Some remarks on Wittgenstein's private language argument (PLA)
Gertie says, "Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject.
I want to specifically respond to statements like this, which is important to what Wittgenstein is saying in OC, and how it relates to the PLA in the PI.
Private Language Argument (PI 243-315)
In the Philosophical Investigations (PI 243) Wittgenstein starts by asking an important question. “But could we imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and the rest—for his private use?” But don’t we often write down our feeling and moods, etc., in private? Wittgenstein replies, “This isn’t what I mean,” i.e., the words in this example are not something others understand. It’s a private language, i.e., it’s only known to him or her.
Wittgenstein also asks, “How do words refer to sensations?—There doesn’t seem to be any problem here; don’t we talk about sensations every day and give them names?” However, the real question is how is the relationship between the name and its referent set up? How is it, Wittgenstein continues (I’m quoting and paraphrasing PI 244), that a human being learns the meaning of the names of their sensations? A child learns to connect their natural expression of pain with words, and later sentences. As the child learns how to associate language with their pain, the child is taught new pain-behavior. This, Wittgenstein points out, doesn’t mean that the word pain really means crying, the word pain replaces crying. It doesn’t describe it.
In PI 246 Wittgenstein asks, “In what sense are my sensations private?”—Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “to know” as it is normally used (and how else are to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.—Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself!—It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain? What is it supposed to mean [my emphasis]—except perhaps that I am in pain?”
Others know when you are in pain (unless you’re purposely hiding your pain), i.e., they’re justified in believing you’re in pain because of what you tell them, or because of your pain behavior (screams, cries, wincing, etc.). So, others are justified in their knowledge of your pain, but you’re not. You don’t justify to yourself that you’re in pain. This is senseless.
So, you say to someone, “I am in pain,” they respond, “Are you sure, maybe you’re mistaken.” You see how silly it sounds. Making a claim to knowledge carries with it the idea that you’re justified in your belief, which is something that’s verified. Sometimes it turns out that my justification is unfounded. Hence, this is why Wittgenstein points out in OC 12 that knowing “…seems [note the word seems] to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression ‘I thought I knew.’” It often turns out that we are wrong in our claims to know, but how would that work with having a pain, or any sensation we're having?
I will continue the analysis of the PLA.
Comments (773)
It appears that Wittgenstein's private language argument is about, all things considered, the subjective nature of consciousness and how that bears on language.
A private language is dedicated to those aspects of experience that can't be made public and thus, with nothing to refer to, given a sign in a private language, a person trying to learn or translate the sign can't do both. It's as if the sign were attached to a thread that extends back to its referent kept in a pitchblack room - no way of discovering the referent.
Wittgenstein then claims, for the private language user, the only possible means by which fae can know that fae is using a word/sign in that private language correctly is to consult oneself and that's problematic for the simple reason that whatever seems/is thought to be correct will be taken as correct. The notion of correct usage becomes meaningless as the verificatory process is, at the end of the day, circular: If you're unsure whether a word/sign is being used correctly by you, how can you ask yourself to check whether a word/sign is being used correctly by you?
A private language, therefore, is incoherent - there's a high probability it lacks the required level of consistency between sign/word and referent to qualify as a legit language. The sign-referent pairing could be virtually random and the private language user wouldn't have the slightest clue - fae can't ask faerself to clear faer own doubt, fae doubts precisely because fae can't clear faer doubt.
So we can't say, "I know that I see a red coffee cup", or "I know that I had a dream last night of my teeth falling out while addressing an audience in my underwear as a tsunami approached"?
That seems to undermine empiricism. Of course we know things based on having experiences. Sensations make up those experiences.
My take is that it's not so much about the "nature or consciousness," but about the nature of language against the backdrop of consciousness. But ya, there is definitely something to be said about consciousness when analyzing Wittgenstein's comments over all. However, it seems to be more of an aside. It would be interesting though to study consciousness through Wittgenstein's eyes.
Quoting TheMadFool
I think we agree here, except for the idea that it's circular. I'm not sure about that, you may be correct though, but it depends on how the argument is framed.
As to the first question, "I know that I see a red coffee cup," whether one knows it or not depends on the context. There are situations where it would make sense to make such a statement, viz., maybe the lightening is poor, or you're closer to the object than someone else who's enquiring about the object, etc. But generally speaking, and this is the same with Moore's statements, it's senseless to say, as we're both sitting in front of a red cup, that you know that you see a red cup. As Wittgenstein points out, what does this amount to, other than, "It's a red cup." Is there some legitimate doubt here? If there is, then yes, the "I know..." would make sense.
Your second example is even more problematic, because it's difficult to think of an example in which it would make sense to say, "I know that I had a dream last night..." Maybe if someone was learning English it might make sense, i.e., learning to use the word dream. Maybe some of this will become clearer as we go through Wittgenstein's argument, or maybe you'll just never agree with W.
Quoting Marchesk
I don't think this affects empiricism at all, because there are things that we can legitimately doubt, that do need an empirical analysis, or an empirical justification. Wittgenstein wouldn't deny this. Do you have to justify to yourself that you had a dream last night? No. You just say you had a dream, and you may describe the dream, but that's about it. Unless you know someone is being deceitful, but that's something else entirely.
We could be feeling a vague , ambiguous sensation that at times seems like pain and at other times like a tickle or distraction. The context (bodily-cognitive-affective-social) determines what exactly it is we think we are feeling. And when we determine a sensation to be pain, we are not simply consulting an already extent fact, but construing a fresh variant , a new contextual use of ‘pain’. Wittgenstein is right that the pointing to a feeling and construing it as ‘pain’ is not the consulting of an inner domain. In making this argument , he always uses interpersonal situations as examples of the social , the language game. But the social begins even prior to the interpersonal understood this way. Between I and myself there is a social , an other that intervenes the moment I point to an experience. This sociality doesnt require the presence of other ‘persons’ to participate in the game. The game is already underfoot between ‘I’ and myself. It is not public in the sense of a between-person interaction , but neither is it private in the sense of an inner repository of referents.
My reaction to this, is that the word social, as you're using it, is not a normal use of the word. Social contexts require other people, we don't refer to the "I and myself," as something social. Besides what's the difference between the "I' and "myself," it seems to me you're describing the same person, viz., you.
I brought up consciousness because Wittgenstein, despite his exceptional ability to find good examples, only uses ones that are about consciousness, specifically that aspect (sensation) which philosophers term qualia which I hear is a hot topic in mind philosophy. He didn't have a choice which has its own point to make about the relationship between consciousness and language viz. we can't think about, linguistically, private mental experiences in a consistent/coherent manner.
Quoting Sam26
I have my doubts too - I skimmed through the Wikipedia and Stanford Enyclopedia Of Philosophy articles on private language argment and pieced together the puzzle as best as I could.
How's it going at your end? Any progress?
My understanding of self here comes from phenomenological philosophy, particularly Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty( also Derrida). For them self is not an entity, it is a constantly transforming interaction with world. They abandon the idea of outer and inner. The self is always outside of itself , coming back to itself from the world. To the extent that my use of social isn’t ‘normal’ it is not because it denies immediate expose use to an outside , an alterity , the foreign and the empirical, but because it is claiming such an exposure isnt restricted to interaction with other ‘persons’.
Quoting Shawn
Yes, the argument is that you don't know you're in pain, i.e., you don't justify it to yourself, you just have the pain. We say, "I'm in pain." However, we can justify to ourselves and others that someone else is in pain, i.e., by observing their pain behavior, so there is an important difference.
Why the talk about 'justification' when this fact of being in pain can be discerned from behavior?
You're right, in many cases it doesn't even make sense to say, "I know Mary is in pain," it would be like Wittgenstein's example of a sick man lying in bed, and I say to you, "I know there is a sick man lying in bed," sounds a bit off to say the least, so yes you're right. However, I can imagine a case where it would make sense to have to justify to you that Mary's in pain, i.e., where a doubt might arise. But I can't imagine a case where I would have to justify to myself that I'm in pain. The difference between the statements "I know I'm in pain," and "I know Mary's in pain." A doubt in the former statement seems quite senseless, but a doubt in the latter statement is easily imagined. Maybe a doubt might occur in the former statement if you're questioning your use of the word know because your learning English, so maybe it can be imagined.
As Wittgenstein might put it, it would seem queer to doubt someone is in pain based on ostensive displays of behavior indicating them being in pain.
But, yes I don't think it would be possible to doubt yourself that you are in pain. It's rather bedrock at this point.
This is likely a distraction, but what happens with the past tense? Say you don't generally justify that you know you are dreaming (you are asleep after all), but then you are talking to someone and they say, "You look good in that."
Sometime later you think to yourself, "Who told me I look good in this?" You think awhile and can't remember, but has the occasion slips further into the past you begin to feel increasingly unmoored from the memory - like it is a transient thing that you have a glimpse of but as no real content. In fits and spurts it happens and then one day you think to yourself, "I must have dreamt that." Time passes and you come to believe that you know you were dreaming when you heard it, as that is what your memory consists of.
Now you meet the same person again and by chance you are wearing the same thing. The person says, "You look good in that." You respond, "Ha. The last time you said that was in my dreams." The person responds, "Why do you think you were dreaming?" And you respond "I know I was dreaming."
What work does "I know" do?
A very [I]vague[/i] one, until specified.
There is a shared context here of agreed access to remembered dreams. Their question “Why do you think you were dreaming “? almost certainly suggests to you that they also remember their dreams , or at least know when they have dreamt, and is questioning you on that basis. So your claim to ‘know’ implies your preparedness to share your method of ascertaining that knowledge with them , via recollection of a dream. Your claim to know anticipates his potential interest in probing your ability to demonstrate to them the reasons for your confidence that you were dreaming it.
My guess is that it expresses a person's emotional need to underscore their certainty and has rhetorical use.
"Them" are too abstract. "You" is just the bodily you, talking, feeling, gesturing, feeling angry or in love, seeing ideas and dreams and thoughts in your inner world, perceiving colors and forms in the physical world, etcetera. All thanks to the brain inside of you, that brain being the generator of your inner world, you in between this brain (inner world() and the physical world (outer world).
Quoting Sam26
I picked a dream because that was my mood, but I can also lay out a pleasant tale about how I know I was in pain when I stubbed my toe. Is it that we don't justify our claim of our present sense perception or that we don't ever justify our claims of sense perception? I am not talking about "I saw a ghost!" and someone points out that you saw a sheet (errors of interpretation), but what we do with past sense perceptions and whether we justify our beliefs about them to ourselves.
Why do you say that the notion of correct usage becomes meaningless? As Sam26 says, the verification is not circular. The individual applies one's own criteria and makes the judgement of "correct". Isn't that how any judgement of "correct" is made, by an individual applying what is believed to be the relevant criteria? Where's the problem? What makes such a judgement meaningless?
That's just it. The meaning of the sign 'pain' (if we insist that there is such a thing) has to be 'out there' in the behavior that one would appeal to in order to justify a claim.
Is what I call 'pain' the same as what you call 'pain'? Those who think 'pain' has an internal/private referent would like to (or even have to) say yes. Maybe they'd justify that hunch in terms of similar behavior. But doesn't it make more sense to see that 'pain' gets its 'meaning' (as a token of social currency) in the behavior that surrounds it? To put it another, it's conceivable that an artificially intelligent agent could employ the word successfully and pass the Turing test. The 'structure' of the 'meaning' of 'pain' is 'out here' in public.
Personally I find all this in implied/suggested by Wittgenstein. If meaning is outside, part of the world, then the 'internal monologue' is not longer either internal or a monologue in a strong sense.
I find the resonances between Wittgenstein and phenomenology fascinating. I also find the differences important. For instance , Nietzsche’s influence
cured Heidegger of the temptation toward a religious moralism. Unfortunately, the same can’t be said for Wittgenstein, and I think this moralism is implied in his work.
It also seems to me that language games are vulnerable to Heidegger’s depiction of Das Man; this would be discourse as a flattened sharing rather than Heidegger’s account of authentic discourse as oriented toward one’s ownmost possibilities.
At least for the early Wittgenstein it was everything outside the domain of propositional analysis.
I also do want to mention Searle in how he carries out the moral issue from the perspective of law and order in/of a society. Not just the individual and their conception of morality.
It's not as though we can't apply the word know in private after learning how to use it socially. The real question has to do with the meaning of "I know..." being associated with something internal, i.e., something private, including a private language. He's basing his knowledge on a memory, albeit a false memory. It seems as though the "I know..." is doing some work here, in that he believes he is justified based on what he remembers. We often do this, but in this case there is an appropriate doubt emerging, so the further question is, "How do you know?" Of course it will later be confirmed that he is not remembering correctly, so his justification is unfounded.
Note that in OC Moore is saying he knows this is a hand without an appropriate doubt. In fact, the point that Wittgenstein makes, is, what would it mean to doubt in Moore's context? "I know..." in Moore's context is definitely not doing any work. It's empty, he saying no more than, "This is a hand." If we can appropriately say, "I know X," then we could certainly imagine how it is that we can fail to know, fail to be justified in our claim. Hence, the phrase, "I thought I knew," which by the way works in your dream example. So, again, I see the "I know..." in your example as appropriate. At least that's my take.
I'm going to try to post something from the PI next.
"For how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between pain and its expression (PI 245)."
I would be interested in what others think of this passage. What would be in between pain and the expression of pain? Is there something there that could be referenced? I would think not. I'm not sure what Wittgenstein is getting at. What is it that he's trying to get us to think about?
In PI 246 Wittgenstein asks, "In what sense are my sensations private?--Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain [of course this is the mistaken idea that emerges from those who are making the mistake]; another person can only surmise it." Wittgenstein points out two problems with this statement. First, it's incorrect to think that others can only surmise (or guess) that I'm in pain. This is just wrong, people often correctly infer that another is in pain based on their outward expressions of pain, and it's objectively confirmed. As to the second mistake, "What is it supposed to mean--except perhaps that I am in pain?" It's not a matter of knowing. How could I doubt that I'm in pain? I just broke my nose, I'm having the pain, that's it, end of story. What am I supposed to justify here? Do I look inwardly, and say, oh ya, there it is, the pain, yep, I'm having it. Okay, now I know I'm in pain. Nonsense.
I don't see it (or I choose to ignore it perhaps.)
Quoting Joshs
Roughy it's as if 'form of life' = 'Das Man.' Being-in-the-world, being-with-others,... is being-in-language-in-the-world-with-others.
Quoting Joshs
To me this is (or can be read as) Heidegger's moralism, related to Kierkegaard's.
A more neutral rendition might a spectrum that runs from the hackneyed to the offensive and the obscure. If the point is the rescue a heroic subculture of the single genius, then's there a little room for that. Surely an individual can stand out against background more than others...but not without being primarily 'made' of that background, sensible in terms of it.
You gotta use words when you talk to me, words you didn't define (if you define your own new jargon, it's in terms of the one we were thrown into.)
Perhaps he means the difference between some postulated 'raw feel' and all the understood-as-signs for it. 'Logically' one cannot be wrong about how things 'seem' to one. I mean simply that we don't usually challenge such claims. Some philosophers extrapolate from this kind of thing that some private show is involved. Pain is understood as one of those 'mental' (infinitely intimate) entities that the experiencer cannot misperceive. But this unmistakable private something is also unnamable...except through public actions that get associated with the public token 'pain.' I don't know if my red is your red, but we both know that roses are red. In the same way pain goes with injuries and aspirin.
I don’t define my own words de novo, but they are not simply introjected from a culture either. There is no such thing as culture as a monolithic structure , at any level , even at the level of a language game with two participants. Each word that is ‘shared’ between us is a different sense of the word for you than it is for me. It must be in order for there to be an ‘us’. I am already an other to myself when I talk or think to myself. The words I ‘use’ to think to myself come back to me in the instant I use them as if they came from another. I am changed in using my own words. You are a further other to my other that is myself.
Wittgenstein begins culture between you and me , but culture begins most primordially between me and myself, as I find myself always changed from moment to moment via temporality. The shifts in context ushered in by my temporally unfolding self-talk already move me through a multitude of language games , prior to my engagement with others.
A private language user, if fae's not sure if fae's using the sign, say, S, correctly has only one option: ask faerself about whether S is being used correctly or not but fae doesn't know that; isn't that why fae's asking faerself? It's like a judge in court who's unsure about a certain article of the law and then consults faerself about it; fae doesn't know, that's what being unsure means.
Complex terrain. In one sense, I agree. No token is ever used exactly the same way twice (is ever used in exactly the same context. That can't be a theorem, for we can't really do math with these tokens. (Nor can that be a theorem.) Does that make an 'us' possible? Perhaps. But you stress that the self is already a 'we' or an 'us' (and I agree), so perhaps the sign 'us' is more strongly rooted in us having separate bodies. Why were we ever tempted toward the singularity of the self? Why just one proper name on the birth certificate and gravestone? It's how we happen roll...and probably a more effective method for training those bodies to work together.
Quoting Joshs
I agree with all of this. I am a further others to the others that you are to yourselves. Or we am.
Quoting Joshs
Here our paths diverge. I don't find it this prioritization of the single body plausible. Of course it's important, and we can imagine revolutions born in 'internal' 'monologues.' Granted. But bodies want food, love, sex, status. Even narcissism enjoys an image of how the self is seen, if only by an ideal other, a community to come.
What are good looks, money in the bank, and fine words about the great dead philosophers without others to impress, seduce, protect, intimidate, fuck, and flee?
Don't forget that it's parents (or the like, and usually many others) who teach baby to talk in the first place. The boy in the bubble doesn't need excuses, justifications, seductions, outright lies. I don't deny that after years of immersion with others that then a body could wander off into the woods to talk to itself in new and terrible ways.
What lies between pain and the expression of pain is some sort of judgement. The determinist will say that this is not a judgement at all, it's an automatic reaction, cause and effect; hit me and I will react. ,But using words as a form of expression is seen to sometimes consist of conscious judgement. So word use seems to cross the boundary between automatic reaction, and conscious judgement, consisting of some of each.
Quoting TheMadFool
You seem to be using the premise that one must be absolutely certain before judging something as correct. But that's really opposite to reality. There are degrees of certainty, but we never obtain to the level of absolute. Nor do we require absolute certainty before proceeding with an action. So fae can use a sign, and we can interpret this as meaning that fae has in some sense judged it as being correct for the situation, even while maintaining doubt as to whether it truly is the best sign for the situation.
There is an entire range of degrees of doubt which we could look at. Down at the base is trail and error. There is a judgement that the thing tried ought to be tried, so that is a judgement of "correct", even though the probability for success, from the trial is known to be very low. At the top, there is a healthy respect for the fact that even when we proceed with the highest degree of certainty , there is a faint possibility that things will go wrong, accidents do happen. So even when we proceed with the highest degree of certainty we ought to keep in mind the possibility of mistake.
So your example doesn't give us anything real to go on. The person using the sign doesn't need to be certain, and in reality ought to never have that attitude of absolute certainty. So the second guessing oneself, which you are talking about, though it does occur, is not a necessary aspect of using a sign, and it ought not be presented as if it is.
Fair point but, from what I gather, the certainty Wittgenstein is concerned about regarding whether or not the sign "S" is being used correctly applied can be treated in a relative sense. We aren't as sure of the sign "S" and its referent as we are about the referent of "water", the former being private and the latter being public. Therein lies the rub.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You mean to say, a private linguist doesn't need to be certain what a sign S refers to in faer private, inner world? So, S is like a variable and can stand for any sensation, this particular category of experience being chosen by Wittgenstein out of necessity? What S stands for can change at any time; a private linguist might, for instance, say, "oh, this feels right for S" and run with that. That's exactly what Wittgenstein claimed will happen - the notion of whether a word is being used appropriately/properly is N/A. What do you think this leads to? I'm curious.
I wish @Banno would chime in, he's a Wittgenstein zealot! :grin:
I think the important thing is to stick to what Wittgenstein is saying, try not to get off on tangents.
"Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,--for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them." That we don't learn our sensations is important to the understanding of what it means to know. I'm thinking back to the statement made by Gertie in the OP, "Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject." It's common for people to think this. Why? Because we're able to talk to ourselves, so we think we can just use words (our e.g., know) willy nilly, i.e., as we have our internal conversations, and as we refer to our internal sensations. We forget that we learn language socially, i.e., meaning is socially derived. The social aspects of language put limits on what we can do internally with language. What we can do internally has to be directly connected with the social parts of language. Knowing is not something I can do strictly with myself, i.e., in isolation from social contexts. Why? Because of the rule-following aspects of language. In other words, my internal conversations are constantly being reinforced by the rules of language, and what I've learned socially. This, I believe, is why Wittgenstein gives the example of having a private language, and the associated rule-following that necessarily goes along with language. The rules of use must be done in conjunction with other people. Otherwise there is no way for rules of use to get a foothold. How do I check myself in a strictly private language? This is why Wittgenstein makes the comment, "Whatever seems right to you, is right." Rule-following will become whatever you think it is.
However, someone might argue that once we learn the rules of use socially, then we can apply the word know to private sensations. The reason is, we're able to go back and forth between our internal conversations and our social conversations, so we're able to apply and check the rules of use. So, their argument might be, we know what it means to know, so we know how to justify a belief. We know this is our pain, because we're the ones experiencing it, just as we know that the orange juice is sweet because we've tasted it. We often know things through sensory experience. So, the same can be said of Moore's proposition, he knows this is his hand through sensory experience, and because this is what we mean by hand linguistically. So, isn't Moore correct, and Wittgenstein wrong? How would you argue against this?
Note that you're changing grammatical forms and tenses, which changes the analysis and it could very well be identifying something idiosyncratic to English and not to language generally.
Telling someone that "I know I'm in pain" could have a meaningful use if we wish to be creative enough, but assuming the "I know" is necessarily superfluous in that sentence, that superfluousness would occur only in the present tense while the experience were actually occurring and streaming through one's consciousness.
It's a different result where you speak in the hypothetical (as you did above), where you say "only I can know whether I am really in pain." That does make sense because it clarifies the fact that no one else has access to my phenomenological state. The removal of the "I know" from that sentence changes its meaning. That the statement "I know I'm in pain" might contain a superfluous "I know" doesn't dictate that it will in all forms.
If you change the tense, you have a similar result, as in "I know I was in pain yesterday." The "I know" isn't superfluous and it's not necessarily being supplied just for emphasis, but it could actually be an assertion of a recollection that does require a justification. If you told me that I was not in pain yesterday, but I specifically recall that I was, but you keep telling me I wasn't because for some reason you choose to disbelieve me, my insistence I was in pain is based upon my justification that I remember my recollection (that was never reduced to language) of my pain. Perhaps something might jar my memory and I'll remember, "Oh yeah, I wasn't in pain yesterday; it was Monday I was in pain."
I'd also say that if you try to make "know" a term of art where it cannot ever be used except to mean that which requires a justification (which is the knowledge = justified true belief epistemological theory), then you violate Wittgenstein's own non-essentialist's claims as it relates to definitions. For something to fall into "knowledge" it only has to have the family resemblance of knowledge. It's not required that it contain X as one of its essential features. Here you're claiming that X is a justification.
Quoting Sam26
It doesn't follow why crying and saying "I am in pain" would ever be synonymous in terms of what they communicate and that one would replace the other. Saying "I am in pain" does not equate to crying in terms of what is conveyed to the observer.
I should mention that my approach to language and intersubjectivity is what I call ‘radically temporal’. Other philosophers I’ve found who ground experience in a radical notion of temporality include Heidegger, Derrida and Eugene Gendlin. Striking features of their work include the abandonment of the distinction between affect, cognition-intention and will, and their assertion that everything we ‘absorb from our participation in language and culture has a peculiar ‘ownness’ about it , such that an ongoing thematic self-consistency characterizes all our engenders with others.
From this vantage , what is is interesting about the fact that a baby must first learn language from its social world before it can talk to itself is the nature of the way what it learns is organized with respect to its history.
That is, everything I assimilate from my world , either perceptually or in terms of formal
language, can only be understood by me via dimensions of similarity with respect to my current outlook. I own everything I learn in a way that makes it impossible or to claim that I simply ‘share’ the senses of words and concepts with others in my culture. Even when someone lives in a culture which is tightly conformist, one neither passively absorbs, nor jointly negotiates the normative practices of that culture, but validates one's own construction of the world using the resources of that culture.
Im going to borrow from a paper I wrote to elaborate here:
Rather than a retreat from a thoroughgoing notion of sociality, radically temporal approaches achieve a re-situating of the site of the social as a more originary and primordial grounding than that of the over-determined abstractions represented by discursive intersubjectivities. Those larger patterns of human belonging abstracted from local joint activity, which Merleau-Ponty's intercorporeal approach discerns in terms of cultural language practices, hide within themselves a more primary patterning. While our experience as individuals is characterized by stable relations of relative belonging or alienation with respect to other individuals and groups, the site of this interactivity, whether we find ourselves in greater or lesser agreement with a world within which we are enmeshed, has a character of peculiar within-person continuity. It also has a character of relentless creative activity that undermines and overflows attempts to understand human action based on between-person configurations or fields. We may identify to a greater or lesser extent with various larger paradigmatic communities, delicately united by intertwining values. But the contribution of each member of a community to the whole would not originate at the level of spoken or bodily language interchange among voices; such constructs repress as much as they reveal. Even in a community of five individuals in a room, I, as participant, can perceive a locus of integrity undergirding the participation of each of the others to the responsive conversation. To find common ground in a polarized political environment is not to find an intersect among combatants, a centrifugal ground of commonality, but to find as many intersects as there are participants. Each person perceives the basis of the commonality in the terms of their own construct system.
In my dealings with other persons, I would be able to discern a thread of continuity organizing their participation in dialogue with me, dictating the manner and extent to which I can be said to influence their thinking and they mine. My thinking can not properly be seen as `determined' by his response, and his ideas are not simply `shaped' by my contribution to our correspondence. The extent to which I could be said to be embedded within a particular set of cultural practices would be a function of how closely other persons I encounter resonate with my own ongoing experiential process. I can only shape my action to fit socially legitimate goals or permitted institutionalized forms to the extent that those goals or forms are already implicated in my ongoing experiential movement. Even then, what is implicated for me is not `the' social forms, but aspects hidden within these so-called forms which are unique to the organizational structure of my construct system; what I perceive as socially `permitted' rhetorical argumentation is already stylistically distinctive in relation to what other participants perceive as permitted. Each individual who feels belonging to an extent in a larger ethico-political collectivity perceives that collectivity's functions in a unique, but peculiarly coherent way relative to their own history, even when they believe that in moving forward in life their behavior is guided by the constraints imposed by essentially the `same' discursive conventions as the others in their community.”
That’s how I read it too. But I want to quibble with it.
Let’s say that I produce a new philosophy with new concepts. If I write it in English , then it is filled with commonly understood , simple nouns , verbs and adjectives. But the core of the thesis is set of terms that I am trying to introduce to others ( or perhaps I only intend the writing for me to read). I may begin with what I assume are familiar, conventional ways that others are likely to approach the interpretation of my ideas , and then attempt to shift their thinking in a different direction.
But I can very well fail to do this. In such a case , my readers may complain that my terms are incoherent , or they will equally likely say they understand them perfectly well , by which they mean that they are misreading them in the old conventional way.
So have I created a private or a public language? It is public in the sense that the grammatical
structure is conventional ( subject-predicate etc). But this not need be so. I could transform the grammar, as Heidegger does with the word ‘is’. The point is that what I write will be recognizable to others in some form, at some level. At r very least , others will know that I am trying to communicate something. But is this all that is required for a language to be considered public? Isn’t it true that I must be able to translate my idiosyncratic language into the conventional language to understand myself? But how exactly do I understand myself as I go through a long process of transforming my thinking? Is my starting point a ‘public’ language? Is my point of reference a way of understanding words that is common to a community that uses them? Certainly if my aim is to communicate with others, then my assumption is that my word will be understood at some level. But what if I also know that I will not be understood well , because my use of words invokes senses that I find others dont share. It is a poor fit.
I may not initially feel this way about my relation to others via language , but as I progress in my ideas, I find that while I begin by translating my new concepts into what I perceive as public or conventional language, eventually in y writing I am no longer referring back to that public sphere but instead to my own writing of an earlier stage in my progress. In other words, my ‘public’ becomes my own past, and the further and further away from others’ thinking I get in my theorizing , the more and more irrelevant that initial ‘public’ becomes for me. Wittgenstein said if a lion could talk we wouldn’t understand him. That is true of original philosophic work also.
Quoting Joshs
I never felt that saying is quite right. Why would we not understand, or at least be able to come to understand, the lion if he speaks a language we are familiar with? If he doesn't speak a language we are familiar with our inability to understand would be on account of the fact that we didn't speak the language; and extremely common human situation.
Some words, like "water", we are very sure about, other words, we are less sure about. It's generally a matter of being familiar with the word and its use. Why would "S" be any different? The use here, which one would become familiar with, is one's own use. But I don't see how the judgement of "correct" would be any different in principle. In the one case consistent with the use of others would be the criteria for the judgement, and in the other case consistent with one's own use would be the criteria.
Either way, if we assume that there is a first use of any word, there is no basis for a judgement of "correct" in that first use. And; if a following use is different, or what you'd call incorrect in relation to that other use, it is still a use, and serves as the basis for a further judgement of correct. So the word could then have two correct uses even though one of these began as incorrect . This I admit could pose a problem to the private user. But it's not a problem that couldn't be overcome, the person would just have to choose between the two.
Quoting TheMadFool
No, I mean in any use of language one does not have to be certain of what the words mean. That's just the way language is. It's that type of thing, something we can do, without being certain of what we are doing. There is no fatal consequence, for example, for making a mistake, so we can proceed rather carelessly.
Quoting TheMadFool
Looks exactly like what happens to language; word meaning evolves and changes as people are free to use words however they please.
Isnt this the question of whether there is anything new under the sun, or at least now we are to understand the idea of novelty? If we present a 5 year old child, or a dog, with ‘e=mc2’ , how do we talk about the distance between what they perceive in the image and what those of us familiar with the physics perceive in it? gould we say that , relative to the dog and the 5 year , we are extending the meanings they are encountering by a certain amount? One might want to counter that extending the meaning of a concept is different than extending a language within which concepts are articulated. But I guess my point is that, in theory we should be able to extend the meanings of the words of a language to the point where we can no more call these common than we can my experience of e=mc2 versus a dog or 5 year old.
If two people are understanding the senses of the words of a ‘common’ language in significantly different ways , even if they are able to engage with each other at some level with it, why call the language ‘common’? Why not say there are two somewhat similar languages being used? If I understand the sense of a word in one way and you understand it in a slightly different way, are you and we sharing a common sense , or two distinctly different but related senses? Isnt this true for every aspect of a ‘common’ language that each of us participate in?
We know that new languages evolve from
old ones gradually. But don’t they do this one person at a time? Don’t each of us , whenever we use our ‘common’ language , in some minuscule way already speak our own variant? I could take this even further and suggest that every time I use my language I am reinventing it in some slight way, and thus every moment I am using a different language.
I would agree with that because we all have different sets of associations that have come to be attached to words and phrases. If I extend the meaning of a term in a completely novel way it must be done in accordance with some logic, it must make sense in some way we can all understand, in order to be, or at least come to be, meaningful to others.
The problem is two-fold. Suppose you're the provate linguist.
1. The referent of S is known only to you. So, no possibility that you might inform a second person of what S means. There goes your chance of being able to establish a corroborative backup in case you ever forget what S means.
2. Suppose now you doubt what S means. You and you alone can clear this doubt (from 1) but you can't because you're in doubt. You can't expect a person, viz. yourself, who's uncertain what S means to tell you what S means.
What does it mean to use S correctly? Well, it means to never get its meaning wrong but from 1 and 2 (above), this is impossible. If you ever doubt what S means, you're in thick soup - only you know what S means but now you don't. What happens next is incorrect use of S unless you're grotesquely lucky and all of your guesses are correct.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The private language argument's primary goal is to demonstrate that language is a social entity. How language operates in a group - meaning is use - is an altogether different story. Suffice it to say that a public language has standards that determine correct/incorrect usage of words that's free of circularity.
That's what I think anyway. I'm not as certain about my reading of Wittgenstein as I'd like to be.
This is not an issue because the possibility of informing a second person of what S means is highly unlikely in the first place. "S" refers to one's own sensation, a feeling that a person has. How do you propose that you can show another person your own feeling, to inform that other person what S means? The idea that you might inform another person of what S means has no place here. So this is just a bad premise.
Quoting TheMadFool
As I said, you can never completely rid yourself of this type of doubt, to be absolutely certain, but this does not prevent us from proceeding. In other words, it's impossible to clear this doubt, and that's just a fact of life, accept it.
Quoting TheMadFool
Right, it's impossible to ever know, beyond the shadow of a doubt, the correct use of a word. But contrary to what you are saying here, this does not entail that "incorrect use" is inevitable. It just implies that there is no such thing as the correct use of a word. Once you come to understand this, and accept it as a fact, your doubt will be quelled because you will no longer be inclined to doubt whether or not your usage is correct. You will see that you are free to use words however you please.
This must be hell for English teachers. Why is it impossible?
:ok: We're on the same page. I wanted to make sure.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The issue is not about the doubt itself but how we might address that doubt.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think this is what Wittgenstein wants to convey. There is such a thing as correct usage of words. How else is this conversation taking place and how are we to read Wittgenstein's works if there were no such thing? :chin:
No English teacher I have ever known has attempted to teach me the correct use of a word. Such a thing is impossible because no two particular sets of circumstances are exactly the same and successful usage varies according to the circumstances. A word is like any other tool, and there is no such thing as the correct use of a tool, it is used differently by different people in different situations. That there is such a thing as "the correct use" is just a false assumption that some people make.
"Good", "bad", "worse", and "better", implying a variance by degrees is a completely distinct concept from the dichotomous "correct" and "incorrect".
Quoting TheMadFool
Well I probably am not in total agreement with Wittgenstein on this point, but it is actually very difficult to decipher exactly what he has said to be able to determine such agreement. And, the fact that his use of words can, and is, interpreted in many different ways, is evidence that there is no such thing as "the correct way". In fact, if you pay very close attention to his use of words, you may notice that what he appears to be saying with his words, is something inconsistent with what he is doing with his words.
This is a form of hypocrisy which he presents us with, when you are doing something different with your words, from what you say you are doing. It's the foundation of deception. Take a look at the inverted form of the liar paradox ("I am not lying") for a very simple example of that type of hypocrisy.. The reason why it becomes a paradox upon inversion, is that we cannot find the principles to allow for the lack of consistency between what the person is saying and what the person is doing. If meaning is use, then saying something is doing something. But this presents us with a very peculiar problem of accounting for the real existence of deception. Deception is doing something different from what you are saying, and for this to occur there must be a separation between the meaning of what you are saying, and what you are doing. Therefore the two are different, as evidenced by the reality of deception. So deception successfully demonstrates that meaning is something other than use.
Quoting TheMadFool
I think I already sort of explained how this conversation can take place without such a thing as "the correct use of a word". We proceed in our actions, and have success in our actions without the need of determining "the best", or "the correct" way of doing things. Actions are the means to ends, and we have many choices as to the particular means to any end, which is something more general. So we choose and we proceed. If we are unsuccessful we might designate that particular way as "incorrect", as commonly happens in trial and error. But contrary to popular opinion, the fact that many ways can be designated as "incorrect", does not imply that there is one "correct way".. Actually it would be more likely that there are many correct ways. And if there are many correct ways, This rules out "the correct way", though some might still be better than others.
That implies, paradoxically, that neither did Wittgenstein know what he was talking about, nor is it true that the two of us can or should understand each other. Case closed!
And yet most of the times in general life we understand people and get the gist. Depends on the intelligence of the listener/reader.
Wittgenstein has some good ideas but he is a pedant and lousy writer and incomplete philosopher.
@Metaphysician Undercover
In my opinion, it only makes sense to discuss Wittgenstein's remarks when they situated in the context of the traditions of both analytic philosophy and phenomenology.
Nobody taught you how to speak English?
Do not most people learn language at home in dialogue with their parents?
And all people have an instinct for language. They are not strictly learning from scratch,but expanding their language instincts.
Yes.
Quoting Ambrosia
People may have an instinct for language (although I'm not sure what that means, exactly). However, nobody knows English, or any other language, without being taught it.
Well,we all have universal principles of language and grammar in our instincts.
Having an instinct for language is not the same as having a language.
My understanding of Wittgenstein's grammar is that grammar sets out the rules governing the moves we make in language. Similar to the rules of chess governing the game of chess, viz., the moves. This is a correct move, this is an incorrect move. So, grammar is what we use to govern whether someone has made a correct move, to reiterate the point. The rules are difficult to grasp because some rules are explicit, but others are implicit and not easily understood.
How do we learn the use of the word know? Understanding this gives us clues to the rules of use. We know we don't learn it in private, there's not some innate knowing, it's done with others, and only with others. It's a social word. We justify what we know to others, it starts socially, by learning the concept and using it correctly. Knowing has to be seen in the context of being wrong (I thought I knew), but how in the world could you be wrong about "I know this is my hand" in Moore's context? A grammatical mistake, right? Can we be mistaken in Moore's context? The same is true of our sensations, "I know this is my pain" what?
I don’t know if you were following the thread below:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11479/bedrock-rules-the-mathematical-and-the-ordinary-cavell-kripke-on-wittgenstein
It looks like you’re taking the position of Luke, Hacker and Baker on what Wittgenstein means by grammar and rules. Antony and i were, in different ways , arguing for a different reading of Wittgenstein, in which rules and grammar only have existence in radically contextual, situational and personal situations.
I've got three or four threads going in two different forums, so it's hard to keep up with everything that's going on. But, I definitely would have a problem with this reading of Wittgenstein.
This is the ‘postmodern’ reading that authors like Cavell, Cora Diamond and James Conant endorse. Also , Baker, who along with Peter Hacker, produced a series of works on Wittgenstein in the 1980’s which have been taken as authoritative by many academics( and seems to be consistent with your perspective), rejected his earlier Hacker-Baker position by the 1990’s in favor of one consonant with the above writers. This is not to say that one position is right and the other wrong, but that there is a lively ongoing debate.
1. Wittgenstein has issues with ostensive definitions but, personally, I don't find anything amiss with this often employed definitional technique. So, assume ostensive definitions are legit.
2. Private language argument: Suppose a private experience in the life of a private linguist W, a sensation to which you assign the word "S."
The question is, will W use the word "S" correctly all the time?
If W has a perfect 20/20 memory, W will definitely do so and we have a private language.
In real life memory isn't as reliable as it should be for W to recall the sensation S is assigned to the word "S." Sometimes W forgets. When this happens, W can either give up trying to remember either the word "S" (W experiences the sensation S but forgets "S") or the sensation (W recalls "S" but fails to link it to the sensation) in which case no private language.
The other option is to go with whatever sensation (has the word "S" but can't get a fix on the sensation) or whatever word (has the sensation but no word "S") that seems correct. However, there's a world of a difference between seems correct and actually correct. The end result - the word "S" is used incorrectly. In short, W's private language is incoherent.
To sum it all up:
a) A private language is possible for a person with eidetic memory given that ostensive definitions are given a clean bill of health.
b) In the real world, memory is unreliable. A private language is impossible.
By the same argument when I look at the tree in my backyard, I don't know or believe there is a tree in my backyard, I see the tree in my backyard, I see that there is a tree in my backyard.
Hi Janus,
I think we have to be careful here. We do use sensory experiences as justification to believe that something is the case. So, it's very appropriate to say, "I know the orange juice is sweet." Someone might reply, "How do you know? (this would be the case even if you just said, "The orange juice is sweet.)" You answer, "Because I tasted it." Sensory experiences are important in observing experiments also. It's true that you can simply say, "I see the tree," but many statements of knowledge are said without the "I know..." Note that the doubt often makes sense in these situations, which demonstrates the appropriateness of the knowledge.
See the sentence immediately preceding this...
So "I have a pain in my neck" is the same as "ouch!"
and at the start of §244 ""How de we refer to sensations?" - the italics are in the original; the answer is that it is muddled to think of ourselves as referring to sensations at all. We express them.
Language cannot refer to a pain - it cannot get between a pain and its expression.
Is not feeling pain a kind of sensory experience? I'm finding it difficult to see a cogent difference in kind between "I feel a pain in my toe" and "I see a tree in my backyard"..
Do that with the pain.
Why not?
Yeah, I'm not so sure. It might be a difference of kind rather than perspective.
"I have a pain in your toe", while odd, does not seem to be ill-formed nor contradictory.
It seems syntactically well-formed but semantically ill-formed; to me at least. Is it contradictory? Perhaps according to the logic of ownership? Like saying "your pain belongs to me".
Right, I'm self-taught, through the scientific methods of observation, and trial and error. Aren't you?
