Only if you hold "same" to the impossible standard that requires another person be in precisely the same place and time (and mind?) in order to replic...
No problem. I just did a quick search and found this which has a download option: https://www.docdroid.net/FmkyBAp/ludwigwittgenstein-philosophicalinv...
Yes. As I understand it, Wittgenstein was strongly influenced by Frege and adapted the context principle in both his Tractatus and Philosophical Inves...
Okay, we don't disagree, so what do you want from me? Your original complaint was: I explained prior to this what I took "moving information from one ...
Information can have meaning, but it does not follow that information is meaning (or the same as meaning). Likewise, a demonstration can be peaceful, ...
If moving information (or using language to inform people of things) is something that we use language for, then I don't see how it is incidental "to ...
I've already stated my objection: that you are conflating meaning and information. I've also quoted you obviously conflating the two when you say "wha...
My concern with the OP, as others have already expressed, is that moving information from one head to another can be one use of language, even though ...
Your awareness of dreaming is not at all the same as Wittgenstein's inability to seriously suppose that he is dreaming while he is awake writing his b...
Philosophy is typically a serious subject. I don't think this necessarily implies or indicates that philosophers are humourless. But obviously they ar...
Firstly, Wittgenstein makes a clear distinction between reality and dreams; or between language use in reality and language "use" in dreams (where the...
The assertion of the OP was specifically about information; not about "all those things and more". Unless there is an argument that (moving) informati...
I've wasted too much time on this and given too much credence to your preposterous reading already. I was just optimistic that you might for once be a...
What I dispute (consistent with Baker and Hacker's exegesis) is that Wittgenstein is referring to the pupil's way of looking at things at all. Instead...
You're reading too much into "he". Wittgenstein often uses the third-person male pronoun ('he', 'him') as a general reference to any person, which was...
At 143 Wittgenstein writes that in copying the series of natural numbers, there is a normal and an abnormal learner's reaction. We can assume, given t...
I know you're beyond help (or a troll), but in the interests of futility: At 144, he asks: "What do I mean when I say “the pupil’s ability to learn ma...
144. Wittgenstein reflects on the purpose of his preceding section 143, and particularly its final line: "the pupil's ability may come to an end". He ...
I don't disagree, but in the distinction between a picture and its application, the use is the application (of the picture). Recall that the same pict...
143. Wittgenstein describes a language game of teaching the natural numbers, wherein a series of numbers are written down and a student is required to...
Your original claim was: "you can use a word however you please, and this use provides meaning for that word." Now you are pretending that your claim ...
142. At the end of 141, Wittgenstein tells us that a picture can suggest a particular use because that is how it is normally applied. At 142, he state...
I intentionally used that string of words to be meaningless. I used those words how I pleased but my use did not provide meaning to those words, so yo...
141. At 139 Wittgenstein demonstrated that a mental picture evoked by the hearing/saying of a word does not force a particular use/meaning of that wor...
I question whether this is something that he ultimately wants to deny. Given that a picture can have more than one application, it seems important tha...
You claimed that "you can use a word however you please, and this use provides meaning for that word". But is it actually meaningful if nobody underst...
Sure, meaning is use. A speaker doesn't require any understanding in their use of words? Where does Wittgenstein demonstrate this? How is it unintelli...
It is possible for the meaning/use of the word to be different from what is suggested by the mental picture which is evoked when you hear or say the w...
The "problem brought up at 139" is problematic for both the hearing and the speaking of a word, due to the erroneous assumption that meaning is a pict...
Thanks for clearing that up. Could you now explain your earlier distinction between ""understanding" in the sense of understanding a spoken word, and ...
In the midst of summarising the current sections and while trying to find more information about Wittgenstein's use of "method of projection", I came ...
Since you asked so nicely, here is part of Baker and Hacker's exegesis of 140: I think you could be conflating the use (or speaking) of words with cho...
Wittgenstein does not mention anything about "choosing words" at 138 or at 140. He makes only a passing mention of choosing words at boxed section (a)...
No, it's convoluted. Where is use described as choosing words? I know it's your presumption, but it's not part of the text. I wasn't specifying this d...
You complained earlier that Wittgenstein was vague about this, but now you seem to find that he is very clear about it, so which is it? Wittgenstein d...
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