Luke

The distinction is the one you have needlessly introduced. Wittgenstein is talking about understanding meaning. You are talking about understanding ch...

He's talking about understanding meaning. He's not talking about 'understanding choosing a word when speaking' - whatever that is supposed to mean. Th...

See 197. Better yet, wait until we get there.

It's much more likely that you are confused. Maybe that's not the purpose of this section. You complain that he doesn't answer a question that's on yo...

The point is that the meaning of a word is not "a Something" in the mind. I suggest you reread. Your only account of "method of projection" here is th...

What he says in boxed section (a) is that meaning is not a picture in the mind, which is the point (my emphasis): The method of projection Wittgenstei...

No, he asks whether when you hear a word (outside of any context) it evokes a picture in your mind and whether this picture (or pictorial understandin...

That's not the type of 'fit' Wittgenstein is talking about at 139.

139. I may know what a word (e.g. 'cube') means when I hear it, but the same word can also be used in other ways, thus giving the word conflicting mea...

I was trying to determine whether that's what you were getting at, like I said. I asked you several posts ago whether this was about private language ...

As I asked you before, where does he give this definition of language? I still don't understand what you're getting at. Are you asking whether Wittgen...

Where?

I'm asking because I disagree that Wittgenstein uses a narrow or strict definition of language, as you claim.

What is the illusion? What is the ideal? I still don't understand. What is this "strict definition of language"? Do you mean lacking a private languag...

I don't understand what you mean by "the play between" or "the purposeful illusion of ideal meaning". Purposeful?

138. Wittgenstein criticises the notion that each word has a unique meaning attached to it, and that these unique meanings can be fit together with th...

137. We determine the subject of a sentence by asking "Who or what...?" and there is a sense of the subject 'fitting' this question. A similar type of...

136. Fitting vs Belonging We do not discover whether something is a proposition by asking whether we can apply a truth value to it; by whether we can ...

To dismiss the notion.

How would you ever know? What comparison can you make in order to determine this? You can't compare our mind-dependent concepts to the mind-independen...

Right. Or, as Wittgenstein expresses it:

Do you think PI 242 also speaks to this?

I don't understand the meaning of your question.

I apologise if I said something to upset you. That was not my intention.

I'm not trying to "get" you, Sam, except to get you to acknowledge that propositions need not be beliefs, which you appear to have done.

You said on the previous page that "All propositions are beliefs" which implies that propositions are necessarily beliefs.

If propositions need not be beliefs, then you shouldn't say that propositions are beliefs.

I tend to agree with Fooloso4 here that propositions are not necessarily beliefs. A proposition could be about something absurd and/or probably false,...

I'm still trying to get clear on this distinction. It seems like a hinge is something in the background; a presupposition of sorts, or what Wittgenste...

What would make one a hinge but not the other?

The BBC article states that "we should be cautious" and that "the report is plausible". I would hardly call that "debunked".

§132. I find the following quotes from Lee Braver's Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger are helpful in understanding Wittgenstei...

Thanks, I'll take a look.

Right. Wittgenstein's comments at §111 and §129 (and his other comments on philosophy in the early 100s) are more of a corrective to his own earlier (...

You have no interest in even trying to understand Wittgenstein.

You introduced 'foreground' into the discussion as an "opposition" to 'background' and now you're claiming it was never used in this way. You're full ...

You introduced the 'foreground' concept into the discussion when you said: So you explain it. Or else stop making shit up.

I don't know since I have no idea what these terms mean. I've asked you to explain what you mean by 'foreground' and 'background' in my last two posts...

So the foreground is expressed opinions and the background is unexpressed opinions, right? And when you said that the background of unexpressed opinio...

Explain the difference. What do you mean by "the background of unexpressed opinions"? How can unexpressed opinions have a foreground and a background?...

I'm just pointing out that you've contradicted yourself, so perhaps I agree with one statement but not the other. However, I don't think I need to agr...

Which part is true? That unexpressed opinions can either be an agreement or a disagreement, or that unexpressed opinions can only be a disagreement?

In other words: We ought to consider that unexpressed opinions can be either an agreement or a disagreement. If we do this, we should see that all une...

Per the article that I keep recommending:

A thesis implies a conjecture or hypothesis about the essential, hidden nature of things, which is a scientific or metaphysical endeavour. Wittgenstei...

I think you'll need to show us the puzzle somehow. I couldn't access it via your links.

Your latest post is full of complete jibberish and unsupported assertions. I'm not going to bother responding to you any further.

You said that the business (work) of philosophy was the goal of philosophy, and I painstakingly pointed out to you that this was incorrect. What I fou...