"I have a pain in my neck" is not the same as ouch. Ouch replaces the natural pain behavior, like crying etc, but that doesn't mean that the pain in your neck is the same (not sure what you mean by same) as ouch, that would be weird.
The child is learning new pain behavior, but that doesn't mean we can't refer to pain. For example, a doctor asks, "Where are you having pain?" You respond, "Here, in my big toe." It's true that a child in Wittgenstein's example (PI 244) learns to replace crying with "ouch" or "that hurts," but this doesn't mean that it's always muddled to refer to pain. It depends on how we're referencing the pain. If we think that meaning is attached to my pain, then that for sure is muddled. It's also muddled to say, "I know I'm in pain." but we can definitely refer to pain in certain contexts. Remember he's starts out talking about meaning in reference to a private language, and how that's nonsense due to rule-following and such. He then goes on to explain how we learn to associate words with certain behaviors in social contexts. He's not denying in the last paragraph of 243 that we can express or refer to our inner experiences. He's denying it in particular contexts.
Perhaps. But if we read the text as saying that it is, ?245 works.
What's being rejected, and here I think I'm following Kenny, is that notion that talk of sensations takes the form of object and reference - see ?293. So Kenny to:
The sensation has the same grammatical structure as an object: "I have a pain in my hand" against "I have a phone in my hand". The phone is a thing; the pain is not. We refer to the phone, but give expression to the pain.
So if one refers to a pain it is not in the way one refers to a phone, despite the superficial similarity int he grammar.
What you are missing, is that there is some form of judgement between the pain and the expression, as I described here:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That it is necessary to assume a medium, such as a form of judgement, is required due to the fact that there are many different possibilities for a single person's response to pain. The multitude of possibilities implies that there cannot be a direct causal relation between pain and expression. So, we must assume a medium which "chooses" from the possibilities.
We can see "pain" as the name of a type of sensation, just like "phone" is the name of a type of object. So I think your post displays ambiguity between naming a particular object, as one might do with a proper noun, and using a word like "phone" to refer to one object out of a group of things which could be called by the same name. Notice that 'the phone in my hand' would single out one phone out of many possible phones, but it is the context 'in my hand' which makes the word a name. You could have used any word to name the object. It's not necessary to call it "a phone", so that is not its name. However, if you held up a phone and talked about 'the cup in my hand', people would be very confused as to why you were referring a phone as a cup. This is why "meaning is use" is not straight forward, and actually somewhat deceptive. If meaning really was use, "cup" would be acceptable as being used to refer to the object. But "meaning is use" doesn't account for some preconceived notions that people have developed, which leads them to misinterpret other people's use.
You ought to recognize that "phone" is not the name of the object in your hand, though it might appear that way, when "phone" is given that context. In reality "phone" signifies a whole class of similar objects. Likewise, "pain" is not the name of the sensation in your big toe, after you stub your toe, it is the name of a type of sensation. Since both, "pain" and "phone" signify a type of thing, and are not properly the name of any one thing, .the proposed separation, or distinction between the two, which you describe is unwarranted.
In 245 it seems that he's saying you can't use language to get between pain and its expression. There's nothing between me having the pain, and the expression ouch. The ouch is an outward expression (linguistic expression) of the inner experience. The ouch replaces other outward natural expressions, i.e., we learn to replace crying with words and sentences. So, the ouch is bringing the natural expression into language. At the end of 246 I think we see what he's getting at, it's the mistaken idea that ouch somehow describes crying. It doesn't describe it, but replaces it. If we were trying to use the expression of pain as a description of crying, this, it seems, would have the affect of "...try[ing] to use language to get between pain and its expression."
This also means that we don't learn the language of pain by referring to an object, like we might learn to use the word cup, i.e., we would teach a child how to use the word cup by pointing to objects that are it's referent. We can refer to where we're having the pain, for example, in my toe. We do this all the time with others, so we know that to refer to where I'm having the pain, is a correct use of the word. It's not as though I'm deriving meaning from this context, the context of pointing to my toe as the source of the pain, and this is the point.
I agree with you that the meaning of pain is not the name of a sensation, but I can use the word pain to refer to where I'm having a pain on my body. I'm not sure, but it seems you think that if I refer to a pain on my body, that this equates to what we mean by pain, but it doesn't. We're not naming the sensation on our bodies, we're simply showing where its located. The location of a cup is not the meaning of cup. Where is the cup, or where is the pain, is something different. I have to learn to use these words first before I can locate them. Although the pain location is not as specific, unless we're pointing at a cut on our toe, then the pain location is a little more specific.
Quoting Banno
I don't quite follow this paragraph. I don't know about you, but it seems to me that we're talking about what is ordinarily meant by these words. The only thing out of the ordinary is the incorrect use of language.
I agree that the use of the word pain in a sentence has the same grammatical structure as the use of the word phone; and this is where some of the confusion lies. But, again, I disagree that we only express pain, we also refer to them, and we do it all the time. Of course it's not exactly the same as referring to the phone. And, I wouldn't call it a superficial reference when referring to the pain in my toe. You seem to think it's superficial because the pain is not a thing like a phone, but it's just as real, so it doesn't seem superficial. And, in this context what would superficial mean except some subjective view of referring.
Oh, no not at all. I agree with you. Quoting Banno
The referent in "I have a pain in my hand" is my hand, not the pain.
Quoting Sam26
Yes, it's real. So is the beetle. ?293 takes pain as its example. Note the last paragraph there: if we treat pain talk as object-reference then the object vanishes.
Indeed the more I re-read this the more convinced I am that pain talk expresses, but doesn't refer.
The referent, is where the pain is, viz., in my hand. It's not the hand. The hand just happens to be the location of the pain. The point of the beetle example is that someone doesn't know "...what the pain is only [my emphasis] from his own case (293)!" In the case of "the pain in the hand," I'm not suggesting that anyone knows what the pain is from their own private case. In this case (the pain in the hand) we've learned how to properly use the word pain in social settings, and we are properly referring to a pain in the hand. Moreover, pointing to the hand as the location of the pain, is not deriving meaning based on this context. In other words, my example doesn't make this mistake, and this is the mistake we should concern ourselves with.
I'll maintain that we are referring to the hand, and expressing the pain. But I think it a moot point.
Where are you heading with this thread? We've differed as to what is to count as "knowledge" before; is the concern here more about sensation or about
(Good to see you writing again...)
The line you quote is the foil for bringing down the notion of reference. See the phone example. This is an instance of a superficial grammar misleading folk into thinking in a certain way. It's a recurring theme in PI.
No, it's not a moot point, if you mean by moot that it has no relevance, it's very important to understanding W.
Quoting Banno
I'm trying to show why statements like, are meaningless; and, how its being meaningless, is connected with Wittgenstein's PLA.
I thought our other disagreement was over pre-linguistic beliefs, but I'm not sure.
As demonstrated by my argument above, the fact that "ouch", or "I have a pain in my neck", can serve as a replacement for crying, indicates these cannot be the sensations themselves which are being expressed. They are a response to the sensation. And we apprehend them as representative of the sensation. In the one case we even refer to the sensation as "a pain". The idea that we express the sensation with these expressions, rather than respond to the sensation is rather ludicrous.
Quoting Sam26Ah, three points of disagreement, then. Even more fun.
Quoting Sam26
So if, as I think both you and Wittgenstein have it, knowledge must be justified, then an experience is not known; justification makes no sense here. I'd agree with that.
I also have a problem with the notion of an experiential state; there's a reification there that I find uncomfortable. Experiences are not always sufficiently static to count as individuals; or at least there are issues for consideration in the individuating of sensations. (@Metaphysician Undercover mentioned something along these lines above, but it made no sense.)
Usually when we refer to sensory experiences we're talking about the five senses, so in this sense feeling a pain is not sensory. We do use the words in similar ways, i.e., the grammar is the same, viz., "I feel the pain" vs "I feel the table." Our sensory experiences generally refer to things in reality. I see the tree, hear the trumpet, touch the table, smell the flowers, etc. However, pain manifests itself as a cry, or the word ouch for example.
Moreover, it makes sense to claim to know based on sensory experiences, but not, to claim to know that I'm having a pain, which has been the main idea of this thread. There's no knowing one is having a private sensation, I just have them.
He goes on to ask how we learn the names of sensations (e.g. "pain"):
He answers:
You take from this that the expression is the sensation. But he clearly distinguishes pain from its expression at §245.
Adults teach the child linguistic expressions (e.g. "I have a pain in my toe") to replace the natural expressions of pain (e.g. crying). This does not imply that the pain (sensation) is identical to the pain-behaviour (expression).
Wittgenstein is saying that the child learns the names of sensations by being taught new expressions of pain. The child sees that words are connected with the natural expressions.
Saying "I have a pain in my toe" is an expression of pain; a pain-behaviour, not a description of the pain-behaviour. "Pain" does not mean crying.
If we all had a pain in your toe, then that pain would be like the tree.
We don't, so it ain't.
Are you saying that you just have private sensations, but that you don't know you have them? I don't see the difference between feeling a pain in my foot and seeing a tree in my garden. neither of these experiences require any further justification.
Pain is not an object of one of the five "external" senses, but it is sense nonetheless I would say. It makes sense to me to say I feel pain or I sense pain.
Pain is different only in that it is internal to the body and so irretrievably hidden from the senses of others. As I said before the only different is the contingency of perspective; where pain is the extreme case.
Both are expressions. As opposed to names.
Quoting Luke
Yes. Pain-talk is primarily expressive, but has a superficial resemblance to reference talk, to naming. That's what I say Wittgenstein is saying. And here I think I am expressing the view long held by Kenny, Anscombe, and those who were in his company.
Well, yes - and hence drops out of the discussion. Unlike a tree.
That is rather the point.
I agree that my being in pain cannot be intersubjectively corroborated as my seeing a tree can be. From my own point of view though; I feel the pain, I see the tree; and no further justification is needed.
Not happy with that sort of language. Wash your mouth out.
What about the pain in @Sam26's toe, and the tree in his yard? What do you know of them?
It's not a matter of knowing you have a pain. Contrast this with it's negation, "I don't know that I have a pain in my toe," it doesn't make sense. If we claim to have knowledge, then this has to be juxtaposed with not having knowledge, which is why it's important to understand the importance of the doubt. What would it mean to doubt you're in pain? Wittgenstein asks the same question of Moore's proposition, viz., "What would it mean to doubt this is your hand in the context Moore's using it?"
You don't see a difference between not being able to doubt you're in pain, as opposed to being able to doubt there is a tree over there. Of course the latter depends on context, it would be easy to imagine someone doubting that your seeing a tree. For example, maybe it's foggy and you can't see clearly. However, try doubting the pain you're having.
I know nothing of the pain in Sam's toe or the tree in his yard. If I went to his place I could, via the senses, directly confirm whether or not there is a tree in his backyard, but not whether or not there is a pain in his toe. That all I mean by "Intersubjective corroboration".
Have you read the SEP article?
I think it rather clear on the topic - but then I sympathise with Kenny's account. I particularly like the concluding remark that
Perhaps that artilce can serve to move beyond mere explanation to critique of private language?
Quoting Janus
Indeed.
This sub-thread is in reply to your post: Quoting Janus
Do you see it now?
I like figuring it out from the primary source. Some of these philosophers may or may not understand Wittgenstein's points. However, this is also true of me. Too many of these so-called Wittgenstein experts just have it wrong. Although you and I are excluded. :wink:
As I said to Banno, I can see the difference in the intersubjective context. But from my point of view it would make no more sense to doubt I was seeing the tree I'm looking at, than it would to doubt that I'm feeling the pain that's throbbing in my toe.
Quoting Banno
As I say above and have said from the start, I see the difference in the intersubjective context. But I put that down to the contingency of perspective: in some cases there is just no way you can get yourself into a position to experience what the other is experiencing.
I agree with this, but note again, that we can imagine a doubting situation with the tree e.g., but not the pain e.g..
That's true, and maybe that's because doubting situations always arise in the contexts of what can be intersubjectively corroborated (sorry Banno).
The PLA. So, the discussion has veered into the question of private experiences. I already agreed that no private language is possible (because to determine and subsequently know what its words referred to we would need to translate it into a public language).
Wittgenstein is not easy to understand. In fact, some of what he says, seems, at first glance, to be plainly incorrect. When Russell first read the Tractatus he completely missed the point. Moreover, it's difficult to explain some of these ideas, which is why we get stuck. We end up just repeating ourselves.
Seems you missed it. Oh, well.
Or was it something ineffable?
Ya, answer that in your one sentence reply. :yikes:
Here's a thing: I think is would be a mistake to think of him as setting out an argument for a particulate conclusion. Instead I think he is presenting a way of arguing.
So understanding him does not consist in agreeing with his conclusions, and hence in following his arguments, but in taking on a certain approach to dealing with philosophical issues.
After all, if philosophy is a process of clarification, there are no conclusions.
Quoting Banno
How's that? :wink:
Obviously both are expressions. Wittgenstein asked: "How does a human being learn the meaning of names of sensations?" He suggests that it's via an association with their expression (e.g. pain-behaviour).
You're putting a lot of emphasis on the word "refer". Do you view reference as being restricted to a particular class or something, e.g. only to real world objects? Otherwise, I don't understand your concern here.
Yes, and I see the situation can be understood differently from a subjective or an inter-subjective point of view. Is there anything else of interest to say about it, or is this the Wittgenstein Secret Handshakes Club?
@Metaphysician Undercover in particular makes this sort of mistake often and repeatedly, but doesn't see it.
We do use language to refer to pains and to phones. But pains are quite different to phones. Paying attention to the difference allows us to identify and explain certain philosophical errors - see how Janus at first claimed not to be able to see a difference except as perspective? He went all the way to saying that Quoting Janus
but then reneged, choosing only to see this as a difference in perspective and not of kind.
The same floppiness occurs throughout philosophical discussions; it's most noticeable in talk of qualia, but it's also there in talk of truth and belief, and in the foundation of mathematics.
So yes, it is a recurring theme.
True, but that's not the point of §244.
OK, from an intersubjective point of view it's a difference in kind of perspective because there are some "views" you can have which I never can and vice versa, and other "views" of yours which I could have if I were in a suitable position (although I could never have exactly the same view as you which is a further wrinkle in the fabric). I have already acknowledged the difference re the possibility of corroboration.
From a subjective perspective the tree is an external object and pain an internal one, but I don't need any further justification to know I am seeing a tree than I do to know I am feeling a pain in my toe. So it really does all come down to perspective, as I see it.
But if you think I've made a mistake somewhere, then please identify it; I'm open to correction if it is precisely targeted; but I'm not interested in vague assertions of misunderstanding.
The question. is posited - how do words refer to sensations?
Now I read §244 as showing that this question is conceptually mistaken. He shows this by addressing the next question - how is the connection between a name and the thing named learned? Perhaps words are connected to the expression - this as conveying that the pain is there to others, not making a thought known - as "Ouch!"
And one learns to use words in the place of "Ouch!"
The verbal expression replaces the "ouch!"
The addenda: we now have a situation in which pain-talk is superficially like phone-talk; but we have seen that this is an error.
Now, where is my mistake?
“Now”? Following from what?
Meh. Make my time here worthwhile. Give me a decent reply.
I'm going outside.
I'd go further than this, to say that experiences are never static things, but neither are physical objects in the world static things. However, this does not change the fact that we talk about both of these as if they are static things. So if there is an error here, in referring to one or the other as a static thing, it is not specific to one or the other.
What I think is that we recognize or apprehend certain aspects of both, experiences or feelings, and physical objects, which appear to be unchanging, and this provides the basis for talking about these as if they are static things. Perhaps it is more difficult to find consistency in experiences and feelings than it is to find consistency in the physical world around us, so this creates the illusion of a big difference between the two.
Quoting Banno
Really, it is simply you who is not following what analysis of the language is showing us, and you are trying to make a distinction which is unwarranted, unsupported by the use of language, and in error. It is not the case that the grammar is hiding something, it is the case that you are not accepting what the grammar is showing you, thereby assuming that there is some other reality inconsistent with the grammar, and hidden beneath the grammar.
The real distinction to be made is between the static and the active. Such a distinction can be carried through. But both, the internal feelings, and also the external physical objects, have each, active and passive elements. So to separate the two, internal feelings from external objects, on the premise that one is active and the other is passive, as the basis of this separation, is a mistake.
It's perfectly possible to doubt the pain you're having. Nociception is regulated by a descending pain modulatory system which in turn is regulated by cortico-limbic-striatal circuits dealing with attention, emotional response, cognitive appraisal and behaviour. These can not only alter the autonomic response, but, via the descending pain modulatory system can even use the inflammatory mediators to 'switch off' nociceptor neurons.
In all, it's perfectly possible to doubt nociceptive sensations in no different a way to the way one doubts retinal sensation. One can question the level, location and type of pain and, via that re-modelling, alter the nature of both the pain perception and the root signals producing it.
The problem with a lot of these discussions (qualia being the worst culprit) is they they confuse an interesting discussion about grammar with a discussion about the object of that grammar.
Since when did philosophers become experts on limits of human imagination?
I can imagine it. Prove me wrong.
This has nothing to do with limiting human imagination.
All "Prove me wrong" means is that your mind is made up and there is nothing I can say that will change it. Ya, so you're right, I probably can't prove you wrong, the idea of proof here is too subjective.
Okay.
Not necessarily (phantom pain is still a pain). I'm talking about the fine line between what we can reflect on having happened in our minds and what we know actually happened, or what we can 'just catch' actually happening when our attention is drawn to it. Interpretation of pain is like this. When we reflect on what we're feeling, we'll generally say we're in pain, no question. But when our attention is drawn to the assessment process, we can often catch a point where it's not clear (in fact, what we're catching here is the action of the descending pain modulatory system, particularly in the involvement of c-fibre signalling). Just as when I see an aberrant object in my field of view I might 'double take', first doubting that I did indeed see such an oddity; with pain, I can sometimes catch myself doing the same. You've had the experience of 'forgetting' you're in pain whilst distracted, yes? What happens just after that moment - the few milliseconds where you return to feeling in pain after having 'forgotten' about it. Focusing on that moment, I wager, will reveal a conscious 'doubt' that you're in pain.
The grammar of it (I think) is that being 'in pain' is still a public category, we can't simply declare ourselves to be 'in pain' in response to any old feeling. So there's a form of the question "am I in pain?" which makes perfect sense - its "does this sensation I now have meet the public criteria for the category 'pain'?". Most of that questioning is done by subconscious models informed by our experiences to date (and whether that counts a 'doubt' I suppose is debatable), but some of it is conscious - even if only barely - and so excluding it from the definition of 'doubt' would seem question begging.
Recall Wittgenstein's analysis of Moore's proposition later on in the book, namely "It is raining, but I believe it is not raining", which Moore had previously considered to be nonsensical when considered in the present tense. Wittgenstein, if i recall correctly. envisages the possibility of this sentence making sense in a situation in which one finds oneself consciously disbelieving that it is raining whilst observing oneself to be behaving otherwise. Our thoughts can belie our actions.
Technically, maybe. The International Association for the Study of Pain defines pain as: “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.” If a person were to be shown to having sufficient excitation of nociceptor fibres to elicit a report of pain in most humans but for some reason they were oblivious to that state, I don't think it would be nonsensical to describe the situation as their being in pain but without knowing it.
The changes brought about by a greater understanding on how the brain works is where I think this is interesting. The above might have sounded nonsensical 20 years ago, but not so now.
When Wittgenstein rhetorically asks what it would even mean to doubt here is one hand, I don't think he's claiming to have discovered a fact about the world, but rather a fact about our culture. That "I doubt I'm in pain" has no meaning is a cultural artefact, it has no meaning to us, not in general. As our culture changes (with things like advances in neuroscience), expressions which previously had no meaning may start to acquire one.
It means that i don't have the proper vocabulary to argue with you.
I was talking to a friend the other day about investing. In particular, about options, viz., a put, a strike price, etc, etc, I didn't have a clue, so it happens to all of us.
I'm not sure exactly what my mind is made up about. :confused:
I'm against the proposition that philosophers can tell you what you can imagine. How's that?
Whether or not this is a problem depends on the example. If I have a toothache there is no problem understanding what I am referring to. If, however, I say "I have a sensation" then I have not referred to anything, I have not identified the sensation. Giving it a name gets us no further.
Although having a toothache is, like all sensations, private, the sensation is common enough that we can refer to it. It is in this sense public rather than private. But we do not have to have personally experienced toothache; far less likely, we do not even have to have even experienced pain to know what is being referred to and to refer someone having toothache to a dentist.
I would be against any philosopher telling me what I can imagine too. Unless the philosopher is telling me I can't imagine a two-sided triangle, then I would think he has a point.
Why does Wittgenstein mention "imagination"?
It's a kind of thought experiment. Given his thinking about how language develops, viz., that it's not a totally private affair, it's done necessarily with other people. And, given that language is necessarily a rule-following endeavor (implicit and explicit rule-following), he then concludes that this process, being that they are both done with others, cannot be done totally in private. It's almost like trying to think of the two-sided triangle. He wants you to think about it, try to imagine it.
Why does he think it is necessary? Wittgenstein doesn't seem to be very rigorous.
Quoting Sam26
I can't get into this. Thank you for your time. :victory:
The main problem is rule-following. What does it entail to follow a rule? Imagine a private language, i.e., just one that you're creating. Now try to imagine that you have to remember how to use all the words/concepts involved in your language. Are you remembering the correct use of your words? How would you know if you're making a mistake? Wittgenstein points out that you wouldn't, i.e., what would seem right in the use of your words/concepts, would be right. So, your use of words, in terms of correct and incorrect, would follow any application you deemed correct. Note that this is not how language works, I can't just decide to use the word car to refer to a pencil. Why? Because there is an objective standard (for the most part) that helps us to understand where a mistake has occurred. This, again, is only done with others, in social contexts. This is my take on it, at least partly.
I'm stuck here. It's hard to imagine a language that doesn't rely on any sort of social conventions.
That's the point, you can't. Unless you think you can imagine it, then it's a matter of understanding what Wittgenstein is trying to tell us about language.
My question is, if experiential states are so private, why is he talking about them!
It is important to acknowledge here that when we speak of "two exactly the same", we are not adhering to the law of identity, which stipulates that only one thing is the same as itself. So when we talk about two things which are the same, this is not "same" according to a strict criterion of identity like the law of identity.
Further, it is in using "same" in this way, which implies that two similar things are "the same", as they are said to be "two exactly the same", when they are really two which are very similar, which allows one to say that my pain is the same as your pain. It isn't really the same if "same" is defined by the law of identity, but since they are said to be "exactly the same" in that other sense of "same", which really means similar, then my pain is the same as your pain.
This is to use "same" without adherence to the strict criterion of identity, which is the law of identity. But since it is very common to use "same" in this way, and it makes complete sense to us to see it used in this way, because we are accustomed to it, then we can proceed in using it in this way.
Just be aware, when interpreting any supposed private language arguments, that "the same" for Wittgenstein, in the sense of 'the same sensation' really means distinct, but similar, sensations, in the way that we might say two different things are the same.
Sure, and how would I be sure I conveyed my new langauge to someone else since I apparently can't rely upon my memory for anything?
Imagine i had private thoughts that I formed when hiking alone that consist of the recollections of that hike, the colors, the landscape, the calm, and whatever else goes into the complete internal memory of that experience.
How can i ever be sure I remember the memories correctly if I don't report them to others to verify for me that my recollections are accurate later?
It's not complicated. I remember without employing others because i know my memory works. It always has in the past and it does now.
If i create a new word for cat, how can I be sure that when I report my new word to you that I'm remembering the word I just created and haven't changed to a new word? If words have no meaning until spoken, then what were they before spoken and how did I know to start using it?
If I misuse words and you correct me, how do you know that you've corrected me if I deny you corrected me?
What am i missing here? All this reductio seems to follow if we deny the reliability of personal memory.
Edited 12/10/21: Actually Hanover brings up an important point, which I never really addressed.
It's not the failure of memory that is central to the argument, it's the failure of meaning.
(SEP Article)
then:
Hence the generalisation of the argument to all rule-following, which I think @Sam26 is moving towards.
A private linguist, each time they make use of a sign to represent a sensation, would be engaging in an act of ostensive definition. Each use would be novel. Hence, there is no rule being followed.
Ya, I agree, I've mentioned this several times. Maybe I should have emphasized it more in the post Hanover is talking about.
Each use of the sign "S" is a novel use, because each instance of sensation is a new sensation. These sensations are only said to be "the same" through that sloppy use of "same", which follows from the absence of a criterion of identity. This sloppy use of "same" which says that two identical things are the same, is an illness which pervades mathematics, requiring philosophical treatment.
As you say Banno, there is no rule being followed, because there is no criteria as to what constitutes an S, because each S, as a particular individual is different from every other S. But that's simply the way language is, it does not consist of rules. Each person decides, based on one's own experience, what to call any different object, or any different feeling. We don't follow rules, each one of us follows one's own personal inclinations. Who, (unless there is a God), has the power of authority to say one is correct and another incorrect?
Interesting. So....
In that millisecond you are supposedly making a judgement - "Does that count as a pain?"
But do you want to go further and doubt that?
Where that is a act of pointing.
Wittgenstein was not promulgating coherentism. But I have an interest in reconciling Davidson - Quine's intellectual son - and Wittgenstein, so I'm interested, if confused.
Quoting sime
Start there. What is it? Who called it that?
You would say that they were in pain even if they had no "unpleasant experience"?
Quoting Isaac
I think Wittgenstein's point is that having a pain (or other sensation) is not something that one can come to know or to learn of, and so it does not constitute knowledge. In order for it to be (learned) knowledge, one would need to be able to guess or speculate whether one was in pain and then be able to confirm or disconfirm it. If it makes no sense to doubt whether you are having pain (when you are having pain), then it makes no sense to be certain of it, either.
Agreed, and this is the whole point of this thread.
Wow, that's some statement. Now I understand how it is that you can make some of the statements you put forth.
If you saw some of my discussions with Luke, you'd see that I've been arguing this for a long time. Wittgenstein is the person who gave me this idea. Look at what is said in 253-255. There is no criterion of identity (rule) by which we say that two things are the same. Luke supports this above with the quote from 216, the law of identity is a useless statement.
Bear this in mind when you read 257-264. There is no rule followed when the person in the example names a sensation with "S" To be named S requires that the sensation be judged as "the same" as the prior one named by S. But the person has no criterion of identity by which to make that judgement. Furthermore, as explained in 253 -255, there is no criterion of identity in language use in general, by which people in general might judge two things to be the same, thereby justifying the use of the same word for two distinct things. So, the example presented at 258 is a representation, or description by analogy, of language use in general. We have no rule, no criterion of identity, by which we say that this object (which we are inclined to name as a "phone" for example) is the same as the last object which someone used the same name on, as these two are clearly different objects, not the same object, therefore using the same name is unjustified.
So, we proceed to 261, the use of a word stands in need of justification. This refers not simply to the private language, which serves as the example by analogy, but language in general. And this is where we turn to others, the public, to derive justification for our private acts of word use. The point we are at now, is that word use itself is not necessarily public, it may be something private, but justification of that use is something public. This is the premise which Wittgenstein will proceed to argue in the next section, that justification is necessarily public. He is not arguing that language use is necessarily public, because he's already demonstrated that private use is exactly the same as public use, by showing that neither employs a criterion of identity. (Notice the twist here, "demonstrated that private use is exactly the same as public use", when there is no criterion of identity.)
However, this exposes a much deeper philosophical problem. If a criterion of identity is not employed when we name two distinct things by the same name, (or designate them as "exactly the same"), then how is one's use of words justified? So justification becomes a very deep problem with no immediate solution.
You agree with Wittgenstein that the law of identity is - as you call it - "a useless statement"?
Then why do you also say things like this:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
On the one hand you agree that the law of identity is useless, but on the other hand you complain about "sloppy" uses of the word "same" that do not conform to the law of identity.
There is such a thing as knowledge by acquaintance: knowledge of what one is familiar with strictly via direct experience. Others can doubt your knowledge by acquaintance (you could be fibbing). You can, with some extensive effort, come to doubt that your knowledge by acquaintance is not illusory (is it a hallucination?). But one can never doubt that one is acquainted with that which one is acquainted with (that I see a pink tree might be a trick of the mind but the pink tree momentarily seen is seen by me all the same, and I know what it looks like: pink, for starters; in this example, one knows of the pink tree strictly by acquaintance).
Just as it makes sense to say when someone else doubts, “I know what I saw”, so too can it make sense in some such cases to affirm, “I know I’m in pain”. For instance, “I get you want to move the sofa, but are you forgetting that your sciatic nerves went out and that you’ve been in a lot of pain,” retorted with, “I know I’m in pain, but I’m going to move the sofa anyway.”
And this knowledge of “being in pain” isn’t JTB or some variant but, instead, one’s direct awareness of oneself being in pain; hence, a variant of knowledge by acquaintance.
I'm familiar with knowledge by acquaintance, and I do believe that it falls under the umbrella of JTB. For me, JTB has a variety of uses, as seen in particular kinds of language-games. My view is that we justify our beliefs in a variety of ways, including sensory experiences, which directly relates to knowledge by acquaintance. For example, you might ask me after I say the orange juice is sweet, "How do you know the orange juice is sweet?" my justification is, "I tasted it." I think it's clear that we use sensory experience as a justification for many of our beliefs. Similarly, we can justify our knowledge (knowledge by acquaintance) of certain people, because of our direct sensory experiences with them, but justifying the belief that one is in pain seems way out of place. Why? For the various reasons just given in this thread.
Right, we can use knowledge by acquaintance to justify our beliefs, but that which we know by acquaintance is not of itself a belief - that in turn needs to be justified. That one sees a pink tree - be it illusory or not - is not a belief at the moment experienced. Hence:
Quoting Sam26
Awareness of being in pain is not of itself a belief. Its a datum, for lack of better words.
Haven't read the entire thread, so excuse me if I've overlooked where the case was made for the contrary, if it was.
Well, I would take issue with "that which we know by acquaintance is not of itself a belief - that in turn needs to be justified," because if we know it, then by definition it's a belief, viz., one that's true and also justified. And, why wouldn't something be a belief the moment I experience it? If for example someone pulled a gun on me, and surprised me with that gun, my reaction would probably be immediate based on my knowledge (the belief) that they have a gun.
I don't discover my pains. I have my pains. Knowledge is something I learn. How would I learn of my pain?
TMK, a belief is primarily understood as either a mental acceptance of a claim as true or, else, faith or trust in the reality of something. Add to this if you're thinking of something different.
That I see a red cup is neither contingent on claims that I might make nor is it a reality I need to place my faith or trust in. It simply is. That I see a red cup is a datum, a fact, one that remains such irrespective of whether it is a hallucination or not, etc. If doubting whether what is seen is in fact real, then belief is involved. But that what is seen is seen is, again, a brute fact - that I neither express as a claim nor that I place faith or trust in in order for it to so be.
A belief might then be that the cup has a backside that is also red. Yes. But this does not dispel the datum on which this belief is based.
Where do we disagree with this?
Quoting Sam26
This is what I am contesting.
State: "The particular condition that someone or something is in at a specific time."
Knowledge: "Facts, information and skills acquired through experience or education."
How can a state exist as knowledge? These two things are totally incompatible.
Then, what does "private certain knowledge" mean? It can't stand either grammatically or semantically. "Private" cannot be an attribute of "certain". On the other hand, "certain private knowledge" could stand, since "certain" can be an attribute of "private".
With my above remarks I want to show that even if Wittgenstein seems to care a lot about language, he doesn't actually care about it. The above is a good example and proof of that. And it is even worse than his statement "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world", which at least stands grammatically, but the words in it are used too loosely, with the reault of making the statement shallow.
So, I am sorry not to respond to the rest of your description of your topic.
First, thanks for the explanation. This Wittgenstein stuff baffles me, and I teeter between thinking I'm missing something terribly to the emperor wears no clothes.
If you'll hang in there with me, let me know if I have this right:
I see a dog and I name it "dog," yet I tell no one and that private word exists for me. I then see another dog and I recall it is called "dog," and I say to myself "there is a dog," but the fact that I cannot be corrected as to my use of the term "dog" means I'm not playing a language game with agreed upon rules and therefore the idea of correctness fails to have meaning in this private language context. Since there were no rules created by other players, the second time I called the dog a "dog" was not based upon any rule, but was a new, arbitrary word creation. That is, had I declared the existence of the dog aloud to where others agreed, then I'm forced to follow those rules and the word "dog" retains its meaning. That I kept it to myself allows me to call a dog a "cat" and it would be called "cat" because I'm not compelled to follow any rules. There being no rules, there is no correct and no incorrect, and I'm no longer using language.
Do I have this right?
If I do, and I realize I might not, I'm still at a loss as to why I have to accept this whole notion that I cannot be forced into a particular word usage game even when I am the only person who knows the word I'm using.
Language formation occurs as the result of a priori rules hard wired into our DNA. It's not like we're blank slates able to modify the most basic ways we form, retain, and use language. There are cultures of all different sorts, but none constantly put the names of objects into flux as part of their language scheme. The reason they don't isn't because they just don't like that sort of game, but it's because they can't. They're human beings and that's not what human beings do
This is to say I consistently keep calling a dog a "dog" in public not because of the correction that would occur if I publicly called it a "cat." I keep calling a dog a "dog" because my brain recognizes it as such and my internal language rule structure would auto-correct me even if I privately called it a "cat."
Edit:
I see this is tack I have taken. Do you find it persuasive?
There are plenty of approaches within psycholinguistics that offer alternatives to this Chomskyesque view of language. Embodied and enactivist models embrace the later Wittgenstein while rejecting innatist and representationalist theoreis of language.
I don't think the problem is that a rule is not being followed, but that ostensibly he is not pointing to anything at all. He may have this sensation but he is not pointing to anything that would allow us to know what that sensation is.
Quoting Hanover
You could, however, make that information public. There is an object that is pointed to. The thing about a private language is that it cannot be made public. It is not simply that it would then no longer be private. His examples are of sensations that cannot be conveyed, because they are not specific enough to allow for anyone else, or, for that matter, even the person who has the sensation, to identify it, to give it a determination or, as he calls it, a post or a marker by which we can say it is this and not that.
Haven't read much of these alternative accounts in relation to language. Can these alternative accounts reasonably explain why humans which were not exposed to language in their preadolescent years cannot learn to speak grammatically correct language?
I get that I cannot point to an internal sensation, but what of non-nouns that I cannot point to, like run, put, beside, and without? What about nouns that I can't point to, like freedom, the United States, agency, Bigfoot, the current Queen of France, etc.?
If you fail to develop your language skills at an early age, they don't develop correctly. What other explanation is there?
Hey, I agree! But being the fallibilist that I am, I asked out of curiosity.
There are a lot of capacities that we learn much more effectively in early childhood than in adulthood, such as a foreign accent and perceptual skills. . This would seem to be more a matter of the neural plasticity of a young brain rather than the effect of innate structures.
These are things about which there is enough familiarity to discuss them.
The sensation that only I have that I name 'S' is not like that. Or maybe you too have a sensation you call 'S'. Are they the same or even similar? How could we tell?
I grant the explanation, but it leaves me, personally, far from convinced. We are by far the most behaviorally plastic species that we know of. Yes. But I don't find this fact to in any way dispel the reality that we too hold genetically innate behaviors. From our innate ability to engage in basic perception (e.g. of a basic behavior) to our innate imprinting on caregivers (e.g. of a complex instinctive behavior), innate activities in humans still play an important part of our behavior as a species. And I can find no reason not to include universal grammar in the list.
There are also other questions that could be asked, such as an explanation for creole languages:
Quoting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_grammar#Presence_of_creole_languages
How does increased neural plasticity in youth in and of itself account for why creole develops from pidgin when pidgin is all that children are exposed to and when pidgin works well enough for the adult original speakers?
But to sum, I grant your explanation, but I find it very wanting.
This is interesting.
But this is a major theme: knowledge by acquaintance is problematic.
From the start of PI Wittgenstein examines ostension. He starts with a critique of Augustin's idea that pointing is fundamental to language. Pointing is as much a linguistic act as is asking a question, so it cannot stand as fundamental to language.
And knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge by ostension.
The argument is that you cannot doubt that the door is shut while you are standing looking at the door - or something along those lines. That you know the door is shut by acquaintance. But you can doubt that what you see is indeed a door - that the word "door" applies here. With this and other arguments Wittgenstein undermines the primacy of knowledge by acquaintance, showing it to be as much a part of our use of language as any other sentence. "Slab!
Quoting javra
It's based on your use of "Red" "Cup" "I" and "See". It already embeds you in a language community.
Your belief that the cup is red is not justified by anything. The contention is that it is insufficient to count as knowledge, because doing so fudges the very useful distinction between belief and knowledge.
But further, if "the cup is red" were to count as knowledge by acquaintance, it must be justified by appeal to our common use of those words.
This is where @Sam26 and I differ slightly; I recall that he takes a stronger line in defining knowledge. It's a point of ongoing discussion.
Are you arguing that pre-wired innate structures play a central role in the most complex kinds of adult human interactions? Could you give examples of this?
Yes, that, I think, is a common objection, to which the first reply is : "… whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘correct’"; and the second, A repeat of my claim above; you used the word "dog" to privately refer to the first dog; now you have no basis to show that your referring to the second dog is a second instance of the same rule; all you may be doing is inventing a novel use of the word "dog".
This leads us to the generalisation of the private language argument to rules, in principle. That one is following a rule is not dependent on stating the rule, but in following it. This is complimentary to the theme of replacing meaning with use.
A precise answer to that question can be found here.
Quoting Banno
Fodor et al. as described here
For Wittgenstein, even the concept of a machine implementing an algorithm is relative to human customs, rather than what machines themselves are doing per-se. He is a logic anti-realist. Unfortunately, his understanding of rules as being ontologically dependent upon the background context of human customs for their recognition is perpetually misinterpreted as referring to meaning and rules being epistemically dependent on social feedback, something which isn't helped by the terrible wikipedia article on the subject.
I don't know any other word with which to describe Wittgenstein other than a coherentist, given his abandonment of foundationalism and recognizably Quineian stance towards semantics, nothing the 1951 publication date of the Two Dogmas of Empiricism that was two years prior to the posthumous publication of PI in 1953. There have been some recent attempts to divide their points of view, but I personally find them unconvincing.
IN the case of a private sensation, yes.
Your comparison with Quine came to mind as I wrote
Quoting Banno
I'm not sure "anthropological holism" is an accurate term. Partly because I am somewhat allergic to the use of such generalised terms in an argument, much preferring common language. While the term draws attention to similarities between Wittgenstein and Quine, I doubt it pays sufficient attention to their differences.
That is, I find it very difficult to decode sentences such as:
Quoting sime
You must also then have invented the private words "there", "is" and "a". But how would you know what they mean without translating them into the public language you have been inducted into?
My dog has no language and yet knows the door is shut, so this argument fails to convince. Knowledge by acquaintance is indeed foundational; without it there could have been no language to begin with..
That is exactly what is in contention, so merely asserting it is not presenting an argument.
Does your dog know that you will shut the door at midday?
I can understand that it can be problematic. I think this is primarily because it is a rather vague and thereby ambiguous term. We’re accustomed to abstracting. But the most concrete of knowns are simply that which we are directly aware of. And this devoid of communication, such that at least most of what we are directly aware of is not contingent upon our communicating it to others or to ourselves. I double checked the definition of “know” and “knowledge” to confirm common usage and, as I anticipated, some definitions rely on “to be aware of” or some such.
So while much of communication is contingent on ostension (communication of emotions via facial expressions as one example that isn’t), our direct awareness of givens is not. Furthermore, that which one is directly aware of is, as a percept, and via common usage of the term, known to oneself. How does one know that the orange juice one drinks tastes sweet to oneself if not via direct awareness, with no ostension required in this. Or, as a more extreme example, how does an animal know whether what they put into their mouths to taste tastes good to them and is thereby worth being eaten?
This is the form of “knowledge by acquaintance” which I have in mind. And, here, knowledge by acquaintance is not knowledge by ostension.
Quoting Banno
I don't fully disagree. Language can and does shape our awareness to an extent. What might a wine connoisseur be devoid of the language that conveys the different subtleties of taste? Without this language, including the understanding of what it conveys, one would be clueless as to what a connoisseur knows. Nevertheless, a lesser animal with color vision can discern a red object from a non-red object too via its sight - without any language community required for this discernment. I don't find that we are so different from lesser animals that we'd be unable to so discern in the absence of our holding a language. After all, pre-linguistic children do. Here, again, both the lesser animal and human would know what is and is not red via acquaintance. So in this chicken and egg issue, I find that knowledge by acquaintance is prior to language, or even communication in general - though sometimes language can, for example, focus our perceptions so that they become more finely tuned.
So, again, there's disagreement with this:
Quoting Banno
There are certainly some significant differences between Quine and Wittgenstein , such as their divergent views on the continuity of philosophy and science.
