Luke

It's good to see you finally acknowledge that the issue concerns the recurrence of the sensation, and not just a single instance of the sensation. Thi...

Let’s suppose you are right and that Wittgenstein is talking only about a single particular token of the sensation. As he describes it at PI 258: So I...

Yes, but what is important, crucial and meaningful in an activity is not equivalent with what an expression means or the use it has, is it? Right, but...

I raised it because it helps to clarify the different meanings of "the same". I started responding to your comment on the chair at PI 253 because the ...

This seems similar to what I was saying in the other discussion: that I intend my use of the public language, but I do not invent the conventional use...

EVERY TIME implies more than one time. A token occurs only one time, so W cannot be talking about a singular token of the sensation. If he was talking...

In case you don't understand the type/token distinction, "the same one every time" implies it is the same type of sensation every time. A token of the...

Do you call it "toothache" every time you have toothache? Why don't you call it something different every time (for each token of toothache)? Or do yo...

How am I be responsible for it if I did not intend it?

For starters, chairs don't recur. If you were to see an identical chair "day after day, week after week", then it would be the same token of chair. I ...

And I've just pointed out to you that Wittgenstein is talking about two objects the same; not one object the same.

The argument I gave about recurrence. Perhaps you'd care to address it?

He is talking about the same type of sensation; not the same token of sensation. This is evident because he speaks of the recurrence of the sensation....

How could I mean one sense instead of another? You just said that "Saying something particular is not caused by my intention".

I thought you said there are no such things as sensations or pain. So what are we right to assume? What is "the only thing we could possibly say const...

What if they do materialise? How does a sensation differ from an interocepted physiological state? And if it does have the intended effect on those st...

Once again: LOL. You've never been in pain? You don't know what "pain" means? I wouldn't want you to upset your theories by feeling anything.

Doesn't what you've written here have a meaning that is "particular and certain"? How does this relate back to the private language argument? I don't ...

Why are you doubting that you or someone else is using the word "pain" correctly? I just said that you were now talking in terms of third-person model...

First-person is you, not they.

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You're now talking in terms of third-person modelling. Wittgenstein says that it is possible for other people to doubt whether I'm in pain. But if you...

I'm not saying that "pain" is used to refer to an autonomous response nor to a natural expression or reaction. Pain is not identical with its expressi...

Do you acknowledge two different senses of "meaning" here? One sense of "meaning" (as in word meaning) is definition, explanation, or sense. The other...

Yes, but not with my recent questioning of your implication that there are no natural expressions or reactions. I don't see what conscious processing ...

I was only talking about natural expressions/reactions, not language. How are you distinguishing those autonomous responses (such as "already pulled a...

You're implying that there are no natural human expressions or reactions. How are a tendency to say "ouch" or a tendency to withdraw from the perceive...

You don't get it. You quote Wittgenstein saying that it is "possible for us both to have the same pain", but it could not be possible if there were no...

Okay, but you're no longer talking about the sensation of pain, like Wittgenstein is.

You're not actually talking about pain. You are talking about the physiological functions that are known to be correlated with pain, and calling it "t...

Well, that was the question I originally asked you. This reasoning would commit you to saying that patients under anaesthetic are in pain (or equivale...

Then why did you say: I don't think you understand PI 216 or much of anything that Wittgenstein says.

You agree with Wittgenstein that the law of identity is - as you call it - "a useless statement"? Then why do you also say things like this: On the on...

You would say that they were in pain even if they had no "unpleasant experience"? I think Wittgenstein's point is that having a pain (or other sensati...

Could you be in pain and not know it?

Likewise.

“Now”? Following from what?

I did, and I think you are mistaken to read §244 as making a distinction between "I have a pain in my hand" and "I have a phone in my hand". I'll gran...

True, but that's not the point of §244.

Obviously both are expressions. Wittgenstein asked: "How does a human being learn the meaning of names of sensations?" He suggests that it's via an as...

Yes, I read it. It does not support your view. He goes on to ask how we learn the names of sensations (e.g. "pain"): He answers: You take from this th...

Having an instinct for language is not the same as having a language.

Yes. People may have an instinct for language (although I'm not sure what that means, exactly). However, nobody knows English, or any other language, ...

Nobody taught you how to speak English?

This must be hell for English teachers. Why is it impossible?

Let me start with the admission that my comments on intention were my own and are possibly not in accordance with Wittgenstein's views on intention. I...

I came across this neuroscience article (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6499020/#sec3title) which I think has a good discussion of Wittg...