of logic. So it is a mix of taking an already universal trait and then exposing it to the contingencies of civilizations that mined it thoroughly and saw use for it.
However, that's not all. ONCE these contingently ratchted inferencing techniques were applied to natural phenomena, we found not only that the conventions worked internally in its own language-game, but that it did something more than mere usefulness to human survival/language-game-following. It actually mapped out predictions and concepts in the world that worked. New techniques now harnessed natural forces and patterns to technological use, far beyond what came before. Math-based empirical knowledge "found" something "about the world" that was cashed out in technology and accurate predictive models. This is then something else- not just conventionalized language games. This particular language-game did something different than other language games.
My own conclusions from this is that the inferencing pattern-seeking we employ as a species, to survive more-or-less tribally and at the least communally, by way of contingency, hit upon real metaphysical patterns of nature. Thus my statement in another thread that while other animals follow patterns of nature, humans primarily recognize patterns of nature in order to survive.
@Metaphysician Undercover @Sam26 You may be interested as well.
No, one can't, that's my point: that it's a total, utter misreading to think this. One might put the point this way: the PI stands as one of the most rigorous meditations on the force of necessity in language ever written, and to think that this force is somehow missing in the construal of language-games is to misunderstand them entirely. Forget this shallow focus on 'culture' and 'convention', again words that barely appear in the PI. Langauge-games only exist to the degree that they lay down roots in the world; they do not exist as a thin film pulled over it.
Quoting schopenhauer1
But this is false, an untruth - at least in the terms proposed in your post. Witty's entire point is that our use of language, to the degree that one can mean anything at all with it, is saturated with nothing other than 'predictions and concepts in the world that work'; we 'technologized' and 'predicted' long before we had math at hand, and were we to lose every work of math and every mathematician to a fire tomorrow, we would go on predicting, inventing, and putting language to work regardless. Nothing in language would work - or would do work for us, would mean anything - unless at every point it 'hit upon real metaphysical patterns of nature'. Witty's complaint against philosophy is precisely that it doesn't register such 'hits', although Witty would not call them 'metaphysical', but simply, everyday.
I would also make note of your continual conflation between math and logic, which ought to alone disqualify everything you write, but I doubt you care. Here's an idea - follow along and contribute to the reading group, rather than waltzing in with your preconceived ideas and prior, unrelated concerns.
Before I answer anything further.. I'd just like to make a plea in this forum to stop vitriolic hyperbole that. it's unnecessary rhetorical vitriol and only stirs up emotion, not makes a point. It's rhetoric for rhetoric. I will read further though.
It's either gnashing of the teeth, or meant to piss off..either way, its emotional unnecessary flourish.. and I think you are clearly a well-read poster, I just think this style doesn't befit your knowledge.
I deem math and more specifically, mathematical logic as a set of logical frameworks for proofs, axioms, and such that try to lay the foundations of mathematical operations of quantity, functions, variables, spacial analysis, geometric analysis, probabilities, etc.. I deem this to be a specific variety of a larger logical framework (language-game) that has essentially been going on since the Greeks. The history of both are intertwined so much, that there is much borrowing of each, though they started out in different avenues, closely related. The early analytic philosophers blurred the lines as many were both mathematicians and general logicians and tried to use symbolic logic to found arithmetic in a larger logical framework, though this approach was obviously questionable. Logic in general, extends to more than just quantity, numbers, space, and probabilities- but also used to analyze the basis of ordinary language and concepts.
Quoting StreetlightX
Right, but all is language-games, implies a relativism in how each language-game corresponds to what is the case. He precisely criticizes the idea that we can even get at what is the case. How is it that the language-game of science "hit upon" the technological complexities it has? Well, if all is merely language-games, why are some language-games useful for creating greater complexities out of natural phenomena than others? Clearly, there is something going on with certain language-games over other language-games. Perhaps this leads the way to a realism of the world that the this particular language-game is hitting at, that other language-games are not. Other civilizations (maybe contingent world-histories) can get along without the discoveries of the science language-game, but then that is missing the point of all the technology and predictions the science language-game does compared to other language-games.
The same way the language-games of literally anything else 'hits upon' the 'realities' they are adequate to. It's as if someone were to ask: 'how is it that 'block!' 'hits upon' this block here such that the builder will pass it to me? What a mystery!'; a mystery, sure, to anyone who does not understand what a language-game is. One lesson here is: no language-game is 'mere', is sufficient unto itself: every language-game is constrained and made possible by the realities out of which it is born and is addressed to. This is as true of one asking to pass the salt as it is of one asking to measure the velocity of light.
So this insistance - made with no argument and substantiated by the most flimsy of suppositions - that the language-games of science (now further illigitimately assimilated for no apparent reason into math and logic, out of nowhere) do something other than any other langauge-games simply rings hollow and false. It falsifies not only the concept of language-games, but also the operations of math, logic, and now, apparently, science. As if we did not make predictions until the advent of math. As if we could not invent before the formalizations of logic. Rubbish.
No, that is now taking me out of context, ignoring what I said earlier. I said that all humans, even tribal ones, have a basic inferencing capability, and it is a universal capability of all humans in all types of cultures. In fact, I said almost the complete opposite of this quoted statement above. I even posited that inferencing is perhaps a necessity of humans due to evolutionary explanations of pattern-recognition
What I did say, and you misrepresented, was that this initial inferencing ability was refined (what you called "formalized") by originally the Greeks (with synthesis from other cultures), and further updated and appended down the generations in mainly Western culture(s). These formalizations/refinements were mainly due to contingent circumstances of historical development (e.g. I mentioned perhaps the culture surrounding the Greek city-state as one possible originating contributor out of a wide-array). This formalized form of logic, however, provided insights to predicitions about the natural world that were accurate, and technology that was vastly more complex than what came before.
Yes, it is not just logic or math that produced these results (which indeed would be a formalized language-game(s)) but it was/is this formalized math along with formalized empirical observations of the natural world that created these results. These results have been cashed out in the predictive power and technology that was/is generated as a result of these insights.
Thus my further conclusion that through evolutionary means, humans have an extremely high capacity for inferencing, which was necessary for survival. I further stated, that most other animals are following patterns of instincts that conform with survival, while humans survive by having the capacity to recognize patterns using inferencing, enhanced by problem-solving and accumulated cultural knowledge. That is not to say other animals don't recognize patterns (as I get that being some objection), but this pattern recognition is usually by instinct and lower-learning capabilities, and not by the immensely ratcheted up capacities that language, accumulated cultural knowledge, and all the rest bring with the human mind which allow it to primarily survive in this form of life rather than via instinctual modules (as is the case for most other animals). So, the "real" here is that there are patterns of nature, and some of our language-games have recognized them, to such an extent that the resultant technology harnesses them.
Quoting StreetlightX
Where yes, every language-game may be sufficient for its use in that form of life/community, there is something different regarding the measure of velocity versus the language-game surrounding how to pass the salt. One is seeing the patterns of nature via a formalized version of our basic inferencing abilities (mathematically-derived empirical science), and one is a contingent convention. We also cannot misconstrue that the historical development, though contingent on how the language-game played, nonetheless produced something that sees "real" patterns of nature that have produced highly accurate predictive models and technology that other language-games cannot and do not do.
Edit: Oh and then I'm guessing you or someone else will probably bring up how sciences have "revolutions" of conventions and relativity and QM replacing Newtonian physics, etc. etc. So, ""HA! realism schealism! You are wrong!" No, it is just that this language-game allows for corrections of its own conventions, built into the game itself. Besides the usual resistance to change, and hurt feelings people get from strongly held beliefs, the actual game of science itself allows for corrective changes in principle, based on where the evidence takes you.
'More complex'; ' immensely ratcheted up capacities'; 'something different': these are all so many ways of saying nothing at all: what complexity? What kind of capacity? What 'something different'? Merely insisting on some kind of Very Important Difference - and that is all you've done - is to insist on nothing. You've given no conceptual substance to any of these apparent 'differences', other than beg the question and insist that language-games 'cannot capture real patterns of nature'. And this despite the fact that such 'capturing' is just the sine qua non of language-games as such. As if passing the salt is something unreal.
Wittgenstein reduces logical necessity to a form of "needed for a particular purpose". This is the pragmatist standard, conception is based in purpose. The problem is that Wittgenstein does take this position happily, or even willingly, it's a philosophical problem which worries him. He seems to have an underlying disposition to reject this pragmatism as deficient. So he attempts to get to the bottom of it, and find something real which supports it. From the days of the Tractatus, to now in the Investigations, he seeks a way out of the pragmatist mess. He seems to believe that there must be some underlying reality, which would give a necessity to logic, a necessity other than purpose. In the Tractattus he considered fundamental elements (materialism), and in this book he considers fundamental Ideas (Platonic realism), but neither of these is acceptable. So he is stuck in this pragmatist base where "logically necessary" simply means necessary for the purpose of this particular logic.
At this point there is nothing here to indicate that he is nominalist. He has found no basis for the assumption that social conventions are based in anything "real". They are part of the language-games. The only thing we might assume as a basis for convention is a commonality of purpose but we haven't gotten an indication of this yet.
[quote=Philosophical investigations] 185. Let us return to our example (143). Now—judged by the
usual criteria—the pupil has mastered the series of natural numbers.
Next we teach him to write down other series of cardinal numbers and
get him to the point of writing down series of the form down the series of natural numbers. — Let us suppose we have done exercises and given him tests up to 1000.
Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say +2) beyond 1000 —
and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. We say to him: "Look what you've done!" — He doesn't understand.
We say: "You were meant to add tn>o\ look how you began the series!"
— He answers: "Yes, isn't it right? I thought that was how I was
meant to do it." —— Or suppose he pointed to the series and said:
"But I went on in the same way." — It would now be no use to say:
"But can't you see . . . . ?" — and repeat the old examples and explanations.
— In such a case we might say, perhaps: It comes natural to this
person to understand our order with our explanations as we should
understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000
and so on."
Such a case would present similarities with one in which a person
naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking
in the direction of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to
finger-tip.[/quote]
The point here being that in order to carry out the rule of the social convention, one must be able to understand that rule. To understand the rule requires that the person sees things (with the mind) in the same way as the others. This seeing things in the same way is instinctual, it's what "comes natural" to the person. So now we have this underlying instinct, or intuition, which is necessary for, and underpins the social conventions.
Yes, then I'd agree with Witt, that per evolutionary forces like theory of other minds, and social learning (something most other primates lack), humans have predispositions that start to work when exposed to social cues to understand the nuances of the language-games of their social environment. I used inferencing as an example of human capacity, but the predisposition for social learning is also an example of a human-centered ability shaped by evolutionary/survival forces. The language-games seem to have a base in these evolutionarily shaped tendencies.
My point was language-games have a base in "real" causes (patterns of evolutionary necessity) and in turn, lead to language-games like math-informed empirical investigation in general, which, though contingently constructed, has "hit upon" an understanding of the very patterns of nature, which has constructed the human (amongst other patterns of nature, ones harnessed for complex technologies and predictive accuracy of investigation into natural phenomena).
Let me ask you this: What is the difference between technologies and explanatory powers before the Scientific Revolution/Enlightenment/Industrial Revolution, and after? Why might there be a difference? Simply just another language-game like passing the salt, or is there something different about this language-game?
There is 'something different' about every language-game. Every language-game has a purpose or a point to which it is keyed, and there are as many language-games as they there are purposes to them, without which they would not be language-games. This is such an important point that Witty's emphasis on the varying kinds of language-games - the fact that they differ by kind, and not merely by degree - is placed right at the very start of the PI, and governs everything that follows in the book. That there might be such a difference in kind between the language-games that existed at some supposed break between the various revolutions you speak of (predictably lumped together like so many dead fish, as you lump math, logic and science together, utterly gutting any conceptual cogency each might have) is not an argument against the scope of language-games, but an elementality built right into their definition.
Ok, I'm with you there.
Quoting StreetlightX
Right, but we have to parse out the way I am using the idea of "different" or "break" here, as it is different than what you are construing it as. In a very Wittgensteinian way, we are talking passed each other in our language-game. I'm not arguing that each language game does not have its own nuances, complexities, and purposes that they are keyed to.
