I Simply Can't Function Without My Blanket!
In one of her books, Hanna Pitkin relates a charming little story which I think that alot to teach us about how language works, and in a way that questions some of our usual approaches to the subject.
Pitkin relates the story of her friend's three year old, who walked into her parents bedroom one morning with her blanket in tow. Asked to take the blanket back to her bed, the child exclaimed: "I simply can't function in the morning without my blanket!". Pitkin recounts: "At first her parents were astonished; they had no idea that a word like 'function' was in the child's vocabulary. But then they recognised the expression as one the mother characteristically uses about her morning coffee, and everything seemed clear: the child had merely 'picked up' the expression. Moreover, she 'picked it up' well enough to use it correctly on this (almost?) appropriate occasion".
I think this is super cool and shows, among other things, that language is at once both simpler and more complex than we sometimes give it credit for. Simpler because it shows that we don't necessarily need to know what's going on with every single word in order to use a word: it's doubtful that the child 'really' knows what the word 'function means; rather it's just 'the kind of thing you say' in that kind of situation. She really doesn't want to part ways with her blanket right now, and her employing the expression 'I simply can't function...' is a way of expressing that. Were she to be asked "what does function mean?", she might likely stumble, or just rephrase herself to say something like, "I want my blanket right now" or somesuch. Yet for all that we can't really say she doesn't know what she means.
Alot of A.I/machine learning takes place along these lines, in which what is 'learned are patterns, and what to 'do' when encountering such patterns. This is one of the reason that both children and AI can make some sometimes pretty hilarious mistakes when a pattern is recognized but it isn't quite the right one (I once recall a child, visiting a new set of apartments, exclaiming "this has great infrastructure!"). One distinction to make here however, is that the child in question is not merely repeating her parent, but modifying what is said; she understands the expression well enough so that she projects the expression into a new context, while still retaining meaning.
But this 'simplicity' of language is, from a different vantage point, also a sign of complexity. For it implies that language is also not something learnt atomistically, 'built up' out of a set of sets of discrete definitions which are then put together. What the child has learnt is not 'just' a set of words, but a whole life-context as it were. As Pitkin writes, the child "looked at language and looked at the world and looked back and forth... And the 'world' it looked at was not just a collection of objects... [but] included people, and their feelings and actions, and consequences". And this, understandably, is precisely the kind of thing A.I. can struggle with.
Anyway, just wanted to write something up about the story and draw out a couple of possibly interesting implications.
Pitkin relates the story of her friend's three year old, who walked into her parents bedroom one morning with her blanket in tow. Asked to take the blanket back to her bed, the child exclaimed: "I simply can't function in the morning without my blanket!". Pitkin recounts: "At first her parents were astonished; they had no idea that a word like 'function' was in the child's vocabulary. But then they recognised the expression as one the mother characteristically uses about her morning coffee, and everything seemed clear: the child had merely 'picked up' the expression. Moreover, she 'picked it up' well enough to use it correctly on this (almost?) appropriate occasion".
I think this is super cool and shows, among other things, that language is at once both simpler and more complex than we sometimes give it credit for. Simpler because it shows that we don't necessarily need to know what's going on with every single word in order to use a word: it's doubtful that the child 'really' knows what the word 'function means; rather it's just 'the kind of thing you say' in that kind of situation. She really doesn't want to part ways with her blanket right now, and her employing the expression 'I simply can't function...' is a way of expressing that. Were she to be asked "what does function mean?", she might likely stumble, or just rephrase herself to say something like, "I want my blanket right now" or somesuch. Yet for all that we can't really say she doesn't know what she means.
Alot of A.I/machine learning takes place along these lines, in which what is 'learned are patterns, and what to 'do' when encountering such patterns. This is one of the reason that both children and AI can make some sometimes pretty hilarious mistakes when a pattern is recognized but it isn't quite the right one (I once recall a child, visiting a new set of apartments, exclaiming "this has great infrastructure!"). One distinction to make here however, is that the child in question is not merely repeating her parent, but modifying what is said; she understands the expression well enough so that she projects the expression into a new context, while still retaining meaning.
But this 'simplicity' of language is, from a different vantage point, also a sign of complexity. For it implies that language is also not something learnt atomistically, 'built up' out of a set of sets of discrete definitions which are then put together. What the child has learnt is not 'just' a set of words, but a whole life-context as it were. As Pitkin writes, the child "looked at language and looked at the world and looked back and forth... And the 'world' it looked at was not just a collection of objects... [but] included people, and their feelings and actions, and consequences". And this, understandably, is precisely the kind of thing A.I. can struggle with.
Anyway, just wanted to write something up about the story and draw out a couple of possibly interesting implications.
Comments (143)
Psychologism?
Well, I believe that the child understands the context of the word "function" by the verbal tone/pitch and whatnot along with the intension of the speech act by her mother in the story.
It is through, or even primarily through knowing the performative intension of the function of "I cannot function" that allows the person in the story to conclude or decipher the meaning behind the phrase.
Just throwing some thoughts out there.
Therefore justice is simplicity.
Or possibly the unit of meaning is not the word, but the phrase, which would explain why Shakespeare is full of cliches.
Lovely story but I'm not sure that it teaches us anything we didn't know already.
A child learns to speak by imitation. Echoing. Parroting.
The trouble is when aping affects political thoughts, absurd behaviour and voting patterns.
Quoting Halim Shebaya
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-tells-it-like-it-is_b_9836974
Trump 'tells it like it is'.
This phrase is repeated ad nauseam whenever someone is asked why they voted for him.
Combined with the media who do not 'tell it like it is' - the repeated 'Fake News' - this language is powerful as a way of looking at the world and people; 'feelings, actions and consequences'.
Quoting StreetlightX
Sometimes, I think AI would be preferable to our robotic and moronic reactions and responses.
If it were possible to implant a linguistic logical process whereby people can think with greater care, would we do it - if it were for the good of the many - to counteract stupidity and lessen hostility - would our world become safer, more secure?
Interesting topic Quoting StreetlightX
What are our usual approaches to the subject ?
But how does that get turned into understanding? After-all, neither a [arrot nor current AI can make that transition. What is about human children that imitation leads to them learning how to use words?
But this is not a case of that. The whole trust of the story is that the child has used the phrase in a new way, one that specifically doesn't simply parrot the parent.
Yep, while children's ability at explicit logical analysis of language is obviously far poorer on average than adults, they are highly sensitive to the emotional valences and contextual cues around which particular chunks of language are uttered: functions, desires, behaviours etc. Kids instinctively pick up on what's being done and that has a visceral impact on them such that productive use rearises in a similar context. You often hear that children soak up language like sponges, and we think of them absorbing new vocabulary, grammatical rules and so on. But what they're really soaking up is how to live in the context of people speaking, and the words and grammar are less important than the linguistic acts (in whatever form) that can be repeated and / or reformulated (not just imitation @Amity, see Chomsky vs Skinner in the 60s) in order to master the function that needs to be mastered. And it has to be so considering a) how much of language is idiomatic / metaphorical etc. and b) that children are thrown into a socio-linguistic world in which they can only navigate through achieving affects on other language speakers, with the currency of affect, again, not being words and grammar directly but particular speech acts that may even be sentences or phrases that can't be broken into their constituent parts and retain their sense.
Yes. It is not only a parroting of the words alone but an imitation or copying of the behaviour and context in which the parent used it. Body language if you like. I agree with Wallows.
Quoting Wallows
How does anything get turned into understanding ?
The learning process. The ability to learn is possessed by humans, animals and possibly some machines.
We learn by our interactions with others and our environment.
I guess it's the progression from passive to active learning that leads to understanding.
When we recognise what we understand and what we do not.
We can develop such understanding by play and role playing which aids in the development of thinking and language skills.
At least that's my take. What do you think ?
And how did the story question how language works ?
I repeat the question since it interests me. I have noted Baden's suggestion.
There must be more examples of approaches...
But it isn't a copying of the context. (how does one 'copy a context?' A context is given, to a degree - one acts in it; the child does not purposely arrange the environment just so, so they can use the words). Or rather, it is a projection of the context; a decision made that this context is the same as the other context, itself a novelty.
Yeah, this is part of what I take away from Pitkin's comment that "The 'world' [the child] looked at was not just a collection of objects... [but] included people, and their feelings and actions, and consequences". One interesting question is how one gets from this to words as, as it were, free floating entities, imbued with 'meaning apart from such life-contexts. There was a phrase I was particularly struck by in one of my recent readings of Stanley Cavell where he complains about instances where words become 'nothing but their meanings': I take this to be what happens when words like 'function' eventually become dictonary-defined: then gain a sense of self-consistency at the price of detaching them from the life-world in which they gained their purchase.
Yes. It is not a copy of the original context. How could It be ? It is a reformulation adapted to suit the needs of the child.
If 'our usual approaches' - whatever they are - do not include this aspect , then no wonder some might see this as a 'novelty'.
The child used it, as appropriate, in her/his own context.
What is surprising here ?
As I read your post and then all the follow ups, I kept thinking about it from the other direction - the process you're describing is how the little girl learns the meaning of "function."