Examples were give in the statement you quoted. Some of the most complex kinds of adult human interaction are in large part built upon them: perception and infant/child imprinting on caregivers (and the characteristics of such). We don't learn to perceive and we don't learn that we need to become attached to specific caregivers as young children (and, thereby, to their system of values which we tend to grow up with as individual humans).
Knowing that... is inherently propositional.
Knowledge by acquaintance, if it is anything, is a form of knowing how.... Knowing by acquaintance that the cup is red is nothing more than knowing how to make use of the words "cup" and "red" in a sentence.
As such any special epistemic place it might be thought to have dissipates.
The dog knows how to go through the door, but does not know that "the door is closed" is true.
You've overlooked what I said. Not very interesting, as you say.
I don’t see why we need the assumption of such a pre-wired imprinting to explain the huge variety of adult social relations. All that’s needed is the assumption of humans as sense making creatures. Without. imprinting, how would social relations be different?
You have it backwards . Knowing how and knowing that are forms of knowing by acquaintance; it is by familiarity with an activity that you come to know how. You know the cup is red by seeing it. It is simply the ability to distinguish between red and other colours; like the honeyeater who can recognize the red flowers that are her favorites.
My apologies. Point me to it.
You can say that, but doing so fails to notice the very great difference between your dog's knowledge and your own.
I don't see that you are addressing the topic. It seems to me that you have simply bypassed the private language argument because you find it inconvenient. That's fine, and you might be able to work around it in an interesting way - although I think @Isaac makes a better case.
Quoting Joshs
A complex topic were one were to get into it. I'm not Freudian leaning, no Oedipus or Electra complexes for me (!), but I do hold that we as adults, for example, tend to be attracted to partners that (for heterosexuals) embody the characteristics we saw our parent of the opposite sex hold during our formative years. This, again, due to what I believe to be our imprinting what a relationship ought to be from out parents. And it does explain the data that Freudian BS often makes use of.
How would social relations be different without imprinting? I imagine we wouldn't hold any subconscious preferences in who we find attractive. These often stubborn and sometimes unhealthy subconscious preferences are far more tedious to adequately explain via the assumption of blank-slate, sense-making creatures. But again, I do hold an absence of metaphysical division between humans and lesser animals, and I think we can agree the latter are not "blank-slates".
edited for mistypes
OK: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/598040
I do acknowledge the great difference between the dog's knowledge and my own; it's just that I understand them both as being founded on sensory experience.
I don't see how this relates to the PLA. As I've said a few times I think a private language is impossible, because in order to create a language uniquely my own I would need to translate the words, at least the non-ostensive words, that constituted that language into English in order to explain to myself what they refer to.I don't know if that is Wittgenstein's argument, though; I've never been able to work out just what his argument is.
My view is that another way we justify beliefs is by linguistic training, i.e., we learn how to use words. How do I know that that is a cup and that it's red? First, we learn to use the words in social contexts, so (as I point to a cup) it's what we mean by cup, red, etc. Whether it makes sense to say "I know this is a cup," depends on the context. If someone was learning a language, we could imagine where one might appropriately doubt whether X is a cup or something else. In other words, the doubt is about the use of that particular word, and its referent.
So, I wouldn't claim that the cup example is an example of knowledge by acquaintance, you're making this assumption. This would be an example of justifying a belief based on linguistic training.
Cheers.
Let me reflect back to you what I take you to have been saying, so that you can correct my error.
I had presented an argument that knowledge by acquaintance is ostension, and hence the very topic with which Wittgenstein begins the PI; and hence that the argument in the PI is indirectly about knowledge by acquaintance.
I happily acknowledge the variation in the use of "know"; and am explicitly advocating a certain use, that knowledge in the context being discussed is propositional. Further, we can acknowledge that there are other uses, and for out purposes here keep a keen eye on which we are using so as to keep track of our progress.
On this account, what you have called knowledge by acquaintance might be better termed belief based on ostension, so as to keep it distinct from propositional, justified knowledge.
Now, Wittgenstein presents a range of arguments against ostension being central to communication. This is explicitly an argument against the contrary view of building a language from logical simples, which he had himself set out in the Tractatus. If he is correct and ostension is as much a part of language as questioning or commanding, then one cannot use pointing to logical simples as the foundation of language.
SO what is in contention here is what you take as granted; that much of communication is contingent on ostension.
So where you say:
Quoting javra
What you are doing in recognising that the juice is sweet is precisely recognising that the right words to use are "juice" and "sweet". Using the words correctly is exactly what understanding that the juice is sweet consists in. Recognising that the juice is sweet is already embedded in language, already a public act.
The dog does not recognise that the food is tasty; it just eats the food. The judgement that the food tastes good and therefore is worth eating is, as it were, post hoc, and in this case made by us in setting out the actions of the dog.
On that we can agree.
I agree; I was using the phrase in order to be clear with Javra. Knowledge by acquaintance is a furphy.
The dog does, however, enjoy the taste of the food; which is the foundation upon which recognizing that the food is tasty rests.
Nope. No ostension involved in awareness of that which is directly experienced. Not to oneself and not to others. First awareness of and then, maybe, ostension so as to communicate that which one is directly aware of. This is what I call knowledge by acquaintance of X: direct awareness of X. Its also what a lot of other people call it, including Bertrand Russell. If you're so inclined check out the rest of this Wikipedia entry:
Quoting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge_by_acquaintance#%22On_Denoting%22
Quoting Banno
Animals would die quickly according to this reasoning. For an animal to not "hold awareness of" predator (non-food) from prey (food), or of that which is nutritious for it (food) from that which is toxic for it (non-food), would be deleterious to the animal.
But, thank you for actually replying to what I posted.
Quoting javra
Forgot to make this explicit. That which is deemed as food will be desirable, and thereby good tasting (as contrasted to pleasantly sounding or the like), when the animal is hungry. It's what animal taste buds are for, right?
Then it is awareness, not awareness of. An unpointed awareness is not an awareness of something.
To my eye, that closes it. In Quine's terms, observation - even down to awareness of a red cup - is embedded in theory.
Quoting javra
This is a pointing: That is a food.
Seems the we differ as to what is involved in pointing.
For someone who gives great emphasis to language use, you have a strange means of expressing yourself. While I think I happen get what you mean by "an unpointed awareness" I hope you know that linguistic use of the term is fully idiosyncratic. One points one's awareness at things ... no, I'm not understanding that. To me it's worse than a homunculus argument.
But OK.
I don't agree that the law of identity is a useless statement. I agree with Wittgenstein that there is no criterion of identity by which we say that two things are the same. The law of identity states that one thing is the same as itself. It is not a criterion for judging two things as the same.
And this is what is discussed at 253, the possibility of a criterion for judging two things as the same. Since there is no such criterion, and people use "same" to refer to things which are obviously different, but are in some way similar, then it would make perfect sense to say that your pain is the same as my pain.
Furthermore, I am no more justified, or correct, in judging that one instance of my pain is the same as another instance of my pain, then I am in saying that your pain is the same as my pain. This is because we have no criteria by which we can judge two distinct things as the same, so any instance of doing such is just as absurd, and unjustified as any other.
Anyway, Wittgenstein didn't believe that the law of identity is useless, he just didn't like the way that it was stated, so he offered his own interpretation. If you read the rest of that passage, you'll see that he just preferred to offer his own way of stating it, as "every thing fits into its own shape" or something like that
Quoting Sam26
So do you, so does Banno, and also Luke. In this sense we are all the same. Go figure.
Quoting Sam26
You are making a big jump here, thereby avoiding the problem of justification which Wittgenstein is pointing at. We need to justify our use of words, as you say, demonstrate that we are correct in saying that X is a cup. This is the only way to quell the doubt about the use of that particular word. Now you cannot jump to "we justify beliefs...by linguistic training", as your answer to the problem of justification, because, 'this is how I learned to talk therefore it is correct', does not suffice as justification. It's an appeal to authority, and is really nothing more than circular logic. Why is this use of words correct? Because it's what we were taught to do. Why were we taught to do it? Because its correct. It's just a circle which really says nothing about justification. To understand what justification really is, we need to really look at why we use words the way that we do, rather than just saying that we use words the way that we do because we were taught to use them that way.
That's not so idiosyncratic. Pointedly so. It is what we do. Awareness is not passive.
I'm not entirely clear what you mean here. If by 'that' you mean the sensation itself, then no, I don't think it makes sense to say "I doubt I had that sensation" as 'sensation' is term which covers pretty much anything that such a triggering event might be.
In a sense it's just putting it on the same footing as our other senses. We might doubt that we've seen an oasis ("is it just a mirage?"), but not that we've seen something. It's nothing but pragmatism, but I just think there's no good cause to go about thinking that nothing at all causes all these sensations we have. I do, however, find it useful to have a language in which I can talk about the difference between causes. The thing I'd say about pain is that it usually associated with tissue damage, or some negative thought (in terms of emotional pain), so it makes sense, in the absence of either to ask "have I got this right?".
When we name stuff we're not just labelling, we assigning a social role, a set of subsequent behaviours on our part, and expectations of others follow from the naming. If these don't work out as we expected them to, we need to change something about the model, and that usually means changing the name too. This makes everything with a name open to doubt, that doubt being "naming it such-and-such didn't work out as I expected, maybe I should try another".
I'm not entirely clear what you mean here. If by 'that' you mean the sensation itself, then no, I don't think it makes sense to say "I doubt I had that sensation" as 'sensation' is term which covers pretty much anything that such a triggering event might be.
In a sense it's just putting it on the same footing as our other senses. We might doubt that we've seen an oasis ("is it just a mirage?"), but not that we've seen something. It's nothing but pragmatism, but I just think there's no good cause to go about thinking that nothing at all causes all these sensations we have. I do, however, find it useful to have a language in which I can talk about the difference between causes. The thing I'd say about pain is that it usually associated with tissue damage, or some negative thought (in terms of emotional pain), so it makes sense, in the absence of either to ask "have I got this right?".
When we name stuff we're not just labelling, we assigning a social role, a set of subsequent behaviours on our part, and expectations of others follow from the naming. If these don't work out as we expected them to, we need to change something about the model, and that usually means changing the name too. This makes everything with a name open to doubt, that doubt being "naming it such-and-such didn't work out as I expected, maybe I should try another".
I might not use the expression 'in pain'. It sounds messy "they're in pain but they don't know it". But something like "their body is being wracked by pains but they're unaware due to a malfunction of the thalamus" seems to make sense to me. At least I don't think I would be met with baffled failure to understand if I were to describe a person in those terms. There a condition in which increases the availability of 5-HT at the 5-HT3 receptors at a nerve ending, this results in a sensation of pain (or discomfort), but the rest of the pain pathway is absent. Some talk about this as not being in 'real pain'. Personally, I should stress, I disagree with that use of language, I think it undermines the felt pain of people who suffer from such a condition; but the point - as far as this discussion goes - is that people know what they mean, my disagreement is a psychological one, not a failure to understand what they mean.
Quoting Luke
Yes, I agree. But Wittgenstein was not privy to modern understandings of cognitive psychology, so whilst I'm completely on board with the idea that if something could not 'come to be known' there's be no sense in doubting it (The insight Wittgenstein is qualified to espouse), he's wrong in his examples of those somethings, simply because he didn't know then what we know now about how we come to judge the causes of our sensations, including interocepted ones like the activity of nociceptors.
Then why did you say:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think you understand PI 216 or much of anything that Wittgenstein says.
Well, that was the question I originally asked you.
Quoting Isaac
This reasoning would commit you to saying that patients under anaesthetic are in pain (or equivalent), whereas the entire reason for anaesthetic is to eliminate pain. I think it is a matter of you using these words incorrectly. You have not addressed the point I made about the definition you provided: you completely ignore that pain is defined in terms of an "unpleasant experience".
Quoting Isaac
What are you claiming Wittgenstein is wrong about? He says (at PI 246): "it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself."
[quote=Wikipedia]Speaking in tongues, also known as glossolalia, is a practice in which people utter words or speech-like sounds, often thought by believers to be languages unknown to the speaker.[/quote]
In a strange reversal of conditions, a person who simply repeats (oh! Talking Birds) a sentence in a language fae doesn't understand, is kinda like the mirror image of a private linguist. In one case the language is public, in the other it's private but in both situations, comprehension is nil!
[quote=Wikipedia]Talking birds are birds that can mimic the speech of humans. There is debate within the scientific community over whether some talking parrots also have some cognitive understanding of the language.[/quote]
No, because anaesthetic acts differently. It might reduce conscious awareness of pain, reduce memory of pain (amnesiac effects) , it might reduce the signalling of pain at the nerve ending, or it might reduce the transmission of those signals at the brain stem or thalamus. At each point in this chain we can sensibly talk about 'the pain' and be perfectly well understood. If I say, "the pain reaches the thalamus but the the drug interferes with the communication between neurons from there on", no-one says "what do you mean 'the pain' - the patient isn't in any pain because they're anaesthetised? I've no idea what you're talking about". It's perfectly clear what I'm talking about.
Quoting Luke
Exactly as I explained previously. There is no such thing as 'pain' (the experienced sensation) in physiological terms. It simply doesn't exist. It's a constructed experience, we interpret interocepted signals using socially constructed models of the meaning of those signals, one of which is 'pain'. Most of that modelling is done subconsciously (which it makes no sense to doubt, since we've no access to it), but the evidence is (evidence which Wittgenstein obviously didn't have access to) that a very small part of that model-fitting is done consciously milliseconds after a shift in attention. The cortico-limbic-striatal circuits use the descending pain modulatory system to modulate pain signalling in line with models of pain at higher cortical hierarchies. You literally decide if you're in pain.
Than I'm lost. It seems it is not possible to doubt a pain.
Quoting Isaac
Here's the thing: with the other senses there is a public item at the source. See the house? SO can I. Hear the bird? So can I. Touch the wall? So can I.
But with pain, not so much. When you assign a social role to the house, the bird, the wall, there is a public confirmation that is absent with pain.
You're not actually talking about pain. You are talking about the physiological functions that are known to be correlated with pain, and calling it "the pain" as shorthand. There is no "unpleasant experience" in these examples, so you are arguing against the definition of "pain" that you provided.
Quoting Isaac
That's beside the point. It only matters that we are either in pain or not.
Briefly, as I have a meeting to get to.
Quoting Banno
FMRI scans. What I'm saying is that the lack of a public shared referant for pain is a consequence of our technology, not a restriction about the way the world is. As we've discussed before, I think, different sub-cultures require languages in which to talk about their particular models. We're not 'wrong' for using language that way, only context-specific.
Notwithstanding that, I think constructed experience models do provide us with a public confirmation of pain in the way I described earlier. If I go about saying I'm 'in pain' in response to some particular set of physiological signals and it doesn't have the effect I expect it to have I might well conclude that I'm wrong, maybe I'm not in pain afterall, maybe this is something else. As I said to @Luke above, 'pain' is a socially constructed model, the physiology causing it is overlapping and non-exhaustive so there is definitely an element of 'deciding' you're in pain. There's disagreement about whether any part of that decision is conscious - and if none, then your position would be right; but if any, then your position would be wrong. It hinges on the psychological facts of the matter.
Quoting Luke
If I use the word 'pain' and I'm understood by a reasonable community of language users, then I am 'actually' talking about pain. There's no objective definition, that's why I brought up the standard one, to show it's ambiguity, not to set it up as a gospel.
Okay, but you're no longer talking about the sensation of pain, like Wittgenstein is.
[quote=Google]
The 7-38-55 rule indicates that only 7% of all communication is done through verbal communication, whereas the nonverbal component of our daily communication, such as the tonality of our voice and body language, make up 38% and 55% respectively.[/quote]
Philosophy is toneless and bodiless, and that is why it goes astray so often.
*Gives long hard scanning silent stare to audience.*
The latter question, which philosophers agonise over for centuries, is an expression more or less equivalent to "um," but occurs at the end of the speech more than the middle.
Foreigners don't get it. But they copy it. It's now in California, Canada and other parts.
I don't think you understand the law of identity. According to this law it is impossible for two things to be the same. Only one thing can be the same as itself. Calling one thing, "two things", is contradictory. That's why I said "There is no criterion of identity (rule) by which we say that two things are the same", "Two things are the same" is a violation of the law of identity, and no new law has been proposed to take its place. So there is no other rule, or law which provides us a principle, or criterion, by which we can say "two things are the same", even though we commonly use "same" like this, in the vernacular.
Wittgenstein clearly understands the law of identity (216), and explains how he will use the word "same" in the vernacular way, which violates the law of identity (253-255), He even emphasizes this usage at 254 with "The substitution of "identical" for "the same" (for instance) is another typical expedient in philosophy." By this substitution, two "identical" things are said to be "the same" (in disregard for the law of identity).
He also alludes to the consequence of this action, that with this use of "same" which he has chosen, there is no criterion of identity by which the two things are said to be the same. Clearly, he is implying that since he has dismissed the law of identity, in favour of the vernacular use of "same", there is now no rule governing his use of "same".
Does he discuss private language without private sensation?
You don't get it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You quote Wittgenstein saying that it is "possible for us both to have the same pain", but it could not be possible if there were no rule governing his use of "same". You seem to think that "same" must mean identical per the law of identity, otherwise it can have no meaning.
True, but in my first case (the social construction of natural kinds like 'pain') I am talking about the sensation of pain Wittgenstein is referring to. It is neither something we 'learn' of ourselves, nor is it something which it would make no sense to doubt. If it is something we construct, then we can doubt the appropriateness and/or utility of the construction. We can't doubt the triggering sensations, but they were not (in Wittgenstein's use) 'pain' in the first place, they're just physiological activity.
Image you've six physiological signals (a, b, c, d, e, and f) you generally model any combination of four or more as 'pain' (by model I mean things like a tendency to use the word 'pain', a tendency to say 'ouch', a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source...etc). The six signals are obviously not themselves 'pain' (again, in the way Wittgenstein is using the term), so it must be the model. But if it's the model, we do doubt it because those six triggering physiological signals overlap with some of the triggering physiological signal for other state/emotion models. Just as we might say "I wasn't hungry, I was just nervous" (misinterpreting the overlapping signals from the digestive system in those two models), we might be able to say "I wasn't in pain, I was just cold and cross". That we don't actually say that is not necessarily a reflection on what is the case so much a cultural artefact of the belief that things like emotions and pains are natural kinds (a belief I believe modern cognitive sciences shows to be unfounded).
I don't see where you derive "it could not be possible if there were no rule governing his use of 'same'". That's utter nonsense. I can't believe that after so much time discussing this issue with me, you are still arguing such a lame point.
Anyway, I do not think that "same" has "no meaning" as you suggest. I think that it could have any meaning, depending on the context of usage, as Wittgenstein suggests. Do you apprehend the difference between having no meaning (meaningless), and having a vast array of different meanings depending on the context of usage? The latter is what Wittgenstein suggests happens to "same" when we reject the law of identity.
The vast array of different meanings is the result of the rejection of the rule (law of identity), i.e. it is the consequence of there being no rule. So the meaning in any particular instance of use is dependent on that particular context of use, not some sort of rule. Meaning is a feature of the particular context of use, not a feature of some universal rule. A rule might restrict the meaning, in the sense of providing a boundary, as a part of the context, but a rule is not a necessary part of the context. Therefore meaning is not dependent on rules. When you come to grasp this fact, you will see that context may provide all the restrictions necessary for the existence of meaning, without the requirement of any rules.
I have some sympathy for this line of thinking. There's a reply from Davidson that I might try to re-formulate to match the case you present. I think there remains something here that is a bit puzzling, methodologically.
SO you have a Quoting Isaac
The idea is that we can map "pain" against signals a, b, c, d, e. Now suppose that we see a suitable combination of four of more signals, such that it fits within the model. We would expect to have the person in whom we observe this - let's call him John - report a suitable pain.
But John does not.
We have a choice. We might say that the John is in pain but does not feel it. I gather that this is what you are proposing. Or alternately we might say that the claim that we can map "pain" against signals like a, b, c, d, e is faulty.
To tie things down, this in in response to @Sam26's Quoting Sam26
SO we might also consider the alternative; John reports having a pain, but does not exhibit a suitable combination of signals. We might again either insist that John is not in pain, but only thinks he is; that his pain is an illusion of some sort. That looks a more than precarious position to adopt, methodologically and ethically. Or we might modify or drop the theory.
I think we addressed this long ago, but we might have a clearer example here.
@Sam26, if this is too far off topic I am happy to move it to another thread. Just give the nod.
The first problem with the private language "argument" is that it (and the whole of PI for that matter) is seen as only true/false statements, rather than the work of finding out for ourselves the insights from these claims. It is taken as an argument for a conclusion, as @Banno has noted (or multiple). As elsewhere, Witt is coming up with examples (even fantasies such as this), in order to draw out their implications which reveal our interests, needs, and desires (at times, looking for a particular outcome). This is not an explanation of human biology or "language" (the language claims/examples are to reveal the implications, which are about our lives).
People also get stuck just saying language cannot be private (and how it cannot), overlooking that we do have "privacy", as in personal experiences (the awe of a sunset by myself), sensations (feelings), and our own desires, interests, needs, and intuitions. These are mine, separately, perhaps secretly, maybe alone (this counters some* of our feeling of being denied/losing something). Witt could be said to make room for the personal, even the ineffable (think: opera, painting, crying). This is not the erasure of the self, nor is it a fight against "solipsism"--the idea I control, judge, or value everything, as it were, individually (without history, our lives, language, etc.)--which ends in our solving our skepticism of each other by saying "you do not!", perhaps (as emphatically) pointing to our "forms of life", language, rules, etc.
More important than proving that a private language is not possible or is nonsensical (pointless), his investigation is to reveal our hidden desires and the state of our human condition. Beyond (in between) the "Private Language Argument" is that:
1) I do not "know" my own pain; I feel it/I express it. There is no space between those for certainty (my "knowledge"). So "referring" to my pain, even the sensation, is in the sense of making it known, as in revealed (to you), not "referring to", as in pointing to a "thing" (an object of knowledge). And "doubt" is just not what I do with pain; I repress it, ignore it (though the example of pain makes this seem impossible, as if I am skewered on it, Cavell says; imagine instead, say, sadness). We focus on, or suppress, our pain/experience, as we would express it to others (or hide it). And you and I have the same pain, experience, etc. to the point we can express and accept them as similar. Here Witt shows that the picture of solipsism comes from a desire to be unknowable.
2) I also don't know your pain, say, by inferring it from behavior, or through science (@Isaac). I do not "know" your pain, I acknowledge it, I react to it (or deny it, blind myself to it) (Cavell--drawn out in my OP on the "Lion Quote"). Knowledge is not our only relation to the world; we have a relationship to others (we may treat them as having a soul, PI p. 178); and our acts/expressions at times define us, even adverse to our culture (beyond what is meaningful to it/in it).
3) That a word can be defined (which we do call: its "meaning") does not reflect the way language works, e.g., a sentence cannot be defined. Meaning is not an action (a cause/our "use") or a thing (internally, like, intention; or externally, like rules for a practice); it is what is meaningful to us as a culture, what is essential to us, expressed in the implications (grammar) of our expressions and actions. This desire for rules is to ensure beforehand that my expressions work out, but most importantly, without my being responsible for my actions, answerable to others (even myself). And the picture of causality satisfies the human wish (for me) to be necessary and for my experience to be special (certainly known, or never fully).
4) There are such things as deception, lies, faking, acting, repressing, etc. Though our word is our bond (Austin), there is just no getting around this (other than reading credibility and the context, etc.). Our response is to try to reach past you, in a sense, to something fixed (inside or out) that we can rely on. The shear fact of this failing leads us to deny the other (as a person) in order to ward off the conclusions of the skeptic; however,
5) *There is a truth to skepticism: that we are separate(d) individuals (we have our "own" pains/sensations/experiences, not because they are necessarily special, but because we "own" them, express/hide-accept/deny them). More to the point, we are responsible to answer for our expressions--and the attitude we take, the aspects we see (or ignore). And we can always/endlessly work to understand each other and our expressions, though there is no assurance this will lead to a resolution--which is the same fear that fuels our desire to turn the fact of our not being the same (person) into an intellectual problem.
You're implying that there are no natural human expressions or reactions. How are a tendency to say "ouch" or a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source [of pain] not natural expressions or reactions, but merely "something we construct"? Don't most animals tend to withdraw from perceived sources of pain?
Such general facts of nature (PI 142) are pivotal to Wittgenstein's work, especially his references to form of life and "shared human behaviour" (PI 206), or that we teach children sensation words on the basis of such shared behaviour (PI 257).
Quoting Isaac
It's "not necessarily a reflection" that pain is a natural kind, but there's very strong evidence to support it. Why else do you think we don't actually say "I wasn't in pain, I was just cold and cross"?
Yes. Although, to be clear, we'd need to say that John was triggered by signal x. Un-triggered expressions can happen - the brain is almost certainly stochastic, which is why I always talk in likelihoods (tendency to behave as if...) rather than x causes y - but it would be a different proposition if we're saying John randomly says he's in pain despite having none of the traditional triggers. I get the feeling you're wanting to explore the version in which John says he's in pain in response to a different set of triggers to usual.
A tendency to reach for the word "pain" is one part of the model we might call {being in pain}, that model being a network of neural connections which make some set of action-responses much more likely given some set of triggering neural signals, one of those responses being to use the word "pain".
If John was reaching for the word "pain" in response to an unusual set of triggers, I'd probably be first inclined to think he had some form of aphasia, that he once upon a time had a more normal model, but some trauma has disrupted the network and now those signals produce a tendency to reach for the word "banana", and some other set of signals has become linked up to a tendency toward the word "pain".
Alternatively, if John was a very young child, I might assume he's learnt the word wrong, some mishearing has made him think it's appropriate to use it in response to signal x when, in fact it was a misunderstanding and we don't tend to use the word that way.
So the question is why I'd go for either of those two explanations rather than expand my list of normal triggering signals to include John's x.
Psychologically, it'd be because John's use of the word that way probably isn't working for him, it's not yielding the results he wants (he keeps getting sympathy when he wants a quick healthy snack and keeps getting yellow fruit when he wants some pain-killers). Maybe John is quite happy with his re-arrangement though, but even in that case it doesn't seem like an unreasonable assumption that most people wouldn't be, so we still need a model of pain-talk where this kind of response is considered in the category something's-gone-wrong.
Trying to relate that rather psychological way of looking at it back to philosophy and the PLA...we both agree, I think, that language primarily does stuff, it's not just a report, it's a social tool to get stuff done. So how's John going to get the stuff done he want's done in a society of other (biologically similar) humans all using "pain" in response to some loose (but still defined) set of triggers a, b, c, d, e, and f, when he's using it in response to trigger x? It seems to me that our shared biology (triggers a, b, c, d, e, and f are biological) is going to undermine his attempts to use the word "pain" and get the stuff done he wants to get done.
In terms of PLA, isn't John's use is exactly a case of sensation S? Haven't we learnt to use the word pain appropriately by trial and error, I use it here it should do this...no, that didn't quite work out as I expected...perhaps here, like this...all the while watching other humans in our social group to see how they react. If those other humans all share a similar biology, then they're all going to react with sympathy, medical treatment etc, to the use of the word "pain" in response to triggers a, b, c, d, e, and f (which indeed require sympathy, medical treatment etc to deal with them) - where such triggers are things like tissue damage signals, heat/pressure signals, or certain neuronal patterns to trigger mental pain (we don't really understand these yet so I've been deliberately vague).
For John to use the word pain absent of these triggers, he'd have to use it either a) randomly (accident) or b) in response to some other publicly measurable trigger (say, hunger), or c) in response to some private, potentially ever-changing, trigger (sensation S). (a) seems irrelevant to any discussion of language use, (b) is an error of use, if we're to have any rules about the use of terms with public referents, but also for John, would get his hunger dealt with by sympathy and pain killers, and (c) seems to run into the problems of the private language argument.
Have I missed an option?
A natural expression might result from some deeper subconscious network (a direct link from a sensory neuron to a motor neuron - via an association neuron - in the spinal cord). The part of the brain dealing with language doesn't even get a look in on this type of signalling, it gets the second hand messages from the proprioceptive neurons, and the eyes that it's body has already pulled away from the hot thing, or shielded the pain site. Reaching for the word "pain" to describe any of those goings on is a post hoc modelling of the signals telling us what just happened, not the real time signals as they're happening.
Beyond those autonomous responses, then yes, I am saying there are no natural human expression or reactions. It's probably the leading theory of affect cognition at the moment. You can read a primer here if you're interested.
Quoting Luke
Well, then scholars would be wise to listen to what scientists say about these facts then, no? It seems odd to say that such facts are pivotal to Wittgenstein's work and simultaneously hold that a philosopher who barely left his offices has a better grasp of those facts than the scientists actually working on them with the full arsenal of modern investigative technology at their disposal.
Quoting Luke
I've just given an account of why - we have a cultural belief in natural kinds.
I was only talking about natural expressions/reactions, not language.
Quoting Isaac
How are you distinguishing those autonomous responses (such as "already pulled aware from the hot thing, or shielded the pain site") from natural expression/reactions?
Quoting Isaac
I don't understand your account. Your account of why we don't actually say "I wasn't in pain, I was just cold and cross" is because we believe in natural kinds, not because there are natural kinds. I don't see how that's an account rather than an assertion. We might believe in natural kinds because there are natural kinds.
But the subject here is language, no? The use of the word "pain".
Quoting Luke
By examining what's going on in the brain. Autonomous reactions don't have any connections to areas of the brain we know to be involved in conscious processing, language use etc.
Quoting Luke
I provided a paper to indicate the support for the model, I can give more if you suspect I'm being dishonest in saying it's the prevailing model. I could give a full account here, but that would be considerably dry and totally off-topic, and it's better you read it directly from the scientists doing the work. What other kind of evidence were you expecting to raise my comment above the level of mere assertion?
Yes, but not with my recent questioning of your implication that there are no natural expressions or reactions.
Quoting Isaac
I don't see what conscious processing and language use have to do with natural reactions/expressions.
Quoting Isaac
Explain to me how your autonomous reactions are different from natural reactions/expressions and maybe I'll read it.
Do you acknowledge two different senses of "meaning" here? One sense of "meaning" (as in word meaning) is definition, explanation, or sense. The other sense of "meaning" (as in meaningful) is significance, consequence, or worth.
I see, well on that you're right. If you want to call autonomous responses a natural kind then we'll have to say that there are some natural kinds. It's not how I'd define a natural kind, but that's fine. The point is that there are no natural kinds when it comes to the states we label with words like "pain" and emotion words.
Quoting Luke
As I said above, autonomous responses are not the sort of thing I'd class as a natural kind, so your question sounded like it was asking how we can tell the difference between autonomous responses and constructed states. If you mean to ask why I don't categorise autonomous responses as natural kinds, I don't know. I've just never come across them being described that way.
Quoting Luke
Well, if we assume it's just a categorisation issue, then it's just a matter of the way I've learned to use the term. I don't think it's that relevant to the topic is it?
The point is that "pain" is used to describe a complex state, not an autonomous response, so when determining if it refers to a simple, what matters is whether such states are natural kinds. Whether autonomous responses are natural kinds seems immaterial.
The distinction between natural and artificial is untenable in the modern world which has done away with the supernatural (God) as the support for the natural. So you are inclined to assign things like instinct and intuition to "the natural", even though they are more similar to "the artificial", by showing intention. The theist could attribute the intention displayed within "natural" things to God, "the supernatural".
Now we'd say that a human construction is artificial, but a bird's nest, or a beaver's dam is natural, though all of these ought to be classed as the same type, because they are purposefully created, therefore created intentionally. So instead of supporting all the intention which is evident within the natural world, with the supernatural, God, we have turned the other way, to say that human beings and their artifacts are a part of nature, natural. Clearly, the division you want, between the natural and the artificial is untenable in the modern world, where we see human beings and their artificial products as a part of nature.
Therefore your proposed division between natural (instinctual) reactions and learned reactions is not at all useful to the subject at hand. They are all intentional (purposeful), and your claim that "shared human behaviour" is somehow not natural is completely untenable without support from the supernatural, God. And to imply that such a division is "pivotal to Wittgenstein's work" is simply wrong. So it's time for me to turn the judgement you made against me, back at yourself. You have a very keen capacity to produce quotes, but ".I don't think you understand ... much of anything that Wittgenstein says."
Quoting Isaac
This is exactly what I've been arguing, but there's a tendency at this forum, to argue that certainty is prior to uncertainty, and that we cannot proceed with an action (such as speaking), without first being certain of what the outcome will be. But this is a complete misunderstanding of the nature of language use. It is the type of activity which if we make a mistake there is usually no serious consequence, or punishment. So there is no requirement of certainty in language use, and trial and error plays a significant role. In fact, the mistakes of young children are seen as humourous and entertaining, so they are encouraged to proceed in their trial and error of learning.
The whole idea that language use is rooted in some form of certainty which is produced from following rules, is simply a misrepresentation of language. And to say that Wittgenstein presents us with this model of language, as if it is a rule based activity, with all those rules being founded upon some rock solid indubitable rules, is a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. He is actually exposing the flaws of this perspective, in order to discredit it, he is not supporting it.
This is a feature of philosophy which many people do not understand. To discredit an idea, refute an ideology, requires that one lay out for display the complete ideology, all of its features and aspects, in their entirety, revealing the faults. The trained philosopher will see the faults, as revealed, and understand that the person laying out the display is actually refuting the ideology by displaying its faults, rather than supporting it.
The way people relate to Plato is a prime example. Modern day "platonic realism" is really a replica of ancient pythagorean idealism. Plato laid out for display all the features of pythagorean idealism, complete with its flaws, and effectively refuted it. Aristotle formalized that refutation. But today, we learn pythagorean idealism through Plato's descriptions, and most people do not read Plato thoroughly enough to understand him, so they believe he is supporting that ideology, and we even attribute the ideology to him, as platonic realism.
I'm not saying that "pain" is used to refer to an autonomous response nor to a natural expression or reaction. Pain is not identical with its expression.
This is what I found odd about your post where you said:
Quoting Isaac
You started that post talking about the sensation of pain as a natural kind, but then you went on to talk about constructing models in terms of expressions of pain. Except you didn't note the distinction between pain and its expression, so you ended up denying that there are any natural expressions of pain or reactions to pain, instead of denying that pain is a natural kind.
Quoting Isaac
It's only immaterial because you started talking about expressions of pain instead of pain.
Also, if the abstract to your primer is anything to go by, then it discusses emotions, not sensations.
3) That a word can be defined (which we do call: its "meaning") does not reflect the way language works, e.g., a sentence cannot be defined. Meaning is not an action (a cause/our "use") or a thing (internally, like, intention; or externally, like rules for a practice); it is what is meaningful to us as a culture, what is essential to us, expressed in the implications (grammar) of our expressions and actions.
— Antony Nickles
Quoting Luke
I would say an explanation does not show something's significance. Or that a definition imposes itself over anything else of consequence. What I was getting at is that the model of meaning based on a word's definition, imagines it as particular and certain; which creates the picture that I cause or intend something particular and/or use rules for a certain outcome. Wittgenstein is taking apart that explanation to see how each thing is important to us (all).
I want to add
d) a sensation that is not private.
Still thinking. Comments welcome.
I'm denying that Wittgenstein's 'sensation of pain' is a simple, so I'm "talking about it" only insofar as I'm denying it is as Wittgenstein speaks of it. I'm sorry if that was not clear enough.
There's no such thing as a 'sensation of pain'. There's no consistent neural equivalent and psychologically there's a failure to link reports with any consistent physiology.
There's a set of physiological signals that are non-exclusively associated with a tendency to use the word "pain", and there's the modelling relationship between that set of physiological signals and a similarly non-exclusive set of responses. We can refer to this modeling relationship as 'the experience of pain' as it is consistent in it's output (the use of the word "pain", but this model is definitely socially constructed, and modified on the hoof - ie it can be doubted. The expression of pain is just some of that non-exclusive set of responses which form the 'output' half of the 'pain' model. Because, in this system, both the input signals and the output responses are non-exclusive set, the correctness of the model 'pain' can be doubted.
Quoting Luke
The work on pain (and other sensations) is just more complex and behind paywalls. The paper I cited is a good introduction to the theory, it covers (as the title suggests) all interoception, it just focuses on emotions because that's the author's original field. I can provide the papers on pain perception, but you'll need journal access to read them.
See my comments to Luke above. There's considerable doubt now that such simples as 'sensations' even exist. The prevailing model consists of non-exclusive sets of triggers, and non-exclusive sets of responses (all stochastic I should add - people get a bit jumpy when we start to talk about stimuli-response, and for good reason). The non-exclusivity of both inputs and outputs means that the modelling relationship is variable - ie there's nothing in the brain that can be called a 'sensation' of pain, only triggers, models and responses.
I think all three could be used as a public referent for the word 'pain', it's not like we have much trouble with non-exclusive sets in other areas of language ('game' as an obvious example). But the non-exclusivity opens the space for doubt. "Am I using this word right? Is it doing what I expect it to do in the circumstances?"
And so I think there is something amiss in the picture you draw.
You don't have to go to another thread. I don't mind at all.
I admit to being a bit perplexed by Isaac's approach.
Ha! Yes. But actors, hypochondriacs... don't we already have a perfectly ordinary notion of people showing external signs associated with pain but without the 'sensation'? I don't see that removing the sensation from the picture makes the assessment of honesty or exaggeration any more problematic. What I'm doing is really akin to the way I treat qualia, it's just an unnecessary reification. There's just a purple thing and our tendency to use the word purple in response to it, we don't need 'the experience of purple', it's not playing any useful part in the discourse. Likewise with pain. There's this collection of physiological triggers and there's our tendency to respond to them in certain ways (saying "pain", screaming...), the 'sensation of pain' just drops out of necessity, we don't need it to explain what's going on.
You're now talking in terms of third-person modelling. Wittgenstein says that it is possible for other people to doubt whether I'm in pain. But if you're the one who is obviously hurting, then doubt is misplaced. There is no hypothesis to be tested or knowledge to be gained from the perspective of the one who's in pain. Maybe the "unpleasant sensation" of pain covers a wide range of sensations that causes some difficulties for scientists, but we all quickly learn what the word means.
No, I'm talking about the first-person, doubting that they are using the word "pain" correctly (or any other response to their set of physiological triggers)
Quoting Luke
Yes. Wittgenstein was wrong (which we shouldn't be surprised about since he had no training in cognitive psychology and the models we use to show he was wrong weren't even around at the time he was writing). There is a hypothesis to be tested, it's how all modelling in the brain works - hypothesis testing. That much is not even really in question. The only question is over what proportion of the hypothesis testing there's some conscious awareness, which is the matter addressed by the papers I cited. Not a settled question, I'll grant, but an interesting one.
Quoting Luke
We quickly learn what the word does. That doesn't require us to refer to any private 'sensation' at all.
"I'm in X" (where X is some mental state) is something which can't meaningfully be doubted, it wouldn't make any sense to say that I was not in some mental state, it would require denying that I had mental processes at all (an obvious contradiction), or denying that they are always in some configuration or other (which seems a logical impossibility). But "I'm in pain" where we've used a word in response to our particular mental state is something which can be doubted because the word is public object, it's use (and associated conceptual responses) is a strategy to get something done within a social context. It might be the wrong strategy, it might not do what we expect it to do (same as any other response). In that case we've used the wrong model, we made a mistake reaching for the word "pain".
First-person is you, not they.
I was referring to another person's first-person experience, but it makes no odds I could have said "I doubt that I use the word 'pain' correctly"
Further, Wittgenstein proceeds with "To this end I associate it with the sign 'S' and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation...". Notice his reference here to "the sensation" as if every time that he judges a sensation as being similar to a previous one, he might conclude that it is that very same, "certain" sensation.
What he has done here is set up a scenario, which appears to the untrained mind, to be a completely normal and acceptable scenario, the person is going to mark down every time they experience the same sensation. However, in reality it is an impossible scenario. No two sensations are the same, as Isaac explains, so in reality, he could not ever be using the sign "S", if he could only use it when he was certain that it was "the sensation".
Of course Wittgenstein knows of this impossibility, and he has set up this impossible scenario intentionally, because he knows that many people might believe the scenario to be really possible, and might picture someone in that scenario actually using "S" to signify a "certain sensation". So, he proceeds to question how one might justify the use of "S" to signify that a sensation on one day is the very same sensation as the sensation on another day. Of course this cannot actually be justified.
Now, justification he says, requires an appeal to something else, something independent. So it is a type of comparison, a matter of establishing a relationship. So we see at 270 a correlation between his use of "S" with a rise in blood pressure, as a possible justification for his use of "S". However, as described, this is not a true justification.. So long as his use of "S" is judged as coinciding with a blood pressure rise, his sensations become completely irrelevant. So his use of "S" to signify a "certain sensation" cannot be justified in this way.