Rather, I am arguing that hitting upon a way to map the world that cashes out accurate predictions and increasingly complex technology, is a language-game that hits upon something different than other language games. Where we are missing each other, is that you think we don't agree, but I do agree with you that all language-games are useful in some way to that form of life. I am not debating that. Even survival-related language-games do not need to be related with science to foster surviving.
Rather, I am pointing out that there is something special about the way this language-game is able to so accurately predict and create powerful technologies out of the material world to a degree and kind far more than any other kind of language-game. To sum it up:
1) We agree language-games have various kinds for various purposes.
2) We agree that humans do not need the language-game of Western/formalized math-informed science as it has formed in the last 400 years to survive.
3) We have contention as to the significance of Western/formalized math-informed science as it has formed in the last 400 years.
What I think the significance can possibly be is pointing to a realism- a metaphysical indicator that there are structures to the world that are real, and can be mined with certain language-games that roughly map on to the structures enough to harness predictive explanatory power and technology.
Where other language-games are conventionalized forms of life that more-or-less are pragmatic agreements by participants for the indirect and stated purposes of the game, math-informed science language-games are discovering something beyond conventional pragmatic discourse.
And my point is that every language-game does this. I've said this multiple times now. I'll not say it again. You have a very shallow view of language-games as being nothing but 'conventions' or 'social pragmatic discourse' or whatever: terms which are not used by Witty, and which are often projected onto him by those who have not read his work. Language-games are 'real' through and through, and everytime you keep try and institute a dichotomy between 'mere' language-games and 'math-informed science' as turning upon 'hitting a reality' or whatever, you misunderstand language-games. Put 'conventions' in the trash bin of your mind; where they - and talk of 'social' and 'cultural' - belong. Also forget 'usefulness', language-games are not useful-for-x; language-games have uses is all; they are defined by their uses; whether those uses are themselves 'useful' for survival or not is irrelevant, and every time you speak in those terms you betray - again - your misunderstandings.
Start talking in terms of grammar and criteria, and then maybe you'll have something of relevance to say.
Quoting schopenhauer1
The problem here being that, as I described in my other post, we have no principle whereby we can say that a language-game is a "real" object. Remember the question of 65 what is a language-game, and the following inability to say what exactly what a game is. Then we enter the paradox of trying to describe language with language. This is what is causing him the philosophical problems. In the Tractatus he found reality in representation, but he later noticed this was incorrect. Here he searches into concepts, ideas, but rejects Platonism and finds that language-games are based in human purpose.
Now language-games may be described in terms of learning social conventions, and the natural tendencies required to learn these conventions, but if we want to name "the real cause", we cannot get beyond purpose. Purpose is what holds the various features together into some kind of unity, which Wittgenstein calls a game. But here we reach the paradox I refer to earlier, with trying to describe language using language itself. To produce a true bounded object, a game with clear and consistent rules, we must specify the purpose. And as soon as we specify a particular purpose, we make an error in our description of language, because language is not bounded to be directed toward one particular purpose, it is unbounded so as to be adaptable to any purpose.
Quoting StreetlightX
I don't think we can say that a language-game is real. Remember the section starting at 65, where he asks what is a language-game, and consequently what is a game. We go into an unbounded, vague, conceptual realm where it would be impossible to separate one language game from another, to give one or another real separate existence, as they are dependent on a specific purpose, and purposes are general, vague and overlapping. And now, he has implied that there is no such thing as language as a whole, as a unity of all language-games in the language-game. So I really don't think we can say that a language-game is something real.
I mentioned survival, as you mentioned earlier that people went about surviving fine long before science, and I agreed with you.
Quoting StreetlightX
I said "useful in some way for that form of life" which implies Quoting StreetlightX
Quoting StreetlightX
I never disputed that language-games are not real in their own context and way of being. I only posited that the science language-game has a quality of cashing out certain outcomes, and this indicates patterns of nature are real.
I guess it is more to do with Witty's understanding of science itself. I know he was against scientisim, but so am I. Sceintism I take to be the idea that philosophy and logic can describe the world scientifically, finding some truth a priori, or by simply rigorous examination. This is just a form of language-game as well.
However, scientism isn't science, and I know he had respect for the outcomes that were chased out in scientific disciplines. Perhaps it is that I am against a certain interpretation of Wittgenstein, that can be taken out of his own context, by trying to conflate even scientific understanding as being "just another language-game". Mapping onto a way we go about interacting in or with the world, and mapping out how the world interacts, are two types of things. One is more malleable, and amenable to change. The language-game is fluid. The other is more rigid. The language itself can change, but the concepts informed mathematically are fixing on some phenomena that are showing some real patterns "out there" in the "great outdoors".
I know we've discussed Speculative Realism.. this would be more leaning in that direction I guess. That is to say, there is a way of speculating on the "real" or an ontology above and beyond never getting out of our epistemology. I also want to say, that this does not mean that I am in agreement with any particular speculative realism, but the openness to some ontological speculation is not out completely off the table. This also doesn't mean that I am not open to the idea of Witt's at the end of Tractatus, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". These are sometimes two tendencies of the modern philosopher world. The world presents itself to us, often in ways humans would not otherwise conceive, and is accessed via scientific results. But often it is hard to see how humans can get anywhere out of their predisposed epistemology.
Meaningless.
So this has to do with what I said about epistemology and ontology. Speculating about ontology beyond human interaction with it. If that is meaningless fine, but then please indicate that. Saying meaningless is meaningless otherwise.
If you would like to assume the "everything is for-us" position, and that science is simply "for-us" always, that is fine too. I am open to dialogue.
That is not so. It's the same stinking distinctions that are being made, just in different terms. It's all the same at the end of the day, whether you analyze every word of Philosophical Investigations or not. The implications and conclusions will lead to these distinctions. I'm more interested in what PI implies and how it fits with other views in the philosophy world here.
You want to keep it to grammar and context distinctions.. that's fine, but I am moving it to a meta-view of that. You say we cannot get out of that talk when talking of Wittgenstein.
While I'm not as dismissive of your concerns as @StreetlightX was here, you need to do a lot more work to link the concepts given exegesis in the thread to the much more general philosophical viewpoint you're trying to take. Precisely when one of the major thrusts of the currently discussed part is that finding seeds of universal generality in contextually dependent notions of sense ('philosophical grammars' to link it to previous discussion here) is a fool's errand!
@fdrake This was the start of this particular sub-discussion. I'll refrain from making comments regarding the context of Witty in the broader philosophy of ideas in this thread. I think it is relevant, but I see that we want to keep it close to the reading. Would it be appropriate to start another thread then?
It'd probably be for the best. It's not exegetical or easily related to the exegesis here. I'm fairly sure that a general thread won't get the kind of responses you want, though. You'll have to do most of the work in the OP.
§135
If §134 casts doubt on the idea of a 'general form' of the proposition, §135 essentially asks: well, does that mean that we cannot have a concept of a proposition at all? And it answers: well of course we can, in the exact same way we can have a concept of a "game", previously defined in terms of 'family resemblances'. Worth recalling here a few of Witty's remarks on games and boundaries from before; For fun, and comparison's sake, I'll substitute the word 'proposition' for 'game' in §68:
§69: "We can draw a boundary a for a special purpose. Does it take this to make the concept usable? Not at all! Except perhaps for that special purpose."
§68: "What still counts as a proposition, and what no longer does? Can you say where the boundaries are? No. You can draw some, for there aren’t any drawn yet. (But this never bothered you before when you used the word “proposition”.) “But then the use of the word is unregulated” —– It is not everywhere bounded by rules."
Anyway, back to §135, where he says one can say what a proposition is by way of examples: which is nothing other than Witty's procedure for showing family resemblances. At the end of §135 he asks that one compare the concept of a proposition to that of a number. Well, here is Witty on numbers, for comparison:
§69: And likewise the kinds of number, for example, form a family. Why do we call something a “number”? Well, perhaps because it has a - direct - affinity with several things that have hitherto been called “number”; and this can be said to give it an indirect affinity with other things that we also call “numbers”. And we extend our concept of number, as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre".
He has exposed a gap between common, every day concepts like "game", which are vague and essentially without boundary, and the more precise logical concepts of logic and mathematics. So at 81 the question of what it means to be "operating a calculus according to definite rules" is posed. But this question puts us on the brink of misunderstanding, that is if we proceed with the wrong answer we fall into misunderstanding. After some background information is laid out the "difficulty" with mathematics is broached again at 125:
Now we can see clearly, at 135, that the meaning of a proposition is being compared to the meaning of numbers, a mathematical statement or equation for example. In the section which follows, we will see that Wittgenstein extends the vague, boundlessness of common language, through logical propositions, right into mathematics. This is expressed in the possibility of following the rule in a different way. There is an analogy of a machine. It always operates in the same way, just like people following the rules of mathematics, but the possibility is still there, that something could break or go wrong (a person could follow the rule in a different way).
The misunderstanding, mentioned at 81, which we were on the brink of, and must be avoided is if we proceed to understand rule following in the opposite way. This would be an attempt to extend the "definite rules" which appear to underlie mathematics, into logical propositions, and language use in general, to conclude that language use must consist of following definite rules. The underlying thing in language is the vague boundlessness, and this must be understood from its existence in common language, to underlie logical propositions, and even mathematics itself, which appears to consist only of definite rules. To proceed the other way, to understand the definite rules which mathematics appears to be composed of, as underlying all language use, is to misunderstand. The rules come into existence only for specific purposes.
This is exactly the kind of answer Socrates rejects in response to his "what is" questions. He does not want examples of justice, for example, but what justice itself is. And, of course, such inquiries end in aporia. Instead of definitions Wittgenstein says:
:up: Yes, great point. There's an anti-Platonism here right at the level of questions asked, which is just where it ought to be.
[Edited to add:]
It is not just a matter of method. He regards Wittgenstein as a kind of skeptic, but not the radical skeptic he argues against. I agree.
We do not discover whether something is a proposition by asking whether we can apply a truth value to it; by whether we can say that it is true or false. That is, 'true' and 'false' do not exist as independent criteria by which we determine whether something is a proposition. In other words (to use Wittgenstein's terminology), 'true' and 'false' do not fit the concept of a proposition. Rather, the concepts of 'true', 'false' and 'proposition' all constitute or belong to the same game.
Similarly, we do not discover which chess piece is the king by asking which piece can be put in check. Only the king can be put in check, as per the rules of the game. In other words, the concept of 'check' does not fit the king. Rather, 'check' and 'king' both belong to the same game.
@Luke is exactly right to say that the distinction between fitting and belonging is what organises this section, and I'll only add that the thought that came to my head was the distinction between analytic and synthetic: that a proposition is a truth-apt statement just is what a proposition is, analytically so. It is not that there are propositions on the one hand, and truth-apt statements on the other, which are then brought together in some act of synthesis. Rather, there cannot be propositions which are not truth-apt, in the same way that there cannot be bachelors who are not unmarried.
This way of putting things may or may not be confusing issues since the analytic-synthetic distinction usually involves questions of experience and its role in knowledge, but I find it helpful regardless.
Wittgenstein clearly rejects modern or radical skepticism, but his attitude and practice is in line with Socratic zetetic skepticism, that is to say, skepticism as inquiry and an acknowledgement of the limits of human knowledge. In addition, Wittgenstein was consistent in his view of the contingency of existence. There is no logical necessity or metaphysical order that determines that things be as they are.
Skepticism in this sense is not the claim that we cannot know, but that there are limits to what we do know. Our knowledge is not grounded on absolute certainty or indubitability, it is not that we cannot doubt but that we do not doubt. In this sense skepticism is not a threat. It is philosophical practice - philosophical inquiry, philosophical investigations.
Is this a fact of some law of human thought processes, or a fact of convention?