I imagine it's actually both ways at once, if you consider it retrospectively like this, rather than how stuff means stuff at the moment (and retrojections to that moment, like "she wouldn't be able to explicate the meaning of "function" despite using a phrase containing it").
Yes. I wasn't putting out my idea as a disagreement, just an addition.
But if you think of "meaning" in this way, as something which is attributed to words, you would have to accept that we can use words without knowing the meaning of the words. How would we characterize this type of use then? The child gets some sort of message across to the parents, but we cannot call it "meaning", because the child doesn't know the meaning. What is the child doing?
I want to flesh this out more. I think one way to think of what I consider a common and usual approach is to consider meaning primarily a matter of definition. To have a meaning is to be defined, as it were. I think one of the things the example brings out is the inadequacy of that model: I don't think our three year old would be able to define 'function', if asked. Nonetheless, she means something by it, or rather, she means something by her manner of employing it among a wider constellation of actions (a sad face, a whine in her tone, a stiffened grip on the blanket).
Importantly, there's nothing 'lacking' in her meaning what she says. Her saying 'I just can't function...' has a point she wants to express, and for that point, what she says is perfectly adequete. So to this:
Quoting Fooloso4
It's not clear that 'function' means anything at all for our child, at least not in isolation, as a word dangling by itself. She's used it, along with a bunch of other words and emotional and physiological cues, to mean something (roughly: "I need/want my blanket right now, don't make me take it back"), but 'function' on its own needs to be seen as operating with and among this wider constellation of actions and consequences without which it would be without significance.
I agree, but might phrase this differently: the process I'm describing is how the little girl learns what it is to ask and give an answer to 'the meaning of 'function'. My motivation for this rewording is that I want to emphaize that there is nothing 'missing' in the girl's current employment of 'function'. Her use of the word 'function' is not, as it were, 'half-way there' - rather, for the purposes at hand, it is perfectly adequete. Another thing this implies is that 'to know the meaning of the word 'function'', (to define it?) is not the same as being able to use the word meaningfully (although the latter is how one goes about learning the former, as you said).
This reminds of a passage in Deleuze on the nature of learning: "A well known test in psychology involves a monkey who is supposed to find food in boxes of one particular colour amidst others of various colours: there comes a paradoxical period during which the number of 'errors' diminishes even though the monkey does not yet possess the 'knowledge' or 'truth' of a solution in each case". The girl's case in analogous to this: her use of the word 'function' is meaningful, even as she would not yet be able to say exactly what it means.
Thanks for this example of what you consider 'a common and usual approach: 'To consider meaning primarily as a matter of definition'.
I am not sure how or why this would be common or usual. In whose world ?
What does 'Brexit means Brexit' mean ?
It seems clear that a simple definition does not encompass a variety of meanings attached to a word and how it is used.
So yes, it is inadequate.
Since posing that question, I delved into the murky world of philosophy of language. I had forgotten my frustration when studying a module related its theories, a long time ago.
I think I lean more to the approach as outlined in the penultimat para of the SEP article:
.Quoting Jeff Speaks
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning/
And the follow up:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning-normativity/
However, I have not read enough. And, for sure, it seems any theory will have its inadequacies.
It does seem to align with my previous post where I said:
"We learn by our interactions with others and our environment.
I guess it's the progression from passive to active learning that leads to understanding.
When we recognise what we understand and what we do not."
The problem that arises in my mind is how this normative approach might fail to consider the genius and originality of creative expression.
Thanks for thought provoking thread.
You answered my question of Quoting Amity
The story did not surprise me. I was not surprised by it showing that:
Quoting StreetlightX
Quoting StreetlightX
The surprise element comes in the astonishment of the parents.
It is natural that it would surprise and delight them. Their 'precocious three year old girl' would seem to have the early makings of a genius ! Wow. Now, what would that be down to...I wonder.
https://www.khanacademy.org/test-prep/mcat/processing-the-environment/language/a/theories-of-the-early-stages-of-language-acquisition
That is precisely the issue. To have meaning is not the same as to have a definition. There are some members here at tpf who would restrict the meaning of "meaning" to words, statements, and propositions. They will say, that only these things have "meaning" to produce a very special meaning of "meaning". And if you talk about the "meaning" which art, or a beautiful landscape has, they will insist that you are using "meaning" in a different way, claiming you use a different sense of "meaning". But this is not true at all, these things have "meaning" in the very same way that words have meaning (as your example of the child using "function" demonstrates). So these people are trying to create a division between this type of meaning and that type of meaning, without any supportive principles to show that one suppose "type" is actually different from the other. In reality, the meaning which a defined word has is no different from the meaning which a piece of art has, which is no different from the meaning which a beautiful sunset has..
I haven't really thought about the philosophy or science of language since my psych classes back in the .... well, a long while ago, so I'm uncomfortable making definite statements. But that never stopped me before. Doesn't knowing the meaning of a word really mean knowing how to use it appropriately? The little girl used it appropriately. Because her knowledge is incomplete, there's a good chance she'll use it inappropriately in the future. Then she'll learn more about what it means.
This is sort of the opposite of what I just said in my response to Metaphysician Undercover right above this response. As I indicated in that response, I'm not comfortable that I understand the intricacies of language well enough to be sure.
We use plenty of words - probably the vast, vast, majority of our words - without once having given any thought as to defining them in terms of meaning+. Most words we know we've learned 'passively', absorbing their use from the linguistic environment around us, employing them and occasionally being corrected, complimented, or responded to in ways which confirm or deny our correct use of a word. And it's only very, very occasionally that we really presented with a situation in which we are asked 'what is the meaning of that word?' - and I want to say that answering this question is a different skill from knowing how to use a word meaningfully, a skill which is additional to being able to use a word meaningfully.
Part of the issue is that the explicit question of 'what a word means' generally only tends to crop up in academic discussions like this, where the question 'what is the meaning of a word?' is taken as a model for being able to use a word meaningfully. But almost none of the words we use are learned in this manner, save some extravagant ones like, 'crepuscular', say. Trying to articulate this distinction between (knowing how to) use a word meaningfully, and knowing the meaning of a word, is a bit of a struggle.
In the context of the discussion, I want to say: yes he does. He knows what time is. As we all do. But he's missing the additional skill of being able to say what it's meaning is, which requires more knowledge, something extra.
Vygotsky categorises this as the movement from word to concept:
"[A] concept is more than the sum of certain associative bonds formed by memory, more than a mere mental habit; it is a complex and genuine act of thought that cannot be taught by drilling, but can be accomplished only when the child’s mental development itself has reached the requisite level. At any age, a concept embodied in a word represents an act of generalization. But word meanings evolve. When a new word has been learned by the child, its development is barely starting; the word at first is a generalization of the most primitive type; as the child’s intellect develops, it is replaced by generalizations of a higher and higher type—a process that leads in the end to the formation of true concepts. …"
Vygotsky - Thought and Language
And this parallels the gradual internalisation of the social to the inner voice whose self-sedimentation obscures the nature of its origin. That voice being the substrate from which said concepts speak.
'Self-sedimenting of inner voice' - that sounds murky.
What do you mean by this?
As I try to imagine this process of internalizing words and their meaning, I think it more of an absorption. Part of a taking in and, at times, an unthinking usage rather than a hidden, submerged and forgotten voice.
It isn't the voice that is self-sedimenting but, for sure, it grows from one level of understanding to another. Is that what you mean ? We develop our understanding of ever more complex words or concepts from a baseline. How else could it be ?
And so, our thinking process move onwards and sideways, back to front, gets shaped and shaken about ? No self-sedimenting voice here. Or have I totally misunderstood and lost the plot.
Here's more from Vygotsky:
Quoting Vygotsky
Or yet another revision: words don't mean things; we mean things by way of words.
Oh, I mean more or or less the gradual development of self-consciousness (viewed as self-reflexive social functioning) which occurs through the gradual internalisation of the external (the sociocultural context including language).
Via Vygotsky:
“Every function in the child’s cultural development appears twice: first, on the social level, and later, on the individual level; first, between people (interpsychological) and then inside the child (intrapsychological). This applies equally to voluntary attention, to logical memory, and to the formation of concepts. All the higher functions originate as actual relationships between individuals.”
https://www.instructionaldesign.org/theories/social-development/
First came across him through a uni course in linguistics. Haven't read as much of him as I should have, but from what I have, I like the way he rolls.
Quoting StreetlightX
Yes, and then become aware of the process, confusing ourselves along the way.
:up: :up: :up:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
She is doing what we all have to do all the time, to a greater or lesser extent. Play the game of pointing the words (or pictures or sunsets) at what they (already, or are destined eventually to) point at. About which there obviously can be (as famously noted) "no fact of the matter". But about which we are nonetheless happy to strive to agree.
Spartan enough and general enough?
Do you see a difference between knowing how a word was used, and the act of using a word? If you associate meaning with use, then I would say that knowing the meaning of a word is knowing how the word was used. This accounts for the fact that the same word has different meaning in different instances of use. Meaning is specific to the instance of use, and knowing its meaning is knowing how it was used in that particular instance.