In conclusion, that "S" signifies a certain sensation is just a faulty idea created by the language-game.
I haven't been following closely, but it seems to me that Isaac is really adding a new language-game to the mix based on new information. It could be that the example (not sure at this point) of pain and doubting that one is in pain, is generally senseless, but that there are exceptions. It makes me think of Moore's claim, "I know this is a hand," i.e., can Moore doubt in this context? He's holding his hand up in a well lit room before an audience. Doubting in Moore's example, is a doubt that lacks justification. However, as Wittgenstein points out, there are situations where the doubt would be justified (make sense), then he goes on to explain how that can happen. So, the point with Isaac's example is that it could be just such a counter-example, but this really does nothing in terms of Wittgenstein's overall points about language.
Isaac brings up really interesting points.
So @Isaac's scientist is not measuring pain.
It is clear from the examples I gave that the combination of signals being measured is not the exact same thing as being in pain. The patient can be in no doubt as to their pain, while the doctor can - which is, as Isaac points out, no different to our present situation.
So presents an example of someone doubting the applicability of the word "pain" to their present situation. That's not the same as doubting that one is in pain. seems to make a similar point, as does . And here: Quoting Isaac
Isaac seems to be agreeing, but I suspect he will differ.
Quoting Isaac
Why are you doubting that you or someone else is using the word "pain" correctly?
Quoting Isaac
I just said that you were now talking in terms of third-person modelling, and you denied it, saying "No, I'm talking about the first-person" and doubting their (or your) use of the word "pain".
Anyhow, how one's brain works is not a first-person perspective, or something that we are consciously aware of in the first-person. Being in pain is not the same as having knowledge of our brain functioning. Otherwise, we'd all be experts in the science; or, perhaps, those who knew nothing of the science could not feel pain.
Quoting Isaac
I don't see how the word could be used (in the sense we are using it here) without reference to the sensation. Pain is a sensation. I might cry in pain, but it doesn't mean that pain is crying (nor any other expression/s of pain).
No; he's using "certain" in the attributive sense, as about a specific sensation.
It's your eccentric readings leading you astray, again.
I agree he uses "certain sensation" in the way of "specific sensation", or "particular sensation". The point being that any time he has an instance of a sensation, which he is inclined to label with "S", as the specific sensation, that it is the specific sensation cannot be justified. Therefore he can never be certain that the sensation he has, is that specific sensation. And his attempts to justify it reveal in the end, that he is not even justified in saying that "S" refers to a "particular sensation", or even "a sensation", according to the quote I provided.
Doesn't what you've written here have a meaning that is "particular and certain"?
Quoting Antony Nickles
How does this relate back to the private language argument? I don't view the PLA as being about what is meaningful or essential to us as a culture.
Yes, that's exactly it. @Banno and I have been here before. When we talk about cognition, in the scientific sense, we need a language-game to talk about what we find, but that's often not the folk psychology that gives us many of the terms we use day-to-day.
Quoting Banno
I maintain that it is the same. Being in X is what is undoubted, whether that x is 'pain' is a socially constructed judgement and can be mistaken. The reaching for the word "pain" is one of the responses to the stimuli. You're still assuming that there's a physiological/mental state that answers to the term 'in pain'. What if there wasn't? How would that change things?
Quoting Luke
Same reason I might doubt I'm using any word correctly - it's not having the effect I expect it to in the context I'm using it.
Quoting Luke
It isn't. There's no such thing as 'sensations'. They don't exist. No representation on earth, Non-entities...*
*Obviously I'm being rhetorical, it's a leading theory, that's all - other theories are available.
Once again:
Quoting Isaac
LOL. You've never been in pain? You don't know what "pain" means? I wouldn't want you to upset your theories by feeling anything.
Ya, but when you say things like this, Quoting Isaac then you lose me. Also, you can't look at X, Y, and Z happening in the brain, and say, that's pain. Moreover, if someone isn't feeling pain, then they're not in pain, regardless of what the body is doing.
Yeah, I lose a lot of people at that point.
What do you think the 'sensation of pain' is, as an existent entity. What type of thing is it? On what grounds does it 'exist'?
If I were to say "I'm ill, I have some bad humors", you might say "humors don't really exist, they're an old theory of physiology, but modern science can find no such thing answering to the definition, so you're mistaken in saying you have them".
Modern science can find no such thing that answers to 'the sensation of being in pain'. That's the problem I'm attempting to address.
That's just the old problem of trying to identify some thing that corresponds to the word. Obviously, not all words function like that, and sensation, is just one such word. Are you saying that when someone says, "I feel a weird sensation in my big toe," that that sentence is meaningless? It's correct use is what gives meaning to the word, so it has an ontology based on that use. This reminds of people trying to argue that consciousness is an illusion, or that the self is an illusion, therefore, they don't exist. You say, there's "...no such thing that answers to the 'sensation of being in pain' - but this just isn't true, we answer to it all the time. How? By what we say and do. You seem to be confusing the grammar of "This is a cup" (as you point to it), with the grammar of "This is a pain." One's tendency, and this is what Wittgenstein points out as a mistake in the Tractatus, and what he is fighting against in much of the PI, is to want to find that thing. What exists here is not some kind of object, be it physical or not, that corresponds to the pain, but a family of actions and statements that create its ontology. Where is the thing that corresponds to the word the? Should I say the word is meaningless, or that it doesn't exist because I can't find some thing to point at?
Yes, as was Wittgenstein throughout his entire career.
I would first suggest reading Bertrand Russell's Analysis of Mind. Without reading this book, it isn't easy to fathom the ideas Wittgenstein was criticising and the problems he was attempting to solve, especially with respect to his remarks regarding 'private language'. Wittgenstein's 1930's transcript known as 'Philosophical Remarks' is also necessary reading to understand his intermediate thinking and to put his later remarks into the right context. Both of these works are freely available online.
Notably in PR, Wittgenstein gives what is to my understanding the first 'zombie argument' against behavioural understanding of 'Other Minds', predating David Chalmers zombie arguments by 65 years. But unlike Chalmer, he phrased the zombie problem in terms of the indistinguishability of sense when interacting with a person versus a zombie, as opposed to Chalmer who posed the problem in a more realist fashion in terms of metaphysical substances.
Ultimately, the late Wittgenstein was an anti-realist who didn't think of 'other minds' in the sense of other substances or in terms of property dualism. Rather he emphasised the role that ones own sensations play when one attributes so-called 'other' minds to other people.
However, it is the place where you find me.
Quoting Isaac
This is the scourge of Platonism. We refer to things like Ideas, and sensations, as if they are things, mental states, subject matter, content, what Banno calls mental furniture. But this is a complete misrepresentation. It is a misunderstanding of the mind, and how the mind works, which Aristotle attempted to dispel us of, when he formulated the law of identity. The law of identity states what a thing is in a way which excludes ideas, and other subject matter from being classed as things. This is the category separation between universals and particulars. To understand a universal as a particular is the classic category mistake.
The issue which is alluded to at 270, in the quoted passage above, is that this way of speaking, because it provides us great convenience for speaking about internal feelings and thoughts, is very deeply rooted in our language-games, pervading them all. Aristotle proposed the law of identity as a way to exclude this type of speaking from formal logic, but as Wittgenstein implies at 254-255, it is an illness which has reestablished itself through mathematical axioms.
Wittgenstein suggests at 255, that philosophy needs to treat this illness. The illness consists of convenient falsities, and is therefore a form of pragmatic dishonesty, rooted in intellectual laziness. But how is it possible to treat such an illness, when these expressions provide us with such a high degree of convenience for talking about internal conditions? This illness, which has been allowed to establish itself at the highest intellectual levels, is allowed to permeate in a top down manner throughout all the different games. In the other thread Banno insists that burning books is not a good thing, it burns a hole into the culture. But how else can we destroy such a cancer?
As I said...
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
I'm arguing against the identification of a word with a referent. (I doubt you'll have had a chance to read other posts I've made on the subject, but I've been quite vocal about that very error over the years).
People can nonetheless use words wrongly, it's not a free-for-all.
When we use the word "pain" we do so as a result of a modelling relationship with a non-exclusive set of triggering physiological signals, it's one of the outputs from the model, a tendency to say things like "I'm in pain". This is a strategy, a response to the signals to get something done. This response will downregulate the input signals in accordance with a prior expectation about the cause of those signals. So If I just saw my thumb get hit with a hammer, I'll be expecting pain and will start the responses before the c-fibre signals have even reached the cortico-limbic-striatal circuits. If, seconds later, those signals fail to materialise (for whatever reason) I'll adjust my model response and update my priors - in other words, I'll have been wrong about the only thing we could possibly say constituted being in pain.
Basically, if "I'm in pain" has any meaning at all, it has to serve a function in a language game which those involve understand, it can't just 'hang loose' unconnected to any social function. Our models are socially constructed so that where one on the responses is linguistic, they match these social functions. That has to link back to the effect we want the word to have (again, if there's no context dependant consequence in mind, the word is meaningless). So "I'm in pain" is a response which does something in a social context, and - being triggered by interocepted physiological states - it's those states we intend the word to act on. If this weren't the case, the saying of it would have no cause to be triggered by those states. So if we reach for that word and it doesn't have the intended effect on those states, we're wrong to reach for it.
Note this is not just us not having learned the right use of the word, since the modelling of the "I'm in pain" response at inappropriate times can result from nothing more than a misfiring of triggering signals, or an overlap with similar signals in a noisy part of the network.
What I'm saying is not that we can't treat "I'm in pain" as a simple functional expression, and therefore not amenable to being right or wrong, we can. I'm saying that there's an additional matter to be talked about when we speak of as pain responses modelled from what are typically pain triggers. Here we definitely have a moment when we decide, post hoc, if we're going to trigger the 'pain' responses or not and if we decide in such a way as to elicit an unexpected response, we change the prior (ie we consider ourselves to have been 'wrong' the first time). How do we speak about this psychology if not by saying that we decide if we're in pain and can be right or wrong about that?
Well, it's nice to have some company, but as ever I can't really make much sense of what you're saying, you may have to be a bit more explicit for me.
What if they do materialise?
Quoting Isaac
How does a sensation differ from an interocepted physiological state?
Quoting Isaac
And if it does have the intended effect on those states, then we're right to reach for it.
Quoting Isaac
It sounds like there are also appropriate times that 'I'm in pain' gets used.
Quoting Isaac
Then it's not about the use of the word "pain", as you've been claiming.
Also, what counts as "right" and "wrong" here? Because it sounds very much as though what is counted as 'right' is if there follows a sensation (or an interocepted physiological signal) of pain.
Quoting Isaac
You said that if we hit our thumb with a hammer, then we expect a painful sensation to follow but we may find that it does not follow. I would not call that "deciding" whether to be in pain or not. Wittgenstein is only talking about those cases where the pain does follow and we find that we are in pain.
The problem I see with Luke's reading of Wittgenstein, and Sam26's to an extent, is that they give priority to rules, as if rules are foundational to language, as required for language. But a careful reading of the first part of PI reveals that Wittgenstein intended something completely different. Rules are not foundational, and only come into existence as a feature of language. You might say that rules are the result of the public use of language.
Misunderstanding of the PLA leads one to believe that a private language is impossible. But this is not at all what Wittgenstein has demonstrated. What he has demonstrated is that a private language cannot consist of rules, so right and wrong within a private language is nonsensical. This does not mean that a private language is nonsensical, it just means that the ideas of right and wrong cannot be supported by the private language. So we have a deep division here, a fundamental divide between two very distinct types of language-games, the private game within which there is no such thing as correct and incorrect, and the public game, within which "correct" and "incorrect" appear to form the substance.
When we think or talk to ourself, or perceive our surroundings, we know when an event is recognizable or unrecognizable, coherent or incoherent , consistent or inconsistent , with respect to our expectations. Aren’t these forms of correctness? Let’s say we are creating poetry or literature that is making use of idiosyncratic grammar and words. Within that world of language we have constructed dont we know when we have violated our own norms?
I'm not sure that this is actually different to what @Isaac is claiming.
So I'll come back to our poor patient's agony, while the doctor calmly says "You are not in pain, because you are not exhibiting the correct neural signals to be in pain".
Who is to have authority here, in our new language game?
Only me Banno, only me. :wink:
Not in Wittgenstein's conceptual structure. Remember, to think that oneself is following a rule is not the same as actually following a rule. We must be capable of judging one's actions as being consistent with the rule, to be able to say that the person follows a rule. This is fundamental to Wittgenstein's form of justification.
So, for a person to recognize something as similar, or to make a judgement of consistency, this is not sufficient for justification. And if it is not justified we cannot say that it is a form of being correct. In other words if the person cannot be judged as following a rule, then "following a rule" is not justified, nor is "correct".
I really don't think that Wittgenstein intended to deny the reality of these forms of judgement, he is just not interested to move on toward describing these personal forms of judgement. He classes them as outside justification, and moves toward understanding the justification side, epistemology, rather than the metaphysical side. In the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, such personal judgements are judgements of "good". You can see that "good" has a pragmatic base, very much dependent on the particular circumstances, whereas "correct" is rule based, depending on universal laws. The two meet in moral ethics, morality being concerned with the personal decision of good and bad, whereas ethics is concerned with rules of correctness, though many do not care to acknowledge the difference.
@Metaphysician Undercover
It should give you some pause if MU is on your side. Of course it could be that MU is right and everyone else is wrong, it's logically possible. Sorry MU, but it's just so funny how your thinking on this subject is so different. And, by different, I mean that I know of no one who interprets W. the way you do, but I could be wrong. There might be some one somewhere, after all the universe is a huge place.
I'll have to commend you on a couple of things MU, you're consistent, and you're, on the whole, very respectful of others, which is probably more important than being right. I, on the other hand tend to be a bit cranky.
This is the root of the problem right here. "Correct" is determined through public justification, making "correct" whatever obtains social consensus. However, there is no consensus as to what Wittgenstein is actually saying. Therefore there is no "correct" reading of Wittgenstein. You, and your buddies, can argue endlessly about who's reading is "correct", and there will never be a resolution. Wittgenstein intended it this way. There's a way of speaking, an oratory skill, which employs parables, and ambiguity is essential. To be appealing to a wider audience one can choose words which different people will relate to in different ways, allowing that everyone might find something favourable in the same expression. But I see through Wittgenstein's sham, to see that true principles are derived from the minds of individuals, not from the public judgement of "correct".
He may have done if he overstated the degree to which it's representationalist. I think we've talked about this before. I get what you're saying about representationalist approaches, I just don't agree with you that active inference need necessarily be interpreted that way. But the extent to which active inference and enactivism differ is way out side the scope of this thread (which is already a little off topic), lets not make matters worse.
Quoting Joshs
Yes, I think 'existence' here causes unnecessary confusion, rather we should ask about the consequences of our decision. If I say "sensations don't exist" (as I have been wont to do), what is it that I intend such a declaration to do? I'm not interested in whether it's got the 'right' label, because there's no external measure of that anyway - we can say these rules 'exist' or we can say they don't, what matters is the consequence of that exercise. What does it do if we say they exist or not? This is a question which doesn't have a single answer, it depends on what the person is trying to do by asking the question (or challenging the proposition) in the first place. I sometimes respond to these types of posts (bearing this last matter in mind) because I suspect reification where the effect of such is to undermine progress in understanding of pain function. That riles me (only a little) so I resist. Were I to suspect that the object of insisting the sensation of pain exists were merely to allow for a convenient façon de parler, then I'd be less inclined to care, but then who's seriously concerned that the result of this investigation might be to ban the use of the word 'pain'?
Then we'll have been 'right' to assume such.
Quoting Luke
A sensation is a single category, the interocepted physiological state signals are manifold and form a non-exclusive set.
Quoting Luke
Yes. Although, we could later revise that in the light of other goals, we have more than one objective that these outputs form part of the subsequent model for.
Quoting Luke
Yes. I think that's undeniable, the expression wouldn't exist otherwise.
Quoting Luke
Not sure what you're getting at here...
Quoting Luke
No because a sensation of pain is not the same as an interocepted physiological signal. There is no physiological signal for 'pain' there's only a non-exclusive set of signals, some portion of which get modelled in such as way as to lead to a tendency to use the word 'pain'. Much like Wittgenstein's 'props' when he talks about using the name 'Moses'.
Quoting Luke
Again 'pain' does not 'follow', it's not a physiological state, it's a modelling relationship and we make decisions about those.
I'm not referring though to the third-person's assessment. I'm referring to our own. We (in our modelling relationship) make a decision about whether to follow the pathway of responses which include the use of the expression "I'm in pain". We could later (milliseconds later, even) decide that was the wrong pathway to follow when we have updated physiological signals.
The doctor, of course, could predict this change of model if he had access to the external cause of those signals, but that's not the same as giving him authority over the 'correct' response. Being able to predict it isn't the same as being able to proscribe it.
I thought you said there are no such things as sensations or pain. So what are we right to assume? What is "the only thing we could possibly say constitutes being in pain"?
Quoting Isaac
This sounds like family resemblance, and you are seeking the essence of pain.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, but right now, we are feeling pain. Wasn't that "the intended effect on those states"?
Quoting Isaac
So, just to be clear, what makes the usage appropriate in this context is when there is not a misfiring of signals and no overlap with similar signals in a noisy part of the network. So it's when your body gives you the right signals that you are in pain. Which is what most of us would call a pain sensation. So why are there no such things as sensations or pain?
Quoting Isaac
If we can treat "I'm in pain" as a simple functional expression, then it's not a problem with our use of the word "pain", right? The "problem", as far as I can tell, is that there is no unique or exclusive set of physiological signals that answers to the name "pain". Nonetheless, the word "pain" still has a use in our language.
What I don't get is if there is no such thing as pain and no exclusive set of signals that answer to the name "pain", then how can the word "pain" (in the sense we are using it here) have a use, how can it be used "appropriately", and how can your body give you the "right" signals and "the intended effect" that you are in pain?
Quoting Isaac
Meteorologists who model and forecast the weather do not decide what the weather will be.
If you are talking about learning new things about physiology, and creating a language-game base on these new discoveries, that's one thing, but you seem to be drawing inappropriate conclusions about what's happening linguistically (based on your model). It's not clear to me, and it seems it's not clear to others, so your idea needs more work.
According to what I described above, Wittgenstein's PLA, 253-270, demonstrates very clearly that one can never be certain concerning one's own sensations, if certainty requires justification. Do you not agree, that Wittgenstein has created a model that shows we can doubt being in pain?
Consider the beetle in the box. Is a person not justified in doubting whether the thing in one's own box is really a beetle? Suppose we say that the person has named the thing "beetle" therefore it is impossible that the thing is other than the thing called "beetle". We could say that there is necessity here, so the person is certain. But what Wittgenstein is arguing, and Isaac as well, I believe, is that each time one looks into the box, the thing is a little different, so how is one certain that it is still the same thing in the box? Look at 253, how do you know that the chair in front of you today is the same chair that was there yesterday. That it is identical is just a judgement you make, which is fallible. Someone could have switched chairs over night.
So this is the issue at 258, and what Isaac brings attention to, the sensation from one day is not the same as the sensation of another day. They are similar but not the same. Therefore we do not have a thing named "beetle" in the box anymore, each day you look in, there is something different, yet similar in the box. Now, we cannot be certain that it is a beetle, (or "pain") because justification is impossible, as Wittgenstein describes.
Btw, thanks for the compliment above. I'll try not to push your buttons, to make you cranky. That kind of thing is really detrimental to constructive discussion, but sometimes it takes a long time to understand how to avoid it, especially with people who have very different perspectives.
I think that's a very charitable summary. I hadn't intended it to be 'idea' at all really, just trying to see how my knowledge from my specialist field fits in with my understanding of Wittgenstein (which is far from my specialist field!). The answer may well be "nowhere". Wittgenstein talks a fair bit about things which appear to have a strong overlap, belief and certainty - two aspects of the human psyche I've spent most of my career studying. I understand belief in terms of active inference models (little bits of hierarchical neural networks which output 'tendencies to act as if...') and certainty in terms of Bayesian probability. I know Ramsey (the only philosopher I would dare to claim I knew quite well) dealt a lot with the latter, but obviously no one has particularly dealt with the former because its quite new to cognitive science.
At it stands, all I was really trying to do was interrogate some of the positions people talk about here in the light of the cognitive sciences. That's been most instructive.
As to my 'idea' I'll see if I can formulate it any more clearly with fewer contradictions.
You are correct to think that Wittgenstein is talking about doubting one's pain in these passages, but there's a huge difference between these examples, and the examples where one cannot doubt that one is in pain. The difference is this: In these examples, Wittgenstein is referring to the PLA, as you correctly pointed out, and the point of the PLA is that one cannot privately create a language that correctly identifies sensations (of course it's more than sensations that goes terribly wrong). Hence, the doubt, but in this contrived situation (viz., the PLA context), which is, it seems to me, logically impossible. Why? Because language dictates a social environment, which is lacking in the PLA. Actually, one would wonder if even the concept doubt would have a foothold in the PLA, because the same argument being made about sensations could be made about doubting.
Now the contrast - the PLA must be seen against, and in the light of how we normally learn a language. So, in our normal everyday language-games about sensations and/or pains, which is not by the way, the PLA, can we doubt we're in pain? Emphatically, No! We can see how far out such doubts are, especially if we compare this with what Wittgenstein is doing in the OC. If we compare Moore's proposition "I know this is a hand," at least Wittgenstein gives a reasonable example of how a doubt can occur here, although one has a difficult time understanding how a doubt could arise in Moore's context. However, in the case of doubting one is in pain, Wittgenstein constructs a contrived example (the PLA), which cannot be done (a totally private language cannot be done), as he rightfully points out. It's only done to point out how language logically works, and how that logic falls apart in the PLA.
Finally, it must again be pointed out, that even the doubt in the PLA is not a doubt.
Saying something particular is not caused by my "intention" (or the particularity of a rule) so a particular "meaning" is not transferred from me to you; and, by "certain", here you mean specific, which is a different sense of certainty (something I am sure of, resolved to stand behind) than the kind of certainty in which some kind of intention or rule would give you: complete repeatability, extension, application, removing the need for me, judged as true/false, right or wrong.
Quoting Luke
If we say: meaning, grammatically, is not something I share with myself alone, than we share meaning together, we share how we would judge a particular event; how it has meaning to us, thus meaningful to us.
How could I mean one sense instead of another? You just said that "Saying something particular is not caused by my intention".
And of course there can't be any such equivalence, as is plain from Wittgenstein's analysis.
It seems then that your example is consistent with the the PI.
But we disagree on "the point of the PLA". I think the point is that no language can correctly identify sensations, not just the private language. Surely the demonstration which Wittgenstein makes shows that the doubt concerning "a particular sensation" goes beyond the private language, to language use in general. Look what happens when the person tries to justify, publicly, that "S" refers to a sensation, through readings of blood pressure measurement, at 270. If the justification is successful, then "S" simply refers to a rise in blood pressure, and the supposed "sensation" is now irrelevant.
What does "S" really refer to, the supposed sensation, or a rise in blood pressure? That "S" refers to "a sensation" is dubious privately and needs justification. Publicly, the justification of the usage, the rise in blood pressure, replaces the sensation, as what "S" refers to. Consider that at some time the blood pressure might rise, but the person does not have the sensation, and does not mark S. Then we must say that the person is not using S correctly. And the person cannot argue this because correct usage was dependent on that justification. So S really refers to the rise in blood pressure, not a sensation
So Wittgenstein's PLA demonstrates, as you say, that a person cannot assume to be able to correctly identify a particular sensation. But that is just the beginning. He then proceeds to demonstrate that if a person attempts to identify a particular sensation, justification of the usage of the symbol will be required. And if the usage of the symbol can be justified, then the symbol does not refer to the sensation anymore, it refers to whatever the means of justification is. Therefore we can conclude that a symbol cannot refer to a particular sensation.
For example imagine you have a sensation you are inclined to call "pain". To begin with you cannot be sure that the sensation you have is the real one which is supposed to be called "pain". But the use of the word can be justified publicly, so you show others your wound, to justify your use of "pain". Now "pain" doesn't refer to your sensation, it refers to your wound.
Quoting Sam26
I really think you are missing the point of the PLA here. Notice that the PLA is concerned with identifying a particular sensation, a certain sensation, or what Banno called a specific sensation. "Pain" is a very general class which consists of all sorts of different sensations. The problem which Wittgenstein is talking about in the PLA is the uncertainty involved in saying that this sensation I have today, is the very same as the sensation I had last week. This is the same type of doubt as in his example of the chair. The chair here today seems to be identical to the one here yesterday, but I can't be sure that they are the same chair, because they could have been switched in the meantime. So, the question is, what justification do I have in calling these distinct instances of sensation by the same symbol "S", in my judgement that they are "a sensation". I cannot appeal to the universal, and say that I know beyond the shadow of a doubt that these are instances of "pain", because there are many different types of pain, and the issue here concerns identifying one particular sensation, not a general class of sensations..
He is talking about the same type of sensation; not the same token of sensation. This is evident because he speaks of the recurrence of the sensation. It is not possible for the same token of a sensation to recur. If it did recur, then it would be a different token (of the same type), not the same token.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
At PI 253, Wittgenstein asks us to consider "two exactly the same":
You are talking about one exactly the same, so you have misread.
His terms are "a certain sensation", "the sensation", "a sensation", "a particular sensation". Imagine if he started with "a certain chair", and proceeded to discuss "the chair". How could you ever believe he was talking about a type of chair. Nowhere does he refer to a type of sensation, he is talking about "the sensation". Your interpretation is completely unjustified, and obviously wrong.
Why do you impose this condition, that it is impossible for the same sensation to occur many times over and over again. Don't we see the same objects over and over again day after day, week after week. No one assumes that it's impossible that the chair you see here today is the same chair that was here last week. What support do you have for your claim that it's impossible that the sensation I have today is the same sensation I had last week? You are just making up, this so-called impossibility, as an attempt to justify your wrong interpretation.
Quoting Luke
That's exactly what I'm talking about. Suppose I say this chair here is the same chair which was here yesterday. And you say, no it's not, it's exactly like it, but it's not the same chair (you think someone switched the chair for one exactly like it, I do not, I think it's the same chair). This is what you are saying about "the sensation", it's not the same sensation, you are saying, it is one like the other. But Wittgenstein is very deliberately calling it "the sensation", so he intends that what is meant is 'the same sensation', just like I say the chair is the same chair. He even ends this section at 270 with the passage I quoted already:
There is nothing else to say, except that you are very clearly misunderstanding this section if you think he is talking about "the same type of sensation". He is very explicit, I think he uses "the sensation" about four times in 258 alone.
The argument I gave about recurrence. Perhaps you'd care to address it?
I did, the same chair recurs to me day after day, week after week. There is no impossibility here.
And I've just pointed out to you that Wittgenstein is talking about two objects the same; not one object the same.
I don't see your point, he's differentiating between one object which is the same, and two objects which are identical. So he's talking about both, and the difference between them.
has long had issues with identity, numerical equivalence, and material equivalence. Better not to go down the garden path with him.
I mentioned enactivism only because in the thread I linked to , I addressed the concerns of Hutchinson and Reid over a pervasive reading of Wittgenstein in which rules. , grammars , representational structures and concepts are claimed to be based on pragmatic ‘use’ but only within a conventional , normative , categorical framework. They see enactivism , due to its embrace of phenomenology, as giving priority to the personalistic over empirical, naturalistic accounts of experiencing. In other words , they argue that Wittgenstein , like the phenomenologists, believes the sense of a word, including empirical terms , is person-relative and occasion-sensitive. What the sense of a word points to is not a matter of belief , because belief presupposes the pre-existing sense of something that is or not the case, whereas the use of a word creates the sense. For a word to be is for a word to be used. Language does not exist external to its use by us in the world.
Your discussion of the treatment of pain seems to operate on two levels, a personalistic level of contextual language use and a naturalistic level of neurobiological entities( physiological signals, computational neural
networks). What I’m wondering is whether the concepts you utilize from the subpersonal , neurobiological level are presumed to have sense independently of their person-specific use in actual situations, that is, whether you prioritize a naturalistic over a personalistic account.
Quoting Isaac
This strikes me as the kind of reading of Wittgenstein that Hutchinson and Reid object to:
“The mistake here then is (Baker &) Hacker's thought that what is problematic for Wittgenstein—what he wants to critique in the opening remarks quoted from Augustine—is that words name things or correspond to objects, with the emphasis laid on the nature of what is on the other side of the word-referent relationship. Rather, we contend that what is problematic in this picture is that words must be relational at all—whether as names to the named, words to objects, or ‘words' belonging to a ‘type of use.'It is the necessarily relational character of ‘the Augustinian picture' which is apt to lead one astray; Baker & Hacker, in missing this, ultimately replace it with a picture that retains the relational character, only recast. There is no such thing as a word outside of some particular use; but that is a different claim from saying, with Baker & Hacker, that words belong to a type of use. For a word to be is for a word to be used. Language does not exist external to its use by us in the world.”
Arent you claiming that words belong to a type or category of use when you define use by reference to subpersonal physiological structures whose sense supposedly transcends situational contexts?
I claim that Wittgenstein is giving us a way to treat a notion like ‘correctness' that doesn't depend on the reproductive representation of an alleged ‘essense'( the essense of what cases have in common). Correctness would not be conformity to a categorical essense, but the fresh generating of a resemblance that produces the possibility of agreement, among other things.
I was attributing meaning (afterwards), not guessing at a "meaning" caused by you--I could have said "here in the sense of clear and precise". It is a claim open to debate, not an individual, unique instance. The way I put it sounded arrogant, but it exemplifies how the use or sense of something that is said is as available to me as to the speaker. You are the cause of the meaning of an expression in that you are the one answerable for it, responsible for having said it.
How am I be responsible for it if I did not intend it?
Then why does he repeatedly say "the sensation", and he ends this section with "And why a 'particular sensation,' that is, the same one every time?"? He says absolutely nothing to indicate that he is talking about types or tokens here, and he explicitly says that he is talking about one particular sensation "the same one every time". You are simply adding in this type/token change to what he says, so that the PLA makes sense to you and produces the meaning which you want from it. But that is to disregard what Wittgenstein is actually saying, and substantially change the nature of his demonstration.
Continue with your misinterpretation if you like, I am just trying to be helpful by pointing to the words he is actually using, what he actually said, to pull you away from what you think he is saying, which is incorrect, being inconsistent with the words he used.
So, consider his example at 257, a "tooth-ache". Is the tooth-ache I had yesterday not the very same tooth-ache that I had the day before, and the same tooth-ache I have today? I might sleep in between, so that my tooth is not aching at that time, or it might go away for a few days, and come back. Why would you assume that Wittgenstein is talking about distinct tokens of the same type, when he is very explicitly talking about naming something? "But what does it mean to say that he has 'named his pain'?" He is very clear, and repetitive in his statements here. He is talking about naming something. Yet you infer that he is talking about classifying distinct tokens of the same type. Why are you inclined toward this incorrect understanding (misunderstanding)? I suggest that you are inclined toward this incorrect reading because it produces the conclusion you desire from the so-called private language argument.
Quoting Banno
Well, you know I'm in good company, because Wittgenstein has the same issues with identity. He's the one who got me started down that garden path. And it is evident that in order to understand what he is doing with the so-called private language argument, it is necessary that we go down the garden path where he is pointing. Have you yet come to grips with 253-255? Why is the substitution of "identical" for "the same" expedient? This substitution renders what mathematicians are inclined to say about the "reality of mathematical facts", as an illness which needs to be treated by philosophy.
Do you call it "toothache" every time you have toothache? Why don't you call it something different every time (for each token of toothache)? Or do you just have one continuous token of toothache throughout your life but sometimes you don't notice it (and for some reason the pain is located around different teeth at different times)?
When I use "the" in front of the word, in normal conversation, such as "the hammer", "the chair", as Wittgenstein does with "the sensation", I am referring to a particular thing which has been named by the word, I am not referring to a type.
In case you don't understand the type/token distinction, "the same one every time" implies it is the same type of sensation every time. A token of the sensation is a particular instance of having that (type of) sensation on one of those occasions, or at one of those times.
I like the beetle in a box thought experiment. It goes like this: Exclusively private experiences (qualia and others) are hidden from the public eye i.e. it's impossible to crosscheck the referent for correctness. Yet, oddly, there are words that refer to private experiences like pain, joy, etc. How's this possible? Consistent external cues obviously.
So when I'm in pain, I wince, cry, and so on - these outward manifestations are observable and are the pseudo-referents of words that, purportedly, describe the corresponding inner mind states. However, intriguingly, there's no way I can tell that my pain is the same, qualitatively and quantitatively, as yours or anyone else - the contents of the box (beetle/whatever), according to Wikipedia, "...drops out of consideration..."
Pain (feeling) -> Wince & Cry -> "Pain" (word). Put simply, words that refer to inner experience must have some observable outer signs. If no such cues are available, inner experiences can't be discussed with other people or, if one insists that's not true, only at the level of visible external features.
A private language (specifically designed for pure inner experience that doesn't possess any kind of outwardly detectable signs) is untranslatable & incomprehensible (to others).
Now, if I construct a private language, what happens is I can't determine if I'm using the words correctly (consistently), necessary for comprehension. The only person who knows what words mean in a private language is myself and if ever I doubt the meaning of these words, I have only myself to consult but that's a dead end - that I doubt means I don't know and if I don't know how can I clear my doubt?
Hence, the nature of many experiences (religious, mystical, nirvana) :point:
Show, don't tell
When I perceive my environment my expectations guide and co-determine what appears to me and how it appears to me, visually, tacitly , auditorily. You could think of this as my perceptual language. Due to the anticipatory nature of perception , events can appear recognizable or not, coherent or not , correct or not with respect to those expectations. If I construct a new way of thinking , I will modify my langauge to express new ideas. Words now have senses of meaning foe me that are unique to my new outlook. If, when I read some of my written ideas , I encounter a word whose sense I am not sure of( perhaps I knew it and in the meantime forgot how I intended to utilize it , or only ever meant it in a vague and ambiguous way) I can read further into my written work and this may recall the context in which I used the word. Or I could decide that for whatever reason I had or finally used the word, I know want to choose a better or clearer
term. In any case , when I am in doubt about the uses of words in my private language , I consult a written text or my memory of the context of use of that word in sentences and paragraphs that determine its sense.
You can't write about inner experiences because the definitions of the words are ostensive and that would mean every time you think of a word in your private language you would need to recall what it referred to but what if you're not sure? You would be stuck in a loop.
What is it that any groundbreaking philosopher is doing when they construct an idiosyncratic vocabulary? Even before they have written a word of it or even fully articulated their new concepts in words, they have an inner sense of this new way of thinking that they consult , refer to , modify. Ostensive definition is only useful
if you want to copy dictionary definitions. In terms of how we actually use words, we rely on their sense for us in relation to each of our unique ways of understanding the world. My sense of each word I write here is slightly different from your sense of these words as you read them. Ostension misses this about actual
word use. It is an abstraction that covers over what is really happening. Ostension is just a rickety, inadequate belief system about how we do what we do with words.
I guess I should say that's exactly Wittgenstein's point - even words that have referents that all of us can see, point to (ostensive), we make errors. So, a fortiori, words that are about inner experiences fare worse.
I'm mystified as to why you come in these Wittgenstein threads, especially given that you see through the "sham of Wittgenstein." I'm genuinely curious, are you trying to convince us of your particular interpretation? You seem to be privy to some special knowledge of W. that none of us possess. I know I create these threads because W. really interests me, and sometimes I get new insights into his thinking. Sometimes I even revise my interpretation because my interpretation is just incorrect.
Because you are the person who said it (as in, not me). You didn’t keep it to yourself. The identity of the expression of pain is that it is yours, individually, not particularly. You own it--you either express or deny it. You stand by what you said or weasel out of it. If you can show you killed someone by accident or inadvertently, then you can avoid being punished for doing it with premeditation, but to be innocent/not responsible (in most cases), you have to show someone else did it (or that they could have).
I'm fully aware of the type/token distinction, and as I said you are incorrect. You didn't seem to notice that he says "a particular sensation", which is the same one every time. I hate to have to inform you of this Luke, but "a particular sensation" can in no way be interpreted as a number of different tokens indicating a "type of sensation", unless he qualifies the statements as "a particular type of sensation". He never mentions "type" of sensation. He talks about naming a sensation, and then refers to it as "the sensation" "The same one every time" refers to "the sensation", a "particular sensation". There is absolutely nothing to indicate that he refers to a type of sensation. You are simply fabricating this idea. You're wrong in your interpretation because it is based in your own fabrication, not in what was actually said. And I've tried to help you to understand what Wittgenstein is actually saying, but you refuse to be helped. I'm not surprised, you've demonstrated your helplessness many times.
Quoting Sam26
I enjoy Wittgenstein's little word games, they make you think. I call his games a sham, because that's what they are a pretense. He pretends to be saying something which he is not saying, so one must be very careful to determine what he actually says. He intentional states things in ambiguous ways to trap people within their own preconceived meanings for words, meanings which are inconsistent with the way that he is actually using the words, leading people into traps which he has carefully laid. I call it a form of hypocrisy. What he is doing with the words is not the same as what the words mean to us. That's the basis of dishonesty and lying. When a person lies to you, what the words mean to you is something completely different from what the person is actually doing with the words.
So, you might say he has led me into a trap, and I would say that he has led you into a trap. However, as I disclosed to Banno above, my way has led me toward a vast problem involving identity and the Platonism which inheres within mathematics today. This is the illness which Wittgenstein mentions at 254-255. All I see from your way is a never ending argument as to what Wittgenstein really means, therefore a dead end.
Quoting Joshs
...and in being language it is already not private.
You expect to see a tree; and your expectation is satisfied. What you have done is to divide the world up as is customary in your language - into trees and not-trees. This is not an instance of a private application of a word. But moreover, your understanding of trees is built not just by seeing, but by feeling, climbing, cutting; and by doing this in the company of others. You were show what a tree is, and you still modify that understanding.
The tree is not private.
You consult your notes and find that the tree before you is similar in relevant ways to the one you found elsewhere. The similarities are all the sort of thing that can be shared - it has a certain bark, leaves of a certain colour and shape, and so on.
But the premise in the beetle example is that there is nothing that can be shared in this way.
Quoting Joshs
They are showing others how to use that vocabulary. And hence it is public. Hence this is not an example of private language.
EVERY TIME implies more than one time. A token occurs only one time, so W cannot be talking about a singular token of the sensation. If he was talking about a singular token then the diarist would make only a single entry of ‘S’ in their diary, but W says “we’re supposing, aren’t we, that we write “S” every time.” EVERY TIME.
I do t just divide up the world according to discursive conventions. I subdivide the world in a much
more grained way within and outside the bounds of those generic conventions. Whatever I do with the tree either alone or in the company of others is done from my vantage in my own way in relation to my own overarching framework of goals, intents , relevances. These are not wholly alien to some languaged culture that I interact with ( there are actually myraid languaged subcultures that I interact with)
but neither are they simply ‘within’ the bounds of some normative frame. They are my own variation of practices and understanding and sense of the language. Becuase there is never ‘one’ language but as many languages as there are speakers of English. These are subtle but comprehensively unique variations. Quoting Banno
What I share with others( words like bark, leaves, etc) is understood by all of us in ways that are unique to each of us.
Quoting Banno
They may be disappointed for many years , since in most cases their use of the words is so profoundly different from the way that others demonstate their use that others’ interpretations are almost unrecognizable to them
for an long time. The question of public vs private comes down to the role of novelty in language and thought.
Public use of language must imply fundamental difference in sense also. Every time we participate in language we reinvent the bounds of that language in some fashion. Even when I am engaged in solitary thinking or talking or writing I am reinventing my own sense of my language.
You don't get it Luke, Wittgenstein is not talking about types or tokens. "Every time" is clearly meant as every time the person has the sensation, just like every time I see the chair. The same chair, occurs to me many times, and it is only one token.. Therefore your claim that a token only occurs one time is false
He never makes that type/token distinction anyway, so I don't see why you're bent on applying it. . You are trying to apply that distinction to what he has said, and this misleads you because it is not applicable.
There is no "type" mentioned.. The result is a misreading. He is not talking about a singular token of a type of sensation, he is talking about "the sensation", as a named thing. How can you not apprehend this? Why must you apply this type/token conceptual structure when he makes no reference to it, or even implies that it is relevant.. You need to take what is written, as it is written, and quit trying to apply some type/token bullshit which is totally inapplicable.
He talks about criteria of identity (253 -256), then asks what it means to name a sensation (257), then he proceeds to describe the problems involved with this, trying to name a sensation (258-270).. There is no type/token distinction made. you are fabricating.
Do we at least agree on what is very clearly stated at 257, that he is talking about naming a sensation? If so, how do you jump from "naming a sensation" to "naming a type of sensation". This change is unjustified and is a clear category mistake.