It sounds like it is some emerging that arises from humans interacting in a world of objects. It just happens that way. I wonder what Chomsky's idea of innate generation of syntax bears on the more social/world/language game use view of things. Are humans always going to play the same language games with the world, more-or-less with cultural variations, or do they arise independently and ad hoc? The conditions of the world, move the language games to form a certain way, or do human brains do this, or both? Of course, this requires tons of empirical research more or less. Incidentally, here is this week's comic, featuring Wittgenstein:
https://existentialcomics.com/
'It'?
http://existentialcomics.com/comic/290
http://existentialcomics.com/comic/284
http://existentialcomics.com/comic/268
This one's a bit oblique, but as I can make out, it tries to address an objection posed to §136. The objection works by trying to draw an analogy between ascertaining the subject of a sentence (what a sentence is about), and determining if a proposition is truth-apt. The idea is that a subject of a sentence might always be otherwise: in the sentence, "Bob is funny", Bob is the subject of the sentence. But in the sentence, "Alice is funny", Alice is the subject. The subject then is not (what I called) analytically related to the sentence in the way that truth-aptness is related to propositions. So might it not be the case the the truth-aptness of propositions are related together in the same way as the subject of sentences?
Witty's response to this is the comparison is valid only if it is recognized that it works when trying to distinguish propositions from non-propositions (what Witty calls 'other expressions'), and not 'truth-apt propositions' from 'non-truth-apt propositions' (the distinction is not internal to types of propositions, but 'external' between propositions and not-propositions). It's only in this sense, says Witty, that one can talk of truth-aptness 'fitting' a proposition.
"Wittgenstein ... would have rejected the thought that language should be capable of systematization. Hence, he would have denied that we can give a uniform account of what it means to treat a sentence as assertible which can be applied across the board, in a uniform way, in all the contexts in which we use “is true.” As he argues, the notion that meaning can be explained without reference to anything other than use arises from the fact that “in our discussions, [we] constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding according to exact rules” (B.B., p. 25). And we are inclined to say that the meaning of a word must be fixed and precise in order for it to be intelligible (cf. P.I. #79).
But we should remember that “in general, we don’t use language according to strict rules—it hasn’t been taught us that way either” (B.B. p. 25). In practice, we do not always use names with a fixed meaning—we may use the name “Moses” without a predetermined sense of which descriptions we are willing to substitute for it. And this does not detract from the usefulness of the name in our language (P.I. #79). Similarly, we may say to someone “Stand roughly there,” and the inexactness of the expression does not make it unusable (P.I. #88). The person we are addressing will know what we mean and what he must do to satisfy the request. Examples such as these should suggest to us that what determinate meaning requires is not conformity to a universal standard or model. Rather, it requires an understanding of what is needed by those concerned in a given context.
....When we try to construct a systematic theory of meaning, it appears as though there is something outside of language by reference to which we can explain what meaning is. That is, it appears as though there is something independent of our actual use of words in language which bestows meaning on them—and which does so in a uniform way."
Wonderful stuff.
More Chimp-Pig content, please.
§138 finally brings out, I think, why any of these previous discussons matter at all in the context of the PI. That is: what does it matter whether or not propositions are intrinsically truth-apt or not? Why is Witty discussing this at all? - other than as a critique of his previous position in the TLP? If that critique functions as an 'external' motivation, what is the 'internal', philosophical motivation for engaging in this discussion.
§138 makes it clear: it's because meaning is use! It's only in the case where meaning might be anything other than use that we can speak of a proposition 'fitting' it's truth-aptness, and not belonging to it; Recall §120:
"People say: it’s not the word that counts, but its meaning, thinking of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, even though different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow one can buy with it. (On the other hand, however: money, and what can be done with it.)"
Just as, if you can't, for example, buy things with money, it just wouldn't be money, so too that if a proposition were not truth-apt, it wouldn't be a proposition. This is why Witty here speaks of 'grasping meaning at a stroke'; there's no inference that needs to be made from sentence to meaning, for a sentence wouldn't be a sentence did it not have meaning: were it not used in a language-game or another.
Witty's boxed notes are always obscure, and this one is no different, but my sense here is that he's suggesting that while we understand words in this way or that way, we don't, except in exceptional cases, wonder if we understand a understand a word at all. Another way to put this is that we are always in the 'sphere of meaning': even if we misunderstanding a meaning, what we misunderstand is a meaning, and not, say, a mere sound (we neither understand nor misunderstand noises). This once again as to do with our 'grasping meaning at a stroke': this grasping is not a 'two step' process, where we first ask (1) Is there meaning?, and then (2) What could it be?: when it comes to meaning, both steps are condensed into one,: (1) What is meant? (What is the use to which those words are put?).
This reminded me of the following:
from here.
That is to say, we are not always in the sphere of meaning, but one cannot help thinking one is, one finds meaning in the utterances of Trump the way one sees faces in the clouds.
Having just told us that "true" and "false" do not fit propositions at §136, Wittgenstein now tells us at §137 that "true" and "false" do fit propositions. Why is this?
At §136, "Being true and false are not criteria for being a proposition" (Baker and Hacker). That is, "true" and "false" do not help us to discover propositions in some scientific or metaphysical sense (i.e. outside our language games), so "true" and "false" do not fit, or are not appropriate to determine, a proposition in this sense.
At §137, however, Wittgenstein is speaking in pedagogical terms within our language games. In this sense we can speak of 'fitting' in our determination of (e.g.) the subject of a sentence, the letter that follows 'K' in the alphabet, or which expression is a proposition. "In that sense, "true" and "false" could be said to fit propositions."
Wittgenstein then anticipates a possible rebuttal against his dictum that 'meaning is use'; one most likely made by those captured by the view that a word's meaning is something mental:
If the use (and meaning) of a word is extended in time, as Wittgenstein contends, then how is it that we can grasp the meaning of a word at a stroke? Wittgenstein does not provide an answer, but it lies in our training, practise and acquired ability with the use of words.
The boxed section offers a counter to the rebuttal with the simple observation that we do not always understand the meaning of a word (e.g. "at a stroke"), even if we think we might.
I often get the impression when I see people talking about Wittgenstein that a number of them assume any given word to be a concept. I’d also add that many conflate his use of the term ‘language’ - I know I used to until I read his stuff and saw he attaching a specific meaning to ‘language’ that others choose to use more broadly (those others being linguists).
We “understand” a word when we hear it just like we understand a tree when we see it - the difference being the experiential exposure to a tree is not enclosed in a communicable language other than by ostensive means (literally pointing the physical object out to another or by way of mimicry).
“Understanding” is just a word used to communicate a certain way of comprehending boundaries - the “understanding” (in common parse) is what happens ‘between’ our concepts bound in wordiness and the immediate phenomenon.
For the individual person every experience is unique, yet the subtle differences are glossed over. Most words used don’t have any apparent “unique” meaning to the individual, yet they only have a unique meaning at large - or they wouldn’t have meaning at all (there would be no differentiation). When a word is considered as an experienced item - a memory attachment - then it is uniquely meaningful to the individual (as is the word “mountain” for me due to my personal connection with the word in regards to ... well ... something personal and in relation to Wittgenstein’s proclamation of there being no ‘private language’).
If the meaning is the use then what does ‘use’ mean? Clearly we’re talking within W’s strict definition of language so it is true. The point here being he sets out the limits of the map and then has a hard time being satisfied with this limited reach - and also seems to forget HE set it up as the limit of his investigation (he equates “language” to “philosophy” so a more precise title would’ve been “Philosophical Musings about Language”).
Notice that in this section he conflates "understanding" in the sense of hearing a spoken word with "understanding" in the sense which is required for choosing a word to say. He talks about understanding a spoken word, yet deciding whether a word "fits" a particular situation is a matter of choosing the appropriate word to use in that situation. So the distinctions which he makes here are quite confused and difficult to understand because understanding a spoken word, and choosing the appropriate word to say, are very different, yet he places them together.
"But we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it, we grasp it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'use' which is extended in time!"
The "use" of a word must include both the hearing and saying of the word. But these are very distinct and cannot be classed together under the same name of "understanding" without equivocation. The "grasp in a flash", which may be appropriate for the hearing of a word, is not so appropriate for the decision as to whether the word is the right word to say in the situation, whether it "fits". Now Wittgenstein's distinction between the normal and the abnormal will get very confused. What he seems to be missing is that in hearing it is normal to understand in a flash, and these instances with little doubt are less likely to produce mistake, compared to instances with much doubt. But the converse is the case in speaking. In choosing our words to say, the normal case is to use a process of selection, and if the words to say come to our minds in a flash, this is abnormal, and much more likely to produce error.
What is the illusion? What is the ideal? I still don't understand.
Quoting I like sushi
What is this "strict definition of language"? Do you mean lacking a private language?
Quoting I like sushi
You are conflating private meaningfulness with the denotative function of meaning. Your talk of "meaning to the individual" refers to something memorable or important (to the individual), whereas Wittgenstein's talk of meaning refers to a definition or denotation.
Note: Linguistics is a science and the term ‘language’ has multiple applications; you know that so only you know why you’re asking for clarification there.
I'm asking because I disagree that Wittgenstein uses a narrow or strict definition of language, as you claim.
That is the mistake I was highlighting people make.
In terms of how Wittgenstein defines language, he does so. He defines (denotes if you wish) language to be of character X and then says it cannot be of character Y. I don’t imagine he thought this was a particularly astounding point yet I find that many regard it as being something unique. I’ve seen many people say “you cannot have private language, read Witty!” I read Witty and he defines language as being something communal, something exchanged between people - ergo it is obvious by such a definition that ‘language’ cannot be private.
If Wittgenstein is talking about communicating, as distinct from language, he doesn’t anywhere say so - although he touches on this in part.
In the broader field of linguistics animal communication is taken by some as ‘language’ where others believe ‘language’ to have a more rigid definition (in the sense Wittgenstein uses the term). We could even make the false claim that a rock is “communicating” with the ground it is on. Reality is we perceive such distinctions naturally - is this ‘language’?
Humans do not require a “language” to function in society. There is most certainly a means of communication though that allows humans to interact without the use of definitions - mimicry and innate empathy, mirror neurons and such, show this to be the case.
As I asked you before, where does he give this definition of language?
Quoting I like sushi
I still don't understand what you're getting at. Are you asking whether Wittgenstein includes non-linguistic communication as part of language? His concerns are philosophical and he considers philosophical problems to arise from linguistic confusions. I don't think Wittgenstein would include animal communication as part of (our) language, but unless animals are engaging in philosophy I think it's largely irrelevant.
I wasn’t asking a question. I was making a statement. If you think Wittgenstein wasn’t referring to animal communication then you’re asking me why I think such, shouldn’t you perhaps ask why you think so? Do that and you have your answer - point being the broader definition of ‘language’ extends to animal communication (note: we’re animals, ergo we have means of communication that fall outside of W’s stricter definition of ‘language’).
If that doesn’t get across what I’m stating nothing likely will. We can at least agree that many people conflate the various uses of the term ‘language’ to suit their reading of W. We can hardly blame them given that that particular work is a hodgepodge of ideas (as W admits in the preface). The biggest mistake is to take the whole work as a set of completely interrelated thoughts and ideas.
I was trying to determine whether that's what you were getting at, like I said.
Quoting I like sushi
I asked you several posts ago whether this was about private language but you didn't answer. Nevertheless, what does private language have to do with non-linguistic communication? Animals do not communicate with each other in a private language, and non-linguistic human communication is not a private language.
There is a distinction to be made between understanding the use of a word upon hearing it in a particular situation, and judging whether a word is "fit" to be used for a particular situation (ought to be spoken). Wittgenstein appears to be blurring this distinction. But it is an important distinction to uphold, because it is commonly the case that I may understand your use of a word "at a stroke", when you are speaking, but if I were the one speaking I would not have chosen that same word as you, because I wouldn't have, in choosing my words, judged that word as "fit" for the situation, I would have chosen different words.
Of course it's the same sense of "fit". He's asking if the word is fit as an appropriate descriptive term for the picture in mind.
The only thing is that he has turned things around, to ask if the picture is fit for the word, instead of, if the word is fit for the picture. And this is how he is blurring the distinction between hearing and saying. If I hear a word, and I understand the word in a flash, and it is as if a picture comes to my mind, I never question whether the picture fits the word, because I have understood in a flash. There is no room for such doubt in the description of understanding in a flash. But when I am thinking about what to say, I will question whether the word fits the picture I am trying to describe. The point being that we question whether the word fits the picture (this is thinking about what to say), but we don't question whether the picture fits the word, because when we hear the word we understand it in a flash.