Knowing how to use a word appropriately is a different matter altogether. This assumes that there is a distinction between appropriate and inappropriate use. On what principles would this distinction be based? Would this be a moral issue? I don't think it's a legal issue. What sort of principles do you suggest would be used to determine appropriate use?
Quoting T Clark
What makes you think that she used the word appropriately? I think it was a lie, she really can function without her blanket. Since she didn't intend to tell a lie, yet her use of that word creates the appearance that she was lying, her usage belies her intention. Therefore I do not think the word was used appropriately. Using words in a way which is inconsistent with one's intention is deception, and deception is morally inappropriate.
Quoting bongo fury
What's this --- we are happy to strive to agree? In some instances we co-operate and truly do strive to agree, happily. But in other instances, like in the philosophy forum, we happily disagree.
Whether or not there is a "fact of the matter" appears to be completely irrelevant. Sometimes we are inclined to agree and co-operate, and other times we are inclined to disagree and be pricks in the side of the others. From where comes the strive to agree?
Rubbish.
Some. Certainly. Most. Certainly. Not all. It takes pre-existing thought to learn words/language.
The something extra involving answering what some word or other means (meaning+) is the ability to pursue a metacognitive endeavor.
That question has already been adequately answered. What more proof could anyone ask for?
I was disagreeing with...
Quoting Vygotsky
...because the author kept being referenced.
The story of the child is not at issue. The mother uses the phrase containing "function" in a way that correlates, associates, and/or otherwise connects it to the way she feels about starting the day without something. "I can't function without my coffee". The child uses it for the same reasons. The mother wants to have her coffee, and the child wants to have her blanket.
That wasn't parroting. It was a misuse of language, but perfectly understandable.
Nice example too!
So, it's rubbish but it's certainly mostly true? You seem to be having trouble with the concept 'rubbish'. Perhaps some thought would help. Your posts are confused strawmen based on taking one sentence out of context and mangling it.
I mean if you had even bothered looking at this on the same page:
"The relation of thought to word is not a thing but a process, a continual movement back and forth from thought to word and from word to thought"
Your whole criticism falls to pieces.
Though it should have been obvious anyway as Vygotsky said "not merely" rather than "always" in the part you quoted
So you're arguing against a behaviourist approach a la Skinner (which is thoroughly outdated and has been refuted anyway) not against Vygotsky who proposes a sociocultural approach.
Quoting Amity
Quoting Baden
What evidence is there of this two stage development? I doubt things are so neatly divided.
Thanks to Fooloso4 for telling me about this.
This is a totally fascinating TED talk by Deb Roy, MIT researcher.
He chronicled the development of his son's speech. Time accelerated motion analysis from bud to blossom, if you like. But really from 'gaga' to 'water'. Real world. And mostly jargon-free.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=RE4ce4mexrU
The advice goes without saying. What it often comes down to is which theory is least inconsistent with the observable facts of language learning. For example, Skinner's behaviourist approach doesn't account for novel constructions etc.
Had a look at some of the vid. Interesting that in the minute or so I watched the speaker already used a Vygotskyian influenced term, i.e "scaffolding" and the process seems very tied to the sociocultural approach. So, thanks for the link. Will watch more and say more anon.
Whatever Baden.
:brow:
He wrote that thought comes into existence through words. No mangling needed. He's clear. He's wrong. If he meant some thought(rather than all) comes into existence through words he would have said so. He did not. His use of "merely" is to emphasize that it is not only that thought is expressed in words, but rather... that thought's very existence - the very existence of thought... comes through words. That clearly implies all thought. If I'm wrong, show me where he clearly asserts the contrary. He doesn't.
He's dead wrong, as is anyone else who believes that. It's rubbish.
I simply pointed it out. You - of all people - partake in personal attacks? Aren't you a moderator or part owner here? Someone of some importance, that much is certain.
Meh.
Just read the posts and the quotes. You're wasting our time here. And no it wasn't a personal attack any more than your comment on Vygotsky was a personal attack on him. If you're going to dish it out, be prepared to handle the same.
Thanks.
What?
:brow:
Does this somehow exonerate him from saying that thought comes into existence through words?
No you didn't. You picked one sentence from a thinker you're unfamiliar with and strawmanned him on the basis of interpreting the words in that sentence for your own purposes.
What I'm asking you to do is read about the ideas of the thinker you're criticizing so at least there's something to be discussed. Here's a whole chapter, for example, specifically on thought and word. Try that for a start. And note particularly:
"... the basic methodological defect of nearly all studies of thinking and speech – that which underlies the fruitlessness of this work – is the tendency to view thought and word as two independent and isolated elements whose external unification leads to the characteristic features of verbal thinking.
We have attempted to demonstrate that those who begin with this mode of analysis are doomed to failure from the outset."
Thinking and Speech. Lev Vygotsky 1934 Chapter 7 Thought and Word
True for some. But worth repeating, I think, as a reminder to self and others to be constantly aware and critical, to ask pertinent questions of 'just ideas'. Not being taken in by all of a theory just because one part seems right and agrees with how you roll.
Quoting Baden
You see this is an example of jargon. It can enrich but specialist language can also be like a secret code.
I think some philosophers sometimes use this as a blanket to obscure meaning.
Some just like to be clever with language and use it to provoke further discussion.That's fine.
They are in their comfort zone. And that can be instructive and amusing.
' I Simply Can't Function Without My Jargon ! ' :wink:
Well, writing is one of the things I do and I like to jazz things up sometimes. I've admitted before it's self-indulgent but I'd always be willing to explain what I'm on about. Pinky promise. :wink:
What are you talking about?
There's an obvious disconnect here. Are you denying what he wrote? That's a foundational premiss Baden. He wrote it. He believes it. Everything you've written in the last couple of posts supports the idea.
Show me where he says otherwise.
If any thought exists before words, he's wrong.
Anyway... the subject matter and the OP are very interesting. I just don't think it's a good idea to lean too much on that guy's offering about the origen of all thought.
I know and appreciate that. You are a devilish angel :halo: :naughty:
Do we, though? We know the experience of time passing. But it took until Einstein before time was known as part of the four spacetime dimensions. And it took a knowledge of entropy and cosmology to understand f the arrow of time (somewhat). There's a possibility that we live in a frozen block universe where all points in time exist, and the passage of time is just an experience our brains create.
But this is all irrelavent to knowing the meaning of the word 'time', when used in most circusmtances. Certainly, it was all irrelavent to Augustine, and did not compromise his ability to use the word properly in conversation.
I've watched it twice now, only 20 mins long, it informs and delights. It's a Wow for me :cool:
The summary where he talks to his son about the data recordings, who shows amazing understanding. And then shares his son taking his first steps. He echoes what his son whispers.
I look forward to hearing what you and others think...about the video and how much it explains the development of language in socio-cultural terms. Feedback loop * Is there some other, better ? explanatory factor or approach ?
Edited to add:
* another aspect:
Quoting LENA Research Foundation
https://integratedlistening.com/blog/2014/03/26/language-development-parent-child-feedback-loop/
Just watched the full video and it is fucking awesome. More so for its implications for broader language acquisition and sociocultural research than any specific conclusions drawn, which the researcher didn't really get into. There's a very dark side to this too but that's probably for another discussion. I'll have to look the guy up for more details on how his work plays re language acquisition theory (thanks for the links) but the method jives well with the sociocultural approach.
Agree. Fascinating to watch but I kept having thoughts re ethics, even though privacy issues were taken into consideration. I was a bit uncomfortable.
Also, a bit frustrating as to not making any specific conclusions.
I edited my last post to include another piece of research re feedback loop.
Happily? Only, I would say, in those lucky cases where we can agree about what we are disagreeing about (in my book, agree about what each of us were pointing the words at). Only then can we say: either, ok, it's a matter of opinion, we'll agree to disagree; or else, oh dear, one version must be wrong, but we'll allow both accounts to co-exist for now. But, in that case, only for now. I'm surprised you can't see the strife as striving for agreement? No one need assume that any eventual settlement must be congenial for all parties.
Hope you and T Clark don't mind if I butt in here, because it's relevant to the above...
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Do you associate meaning with use? (Or were you just interrogating T Clark on the point?) I certainly do associate the two. Equate them, even. But probably I see it/them quite differently to you. I see it as definitely not a matter of fact, but one we can reliably find agreement on in many cases (the clear ones). Like the case of a single grain of wheat not being a heap, snow not being black etc. I deny that you can (within the language) succeed in pointing the word heap at a single grain. Whereas, from what you say, I'm guessing you will accept any such attempt at use as inevitably counting as an instance of use of the word, however anomalous?
That was really cool. That kind of data visualization though is everywhere right now. When you hear 'big data', that's what it involves. That kind of stuff is now the bread and butter of Facebook, Google and so on.
Well, like I said, I thank Fooloso4 for introducing me to it. That was a first for me.
I did wonder how it would have progressed...
What's new in language development ?
I will gladly take credit if anyone approves, but if you don't then blame Amity.
I am sure you have plenty more sparklers to magically whisk out of your top hat or psychedelic pants.