Some approaches to phenomenology trap folk in a solipsistic world, preventing them from reaching past what they think of as private experiences to the world beyond. For many, escaping this cartesian trap is the most important lesson Wittgenstein taught. Anscombe describes the situation clearly:
I was just out weeding a poppy bed. To do this I was distinguishing weed of various sorts from the several types of poppies, each with their own leaf. I can describe the job in some detail, but I did not need to in order to do the job. Either I or an observer might well set out the process as the implementation of a series of rules involving decisions to pull or leave, and if a weed could be pulled by hand or needed the assistance of the fork. But those ruminations are post-hoc.
I see a long leaf amongst the poppies, reach for it and follow it to the ground, below the growth were I can not see it. When I find the base I push my fingers into the soil, twisting horizontally as I do so as to pull the root out rather than break it off.
All of this is done with a deliberation that had not been articulated until now.
But all of it can be articulated. And any detail you might choose can also be further discussed. Dividing the world up in accord with our language does not place any limits on what can be addressed. I could for example, by a combination of language, demonstration and practice, teach you the technique of holding the stem of a mugwort so as to twist it over your long finger and pull out the several inches of root without breaking it. Language does not work independently of the world, nor of the body that is speaking or hearing. Cognition is the same. It does not happen in one's mind alone, but in one's hands, in the feel of the root and the soil. Cognition is in the doing, language is a part of that doing.
And it is not just I who do these things; it is not hidden. The things you do are embedded in the world, and so not just available to yourself but available to others. You can tell and show what you are doing, we can listen and watch, and do the task with you, if need be.
But this is very much at odds with your account:
Quoting Joshs
Meaning is not a thing in your mind. It is created in the way we interact with each other and with the world. there are not many languages, but one, that is as multiple and varied as all the situations in which all the folk of the world find themselves. That "variation of practices and understanding and sense of the language" is not private, it is shared, lived and ever-changing.
Now we have two pictures of how language works. For me, one view serves to lock one into a private phenomenological solipsism, the other opens to the world and all its people. You can make your choice as to which picture you prefer.
Quoting Janus
Indeed, since in the end it is all public.
No, no question. Just needed to check if I was anywhere near the ballpark with Wittgenstein.
This seems similar to what I was saying in the other discussion: that I intend my use of the public language, but I do not invent the conventional uses/meanings that exist in the public language.
The point of disagreement seems to be this: I say that we use words intentionally to have a particular meaning (in accordance with conventional uses/meanings), whereas you say that we use words unintentionally and leave it up to others to decide what we mean by it. How is it that others can know what we mean by it but we cannot? That seems to imply that I cannot say what I want, or mean, or intend to say.
I raised it because it helps to clarify the different meanings of "the same". I started responding to your comment on the chair at PI 253 because the type/token distinction can dispel your confusion here:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
For tokens:
If the chairs were switched then you would see a different (token of) chair.
If the chairs were not switched then you would see the same (token of) chair.
For types:
You would see the same (type of) chair regardless of whether the chairs were switched or not.
If you have an iPhone 12 and I have an iPhone 12, then we each have different tokens of the same type.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You appear here to be talking about two different tokens of the sensation - the sensation you have today and the sensation you had last week. You are saying that they are "the very same" type of sensation, but two different tokens of that sensation - the one you had a week ago and the one you have today.
That is, I presume it is a different token of the sensation a week later and not the same token of the sensation that you have had continuously all week, otherwise there would be no need to question whether it was the same. If you have had the same token of the sensation continuously all week, then you would simply call it 'S'. The question Wittgenstein raises is whether or not you can justify calling it by the same name - that is, whether it is the same type of sensation - the next time it occurs so that you can also call the new token of the sensation 'S'.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is where I see you as going wrong and confusing different senses of "the same". 'S' refers to a general class of sensation; the same type of sensation. 'S' does not refer to only one particular token of sensation. Otherwise, you would be giving a different name to each new token of 'S', and so you would not be calling it 'S' every time, despite the fact that it is meant to be the same type of sensation every time.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I hate to have to inform you Meta, but you cannot have the same token of the sensation "every time" when each token of the sensation occurs only one time. It only makes sense to have the same type of sensation every time.
I would agree that we do not invent what is common amongst us, but I would not take "meaning" out of the internal and simply place it externally. Look at it as if "meaning" disappeared completely. Our shared judgments for doing one thing rather than another, what is important in an activity, what is crucial, what counts in failing, etc., is what is meaningful, in explaining, clarifying, distinguishing what is meant by an expression.
Quoting Luke
It is not that we use words unintentionally (this is not the opposite of the picture of intention you propose). We do not intend or "use" (as if during) what we say, based on a private meaning nor in accordance with a public one. We say (do) something, and afterwards we can discuss the use (explain the meaning #560), ask what was intended, identify what conventions it followed, or failed at (one difference is we have a contex now). I'm not sure I can put the importance of the timing better (or am too lazy to) than @Banno does above in discussing his weeding example "articulated" "post-hoc". As I have said, we can choose what we say; we can even deliberately attempt to follow conventions, explicitly address (having considered beforehand) what might be a confusion between one use of an expression (concept) and another in this situation, to this person. However, in the same vein that, as you say, we do not "invent" the use of concepts, neither do we ensure an expression nor make it particular (in the sense of a certain instance) and neither does any rule we might "use".
Quoting Luke
The idea of an intention is the want (the desire) to ensure that what you say has the impact, interpretation, clarity, etc., that makes it complete and certain, without your being responsible for it, and its "meaning", afterwards. This would imply that you have said it according to the rules, rightly, and so my confusion, disagreement, bewilderment, is, as it were, on me, unless I disagree with whether you followed the rules correctly.
And that others can know what I mean but I might not is simply because of the public nature of how expression is meaningful. I know the same way you know (#504). The implication of Witt's realization that meaning is public must be pushed farther. On p. 223 (3rd Ed) there is a discussion of guessing at thoughts, and it is said that some people can be transparent to us. This is the sense in which I may know more about the meaning of what you have said than you. To say you alone can know what you mean defies the fact that once you say something, you can not, as it were, take it back (without saying you misspoke or literally taking it back)--you can not get out of it. Cavell puts this that we must mean what we say--that we can be read by what we have said; we are bound to it, wedded to its implications and consequences, fated to it Emerson says. You can "say what [ you ] want" but you can not make what you say mean what you "intend".
Yes, but what is important, crucial and meaningful in an activity is not equivalent with what an expression means or the use it has, is it?
Quoting Antony Nickles
Right, but I don't think that intention entails ensuring an outcome. My intention to achieve an outcome does not ensure the outcome; that's not what "intention" means.
Quoting Antony Nickles
Yes, and this is why I can intend for my words to have a particular meaning. Again, there is no guarantee my words will have the meaning I intend, but they often do have the meaning I intend, and I think they often must (for everyone) in order for language to work as effectively as it does.
Not that I want to get lost in that jungle, but we say you and I have the same sensation/experience to the extent we express it and agree we do. "I have a scratchy throat." "Me too!" "But mine is raw and only scratchy on the back." "Mine too!" Then to say "But surely another person can't have THIS pain!" (#253) is to want to remain unknowable, unreadable, or to have a crisis about whether there is anything that is mine, there is anything to me (there very well may not be). But there is also a sense in which my pain is not the same as yours, not identical, and that is that mine is in my body, and yours in yours. Numerically there are two pains, in different places. But to say "I am in pain" is not necessarily to differentiate who is in pain, but to say "Help me!", to make a claim on you for myself (#405). Thus in saying your pain is not (I can't know it is) the same as mine, I am, in a sense, denying you. (Cavell, Knowing and Acknowledging)
Not sure I follow this statement. I understand that we can say what we want, even if it's just babbling. However, the latter part of that sentence seems confusing. viz., "...you can not make what you say mean what you intend." If my intention is to mean something totally private (as in the PLA), then this makes sense, but if I intend to mean something within the framework of public meaning, then I can intend what I mean, if that intention is a public conveyance. So, I'm transporting, so to speak, my intentionality into the public domain where my intention gets in line with public meaning (is evaluated publicly) and rule-following. So, whether the latter part of this statement is true, depends on the source of the meaning of intend. Unless I completely misunderstood your point.
Good points @Banno not just this quote, but that post is very well said. It would be interesting, in light of what's being debated about consciousness, to talk of what we mean by consciousness in the light of some of these thoughts. It would seem that our consciousness, and the consciousness of others, shows up in the same way that cognition does, viz., in the doing, language or otherwise. This is one of the reasons I have a problem with others saying that consciousness or the self is an illusion.
I addressed this in the post to Luke (and many other posts in my OP on Cavell and Rules), but my claim is that the concept of "intention" is discussed afterwards. There is no intention or cause beforehand or during every time. I can choose what I say, for a speech or when talking to my angry wife, but even then I do not intend what I "mean", even if I am intending a public "meaning". There is no "intention" in this way, and this is not how "meaning" works. I say something, and the context and the criteria of the concepts allow it to be judged as meaningful along the sense or uses of that concept in that context. We ask "What'd you mean?" or "Did you intend to shoot that donkey?" and these questions and our responsibility to answer can be endless. Your "intention" is not transported and does not align with a "meaning" or "rule", public or not. Such a picture of intention and meaning goes away. This is a little terse but I've been battling it with Luke over a number of weeks.
As I said, I draw it out in more detail in the OP I titled "Bedrock Rules" (for lack of a catchier headline). Luke and I sidetrack into meaning and intention at a certain point as that needs to be cleared up to talk meaningfully about rules. It is an appropriate discussion here as what people call the private language argument is an example, not a conclusion, the fallout of which is not just taking the picture of "meaning" and moving it externally, publicly.
Quoting Banno
Husserl was the founder of modern phenomenology, and phenomenology has often been misread as introspectionism, solipsism , Cartesianism. That may be who you have in mind here. That view is changing. For instance, Evan Thompson recanted his earlier critique of Husserl here:
“READERS FAMILIAR WITH MY EARLIER BOOK, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991), might be surprised by the importance I give to Husserlian phe-nomenology here, given the critical attitude toward Husserl that book expressed. What accounts for this change of attitude?
Our earlier interpretation of Husserl was mistaken. I now believe (i) that Husserl was not a methodological solipsist; (ii) that he was greatly concerned with the intersubjective and embodied aspects of experience.
My viewpoint has changed for two reasons. The first is that when Varela and I were writing The Embodied Mind (during 1986-1989; Eleanor Rosen joined the project near the end of 1989) our knowledge of Husserl was limited.
The second reason is that we accepted Hubert Dreyfus's (1982) influential interpretation of Husserl as a representationalist and pro-tocognitivist philosopher, as well as his Heideggerian critique of Husserl thus interpreted.”( Evan Thompson, Mind in Life)
Embodied enactivist approaches have found Husserl
and Merleau-Ponty to be among the most useful philosophical foundations for their models. You will also find that they embrace postmodern readings of Wittgenstein against more conventional interpretations. See Hutchinson and Reid for an integration of Wittgenstein and phenomenologically oriented enactivism.
So why is Husserl not a solipsist? For one thing, his account of how persons constitute their understanding of the objective world determines objective , empirical reality as an intersubjective accomplishment. The words we use to describe the things in our world point to entities that none of us see on our own. I see phenomena in my surroundings via constantly changing perspectives , which shift in correlation with the movement of my body. Others may have similar but not identical experiences of the same phenomena. Our words synthesize these multitudinous flowing changes in phenomena , experienced slightly differently by each of us, into objective entities that are presumed to be the same for all of us ( this tree , this rock, etc). Our everyday language assumes that each of us personally experiences an aspect of the one ‘real’ empirical object. This assumption is what makes science possible.
Quoting Banno
The simper the task or coordinated social interaction ( navigating traffic) the more it appears that the senses of meaning invoked in the situation are transparent to everyone, that a common understanding is involved. But there are things we encounter just about every day that matter more profoundly to us , that impact our lives, our goals, our sense of ourselves. These are the everyday feelings of anger, guilt , sadness, anxiety. When we you feel any of these , it is because there is a rift between your understanding of a situation and the behavior of others that you can’t accommodate successfully. It is these feelings that remind us that the ‘public’ understandings are only superficial, involving aspects of situations that don’t matter greatly to us. You can teach me how to plant a mugwort and I can demonstrate to you that I understood your instruction. But what if I said I found gardening boring, or disputed your method of tending to your garden or of planting mugworts? You would would not likely become frustrated, angry or upset unless my sentiments violated your prior sense of how I felt about gardening and your skills with mugworts.
It is at this point that it is vital for you to be able to discern that my sense of these matters is not your sense, inspite of a supposedly shared vocabulary. Because that generic vocabulary masks imdividual differences in interpretation , and the fact that our interpretations of trivial , subordinate meanings of events is guided and determined by more superordinate schemes of understanding that comprise a worldview for each of us and determines each of us as subcultures within and beyond a larger culture. These relatively stable , but evolving personal world views orient even the most seemingly insignificant tasks , such as planting, in ways that are mostly hidden from others until a disagreement appears. But because our ‘shared’ language disguises the fact that others are often living in a different world than us, we ascribe our disagreements to stubbornness on their part, or irrationally, pettiness, perversity , arbitrariness. At the level of larger political groups , we blame polarized views on indoctrination and conditioning, ignorance or devious intent. The idea that the ‘same’ words we understand in one way evokes an entirely different universe to others is alien to our thinking.
Quoting Banno
For Husserl meaning is neither in the mind nor is it merely ‘public’. It transcends the inner vs outer distinction. It is a radical intersection between my past and new experience that remakes who I am every moment through my exposure to an outside. I am already exposed to and altered by the otherness of the world every moment. I am already an other to myself and therefore ‘out in the world’ each moment. You begin too late when you determine the origin of the social, alterity, the alien, the world only at the point of interaction between persons. That is not the primary site of the social and the world. There is no ‘ inner’ to be contrasted with an outer , no private to be contrasted with a public.
That is what you presume, But it is not what Wittgenstein was saying. He is drawing our attention to a way of speaking in which we refer to internal, "private" feelings, sensations, and even ideas, as individual, particular things, like objects. That's why "S' refers to "the sensation". I refer to the recurring pain in my tooth as my tooth-ache, a particular thing. We refer to the recurring idea which is associated with "2" as the number two. This is what Wittgenstein is questioning, this way of speaking. The example he produces where "S" refers to a particular sensation is an example of this way of speaking
I'll refer you back to what Banno said near the beginning of the thread:
Quoting Banno
I agree with you both, Luke, and Banno, that this is not a very good way of speaking. It would be better to refer to such inner experiences as types or something like that as Luke suggests. However, this way of speaking abounds, and it is this way which Wittgenstein is demonstrating with "the sensation", that is named "S". He is talking about the sensation as if it is an individual, some sort of thing. And he is talking this way deliberately avoiding calling it a type, or anything like that, to demonstrate the problems involved with talking this way. Look at 270 again Luke:
Obviously he is not saying "a type" of sensation he's saying "a particular". What justifies that "S" refers to a particular sensation? Nothing but the way S's use in the language-game, "S" is used that way. The sensation referred to by "S" is one particular sensation (not a type), because that's what we say it is by naming it this way. What justifies that "2" refers to an individual thing called a number, nothing but the language-game. The idea referred to by "2" is an individual, particular thing a number, because we use "2" this way.
Now look back at 254- 255:
"Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to say about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment.
255 . The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness."
Wittgenstein sees this way of speaking, which refers to features of our inner experiences as individual things, as an illness which needs to be treated.
Let’s suppose you are right and that Wittgenstein is talking only about a single particular token of the sensation. As he describes it at PI 258:
So I have a sensation and write ‘S’ in my diary. How is this problematic?
That is not problematic. What's problematic is the criterion by which you say that the next sensation is the same sensation. It's just like the example with the chair. How do I know it's the same chair, or just a different one which appears to be "identical"? So when the second occurs, you judge it as "the same" ,and this is why you call it by the same name, but the only real reason for it being the same is that you have called it the same.
But Luke does not believe that it is "the same", as you've argued. And I agree with you, that it really is not the same. So, if the only thing which supports the second occurrence being named with the same name as the first occurrence is your belief that it is the same, and you really do not believe it is the same, then this use of the symbol is just a sham (260 - the note has no function whatsoever). You could call anything "S", the decision might be totally arbitrary.
The tricky part to understand is his move toward "a justification which everybody understands", at 261. This need, for such a justification is produced when he introduces a common (public) word , "sensation" to replace "S" (private symbol). How can we say that "S" refers to something which is "a sensation"? At this point the private word "S", has to get introduced into, integrated into, the public language, so its use need to be demonstrated (justified). .
It's good to see you finally acknowledge that the issue concerns the recurrence of the sensation, and not just a single instance of the sensation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is correct. I could be picky and say that it is not possible for a sensation to be "the same" in the sense of being the same token you had before. A different token of the sensation that seems identical to the previous token is supposedly what would prompt the diarist to write 'S' again.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But I am Luke...?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Now you're getting it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's right. So I take it you no longer view what Wittgenstein is trying to do with the passages on the private language argument in this way:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Basic courtesy dictates that you respond to someone you has replied to your topic and in fact in length ...
(Re:¨https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/597942, 8 days ago)
Right, but the diarist believes that the sensation is the very same what you call "token". That's why it receives the same name. It's not a type being named, it's the sensation itself. If the diarist believed that it was a different token it would be nonsensical to give it the same name. because the diarist is not naming a type.
Quoting Luke
I don't see why you're saying that, I still see it the same way. I just refer now to the sensation which is named as "a token", to suit your way of speaking. The diarist (Wittgenstein) is marking the recurring sensations as the very same token. It is only you who is judging that they are different, and that somehow there is "a type" involved here.
To say it is all public is as pedantic as to say it is all private. To put it another way, it is just your preferred interpretation of the situation; other interpretations are possible and equally as valid from their standpoints.
Obviously language originates in a communal context. But each individual can do with it whatever they wish within the range of their imaginations. Think Joyce's Finnegan's Wake.
Of course they can. And if it does nothing, then like the beetle it drops out of the discussion. The utterance would be senseless. And if it does something, that something is shared.
I agree that if the precise meaning of some imaginative construction could not be explained to others it would be senseless,in a sense. It would nonetheless be meaningful to the poet in the sense of evoking feelings that cannot be explicated. This is true of many poetical works; no precise meaning can be determined; the words are meant to allude and evoke some indeterminate feeling Try explaining what Joyce is saying in Finnegan's Wake.
Of course what you say is true of propositional language, but that is only one dimension of what we do with language.
Isn't the point of poetry to explicate the inexpressible? Yet poetry is not private. No precise meaning can be determined because there is no precise meaning, only the use - in this case, the elicitation of feelings...
And this for sensations, too; Quoting Banno
Both cases - poetry and sensation - lack a sense and reference but have use.
I would say 'express' or 'evoke' rather than explicate. My point is just that the feelings elicited by a poem are ultimately private, like sensation. Of course we all have feelings and we all have sensations, and in that sense some sharing is of course possible.
A good example is headache; I sometimes have one, and my friend has never had one. So when I tell her I have a headache, she can understand that the pain is located in my head, but she has no idea what it is to have a headache, just as I really have no really concrete idea what it is to give birth. The usual extreme example is that a person blind from birth has no idea what it is to see. Some people have a genetic abnormality that stops them from being able to feel pain at all. Because they have never experienced pain, they cannot know what 'pain' refers to, because it doesn't really refer to manifest behavior.
No they are not. We share them; if it were not so then the poet could have no say in the responses of their readers. One's reaction to a poem is not arbitrary.
But now we are back to the same examples, and the presumption that there is a thing that is the pain, a thing that is what it is like to see; and this is the error Wittgenstein is dismissing. The pain is not located in your head, rather it is the head that pains. There is not a thing the blind person cannot do, rather there are things they cannot say.
Back tot he beginning.
The poet does not have any say in the responses of the reader. Given that language has conventional associations there may indeed be limits to the range of feelings that might be elicited by a poem, of course.
Quoting Banno
This is all just reads like idiosyncratic assertion to me. I find the suggestion that there is a difference between saying that a pain is in your head and that it is the head that pains absurd, or that there is not something, namely seeing, that the blind person cannot do. It makes me wonder what planet you've been living, on to be honest. It's like you are wanting to force reality to accord with your stipulations.
What is supposedly being named is a type of sensation, not a token of the sensation. That’s my point.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Your iPhone 12 and my iPhone 12 are different tokens and are both named “iPhone 12” because they are the same type of phone. Likewise, the sensation the diarist had last week and the sensation the diarist has today are different tokens and are both named ‘S’ because they are (seemingly) the same type of sensation. There is nothing nonsensical about this.
It will turn out that the diarist is not naming anything, but Wittgenstein has us suppose at the outset that the diarist is naming a particular type of sensation.
Think on that. The implication is that the reader's response is unrelated to what the poet writes.
In which case it does not matter what the poet writes.
It may well be that the reader's response is quite unrelated to what the poet felt or had in mind. It is the words themselves and their range of possible associations which do have some say in the reader's response. But who knows how wacky and unrelated to any 'normal' response some readers' responses might be?
I don't know if many people experience this, but when I am reading philosophical works I sometimes find myself visualizing some scene from my childhood, like the backyard of the girl who lived across the road, or the stretch of bush that ran from the back of my grandmother's house to my parent's house. Sometimes it's like the images in dream which don't make any describable sense. This only happens with philosophical works, possibly because they are not describing anything concrete that can be visualized. It's a very strange stream of images and feelings going on in the background.
is too strong. Poetry succeeded in virtue of the shared world of poet and reader. Poetry is not private.
I do agree that poetry as an institution or cultural phenomenon is public. So, perhaps I should have said that the feelings elicited by a poem may be ultimately private, not they necessarily are.
This:
Quoting Janusis an individual reaction; but it is not private - after all, you just shared it.
Sure, but unless you have experienced something like it, you would not have any substantive idea of what I'm talking about. Say you have never visualized anything, your mind just doesn't work that way. Just like the example I gave earlier of someone who has never experienced pain, or the blind person who has never seen anything. So, it's public because it's expressed in a public language, but it's not all public because its communication depends on some commonality of experience which may not always be in play.
Well we're right back to the same point. I thought you said "Let’s suppose you are right and that Wittgenstein is talking only about a single particular token of the sensation." Under this premise, what is named as "S" is a single particular token. You are completely unjustified in saying that it is a type of sensation being named. If the person was wrong in the naming practice, in your judgement, because you think that it's impossible that two distinct occurrences could be of the same token (an opinion which of course is disproven by the chair), and the two occurrences are actually different, being different still doesn't make them the same type. And you have no way to judge what is being named as the same type, because it's private. You have two unjustified assumptions here. First that it's impossible that the same token could appear to a person at two distinct times, and second, that two distinct tokens must be tokens of the same type.
Quoting Luke
There is nothing nonsensical, it's just a completely unjustified conclusion, doubly so, as explained above. First, the two occurrences might very well be two occurrences of the same token. I can see the same chair last week and this week. Why can't I have the same sensation last week and this week? Second, and this is a significant point to the PLA, if you assert that the person is wrong in naming it the same token, because you insist that it must be two different tokens, then you have no capacity to judge the two as the same type, having no access to the person's private inner feelings which are being named.
To make your point, you need to ask the diarist to justify his judgement of "the same". And that's why Wittgenstein takes us to the device which reads blood pressure as an example of justification. But then the person's sensation becomes irrelevant, and the symbol signifies a rise in blood pressure instead. And if the diarist argued that there is a corresponding sensation, which is always "the same" sensation, you could argue that it is just the same type, the type which causes the blood pressure to rise. But this only a feature of the justification, which makes "rise in blood pressure" the definition of "S", and the sensations which the diarist refers to are judged by you as the type which coincide with the rise in blood pressure. You still wouldn't know for sure that they weren't the very same token occurring at a different time, like the chair.
This blind Rugby player seems to have a substantive idea of how to kick a gaol, despite not being able to see ball, field or bars.
Thing is, the substance around him - the world we share with him - is substantively the same. The experience - not so much.
Quoting Janus
It's not a shared experience that makes the difference; it's a shared world.
It's not disproven by the chair. The chair is no different. A token of the chair just means the existence or "lifetime" of the chair. Excluding any kind of Ship of Theseus issues, the token of the chair is a single chair that can only be the same as itself, as per the law of identity. It cannot be the same as any other chair that looks identical or that is of the same type.
We can equally speak of the existence or "lifetime" of a sensation. Sensations typically have a duration; they start and end, or come and go. A particular instance or duration of a sensation is a token of that sensation. Like the chair, the token of the sensation is a single (instance/duration of the) sensation that can only be the same as itself.
What is assumed in Wittgenstein's scenario is that the diarist will write 'S' in their diary for each instance or token of the sensation. The next time the diarist has the sensation it is a new token; a new instance of the sensation. Therefore, it is not possible that two distinct occurrences of the sensation could be the same token.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am assuming neither of these things. First, it is impossible to have two of "the same token", by definition. Second, tokens are of the same type, by definition. It is clear that you still do not understand the type/token distinction. The type/token distinction distinguishes between naming a class (type) of objects and naming the individual instances (tokens) of that class. Each class has its own individual instances, so it is senseless to question whether two distinct tokens are of the same type.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You can have the same type of sensation, but not the same token of sensation. Anyhow, I thought you were talking about the same chair. It is sensible to question - as you did earlier - whether it is the same type of chair that only looks similar to the one you saw here yesterday, or whether it is the same token of chair - in fact, the same chair - that you saw here yesterday. This is how the type/token distinction can help to clarify the matter.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
My access is not the issue. We can each consider doing this sort of private inner labelling process ourselves. Actually, that's what Wittgenstein wants us to do in order to try and free us from the misconception that the way sensations are named and what gives words their meanings is simply memorising the connection between the sign and the sensation.
I don't always have the time to respond to every post. Life just has a way of getting in the way of my responses. Sometimes I can put more effort into these threads than other times. I would like to respond to every post, but sometimes I just don't have the energy. There are a lot of things that can get into the way of responses, like an illness for example. So, it's not always that someone is being discourteous. When I'm distracted I tend to make mistakes, so I try not to force myself. So, don't take it personally.
Just "Thank you for your response" suffices. It only takes a couple of seconds of your time, which I believe are well spent, because you show that you are not ignoring the people who respond to you your topic. Otherwise, why one should respond to the topics at all? Responding to a topic is the minimum that can happen in a discussion that has started by launching a topic.
If you don't have the time to cope with a discussion even on a minimul level (e.g. with a response like I mentioned at above), do not "Start a new Discussion" (as TFP prompts you to).
If it were a honest response I would just say "OK" (two letters). But it wasn't.
Besides, according to your spirit of communication, since you didn't like "the way I responded" you should ignore my reply and do something else with your time! (I didn't expect a reply, anyway.) :smile:
Which, BTW shows that you do have time to spare for responding! (Hence your dishonest response! :smile:)
You appear to be missing the point Luke. If the same token of a chair can come and go many times, relative to my conscious experience, then why can't the same token of sensation come and go many times, relative to my conscious experience? One comes from ,and goes to; an external source which is outside my conscious experience, and the other comes from and goes to an internal source which is outside my conscious experience How could your memory work, if it wasn't the same token coming and going, to and from your mind, each time that you remember the same event? A memory of an event comes and goes from your conscious experience, coming from and going to some internal place. Why would you think that each time the memory occurs to you, it is a different token? If it was a different token, you would not remember it as the same event, it would occur to you as a different event each time. And if each time the idea of two came into your mind, that is the number two not the symbol, it was a different token, how could you do any mathematics?
Quoting Luke
You are still refusing to acknowledge Wittgenstein has explicitly said that the diarist is naming a "particular sensation" (270), therefore the very same token. He says absolutely nothing to indicate that the diarist is naming a type. This fabrication of yours is misleading you, causing you to misunderstand, and miss the whole point of the example, the criterion of identity What happened to "let's suppose you are right..." , and proceeding from there? we didn't get anywhere because you just jumped back to your old fabricated reading.
Quoting Luke
I'm not arguing "two of the same token". I am arguing that the same token can occur to the conscious mind, two, or a multitude of distinct times. This is extremely common in the case of external things. Yet you are insisting that in the case of internal private things this is impossible. But you have provided absolutely no justification for this assumed difference, only repeated assertions.. I have provided examples of when we commonly speak of the very same internal private token, recurring to the mind a multitude of times, the tooth-ache, and the ideas, or concepts of mathematics. Now I offer you memories as another example.
Quoting Luke
False. a "token" can be a token of any type. I am only using "token" as a term here instead of "particular", "individual" at your insistence, because you do not seem to have the capacity to understand this subject by other terms. But I'm not going to allow you to redefine terms as we go. Many different types of tokens occur to a person, and the person must decide which type they are tokens of. You are just spouting nonsense to insist that two tokens must be of the same type. If this were the case then there would only be one type, because all tokens would necessarily be of the same type.
Quoting Luke
That is the very question which Wittgenstein asks. Why would you think it is senseless to determine the identity of a particular token? Suppose you and I have the very same "identical" chairs, the same type. Yet mine has five times as much use, so it is weaker and more worn. Why do you think it's senseless to distinguish which token of that type is which, which is mine and which is yours? Would you readily trade? What if it was something more valuable like a car. Would you trade yours for one of the same type with five times as much distance on it?
Quoting Luke
Of course access is the issue, that's what makes the private language "private". How can you say such a thing and claim to have any understanding of the PLA? If it wasn't the issue why make an example of a "private language" in the first place? It's the beetle in the box thing, you can't see into another's box.
Because it isn't the same token of the sensation, obviously. If you have a sensation and it goes away, then it's not the same token of the sensation when you have it again.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You have changed the subject to talk about memories.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That could be either a particular token of the sensation or a particular type of sensation. Unless you can provide an argument for why 'S' must be the name of a particular token of the sensation (only), and not the name of a particular type of sensation, then stop mindlessly repeating this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You said there was no problem with naming a token! But there is a problem with the diarist scenario, right?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What do you think a token is?
An instance of a sensation or an instance of a chair is not how many times these things appear to your consciousness or your memory, or whatever rubbish you are spouting. I already explained to you that a token or an instance of these things is their entire existence or "lifetime". It is one unit or one instance of a class of objects, which is what 'S' denotes with regards to a sensation. The word "sensation" does not apply to one token only; it applies to a class of objects - a type.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Do you know what the type/token distinction is? Have you ever heard of it? I'm not the one trying to "redefine terms". You're the one not using the word "token" correctly. Look it up.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I never said it was senseless to determine the identity of a particular token. I said it was senseless to question whether two distinct tokens are of the same type.
Where is your proof? You continue with this unsupported assertion. If I see a chair, and someone takes the chair away, then brings the very same chair back, obviously it is the very same token. Would you assert that because it went away and came back, it is obviously not the same token. Your assertion, that if a sensation goes away and comes back it cannot be the same token, makes no sense because it is completely unjustified. I get a pain in my toe sometimes at night, I can get it many nights in a row, or some nights I don't get it. It wakes me up when I'm sleeping. I cannot see what causes it to come and go. But the fact that it comes and goes does not give me reason to claim that it is not the same token of the type "pain" every time it occurs .
Quoting Luke
Wittgenstein is talking about private experiences in general. 256: "what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand?" He uses sensation as an example. If what you assert about sensations is only true about sensations, and not true about other inner experiences, such as memories and ideas, then sensation would not serve as a good example of inner experiences. Obviously, Wittgenstein has chosen sensation as a good example of inner experiences, so he surely is not expressing what you are asserting, as you seem to be admitting that what you are asserting about sensation, does not hold for other inner experiences.
Quoting Luke
I don't need to provide an argument, it is what Wittgenstein explicitly stated, "a particular sensation". You are fabricating something else, that Wittgenstein is talking about a type of sensation rather than "a particular sensation", so it is who who needs an argument to show that your interpretation which switches in "type" for Wittgenstein's "particular" is consistent with what Wittgenstein intended to demonstrate, and not a category mistake. All you have is repetitive assertions, that Wittgenstein could not have meant anything other than the interpretation which you've fabricated. But I've shown very clearly how he could have intended exactly what he stated, a "particular", not a "type".
Quoting Luke
No, there is no problem inherent within the diarist's scenario. the problem arises when the diarist wants to justify the use of "S", to the public.
Quoting Luke
Sure, but "S", as Wittgenstein uses it, does not refer to a type of inner experience called "sensation", it refers to a particular sensation, a single token of that type of inner experience called "sensation". And if my tooth-ache goes away and comes back, depending on drugs sleeping, internal conditions, etc., all these reoccurrences are part of the "entire existence or 'lifetime'" of that one single token of sensation, my tooth-ache.
Quoting Luke
How is this senseless? Every object is a token of some type or types. Why would it be senseless to ask what type is that object a token of? It seems it's who who misunderstands the type/token terminology. You are just requesting that we use it, even though Wittgenstein did not, because it provides you with sufficient ambiguity to create the confusion required to make your fabrication look acceptable.
Suppose that I (somehow) denote my "previous" sense-data with the label "R", and that I directly denote my present sense-data S with the label "S". Paradoxically, the condition of empirical meaningfulness entails that R, although conceived as being "previous" to the "present" experience S, is nevertheless contained within S, for otherwise "R" would not be an empirically referring term. In actuality, "R" is being used as an indexical referring what is presently being remembered as part of S.
In other words, R and S are analogous to the concept of two adjacent ordinal numbers, say R = { 0 } and S = { { 0 } , 0 } , while their labels "R" and "S" are analogous to the corresponding numerals, i.e. "R" = 1 and "S" = 2.
In mathematics it could be said that every finite ordinal is part of the same first limiting ordinal. Analogously it could be said that all experience, whether past , present or future, is of the same experience.
Therefore the reason one says "my present experience" isn't to assign a quality of "being present" to the experience, but because one is using a subset of his experience as a memory, and is using "present experience" as an indexical referring to the other part.
By way of checking that we agree what is being argued here, the point I think Wittgenstein has quite successfully argued is that pain-talk does not refer.
That is clear to you, I hope? And you disagree with it?
If I talk about a particular tree then I am referring to that tree; would you say I am referring to anything if I were to talk about trees in general?
It's because you can refer to a single tree that you can refer to trees in general.
If instead fo referring to a pain you express pain, then the status of the collective noun is ambiguous. Does it refer to the collection fo expressions of pain, or is it an expression of those expressions, or both, or either.
GivenQuoting Janus
I suspect that you have not actually engaged with the analysis, from Wittgenstein, presented by @Sam26 myself and others, actually has to say. SO Quoting Janus in asking what I mean by "refer" when I am arguing against the use of that notion in this context seems unhelpful.
Is there a way to move away from the May Pole?
The point I’ve unsuccessfully been trying to make is that Wittgenstein is talking about establishing the name of a sensation. This means not only establishing the name for a single token, but for a class of tokens, i.e., a type. Wittgenstein is debunking the idea that a name or word can be established in the way he describes.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The “proof” is that it is assumed by the scenario that the diarist writes ‘S’ “every time”, for each token or instance of the sensation. What prompts the diarist to write ‘S’ is the recurrence of the sensation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I didn’t switch in “type” for “particular”. A “particular sensation” could mean either a particular type or a particular token. Your repetition of “a particular sensation” does not resolve which one it is. On the other hand, I have cited further context to support that he means a particular type.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The type/token distinction is used to clarify the distinction between a particular class and its instances, so it is senseless of you to question which instances belong to which class.
It's because I can refer to single instances of pain "This headache is killing me" that I can refer to pain in general. I don't see a cogent difference other than the fact that my headache is not an object in the external world which can be pointed at. Or if I said "The headache I had the other day was severe" you could reply " Is it the headache you had yesterday you are referring to or the one you had last week". To my way of thinking that is a perfectly valid usage of 'refer'
In any case I'm not really arguing about the coherence of various usages of 'refer'. I have been saying that if you had never felt pain, you would not know what the term is intended by the speaker to refer to. This would be the same as if you had never seen a tree.
I don't hold Wittgenstein to be a sage, by the way. If meaning is use, it's even possible that usages have changed somewhat since his time. In any case I do think it is wrongheaded to say that there can be no reference to pain, even though that is not what I have been focusing on. I'm not trying to be difficult, rather I'm just trying to communicate what seems to make sense to me.
Let's track the arguments, though, since you list them with care.
1. That pain can be referred to, not just expressed; and the argument for this is that you don't see a cogent difference other than the fact that my headache is not an object in the external world which can be pointed at.
2. That someone who had not felt pain could not refer to it.
3. That Wittgenstein thought meaning was use.
The replies are
1. We agree that the grammar of talk of pain is superficially the same as that of other object - hence the example that "I have a phone in my hand " and "I have a pain in my hand". The cogent difference is exactly "the fact that my headache is not an object in the external world which can be pointed at".
2. If the account in (1) is correct, it's not just folk who have not felt pain who do not refer to it; rather, we all express pain. But further, the blind rugby player mentioned above might not share in the experience of seeing, but can kick goals, with all that involves; and so it's not shared experience that counts, but being in a shared world.
3. Arguably Wittgenstein's purpose was to dissuade philosophers from arguing in terms of words having meanings, especially if they are considered some sort of mental furniture. The admonition is to look at use in the place of meaning.
And, the point I 've been trying to make (unsuccessfully it appears), is that this is a misreading. Wittgenstein proceeds from a brief description of a problem which concerns the lack of a criterion of identity, to ask how do we talk about our inner experiences, and then provides an example of naming a sensation.
There is no talk here about a class, or a type, or tokens of a type. You are apparently approaching what he says with this preconceived notion that he is going to talk about a type,, and this influences the way you are reading him. If, in the end, it turns out that he successfully proves that a word or symbol cannot be used in a certain way the that way he is demonstrating in his example, then we can walk away with that conclusion. However, we need to follow the demonstration through, and understand it as it is presented, to see what it actually does demonstrate, rather than interpreting the writing in relation to a foregone conclusion. When there is ambiguity in the words used (as there always is to some extent, especially in philosophical writing), the latter is very conducive to misreading. This is a danger which is amplified by reading secondary sources prior to the primary source.
You appear to have the preconceived notion that language cannot be used without rules. So when at the end of 258, Wittgenstein says that there is no right or wrong in relation to the diarist's use of S, you conclude that a word cannot be used in this way. That's a faulty conclusion though because your preconceived premise is unstated and unsupported.
Quoting Luke
Clearly we must dismiss such a proof as contrary to the evidence. If what you claim as "proof" was true, then every distinct time that I see a chair, it would necessarily be a different token, and it would be impossible that I could see the same chair (token of the type chair) twice. I do see the same token, the same chair, on a multitude of distinct occasions, therefore the evidence disproves your supposed "proof", and what you claim as proof must be rejected as invalid.
Quoting Luke
Of course that's BS. It is I who have cited support. In all your great capacity to quote Wittgenstein (which I admit is absolutely fantastic), you've come up with nothing except support for what I say: . That's because there is no support for your position, it's a misread based in a preconceived notion. All I have to do is point at 258 where Wittgenstein uses "the sensation" four times to stress that he is talking about a particular sensation rather than a type. Why would you use "the chair" when referring to a chair, if you were talking about a type rather than a particular chair? There is no evidence to support your claim that the diarist is naming a type.
Quoting Luke
That is utter nonsense. You are saying that it is senseless to question whether an object (token) has been wrongly classed. If it was senseless to do such questioning, I could present you with absolutely anything, and claim it is a token of absolutely any class, and you'd say that it's senseless to question this.
This is what comes up at 261 now. " 261. What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation?
For "sensation" is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands.—"
In the private language "S" stands for an internal experience which the diarist has identified and named as S. In the common language "sensation" is a type. Now the diarist must justify that the thing referred to by "S" is a token of that type.
A token does not refer to how many times you see something. In the case of chairs it refers to one (instance of a) chair.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He says: "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign “S” and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation."
For "every day" on which he has the sensation means more than once. He is not talking about a single instance which would be a token of the sensation. You clearly do not understand the type/token distinction. All you have done is attempt to argue against it, displaying your ignorance. I'm not going to waste my time arguing with you about it anymore.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Don't presume to know what I've read or in what order. You're a sad little man.
As you know I have acknowledged that difference, but I think we differ when it comes to what each of us believe follows from that difference.
I agree with that too, but I think there are different contexts within, and degrees to which, our experiences of that shared world can themselves be shared. The situation is not simple and monolithic, it is diverse and complex, in my view.
To say meaning is use is simplistic I agree. Meaning is given and indicated by use, just as use determines the definitions of words that are given in a dictionary. Personal meanings or variations on meanings, if you prefer, are the sets of associations unique to individuals. I wouldn't call that "mental furniture" because it is dynamic and ever-changing. I still maintain that if someone has not experienced what a word commonly signifies, then they will not understand what the word refers to, even if they might appear to be able to use the word correctly. If someone has never felt lonely, for example, they will not be able to use the sentence "I feel lonely" authentically, because they don't really know what 'lonely' means.