If you ask whether the picture fits the use of the word, as Wittgenstein clearly does, ("In what sense can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word 'cube'?"), then you are asking about the appropriateness of the picture in relation to the word. It is the same sense of the word "fits" as I am talking about, a sense of appropriateness..
However, Wittgenstein has turned things around, because we commonly question (in our minds), whether a word is appropriate (fits) a picture, when we are thinking of what to say, but we rarely if ever, question (in our minds) whether the picture is appropriate (fits) the word, when we hear a word and understand it in a flash. Now check the footnote, he goes back the other way "I believe the right word in this case is . . . .". Here he is questioning whether the word is appropriate for the picture, and this is what is common. He is obscuring the difference between these two.
The issue is that there is an activity involved in judging appropriateness (fitness) in the relationship between the word and what the word is associated with (picture, in Wittgenstein's example). This is a mental process, what he calls a "projection". In the case of understanding in a flash when we hear spoken words, there is no such process, or projection, whereby we might consciously judge the appropriateness of the relation between the thing associated with the word, and the word. This is evident from the saying, we understand "in a flash". However, in most cases when we speak, there is such an activity, that sort of projection. But we judge whether our chosen words are appropriate for the picture we want to put across. We do not judge whether the picture evoked is appropriate (fits) because the appropriateness has already been established through habitualization.
What he says in boxed section (a) is that meaning is not a picture in the mind, which is the point (my emphasis):
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The method of projection Wittgenstein is talking about is a way that a picture of a triangular prism could be transformed into a picture of a cube; or a way of viewing one as the other. It is not the mental process of judging appropriateness between a word and a picture.
He uses "picture" as an example, an illustration, it's more like a metaphor, we'd be better off with "picture-like". The point of your emphasized line is that there is not an "exact picture", there is something "picture-like", but not an exact picture. The rest of the quoted paragraph reads like this:
Quoting Luke
Oh, I suggest you reread.
:
He's saying that if a picture of a cube occurs to my mind when I hear the word "cube", but I use the word "cube" while pointing to a triangular prism, then I use the word in a way other than what is indicated by the picture in my mind. But we still cannot really say that the use does not fit because we might find some reason to say that it does fit. Read through 140, and the following conclusion:
In other words, a picture-like cube might come to my mind every time I hear the word "cube", but I might still use the word "cube", in application, to refer to something different (the triangular prism) from what comes to my mind when I hear "cube". Then we'd have to say that these are different meanings.
The point is that the meaning of a word is not "a Something" in the mind. I suggest you reread.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Your only account of "method of projection" here is that it is "some reason". :roll:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This implies that meaning/use is something other than a picture in your mind, which supports Wittgenstein's point.
It's not "a something", because he appears to be dismissing "something" for "process". Nevertheless, what he is discussing is in the mind, but as I said earlier, his distinctions are confused so it's very difficult to say what he actually believes.
Quoting Luke
I agree that Wittgenstein is saying meaning is something other than a picture in the mind. But in this section he is discussing mental processes, "understanding", and not saying specifically what meaning is, only indicating vaguely how the different mental processes of understanding might relate to meaning. The specific thing, or mental process being discussed is "understanding". And as I said, he doesn't properly differentiate between "understanding" in the sense of understanding a spoken word, and "understanding" in the sense required to choose a word in speaking. These two are distinct mental processes, and though he speaks of these activities, he seems to conflate them into one sense of "understanding".
The principle issue which I see is his use of the expression "understand in a flash" (or however it's worded depending on translation). He lays out a preliminary way of using that expression here in this section, and then he will use it again in his discussion of what it means to grasp a formal rule, a mathematical principle for example, like counting. This later use I find to be inappropriate because it does not give proper credit to the role of memory in memorizing the application of the principle, assuming that a grasp of the principle come to the person in a flash. And with this description Wittgenstein puts himself into the category of mysticism, assuming that the principle is suddenly revealed to the person, instead of giving credit to the person's intellectual work of study and memorizing.
So I want to be very analytical of this section, where he first uses this expression, to "understand in a flash", attempting to understand why he uses this, and what misleads him toward such mysticism. It appears like he is not properly distinguishing between the different ways which we use "understand", conflating them in ambiguity.
It's much more likely that you are confused.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Maybe that's not the purpose of this section. You complain that he doesn't answer a question that's on your mind, whereas he never purports to answer that question here. It would be more worthwhile to focus on what he does say than what he doesn't. He doesn't say anything about understanding "in the sense required to choose a word in speaking", so I don't see how he possily conflates the two senses of understanding you are complaining about.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There's no great mystery to it; that's how fluent speakers often do understand the meanings of words as they are being heard/read. It could be a part of the reason for the mistaken assumption that meaning is "a something" in the mind.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This memorising/teaching can be unproblematically assumed.
This is what he said:
As I said, I am concerned with how he uses "grasp it in a flash". To speak in a comprehensible way requires a skill of choosing which words are appropriate for the situation. This skill requires memory, and so this activity of grasping the meaning of a word, really is extended in time, through the use of memory. The description, of grasping the meaning of a word in a flash, is very poor, archaic, comparable to the idea of spontaneous generation of living beings. When an activity is hidden from the senses, and then the results of that activity appear to the senses, we cannot just assume that it happened in a flash.
Here is another possibility of what Wittgenstein is doing. It may be that he is trying to dispel the idea of "grasp it in a flash". Notice that "grasp it in a flash" is described as inconsistent with "meaning is use". It appears like what he might be saying in this section, is that what we grasp when we use a word (say or hear it), is something other than its meaning. Since we do not grasp the entirety of its use, it is impossible that we grasp it's meaning.
In this case, what we grasp when we understand a word, is some aspect of a word's meaning, a particular instance of use, but we do not actually grasp, or understand the meaning of the word, which would be the entirety of the word's usage. What bothers me is that when he goes on toward explaining the learning of a formal rule, he describes it in that same old way, grasping it in a flash, a notion which he seems to be saying that we ought to reject here, because what we grasp in a flash is only an instance of use, a very minute portion of the actual meaning.
More evidence of the confusion I am talking about. The section ends just as confused as it starts, and this is because of the ambiguity in his use of "understand". Distinctions are obscured rather than clarified.
Don't be silly, there's no such distinction. Meaning is use. Using a word is speaking. Understanding the meaning of a word is understanding speaking. Either we choose our words when we speak, we do not, or sometimes we do and sometimes we don't.
At 139 he is asking what comes before our mind when we understand a word. It doesn't seem like the use of the word comes before our mind, because we understand in a flash, and so it is impossible that we'd be understanding the entire use of the word, which is extended in time. It's perhaps a picture, or something picture-like which comes before our mind.
He concludes that even if understanding a word consists of something picture-like coming to your mind when you hear or imagine that word, it is still possible to use the word in other ways which are not consistent with that (the picture-like thing, or whatever it is), which comes to your mind in association with the word.
So at 140 he proceeds to question this idea that whatever it is (picture-like thing) which comes to your mind in association with the word, "forces" a particular use of that word on you. There doesn't appear to be other picture-like things in the mind which could account for these other [random-like] uses, so he suggests that there must be other processes involved [in choosing a word for use].
[quote=140]What was the effect of my argument? It called our attention to
(reminded us of) the fact that there are other processes, besides the one
we originally thought of, which we should sometimes be prepared to
call "applying the picture of a cube". So our 'belief that the picture
forced a particular application upon us' consisted in the fact that only
the one case and no other occurred to us. "There is another solution
as well" means: there is something else that I am also prepared to call
a "solution"; to which I am prepared to apply such-and-such a picture,
such-and-such an analogy, and so on.
What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our
minds when we hear the word and the application still be different.
Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not.[/quote]
The distinction is the one you have needlessly introduced. Wittgenstein is talking about understanding meaning. You are talking about understanding choosing (?).
There is not such distinction and that's what I said. So obviously I am not introducing the distinction, you are. Because you do not want to face the subject Wittgenstein is discussing, that of choosing words, you have introduced an unwarranted separation between understanding meaning and understanding the choosing of words for use, in an attempt to ignore the latter. Meaning is use, and we use words by speaking and writing, and this implies choosing which words will be used. Wittgenstein, is talking about choosing words here. How could you possibly read through 139 and 140 without noticing this? .
You complained earlier that Wittgenstein was vague about this, but now you seem to find that he is very clear about it, so which is it?
Wittgenstein does indeed talk about choosing between words in his discussion of mental pictures and meaning, where he is discussing understanding the meaning of a word. What you have provided zero evidence for is that he is discussing understanding choosing. You might recall your original complaint:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In your latest post, you demonstrate that Wittgenstein discusses choosing between pictures at §139. That may be, but he does not discuss understanding choosing, which is something that only you have attempted to interject into the discussion.
If I were to follow you down this rabbit hole of confusion: understanding the meaning of a word is (arguably) a requirement of choosing to use that word. Wittgenstein doesn't need to "properly differentiate" between your two senses of understanding because he is not at all talking about understanding choosing.
So when you describe something, like Wittgenstein describes choosing words at 139 and 140, this is not a case of expressing an understanding of the thing being described? Give me a break.
As I said, there is no such distinction here, and you are grasping for straws to justify your strange assertion, instead of recognizing your misunderstanding of what was written. Go back and read it again, and get back to me when you have something constructive to say.
If meaning is use, and use is described as choosing words, then understanding meaning requires understanding choosing. That's very simple isn't it? And, it's why Wittgenstein discusses choosing words in this section concerning understanding meaning. But if you think that understanding the meaning of a spoken word upon hearing it, is something different from the understanding required to choose words to speak, then you'll recognize the distinction which I said Wittgenstein is blurring. Is Wittgenstein correct to blur this distinction, is it not based in anything real? What about the fact that you can understand spoken words in a flash, but it takes time to choose the words required to properly express what you want to say?
No, it's convoluted. Where is use described as choosing words? I know it's your presumption, but it's not part of the text.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I wasn't specifying this difference; I was noting the distinction you made.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
WIttgenstein doesn't talk about use in mentalistic terms of choosing words. He says only that use is extended in time.
ETA: Wittgenstein talks about mental pictures only to dismiss the idea that meaning is a something in the mind.
Well, he introduces the topic of what it is to "understand a word" at 138, and proceeds to discuss the meaning of words, the use of words, and the choosing of words. Where's the problem? Why do you insist on excluding the bulk of 139 and 140 where he discusses the choosing of words, claiming it's only my presumption? Or do you think that he is putting the choosing of words into some category other than meaning and use? How could you think this when he explicitly talks about the picture-like thing in the mind, "forcing" upon us a particular use, when we might actually choose the word to mean something else? We have the three elements right here, clear as day in 140, choice, which leads to use, and therefore meaning
Quoting Luke
OK, I give up. Where did you get this crazy idea from? Get back to me after you've actually read 139 and 140. The whole section, from here to 200, is full of "mentalistic terms", so I suggest you prepare yourself if you wish to continue.
Wittgenstein does not mention anything about "choosing words" at 138 or at 140. He makes only a passing mention of choosing words at boxed section (a) of 139, and he makes it only to aid the rejection of meaning as a Something (or a mental picture) in the mind:
What Wittgenstein is saying here is that we are inclined to speak of mental pictures because one can find a word apt, because one often chooses between words as between pictures, etc. However, the inclination to speak in this way does not show the existence of any mental pictures, or that the meaning of a word is a mental picture (i.e. meaning is not "a Something that we have in our mind").
Note however that none of this has anything to do with understanding choosing, and Wittgenstein makes no reference to it. Also, your suggestion that choosing words forms the "bulk" of the discussion at 138-140 is patently false.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
His rejection of a mental picture "forcing" a particular meaning/use has nothing to do with choosing words. He makes no mention of choosing words at 140.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Where does he mention choice at 140?
Let me just see if I can understand your distorted opinion. Wittgenstein is talking about choosing words at 139. Then at 140, where he states the conclusion of his argument of 139, [i.e. that it is impossible that a picture-like thing in the mind forces a particular application, or use on us, because he has shown at 139 that it is possible to use the word in a way other than how the picture would incline one to use the word], he is no longer talking about choosing words.