At a moment's notice. Just like that :sparkle:
But perhaps you are shy :joke:
I was taught not to magically whisk out what is in my pants at a moment's notice. Such things are frowned upon and can get you in a lot of trouble.
And here was me thinking you a contermacious rebel who would rise to the occasion. And delight.
Am now in such a major huff :meh: and sad :cry: and disappointed :confused:
Don't leave me this way :groan:
There is no doubt I would rise to the occasion and delight, but I simply cannot function without my double entendres.
I Simply Can't Function Without My Sexy Emoticons !
:cool: :kiss: :love: :yum:
I see no reason to conclude that this strife is a "striving for agreement". In some cases it may be, but in other cases not, so we cannot characterize it as such, with a general principle. I think it is often the case that one person is trying to get something from another, but what that person is trying to get is not necessarily agreement.
Quoting bongo fury
I do associate "use" with meaning, but I would not equate the two. I believe that meaning extends beyond use. We could consider the metaphysical distinction between "good" and "beauty". "Good" is associated with use, but "beauty" is something desired for no purpose, just for the sake of itself. So "a good" is desired, and called "good" for some purpose, use, and it is meaningful because it is useful for that purpose. But things of beauty are desired and are apprehended as meaningful, though not because they are useful for a purpose. That brings meaning more toward the desire, rather than the act which is intended to fulfill the desire (use). This is why I believe that "use" accounts for some aspects of meaning, but it doesn't account for the entirety of meaning.
As expected, very different views on "use". Thanks for the clarification.
There is no such thing as "use" in a general sense because each instance of using something is unique and particular.
Thanks for the further clarification.
I'm guessing you can't mean "there is no such thing as 'using something' in a general sense because each instance of using something is unique and particular"?
Rather, you are saying you oppose dignifying a narrower, technical sense of "use" whereby it means, more specifically, "using a word to refer to something" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use–mention_distinction)? You want instead to emphasise and keep in play the very general sense of "using something in some way"? Resist reducing linguistic "use" to the mere pointing of words at things?
Such a disagreement between us (where you resist what I embrace) is what I said I expected to be the case, yes. Do you agree this is the disagreement?
Actually this is exactly what I said, and what I meant.
Quoting bongo fury
This is proceeding in the opposite direction of what I suggested. Each instance of use would be a particular act of referring to something, whether that something is a physical object, or a mental object like a type, a class, or category. Therefore "using something in some way" is excluded, as itself a mental object, a classification, which is not an act of use, it's a category.
Quoting bongo fury
Do we have agreement then? The issue though, between us, was the relationship between meaning and use. You said you equate the two. I make "meaning" into a wider category than "use", such that all particular instances of "use" may be classified as meaningful, or having meaning, but not all instance of meaningful things are instances of use.
To explicate this, I brought in the distinction between "good" and "beauty". Instances of "use" necessarily relate to some "good". We use something for a purpose, and that purpose is the good which is expected to come from that use. But when we see beauty in something, such as a piece of art, there is meaning without use. The beautiful thing is meaningful, but not because it is useful. Therefore, meaning extends beyond "use" (good), into the category of beauty.
From this distinction we can produce two categories of "meaning", corresponding to two types of expression. We have expressions which are based in purpose, good, and use, as well as expressions which are based in art, creativity, and beauty. I would say that the two forms of meaning mix and intermingle. So in language for example, we find a mixture of purposeful use, and artful expression. Referring back to the op, we might ask what degree of artful expression is there in the child's statement, and what degree of use. I've noticed that children often enjoy saying unusual and creative things.
As expected, very different views on "use". Thanks for going over yours once more.
Anyway, I remain a fan of your previous diatribe against (other people's) unnecessary multiplication of types or categories of meaning.
That's the first thing that pooped into my mind, too. The young child probably meant "shit" by "function". Sub "pooh pooh" for "function" and it all makes sense all of a sudden.
It seems like a certain emotional attunement comes first, and language is a means of entering as a 'player' (but there must be a better word) into a space crisscrossed by confusing emotional/social dynamics. Does this work? Am I doing it right? You test things out. It's not super unlike posting here, or elsewhere about philosophy. You bring something to 'canon' philosophy, you have all these feelings and ideas, and then you observe for a while, and then you test out certain things, to see if you get it. There's that old trope about the 'western canon' and how it's all one big conversation, which is exactly what it's like to be a child growing into a household, but the difference between learning a first language and trying consciously to learn a second.
Are we willing going to go down the road that we can't use language to speak in the general sense? All word meanings are unique and particular?
Maybe I misunderstand, but if so, I can't help but think something has gone badly wrong. It's language's ability to generalize which is so very useful.
Metaphysical Undercover would probably dismiss yours as a "blanket statement". Remember, s/he is into undercover, not blankets.
If one of you is called Hugh, then the assertion "The difference is huge, of Hugh's views on use of "use"." would make perfect sense.
I.e., there is no such thing as anything.
No I wasn't really going down that road. Notice I spoke in a general sense, and I even used "use" in a general sense. Even so, don't you agree that each instance of use is unique and particular, having its own peculiarities, and no two instances are the same? If you agree, then don't you think that this itself is a meaningful fact? Or would you argue that this is a difference which doesn't make a difference? I would say the latter is contradiction.
Quoting Marchesk
There is a very evident problem with the idea of generalizing, as bongo brought up, and that is the question of what is being referred to in the generalization. If we say that there is a category, a mental object, which is referred to, then we get lost in Platonism trying to validate such a reference. If we say that there is a "way of using" a word, then the generalization is intrinsic to this concept, "way of using". What would validate a "way of using", if not some faulty assumption that X (a particular instance of use) is the same as Y (a particular instance of use)? That there is a difference between X and Y, which doesn't make a difference, is contradiction because the very fact that it may be identified as a difference is an instance of making a difference. Therefore, contradiction is intrinsic to generalization. I believe it was C.S. Peirce who expounded on this incompatibility within the relationship between the fundamental laws of logic and generalization. For him, it manifests as vagueness.
Quoting god must be atheist
Right, where can we start? To have any meaning, a symbol must be associated with a thing, correspondence. If there is no association there is no meaning, therefore the symbol is not a symbol and ought not be called a symbol. If the symbol may be associated with anything, then we have a very similar problem, the symbol might be called a symbol, but it may be associated with absolutely anything. What kind of symbol is that? Can we say that there is any meaning there? If we restrict the use of the symbol, then meaning is created, but it is not created by the use of the symbol, which is inherently free, it is created by the restrictions. Now we can dismiss the idea that there is necessarily a thing which is referred to by the symbol, because it is intrinsic to the nature of the symbol, that it could theoretically (potentially) refer to anything (and there is no such thing as anything), but its application has been restricted, and so it has meaning. The idea dismissed is Platonism, it assumes the restrictions as a thing, an idea. If the restrictions are not ideal, then we are left with the task of characterizing them. How could they exist?
As I said, I'm not denying the existence of generalizations, I'm just pointing out that the existence of such things is very hard to understand. A generalization, as a thing to be understood seems to defy logic. As indicated, they are based in contradiction.
To understand the situation, I suggest you start with what I would call the pure form of "meaning is use". In this case we begin with the assumption that every instance of use is unique, particular. We might say that the true and precise meaning of each word is given by the context of the situation. So in one instance "cup" would refer to a specific object in my kitchen, and in another, it would refer to an object in your kitchen. Do you see that the meaning of the word "cup" is different each time it is used to refer to a different object? When I sit in my kitchen and say "could you please get me my cup", it has a completely different meaning from when you sit in your kitchen and say that, because I am asking for a different object from you Here we have what I would call the pure form of meaning in which the word relates directly to an object without the use of generalization. Each instance of use is distinct from every other.
Contrast this with what others seem to say about "meaning is use". They would say that "use" refers to a "way of using" a word. In this case, there would be a way of using the word "cup", to refer to a certain type of object, such that the word has "a meaning" which corresponds not with the actual use of the word, but with the "way" of using the word. Notice the two generalizations inherent within "way of using", and within "type of object". So in this way of using "meaning is use", one generalization (way of using the word) is related to another generalization (type of object).
In the latter case, we have utilized generalizations to understand meaning. Now we must make a move to understand the nature of a generalization, or else we are not really understanding meaning at all. we would simply be describing meaning in terms of generalizations, without having a clue as to what a generalization is. What is the point of that? What do you think constitutes a "way of using"?
Well, I think that generalization arises from the public aspect, the plurality of use. I use a word in one way, you use it in a similar way, and for the sake of simplicity we assume that we are using it in the same way. This, saying that it is "the same way", is the agreement which bongo said that we strive for. If you and I say that we will use, or do use, the word in the same way, then we have agreement. Notice though, that it's a faulty sense of "the same", really meaning similar. But "similar" doesn't indicate agreement in the same way that "same" does. If a "game" requires multiple players with some such "agreement", then generalization is inherent within the "game".
The problem though is that all of this description is produced in retrospect, from analysis. In reality, we use words in similar ways, without any agreements. And when we reflect on this in a linguistic analysis we generalize, saying that this similar way is the same way. The generalization is produced by the analysis, which is an effort to understand, so "same" is posited to facilitate principles. It's a deficient "same" though. Then, we claim that we agree that this is the same way, and this supposed agreement supports the posited "same". The agreement is non-existent.