See those words, again?
Not all words are nouns. But further, that the noun is used does not imply that the thing named exists.
That's the essential observation that seems not to be present in your thinking.
The words we have been considering: 'pain', and the example I used last 'loneliness' are both nouns. There are many other nouns like those that denote feelings: 'fear', 'anger', 'timidity', 'love', 'hate', 'desire', 'disgust', and so on. What those words signify are not objects, but they exist as feelings; so I'm not seeing any substance to your objection.
Quoting Banno
Quoting Janus
Suppose you are right. Then those feelings and sensations are private. There is therefore, by your own argument, no way we can ensure that we are talking about the same thing when we use the word "pain" or "Loneliness".
No?
I think we can know that we are talking about the same feelings, or kinds of feelings, but we cannot know that the feelings will be exactly the same for each of us, or even exactly the same at the different times we experience them.
But the same applies to objects in our common world. We have no way of knowing whether the table looks exactly the same to each of us.
I don't think we can, and nor do we need to, "ensure" anything. We all seem to know what we are speaking about when it comes to words that refer to common human feelings. And I would say that those of us who actually experience those feelings really do know what we are talking about, whereas those who don't experience them, not so much.
The Blind Rugby Player example shows that its not the experience but the shared world that we can use to "triangulate" your beliefs against mine. It doesn't matter if you experience the table differently, it's still the table. If we disagree as to, say, if it will fit into a particulate space, we can put it to the test, together.
That is not possible with sensations.
The table is a fixed, shared point on which the language games in which it is involved may pivot.
But if you are right in supposing that sensations are unsharable, then they cannot act as a fixed pivot for our language.
It seems to me that you are in the untenable position of insisting that sensations are both not shared and yet the commonality on which talk of sensations is based.
I didn't say sensations are not shared, though. I said the opposite; that they are common, in kind if not in token, and that people need to have experienced them in order to know what the words that refer to them mean. They also need to have seen and understood the behavior of others who profess to be having those sensations.
Experiencing the sensation is one half of the equation and witnessing the behavior of others who are experiencing the sensation is the other half; so meaning has it's genesis in both private and public dimensions of experience. I can't understand why you want to eliminate the private dimension of experience, when it is obviously not irrelevant to the understanding of meanings.
Quoting Janus
Think that's enough. Cheers.
As I said they can be shared in type if not in token; and also that they can be shared does not entail that they will be. A congenitally blind person cannot share your experience of seeing anything; they don't know what you are referring to when you speak of the flashing lime-green leaves. So there be no contradiction lurking there.
But if you're done. you're done I guess; no problem from my side.
Quoting Luke
So, which is it? Can a person encounter the same token more than one time or not? Or are you saying that a person can see the same token more than one time, but a person cannot 'sense' the same token more than one time?
Language and thinking, by its very nature is a bewitching thing. Hence, Wittgenstein's warning, "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language (PI 109)." For myself, I hope that I've learned a methodology from Wittgenstein that will help provide some clarity, but definitely not complete clarity. Complete clarity may be a phantasm. It seems that any thought or theory can be pushed to the breaking point using language. This breaking point can be seen in the changing nature of language and knowledge. Language in some sense is a kind of fog that is more or less dense given this or that understanding. This isn't to promote a kind of skepticism, although there are things to be skeptical about, but only to point out that language traps us into a kind of mire from which we cannot escape. There is a kind of mysticism to my point, and I think to Wittgenstein's thinking.
In short, everyone is talking to each other in their own private language. What would follow if this were true? Firstly, it's plain as the nose on my face that we would be talking past each other. What then? Confusion of course but of a rather insiduous and pernicuous kind. For instance, my God is different from your God but because both use the same word, "God", it gives us the false impression that we're talking about the same thing (same referent). Thus philosophers caution that before you engage in debate, define your terms. This simple but essential first step in a philosophical debate is an acknowledgement of the possibility that each and everyone has and uses a private language.
Unless, we're on the same page - working with words whose definitions are mutually intelligible - no discussion should even begin lest we waste precious time and energy.
Wittgenstein claims private languages even if one attempts to create one will be not only incomprehensible to another person but also can't be understood by the private linguist faerself.
Thus the above view of language collapses. It can't be the case that the word "water" means A to one person and B to another (private meanings for words like "water" can't be used in ways consistent enough to make private languages possible). If so, language must be about what can be put in the public domain i.e. language is a social entity, dealing only in matters that can be shared.
:ok:
It depends on the token/type. In terms of sensations, "encountering a token" is a particular instance of having the sensation. Unless you can time travel and live that moment over again, then you cannot have the same token of a sensation more than once.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's not about seeing a token. A token is a particular instance of a type. In the case of iPhones, my iPhone is one particular instance and your iPhone is another particular instance. In the case of chairs, a particular chair is one instance. In the case of sensations, having the sensation at a particular time, or for a particular duration of time (i.e. for as long as the sensation lasts), is one instance.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I will grant you this one point. It is possible for someone to have the same pain for several days in a row, and we might consider this to be a single token or instance of pain. Admittedly, I had assumed that the sensation 'S' was fleeting and was presumed to last less than a day. Whether we call it a different token or not makes little difference, however, because the problem remains: how can you be sure that you are remembering it correctly as the same sensation after you have stopped sensing it for a while (e.g. after you have slept or lost consciousness)? In other words, are you correct to still call it 'S'?
It's the same problem if it were a different token. If you didn't have the sensation for a day or more and then it apparently returned, you could not be sure that you were remembering it correctly as the same sensation. The point I have been making is: why would you call it by the same name ('S') if it is not the same token/instance of the sensation? If it goes away for a week or a month or a year and then returns, then it is not the same instance of the sensation. This shows that 'S' is supposed to be the name of a type of sensation, not the name of only an instance or token of (having) the sensation. To write 'S' in a calendar "for every day on which I have the sensation" implies that there may be some days that I do not have the sensation.
Nevertheless, the point is moot. I raised the type/token distinction because you have long-standing problems with identity and what "the same" means. You are right that Wittgenstein does not talk about the type/token distinction, but I never claimed or meant to imply that he did. I thought that the type/token distinction might help you. I still think it's easier to think of it in terms of different tokens of the sensation, but it needn't be. The problem is in remembering whether it is still the same type or token of the sensation - whether it can still correctly be called 'S' - after you have stopped sensing it for a while.
I think this is right: it is only the language of poetry that can escape the mire; because it doesn't aim to be propositional but rather allusive and evocative.
For me, probably not Banno, there is a kind of mystical experience in poetry, music, art, and even prayer, that transcends language to a point, not completely. So, the mystical can be seen in, for example, an act of prayer, and it's not about being true or false, it's about what the experience shows us. Wittgenstein admired some of the writings Kierkegaard (I don't put that much value in Kiekegaard), but I think it had to do with admiring the transcendent reach, right or wrong. The mire I'm referring to is confusion, but I don't think poetry escapes this - depending on what you mean by the mire. As long as we use language, in whatever venue, we are in the mire. Don't think I'm saying something against clarity, because I'm not, I'm just saying that language is a muddled approach to reality. I do think that Wittgenstein's thinking helps to bring us one step closer to clarity, if clarity is the objective.
I'm not sure I communicated my point well, but there you have it.
As I've repeated numerous times now, you've provided nothing to support this assertion. You are claiming two distinct types of tokens, ones which can be encountered numerous times and ones which cannot. But such a distinction needs to be justified, and as I explained many inner experiences like memories and ideas seem to involve encountering the same token numerous different times. So the distinction cannot be based in an internal/external division. You seem to be putting "sensations" in a category other than "inner experience", and other than "external object". And that doesn't make any sense.
Quoting Luke
OK, I'm glad we're finally getting to the point. Whether or not you believe it is possible to have the same token of a type of sensation on numerous occasions, is not what is at issue. What is at issue is that the private diarist is claiming this, and is claiming to mark down S every time the very same token of sensation occurs, "a particular sensation". Whether it is possible for the person to actual have the same particular sensation is not the issue.
The question Wittgenstein asks, is if the person might be correct in judging that a present instance is the same as a prior instance. And, he concludes that since there is no criteria which will tell the diarist whether it truly is the same or not, it doesn't make sense to even talk about the possibility of being correct. Again, the question of whether it's possible for the person to have the very same sensation on numerous occasions is not relevant, because what Wittgenstein has concluded is that it is impossible for the person to know whether or not it is the very same sensation anyway. So even if it is possible that it is the same, and it actually is the same, the person would not know whether it is the same, because the person does not have what is required to make that judgement.
Quoting Luke
I think you need to rethink this, because it is not correct. If the diarist is judging the distinct instances, as distinct particulars, rather than as one and the same particular, the problem of a criterion of identity evapourates. The diarist can make up any criteria whatsoever as to what constitutes "the type". He can even say that they are the same type because he named them both S. The diarist may create the type. Simply naming them as the same type is sufficient criteria for making them the same type. This is what comes up at 270, once the diarist switches from trying to identify the same particular to identifying instances of the same type, there's no such thing as naming it wrong, because the type is determined by the particulars (tokens) which are named as being of that type.
Look up the type/token distinction. It doesn't have a private meaning.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What do you mean by "the same token"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not basing it on an internal/external division; I'm basing it on types (classes) and tokens (instances of those classes). You are incorrectly basing it on instances of "encountering".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I'm saying you have sensations as an "inner experience".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not saying that; I'm saying it is supposed that you have different tokens of a type of sensation on numerous occasions, where each token is a different instance of having the (supposedly same) sensation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's the same type, not the same token. The diarist claims to mark down 'S' every time the very same type of sensation occurs, with each instance of the sensation being a different token.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Right.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Which is why the use of 'S' cannot be established.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see why you say this is incorrect. As I said in my last post, it could be considered to be the same "particular" or token of the sensation both before and after one has slept or been unconscious. The problem is in remembering it correctly after waking up or regaining consciousness. Therefore, the problem can equally apply to tokens. That is, if you prefer to define a token, or a particular instance of a sensation, such that it includes a discontinuity in your awareness of it. We commonly refer to some pains in this way.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The same applies to a token that includes a discontinuity of your awareness of it. (Although not entirely accurate, it may be easier to call this a 'discontinuous token' or a 'broken token'. Or, we could simply refer to them as two different tokens.) The diarist can make up any criteria whatsoever as to what constitutes it being the same token both before and after the discontinuity.
I didn't say anything about a "private meaning". I don't know what you're talking about here, and can only assume that you misunderstood what was said, unless you are back to your way of intentionally misunderstanding (straw man).
Quoting Luke
I already went through this, when you accused me of changing the subject to talk about memories, and I replied to tell you that Wittgenstein is talking about "inner experiences" in general, and sensation is used as an example. Here; I'll reproduce it for you..
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Luke
I fully understand the type/token distinction. I don't understand the basis of your claim that a single token of a sensation cannot be experienced (since you do not like "encountered") by a person more than one different time. Isn't any duration of time "more than one different time"? Obviously we experience the same token of chair many different times, and as I described the other day, it appears like we must experience the same token of memory, and the same token of idea, many different times. I do not understand why you think a token of sensation is different.
Quoting Luke
If a sensation is an inner experience, just like memories and ideas are inner experiences, how is it that we appear to experience the same token of a memory many different times, and the same token of an idea many different times, yet you still insist that we cannot experience the same token of sensation a multitude of times.
Consider this Luke. You agree that a token of sensation has a temporal extension. Quoting Luke Why do you think that it's not possible for the person not to be consciously aware of that token of pain during some period of its existence? So that particular token of pain could be existing somewhere in the subconscious, while the conscious mind is not at that time aware of it. Isn't this what we say about memories? The memory is 'stored' somewhere so that it is not always present to the conscious mind throughout the entirety of its temporal existence. Yet it must exist somewhere as that particular memory, or else the conscious mind would not be able to access it.
However, it may actually be the case, that each time a person remembers, or accesses the memory of the same event, the mind recreates the so-called token of memory. If this is the case, then it is not really truthful to say that it is the same memory, because it's really a new scenario created each time. Likewise with ideas, the idea of 'two' for example. If the mind must recreate the idea of two, instead of pulling that token of idea from a stored memory bank, then it is not really the same particular idea. Nevertheless, our language is such that we speak as if these tokens of idea and memory are the very same tokens, and this is the type of language use which Wittgenstein is bringing to our attention as something which renders "what a mathematician is inclined to say about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts" in need of philosophical treatment, as the treatment of an illness.
Quoting Luke
It is incorrect for the reasons I explained. If the person wants to say that it is the very same particular, a criterion as to what qualifies as "the same" is required in order that such naming can be correct. But if the person wants to name two distinct things as the same type, simply naming them as "the same type" is sufficient criteria for them to actually be the same type (270). That is because "type" is an artificial classification, we make the type and we name the tokens of the type, but particularity is not something we create.
Quoting Luke
But just like the chair, there is a reality, or truth to whether or not it is the same token, therefore a correctness to the matter. The point being that there is a valid question, is it the same chair or is it not the same chair, and we believe that there is a true answer. The true answer is establish by some criteria like temporal continuity, and the fact that someone could point to the whereabouts of that particular chair for the entire time period, to confirm that it is the same. If the diarist "can make up any criteria whatsoever", then the truth or falsity is circumvented, and as Wittgenstein says, " we can't talk about
'right'."(258)
On the other hand, if the diarist is naming distinct tokens of a type, he cannot ne wrong because he is creating the type: and it can be as he wants: "the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show."(270)
I agree with you about the mystical element in the arts and religion. I also like what I have read of Kierkegaard's work. As I understand him he's more about the immanent than the transcendent; in other words he's more about the existential leap of faith than he is about advocating the idea of any transcendent realm. Of course as with any thinker whose writings are dense and allusive, various interpretations are possible.
I think poetry escapes confusion because it is not trying to arrive at clarity, or at least any definite propositional kind of clarity, lacking any ambiguity. Perhaps by "confusion" you mean more uncertainty, and if this is the case I would agree with you because I see (at least much of the best) poetry as a celebration of uncertainty. Would you include the other arts in this judgement as well?
I'm not sure what you mean when you say language is a muddled approach to reality. And again I'd ask whether you would include the language of music and the language of the visual arts in this. Perhaps you mean that what we say about reality is never reality itself? But then the very idea of reality would seem to be impossible without language.
You asked for proof regarding the type/token distinction. I can only refer you to the definition, otherwise I don't know what sort of proof you mean.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Then you should understand, per the article, that "The type–token distinction separates types (abstract descriptive concepts) from tokens (objects that instantiate concepts)."
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, a duration of time is "more than one different time"; it is a period of time. A single token of a sensation also lasts for a period of time. What I am saying is that you cannot have the same token of a sensation twice (unless you can time travel and relive some period of time over again).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Instantiations of sensations necessarily depend on our experience; instantitations of chairs do not. There are many chairs that exist without you ever encountering them, but there are no sensations that you can have without sensing them. This is why a token of a sensation is different. The instantiation of a chair does not require you to "encounter" or "experience" it. However, as I noted before, what they have in common is that chairs and sensations both have particular life spans of their existence/instantiation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We don't experience the same token of an "inner experience" many times. A token of an experience can be timestamped. You cannot have the same timestamped token of an experience twice. You clearly do not understand the type/token distinction if you think this. You can only have the same type of experience twice.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If the person is not consciously aware of the pain during some time, then they are not having any pain (not in pain), so there is no pain during that time.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I suppose, but now you are no longer talking about "inner experiences" (and their instantiations) like we are with sensations.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's right, this is what tokens are about. Tokens of "inner experiences" are each unique instantiations that can be timestamped. This is why you are wrong to speak of there being more than one of "the same token".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know what you mean by "recreate the idea of two". The type/token distinction distinguishes between abstract classes - which are themselves ideas - and real instantiations, so applying the type/token distinction to ideas might be confusing (are you talking about the type of an idea or the token of an idea?). Let's stick with sensations.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But a person can simply name them as "the same token", too, and that is also sufficient criteria. We can agree to define the criteria for types and tokens however we like. Moreover, an instantiation of a chair depends on what counts as a chair. So we could equally say that criteria are required for what qualifies as being of "the same type".
Doesn't your timestamp proposal amount to fitting experience to theory, rather than vice versa?
I used to have similar thoughts when contemplating McTaggart's "Unreality of Time". The idea being to regard the terms of the A -Series (i.e. Past, present, future) as being indexicals into a B series of "time-stamps", in an attempt to deflate the A series into the B series, in order to establish the unreality of change.
So for example, the potentially perplexing A-series observation "now is no longer now" becomes after substitution "08:53 is no longer 08:54" which is immediately seen to be nonsensical. Here a time-stamp is meant to refer to a sensation under the assumption that one's set of sensations are unique and ordered -which amounts to the assumption that the B series is phenemenologically real.
I've since come to realise that the middle Wittgenstein had a somewhat similar but arguably better conception expressed in terms of his cinema analogy. With it he identified the A-series of consciousness with an image shown on a cinema screen, and the B-series with the ordered-frames of the movie encoded in the photographic film that was projected onto the screen.
Unlike my proposal, Wittgenstein's proposal (to my understanding) is much weaker, in making no assumptions as to the phenomenological reality of the B series. If I understand him correctly, all that can be talked about, to use his analogy, are case-specific use-cases in which the image on the screen happens to be relatable to the frames on the film-reel. In other words, there aren't always criteria available by which to say that an experience is unique or different from another experience.
I don't know; I'm only applying the type/token distinction to sensations in order to clarify what could be meant by "the same sensation", by noting the difference between the "same type" of sensation and the "same token" of a sensation.
Quoting sime
It may have been sloppy of me to talk about experiences here instead of sensations. Anyhow, couldn't we use the timestamps of sensations as the criteria in order to differentiate two tokens?
I didn't ask for proof regarding the type/token distinction, I asked for proof of your assumption that a person cannot experience the same token of a sensation on numerous different occasions, like we do with tokens of other types.
Quoting Luke
As I explained this is a problematic assumption. If a token of a sensation has temporal extension, and an inner experience can come and go from the conscious mind like a memory does, then why can't the the token of a sensation recur to the conscious mind numerous times, just like a memory does?
Since this claim of yours is so clearly problematic, I asked for justification. But you just kept reasserting it over and over again. Now you appear to have offered an attempt at justification, so I'll get on toward analyzing that.
Quoting Luke
I think this expresses an ontological misunderstanding inherent in direct realism. A token of a chair is not a token of a chair without being encountered and classed as such. It was your choice to bring us away from Wittgenstein's words of particular things, to use the type/token terminology, now you cannot simply slip back without suffering the consequences. If both, the particular chair, and the particular sensation have been judged to be of a specific type, making them "tokens", then it's nonsensical to say that one of them might not have been encountered.
In case the preceding didn't make sense to you, here is the inverted argument, which may make more sense to you. For any occurrence of a "sensation" there is a thing sensed by the conscious mind, or else there would be nothing to qualify as "the token". The sensation itself cannot be the token because sensation is a type, and if we allow that there is variance in sensation, differences in sensation, then there must be an object of sensation at each different instance of sensation, to account for the differences, and this object is what we can call the token.
Now, your claim is that the objects of sensation, the tokens, cannot exist without being apprehended by the conscious mind (what you call sensing them). But if this is true, then the objects, or tokens, only have existence if they are being apprehended by the conscious mind, and this implies that the conscious mind itself, and only the conscious mind, creates these object, or tokens. They only exist because they are being sensed. This negates the characteristics of "a token", as the representative of a class or type, by allowing it to be any type. So you now propose a token "the sensation", which represents no specific type, because the conscious mind creates it every time that the mind encounters it, (as it is not really something found or encountered, it is something only existing when present to the mind, produced by the mind's presence), therefore the mind can make it of any type whatsoever. it is not a token of any type.
Such a thing, the object which can represent any type whatsoever, is not a token at all. And when you say "This is why a token of a sensation is different." , it is because you have described the "token of a sensation" as something other than a token. Are you ready to leave this type/token distinction as inapplicable to Wittgenstein's example of the private language, and proceed without it, or are you still insistent on using it as a crutch, which misleads you?
Quoting Luke
Right, because "pain" here refers to what occurs to the conscious mind, having classed the object of sensation (the token) as that type, pain. But just because the mind is not actively classifying the object as a type, "pain" (i.e. the pain is present to the mind as pain), this does not mean that the token, the object itself, which gets classed as pain, is nonexistent. If the object (token) were nonexistent at this time, then that object would be completely created by the mind, as imaginary, or fictional, when present to the mind, and it could not be a real object, or a token at all, not having the necessity of representing a type, as explained above.
Quoting Luke
What? You are going backward here. If anything, a memory is more properly an "inner experience" than a sensation is. Remembering something requires nothing external, it is a completely internal process, pulling something from the internal memory banks, and recollecting. It is as much purely internal as is possible. The "sensation" always involves something external to the conscious experience, the object of sensation, and this is why the act of sensation is so difficult to grasp, or understand. It straddles the supposed internal/external divide, Wittgenstein specifically, and intentionally, choose "sensation" as his example because it elicits that difficulty, through the ambiguity displayed by our disagreement. The object of recollection, memory, is clearly and unequivocally, something internal, when we remember something, we pull a token from the internal memory banks. But the object of sensation may be of the external type, as I've been arguing, or it may be of the internal type, as you've been arguing.
Quoting Luke
I don't ever speak of there being more than one of the same token. That is your straw man. I speak of encountering, or experiencing the same token more than one time, as in the example of the chair. It seems to me, that since you believe that it is impossible for the same internal tokens to come and go from the conscious mind, each one maintaining its identity as the very same token each time it recurs to the mind, you represent this talk as if it is a case of talking about more than one of the same token.
Quoting Luke
No, we cannot do that. Each token, by the fact that it is designated as a "token", is necessarily a token of all the types that it is a token of. So we cannot arbitrarily declare that it is "the same token" because there is correctness (criteria) implied by the fact that you are calling it a token. If we remove this criteria, the type/token distinction which you've been insisting on, we can get to the point Wittgenstein is making in the PLA. There can be no judgement of correctness to the diarist's use of "S". But "S" does not refer to a token, it refers to a particular thing which is judged to be the same thing each time it is encountered or experienced, and thereby named "S".
Ya, I think you could include dancing, acting, meditation, etc, - which are outward expressions of the inner self. Of course, even language is an outward expression of the inner self (this would have to be further clarified), but it's governed by rules, without which it would fall apart. Even poetry is still governed by grammatical rules, but it lends itself to more of the subjective. There is a kind of balancing act between the subjective world and the objective world around us.
Quoting Janus
When I say muddled, I mean reality, and talk about reality, it's a bit ambiguous. Even the word reality is a bit ambiguous. Hence, all the discussions about, "What IS reality?" Wittgenstein is certainly ambiguous in certain passages, i.e., it's difficult to get clear on what he's trying to communicate. I'm not saying it's all ambiguous, and I do think there is a correct and incorrect way of interpreting Wittgenstein.
I don't disagree, but woudl point out that language transcends language. Poetry is of course just more language; and there is no definite distinction to be made between prose and poetry. Some find the Sermon on the Mount transcendent; some find The Simpsons transcendent.
Which brings me back again to §201.
"Encountering" or "experiencing" is not a requirement of the type/token distinction, nor is it part of the definition of a token. That is nothing but your own mistaken and unnecessary assumption.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Is this empty posturing necessary? Stop being a moron.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Who encounters all the chairs in the world? You? Or just anybody? I have no doubt that there are instantiations of stars and moons that nobody has ever encountered or experienced. Regardless, it makes no difference to the type/token distinction.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
'S' is the type of sensation. The recurrence of particular instantiations of 'S' had by the diarist are supposed to be the tokens of that type of "certain sensation". That's why the diarist is said to write 'S' every time the sensation recurs.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
"The sensation" refers to both the type and its tokens. "Each different instance of sensation" is a token (that's what "token" means), despite you just having claimed that "the sensation itself cannot be the token".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
According to that logic, the same must also be true of external objects.
Your argument is both that all tokens must be encountered and apprehended, but also that encountering and apprehending tokens implies that the mind creates them.
Sorry, but I can't be bothered trying to explain it to you or to put up with your charades any more.
The assumption is that a type is a human creation, artificial. And, since only human beings know humanly created types, then to be be a member, token, of a type is a human judgement. Of course it might be a mistaken assumption,
Quoting Luke
Back to square one, Luke demonstrates that he doesn't know how to read. How is "the sensation", as used four times in 258, in Wittgenstein's description of what it might mean to "name" a sensation, supposed to refer to a type, called "sensation", rather than to a particular sensation?
Quoting Luke
You're missing the point Luke. If each instance of sensation was actually the token itself, then there would be nothing which differentiates one instance from another, and we'd have no basis for a claim that they are distinct tokens. Imagine if each instance of seeing is itself a token. Then each is an instance of seeing, and nothing more than seeing, and they are all identical, the same, as simply instances of seeing. It is the object, the thing described as seen, which forms the difference between distinct instances of seeing.
Now imagine if each instance of pain is itself a token. Then each instance of pain is exactly identical to every other instance of pain, as merely "pain", It is the described object, 'pain in my tooth', 'pain in my toe' etc., which provides the basis for a difference. Therefore the pain itself cannot be a token, as pain is a type, which is a judgement of the mind. So if there is a difference between one pain and another, the difference must be attributable to the source of the pain (just like in an instance of seeing), and this is something other than the pain itself. Differences within a type are attributable to distinct tokens. Therefore the token of pain must be something other than the pain itself (which is a type), and this is what is referred to in philosophy as "the object". If pain itself is a token, then there is no type/token distinction.
Quoting Luke
Yes, it's a conclusion which would hold for external objects as well, but it's only the result of the assumption that each encounter with the object, is an encounter with a different object (token), as you assume with sensations. This assumption of yours, implies that the object of the sensation, the token, only exists when it is being sensed. Therefore the object, the token, must be a creation of the act of sensing. (Unless it's due to some extremely improbable coincidence, which gives these objects existence precisely for the time that they are being sensed making it impossible to sense them at two distinct times).
But we do not commonly make this assumption with external objects. We assume that we encounter the same objects (tokens) multiple times, and they continue to exist while not being encountered. So it's not an issue for most common metaphysics. It only becomes an issue in a metaphysics like a "process" ontology, which sees things as constantly changing, therefore we do not ever encounter the same object twice: Heraclitus: you cannot step into the same river twice. In this type of ontology even the supposed "external object" is something created by the mind each time it is encountered.
Quoting Luke
That the mind creates the token is the logical conclusion from your premise that each instance of sensation necessarily involves a distinct token. I have been arguing that the mind may encounter numerous instances of the same token of sensation. Therefore it is not implied from what I am arguing, that the mind creates the tokens. This is a straw man.
What does this have to do with your false assumption that tokens must be encountered?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Back to square one, indeed.
• As I said in my previous post and others, "the sensation" refers to both/either the token and/or the type.
• You have acknowledged there is no problem with naming a single token of the sensation.
• The problem is in establishing the name/type of the sensation, 'S'.
• Your constant repetition that Wittgenstein uses the phrase "the sensation" is no support for your claims.
• It is not my claim that he refers to a more general type called "sensation", but that he refers to a type of "certain sensation" called 'S'.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If you assume that the sensation occurs continuously, then what distinguishes one instance from another in Wittgenstein's example is every (different) day. Once again, the text states:
"258. Let’s imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign “S” and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation."
However, Wittgenstein's use of the word "recurrence" is indicative that the sensation does not occur continuously, but that it...recurs. "Recur" can be defined as:
recur
• occur again periodically or repeatedly.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
"Pain" and "sensation" are both types and have their tokens. "Pain in my tooth" and "pain in my toe" are also both types and have their tokens. What distinguishes different tokens of a type are their different instances/instantiations.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's not about "encountering" a different object. Different tokens are different instances. PERIOD. Don't even try to argue that this imples that you encounter different instances when it comes to sensations. Of course it does, as I've already explained, but not all tokens are about "encountering" something. All tokens are simply different instances/instantiations of their type.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How does that follow? It's equivalent to saying that seeing something is a creation of the act of seeing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Which part of "it's not about "encountering" something" do you not understand? I'm not going to follow you in your metaphysical nonsense.
This depends on what you call a problem
If the person is naming a single token, it's as Wittgenstein clearly indicates at the end of 258 "One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'". There is no such things as correct, in naming a single token, because this cannot be judged. The person has no criterion by which to judge whether one occurrence is the very same as another occurrence. In the case of the chair, on the other hand, we might ask someone else who observed the chair in the interim time period. So there is no problem for the person naming, just no sense in talking about the person is correct.
But the problem arises when the person attempts to justify his use of "S". Since there is no such thing as his correct use of "S", justification of his use is problematic
If it were as you claim, that he was naming a type, then there would be no such thing as him being wrong . A type is created, so whatever he names, is that type, 270. Since the person writes "S" every time, then the sensation has been placed in that class, signified by S, therefore it is of that type, which the person has called "S". The person cannot be wrong.
This difference clearly indicates that the person starts the practice by attempting to name a single instance, (what you call a single token), and it's only upon the attempt to justify his use, that he is forced to demonstrate it as a type. That there is a difference between naming a type, and naming a single object, is where the problem lies.
Quoting Luke
This is not true. There is no problem here, "Sensation" is a term of the public language with a definition, so it is already established, no problem..
So, the question here is what reason do we have for calling the thing which the diarist has labeled with "S", a sensation.? Why is it a token of "sensation"?
This is why the type/token distinction is misleading you. It puts the type as prior to the token. A token is necessarily of a type. But here, Wittgenstein puts the thing, what is referred to by "S", as prior to the type. It is not a token at all, but just something being named. It's just a thing, "he has something---and that is all that can be said". So we cannot call it a token, because its classification, as a token of a sensation has not been justified.
Quoting Luke
I gave you examples of common use, "the chair", "the hammer". Each time we use "the" in common usage it refers to a particular token. You have provided no examples of when we use "the" when referring to a type.
Quoting Luke
Your phrase, "type of certain sensation" doesn't even make sense. It would make sense if you said "certain type of sensation", but of course that would be inconsistent with what Wittgenstein said. The simple fact is that he doesn't mention "type" at all, so your attempt to put it in there is completely out of place.
Quoting Luke
Clearly, what distinguishes one instance from another is the coming into the conscious mind, coming to the attention of the conscious mind. Just like when you see the very same chair twice, what distinguishes one instance of seeing it from another, is the coming to the attention of your conscious mind. I don't understand why this is a problem for you. He is giving an example of inner experience, and this is how we commonly talk about inner things like memories and ideas, they come and go from our conscious minds many times, as the same thing recurring many times, many different instances of the very same thing coming into your mind.
Quoting Luke
You are refusing to acknowledge that despite the fact that "Different tokens are different instances. PERIOD", we can have different instances of the very same token. PERIOD. Why is this so difficult to you?
Quoting Luke
Why can't you understand this either? If the thing (object, or token) exists only at the precise time when it is being sensed in the act of sensation, then it must be the act of sensation which is creating its existence.
On the other hand, if the thing which is being sensed in the act of sensation continues to exist when it is not being sensed in the act of sensation, then the very same thing might be sensed numerous times.
Quoting Luke
Your refusal to even attempt to grasp some very simple metaphysical principles show me why you have such a difficulty understanding what Wittgenstein said.
This is one token of a chair: “the very same chair”. You are not distinguishing two instances of chair here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We cannot have different instances of the very same token, by definition. A token is an instance of a type, not an instance of seeing or encountering something.
When people talk about medium sized dry goods, it's usually clear enough whether they're talking about two tokens being of the same type, or a single unique individual, though there's sometimes ambiguity. If a friend tries to lend me "the same book" I had loaned them, my name may or may not be on the flyleaf.
But when people talk about their inner experiences, we tend to assume they are all numerically distinct, that having "the same feeling" at one time that you had at another means only that you have had two quite similar feelings. Why is that? Is it because we are physical beings, subject to time and chance?
There seems to be no logical barrier to having the same experience or the same sensation twice. But it strikes us as wrong. We believe "I have the exact same feeling I had when ..." is always literally false. What would have to be different for us to consider such a statement, like the unintentional return of the loaned book, literally true?
Unless I’ve misunderstood, I think your comments would be better directed at Meta than myself.
I agree with you that tokens, or unique individual instances of a type, are numerically distinct. And I agree with you that one cannot have a unique individual instance of a type twice.
But I therefore think that there is a logical barrier to having the same unique individual instance of an experience or a sensation twice, for that is what makes them unique individual instances (i.e. tokens). You can only have the same type of experience or sensation twice.
I’m afraid I don’t understand your question regarding the return of the loaned book.
I'm not talking about two instances of chair, I can't even understand what that might mean. I am talking about two instances of seeing the very same chair. Likewise, a person might have two instances of sensing the very same sensation, or two instance of remembering the same memory, or two instances of using the very same idea of "two", and "four". How is this so difficult for you to understand?
Quoting Luke
I didn't say we can have two different instances of the same token, that doesn't even make sense to me. I said we can have two different instances of encountering, or sensing the same token, like when I see the same chair today, that I saw yesterday..
It is very clear that we can have two different instances of sensing the same token, as exemplified by the token of chair. Why do you think that we cannot have two different instances of sensing the same token of pain?
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
The problem is that there is a double standard here with respect to "inner experiences". We commonly believe, due to some sort of intuition, that it is impossible to have the same sensation twice, a sensation being an inner experience. So we are inclined toward believing that inner experiences are merely similar, or of the same type. But when it comes to other inner experiences like memories. we always talk about having the same memory twice. And then there is the logic of mathematics, where a significant logical structure is dependent on the assumption that the idea (another sort of inner experience) is always the same idea. So there is an inconsistency between this notion, that we cannot have the same inner experience twice, and the fundamental axioms of mathematics, which assume that we consistently work with the same mathematical objects.
What Wittgenstein seems to get backward, is that he portrays the private, inner language as naming particulars, and the public as naming types, showing an incompatibility between the two. In reality the private language is inclined toward naming types, as intuition tells us that two distinct sensations cannot be the same. But to make the private types intelligible to the public in general, we must refer to particulars. So the public language inclines us to name particulars while the private language inclines us toward naming types, and there is still the incompatibility between the two, which Wittgenstein demonstrates.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You know what I meant. Your pretense continues to baffle me.
So I'll repeat what I said before. The ambiguity inherent in your preferred type/token distinction produces the confusion required for your mode of argumentation.
I don’t know what you meant by your glaring contradiction.
What confusion? The only confusion here is yours, caused by your ignorance and misunderstanding of the type/token distinction, which for the umpteenth time has nothing to do with encountering. The definition of a token is not “encountering a token”, as you obviously think it is.
In relation to your book example, I think it is largely to do with "time and chance" and maybe also physiology. We typically only consider ourselves to experience one token of a "certain sensation", such as a headache, at a time. It seems odd to me to consider having two similar but unique headaches (i.e. of the same type) at the one time, in the same way that we might speak of having two similar but unique books (i.e. of the same type; such as having two copies of 1984) at the one time.
Does that answer your question, or is that what you were asking?
Your mode of argumentation, as commonly displayed, is to pay no respect for what the other person is saying, and remove phrases from their context to create the appearance of contradiction.
Here is your confusion. In one context I was speaking about instances of sensation of a token. In the other context I was replying to your talk about instances of existence of a token. You conflate these two, continuing to insist that an instance of sensation of a token is an instance of existence of a token, refusing to acknowledge the difference between these two, hence your confusion .
Quoting Luke
When I've spent a number of days explaining to you, the difference between encountering a token, and the existence of a token, because you ceaselessly insist that a token of sensation can only exists if it is present to the conscious mind, for you to make a statement like this is a clear indication, that you are confused.
I'm sorry if my use of words is confusing to you, but your attitude ("I'm not going to follow you in your metaphysical nonsense"), is the real reason for your confusion. We are discussing a metaphysical issue, so if you refuse to follow the metaphysics of the issue, it is impossible that you will ever understand.
Here's a proposal for another way of looking at this issue, to perhaps iron out the confusion which Wittgenstein has created with his way of writing.
Since we have no point of agreement between us as to whether "S" is supposed by Wittgenstein to stand for a token or a type, Let's start with what Wittgenstein says at 261: "that when he writes "S", he has something—and that is all that can be said". Do you agree that "S" as employed in Wittgenstein's example refers to neither a type nor a token? .Can we say that "S" refers to "something", and that's all that can be said? To say that it refers to a either a type, or a token of a type, is to jump to a conclusion, because the diarist's use of "S" has not yet been justified. What "S" is supposed to refer to is something completely private. Even to say that the diarist "has something" is a little misleading, as Wittgenstein describes at 261, because these words have meaning in our common language, "has" implying a sort of possession, and "something" implying a sort of thing.
So we can remove all this type/token distinction as a distraction, and get right down to what Wittgenstein is actually saying with the example. S refers to something private and we really can't say whether it's a type or a token, because what S refers to is 'known' only to the diarist. Of course this is a special use of 'known', because it is explained that the diarist has no real criterion of identity.
That's a bit bloody rich coming from you.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Hilarious. Here's a reminder of how the discussion transpired with no changes or omissions to the direct responses:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But tell me again how your contradiction is a result of "different contexts". You're delusional.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is easily solved. Provide an example of a token of sensation that is not present to the conscious mind.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We are discussing Wittgenstein who says in the same work: "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use."
.Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Rather than a distraction, I introduced the type/token distinction intending to help provide clarity for what could be meant by "the same sensation" or "the same chair". But we got bogged down in your continual misunderstanding and argumentation about what is a token. So you go ahead and give your metaphysical reading.
I'm looking at my car right now. It is the same car, the same unique instance of a type, that I was looking at yesterday.
I'm feeling confusion now, but it is a brand new unique instance of confusion; it is not numerically identical to the confusion I felt yesterday, not the same confusion.
Why is feeling different from looking-at? That's what I'm wondering. I'm not suggesting it isn't; I'm just wondering why we assume that it is.
Sure. I might have been confused by a math problem yesterday and again by the same problem today; but my feelings of confusion are presumed to be two, one each day, not the same feeling experienced twice. Yes?
Why should I have to tell you again? Can't you read? Oh yeah, that's been central to this whole discussion, your inability to read what is written. I see now, that when it comes to metaphysics, you have an attitudinal blockage, which is most likely the cause of your misreading of Wittgenstein.
Quoting Luke
Yes, what Wittgenstein suggests, is itself a form of metaphysics. But unless you take the time and effort required to understand the metaphysical usage of the words, you haven't the means to bring the words back.
Quoting Luke
I've done this many times already, but you refuse to acknowledge. Any token of pain which is there when I fall asleep, and also there when I wake back up, like a tooth-ache, or the pain in my toe, were the examples already given. That very same "token" of pain exists while I am sleeping and it is not present to my conscious mind. It was there when I went to sleep, and it is there every time when I wake up in the night, just like the chair in the corner of the room, so I can conclude that it must be existing, though I am not sensing it, when I'm asleep. Why would you think that there is some type of magical "token" which magically disappears, and reappears every time I fall asleep and wake back up? Obviously it is the very same tooth-ache, which I have in the morning, as I had the night before, and not a different tooth-ache, so this "token" of pain must exist during the night while it is not present to my conscious mind.
Quoting Luke
Obviously, the type/token distinction has only created confusion. We cannot even agree on what a token of a sensation might be. Wittgenstein clearly does not use that distinction, and at the quoted passage (261), he implies that we cannot make such a judgement concerning what is referred to by "S" ("that when he writes "S", he has something—and that is all that can be said").
Do you accept this, that when he says "that is all that can be said", he is implying that we cannot apply the type/token distinction here?
You started out comparing a token of a feeling to a token of a car. But you then asked why a feeling is different from looking-at, instead of why a feeling is different from a car.
I'd say the reason for this difference is that cars typically last for about 10 or 15 years, while feelings typically don't last as long. However, feelings can last for more than a day, as I noted earlier. You might tell the doctor that you've had the same pain for weeks, months or years.
What Wittgenstein is saying at 258 is that the person has no criterion by which to judge the pain as the same from one moment of occurrence to the next, therefore there is no such thing as correctness in this situation.
However, I believe we ought to consider this principle much more closely. This is derived from Wittgenstein's definition of what it means to follow a rule, and the assertion that to think that I am following a rule does not necessarily mean I am following a rule. This results in the problem above, that the person has no criterion by which to assign the symbol "S", and there is no correctness.
But there's a principle pointed out by Plato, which is that a person can knowingly act contrarily to a rule. This is to knowingly break a rule. And this is a strong argument which Socrates used against the sophists who claimed that virtue is knowledge. Knowing what is good and correct, virtuous, does not ensure that one will act in this way. A person can knowingly break a rule. So if there is some truth to "I know that I am acting in a way which is contrary to the rule, therefore I am breaking the rule, there must also be some truth to "I know the rule, and I am obeying it, therefore I am following the rule".