Please enlighten my so I can understand where I am going wrong. If, in your opinion, he is no longer talking about choosing words here at 140, where he states the conclusion to his argument of 139 (in which he is talking about choosing words), what do you think he is talking about at 140?
I want to suggest that these sections are an elaboration of §115, in which Witty spoke of being held 'captive by a picture': "And we couldn’t get outside it, for it lay in our language, and language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably". §139 and §140 suggest the alternative to this 'capture': not, as it were, getting 'beyond' pictures, but recognizing that there are always other pictures which correspond to the use we make of words. Hence the conclusion to §140:
"There are other processes, besides the one we originally thought of, which we should sometimes be prepared to call “applying the picture of a cube”. So our ‘belief that the picture forced a particular application upon us’ consisted in the fact that only the one case and no other occurred to us. “There is another solution as well” means: there is something else that I’m also prepared to call a “solution”, to which I’m prepared to apply such-and-such a picture, such-and-such an analogy, and so on."
It is important to note here that this insight comes right after Witty's extended discussion of comparing langauge-games, of putting them side-by-side to bring out the specificity of each one. (Recall §130: "Rather, the language-games stand there as objects of comparison which, through similarities and dissimilarities, are meant to throw light on features of our language"). It is this method of comparison, recommended by Witty, that allows one to break the 'capture' of a single picture, and recognise the multitude of possible 'pictures' that correspond to various uses.
Working backwards a bit, the discussion in §139 is meant to bring out that there are no meanings 'before' uses which uses then somehow simply modify or alter (another way to say that meaning is use, they are identified with each other). It's not that there is a meaning of a word, which then subsequently fits (or not) its use. There is only use, and the meaning which issues from that use. All of this also further accounts for the various ways in which we are 'mislead by grammar'; skipping forward again to §140: "What is essential now is to see that the same thing may be in our minds when we hear the word and yet the application still be different" - just because we hear the same word doesn't mean that its application is the same. When we miss this, we are led into linguistic malaise.
I think you could be conflating the use (or speaking) of words with choosing words. At least, that's the only reason I can imagine for why you might think Wittgenstein is discussing choice at 140. The use of words that Wittgenstein is talking about in these (and possibly all) sections of the book is a physical expression, not some mental decision making process. If I'm mistaken, then you are still welcome to explain where Wittgenstein is talking about choosing words (or understanding choosing) at 140.
Also, here is the information I gathered regarding Wittgenstein's "method of projection":
With regards to Wittgenstein's cube, it can look like a triangular prism (or vice versa) when viewed from certain angles. Therefore, if we project or apply the picture in a particular way, then the picture of the cube can be made to fit with (or to look like) an actual triangular prism.
"The picture, don't forget, is not being cast as an aid to understanding; it is supposed to be the thing itself. But it's hard to see how it can play that role when it provides no standard of correctness. If this observation seems familiar, that's because it is closely analogous to the point made about ostensive definition in relation to meaning. There, it was supposed that the sample by itself could establish a link between word and object, that it was completely unambiguous and therefore unmistakable. But it turned out that it only functioned as part of an established practice of describing the rule for the use of a word. And it's a very similar story in the case of the picture (which is, after all, a kind of mental sample). We have the sample, but what we lack is the application. (I should also mention that as well as looking back to ostensive definition this point also anticipates aspects of the discussion of rule-following."
I briefly noted the link between Witty's discussion of ostenstive definition and pictures, but it's true that the discussion applies to rules as well. In all three cases - rules, pictures, and ostensive definition - the point is the same: nothing 'in' the rules, or the pictures, or the ostensive gesture, tells us how to apply them. To anticipate a semi-technical term that Witty uses later, what does tell us how to apply these things is a technique, or rather, a mastery of a technique, which is informed by our forms-of-life. Incidentally, this is brought out in the second part of the boxed note in §139 (b.), where Witty speaks of the Martain looking at the picture of the old man on the hill. Whether the man is going up or down - this is not 'given' by the picture. What the man is doing, what the picture represents, is 'given' only by how we engage with it.
Call it conflation if you like, but when a person speaks words, if the array of words which one speaks is not "forced" upon that person by a mental image or some such thing, then the person is "choosing words. So, by Wittgenstein' description, speaking words, and choosing words are one and the same thing, because the application is not "forced" on us. That is the point of 139. The mental image (picture) of a cube suggests a certain use of "cube" to me, but I might still use the word in a completely different way.
Quoting Luke
He is clearly talking about the mental process here. He started by describing a mental picture-like thing, which would "force" our word usage. He has dismissed this as inaccurate, because it is possible to use a word in a way other than the way which would be forced by the picture-like thing. He has not dismissed the mental process, he has just dismissed the "forcing". So he will continue to discuss the mental process at 141 "Suppose, however, that not merely the picture of the cube, but also the method of projection comes before our mind?".
Quoting Luke
It's very obvious, the footnote of 139 clearly describes choosing words, and the conclusion of 139 is a statement of choosing to use the word "cube" in a way other than that suggested by the picture. So he proceeds into 140 saying that it is not a case of the mental picture-like thing forcing a use on us. If you have truly read these sections, and paid attention to what I've explained, yet you still do not see that he is talking about choosing words (despite the fact that he explicitly talks about choosing words in the footnote), then I'm afraid I may not be able to help you further.
Quoting StreetlightX
At 139, the application of the picture is the act of selecting the word for use. The point being that the picture of a cube may occur in my mind every time I hear the word "cube", but we cannot say that a person applies the picture when saying the word "cube" (selecting the word "cube" for use), because I might "point to a triangular prism for instance, and say it is a cube". Hence the footnote about choosing the appropriate word, and the conclusion of 139: "The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but it was possible for me to use it differently."
So, he proceeds onward at 140 to discuss the outcome of 139. The picture-like thing is what is supposed to come to mind when we hear the word, and as described at the beginning of 139, there may be many different ones associated with the same word, due to different uses of that word. Now the issue at the end of 139 is that I may choose to use the word in a completely different way, distinct from all these pictures derived from all these other uses. The conclusion therefore, expressed at 140, and expounded on at 141, is that the process whereby words are used (we speak and write), "the application", is something other than a case of applying a picture-like thing, or whatever it is which comes to your mind when you hear the word. Hence your quoted line "there are other processes, besides the one we originally thought of, which we should sometimes be prepared to call 'applying the picture of a cube'". And the conclusion of 140 "What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application still be different." [Application being one's use of the word, in the sense of "belief that the picture forced a particular application upon us".] So he proceeds at 141 to question this method of application, which I called choosing words, but Luke doesn't like that terminology.
This note brings out the stakes of §139 quite nicely I think, and I want to try and consider both together. What seems to be at issue is the idea that 'before' use, there are meanings (of words), and the point is to try and find a use that fits the meaning we have in mind. Hence the idea of trying to pick an 'apt word', a word that would 'fit' the idea that we had in mind. But Witty argues that this gets things exactly the wrong way around; it's not that first we have an idea of what we want to mean, and then we find a word that fits it; rather, it's because certain words are more apt than others, do we get an idea of what we want to say: "the fact that one speaks of the apt word does not show the existence of a Something that . . . One is inclined, rather, to speak of this picture-like Something because one can find a word apt".
This reads nicely with Witty's setting up of the 'two-stages' of meaning in §139, only to then subsequently undo it. Note that he speaks, in §139, of multiple (two) ways of determining meaning: "On the other hand, isn’t the meaning of the word also determined by this use? And can these ways of determining meaning conflict?" (my emphasis). In this light, §139 is an attempt to show that there is no two-stage process, but only the one. To conjure up a 'picture of a cube' is to already have an application of it in mind. It may not be the only application there is ("it was also possible for me to use it differently"), but this doesn't imply that there are two stages from meaning to application. Rather, the application is always-already inherent to the meaning.
Thanks for clearing that up. Could you now explain your earlier distinction between ""understanding" in the sense of understanding a spoken word, and "understanding" in the sense required to choose a word in speaking"? If speaking and choosing words are one and the same according to Wittgenstein, then why should there be two different types of understanding here?
I mentioned above that what is being said here of pictures also applies to rules. This section in particular brings that similarity out, especially when placed side-by-side with §86. To recap, §86 was about how to read charts, how rules related to the reading of charts. There, Witty produced what he called a 'schema' - a literal picture of arrows - that counted as a rule for the use of the chart. At the end of it, he goes on to ask, rhetorically: "Can we not now imagine further rules to explain this one?" - the implication being that how one applies rules is not to be found in rules themselves.
Bringing this back to §141, a similar argumentative strategy is at work here, with Witty even reusing the vocabulary of 'schemas'. Speaking here of a "schema showing the method of projection [for a picture]", Witty effectively asks whether this schema is enough to guarantee that a picture is applied in any particular way. And just as in §86, Witty's answer is no: one can well "imagine different applications of this schema".
Once again though, Witty looks to 'test' his account to check if there is, in fact, a two-stage process at work, which he ultimately wants to deny. As he puts it, it looks as though there were first the picture, then its application ("On the one hand, the picture ... on the other, the application which ... he makes of this image"). And moreover, it looks like the picture and the application can 'clash'. Doesn't this attest to a 'fit' and not a 'belonging' (to use the vocabulary of §136)? Witty's answer is no: what 'clashes' is a picture and one application of it, with a picture and another application of it: "they can clash in so far as the picture makes us expect a different use; because people in general apply this picture like this."
Finally, though I won't elaborate on it too much, one ought to also hear resonances with Witty's discussion of the meter rule here. Just as the meter rule plays (or does not play) a role in a language-game, so too does the application of a picture play - or not - a role in a language-game. More to be said, but I leave it to one to consider the connections.
This one's quite straight-forward, so I want to try and maybe couch it in different terms: language-game require certain things to stay constant. Speaking in terms of a meter-rule only make sense if what counts as a meter stays roughly constant through our uses; similarly, it only makes sense if the things we do with the meter-rule stay the same - one can't speak of 'measuring' while using the rule to both measure and to hit something. 'Measuring' would 'lose it's point'.
It'd be like trying to do math when the values and operators fluctuate constantly, with pluses replacing minuses, and powers appearing and disappearing at will. One would be unable to use the equations for anything. It wouldn't even be math.
§1-§27: Imperatives (block! slab!)
§28-§36: Demonstratives (this, that)
§37-§45: Names (Nothung, Mr. N.N.)
§46-§64: Linguistic Roles (Simples, Composites, and Iterations thereof)
§65-§80: Definitions and Boundaries
§81-88(?): Idealizations of/in Language
§88-133: Philosophy and Explanation (Or, Theses and Descriptions)
§134-142: Use: Belonging and Fitting
§143-§198: Understanding, Reading, and Learning (groundwork for rule-following discussions)
The 'little' section we just went over acts as something like a 'bridge' between Witty's discussion of philosophy and the subsequent discussion of understanding, etc. The 'bridge' can be said to span questions regarding being 'captured by a picture' (from the previous section), and introduces questions of how 'application' occurs. The next section (another long one) takes off from the question of application. I quite like what's coming up, and it's very useful - IMO - to read it as also laying down the groundwork for what comes after it - the famous discussions on rule-following. As we read through the next bit, it might be useful to keep that in mind, even as 'rules' will not come up all that often.
Suppose you hear a spoken word, and understanding that word consists of associating it with a picture like thing (I will call it an "idea", perhaps). Now, speaking is using words, what Wittgenstein calls "application". If we simply reverse the process above, and say that choosing the appropriate word for use is simply a matter of applying that idea, to determine the appropriate word, we have the problem brought up at 139. As much as the idea associated with "cube" tends to force a certain use on me, I can still use the word to refer to a prism if I want. Therefore, as Wittgenstein concludes at 140, there must be another process, or other processes involved in choosing which words to use, distinct from the process of associating the word with ideas, which we often assume accounts for the "understanding" of the spoken word. That is why I referred to this other process whereby we choose words to be spoken as a distinct form of "understanding".
