Luke

Wikipedia tells me: From this I gather that a 'proper noun' is a noun that refers to a single entity. I guess, but then the first also refers to the s...

You said that common or conventional language use "may dictate what is correct and incorrect, it does not necessarily indicate what is true and what i...

You are not describing your pain, but you are describing your sensation? I take W to be saying that if you say you are in pain, then you are expressin...

I'm startled that you are criticising me instead of MU, who asserts: while at the same time contradicting his claimed awareness with comments such as:...

You overlooked my quote of PI 241. Does the English language have real existence? Santa Claus or any other proper noun does not really fit types and t...

Why are you introducing truth and falsity? Correctly call what existence? Are you questioning the existence and use of nouns? Whose imagination does c...

Earlier in the discussion, I said: This summarises the kernel of his On Certainty-style argument that can be found at PI 246, for example. Along the s...

Aren't we talking about the sensation of pain? What many different ways are there to define "pain" in this sense? (I'm not asking what many different ...

I don't want to say that you can't call it a description, but I don't find the word apt. It's unclear to me what it is a description of. And is it the...

You agree that Wittgenstein dismisses the inner sensation completely, or you agree only that most people tend to think this?

Ah, I misread you. My apologies. Yes, that is his misconception. :grimace:

I misspoke here, but I corrected it in my following response. Yes, there are many different types or classes of pain (these are the subclasses), but t...

Why do you think that? This would imply that we all use words differently (assuming meaning is use) and that there are no criteria of correctness in t...

Earlier in the article, Floyd offers this "possible interpretation": Following this interpretation, the word "pain" is used as a reference to a sensat...

You are right that the type "pain" can be divided into subtypes. But the type "pain" is not its subtypes. There is only one type or class that is "pai...

Thanks Banno, I agree with you about enacting rules. I guess I should have specified my interest in the article, which I thought was a somewhat unique...

In the interests of "re-railing" the discussion, I came across this article only this week. I found it to resonate with my own views on the PLA: https...

That doesn't answer my question of what you think a token is, or how you think I am using the word "token". We don't each have our own types of "pain"...

What way is that (or what do you think it is)? I never said that. I don't care if you're lying or not. It's not about me trying to work out if you gen...

You want me to produce my sensations? Do you not have them yourself? Do you want to contradict Wittgenstein and say that you doubt whether you are in ...

A token is an instance is an example. Either you have pains or you don't. Are you claiming that you lie about it in every instance? You seem to be cla...

You said that "A token is an example of a type, by definition." So that means your pains are not examples (or instances) of the type "pain"? I did not...

I hate to break it to you, but "pain" is a word in our public language. I would be more than happy to show you an instance of pain if you would let me...

One more try, because I'm tired of your inability to grasp the type/token distinction. Right, an expression is not a token of the type "pain". What is...

“An example of a type” is an instance of a type, i.e. a token. The toothache or toe pain you have on a particular day or for a particular period of ti...

Pain is a sensation. Surely you’ve had an instance (token) of pain before. And more than one separate instances of pain. No?

Where have you seen this use of a private language before? How does the diarist know the sensation is not “exactly like the other one”?

It entirely depends on the diarist to write "S" in their diary for each recurrence of the sensation, so "the convenience of public communication" is i...

Whatever is going to seem wrong to me is wrong. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘wrong’.

Here we can’t talk about ‘wrong’, either.

You started out comparing a token of a feeling to a token of a car. But you then asked why a feeling is different from looking-at, instead of why a fe...

That's a bit bloody rich coming from you. Hilarious. Here's a reminder of how the discussion transpired with no changes or omissions to the direct res...

In relation to your book example, I think it is largely to do with "time and chance" and maybe also physiology. We typically only consider ourselves t...

What confusion? The only confusion here is yours, caused by your ignorance and misunderstanding of the type/token distinction, which for the umpteenth...

I don’t know what you meant by your glaring contradiction.

Unless I’ve misunderstood, I think your comments would be better directed at Meta than myself. I agree with you that tokens, or unique individual inst...

This is one token of a chair: “the very same chair”. You are not distinguishing two instances of chair here. We cannot have different instances of the...

What does this have to do with your false assumption that tokens must be encountered? Back to square one, indeed. • As I said in my previous post and ...

"Encountering" or "experiencing" is not a requirement of the type/token distinction, nor is it part of the definition of a token. That is nothing but ...

I don't know; I'm only applying the type/token distinction to sensations in order to clarify what could be meant by "the same sensation", by noting th...

You asked for proof regarding the type/token distinction. I can only refer you to the definition, otherwise I don't know what sort of proof you mean. ...

Look up the type/token distinction. It doesn't have a private meaning. What do you mean by "the same token"? I'm not basing it on an internal/external...

It depends on the token/type. In terms of sensations, "encountering a token" is a particular instance of having the sensation. Unless you can time tra...

A token does not refer to how many times you see something. In the case of chairs it refers to one (instance of a) chair. He says: "I want to keep a d...

The point I’ve unsuccessfully been trying to make is that Wittgenstein is talking about establishing the name of a sensation. This means not only esta...

Because it isn't the same token of the sensation, obviously. If you have a sensation and it goes away, then it's not the same token of the sensation w...

It's not disproven by the chair. The chair is no different. A token of the chair just means the existence or "lifetime" of the chair. Excluding any ki...

What is supposedly being named is a type of sensation, not a token of the sensation. That’s my point. Your iPhone 12 and my iPhone 12 are different to...