Applied in this case, we can see that a person might continuously have a tooth-ache, and refer to it as one thing, the same thing. This might be for the sake of convenience in the public communication. But in the privacy of one's own mind, the person would see that it is not the same pain from one moment to the next, it goes through many different phases of intensity, etc.. So the person would know that it is incorrect to call it by the same name, "S". Yet in Wittgenstein's example, the person proceeds to do what is known to be incorrect.
This demonstrates a peculiar use of words by Wittgenstein. He says "whatever is going to seem right
to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'." What is really the case, is that there is no such thing as "right" here, and we cannot talk about 'right', because the person always knows oneself to be wrong. So the only reason why we cannot talk about "right" here, is because the person has excluded the possibility of being right, by knowing oneself to be wrong.
This implies that a person can know oneself to be wrong, without reference to any rules.
Here we can’t talk about ‘wrong’, either.
Yes we can, that's the point. In fact, "wrong" is necessary, and that's why we cannot talk about "right". The only reason we cannot talk about "right" here, is because the person knows oneself to be wrong. If we so much as allow the possibility of being right, then we can talk about "right". And one can only exclude the possibility of being right if the person knows oneself to be wrong. Therefore the only reason we cannot talk about "right" , is because "wrong" is necessary.
So, we can apply this to Wittgenstein's example, the sensation of pain. Every moment that I have pain, I know that it is different, and not the same as the moment before. So every time I mark "S" to name the pain as the same pain as before, I know that I am wrong, it is not really the same pain. Since this knowing that it is not the same (because there is no criterion by which it could be the same), necessitates that I am wrong in naming it as the same, therefore there is no possibility of me being right, we cannot talk about being "right" in this context.
Whatever is going to seem wrong to me is wrong. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘wrong’.
It entirely depends on the diarist to write "S" in their diary for each recurrence of the sensation, so "the convenience of public communication" is irrelevant. "S" is supposed to have a private use only, which is the point. Why would the diarist mark "S" if they thought it was incorrect to do so?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What criterion is there by which the sensation could be different? And what constitutes a single instance/token of the sensation?
I think that the diarist would do that, because I see that people do that all the time. The sensation isn't exactly like the other one, but it's close enough, so I'll mark it as S. The person knows it is not the same, but marks it as the same anyway. I think that this type of behaviour is very common.
Quoting Luke
Change is the criterion of difference. A person senses change and concludes difference. Change is sensible.
Where have you seen this use of a private language before? How does the diarist know the sensation is not “exactly like the other one”?
Call for rewrite
If you know this stuff, have a go.
As I said, change occurs between time 1 and time 2. If change occurs then there is difference. That's what sensation is, the perception of change.
Quoting Luke
There is no such thing as a "token of sensation". That's why I objected to your application of the type/token distinction here. And it's the point Banno was making weeks ago. We ought not talk about inner experiences as if they consist of things. That way of speaking is the illness which Wittgenstein referred to, requiring philosophical treatment (254-255). The reply I made to Banno though, was that we can equally apply the same principles to external "things", as process philosophy does, and Heraclitus, did; there are no things, internal nor external, all is flux.
You refuse to consider metaphysics as relevant though..
Quoting Banno
If I wrote anything it wouldn't even last an hour.
True. There's a reason for that. Wiki uses verified sources.
Well, the way the world is going today, it won't be long before there's a wiki for vilified sources, (if it's not already out there). The alternative wiki, for those who don't accept the mainstream "facts".
Pain is a sensation. Surely you’ve had an instance (token) of pain before. And more than one separate instances of pain. No?
No, because a token is an object which serves as an instantiation of a type. Pain is not an object, so if we use the type/token distinction it can never be other than a type. Think about it, all descriptions of pain are descriptions of a type, tooth-ache, sore toe, etc.. Even if I think about the pain I have right now in my..., it's always a type.
The very same is also true of physical objects, we describe them in words which typify them. The only reason why a physical object can be a token is because we can point to it, without describing it in words in which case the words describe a type. Then, when it's pointed to, we can see it as an example of a type. The internal sensation we cannot see, nor point to, so it cannot serve as a token of a type. Therefore if we class it by type/token distinction, it must be a type.
“An example of a type” is an instance of a type, i.e. a token. The toothache or toe pain you have on a particular day or for a particular period of time is a token, or an “example of a type”.
Your “pointing to” stipulation is something you’ve just made up.
You seem to misunderstand. An expression, such as "I have a headache", is not a token of the type "pain". It is an expression, which you (mistakenly) take to represent a token. It does not represent a token, it explicitly states I have a sensation which is of the type, "headache". This is what Banno attempted to do earlier, remove the separation between the expression, and what the expression indicates, to say that the expression is the pain. But this proved to be nonsensical.
You invalidly concluded that I must be in possession of a token of that type (beetle in the box), from the fact that I assert that I have something of that type. That your conclusion is invalid is evident from the fact that I could be lying. .
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Right, an expression is not a token of the type "pain". What is a token of the type "pain" is an actual instance of pain (e,g, actually having a pain). Perhaps you will understand it if I say that the type "pain" is like Plato's Form of "pain"; the pure idea of pain. However, there is no such Form, there is only the word/concept/type "pain" that we use to refer to actual instances/tokens of pain. This is why having a toothache is a token of (the type) "toothache", and why having a sore toe is a token of (the type) "sore toe". I can have a toothache and you can have a toothache and so can everyone else, and we can all refer to it as "a toothache".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I simply assumed that you have had instances/tokens of pain before. You said as much when you mentioned your nightly toe pain. Do you want to say that you've never had any instances of pain?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Lying about what? That you've had pain before? You could be lying, but you could also be telling the truth. What then?
You don't seem to understand the fact that the type/token distinction cannot be applied in the context of the private language.
Quoting Luke
As I said, I do not believe there is any such a thing as an actual instance of pain. You'll have to show me one before I believe you. That's how you're using "instance", to signify an example of something, a "token". A token is an example of a type. So you'll have to show me your example. To talk about the existence of a token is insufficient, because you are telling me about a type, "pain" and insisting that there is such a thing as examples of this type, "tokens" without showing me these tokens.
Quoting Luke
You are insisting that you have something in your box, a token of the type "beetle" (in this case, a token of pain), But to be tokens of a particular type, they must serve to exemplify that type. Since you cannot use what's in your box, as an example of the type you are talking about, "pain", to demonstrate that type to me, we cannot truthfully say that what is in your box is a token of pain.
Do you understand the reality of the type/token distinction? A token is an example of a type, by definition. If there is something which cannot serve to exemplify a type, such as an inner, private sensation, it cannot be called a token. Otherwise, you could make up all sorts of fictitious types, and claim that there are real existing tokens of those types, like unicorns and flying spaghetti monsters, but all the tokens are in your mind.
Quoting Luke
You really do not understand what a token is. Suppose you name a type, "beetle", and I say, yes, I have one of those at home. The thing I have at home does not serve as an example of a type, and therefore cannot be called a "token", until it is displayed as such.. Since a token, by definition, is an example, used to demonstrate a type, anything which does not serve that purpose cannot be called a token.
This means that we can have real existing things which are not tokens. You seem to be bogged down by some type of dichotomous thinking within which everything must be either a type or a token of a type. So you do not recognize the fact that I can claim to have something, and even call it by the name of a type, "a pain", yet it is not a token of that type because I cannot use it to exemplify that type, as required by the name "token". Therefore it is not a token of that type, as required by the definition of "token".
I hate to break it to you, but "pain" is a word in our public language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I would be more than happy to show you an instance of pain if you would let me. Otherwise, try pricking yourself with a pin (see PI 288).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not using what's in my box. I have asked you several times whether you have had any instances of pain before. You keep avoiding this very straightforward question. Now you are pretending not to know what the word "pain" means.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If you think that tokens of pain are fictitious, then you don't know the meaning of the word.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You cannot have a token that is independent of its type. That is, I don't think it makes any sense to talk about tokens unless you are talking about them in terms of their type, or in terms of the type/token distinction. And I don't think that everything is a type. To repeat, I introduced the distinction to raise your awareness of two different possible meanings of the word "same": the same type or the same token.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If you have something, and you call it a "pain" when it is not a pain, then you are either lying or misusing the word.
I answered this. No. My pain does not exist as an instance, or as a token.
Quoting Luke
Yes, and it was you who insisted that the same token, or instance, of pain could not go away and come back at a later time. My pain usually goes away and comes back at a different time, when I sleep for example. Therefore I have concluded that my pain cannot exist as a token or an instance, as you are defining these words..
I am not avoiding the question. I have answered it. No, I have never had an "instance" of pain as you are using "instance".
Quoting Luke
Yes, I told you lying is a real possibility which proves that what you are asserting is false.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You said that "A token is an example of a type, by definition." So that means your pains are not examples (or instances) of the type "pain"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I did not insist that. Our discussion on the subject began with the definition of types and tokens, and with what a token is for Wittgenstein's diarist. You refused to acknowledge that Wittgenstein was talking about the recurrence of a sensation, despite Wittgenstein's explicit use of the word. I then reminded you that in Wittgenstein's scenario, he states that he writes "S" "for every day on which I have the sensation." This implies that he writes "S" either one or zero times per day.
Furthermore, you are being dishonest because I acknowledged on more than one occasion that a token could be defined as lasting longer than a day. For example:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I also coined the term "broken token" for such an example, and more recently stated that you might tell the doctor you've had the same pain for weeks, months or years.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's a much weaker claim than your earlier insistence that "There is no such thing as a "token of sensation"". Anyway, as I've acknowledged several times and as per my quote above, I am not using "instance" or "token" any differently than you. Moreover it seems that, given the absence of response in your latest reply, you are no longer defending your assertion that I am applying the type/token distinction to "pain" in the "context of a private language". Therefore, you apparently still want to deny that you have pains at all. Maybe you express them without having them?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
And, as I indicated in my response at the time, the possibility of lying implies the possibility of telling the truth. If it is possible that your tokens (or "somethings") of pain are a lie, then it is also possible that your tokens (or "somethings") of pain are not a lie. Which proves that your assertion "There is no such thing as a token of sensation" is false.
Words can be so soothing, but they don't necessarily correlate to their definitions. Sleep, for instance, such a soothing word, while "love", in my opinion, seems rather coarse. "Evil" is empowering, yet maligned.
There are hints of potential words that just soothe an aching conscience. Speak in tongues.
Yes, my pains are not instances nor examples.
Quoting Luke
Perhaps I am lying. How would you know?
Quoting Luke
This is an invalid conclusion. That there is a token, an example, or instance of pain which is referred to when I say "I'm in pain", requires that I am not lying. The possibility that I am telling the truth when I say "I'm in pain", does not necessitate that there is a token, instance, or example, being referred to, because it's only a possibility. It is required that the token actually serves as an example, to be a token..
A token is an instance is an example. Either you have pains or you don't. Are you claiming that you lie about it in every instance? You seem to be claiming you don't have pains. I guess this is all you have left to say.
I claim to be in pain. Yet the question remains, either I have pain or I don't. Where do you think the token is? My claim is not the token.
Quoting Luke
I am waiting for you to produce this token of pain which you seem to believe is so real.
Quoting Luke
Are you asking for being tortured?
You can tell me about your claimed token all you want, that's a far cry from producing it.
Yeah, I'm masochist and Luke readily submits to my desires. But Luke only submits because he thinks I'm feeling pain, when I'm really feeling pleasure.
You want me to produce my sensations? Do you not have them yourself?
Do you want to contradict Wittgenstein and say that you doubt whether you are in pain? Also, what do you make of the remarks at 250 which relate to your comments on lying:
Is a dog so honest that it cannot help but express only real pain? Note Wittgenstein's distinction between pain and its expresssion (pain-behaviour), such as at 281, 244, 245, or, again, at 246:
I cannot show you my sensations because sensations are private. Wittgenstein's is not a private sensations argument (unless you count PI 246-251, where he acknowledges that sensations are private). Did you think he was a behaviourist?
I have sensations, but as I explained to you, they do not consist of tokens, if I maintain consistency with the way you use the word "token".
Quoting Luke
I am not discussing Wittgenstein's expressed point of view on this matter, we are discussing whether sensations can be considered to be tokens. And I often doubt whether some of my sensations ought to be called "pain" or not. That's a common experience for me.
Also, I don't see how the comments at 250 are relevant to the argument I made . You said that if I express "I am in pain", then it is necessary that I have a token of pain. But you accept that the expression is not itself the token. So you seem to completely overlook the possibility that I might be intentionally lying. I don't see how the question of whether a dog could perform such a pretense is relevant.
Quoting Luke
Why would I think that? How is a dog's supposed experience of pain even relevant to what we're discussing? Are you simply writing this as an intentional distraction? You can use the dog as a token of a dog, but how do you use a dog as a token of pain?
Quoting Luke
I can't understand this contradictory mess. You seem to be saying that Wittgenstein argues that sensations are not private, yet at 246-251 he acknowledges that sensation are private.
Wittgenstein clearly indicates at 253, in what sense you and I can be said to have the "same" pain. Read it again, before you continue to insist on what Wittgenstein is saying. If your pain and my pain are distinct, as two distinct chairs are, but are of the same type (to use your word "type", not Wittgenstein's who says "exactly the same as"), then in this sense of "same", you and I might have the "same" pain.
But if this is the case, we are talking about a type, called "pain", not tokens of pain. And if we want to talk about distinct pains as if they are distinct tokens, then we need to produce these tokens, lay them out on the table, or some such thing, so that we can compare them, to see if they truly are "exactly the same". If we have no means for comparison how can we even talk about whether they are one token or two? You are simply talking about imaginary tokens, as if they are real.
Quoting Olivier5
i don't see how you could produce a token of pain with a token of hammer and a token of hand. You could create a token of 'damaged hand', or 'injured hand', but where's the token of pain?
Don't worry, you'll know where it is as soon as I start smashing your hand with that hammer.
What way is that (or what do you think it is)?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I never said that.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't care if you're lying or not. It's not about me trying to work out if you genuinely have pains. I directly asked you whether you have pains. I already know that you do, and you have already said on multiple occasions that you do. I do not understand why you are refusing to refer to separate instances of having pain (or any other sensations) as "tokens".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What reason might there be to think that dogs or other animals are ever in pain? Why even call it "pain"? After all, it's not as though we can compare their sensations with ours.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He argues that a private language is impossible, not that a private sensation is impossible. He takes it as given that sensations are private.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
"Pain" is the type. That there are two of them - you have one and I have one - and that they are both "pain" means that we each have a token of that type. It makes no sense to say that we each have a type called "pain". There is only one type called "pain" and we each have a token of it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Either you and I each have pains (and therefore we each have tokens of pain) or else we don't and so we cannot correctly call either or both of them "pains". In the latter case, what we have is simply not of that type, so we would be miscategorising what we have or misusing the word "pain".
All right, I'm not worried, I've hit myself with a hammer enough times to know what it feels like, and also to know that there is never any tokens for me there.
Quoting Luke
That's right, I think it's nonsensical, incoherent, and inconsistent with the definition of "token", to call pain a token.
Quoting Luke
We each have a type of sensation which we call "pain". Why do you say that this makes no sense? When I have a sensation of the type I call pain, I call it "pain". When you have a sensation of the type you call pain you call it "pain". There is consistency between my usage and your usage due to our outward expressions, as Wittgenstein explains, how we all justify our use of "pain". There is absolutely no need to assume the existence of tokens of pain.
The consistency in our usage is not produced from tokens, examples of the pain itself, it is produced from our outward expressions which are not themselves tokens of the type, but they represent the type in a way other than the way that a token represents the type. So the type is recognized and understood through means other than tokens (examples). And, as Wittgenstein explains at 258, it would not even make any sense to think of the sensations which I call "pain", as tokens, because there is no criterion of correctness by which to judge whether the sensations I call "pain" are really of the type pain. To be a token of pain would require that the sensation conform to some criterion of correctness. Therefore they are just sensations which I say are of the type pain, but do not qualify as tokens of pain because there is no correctness as to whether they really are pain or are not pain..
That doesn't answer my question of what you think a token is, or how you think I am using the word "token".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We don't each have our own types of "pain". There is only one type, which is "pain" - i.e. the category or class called "pain". There is not your type of pain and my type of pain; there is your token of pain and my token of pain and they are both tokens of the same type: "pain". Likewise, if you had a Ford Mustang and I had a Ford Mustang, then there would not be two different types of car (yours and mine); instead there would be two different tokens of the (one) same type of car: "Ford Mustang".
We cannot possibly have different types of "pain" in the way you suggest. In order to have different types we might call your type "pain A" and my type "pain B". But all that distinguishes pain A from pain B is that one is yours and one is mine. Either they both still refer to what we were previously calling "pain" or else we are no longer talking about "pain".
In order to be different types, if you had something of the type "pain", then I would need to have something of a different type that is not "pain". That is, for us to have different types, if you have a pain, then I must not have a pain. Moreover, you cannot have a type. A type is a category or class. You can only have instances or tokens of a category or class. I don't understand your resistance to this mere taxonomy.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein does not mention the word "pain" at all at PI 258. He mentions only the word/symbol "S", which has a supposedly private use in a supposedly private language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As a word of our public language, the word "pain" has a criterion (or criteria) of correctness.
https://philosophynow.org/issues/58/The_Private_Language_Argument
See what you think.
I'll go along with the private language argument being a special case of a more general argument for rule-following not being a private activity.
I think we can go a bit further than Floyd. If we are to take seriously the suggestion that we look to use rather than meaning, then we might run into difficulties if we set out use in terms of following rules. For a rule is inherently statable, and so just yet more language. Hence we must understand rules not as stated, but as enacted (§201 again - it really strikes me as the pivot of the book).
But in what way could tall of a private sensation be enacted?
I think most people tend to dismiss the ("inner") sensation completely (it "drops out of consideration") and presume Wittgenstein to be identifying a sensation only with its expression.
Fair enough. The token-type distinction is overblown anyway.
Sorry Luke, I can't demonstrate to you, the way that you are using a word. If you can't remember, reread the posts.
Quoting Luke
No, there are many different types of pain.
Quoting Luke
There are many different types of Ford Mustangs.
Quoting Luke
That's obviously not true. The type of pain which I have could easily be different from the type of pain that you have, especially if I have a different type of injury from you. And, the fact that we'd be talking about different types of pain, does not imply that we are not talking about "pain" any more. If you and I are talking about different types of Ford Mustangs, that does not mean we are no longer talking about Ford Mustangs. This fact is a big reason for the existence of misunderstanding.
Quoting Luke
Again this is obviously false, as a type, or class, is often divided into subtypes, or subclasses. "Pain" is described in many different ways, sharp, ache, throb, etc., each referring to a different type of pain. That we have different types of pain does not imply that one type is not "pain", this is like suggesting that if we had different different "types", one could not be called a type. But that denies the whole point of having different types, which is to allow that a class can be divided into subclasses.
Quoting Luke
This is what is nonsense. If I can't have a type, then neither can you. And if no one can have a type, then where are all the types? Are they existing in a Platonic realm of eternal Forms?
Quoting Luke
Right, now maybe you're catching on. When I apply "pain" to refer to an inner experience, what we've been calling a "sensation", I might follow some sort of criterion. Use of the criterion ensures the appropriate classification as to the appropriate "type.". However, nothing indicates that whatever it is which I "have", is a token. I might simply have a type, which I class as a subtype, by placing it into the proper category, through reference to the criterion.
Look, "inner experience" refers to a type. Then we have specified a type of inner experience as "sensation", so we have just named a new type. We further divide to another type, the one specified by the diarist as "S". Each division produces a new type, and at no point is a token produced. Now, the diarist wants to say that the thing referred to with "S" is a token rather than a type, but there is no criterion (other than the law of identity which Wittgenstein has rejected as nonsense) as to what constitutes a token. Whenever criteria is applied we simply divide the established type into a further type, coming up with a new type, but never defining "a token".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are right that the type "pain" can be divided into subtypes. But the type "pain" is not its subtypes. There is only one type or class that is "pain". Therefore, there are not many different types or classes of pain. There are many different subtypes and subclasses of pain.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not talking about types of pain, which are subtypes, but the type (or class) itself: "pain". This includes all things/tokens that we classify as "pain".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You're right, neither of us can. We can't have the class/category. We can only have tokens or instances of that class/category.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Correct, but - in this example - a "sensatIon" is a token of the type "inner experience". And each subtype will have its own tokens. That's the mere taxonomy I was referring to.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's right. Now you're catching on, and seemingly starting to get what the word "token" means. It's only taken several pages. Except the diarist is supposed to create a type ("S") from the tokens; from the recurrence of the sensation.
Thanks for the article. It raised some very interesting points.
Quoting Luke
Yes, I agree with this.
Doesn't it do both? Isn't the word 'pain' itself a description? From it we know that the sensation is not pleasant, that it is something I want alleviated rather than prolonged.
A diagnosis is aided by a description of the sensation, its severity, where it is located, whether it is sharp or dull or throbbing, sudden or continuous, tender to touch, whether better or worse with activities or conditions heat or cold,
Refer directly to the sensation of what? The pain? It would be odd if the word pain did not refer to pain!
The sensation of pain does have direct bearing on the meaning of the word pain. Suppose there is one of Wittgenstein's tribes, one whose members do not feel pain. The term 'pain' would be meaningless. It is only because we have had the sensation of pain that we understand what the word means.
Nevertheless, if you cut Wittgenstein, does he not bleed? As with 'red', we are talking about the sensation - the negativity of the sensation - first-aiders are taught to apply some harmless pain to an unresponsive person to see if they are conscious or not. We know how to do it and what it feels like because we practice on each other. We assume our sensations are alike enough because our bodies and our reactions are alike enough. I think this is called a 'theory of mind'. You might just be howling at the moon, but I noticed you dropped that rock on your foot and now you are hopping on the other and clutching your foot as well as howling. I think you are in pain, and the pain is in your foot just there where the blood is oozing out. I'll fetch the Germoline.
I think this is exactly what he believes. We each have our own type system, each have different meanings for the words we share.
Is there not a different instance of pain each time you hit your hand with the hammer?
That's obviously wrong. Clearly there are many different types of pain. That's exactly what being divisible into many different types means, that there are many different types of the type which is divisible.
Quoting Luke
If I don't have the type, and you don't have the type, then where is the type? I think you're wrong here. A type must be somewhere, if it has any existence at all. I think that types are within my mind, and they are within your mind as well. They do not exist in some realm of Platonic Forms.
Quoting Luke
No that's not true, because you are again using sensation to refer to a type of inner experience. A type is not a token. "Mustang", as a type of car is not a token of the type, "car", it's a subtype. A particular Mustang, or any particular car is a token of the type "car". But, as Wittgenstein demonstrates at 258, "a sensation" cannot be identified as a particular thing, due to the lack of a criterion of identity. So it cannot have an identity as a particular, because there can be no correctness in identifying it.. Therefore "a sensation" cannot correctly be used to refer to a token. If you insist on that type/token dichotomy, then it must always refers to a type.
If you took some time to analyze your own inner experience, and sensations, through introspection, as Wittgenstein did, you'd probably come to the same conclusion as Wittgenstein does at 261 " he has
something—and that is all that can be said". Inner experience is "something", sensation is "something", but we surely cannot say that it consists of tokens.
Quoting Janus
No, because no pain exists as "an Instance", so it's equally wrong to say that different pains are different instances of pain. We do say things like this though, but Wittgenstein is demonstrating that this is a way of speaking which is like an illness that needs philosophical treatment.
That seems absurd to me. Say last week I had a headache, and now today I have a headache. They are two different occasions or instances of having a headache. They are not the same headache, as they would be if it had persisted the whole time.
I doubt Wittgenstein would agree with you on this; but even if he would, that is no reason to accept something that seems so absurd.
Earlier in the article, Floyd offers this "possible interpretation":
Following this interpretation, the word "pain" is used as a reference to a sensation, rather than a description of it.
Quoting Fooloso4
I would consider these as descriptions of (various instances of) pain, rather than showing that the word "pain" is a description.
Quoting Fooloso4
I think what he means by "directly" here is that the word 'pain' cannot refer to the "exact nature" of the pain (he uses this phrase in your next quote of him), such as the exact nature of the quale or of what the sensation feels like. In other words, a description of (the exact nature of) the sensation.
Why do you think that?
This would imply that we all use words differently (assuming meaning is use) and that there are no criteria of correctness in the use of words .Therefore, we could not correct anyone's usage or teach anyone a language. That is the opposite of my reading, and of what is obviously the case.
I was describing MU's views, based on dim memory of similar disputes before. And as it turns out:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There's a surprising strain of psychologism in MU's thinking.
I misspoke here, but I corrected it in my following response. Yes, there are many different types or classes of pain (these are the subclasses), but there is only one type or class that is "pain".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I agree the type exists only as in knowing how to use the word "pain" correctly; as the definition of the word "pain"; or as our agreed usage of the word "pain". Tokens are the actual instances to which the word refers. Hence, "Ford Mustang" as a type is an abstract concept. whereas a Ford Mustang is a concrete particular (token) that we classify as belonging to the type "Ford Mustang".
See also my earlier post where I mentioned Platonic Forms.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I wanted to correct this, too. I should not have suggested that all subtypes are themselves tokens. As above, all types are abstract concepts, whereas tokens are (what we might consider to be) actual instantiations of those types.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I disagree with this reading. The word "sensation" as it is used in our public language does have criteria of correctness. And he clearly indicates at PI 244 that our reference to sensations is unproblematic:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He is referring here to the mistaken idea that "the connection between the name and the thing
named" can be established privately. He is not saying that this is a problem for the words "sensation" or "pain" as these are words of our public language. The problem is with the putative private word/sign "S".
That is, what reason have we for calling the private sign "S" the sign of a sensation, given that the word "sensation" has a public meaning?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If there are no instances of pain, then there is only the abstract concept of "pain"; only the meaning of the word with nothing (no tokens) that belongs to that type. That obviously contradicts how we use the word.
1. Ostensive definitions. Are they any good? They seem to be.
2. Consistency of word usage. Memory failure. Can we remember the first word-referent association we decided upon? This is a major setback.
3. Beetle-in-the-box problem. The referent, insofar as private experiences are concerned, drops out of consideration (pain). The word/sign for them but must necessarily attach themselves to some shareable, externalizable thing (tears, wincing, screaming :cry: )
Conclusion: Private languages will be incoherent. Inner/private experiences are language-apt if there are consistent public/external correlates (pain & :cry: for example).
Ramifications: How much of philosophy or anything else for that matter rests on not just the possibility of but the actuality of a private language? When I discuss, for example, public sanitation with, say, the Mayor, is it a requirement that I possess and use a private language? Basically, in any discourse, am I sharing, trying to at least, my private experiences?
Ah, I misread you. My apologies. Yes, that is his misconception. :grimace:
You agree that Wittgenstein dismisses the inner sensation completely, or you agree only that most people tend to think this?
Be on another planet (Cambridge Dictionary)
I habitually write in the voices of other people without making it obvious I'm doing so. Need to work on that. (Though I can't imagine giving up these little embedded dialogs. Can you imagine the Investigations without all the other voices?)
OK, but by that logic I can say that the headache I had last second was not the same headache as this second. Or we could say that it changes by the nanosecond, or Planck length. Luke and I went through this already.
If coming into, and going out of ,the conscious mind, is what constitutes the beginning and ending of an instance of sensation, then why do I say that I have the same toothache when I wake up in the morning, as when I went to sleep? In reality, we do not judge a sensation as "the same", based on a judgement of "an instance", we judge it as "the same" based on a description of type.
The issue is even more pronounced and significant when we consider other types of inner experiences like memories and ideas. We designate it "the same memory", and "the same number two", no matter how many different times it comes in and out of the conscious mind. So why is there a double standard with respect to what constitutes "the same" inner experience? In the case of "a sensation", one might say that it is "the same" sensation for the length of its continuous duration in the conscious mind, whereas in the case of "a memory", or "an idea", we say that it is "the same" memory, or idea, no matter how many different times it come in and out of the conscious mind.
Quoting Luke
Well, you'd have to demonstrate that, if you really think it's true, because I think the evidence demonstrates that this is clearly false. That "pain" may be defined in different ways indicates very clearly that there is not just one type or class which is called "pain".
Quoting Luke
You seem to be overlooking the reality of the situation, that most of the time during language use we do not proceed based on "agreed" definitions, or "agreed" usage. If this is what constitutes the existence of a "type" then I suggest we need something other than types and tokens, to account for all the times when we are talking about type-like things (like sensations for example), which are not "types" according to what you say types are, as agreed upon definitions or use.
Quoting Luke
No it doesn't, because "sensation" has many different meanings or definitions. What I've been telling you, is that in common usage of "sensation", the thing sensed, the object of a sensation (something seen for example), might be called a token of a type. Now, when you say that pain is a sensation, you conflate the object of the sensation with the act of sensing, to say that the act of sensing, "the sensation" (the pain) is itself the object of sensation. So you have no separation between the object being sensed, (which might be pain or something completely different), and the act of sensing which produces the sensation. Therefore you use "pain" to refer to a complexity which is both the object sensed, and the act of sensing it. This conflation which unites a passive object with an act, is just a confusion, a misunderstanding, which cannot have a token.
Quoting Luke
Uh, I beg to differ. Reread 244 please. He distinctly says, there doesn't "seem" to be any problem here. Then he goes on to explain how there really is a problem. And that's the issue at 258, the problem he alluded to at 244, what does it mean to name a sensation. If sensations like pain exist as tokens, we ought to be able to name them, like applying a proper noun "S" for example, such that we might be able to distinguish one sensation from another, like we would distinguish one chair from another. Of course, the problem becomes evident, that sensations do not exists as things, (or tokens), which we can name with a proper noun.
.Quoting Luke
There is no problem with the words "sensation" and "pain", because they refer to what you call types. The problem is in the attempt to name a particular instance of sensation (what you call a token), with a proper name like "S". Then there is an issue of distinguishing the supposed particular sensation, which is to be named with "S", from all other sensation. Since sensation is something inner, "private", there is no criterion for this naming process, because a criterion, or rule, by Wittgenstein's definition is necessarily public.
So the problem is not with the "private word/sign 'S'", as you state, it is with the assumption of a private object, thing, (what you call a token), which is supposedly named with that sign "S". The issue is not a problem with private symbols, or words. There is no problem there, someone could make up private symbols for things, and not tell anyone else, that's simple. The problem is with the supposed thing named by the symbols, being something private, "inner experience", "sensation". The use of the proper noun, "S" as a name to name a particular sensation, which is a supposed private thing (token for you) cannot be justified.
Quoting Luke
The problem is with your misreading, and misunderstanding. You refuse to acknowledge that when Wittgenstein talks about "a sensation", and "the sensation", he is proposing a particular thing (a token) to be named with the name "S" as a proper noun. The public use of "sensation" is to refer to a type-like thing, whereas "S" is proposed as referring to a token-like thing. What reason do we have for saying that "S" refers to a token of that type, "sensation"?
Quoting Luke
Right, Wittgenstein is trying to draw our attention to this type of usage, which he has said is an illness which needs philosophical treatment (254-255). People like you insist on taking the so-called PLA out of its proper context, to propose that its purpose is something else. What Wittgenstein is demonstrating is the reality of the situation, what you describe with: "there are no instances of pain, then there is only the abstract concept of "pain"; only the meaning of the word with nothing (no tokens) that belongs to that type". That is the reality. But this reality is completely different from, even contradictory to, how we commonly use words. This is an illness which requires philosophical treatment. We cannot change the reality, only our usage of words.
It does more than just refer to a sensation. If it just referred to a sensation the word 'pain' would play no role. 'Pain' and 'S' are not the same. Pain, however incompletely, describes the sensation.
The case of pain is not like that of 'S'. As W. points out, the "stage-setting" is in place with the word pain. The same is not true of 'S'. When someone says they are or were or will be in pain we know what they are talking about. The sensation, like all sensation, is private but the language is public.
Floyd says:
If the nature of the sensation has no bearing on the meaning of the word, then how does the word indicate a certain kind of sensation is present? To indicate the kind of sensation that is present is what the sensation word pain means.
Quoting Luke
What is the exact nature of the pain? Words are not a direct replacement for what is experienced.
It should be kept in mind that not all pain talk is an expression of pain. Discussions of pain management, for example, are not expressions of pain.
I don't think that Wittgenstein dismisses the inner sensation, but some people do think this is the case.
I haven't read the whole conversation between you and Luke. If you've been through it already, then you've come out the other side no wiser. it seems. If I can make a reasonable distinction between the headache I have now and the headache I had then, then they are different instances of headache. There is no point bringing up nanoseconds; we don't distinguish nanoseconds.
If I have a headache now and I had one five minutes ago in the same region of my head, then it is probably the same headache. I may have become distracted and didn't notice it in the intervening five minutes. I could still say the current episode of pain is distinct from the episode of pain five minutes ago, just on account of the fact that there had been, for me, no continuity between them.
The headache I have today cannot be the same headache as I had last year, or when I was five years old, because I have not had a headache all that time. This is all so obvious that I can't imagine why you would want to argue against it.
...but this is oddly matched against a form of essentialism, where there is a determinate meaning for each and every word; and hence @Metaphysician Undercover sees the philosophers task as somehow identifying that essence.
There are problems that ensue form reading one section of PI too closely, with scant regard for the other bits, especially that which precedes it. I'd invite Meta, @Janus, @Luke and all to go back a few pages, especially to around §48 and the rejection of the atomism of the Tractatus. The notion of essences receives a very hard knock thereabouts. If we are to look to the use to which we put words rather than to some invisible meaning, then we are setting aside the notion that the meaning of a word forms or consists in some discernible essence.
I get a pain in my toes, usually after a day on my feet. IS it the same pain? that depends on what I'm doing. I might describe it as "the (singular) pain in my toe" were I asking a physician for advice. But in a different situation I might say that it is not the same as the pain I had last night, since it has moved to another toe. The point here is that there is no absolute, canonical, essential right or wrong to these differing descriptions.
Meta, so far as I've been able to make sense of his writings, fails to grasp this. Hence he fails to grasp what is going on in the private language argument, since this is the base from whence it derives - meaning as use, not definition.
As an aside, it's a problem seemingly related to Meta's failure to recognise that 0.99... is one, and that an object can have an instantaneous velocity. He seems to see the essence of 0.99... as distinct from the essence of one; the essence of velocity as involving movement. If he were able to get past this, he would be able to do physics, and perhaps to follow Wittgenstein's argument.
All those pages about tokens and types miss the point.
I was describing my guess at MU's view, so you agree with him rather than me.
I understood that. The "He" of the first paragraph is Meta.
My apologies for the confusion.
A "reasonable distinction" does not constitute a criterion of identity, which is what Wittgenstein is talking about.
Quoting Banno
Agreed, this is what I kept telling Luke, who insisted on this type/token dichotomy, it's irrelevant and misses the point.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Not a bad guess, but Banno seems unable to even manage a reasonable guess.
Quoting Banno
Why would you think that I'm focused on essentialism? That's been part of Luke's side of the argument. Didn't Luke just claim:Quoting Luke To which I said "this is clearly false".
This is the principal feature of the difference between Luke's interpretation of the so-called private language argument, and mine. Luke believes that a word's meaning is based in rules, therefore Luke is drawn toward the reality of essentialism. So Luke thinks that Wittgenstein demonstrates that a private word cannot have meaning. As Luke says above: "The problem is with the putative private word/sign 'S'".
But I see he so-called PLA as involved with the problem of naming an object, rather than being involved with the meaning of a word. What 258 indicates directly is a problem in naming supposed private objects. You seem to agree with me on this point. But I take a step further, where you refuse to go, to say that the so-called PLA demonstrates a problem in naming any objects, private or public. This is the criterion of identity, as referenced by the example of the chair at 253. This means that the demonstration presented by Wittgenstein is not a "private language" argument at all, it is misrepresented as that.
However, I think you are absolutely on the right track to refer us back to 48. What is demonstrated here is the apparently unbridgeable gap between naming an object, and describing an order. This points to a huge discrepancy in metaphysical world-views. which manifests as differences in language use. What I propose is that the so-called private language argument (253-270) is intended to demonstrate a problem inherent in "naming" an object.
Which serves to reinforce my disinclination to reply to them.
It seems you read §48 as being about the order of the squares. Have a look at the context - at least read §47 and §49, but preferably also the critique of ostensive definition - naming by pointing - in the pages before that.
Then help me to work out if naming is part of a language game or not.
I don't want to say that you can't call it a description, but I don't find the word apt. It's unclear to me what it is a description of. And is it the same description every time?
I am more amenable to stating it in these terms:
Quoting Fooloso4
But I wonder whether this account does not also submit to your argument regarding pain management; that it is not necessary for a pain to be present or expressed in order for us to use the word.
Quoting Fooloso4
The exact nature is how it feels (to me), I guess, which ties back to why the word "pain" is not a description of my (or any particular person's) sensation. As Floyd puts it:
It is a description of the sensation, although not an complete one.
Quoting Luke
Right, although one would expect that when there is an expression of pain, a pain would be present. This is why I said that the use of the word is not necessarily to express pain.
I think these are two different things. The pain does refer to the sensation, but to refer directly is not to give someone else my pain.
There is a difference between a word in a private language, 'S', and a word like 'pain'. There is no way for someone else to know what 'S' is, not because it is a sensation, but because unlike pain, no one else knows what the sensation. The word has no use. We all know what pain.
Aren't we talking about the sensation of pain? What many different ways are there to define "pain" in this sense? (I'm not asking what many different types of pain there are).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Fine, I'm happy to call it "common usage" as you proceeded to do. I never meant to suggest that we each signed a contract; only that the usage is conventional or commonly practised.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, common or conventional usage constitutes the existence of a "type". Like when Pluto was declassified as a planet. "Planet" is the type, the definition of the word. The rocks in our solar system are the concrete particulars that we classify as planets or not planets.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What I've told you multiple times is that the type-token distinction is independent of "things sensed"; the distinction is merely classificatory, distinguishing a class from its instances; a name from the things named.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He says there doesn't seem to be any problem of words referring to sensations, and that "we talk about sensations every day, and name them". Where does he "explain how there really is a problem" with words referring to sensations?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You start by saying the problem is not with "S" but end by saying the problem is with justifying the use of "S"...?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Meta's public language argument(!), which demonstrates the logical impossibility of a public language.
...All stated in a public language.
I think I just tend to reflect back what gets thrown at me. Maybe it goes back with more force than it comes at me though.
Quoting Banno
Try this Banno. If something is composite, then we ought to be able to name its parts. But when we go to name the parts, the parts derive their identity from their position (order) within the the thing which they are parts of, as per the demonstration (48). In this case, the name doesn't really name a thing, it names the thing's position as a part of that larger complexity. But this is not really a naming of these things (the parts), it is a description of the complex thing which the parts are a part of.
So, if we distinguish between naming and describing (49), then true "naming" would seem to be prior to all description, names for the things, a requirement for the description of them. We'd need to identify and name the objects, or elements, so that the names would be fixed to them, independently of any context, any description, and this would be true naming, allowing us to proceed in describing them.
However, in the end, such a naming will prove to be nonsensical, or impossible, because the principal criterion of identity is a thing's spatial-temporal positioning. So we cannot get away from our reliance on description for naming, and description appears to be prior to naming, as naming is nothing more than describing, because we have no true criterion of identity.
It seems to me that the inner sensation is useless. It doesn't matter if we all have different beetles in our boxes or if some of us have no beetles. I like the epistemological as opposed to the ontological approach. When do we tend to agree that someone is in pain? Imagine, if you must, some essence of pain that outsiders can never access. Fine. Useless, but fine. So how do we actually judge ? Any of us could brainstorm some indicators (he's limping and grimacing, he tells us his leg hurts, etc.)
'Beetles' are something like phlogiston or the ether.
Indeed, and we've embraced a use of "inner experiences" that makes them useless apart from this uselessness. (Or an ordinary kind of thing was rarefied into a metaphysical cliché.)
Really? I find that claim strange. Imagine a boy who knows very little about female anatomy. He does know that women get their monthlies, and he knows that this is used as an explanation of moods, or as a reason to need privacy in a hurry.
Consider: pain definition1, unpleasant bodily feeling, and pain definition.2, suffering of the mind. Each of these two have distinct subtypes, which do not cross from 1 to 2 because 1 is distinct from 2. If we were to say that 1 and 2 are both types of a further category "pain" in general, then we'd have to have a third definition, "pain" in general. a definition which included both 1 and 2. We might propose "unpleasantness", and suggest that pain is unpleasantness, of which there are two types. However, there are other types of unpleasantness which do not qualify as "pain", so the class of "unpleasantness" contains things other than pain, so we cannot define "pain" in general this way. Therefore 1 and 2 are different ways to define pain, not different types of pain. Plato made a very thorough demonstration (in the Gorgias, or Protagoras, I can't remember which one now), showing that pain is not the opposite of pleasure, therefore pleasure is not simple a release from pain.. Likewise, we cannot simply say that anything unpleasant is pain.