Quoting StreetlightX
It ought to be mentioned that at 141-142 Wittgenstein distinguishes a normal way from an abnormal way of using words. The normal way is the more direct application of the picture [idea] to the word, and this leaves little doubt in the word selection process. This would be the person's habitualized idea/word association, implying a direct relationship between mental activity and word, by psychological necessity (not logical necessity). The abnormal way is the other process, or processes, which Wittgenstein has declared necessary by his argument at 139 to account for the reality of (more random) word selection, by which words are chosen by a means other than a direct application of ideas.
I am very critical of this classification, because I would class such a direct application of idea - word as abnormal, and the more complex selective process as normal. Witty's argument at 142, is that if the direct application were not the normal way, then our language games would lose their point. However, until this point, he has been arguing that the essence of language, and therefore language-games, is their vague, unbounded, ambiguous character. So to place the direct association of the idea to the word, as the "norm" here, is completely inconsistent. Though he might be using "norm" in a different way, implying at 142 that the "prescribed" way is the norm. The problem being that he has yet to establish any basis for a "prescribed" way, therefore the normal way must still be the vague and ambiguous, natural way to maintain consistency .
The "problem brought up at 139" is problematic for both the hearing and the speaking of a word, due to the erroneous assumption that meaning is a picture in the mind. This is the upshot of the current sections.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The point here is that your mental picture of a cube can be made to fit with a prism; or, that the mental picture can have the application of a prism via a particular method of projection. On the other hand, if the mental picture stood for the meaning of the word, then the cube could not be made to fit with the prism, or it could not have that application. Again, this is to reveal the problems with the assumption that meaning is a picture in the mind. However, it should not be inferred from this that you can use a word to mean whatever you want.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, understanding a spoken word does not necessarily consist of "associating it with a picture like thing" either, so I dispute your distinction between two types of understanding.
I don't see why not. It's not that you use the word to mean something, because meaning and use are one and the same. If you use a word, the word has meaning by the fact that it was used. And the meaning is based on the way the word was used. So, you can use a word however you please, and this use provides meaning for that word. There is absolutely nothing to force any particular use, nor has Wittgenstein described anything which would restrict the application of the word. Therefore I see no reason for the conclusion you have made.
"The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but it was possible for me to use it differently."
If it is always possible to use the word differently from what is suggested, then what could restrict the number of different uses which a word could have, and why could you not use a word however you wanted, thereby forcing the pertinent meaning on the word by virtue of that use?
Quoting Luke
Well, this is the only form of understanding a spoken word which Wittgenstein has described, associating the word with a picture-like thing. He does refer to another process, but this is in describing application, using, or speaking words. So we have no reference to any other form of understanding a spoken word, only a reference to another type of process (understanding) involved in speaking words. What is pointed to is that there is one type of understanding involved with hearing words, and another type involved with speaking words.
This is the weakness of his argument. He starts with a proposition about understanding a word, either hearing or speaking it. This is the proposition of associating the word with a picture-like thing. He criticizes that proposition through reference to the process of speaking words, application. But he provides no evidence that such a criticism would be relevant to understanding in the sense of hearing a word. So all he has done is demonstrated a division between hearing words and speaking words, revealing that these are two distinct processes. This difference ought to be evident to anyone who has thought about it anyway. But, the claim that Wittgenstein has proven that understanding a spoken word is not a matter of associating it with a picture-like thing, is unsupported, for this reason, it requires the conflation of hearing and speaking, which Wittgenstein has actually driven a wedge between.
Just to clarify my last point Luke, hearing a word and speaking a word are not the same thing, they are distinct processes. Wittgenstein's argument against the proposition that understanding a word is a matter of associating it with a mental picture-like thing, is based solely on the process of speaking words. We have no principle by which we can apply this conclusion toward the process of hearing words. So there is no argument against the proposition that understanding a spoken word (hearing a word) is a matter of associating it with a mental picture-like thing.
It is possible for the meaning/use of the word to be different from what is suggested by the mental picture which is evoked when you hear or say the word. Thus, meaning is not a mental picture. This does not mean that anything goes; there are other constraints. Otherwise, elephant of cheese red line upon whiskey very distance. Understand?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What we understand is the meaning of the word(s), right? If meaning is not a mental picture, then this applies equally to words spoken and words heard. Do you agree that Wittgenstein demonstrates that meaning is not a mental picture? Or do you still fail to comprehend even the most basic insights of the text?
If the appropriate picture is not associated when hearing the word, this is not understanding, we call it misunderstanding. But speaking the word is completely different. As Wittgenstein demonstrates, the use of the word [and speaking the word is the use of the word, hearing is not using the word] is not constrained in this way. The problem you mention is brought up at 142. There is normal usage, and abnormal usage. "Normal" usage, as "prescribed" usage, prevents such problems.
Quoting Luke
I would prefer to say that what we understand is the use of the words. Do you agree with this?
Quoting Luke
The problem is that speaking a word is using a word, hearing a word is not. To understand the meaning of a heard word is to understand its use, i.e. how it was used by the speaker. What Wittgenstein demonstrates is that there are no such constraints on the user of the word (speaker).
Meaning is use, and use is not a mental picture, it is an activity. So the fact that meaning is not a mental picture is self-evident from the premise that meaning is use. However, Wittgenstein has provided nothing as of yet, to demonstrate that understanding the meaning of a spoken word (understanding its use), is not a matter of associating the word with a mental picture. He proceeds to demonstrate at 141, how the application of words (use) may be carried out simply as a process, without any mental picture associated with the words, but I think it's questionable whether such use would be intelligible. It may be something like this: "elephant of cheese red line upon whiskey very distance".
In your quoted passage, ("What is essential now is to see that the same thing may be in our minds when we hear the word and yet the application still be different."), what is important is to notice that "application" of the word, or use of the word, speaking it, is distinct from hearing the word. Otherwise you will not grasp what Wittgenstein is saying. What we call "understanding" the word, may very well be our capacity to associate it with the appropriate mental picture. However, application of the word, our use of it in speaking, need not be consistent with our "understanding" of it, and this produces "abnormal use". My point, is that unless such use (abnormal) is completely random, there must be another type of understanding to account for this use of the word (speaking), which is not consistent with the above "understanding", but is nevertheless not random. This will come up in the following sections when Wittgenstein discusses the difference between a systematic mistake, and a random mistake ("mistake" being the usage which is inconsistent with the normal).
Sure, meaning is use.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A speaker doesn't require any understanding in their use of words? Where does Wittgenstein demonstrate this?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How is it unintelligible given your claim that "you can use a word however you please, and this use provides meaning for that word"? I used those words however I pleased, therefore I must have provided meaning for those words. So what makes it unintelligible?
Forgot about this one. Anyway, recalling that §142 remarks that language-games only work if certain constants or invariants are in place, the boxed note here can be read as qualifying the scope of these invariants, which are "often extremely general facts of nature ... hardly ever mentioned because of their great generality". Witty doesn't give any specific examples of such facts, but some of the things mentioned in §142 proper hint at what he's getting at:
"And if things were quite different from what they actually are —– if there were, for instance, no characteristic expression of pain, of fear, of joy .... our normal language-games would thereby lose their point ... The procedure of putting a lump of cheese on a balance and fixing the price by the turn of the scale would lose its point if it frequently happened that such lumps suddenly grew or shrank with no obvious cause."
So: we measure things; we express emotions and affects - 'general facts', too obvious to mention most of the time. To anticipate a little, Witty will largely go on to imply that these 'general facts' have to do with our being human. §142 mentions that "This remark will become clearer when we discuss such things as the relation of expression to feeling, and similar topics."; Licensed by this, I just wanna quote a pair of characteristic remarks on this from way further down:
§281: "Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious".
§415: "What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; not curiosities, however, but facts that no one has doubted, which have escaped notice only because they are always before our eyes."
I think it's useful to keep these remarks (and others like it, scattered throughout the PI later) in mind as we read this.
I didn't say that. I said that people can use a word despite having misunderstood how it is used by others. Having understood the use of a word by another does not exist as a constraint on speaking that word. So for example, we can mimic and imitate others without understanding the meaning (the others' use). This is demonstrated by Wittgenstein in this section, 138-141. The process which leads to speaking words (application), is distinct from the process which is understanding the spoken word, such that understanding the spoken word is not required for speaking the word.
[quote=141]Now clearly we accept two different kinds of criteria for this:
on the one hand the picture (of whatever kind) that at some time or
other comes before his mind; on the other, the application which—in
the course of time—he makes of what he imagines. (And can't it be
clearly seen here that it is absolutely inessential for the picture to exist
in his imagination rather than as a drawing or model in front of him;
or again as something that he himself constructs as a model?)[/quote]
Notice the very last phrase here, "or again as something that he himself constructs as a model". The model for application may be constructed by the person, completely independent of anyone else's usage.
Quoting Luke
If you do not understand what I am doing, then to you what I am doing is unintelligible. Using words is a case of doing something. It is very common that people do not understand meaning (the meaning is unintelligible to them). For example, it is very difficult to understand what Wittgenstein is doing in many parts of the PI, so for many people much of the text is unintelligible. But we're getting off topic here.
You claimed that "you can use a word however you please, and this use provides meaning for that word". But is it actually meaningful if nobody understands? In order for people to "not understand meaning", there must be meaning there to be misunderstood. I used the words "elephant of cheese red line upon whiskey very distance" how I pleased and you don't appear to have understood. But how do you know whether there was any meaning there?
That's a good question. I'd say yes. If I swing the hammer, and miss the nail, is the action still meaningful? I think it is, despite the failure. To try, yet fail, is still meaningful, as 'trial and error' proves. Perhaps you think it's not. That's a matter of opinion. If someone speaks, and no one understands, is that action still meaningful? I think it is, despite the failure. Perhaps you think it's not.
Quoting Luke
The premise is "meaning is use". You say here, that you "used" those words. Therefore there is meaning here, despite the fact that I did not understand. The premise forces that conclusion. It appears to me, that you do not agree with Wittgenstein's premise. Would you prefer "meaning is understanding"? But wouldn't that make meaning a mental thing? The problem is that we cannot have both, 'meaning is not mental', and 'meaning requires understanding', because understanding is mental. So if we are to understand 'meaning' as non-mental, we need to rid ourselves of the notion that meaning requires understanding.
I question whether this is something that he ultimately wants to deny. Given that a picture can have more than one application, it seems important that a picture and its application are separable.
Quoting StreetlightX
I agree that there aren't two stages from meaning to application, but Wittgenstein is instead talking about the distinction between a picture and its application. A picture (either mental or material) is essentially "lifeless" and does not force or contain its own application or meaning.
Wittgenstein now considers whether hearing a word might be able to produce not only a mental picture but also its own application/method of projection. How would this work? Wittgenstein suggests a schema showing lines of projection from one cube to another. However, this schema encounters the same problems as the mental picture, viz. it is just another picture. As Wittgenstein notes: "does this really get me any further? Can’t I now imagine different applications of this schema too?"
Nonetheless, is it possible for an application to come before one's mind when they hear a word? Wittgenstein says we need to get clear about this expression:
The only case in which we'd say that one of several particular methods of projection had come before his mind would be where the student goes on to apply it; by an actual application.
On the one hand there is the picture, and on the other hand there is the application of that picture. Wittgenstein notes that it doesn't matter whether the picture is mental or material.
Returning to the question of 'fit', Wittgenstein now asks whether there can be a 'clash' between picture and application. Only in so far as the picture makes us expect a different use, he says. A picture might suggest a particular use because that is how it is normally applied.
I intentionally used that string of words to be meaningless. I used those words how I pleased but my use did not provide meaning to those words, so your claim is false. It is your claim that "you can use a word however you please, and this use provides meaning for that word", not Wittgenstein's. I don't disagree with Wittgenstein; you simply fail to understand him.
This seems to indicate that language is a technique or skill that fluent speakers master, and that there is a certain degree of regularity to our language games. Moreover, there is a regularity to our form of life. Although Wittgenstein does not use the phrase here, I take PI 142 to be one of the best examples of form of life in the text, which he goes on to describe:
Daniele Moyal Sharrock suggests (here) that 'form of life' refers to very general facts of living, which can be identified with the certainties referred to in Wittgenstein's On Certainty. Form of life can also account for Wittgenstein's comment at boxed section §139(b) with the picture of an old man walking up a hill: a Martian might describe the old man as sliding downhill, but there is no need "to explain why we don't describe it so".