Yet we use language and therefore "play language games" without any such agreement. It is therefore, when we want to say that "I play the same game as you", or some such thing, that the problem of generalization crops up. We are apt to use "same" in a way which is not consistent with a rigorous interpretation of the law of identity. The generalization is dependent on that loose use of "same".
Only if you hold "same" to the impossible standard that requires another person be in precisely the same place and time (and mind?) in order to replicate your usage. Nobody besides a misguided philosopher would ever use the word "same" in this way about meaning or use. We often speak of synonyms having the same meaning without requiring your impossible standard of sameness. If that's what it takes to mean the "same" then we ought to replace every use of the word "same" with the word "similar" instead. Thankfully, our everyday usage needn't meet your impossible standards simply because you deem it to be more logically correct. That's just not how the word is commonly used, especially when describing linguistic meaning.
The origin of usage is using a word in a particular way, and many other users will use it in a similar, but not same way; this gives rise to a general form of the meaning, a sort of "mean" or "average".
After that the average takes over, and the meaning of the word will be considered in every subsequent use to be the meaning already averaged.
In my opinion Witty lacked the insight of accepting the status quo of language. He delved into apparent contradictions of language, and he conveniently ignored the social and cultural reconciliatory practices that eliminated the contradictions. He was a genius who stopped his thinking at a premature insight, whereas he ought to have proceeded further in his thinking.
"A conclusion is a place where you stop when you got tired of thinking." -- traditional, origin unknown.
Where does he talk about this?
Quoting god must be atheist
What is "usage" (as opposed to "the origin of usage")?
Quoting god must be atheist
How and where does Wittgenstein reject "the status quo of language"?
Don't be absurd, this is the "same" which is defined by the law of identity. It was stated by Aristotle as a means of expelling sophism from philosophy. If you want to call similar things "the same" then you are not engaged in philosophy, but sophistry.
Quoting Luke
Sure, we use "same" in this way. But it's clearly a way which is unacceptable in logical, or philosophical arguments. "I have two distinct brothers who own the same car, and both drive their cars at the same time " Try to figure that one out. Oh, I really mean that they have similar cars, not "the same car". So, why didn't I say "similar" in the first place? I was just making use of a colloquialism to pull a trick on you. Ha, ha, isn't that a funny joke? Let's call it what it is, sophistry.
You say "synonyms have the same meaning". If you are using this as a premise for a logical argument, it's very clear that it ought to be rejected as unsound. What you really mean is "similar". So if you are trying to use this as a premise for an argument, please state it in an acceptable form. Don't use the form of sophistry.
Quoting Luke
No wonder there is so much confusion in the land of linguistic meaning. Sophistry abounds.
As I stated in my reply to Marchesk, we need to differentiate between the use of language itself, and the analysis of language use. Generalization enters when we look at how language was used, in retrospect, it is not an essential part of using language in the first place. When we generalize, we class similar things as the same. This use of "same" does not mean to say that similar things are the same, it means to say that they have been classed into the same category. The category here is the distinct "way of using" the word. When you say "synonyms have the same meaning", you are saying that these words belong to the same category (way of using).
By the way, we haven't gotten anywhere near to the bottom of this problem of the sophistic use of "same" in the land of linguistic meaning. In this illusory world, two distinct occurrences of a word are said to be occurrences of "the same" word. So the mother says "function", and then the daughter says "function", and we say that this is two occurrences of "the same" word. Clearly if we adhere to the law of identity we can see that this is a misleading use of "the same". And, we can also see that the sophism in this land of linguistic meaning has a very strong base.
It's a shame that your use of the word "same" cannot be identical to Aristotle's definition, by your own argument, since he lived so long ago. I wonder what you can possibly mean by "same" in your current, unique use of the word.
Nominalist, heal thyself!
Of course my instance of using "same" is not the same as Aristotle's, that's exactly the point, and it's quite obvious according to how "same" is defined by the law of identity. Whether it's "identical" depends on how one would define "identical". Do we adhere to "identity" as described in the law of identity as the basis for "identical", or do we subscribe to some form of similarity to define "identical"? Leibniz argues, with his principle "identity of indiscernibles" that "identical" ought to remain consistent with "same"
But Wittgenstein offers a very adept demonstration of a difference between "same" and "identical" at 253-256 of the Philosophical Investigations. You should read it, since I know that you take Wittgenstein as an authority. Notice at 253, that two distinct chairs can be said to be "exactly the same", yet they are distinct and therefore not "the same" by any rigorous standard of identity. Then, at 254 he mentions this switching of "identical" for "same", as if it were a philosophical ploy. (This is the sophism I refer to, two chairs are said to be "the same", because they appear to be identical, when in fact they are distinct chairs and not the same.) .
It is very important to understand this distinction in the way that we use "same", as a foundation for understanding how we attach names to our sensations, which is what Wittgenstein is discussing in that section. We will assign two distinct sensations the designation of "the same", based on some judgement of similarity, despite the fact that they are not "the same" by any rigorous criterion of identity. So when he proceeds to discuss how a symbol "S" is used to stand for a "certain sensation", what the "S" really stands for is a generalized multiple occurrence of multiple sensations, which have been judged as being similar (identical), but are not really "the same" according to the rigorous law of identity. It is only by circumventing the law of identity, and the rigorous criterion for "same" which is associated with it, that a symbol may be used to refer to a sensation in this way.
You asked me, Luke, what's the difference between usage and original usage. The answer is original usage is the first occurrence of he word in the language; and use of the word or language is the ensuing historical or current use of the word.
Witty did not say "I reject the status quo of the language". It is my judgment that he has, and hence his entire body of work.
I hope this post answers your questions and objections to your satisfaction.
You appear to have missed the point. A definition of the law of identity gives its meaning, yet it is your claim that no two meanings are the same or that we can ever be sure that they are the same, since agreement in ways of use are non-existent, and we can at best have only similar but not the same ways of use. Therefore, how can you use the law of identity as a law or a standard of sameness when the agreement of use is non-existent? You cannot be using it the same way as anybody else, including Aristotle, by your own argument. There is no such thing as the "same" because you have made it an impossible standard.
I don't suppose you have any specific references, other than his entire body of work?
They kept coming up but I couldn't get them to stick. I'd get legit frustrated encountering them, they were like little opaque blocks in the reading. But I guess the point of them is they're not meant to convey concepts (like the sat words I could master) but build worlds, and that only works if you have some sense of the world theyre a part of. Its hard to just learn one at a time, while theyre easy as pie if you have a sense of the world of a ship, and can place 'binnacle' in terms of a bigger lived-in space of which its a part.
Definitions work for the SAT words because definitions are conceptual and if you've already got the basic concepts, you're in a position to see how other conceptual words are situated. definitions of the other sort of term tho are almost inherently unsatisfying - almost like replacing a single word with a longer phrase which is just as ungraspable.
the only satisfying definition of 'binnacle' is 'that thing over there' when youve been on a ship long enough to already kind of get it. Just like you only get 'I can't function without...' if you've done a few tours and get mom, her coffee, her emotions etc.
no point really, just something that hit me at work.
I think it's a matter of sharing the same function, or at least the same kinds of functions. So, a cup (to refer to MU's example) is designed, and predominately used for, drinking from. Of course, it will be objected that different instances of drinking are not the same either, but the point is that taken in abstraction they are the same.
The question about generalization in general ( :wink:) is as to how we are able to abstract away all the differences between two things or events to see what they have in common, or how they resemble one another. It seems that difference and similarity are fundamental to human cognition and recognition, and are therefore not explicable in more basic terms. All explications rely on the cognition and recognition of difference and similarity, otherwise we could say nothing about anything, and then there would be no use or meaning.
Yes, it would seem that is so. I would contend this only works if the world has a related structure.
No, we were working with the premise that meaning is use, and attempting to determine how "use" is being used in this sense. To say that a definition is what gives the law of identity meaning is way off track. It is the use of the law of identity which gives it meaning, and I readily admit that we do not use it in the same way, but similar ways. So I do not see that you are making any point here whatsoever.
Quoting Luke
That's your opinion, it's not mine. If you think that the criteria for "same", as described by the law of identity is an impossible standard, and therefore you refuse to agree to it, then so be it. I agree to it, and other philosophers (Leibniz for example) agree to it, and therefore the agreement does exist. That you refuse to agree does not negate the agreement.
Quoting Luke
That is correct. I was making an opinion on Wittgenstein's entire work, and not making an opinion on a specific quote or passage in his works.
Dear Luke, please refer to this post for a considered reply to your query:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6291/is-it-an-unwritten-community-lawscustom-to-demand-factual-proof-when-making-a-reasoned-opinion
I think this is where your confusion lies Luke. I never said that agreements in ways of use are non-existent. I said that such generalizations about ways of use come about through retrospection. I do not deny the existence of generalizations, nor do I deny agreements in ways of use. What I deny is that generalizations indicate sameness within the things generalized, and that agreements in ways of use create same use. What is indicted by generalizations is similarity, and what is created through agreement is similarity.
