Luke

Did you have any further defence for your claims about the goal of philosophy? I directly responded to your question. Don't insult me with this crap. ...

There is a distinction to be made - which I have tried to make it in my previous posts - between the work of philosophy and the goal of philosophy. I ...

I don't know. You're throwing a lot of -isms at me which I'm not completely familiar with, to be honest. And I didn't do very well the first time arou...

He makes no mention of the "goal of philosophy" in either of those sections. If you want to pretend like you've already proven otherwise, then so be i...

You could at least quote the parts of §125 and §126 which support your claim that "just laying things out" is the goal of philosophy. No. When he spea...

I just came across this article which argues that Wittgenstein was not a quietist, so perhaps I was a little hasty to label him as one. I consider the...

This is your unsupported assertion. He never states this is the goal of philosophy. But maybe if you say it enough times it will become true. It appea...

Complete clarity is the goal, for that is when the philosophical problems completely disappear. You originally said that the goal of philosophy for Wi...

I believe so.

The disappearance/resolution of philosophical problems is the goal. The complete clarity is the means to achieve that goal. The statement you have quo...

There is no "shift" if you understand Wittgenstein's philosophy to be therapeutic. Hence the quote of §309 in my previous post. Rather than being the ...

This seems to be the basis for your claim of inconsistency, but where does he describe philosophy as "just laying things out"? Where does he say that ...

§126-128. Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy appears to be different from the prevailing view. Whereas philosophy has traditionally been (and con...

Then why have you said: and Aren't they assumptions about what he means, just as you say here? Exactly. Look at your quotes above. They refer to what ...

Were there any other necessary true descriptions for humans, besides being human?

Thanks Frank. I seem to recall that being a person (or a human) is one (is that right?). Were there any others?

So it just boils down to how the linguistic community uses the name? Pretty much just Wittgenstein's view then? Therefore, Kripke's criticism of Wittg...

I don't think that you should make that assumption, but thanks for finally admitting that you are making it. You formerly said: "I don't know why you ...

Yes, it does. The specific meaning you have assumed, as you yourself have just clearly stated, is that "the object he is pointing to is here". Right? ...

Perhaps not, but the name refers to me as a person. Having just finished a rushed reading of the text, I'd like to note a couple of things. Again, I w...

You may have missed the late edit of my last post, but let's go back to my map example. You stated: It is clear from this that you have a specific mea...

That's not a circumstance. Wittgenstein asks us to consider in what circumstances the sentence (and pointing) are actually used. From what you have sa...

Agreed, which is why I distinguished between suitable and unsuitable contexts/situations.

His example does not contain any circumstances, so there is insufficient information to determine this. But you are doing more than that. You are assu...

That's right. In both examples, the person points at an object. In my example, the object is a map. You are presupposing a meaning of 'This is here' w...

You don't think that my example of pointing at a map and saying "This is here" makes sense? Are we reading the same book? Of course he asks us to cons...

I don't understand why you want to exclude the pointing when it is part of the example described at §117. Don't we need to "add" the "special circumst...

But surely there are a set of attributes (or descriptions?) that determine me as a person? Height, weight, hair colour, eye colour, age, etc. That is,...

I am not very well versed in Naming and Necessity, rigid designators, or modal logic, so I welcome any corrections. As I understand it, just as the na...

I'm not exactly sure what you mean by "compare with the example" but it looks as though we are in agreement here. However, I don't know how to square ...

I don't think this is right. Wittgenstein gives the example, which includes the pointing, and says that in the "special circumstances" in which the se...

If "philosophical use...is no different from any instance of ordinary use", as you claim, then what does it mean to "bring words back from their metap...

I think that within a particular context (where the meaning is unambiguous), it is as though the other possible meanings of a word disappear. Obviousl...

One example I've just thought of could be saying (to someone) "This is here" while pointing at a map, where "this" refers to a location on the map and...

On what occasion would you point at an object and say "This is here"?

Yes, but he also prompts the reader to question what are those "special circumstances". As I said in my initial post on §117, we probably could provid...

Yes, eloquently put. :grin:

I disagree. Firstly, I find no reason to question Wittgenstein's example. Secondly, I think it may be another case similar to "Here is a hand" or "I k...

I don't disagree with this, but "This is here" still sounds unnatural to me in your examples.

I don't see how it could be both "used in absolutely any circumstances" (general) but also "something specific" (particular). By "special circumstance...

If that were the case, then why does Wittgenstein state: "he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used"?

"This is here" - "You understand this expression, don’t you? Well then - I’m using it with the meaning you’re familiar with." But when would we use th...

A relevant quote relating to issues around §116:

Okay. Thanks fdrake.

Yes, but this is aimed more at philosophers who have been misguidedly seeking the ideal, than it is at philosophers who he encourages to look at actua...

Are you using "anthropological use" differently from "empirical use", or are these the same? On the one hand you say that everyday use has "nothing to...

To try and clarify my criticism a little more: What is this everyday use, if not the anthropological use of language? Where is this imaginary language...

Agreed. And also its established meaning. The rules that determine the use also determine the associated meaning, i.e. the established meaning which a...