Well no, just because you claim it, doesn't make it so. That's the difficult aspect of "intention". What you intend does not necessarily come from what you do, that's a failure. So your intent to use the words to be meaningless was a failure, because meaning is use, and that is impossible by way of contradiction, if we maintain that principle You just tried to do the impossible, and failed.
The fact is, that you used the words as an example, and although you intended the words to be meaningless, as an example of a meaningless use of words, your action of using the words this way was meaningful, as an example. One cannot escape the reality that intentional acts are meaningful, simply by claiming I intended to do something meaningless, therefore what I did was meaningless.
Your claim of success in this attempt at a meaningless use of words, just demonstrates that you are using "meaning" in a way other than Wittgenstein does. Maybe you misunderstand "meaning", maybe Wittgenstein misunderstands "meaning", maybe we all do. One thing is quite clear, we can use the word however we please. Whether this use has meaning is another question. Wittgenstein obviously thinks that it does. Even the most vague sentence has a perfect order [98]. It is the fact that you ordered those words to be in the array that they are, which gives the sentence meaning, regardless of whether they are understood.
You might say "I intended to make an unintentional act", and speak the truth in saying this, if you truly believed that you could do this. And I could believe that you had this intention, to make an unintentional act. But if you intended to make that act, clearly it was not unintentional.
Irrelevant. Your claim was about the meaning of words, not the meaning of acts.
Your original claim was:
"you can use a word however you please, and this use provides meaning for that word."
Now you are pretending that your claim was instead something like:
"you can act however you please, and this act provides meaning for that....act?"
I don't believe this was your original claim. Furthermore, if you (as a reader) found my nonsense statement to be unintelligible and I (as the speaker) can find no meaning in it, then to whom is it meaningful? As you say, "just because you claim it, doesn't make it so."
You used the words, therefore they have meaning. Why do you ask "to whom is it meaningful?" unless you think that meaning is something in a mind? It is not, and therefore it doesn't have to be meaningful to anyone, and yet it is still meaningful.
We are inclined to think that a systematic mistake is one which can be corrected. If the student makes mistakes, what is required to correct him, is to change his way of looking at things [144]. at 145 the question is asked, when can we say that he has mastered the system, that he knows the rule? So he proceeds further, 146-151, to question what does "knowing" the rule involve, and he will make a distinction between "understanding" which is proposed as the source of correct usage at 146, and the act of applying the rule [147].
Here's a couple points of criticism which I have concerning this section. First, his example of learning the series of natural numbers is not expressed to represent the way that we normally learn these numbers. He expresses it as copying written symbols, when in reality, we learn to count first, verbally, by mimicking spoken words. Also, at 145 he presents this education as first learning the digits 0 to 9, instead of the way that we normally learn to count, as 1 to 10. I believe that it is crucial to recognize these points if one is actually interested in understanding how we learn to count.
In the first place, the 'repeat after me' method which we normally use, is a method of memorizing an order of sounds, and repeating that order. As a method of memorizing there is a temporal extension to this process of learning, and there is no 'eureka moment' of, 'now I understand'. The second point is very important, because it involves the actual learning of the principle. Learning to count involves learning one object, then two objects, then three objects, so that there is a process of adding an object each time. We do not start with zero, because "zero objects" is difficult and incomprehensible to the young mind. In any case, this method of recognizing one object, two objects, three objects, etc., is the method of learning the application. We recognize that two is one more than one, and three is one more than two, etc.. In this process, learning the principle of application, it is possible that there is a eureka moment of recognition.
So there is two distinct processes involved here. First, there is the learning of the names, one, two, three, four, etc., and this is learning how to count. Then there is learning the application, which involves recognizing the number of objects. So Wittgenstein is correct to suggest a distinction between knowing the rule (being able to mimic, count), and being able to apply the rule, but since his analysis of the learning process is a bit off, his attempt to express this distinction is vague and confused
The student may also make a "systematic mistake"; regularly making the same mistake at the same place. "Here we shall almost be tempted to say that he has understood us wrongly". However, there is not a sharp distinction between (what we call) "random" and "systematic" mistakes. Wittgenstein notes that it may be possible to wean the student from a systematic mistake; otherwise, it may be possible to teach the student the normal way of copying "as an offshoot, a variant of his". However, the "possibility of communication" could end here again (if this fails).
A lot rides on this and I think there may be a genuine question of how to understand this. One part of me wants to agree that a picture doesn't contain its own application - this is after all the thrust of the current sections. But on the other hand, I also want to say that in all instances of what Witty would call 'everyday use', a picture, by virtue of it always being used in some manner or another (read: applied in some manner or another), is always-already a 'living' one, and that 'lifelessness' is always a derivative phenomenon, which happens when words are taken out of their everyday use. In other words, picture and application 'come apart' only in instances of breakdown; in 'normal' cases, there is no separation. A single phenomenon breaks into two, and not - two phenomena are brought together in this case or that case (this would be a case of 'fitting', which is exactly what Witty is arguing against).
I don't disagree, but in the distinction between a picture and its application, the use is the application (of the picture). Recall that the same picture might have various actual applications. Rehashing the metaphor, we might say that this actual use is what gives the picture its "life". Whereas I see Wittgenstein as constantly attacking the mistaken idea that a picture by itself - especially, a mental Something - can be a source of meaning.
§143 begins the section on learning and understanding. For a great deal of what is to come, Witty's overarching question is something like: how does, or how can, someone ‘continue on’ after being shown only a few limited examples? A useful distinction to keep in mind is that between what Witty considers learning proper, and what we might call rote learning. Learning by rote simply is a kind of mere learning by imitation, as it were, following the letter of what has been shown; for Witty, genuine learning must go beyond this: to have properly learnt something is to be able to go on in new ways, to encounter something never yet encountered yet still know what to do with it.
Unsurprisingly then, §143 sets the scene for the questions to come: having written down a series from 0 to 9, how does a pupil go on? How do we, or ought we, characterise deviancies and conformities? In fact, Witty takes a step back and considers the mere effort of copying - what happens when a pupil can’t even do that? Witty here speaks of the point at which ‘communication stops’, and at which ‘our pupil’s ability to learn comes to an end’. My feeling here is that Witty is here drawing on his notion of ‘explanations com[ing] to an end somewhere’ (§1), such that were even the mere act of copying too hard to follow, more than teaching is at stake here (I’m tempted to say: the student does not share our form-of-life - maybe our student isn’t even quite human? A lion?).
The line about there not being a clear-cut diction between a random and systemic mistake had me puzzled, but this reading from Oskari Kuusela helped: “The distinction between not following a rule (making frequent random mistakes as opposed to merely occasional mistakes) and following a variant rule (making a systematic mistakes) is not sharp. Thus, while we may readily say of a pupil who makes constant random mistakes that she is not following a rule, the verdict is less straightforward in the case of a systemic mistake”.
The random/systematic distinction here I think more neatly maps onto mistakes being patternless and mistakes having a pattern.
My little foster brother often counts like {75,76,77,78,79,90} or {75,76,77,80}, in the first case he's incrementing by 10 extra, he does this more often when the number preceding the multiple of 10 and the multiple of 10 share a digit name, like 'seventy-nine' 'ninety'. The second mistake is similar, 78 shares a digit-name with 80. He also sometimes just skips to the next multiple of 10 irrelevant of context, and sometimes skips numbers towards the upper end of a multiple of 10 (like, he struggles with 76,77,78,79 themselves sometimes).
So, for any given case, you can't tell whether he's 'just skipped it' or he's skipped it due to one of the systematic patterns. This isn't just an epistemological limitation, there's nothing in his use of words (including gestures, and intonation...) that determines one or the other. Sure, you can always guess, but there's nothing like 'evidence' of which mistake he's made, sometimes at least.
He's also too young to have developed insight, or an 'inner watchman' for his thought processes, so you can't ask him why he's struggling and, even if you could, he cannot notice these patterns himself, so he can provide no answers.
Ah, this is super useful. I was thinking - and Wittgenstein's phrasing encourages this - of two different mistakes, one which might be called systemic and one random; but thinking of the 'same' mistakes as being indiscernible between the one and the other helps make sense of the passage alot.
I think what he is driving at is the ability to learn. Notice that a systematic mistake demonstrates the possibility of being corrected, and the random mistake does not. If the person were making truly random mistakes then that individual would be showing no effort, no attempt to learn. Learning takes effort, so effort is evidence of the capacity to learn, and systematic mistakes demonstrate effort while random mistakes would demonstrate no effort.
He will later (163) question whether there even is such a thing as a random mistake (read my post above), because to make a random order requires following a rule. This relates back to 98, even the simplest, vaguest order is a perfect order when there is no ideal by which to judge order. So there is a sort of paradox involved, because the person who refuses to learn, makes no effort to learn the norm and insists on doing things in a random way, is already following some sort of rule, to do it in a random way, or in a way other than the norm. The norm replaces the ideal here as the principle for judging order, like in nominalism. "Now, however, let us suppose that after some efforts on the teacher's part he continues the series correctly, that is, as we do it." -145
Nonsense. You just intervene differently in the case of a clear systematic mistake and a random one.
You can tell someone why, or guess how, they made the mistake if there is a systematic error. You do this by exploiting whatever contextual and behavioural cues you can.
If there isn't a systematic error, you can still correct the mistake by telling them what the answer is, or what they ought to do.
I was just trying to explain Wittgenstein's point:
[quote=143]Perhaps it is possible to wean him from the systematic mistake (as
from a bad habit). Or perhaps one accepts his way of copying and
tries to teach him ours as an oflfshoot, a variant of his.—And here too
our pupil's capacity to learn may come to an end.[/quote]
The point being that we are inclined to think that the person making the systematic mistake can be corrected, as Wittgenstein goes on to explain at 144, we correct him by changing "his way of looking at things".
Quoting fdrake
If he is making so-called random mistakes we cannot correct him by telling him the answer, because we need to instill the proper method in him. "Random mistakes" implies that he is using no method whatsoever, he has no "way of looking at things", his actions are random. So simply telling him one answer, 4 comes after 3 for example, will not give him the method. You might continue, and tell him 5 comes after 4, and 6 after 5, but that's what he was already given in the first place, and he was incapable of comprehending the method, and this is evident because he reproduces the numbers randomly. We want the pupil to learn the method, so he can carry on, and if he is just making random mistakes when asked to repeat what he has learned, then he has demonstrated no capacity for understanding any method. If the mistakes demonstrate something systematic, like in your example, then we figure the person is using some sort of method and can be corrected.
Baker and Hacker provide the following explanation for the type of alternative picture Wittgenstein may be referring to here:
I don't agree with that at all. He's talking in the third person, referring to "him", "he is capable of imagining that?", "put the picture before him", "his way of looking at things".
He is clearly talking about the pupil who's capacity to learn has come to an end, not the reader. He is saying that the person whose capacity to learn has come to an end is incapable of recognizing that his own capacity to learn has come to an end. "But was I trying to draw someone's attention to the fact that he is capable of imagining that?" In this sentence, "he" refers to the pupil of 143, not to the person whose attention Wittgenstein might be trying to draw. He already said he would like "you" to imagine that, in the prior sentence, now he is asking whether the pupil ("he") is capable of imagining that, what he wants you to imagine.
Consider that he has distinguished between teaching him the correct way (what is accepted by us, "our way"), and teaching him the correct way as an offshoot of his own way. "His way" remains the principal way for him, and his way is not the correct way. However, we manipulate him, and "his way", until he produces an acceptable facsimile of our way. This is a sort of pretense. He pretends to be doing it our way, when really he's doing it his way and making a representation of our way. His capacity to learn "our way" comes to an end here because the teacher has no way to distinguish the pretense from the real, to bring him around to doing it the correct way, and the pupil has no way of imaging the other way, and the fact that his way is not the correct way.
In the section where Wittgenstein describes reading, he will elaborate on such pretense, pretending to read.