And being similar is distinct from being the same. Is this difficult for you to understand?
What you seem to fail to understand is that similarity is not a concept sufficient to substitute in all uses of 'same'. "Two dogs are the same kind of animal"; I cannot substitute "two dogs are similar kinds of animal" without losing the sense of the statement. It all depends on criteria; I can say that cats and dogs are similar kinds of animal insofar as they are both placental mammals, both predators, both covered in fur, and so on. So saying that two dogs are similar kinds of animals entails that the sameness (of genome, for example) is lost.
I see. I must have misunderstood when you said:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, it's my "reasoned opinion" that you are completely wrong about Wittgenstein.
I accept your disagreement, but I see no reason accompanying your opinion.
I offer my opinion that you are wrong about my being wrong. My opinion is based on reasons that are not stated.
Likewise.
Yes I went through that already. It is appropriate, in a philosophical discussion, or logical argument, to say that two distinct things are of the same kind. It is inappropriate in a philosophical discussion, or logical argument, to say that two distinct things are the same. Despite the fact that we often say two distinct things are "exactly the same" in everyday language use, in philosophy this amounts to sophistry.
Quoting Luke
I apologize for lack of clarity at that point. I didn't mean that there is never any agreement, in an absolute sense, only that in those instances there is no agreement. I believe that is what the op indicates, there is no agreement in that instance of use, yet there is still meaning in that instance.
Bongo had said that we strive for agreement, but I think that people strive for agreement sometimes, and other times not, so striving for agreement is not essential, just like agreement itself is not essential.
We can look at "definition" as a type of agreement, and agreement clearly has a place in language use, especially philosophy and logical proceedings. For example, "I agree, for the purpose of this logical argument, to use "same" in the way indicated by the law of identity. But such an agreement wouldn't restrict the way that I use "same" in my day to day use, which might be full of bad habits. And so long as people understand my day to day use of "same" there is no problem.
However, if I slip outside of the defined usage, which I have agreed to in the proceeding of the logical argument, if my bad habits overwhelm my will to maintain what I've agreed to, then I may be charged with equivocation.
Here is the problem which Wittgenstein exposes at 253 of PI. When we are talking about our sensations, and how one person may experience "the same" sensation as another, by what criteria of identity are we using "same" in this case? Clearly we are not using "same" in the way outlined by the law of identity, as the example of the chair demonstrates. However, there are enormous epistemological consequences which follow from this use of "same", as Witty outlines in the following section. Unless there is some clearly stated criteria (a definition, or agreement) for how "same" ought to be used in this type of situation, all the epistemology which is built on this use of "same" is completely unsound.
Rubbish. What does "in an absolute sense" mean here? What "instances" are you talking about? You said: "we use language and therefore "play language games" without any such agreement." There was no qualification; you meant that there is never any agreement. "The agreement is non-existent."
... about, specifically, which words (or pictures or sunsets) are pointed (already or eventually) at which things.
I was aware that as a description of human discourse this calls for plenty of clarification, and I was trying to begin it by alluding to the "inscrutability of reference": the (alleged) fact that any actual connection between symbol and object is in our imagination or diagram. (Straw man version: no bolt of energy passes between symbol and object.) MU thought this irrelevant, so I wasn't surprised to find it difficult to know how best to engage with their subsequent critique, or whether it really engaged with mine.
But I fancy that their evident fear and loathing of equivocation might be related to my own fascination with what I see as a kind of equivocation at the heart of the social game (of agreeing what is pointed at what). As when, for example, we equivocate between implying that a particular token is (or isn't) pointed at a thing and implying rather that every single token "of the word" is (or isn't) pointed at the thing. Not to mention the equivocation dual with this, between referring to a single thing and referring to each of a whole class of ("same") things.
Not that I would think that all of this equivocating is necessarily a problem, if properly understood. Nor that I'm assuming anyone else would think it necessarily a problem, or that they don't already understand it better than I do. Hard to know what people's assumptions are in a discussion of this sort. Well, obvs.
Fair, if snooty, point. If my last post above is in any way to blame for your sense of dislocation then I should admit that I didn't explain how I might have expected MU, or anyone, to appreciate the relevance of "inscrutability" to the girl's efforts. In fact, I didn't even link back to here,
Quoting bongo fury
... which might have helped - since neither of us, here, is badly neglecting the child. I generalising unashamedly, yes.
Do you, also, find there being or not being a fact of the matter of meaning to be irrelevant to the girl's concerns?
I prefer the term arch. It was a joke.
Quoting bongo fury
Don't take it personally. I won't name names or initials.
Let's compromise: snooty joke.
Sure, why not.
No reason at all. We're all gonna die. Etc.
Being smothered to death by a blanket though does not seem like a good way to go.
You're drunk, aren't you?
... about, specifically, which words (or pictures or sunsets) are pointed (already or eventually) at which things.
I was aware that as a description of human discourse this calls for plenty of clarification, and I was trying to begin it by alluding to the "inscrutability of reference": the (alleged) fact that any actual connection between symbol and object is in our imagination or diagram. (Straw man version: no bolt of energy passes between symbol and object.) MU thought this irrelevant, so I wasn't surprised to find it difficult to know how best to engage with their subsequent critique, or whether it really engaged with mine.
But I fancy that their evident fear and loathing of equivocation might be related to my own fascination with what I see as a kind of equivocation at the heart of the social game (of agreeing what is pointed at what). As when, for example, we equivocate between implying that a particular token is (or isn't) pointed at a thing and implying rather that every single token "of the word" is (or isn't) pointed at the thing. Not to mention the equivocation dual with this, between referring to a single thing and referring to each of a whole class of ("same") things.
Not that I would think that all of this equivocating is necessarily a problem, if properly understood. Nor that I'm assuming anyone else would think it necessarily a problem, or that they don't already understand it better than I do. Hard to know what people's assumptions are in a discussion of this sort. Well, obvs.
Right, we can use language and play language games without any agreement, just like the girl in the op. Agreement may come afterwards, for those who strive for agreement as bongo says we do. Why impose "never" on your interpretation of what I said, when I never said never? Sometimes we agree, sometimes we do not. Where's the problem? When I speak of an instance when there is no agreement, why assume that I mean there is never agreement.
Quoting Luke
Are you familiar with the term "context". I said that agreement [in that type of instance which was being discussed, ones like the op], is non-existent. How can you interpret this as "there is never any agreement"? Come on Luke, you're just arguing for the sake of arguing, when will you start striving for agreement?
Quoting bongo fury
Let me repeat what I already said, in a different way. I really don't think that agreement is relevant here, at this level of meaning which is demonstrated by the op. When I say something to someone, and the person understands what I have said (understanding is demonstrated by the person's actions), I do not think that it is the case that the person agrees with how I use the words to point at different things. I think it is simply the case that the person understands how I use the words to point at different things. Understanding how the words are used, and agreeing with how the words are used, are distinct. So for example, when a person speaks to me using a lot of jargon which I do not think is warranted in the situation, I might understand what that person is saying, but I wouldn't agree with that person's use of words.
In this type of situation, we understand without agreement. Nor do we really strive for agreement because understanding is what is important, and so long as we understand each other it's sort of irrelevant whether or not we agree with how the other is using words. It might be better to say that we strive for understanding rather than agreement. But when it comes to philosophy, and logical arguments, agreement might be expedient toward understanding. Then we might strive for agreement, but this would still be for the sake of understanding. So we ought to give "understanding" priority over "agreement", as what is striven for, or required for language to be useful.
You say,
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Exactly! As though there were some fact of the matter (to be understood) of how you use the words to point at different things.
Whereas, I see it as a game of 'pretend', on which we must collaborate.
You say,
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Whereas I reject the jargon for the reason that it is not conducive to the necessary collaboration. We won't be able to agree (enough) what things (we should pretend) the words are pointed at.
Hence the gulf between our agendas, explaining why you answer this,
Quoting bongo fury
... with this,
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Which is fine, I'm not complaining. We have different agendas, different half-baked theories of discourse. I speak for mine when I say half-baked - yours can be done if you like.
As expected, very different views on "use", the difference resting, if I'm not mistaken, on whether we see reference as a matter of fact.
Lack of agreement does not necessarily mean that we disagree. If we do not understand each other then we can neither agree nor disagree. To be without an opinion on the matter allows one to neither agree nor disagree. And if the matter is seen as unimportant, or if there is no impending necessity of forming an opinion, one might intentionally continue in this state of neither agreeing nor disagreeing.
Quoting bongo fury
Yes, I understand this, but where does the "we must collaborate" come from? Let's assume that I want you to understand me, for my intents and purposes, and you want me to understand you for your intents and purposes, does that force the conclusion "we must collaborate"? If I am unwilling to help you, and you are unwilling to help me, then even though we want each other's help, we might just go on our separate ways, thinking that the other is unwilling to help. Where does the sense of fairness (you'll only help me if I help you), which is required for collaboration come from?
Quoting bongo fury
You haven't really described to me your view on "use", only repeating that it's very different from mine. Then when you allow me a little peek it appears to be very similar. You mention something about striving to agree, and the need to collaborate, but when I say something to you, you make a short reply and run away, saying we're very different in our views, making very little, if any attempt to agree. So it appears like you are proposing that we need to collaborate, and we ought to strive to agree, but you demonstrate the very opposite. This makes me very doubtful of your proposition. I don't see how you relate "use" to "we must collaborate". Do you recognize a difference between loving a person and using a person? How can you produce collaboration through "use" instead of through "love"?
So... you do understand how I might see your example (of how you use the words to point at different things) as a game of 'pretend', but it surprises you that I might see this as likely to involve collaboration?
You wouldn't expect a game of 'pretend' to involve agreement about what is to be pretended? (If it is to amount to a game between or among players, and not just a set of one-person games?)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting bongo fury
The word "use" is used in many different ways. If we restrict "use" to the sense of using words, then I think you need to realize that we use words for a lot of things more than just pointing at things. Do you agree that the most common use of words is to tell someone what to do? And do you agree that this is not a matter of pointing at something? Why do you want to restrict the meaning of "using words" to "using words for a particular purpose", when that particular purpose is to point at things?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Agreed.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
... or at least recognise use of words as an important kind of use...
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Here we differ.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, not really, but anyway...
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, not really. I think it's a matter, at least, of us striving to agree what some words (or pictures or sunsets) are pointed at. One domain from which to choose objects pointed at might be a set (perhaps fuzzy) of slabs, another domain might be a set of places-to-lay, another might be a set of expected tasks, another might be a set of payments or punishments, and so on.
"Urggh! How restrictive... "
Not necessarily. Or, rather... If only!
Under what elaborations, or other scenarios, would you like to explore / test it?
"Can't function" is nice... A relatively entrenched, 'literal' usage sorting the domain of machines into, roughly, those in working order and those not. Then, a more novel, 'metaphorical' usage to sort the different domain of people, according to criteria some of which agree and some contrast with those for literal application. An important contrast, creating humour, would be the more stringent standard, denying the status of working order to perfectly healthy and normal humans recently roused from a sleep state. The story amuses because the child has learnt the secondary, metaphorical use before the original, probably not sensing the humorous implications of the change in domain and criteria. The metaphor itself (the change in domain and criteria) amuses by creating referential links, under the surface as it were, by which other machine-words and machine-pictures are readied to help sort the domain of persons.
And of course we sense the more general struggle of the novice to project, from limited examples, to suitable occasions for pointing a word. Which is always cute. Because we feel so much more expert. Even though we can barely cope, ourselves, with the constant dilemmas of projection, domain ambiguity and type-token equivocation, which are endemic to the game.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
For the same reason someone might want to restrict the meaning of "momentum" to "mass times velocity". The promise of theoretical simplicity and generality. What I thought you might be craving when you lamented:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think that telling someone what to do, is not a matter of pointing at anything. How is an activity, which doesn't even exist yet, a thing?
Quoting bongo fury
So, how does "I can't function...", point to anything? You might say that the subject is "I" so it points to I, but the matter is "function", so the subject matter is "my functioning" and this is not a thing which is being pointed at. Subject matter in general, is not a thing.
Then there is what you call "metaphorical use". How do you think that metaphorical use is a matter of pointing at something?
I really think that most language use cannot be characterized as pointing at something.
Quoting bongo fury
What do you even mean by "pointing a word"? Is this metaphor? If not, I find it rather incoherent. What tool would you use to sharpen the tip of a word?
Quoting bongo fury
There's a problem with this type of restriction though. If you restrict your understanding of "using a word", to "using a word for the purpose of pointing at something", then all those instances in which people use words for something other than pointing at something will not be apprehended by your understanding. And if you say that "meaning is use", and restrict your understanding of "use" to the use of words, you will not apprehend all the meaning which is in those instances of using things other than words. Furthermore, if you restrict your understanding of "meaning" to "meaning is use", you will not apprehend all that meaning which is in things other than use.
Likewise, if you restrict your understanding of "inertia" to "momentum", thereby understanding inertia as mass times velocity, you will not apprehend the inertia of a body at rest. So "momentum" is useful for understanding the inertia of a body, just like "using a word to point at things" is useful for understanding the use of words, but it is an incomplete understanding. And to insist that it is complete would be a misunderstanding.
That should end with “QED,” the equivalent of philosopher smack talk.
Completion eludes us ... except maybe in death.
Haha, but "non sequitur".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
My analogy was: if you reduce your pre-systematic notions of momentum to mass times velocity, at the obvious cost of sidelining all sorts of helpful pre-systematic notions of momentum and wider aspects of motion, you gain a powerful theory which you may even find develops and generalises to apprehend all of those other pre-systematic notions, including notions of inertia. I don't claim this is the actual historical sequence with mechanics. Just that any theory is, typically, reductive (we certainly don't insist it is complete), but we hope that it produces thereby a more complete and systematic view, long term.
Sure, it may fail, and just be reductive. And a less obviously reductive theory may achieve a more systematic view. Let's judge by results.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Unless, as apparently occurs to you right away, it is a matter of pointing at an activity, probably from a range of alternatives. But,
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean 'thing' in the loosest sense, at least if questioned during the discourse itself, but later on...
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
... I will prefer a parsing that imputes pointing of a word at a relatively concrete entity. Here it is quite plausible that the girl points the phrase "can't function" at her concrete self.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
By being a word-pointing that participates in a novel sorting of some domain that is not its original or usual domain. In "can't function" the transfer is from the domain of machines to the domain of people.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Pointing of words (or phrases, or pictures or sunsets) at things, though? Participating in the vast cultural network of pointings we call usage. Helped along by what I was calling type-token equivocation, by which I meant the cultural pressure to infer (and the frequent utility in inferring) that a thing pointed at by one token of a word will tend to get pointed at by another token, and that two things alike in getting pointed at by one word will deserve to get jointly pointed at by other words too. Induction. Generalising. Learning through example and association. That kind of view of language use.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Sure. If it doesn't work for you, try another? The author of the theory I'm hawking calls it "labelling". We don't literally attach words to objects by uttering them, but by a few months old we are able to play the game of inferring the semantics that later on we learn to describe in these and other metaphorical (though often dead-metaphorical) terms: "calling it a...", "describing it as...", etc.
I know that many people (under a certain famous influence) assume such a view of language to be hopelessly impoverished. To me, it looks rich enough. If it were simply a matter of establishing and following a correlation (a word-object mapping), then yes, too easy - easier than human language, and not likely to pass any Turing tests. But what the human baby does is a lot more: it understands the correlation as a large and fragile game of pretence, not reliably tied to the facts of the situation; it has to engage in the complexest kind of collaboration and negotiation.
Telling someone what to do is not a matter of pointing to an activity, because the particular activity which is referred to does not even exist at the time of speaking. So even if we say that speaking is pointing, there is really nothing which is actually being pointed at. This problem is very evident with "meaning". Meaning is related to intention, and intention is related to what is wanted, and the "thing", or state, which is wanted is nonexistent. So your thesis is lacking, because it requires that we can point at non-existent things.
Quoting bongo fury
It's more than just a matter of using "thing" in a loose sense, because there is an issue of the relationship between the general and the particular. We ask for something in general, and the response is to give us something particular. So for example, "can you get me a cup please", refers to "a cup" in the general sense, but the hearer might get a particular cup. Now, the speaker was not referring to that particular thing which the hearer brought, nor is "a cup" a thing unless you're Platonic realist. And, if you're such a realist, then there is a huge gap between the "thing" referred to, the Idea of "a cup", and the thing which the person brings to you, a particular cup.
There is clearly a problem with this thesis, that speaking is pointing at things. It's obviously not "things" in any reasonable sense of the word, which are being pointed at in the act of speaking. And even if we use "things" in a very loose way, so as to include activities, the activity referred to is always (without exception) something general, while any "thing" referred to is something particular. Say a person describes an activity which has already occurred, such that we might think that it is an existent activity, the words used to refer to any activity always allow that one might be speaking about something else carrying out that (very similar, or "same") activity, rather than the particular thing which is being referred to as carrying out that activity. So referring to an activity is always a reference to something general, but if one points to a particular thing which has carried out this activity, is carrying out, or will carry out this activity, we attempt to particularize this reference. But such a thing, to particularize the general, is impossible because there is an incompatibility between the two.