I know you're beyond help (or a troll), but in the interests of futility:
At 144, he asks: "What do I mean when I say “the pupil’s ability to learn may come to an end here”? ...what am I doing with that remark?" He then goes on to explain the purpose of that remark.
Why would Wittgenstein explain his remarks in the text to a fictional person in the text? Do you think that the pupil at 143 is reading the Philosophical Investigations? Why would he refer to the pupil as "someone"? These questions are rhetorical.
In Zettel Wittgenstein says:
When W. says: “the pupil’s ability to learn may come to an end here”, I think he intends for us to look at it in two ways. First, the student can go no further because the way he is looking at it is not the way that one must look at it in order to conform to the practice. Second, we can go no further in teaching the student unless it occurs to us that he may be looking at it differently, and so, we must change the way we are looking at the student's inability to learn.
Of course the larger issue here is not to teach a series of numbers. Philosophical problems may arise not because we are not thinking rigorously enough but because we are not looking at the problem is a perspicuous way.
Right, he asks that question and answers it with this:
:
Notice, he begins by speaking to "you", "you can imagine that too". Then he proceeds in this way. "But was I trying to draw someone's [a reader's] attention to the fact that he [the fictional pupil] is capable of imagining that?"[No, he's not.] And then he proceeds to talk about that fictional pupil. "I wanted to put that picture before him, and his acceptance of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: that is, to compare it with this rather than that set of pictures. I have changed his way of looking at things."
You, the reader are capable of imagining what Wittgenstein asks, the fictional pupil is not. Wittgenstein says "I wanted to put that picture before him...", and "his acceptance of the picture" would incline him to look at the case differently, thus Wittgenstein would "have changed his way of looking at things. However, Wittgenstein could not change the fictional pupil's way of looking at things, the best that could be done according to what is stipulated by the example, is "to teach him ours as an offshoot, a variant of his" way of doing things. So the pupil's ability to learn may come to an end here. His way of looking at things has not been changed, and it may well be that it cannot be changed.
At 143 Wittgenstein writes that in copying the series of natural numbers, there is a normal and an abnormal learner's reaction. We can assume, given that most people are able to count to ten, that the normal reaction is one of eventually writing down the series correctly. Wittgenstein notes that the possibility of communication will depend on the student "going on to write it down by himself". He then says (my emphasis):
This is not intended to be some sort of theory of developmental learning.
At 144, Wittgenstein asks what he means by his statement that "the pupil's ability to learn may come to an end here". He notes that he does not report this from his own experience "(Even if I had such experience)", and he asks us what is he doing with this remark?
He wants us ("you"; the readers) to say “Yes, it’s true, one could imagine that too". To imagine what? To imagine that the pupil's ability to learn may come to an end here. The second line of the above quote relates to the first, as he then asks whether it was his objective to draw our attention to the fact that we could imagine that. His proceeding comments indicate that his objective was not merely to have us imagine it. On my reading, his objective was to put an alternative picture (or "sequence of pictures") before us to accept, where our acceptance "consists in being inclined to regard a given case differently". The objective of his statement that "the pupil's ability to learn may come to an end" is to change our way of looking at things.
However, if your account is correct, then this raises several questions. For example, where Wittgenstein asks in the second line of the above quote:
You claim that this question translates into:
Isn't that a very odd (or oddly phrased) question? Why would Wittgenstein ask it?
Furthermore, what alternative picture does Wittgenstein put before the student (other than the "picture" of the series of numbers which are written down and placed before him)? What "way of looking at things" is required in order for the student to copy the numbers on the page in front of him?
Oh, then what is it? He distinguishes random from systematic mistakes in a theoretical way, and says that there is no sharp distinction between the two. How is this anything other than theory?
Quoting Luke
Sorry, to have to reiterate, but he doesn't say "we", he says "he", referring to the theoretical student.
Quoting Luke
I think it's poorly phrased, yes, that whole little section 144 is, that's why it's so hard to understand, but if understood properly it's not odd at all. He's explaining why we come to the end of the person's capacity to learn, if we have to correct his systematic mistakes by teaching him our methods of procedure as an offshoot or variant of his own.
There's two options given for correcting a systematic mistake. One is to wean him off a bad habit, the other is to teach him our way as an offshoot or variant of his way. If we correct his systematic mistakes in the way of correcting a bad habit, then we change his way of looking at things, he sees his old way as a bad habit which must be broken. This demonstrates that he is open, and accepting of having his way of looking at things changed. He is therefore capable of further learning.
If we can only correct his mistake by having him learn our method as an offshoot of his own, we do not change his way of looking at things. He does not see his way as a bad habit. This is because he is not open and accepting to having his way changed, and so his capacity to learn from us is limited by this. If he proceeds in doing it our way, it is what I called above, a pretense (and Wittgenstein will get into pretending later). It's as if he is saying I'll do it your way, just to please you, and get past this step, but I do not agree with you, and you will never get me to see things your way.
There is a dichotomy between we and he at 144. We have a normal way of looking at things, and do not make systematic mistakes in counting numbers. He, the theoretical student has an abnormal way of looking at things, and needs his systematic mistakes corrected. Correcting a person's propensity for a systematic mistake requires changing one's way of looking at things.
Quoting Luke
Having the appropriate "picture" associated with the appropriate words is how Wittgenstein has been describing "understanding". So, for the person to properly understand the "formation rule" involved in counting the numbers, it is required that the person has the appropriate "picture". If the person is making systematic errors, it is necessary to change that individual's way of looking at things.
You're reading too much into "he". Wittgenstein often uses the third-person male pronoun ('he', 'him') as a general reference to any person, which was common practice at the time. For example:
The "someone" in this case is a reader of the text.
Let's turn this around. Has he copied a series of numbers? What is that series? How does one have to look at it in order to continue?
Skip the first number, 0, and write down the next number 1 followed by the skipped number 0, then skip the next number 2 and write down the next number 3 followed by the skipped number 2, then skip the next number 4 and write down the next number 5 followed by the skipped number 4. The series continues 7, 6, 9,8 (unless I made a mistake).
What he was actually doing was pairing the numbers into twos iteratively then inverting the elements.
{0,1,2,3,4,5}
becomes
{ (0,1), (2,3), (4,5) }
becomes
{ (1,0), (3,2), (5,4) }
becomes
{1,0,3,2,5,4}
A different rule that expresses the same series.
Yes, I think it is easier to see if looked at that way.
I think I might disagree with you though. There isn't always a unique justification for someone using language in any given way, there can be plurality of understandings consistent with it.
Your way is probably how a child might see the error, my way was probably how W. constructed the series.
Maybe he can't continue.
I don't know what you are disagreeing with. I though of one way the student might be looking at it. You suggested another. I think the example you gave in better and would be the first I would employ if I had to teach this series (unless someone suggests another that is easier to see); but of course, both are dependent on first understanding the series that the student appears not to have understood.
I agree that there can be plurality of understandings consistent with it. I take this to be one of the main points Wittgenstein is making here. It is consistent with a quote I cited some pages back:
Ah, sorry, seems we agree on the interpretation of W. then. :)
Perhaps with this student it is, but I don't think Wittgenstein intends for this to be the end of the matter. I take the larger point to be that by changing the way we look at a problem the problem can be resolved.
I see little textual support for this.
That it is not the end of the matter? If so, what would be the point of his even bringing it up?
That by changing the way we look at a problem it can be resolved?:
[emphasis added]
I was commenting on PI 144 when you quoted and responded to me. You appear to be referring to something else.
Sorry for the misunderstanding.
Although I quoted you I was not offering a direct answer your question:
Quoting Luke
Rather I was trying to consider how the student might have looked at the series of numbers he wrote on the assumption that if we can understand how he looked at it we might be able to provide another way for him to look at it that would conform to the normal series. To that end I pointed out that the series he wrote is probably not random, that there is a logic to it. Perhaps this was obvious to others. When it comes to my mathematical abilities Wittgenstein would probably have concluded: our pupil's ability to learn has come to an end.
What I dispute (consistent with Baker and Hacker's exegesis) is that Wittgenstein is referring to the pupil's way of looking at things at all. Instead he is referring to our (the reader's) way of looking at things. I see little textual support for your claim as it relates to PI 144.
It's not a matter of what I'm reading into "he", it's a matter of determining the proper referent of "he". If "he" refers to the pupil in Wittgenstein's example, who requires having our method taught as an offshoot, or variant of his method, and may therefore have his capacity to learn come to an end here, instead of what you claim, that "he" refers to the reader of the text, this is a substantial interpretational difference.
Quoting Luke
Remember, the "picture" here is in the mind, a mental picture. that is how Wittgenstein has described understanding words, as associating them with mental pictures. Teaching the pupil would constitute changing the pupil's mental picture. If the pupil's capacity to learn has come to an end, then our capacity to change his mental picture, (his way of looking at things), has come to an end. It really doesn't make sense to assume that Wittgenstein is talking about changing the reader's way of looking at things.
I've wasted too much time on this and given too much credence to your preposterous reading already. I was just optimistic that you might for once be able to see something so obvious.
How could Wittgenstein be saying in the first line he'd like the reader to "imagine that", but then in the second line be asking about the pupil's ability to "imagine that"? It's ridiculous to think that he switches from reader to pupil in between these two lines. He clearly wants us to say that we could imagine that, and then he asks whether he was trying to draw attention to our ability to imagine that.
I think you are right. I had not read the paragraph carefully enough and had skipped your exchange with MU for reasons I won't go into.
I think the way of looking at things refers to the problem of understanding. At 143 he asks:
Again at 146 he asks:
Has he understood the system if he continues the series to the hundredth place?”
Looking back, I see that this is consistent with what your quote from Baker and Hacker said, and what prompted your question about the student's way of looking at things. With all the noise the signal gets lost.
I suspected that might be the case. No worries and thanks.
OK, so let's assume it's as you say, it's only the reader being referred to with "he" here at 144. The reader says "I can imagine that too", and this means that the reader imagines this as well as something else, and so, the reader's way of looking at things has been changed. What changed the reader's way of looking at things is understanding the phrase "And here too our pupil's capacity to learn may come to an end."
What is required then, is that we, as the readers, imagine that the student's capacity to learn has come to an end. Has anyone here, other than me offered an explanation of (i.e. an imaginary scenario) within which the pupil's capacity to learn has come to an end? I have produced this imaginary scenario, which Wittgenstein asks for, this other way of looking at things, in which the student's capacity to learn has come to an end. Regardless of what "he" refers to, I have explained how the student's capacity to learn has come to an end. Do you understand this? Do you have an imaginary scenario within which the student's capacity to learn has come to an end?
As an aside, which may or may not be relevant, it may be useful to note that there is a significant difference between learning to count the numbers verbally and learning to write the series of numerals. In writing, we learn the digits, 0 to 9, and all the following numbers can be represented infinitely, from repeating these digits in distinct patterns. In counting verbally, we need to learn new names as we go "twelve", "thirteen", "twenty", thirty", "hundred", thousand", "million", etc.. So, whereas the writer of the symbols may obtain the capacity to continue the series indefinitely, independently, the speaker of the numbers cannot continue independently because one must always learn new words continuously, as one gets to the higher and higher numbers. There is no formula for creating the words for the numbers, which would allow one to continue indefinitely, as there is for creating the written symbols, because we must learn distinct conventions as we go.
There may be a hidden reason why Wittgenstein's example consists of learning written numerals rather than consisting of learning the numbers we count verbally. He may be trying to reveal this problem to us. In real educational situations, we learn to count verbally first, because aural training is much more efficient. When we proceed in our education, to the point of writing the numerals, as in Wittgenstein's example, we already have an understanding of how to count. So we do not really proceed simply from this process of learning how to write the symbols, to mastering the system, because there is another important ingredient which is learning how to count, which we learn through the aural process. There is an important synthesis, as we pass from learning spoken orders to learning written symbols, which is somewhat neglected here.
This may become more evident later when he discusses "reading" . Reading is completely sound oriented. The symbol represents a sound, whether imaginary or aural, and orderings are learned through verbal demonstrations. We are able to discern that M comes after L in the alphabet, by saying this part of the alphabet within our minds.