When you say "speaking is pointing at things", and "I mean 'thing' in the loosest sense", you simply veil this incompatibility behind smoke and mirrors, as if you actually believed that you could use "thing" in a way which would make sense here. The problem of course, is that the general allows for the possibility of many different things, while "thing" indicates that a particular has been specified. So if we are pointing when we speak, we are pointing in many different directions according to the many possibilities allowed for by the use of the general, and the hearer might choose one direction, and act as if that is the "thing" referred to. But as you can see, the thesis that speaking is pointing is really inadequate, because pointing at all these different possibilities would require that one is pointing in many different directions at the same time.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not that, typically, we discourage children from pointing out hypothetical or potential circumstances? Fictional ones, even. Not in my home, anyway.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know if you come to bury "meaning" here or to praise it, but I would point out that I offer a considerable simplification: in equating use, meaning, reference, denotation, labelling, and pointing; and from largely (initially at least) setting aside such related notions as intention, desire, connotation, depiction, metaphor, expression and sensitivity. This is in the spirit of enlightened reductionism outlined above, with an expectation of dividends from the theoretical effort, not least by way of insights into the related notions.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As I was saying before, the aspiration is entirely in the direction you urge: towards an analysis that traces reference to concrete, existent things. More so, perhaps, since the reference is assumed to be by uttered or inscribed linguistic (or pictorial) tokens, rather than mental items? And you seem to me to exaggerate the difficulty of interpreting most word-pointings as being directed towards physical items. As a non-metaphysician I don't quite see the problem with tracing (albeit provisionally) reference to future objects and events. But perhaps you will provide me with a rude awakening in that regard?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You're preaching to the converted, here. I'm surprised you don't see that.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If the difference between us is that you see an impossibility where I see a normal human skill of constructive ambiguity, could that be because you haven't grasped the relevance of the inscrutability involved: there being no fact of the matter?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, why is this a problem, that we should be ever unsure whether a token is pointed at some one or several or all of the things that every token "of the word" ever points at? This would be how we generalise and particularize.
What I believe, is that the attempt to simplify a complex thing is a mistake, because it leads to misunderstanding, in the sense of a person who believes oneself to understand the thing because it has been simplified, but really does not understand the thing because it is complex.
The point I'm trying to make, is that I think we can understand some aspects of meaning in terms of pointing, but many other aspects of meaning we cannot understand in terms of pointing. So for instance, part of one's use of language might consist of pointing at a thing, and this is an important part of language and meaning, but what someone says about that thing, what it is doing, or describing its properties, cannot be understood within the context of pointing. This again is an important part of language use and meaning, but it is a part that cannot be understood as pointing.
Quoting bongo fury
As I explained, this form of reductionism doesn't work. It creates the illusion of a complete understanding through explicitly equating one thing with another, "meaning is pointing", or "momentum is mass time velocity", when in reality there is much more to each of these concepts than that which it is equated with. Understanding "meaning" also requires understanding types of activities (and these cannot be pointed to), and understanding "momentum" also requires understanding inertia (which is not covered by "mass times velocity"), because "velocity" requires a frame of reference.. By saying one is equal to the other, an illusion of completion is created, which is really a deception.
Quoting bongo fury
You see no problem with taking it for granted that one can point to something which is not there? I don't understand how you can believe that you can point to something which is not there, and then just assume that you are actually pointing at something. And to simply point, without pointing at anything specific, is not really pointing at all. That's the point I'm making, you ought not characterize this as pointing. If someone uses language to refer to something, then we can say that the person is pointing at that thing. But when a person uses language to refer to something non-existent, how can we assume that this is a matter of pointing at something?
Quoting bongo fury
I really do not see this inscrutability which you claim to be pointing at. What I see is that you are describing something as "pointing" when the thing being described really cannot be described in that way. So you might say "I am pointing to an inscrutability", but in reality there is no inscrutability there, only a vague inaccuracy in your description. What you are really doing is pointing at language use, and insisting that all language use is a matter of pointing, but when it is shown that this is impossible because sometimes there is nothing there being pointed at, instead of seeing that this is not a matter of pointing, you try to dismiss the argument by saying that this is an inscrutable type of pointing. If "pointing" doesn't suit as an appropriate descriptive term, and there is something inscrutable going on, then why not just say that it is something inscrutable rather than a pointing.
Quoting bongo fury
I will ask you then, how is this a pointing? Suppose there are a thousand equally probable possibilities indicated by a single use of a single word, for example, "get me a cup please", when there are a thousand cups in the room. How can you describe this use of that word as a pointing?
Let's assume to point is to direct one's attention. What exactly is the person who says "get me a cup please" directing the other's attention toward? Would this be an imaginary future state, in which the person speaking has a cup? Not really, because the person making the request is requesting that the other perform a particular action, and the reason for this is unknown. So, the person says it because the person wants the other to act. Where is the "directing one's attention"? We often act without directing our attention, as reflex indicates. I think that the principal use of language is to get a response, a reflex action, out of another, without actually directing the other's attention. Any attempt to direct the other's attention would be far too imposing on the other's sense of freedom, and the individual's own will to direct one's own attention toward one's own interests. Therefore attempting to direct another's attention would not be effective, because the person whom you were trying to direct (show the way by pointing), would dismiss this as interference against one's own free will to choose one's own way. So when someone says something, I think that person is simply trying to get a reaction out of the other, without trying to interfere with, or direct, the other's attention. Such actions as trying to direct another's attention (like pointing) would be received as rude and interfering, negative, and therefore not conducive to cooperation. Remember the distinction I made between using another, and cooperating with another? Directing another's attention, pointing, is an instance of using the other.
Just to clarify, I’m not picking on you. I haven’t read the whole thread as I stopped after the OP and the first few responses. Then I picked it up again later on. If one were a psychiatrist or psychologist reading these discussions on this philosophy forum, one might conclude that ALL philosophy enthusiasts or philosophers have loose associations and thought disorders. Just how did we get here from where it all started? One might also conclude that such people ALL have mood disorders given the general moodiness on this forum. Then again, I may just be projecting.
Anyway, carry on.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Clearly, I'm barking up the wrong tree trying to sell my favourite theory to you as a paragon of scientific systemization and simplification. Never mind.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, if it turns out that there was (in the end) nothing there, I and probably the speaker will look for an alternative interpretation. I did say "albeit provisionally".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I notice you keep saying "pointing at something" and ignoring my reminders that it is generally a matter (or rather a mutually agreed pretence) of "pointing a word at something". This (stated properly as a semantic relation between word and object and not usually finger-pointer and object) strikes me as perfectly intuitive, something a child will recognise as being essentially what we are playing at, with language. I sense that you sense this, and are forced into mis-stating the principle in order to deflate the intuition, or to divert us into a certain famous ready-made critique of finger-pointing, which I think is an unnecessary diversion.
Obviously, we can easily cause the child to question the intuition, and quite possibly to soon disavow it. I, though, think the intuition is a good enough basis for a thoroughgoing theory, such as the one I have alluded to, recommended, and tried (however inadequately) to apply to the OP. And I thought you might be interested. And thank you very much for your highly interesting interrogations about it!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm admitting it's far worse than that! Your token of "cup" could be pointing at (referring to) any or all of past, present and future cups. Obviously your interlocutor will look for suitable examples that are ready to hand. You might even produce a token (or, indeed, a finger) that points out a more particular target. But you both want to allow the pointing at any or all cups as well, as this is how (according to the theory I recommend) we create what other philosophers were (and on occasion still are) inclined to call a "concept" or "idea" or "form" of a cup, but which we can better see as a classification, through language, of objects.
I'll let you have the last word. Thanks for looking!
It's not a question of how it turns out, it's a question of whether or not there is something there being pointed to, and the answer to that question is no. The argument, that something may come about, and this particular thing would be the thing which is pointed at, doesn't make sense because that thing might not come about. And when it doesn't, this is clear evidence that the speaking was not a case of pointing to something, in the first place. That's the point, we have clear evidence here that speaking is not reducible to pointing at something.
Quoting bongo fury
No, this is not intuitive to me at all. As I've said, I find that the majority of language use cannot be described as establishing a semantic relation between a word and an object. That's why I've taken the time to explain to you that very often there is no object which is referred to. "Get me a cup please", when there is a thousand cups in the room does not establish a semantic relation between a word and an object, nor is it spoken with the intent of establishing such a relation.
Furthermore, I really cannot understand what you could possibly mean by "pointing a word at something". As I said before, this is incoherent to me, and I asked you for an explanation. So you called it "labelling", but I don't see how labelling is pointing words. And speaking about things is not simply labelling things, it consists of describing things, saying where they are, etc.. These are not instances of labelling. This is what I've been trying to explain to you. It is one thing to name something, label it, and maybe you might like to call this pointing a word at it, but it is something completely different to say something about that thing. Let's assume we've labelled an object, "my phone", so that you would assume that when I mention "my phone" this is a matter of pointing to it. When I say something about my phone, like "I do not know where my phone is", how can you construe this as a pointing at my phone?
Quoting bongo fury
You're very welcome, that's what I like to do, interrogate so that I might better understand your thesis, so it's really my pleasure.
Quoting bongo fury
Then it appears like you agree that it's not really a pointing. You might interpret "get me a cup please" as pointing to a cup, but you readily admit that this is a misinterpretation, because I'm really not fussy and I don't care which cup you bring me. Really, I'm not pointing at any cup whatsoever, or anything in particular, I'm just trying to get you to do something.
Quoting bongo fury
Of course I would say that this theory is evidently wrong. We do not create the concept, idea, or form of "cup" by pointing at cups. We create such concepts through descriptions, just like geometrical concepts. This is not to say that a child cannot learn how to identify a cup by having people point to cups, but knowing how to pick out a cup from a bunch of objects does not require that the child has a concept, idea, or form of "cup". This is the difference between knowing how to identify a cup, and knowing what a cup is.