Quoting Luke
Now, can you see that "common or conventional usage", though it may dictate what is correct and incorrect, it does not necessarily indicate what is true and what is false. In other words, common usage might have us saying something which is false, because it is conventional, and therefore correct, though it is not true. That's why there's a difference between justified and true.
So, let's look at what you call "the existence of a 'type'". If the "type" is produced by, or it's existence is dependent on, common, conventional, or correct usage, with complete disregard for truth or falsity, how can we correctly call this "existence"? Such a "type" is something purely imaginary, and it is incorrect to say that imaginary things have existence. We might say that imagination, as as a mental activity is real, and existing, but it is incorrect to say that the things imagined (in this case the "type") are real and existing.
Therefore, if anyone such as yourself, claims that a "type" has existence, and this claim of "existence" is supported by, or justified by an appeal to conventional usage, we must conclude that this is an invalid attempt at justification. That is because common, or conventional usage is insufficient to necessitate truth. Simply put, we commonly talk about nonexistent things.
Quoting Luke
This is false. If the type-token distinction is merely classificatory, then all tokens would simply be types, because classification just produces types.. But that's not how you use "token", nor is it the common or conventional use of "token", to talk about a type as a token of another type.
And, if we were to be very strict in our usage, and enforce that the distinction is just classificatory, then we could not apply "token" to any thing whatsoever, because a token would always be a type, and a "thing" is not a type.
Quoting Luke
Come on Luke, 258, where "S" is proposed as the name of a sensation, is where he shows that there really is a problem with names referring to sensations..
Quoting Luke
Exactly. We use words all the time without justifying our usage. There is no problem with such usage. Likewise there is no problem with the private language, which names sensations privately without justification. Justifying one's usage though is a completely different matter altogether. So the private language is shown to be useless in the public sphere, because justification requires translation from private to public.
As explained above, we talk about "types" all the time, no problem whatsoever, but when we are asked to justify such use, demonstrate what sort of thing we are referring to when we say "type", then there is a problem. You might simply say, a "type" is a thing whose existence is created by common or conventional usage, but conventional usage is insufficient to support "existence". Talking about Santa Clause does not give that named thing existence. This is a very real and epistemologically significant issue, despite your assumption that it's metaphysical nonsense, and your subsequent refusal to consider such nonsense.
So I'll reiterate, the problem is not with the reality of a private language, there is no problem here. The problem is in making the private language compatible with the public language. Here, the private language will necessarily be negated, annihilated, because there is no such thing as altering the public language to make it private, yet the private may be altered to make it public. But upon such alterations, it cannot be called a private language. Ever watch a baby learn how to talk? The entire process is a matter of trial and error, the baby producing and annihilating the private language, because it is incorrect.
Quoting Luke
Obviously you misunderstand. That the assignment of a specific name to a particular object cannot be logically justified, does not make public language impossible. It just means that our common practise of naming things proceeds in an unjustified manner. That I name the vessel which contains my coffee today, a "cup", rather than a "mug", is not justified. It's a habit. As stated above, we use language all the time without justifying our usage, and this does not make communication impossible. It is your implied requirement, that the naming of an object must be justified for language use to be intelligible and communication to be successful, that is what would make public language impossible.
Wittgenstein's "tribes" are isolated peoples. Unlike the boy who knows something is happening that he does not quite understand, no one in this imagined tribe feels pain. There would be no pain behavior and no word for something that does not exist
It can't be useless. For example, if there were no inner experience of pain, then there would be no language of pain, no outward sign. It depends, I guess, on what you mean by useless. Even the beetle has a function, albeit not the one most people think, in terms of meaning.
Note, though, that you assume that there is a singular held-in-common experience of pain. But this is "inner experience," which can't be compared and is "grammatically" invisible to reason and science. It's as if (quietly) we are after all reasoning from the undeniable singularity of the public token (category of marks and noises that are all classified as 'pain') to some singular referent.
If it weren't so common, I think we'd see the absurdity of it.
Also:
You might say that philosophy got in a strange rut, the idea of private experience, while rarely noticing the impossibility of being rational or critical or scientific about the idiosyncractic-by-definition.
Interesting point, but I suggest that we have no way of knowing that we mean the same thing by 'pain' if we insist on acting as if we can be rational about something that is private by 'definition.' If you think of pain as a mysterious private something, you open the door to p-zombies, solipsism, and so on.
To be clear, I have the usual intuitive sense that I know what it's like to 'feel pain.' My point is that this is way too fuzzy to serve as the foundation of a theory of knowledge.
Why?
As I, and pretty much everyone else, read this section, we see that what Wittgenstein has shown is that there can be no "principal criterion of identity".
But you don't. Hence my critique, that you cannot see that Quoting Banno
Why do you need a foundation?
It's just the introduction of skepticism. Skepticism never rules out anything. It's just doubt.
I think you have the wrong idea about where I'm coming from.
Could you explain why?
Sure. I'm not trying to play the skeptic, nor am I trying to found some theory of knowledge. You might say I'm emphasizing the behaviorist streak in Wittgenstein.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/
IMO, people do think in terms of internal states, though I think it's better to translate this into dispositions...if and when we care about being rational and scientific, etc.
Correct me, but wouldn't Wittgenstein advise that we don't have a vantage point on ourselves necessary to diagnose behaviorism?
Quoting hanaH
They aren't private in the sense used in the PLA, yet they remain subjective.
Quoting hanaH
It's probably better to think in terms of subjectivity when we care about morality.
Earlier in the discussion, I said:
Quoting Luke
This summarises the kernel of his On Certainty-style argument that can be found at PI 246, for example.
Along the same lines, in their exegesis of PI 290, Baker and Hacker state:
They go on to explain that descriptions of physical objects are the terminus of that kind of language game, whereas verbal expressions of pain are the start of their kind of language game. We can be misled into thinking that these "descriptions" are on equal footing. As they say:
As Wittgenstein himself says at PI 290:
I don't think I understand you here. In case it helps,
That's one way to grok "meaning is use." This is not intended to exhaust the use of the phrase.
Behaviorism is built on certain hinges that we don't verify.
What I want you to do is turn the above around on the world you see around you. You have no warrant for saying you're not a brain in a vat.
In all the most significant ways, skepticism about mental states is the same as skepticism about external states.
And the answer to either is exactly the same.
This is how we decide conclusively whether two temporally separated instances of what appears to be the very same thing, actually are two instances of the very same thing, rather than two different but identical things, by referring to a spatial-temporal continuity. Think of what Wittgenstein says of the chair at 253. How would you determine conclusively that the chair in front of you is the same chair as was there yesterday, rather than another chair which is exactly the same? You'd look to determine the spatial-temporal continuity of the chair between yesterday and today. Hence spatial-temporal positioning is the principal criterion of identity.
Quoting Banno
Wittgenstein presents us with the pieces of a puzzle, that is his way of writing the Philosophical Investigations. You, and "pretty much everyone else", are inclined to say that he presents us with a puzzle which cannot be solved. I am inclined to look for the resolution.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He presented the solution, but you didn't notice and have gone off on your own. Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
tTat's just not what is being claimed. And this is the very point I made here:
Quoting Banno
You are convinced of something along the lines of words having determinate, identifiable or statable meanings, in this case arguing that identity has something to do with location. But this is the very ting that has been dismissed in the argument you so tortuously mis-comprehend.
What Wittgenstein shows is that words do not have such fixed meanings. We do not decide conclusively if two temporally separated instances are or are not the very same thing, we just decide to use words to treat them one way or the other, depending on what we need to do.
I really do not know how to put this any clearer.
Sure. I'd say that (roughy) we reason from uncontroversial statements toward more controversial statements.
"The rat pushed the lever." This is something that anyone in the room could agree or disagree with, or so we typically think. A philosopher could muck even this up, but we can't afford to humor the radical skeptic all the time. ("How do we know it's the same rat from instant to instant? Maybe a different but extremely similar rat is teleported into the place of the rat of the previous instant?")
Economy is central here. What can we afford to doubt? What's the cost of the claimed difference? And so on.
Quoting frank
It would be a difference that makes no difference. The vat theory just slaps a different token on the whole of experience without changing its internal structure. It's all mind. It's all matter. It's all a dream. These are information-poor statements. When does a child learn that physical objects exist? When the goo is slapped out of his newborn lungs or when he reads a history of philosophy? Or?
Quoting frank
If external just means public, then I don't see why this would be true.
:up:
You missed the link to Wittgenstein there.
But yes. It's uncontroversial that people have mental states. The cost of your doubt is morality.
If you're happy with that, well, that's unfortunate for you.
I think you are still misreading me. It's not about denying or affirming mental states. It's about cutting out an explanatory middle man, an appendix that serves no purpose, at least in a stricter, philosophical context. We can all still talk about our feelings and sensations when we are off the clock, but there's a reason that a psychologist or philosopher might want to minimize their dependence on entities that are private by definition (invisible to science and rationality by definition.)
Mental states are central to morality. That's the heart, not the appendix.
Quoting hanaH
Scientists call it first-person data. It's certainly not invisible and not private as that word is used in the PLA.
But I'm repeating myself now. Probably a good time to thank you for the discussion and wish you well.
Adios
:up:
Well I know it's not what's being claimed, that's obvious. I didn't say it was being claimed, those words are my means of explanation.
Quoting Banno
I really don't know where you get this idea from. You do not seem to ever be capable of reading what I write because you have some preconceived notion of what I am "convinced of". That's probably the real reason you do not like to reply, because you cannot understand what I say, as what I say is always inconsistent with what you think I am convinced of..
Notice, that what I said is that spatial-temporal positioning is a type of description, therefore it does not provide for a true sense of "naming". That's why I said "in the end, such a naming will prove to be nonsensical, or impossible, because the principal criterion of identity is a thing's spatial-temporal positioning". I had already said that spatial-temporal position is a description, and therefore it cannot be the basis for a true "naming".
So you replied with "I, and pretty much everyone else, read this section, we see that what Wittgenstein has shown is that there can be no 'principal criterion of identity"'. But he really hasn't shown anything about any criterion of identity at this section. He has simply shown exactly what I said, "naming will prove to be nonsensical, or impossible". And as I explained (in my own words), this is because any attempt to name is reduced to a description. as the result of any application of a criterion of identity, which is a requirement for naming.
It's not the case that there cannot be a criterion of identity, what's the case, is that whatever criterion of identity we choose, it will not give us what Wittgenstein requires for a true naming.
Quoting Banno
This is obvious, it's everywhere in the text..
Quoting Banno
Yes we do decide this, quite commonly actually. It's an important legal matter of ownership and possession, for instance. If someone steals my possessions, and I see you with some things which appear to be exactly the same as mine, I might accuse you of theft. .We need to determine conclusively whether the things are or are not mine.
And, if that does not convince you, we could look at the methods of scientific experimentation, and the need to determine whether the object observed at a later time is the same object which was observed at an earlier time.
I really do not know how to put this any clearer, but you are being very foolish to claim that "We do not decide conclusively if two temporally separated instances are or are not the very same thing,"
Ask yourself what that can really mean. Public speech may report experiences using mentalistic language, but these reports themselves are strings of public tokens (or perhaps digital sound files.)
I can do science about how mentalistic language is used.
But Spock doing a mindmeld does not currently compute.
EDIT:
First I looked into first-person data, confirming what I expected it to be. Then I discovered someone who seems to make the same point as above.
https://philpapers.org/rec/PICFD
This point is so obvious that it's strange to see it made. The thirst for hidden entities is so great that it's hard work to look at (public) surfaces?
Till next time.
:flower:
Why are you introducing truth and falsity?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Correctly call what existence? Are you questioning the existence and use of nouns?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Whose imagination does common usage exist in? If all types are imaginary, then all nouns in the English language are imaginary. But in that case, I could not call you an imbecile.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We also commonly talk about existent things. What's your point?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So the type-token distinction, and classification more generally, is impossible? It's clearly not.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But you said:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If the problem with naming sensations is found at 258, then why tell me to re-read 244?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Who claimed that it did?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There's a very big problem here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Nothing is more obvious than your misunderstanding of the private language argument.
Why not? Truth and falsity are important features of our communicative reality, and extremely relevant to the subject at hand, the supposed PL:A. Remember the point I made, that your argument was proven wrong by the possibility of lying.
Quoting Luke
No I'm questioning the existence of types. You keep claiming that types have existence. I think types are something imaginary, simply made up by peoples' minds, having no real existence.
Quoting Luke
Obviously the words are not imaginary, what they represent is. Did you see my example, Santa Clause?
Quoting Luke
I told you to reread 244 because you presented an obvious misrepresentation of what was said there. At 244 Wittgenstein said there doesn't "seem" to be a problem here. You completely ignored the "seem", and claimed that he said there is no problem in naming a sensation. That's what you claimed, that Wittgenstein said at 244 that there is no problem with naming a sensation. This is very clearly a misreading. What he really says is "There doesn't seem to be any problem here... But how is the connexion between the name and the thing set up?". He then proceeds to investigate what follows the "but.". So, "the problem", which didn't "seem" to be there, as it was hiding behind the "but", is expounded on between 244 1nd 258, and expressly laid out in the example at 258. Did you reread 244 yet, to see what I mean?
Quoting Luke
Luke! How short is your memory?Quoting Luke
Do you see that? Conventional usage constitutes the existence of a type. Why bother replying to what was written if you are not even trying to follow the conversation? You take a few days to reply, and all your responses are completely off track from what was being discussed.
Yes, you should have. And please, if you can, refrain from blurting out ridiculous things about me, such as that I am "convinced of something along the lines of words having determinate, identifiable or statable meanings". That simply could not be further from the truth, and only demonstrates that you are incapable of engaging with what I actually say. When you do not have the capacity to do something it's best not to try to do it, that's called getting in over your head.
You overlooked my quote of PI 241.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Does the English language have real existence?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Santa Claus or any other proper noun does not really fit types and tokens, because proper nouns only have one token, which does not make a type. However, that is no argument against common nouns which can be classified into types and their tokens. Types represent their tokens in the sense that a type is a word that represents a (class/type of) concrete token/object. So your argument isn't what you think. To argue that "what the words represent is imaginary" is to argue that tokens are imaginary, not that types are imaginary.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There is no problem with referring to sensations in our public language; we do do that every day, in case you hadn't noticed.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
258 is talking about a private language, not our public language. Think about that, instead of pretending to know what you are talking about.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, and who claimed that conventional usage implies that Santa exists? You are confused. Still.
It is meaningless to say that I am in pain and don't know it. But this use of the term 'know' is no the same as its use in other contexts.
Quoting Luke
I agree and would say that the same is true of "know".
If I say that I am in pain I am not describing my pain or a state of mind, it is, however, still a description of how I feel. If someone asks how I feel and I say that I am in pain, that is a description of how I feel.
You didn't explain how it was relevant, and I couldn't see the connection.
Quoting Luke
No, the English language does not have real existence. That is one thing that Wittgenstein demonstrates in the PI, through the game analogy. The English language consists of a multitude of language-games, and we cannot point to one game which could be called "the English language". There is nothing which "the English Language" actually refers to.
Quoting Luke
That is why your proposed type/token dichotomy is inapplicable here, where Wittgenstein is talking about "naming". "Naming" is a practice commonly consisting of applying proper nouns. You just don't seem to grasp the meaning of "naming", that naming is to relate a word directly to an object, as we do with proper nouns.
Quoting Luke
I really don't see how you draw this conclusion. Your writing is so confused, saying that a type is a word, and nouns are themselves classified as types and tokens. Such things always depend on how the word is used, so we cannot make universal judgements about "words" in this way.
Quoting Luke
The fact that we do it doesn't imply that there is no problem with it. If that were the case then there'd be no such thing as a mistake. Anyway, the issue is whether Wittgenstein sees a problem with it, which he clearly does.
Quoting Luke
That is not true, and again demonstrates that your preconceived ideas influence your reading. At 257 Wittgenstein proposes a sort of private language, where he questions "So does he understand the name, without being able to explain its meaning to anyone?" But by the end of 257 he concludes with "And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed."
I request that you consider the conclusion of 257 very closely. When we say that the person has given a name to one's pain we are already using "pain" to reference the thing which the person has named. In other words, since we are describing what the person is doing, with words of our common language, it is already impossible that what the person is doing can be called a 'private language' such as proposed earlier in 257. What the person is doing is already in the context of being public, because it is being described. Therefore it has been concluded that we cannot coherently describe a private language. That would be an incoherency, because to describe what the person is doing, makes it necessarily public already.
Then he proceeds to 258. So, the conclusion of 257 ensures that it is impossible that he is describing a private language at 258. He has already excluded that as impossible due to the described incoherency at the end of 257. The diarist at 258 is naming a sensation with "S", and as explained at 261 "sensation" is a word of our common language. Therefore the grammar of the word "sensation" is presupposed, just like "pain" at the end of 257. And Wittgenstein is not talking about a private language at all here. He is talking about the problems involved with naming a sensation. It is impossible that he is describing a private language, because he has already demonstrated that it is impossible to describe a private language.
Quoting Luke
You, explicitly claimed that the existence of something, "a type" is constituted by conventional usage.
I think you mean it doesn't exist independently of language games. It's not an Aristotelian substance. It's not the Absolute.
Apparently not. He talked about direct apprehension of mental states.
You alone read it as an argument that identity is determined by "spatial-temporal continuity"* .
And you want to be taken seriously.
Quoting Luke
Do you mean, they each denote a single individual, which is the unique token of its type, making the type/token distinction superfluous? (Though perhaps harmless.)
Then you might or might not want to get into syntax, distinguishing tokens (utterances, inscriptions etc.) of the denoting noun from the word itself, considered as class or type of those tokens?
Quoting Luke
Again, you mean they each denote either (depending how you look at it), a class or type or extension, or on the other hand severally the several objects which are members of that extension, i.e. tokens of the type?
The syntactic items properly called common nouns are identifiable either as single items or as classes (types) of tokens, no different from the situation with proper nouns (see above).
Quoting Luke
This could be (to a nominalist) a lovely way to start deflating types/classes/extensions so that there's no commitment to them as entities. But the general usage admits the implication of such a commitment. Types are an accepted piece of Platonism in linguistics and analytical philosophy.
AFAIK. You might be channeling a different tradition? Apologies if so.
Yes I see that, but if you read carefully you'll see the reason for the conclusion, that there are no ultimate simples. The idea is logically incoherent. What 48 shows is that what you call an "ultimate simple" exists as a part of a proposal, a proposition, as a feature of a description. Therefore it could not be a thing named, because it would only exist as a proposed part of a complex. It's existence is relative to the proposal. So there would be a description of the complex, which includes "ultimate simples", but there could be no real name for the proposed simples which compose the complex, because they are only proposed, not observed and named. There is only a description of the role, or function which they are supposed to play in the complex.
Then the problem of differentiating between one proposed ultimate simple and another is exposed at the end of 48. Is each element named by the same letter the same element, or are they different elements of the same type, bearing the same name by being of the same type? Well, as Wittgenstein says, and Banno says, it doesn't matter, so long as we can avoid misunderstandings. So, we'd say "no problem", they are different elements of the same type.
Well, at 49 it is shown that misunderstanding cannot be avoided. Those who propose ultimate simples, propose them as elements which can only be named, and cannot be described. To be describable would imply that they are themselves composed of parts, and therefore could not be ultimate simples. If they are not describable, we cannot judge them as the same type. So the idea of an ultimate simple turns out to be logically incoherent, because they can only be named, not described, but each and every one would all have the very same name, because they are supposed to be of the same type. But they really cannot be of the same type, because they cannot be described as such, nor can they be distinguished one from another. So they cannot be named, nor can they be described, and it's an incoherent proposal.
To perhaps get a clearer picture of my interpretation of this, refer to the PI reading group, p12 in my pagination, (I'd provide a link but I don't know how). There I describe how Wittgenstein demonstrates that the idea of "primary elements" is self-refuting, because it is as I describe there, simply an attempt to circumvent the law of identity, the proposal of a thing which cannot have any sort of identity.
I'm startled that you are criticising me instead of MU, who asserts:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
while at the same time contradicting his claimed awareness with comments such as:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't claim to be any sort of expert on the type-token distinction. As I've said several times now, I only thought it would help to clarify for MU the difference between two different possible meanings of "the same": the same type and the same token.
I attempted to apply the distinction to PI 258 in order to show that Wittgenstein was not talking about a once-off token of the sensation "S", but that his intention was for the diarist to establish the name "S" for a type of sensation. I see now that my introduction of the type-token distinction was a fool's errand, and that a better approach would have been to stress Wittgenstein's use of the word "recurrence" instead. I did try that early on, but maybe I should have perservered. Either way, MU failed to understand the type-token distinction or the basic meaning of of the word "recurrence".
Quoting bongo fury
If I were to follow my nominalist claim that a type is simply a concept or a noun, then it is perhaps more correct to say that a proper noun is both a token and a type - or "the unique token of its type" as you say. However, it's not much of a type if there is only one token. But I'm not too concerned either way.
Quoting bongo fury
You are talking about distinguishing tokens from their type. Isn't that just what the type-token distinction is?
Quoting bongo fury
Yes.
Quoting bongo fury
If that's what the general usage is, then I guess I wasn't following the general usage. My bad.
You are not describing your pain, but you are describing your sensation? I take W to be saying that if you say you are in pain, then you are expressing your pain and this is not a description.
You said that common or conventional language use "may dictate what is correct and incorrect, [but] it does not necessarily indicate what is true and what is false."
At PI 241, W states that "What is true or false is what human beings say".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How can you maintain both that "The English language consists of a multitude of language-games", and also that "There is nothing which "the English language" actually refers to"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Naming also applies to common nouns, so the type-token distinction is not inapplicable here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There are no universal judgements; I'm trying to help you understand the distinction. I'm saying consider the type as a word, a noun, a concept, or a class, because that might help you to distinguish types from tokens, which are concrete instances or objects of that type. Or forget the type-token distinction altogether and look at Wittgenstein's use of the word "recurrence" at PI 258 instead.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is your position that:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That is, it is your position that all naming (naming anything) is a mistake. If everything were a mistake, then there'd be no such thing as a mistake.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You haven't gone far enough. It's not that there can be a private language only we cannot describe it. It's that there cannot be a private language at all.
As noted in the earlier article I posted:
Now I feel bad. But if you're a Wittgenstein exegisist that dares answer to the name 'nominalist', then hooray, but I want to be sure I understand you.
Quoting Luke
I just need clarification. Does 'proper noun' refer to the name or the named object? Anyone would assume the first and not the second, and possibly "both a token and a type" in the sense of referring ambiguously to either a particular token (utterance or inscription) of the noun in question, or the type which is the class of all such tokens. But then, with
Quoting Luke
I was definitely referring to the second and not the first. The unique bearer of the name.
It can't be both.
I know I've made this sound pedantic. But it's the difference between written notes and sounded tones. It's going to be crucial. I've had the same trouble with most of the big shots around here, so you oughtn't worry.
MU is on his own road.
Wikipedia tells me:
Quoting Wikipedia
From this I gather that a 'proper noun' is a noun that refers to a single entity.
Quoting bongo fury
I guess, but then the first also refers to the second. So 'proper noun' refers to both the name and the named object?
Quoting bongo fury
I don't see why not. A common noun "refers to a class...and may be used when referring to instances of [that class]". If common nouns can refer to both, then why can't proper nouns?
I'm happy for this to be moved to a new thread if it is warranted.
Do you mean, the name refers to the named? Sure.
Quoting Luke
No, only to the name.
Why can a common noun refer to its instances but a proper noun cannot refer to its instance?
Quoting Wikipedia
A proper noun is a noun that is used to refer to a single entity. The proper noun "Jupiter", for example, refers to the single entity which is that planet.
Another example of your misreading.
Quoting Luke
A multitude of things is not a thing. Sorry, I should have wrote "no thing", instead of "nothing" which is a bit ambiguous. But it should have been obvious because we were talking about the existence of things, and what I was claiming is that types have no real existence because they are not things and are imaginary. Your misreading appears intentional.
Quoting Luke
It makes no sense at all to me to see a word as a concept. It's a physical thing, written on a page, or screen, or spoken. If you want me to be able to see a word as a concept, you'll really need to elaborate on this idea.
Do you think that the "word" written here is the same thing as the "word" written here? Are the two of these, two distinct instances of the same token? Or would you say that each is a different token of the same type, the type being a type of word expressed by "word"? This demonstrates the problem with saying that a word is itself a noun. What we call "the same word", could be either a noun or a verb depending on the instance of use. Therefore we have to refer to the context of the instance of use to see "the type" (verb or noun) which the word is a token of. Then each instance of use must be a different token. And therefore it is incorrect to say the "word" written here is the same word as the "word" written here. Each instance of use must be a different word, if we adhere to your proposed type-token distinction.
The alternative, to forget the type-token distinction is what I've been trying to get you to do since you introduced it. So, let's start, as you suggest with Wittgenstein's use of "the recurrence of a certain sensation". If we put that in context, we see that he is talking about naming a particular sensation, which occurs on numerous occasions (recurrence of the very same thing), which is referred to as "the sensation". Further, he talks about the possibility of pointing to this thing, "the sensation" to give it an ostensive definition, but declares that this is not possible.
Quoting Luke
Utter nonsense, as is your habit. You've fallen back into that habit of intentionally misreading to create a straw man.
That would be grossly unfair. Both are fine. It doesn't mean, though, that the phrases "common noun" and "proper noun" refer to any non-linguistic items. Which is what you seem to claim here:
Quoting Luke
Reference isn't transitive (in the mathematical sense of transitive). "Proper noun" refers to names; names refer to their bearers; but "proper noun" doesn't generally refer to the bearers (either severally or as a class). Perhaps your single quotes are scary but not, like my doubles, quotational? Then you are perhaps saying that a name e.g. "Jupiter" refers to itself as well as the planet? That can't be right either. I mean, I see that you're not saying that at all. But then what to make of,
Quoting Luke
I said from the outset that I don’t think a proper noun, which refers only to a single entity, makes a type. Because it makes little difference to me, I was trying to be accommodating of your view, but it looks like I cannot.
A proper noun does not refer to a noun or a name.
A proper noun is a noun or a name.
Quoting Wikipedia
It’s a direct quote. Explain how it’s a misreading.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Almost every thing is a multitude of things. The English language is no exception.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It depends what you mean by “the same thing” (this has been my point all along).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No. An instance is a token, so they are two distinct instances or two distinct tokens.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I said to consider a type as a word, noun, concept or class in the quote you responded to, so I don’t need to clarify if i mean a verb or a noun. I already have.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It’s not incorrect. Same type, different tokens.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Same type, different tokens.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What do you mean by “the very same thing”?
You don’t allow that two instances of “word” can be the same but you allow that two instances of a sensation can be the same?
What do you think “recurrence” means?
My translation gives what you present as the statement: "What is true or false is what human beings say", as a question: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"' There's a big difference between a question and a statement.
Quoting Luke
OK, so let's say that there are two distinct instance of what we commonly call "the same word". In one instance the word is used as a noun, and in the other instance, the word is used as a verb. They are two distinct tokens, as you say here. By what principle do we call these two tokens "the same"? They are not tokens of the same type, because one is a token of the type of word called "noun", and the other is a token of the type of word called "verb".
Quoting Luke
It's not me who said that two instances of the same word are not the same word. I asked you that question, and you gave me that answer. That's not my answer. I would say that if we adhere to the principle stated by Wittgenstein at 253, it is "the same word". In so much as the two instances are "exactly the same as" each other, we can say that it is "the same word".
So, "recurrence", in the context of 258, means a repeated instance of the very same thing. Likewise, a person might have a repeated instance of the very same word, within one's mind. Don't you agree?
According to your translation, what comes after the question?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
My explanation obviously didn't take. Try this: First, establish the particular sense/use/meaning of the word. Second, apply the type/token distinction.
In this case, we are talking about a "sensation". Do you need any help with the meaning of that word?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's not me, either. Where did I ever say "two instances of the same word are not the same word"?
I have introduced the type/token distinction to try and create clarity about the meaning of "the same". You have done nothing but try to maintain opacity.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You have not answered my question: What do you mean by "the same"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You realise that two instances is two tokens, right? How can two tokens be the same? You have refused to accept this until now.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What do you mean by "the very same"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Until you can clarify what you mean by "the same", then I don't understand what this means.
The answer to the question is negative. "That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life."
Quoting Luke
Obviously, the example I made would be analogous only to a case where the particular sense cannot be conclusively determined. That is the situation we have with Wittgenstein's use of "a sensation". We disagree on the particular sense/use/meaning of the word. We cannot establish the particular sense/use/meaning of the word, so how do we proceed toward applying the type/token distinction?
Quoting Luke
I don't need any help with the meaning of "sensation". I see it very clearly as ambiguous. You seem to see a particular sense/use/meaning, and so you proceed toward applying a type/token distinction. Of course that is a misreading, because Wittgenstein intended that the meaning of "sensation" be left as ambiguous.
Quoting Luke
Quoting Luke
I asked whether two distinct instances of the same word are the same token. You answered they are not the same token. However, they are clearly not the same type, because as I said, one might be a noun, and one might be a verb. You continue to insist that they are "the same word", but you haven't explained by what principle you use "same". You say they are not the same token, and I say they are not the same type, so what makes them "the same"?
Quoting Luke
The issue is very clear to me. There is a use of "same" which refers to neither a type nor a token. You apply a type/token dichotomy, and refuse to grasp the fact that many times when we use the word "same", such as "the same word" exemplified above, there is neither a type nor a token implied by "same". So your introduction of the type/token dichotomy does not produce clarity, because if it's adhered to, it produces misunderstanding.
Quoting Luke
I mean exactly as I said, what Wittgenstein explains at 253. There is a use of "same" which we commonly call "identical". Wittgenstein calls it "exactly the same as". It does not mean the same token because it clearly refers to two distinct things. It does not mean the same type, because there is no classing the things within a type, just a judgement of "same". There is no type mentioned, only the very strong assertion that they are "exactly the same".
Quoting Luke
I don't think you will ever understand, because you refuse to release yourself from the grips of that type/token dichotomy. To me it's like you are adhering to the law of excluded middle, to say, it must mean one or the other, and cannot be both, nor can it be neither. But you seem to refuse to accept the reality of ambiguity, and that an author can intentionally mean both, and you refuse to accept the reality of a meaning of "the same" which is neither.
Evidently I'm being played for a fool.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What different possible meanings do you think "sensation" has in the context of Wittgenstein's scenario? How can you possibly understand the scenario if you don't know what he means by "sensation"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I use the type/token distinction. You have offered only synonyms of "same", which explains nothing. No two tokens are the same token, but they can be considered as (tokens of) the same type/class. The principle is one of conventional language use. We learn the names of types and we learn what tokens (typically) belong to those types by means of examples and repetition. I would recommend you to read PI 208, but I'm quite sure that you would intentionally misread it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What does it refer to then?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You keep telling me what "same" does not mean, without telling me what it does mean.
If it's not by type, then how else can two distinct tokens be the same? Try to answer without simply repeating that they're the same (or some other synonym).
To use your type/token distinction, It could refer to what you call a type, or it could refer to what you call a token of a type, as we've discussed.
Quoting Luke
Easily, he means to create ambiguity with the use of the word. He demonstrates that words do not necessarily have what you call "a meaning", that meaning is complex, and not a simple thing.
Quoting Luke
You have given me no principle by which we can determine whether two instances, such as what Wittgenstein is talking about at 258, are of two different tokens, or of one and the same token. You simply insist that two instances are necessarily two distinct tokens. But of course you are wrong, as Wittgenstein demonstrates with the example of a chair, the same token of a chair can occur as two distinct instances of sensation. And you readily admit this but you change the meaning of "instance" to say that they are not the same "instance" of chair.
Quoting Luke
I explained that. In this case, "same" refers to two distinct things which have been judged to be identical, they appear to be exactly the same as each other. They are not judged as being the same token, nor are they judged as being of the same type, they are judged as being the same
Quoting Luke
This is exactly the idea which Wittgenstein is dispelling with the so-called private language argument. We do not "learn the names of types, and we learn what tokens( typically) belong to those types". That is a misrepresentation, it is false. We learn the names of particular things, and we judge others as being "the same" in the sense described above, and so we call them by the same name. A "type" is a complicated concept, which we do not learn until after we get proficient at using words, so it is impossible that we learn how to use words by learning the names of types. We learn to use words by judging things as "the same", in the sense demonstrated by Wittgenstein, which means something other than the same token, and other than the same type.
When learning to use words we learn to judge things as "the same" in this sense, having common features, without learning anything about types. Nor are we learning to judge things by type. Learning types is a complex feature of abstract thought which a child learning language is incapable of.
Quoting Luke
OK, I'll use other terms like "common features". Do you understand that we can, and commonly do, judge two things to be similar, and even "the same as each other", without judging them to be the same type? That they are "the same type" is a logical conclusion drawn from the judgement that they are the same, or similar, along with another premise stating that having the same, or similar features constitutes a type.
When all the features of the two things appear to match each other, we say that the two things are "the same". We are not saying they are the same type, simply that they are the same. We do not refer to criteria. This is what Wittgenstein is describing at 253. when he uses "exactly the same as". In this sense, two chairs are the same as each other (not being said to be the sane type, but being said to be "the same"), and two people might be said to have "the same pain". And Wittgenstein proceeds at 258 to discuss the same sensation. "The sensation" which is referred to at 258 is not meant to be a token nor is it meant to be a type, It is two occurrences which are simply judged to be "the same" as each other.
That's why he proceeds at 261 to ask what reason do we have for calling S the sign of a "sensation". The person judging the two occurrences as 'the same" has not produced a "type classification" he has simply judged them as 'the same".
I'm not asking about "the same" sensation or types and tokens here. I asked you what you think "sensation" means in Wittgenstein's scenario. How do you think the word "sensation" is being used there?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is only to repeat that you don't know how he is using the word. If you don't know how he is using the word, then how can you understand the scenario? You claim to understand the point of the scenario yet you don't understand his use of words?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't need to give you a principle. An instance of X is a token of X by definition. And I've told you this about 30 times.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A chair is not a sensation, and an instance of a chair is not an instance of a sensation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The same in what respect?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Do you realise that I'm applying the concept of the type-token distinction here as a conceptual tool in an attempt to clarify different meanings of "the same"? I'm not claiming that when we learn a language we are explicitly taught about types and tokens.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That is the type-token distinction in other words.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, that's exactly what I don't understand: how two distinct things can be classed as "the same" without being the same type.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's not always about resemblance. It's about the use of the word that names the type.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How do you know, when you claim not to know what the word "sensation" means here?
I told you, I believe it is used in an ambiguous way. Do you understand that? It is a common tool in creative writing to leave the meaning of a word unclear so that it may be interpreted in numerous different ways. Therefore I think there is no such thing as what the word means in that context, because the meaning is intentionally ambiguous.
Quoting Luke
No, I think I know how he is using the word, he is intentionally creating ambiguity with it.
Quoting Luke
No, again that's not the case. I do understand his use of words; It's you who doesn't understand what he is doing with the words, if you do not recognize that he is intentionally using them ambiguously.
Quoting Luke
Why must "same". be qualified with "in what respect" for you? When we say that two things are the same, we simply say that they are the same (e.g. I know someone who has the same hat as me). if we qualified that with some respect, we would not be saying they are the same, we'd be saying they are the same in that respect.
Quoting Luke
Why did you say that then? You said that we learn types, and now you say that's not what you meant, then what did you mean?
Quoting Luke
They are not "classed" as the same, they are just judged to be the same. Whether or not they are the same type, is irrelevant, because they are not judged to be the same type. They are judged to be the same. When I saw the guy wearing the same hat as mine, I saw it, and judge it as "the same". I didn't make any judgement of type. And many other things I judge as the same in this way. I make judgements of "similar" in the same way, without even thinking about types.
On the other hand, if I learn what an oak tree looks like, I learn that type or classification, I might see a tree and judge it as that type. Do you see the difference between judging things as "the same", or even as "similar", and judging things as being of the same type? These are two distinctly different forms of judgement.
Quoting Luke
Because I know how "sensation" is being used. This is why "use" is a better way of understanding words than "meaning". There are ways of using words which do not give the word a meaning.
Yes, it's why I asked you this:
Quoting Luke
You still haven't answered the question.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are claiming both that the meaning of "sensation" is ambiguous and "may be interpreted in numerous different ways", but also that "there is no such thing as what the word means in that context".
It cannot be both that "sensation" has more than one possible meaning in context and that it has no possible meaning in context.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If you have a fedora and I have a fedora, then we both have the same hat, right? These are the same type of hat. Otherwise, how are they the same?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We are not discussing "similar"; we are discussing "the same".
Right "what the word means" implies that it has a determinate meaning. What I am claiming is ambiguity, and therefore that there is a multitude of possible meanings. A multitude of possible meanings is not compatible with one determinate meaning. Therefore, if there is a multitude of possible meanings in this context, there is no such thing as what the word means in that context..
You do not seem to understand what ambiguity is. Can you not see that if an author intentionally uses a word in an ambiguous way, there is no such thing as what the word means in that context? It is not the case that the phrase in which the word is uttered will be devoid of meaning, or nonsensical, the phrase may be very rich in meaning, as metaphors are commonly like this. But it is the case that there is no such things as what the word means. This indicates that "what the word means" is a faulty way of looking at language.
Do you appreciate abstract art? Or do you think that art can only be meaningful if it depicts or represents something? If you accept that the meaning which a piece of art has, is distinct from what is supposedly represented by the individual aspects of the piece of art, then you will see that a phrase can have meaning without the particular words being used, having any specific meaning.
You just don't seem to get this, insisting that each word must have a specific meaning
Quoting Luke
I didn't say "it has no possible meaning", I said "there is no such thing as what the word means". Do you not see a difference between the possibility which is explicitly stated with "possible meaning", and the actuality implied by "what the word means". You seem to jump across the logical gap between 'there is the possibility of meaning' to 'there is an actual meaning'.
Quoting Luke
Right, but your example, of the same type of hat, demonstrates that you just don't get it.
I'll ask you a third time: name the "multitude of possible meanings" that you think the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There is "no such thing as what the word means" in Wittgenstein's scenario, even though the word ["sensation"] has a "multitude of possible meanings" in Wittgenstein's scenario? Make up your mind.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If I think that it depicts or represents more than one thing, then I don't think that it depicts or represents nothing. But that's just me.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not always, but in Wittgenstein's scenario, yes, obviously the word "sensation" has a specific meaning there. You are just being disingenuous, as usual.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Since you have a thing for principles, perhaps you could explain by what principle you judge two things to be the same?
We've been through this for weeks with your type/token distinction. You argued "the sensation" refers to a type, I argued it refers to a token. You simply refuse to accept that it could possibly refer to anything other than a type, so you do not see the ambiguity. But you ignore the obvious, "the..." almost always refers to a particular, and rarely, if ever, is used to refer to a type. That's why I say, you just don't get it.
Quoting Luke
I don't think it is by "a principle". You are the one who insists that language requires rules, I do not agree. I agree with what Wittgenstein says at 258, there is no criterion of identity here. I think that I look at two things and see that they appear to be the same, so I say that they are the same. Likewise with "similar". I look at two things and see that they appear similar, so I say that they are similar. This is clearly not a matter of classing things by type. But if you were to ask me why I think they are "similar", or "the same", I could find reasons for you, to justify my judgement. But I don't look for, nor find those reasons, before you ask me. I just make the judgement.
Conversely, if you show me two things of the same type, and I know that they are of the same type, two dogs for example, then even if I see them as very different, I would judge then as similar, because of that principle, I know they are of the same type.
Ludwig Wittgenstein said “If you and I are to live religious lives, it mustn't be that we talk a lot about religion, but that our manner of life is different. It is my belief that only if you try to be helpful to other people will you in the end find your way to God.”
So someone may use religious language and yet be not religious at all. It's not that we can do anything apart from language in this world but that we don't fully realize all the time what our own personal language means (and especially how it's taken by others)
My two cents..
You hid behind the type/token distinction when I originally asked you this question, and now you're doing it again. Let me get this straight: the "multitude of possible meanings" that the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario are that "sensation" means "type" or "sensation" means "token"?
Surely you are not referring to types and tokens when you say that the word "sensation" has a "multitude of possible meanings" in the context of Wittgenstein's scenario.
Again: what are the multitude of meanings that the word "sensation" has in the scenario? Name two possible meanings, at least.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think you would prefer to talk about "similar" instead of "the same" (or attempt to conflate the two) because you have no reason to judge two things as being the same except that they are of they same type. It's much easier to argue that you don't need a reason or principle to judge two things as being similar than it is to judge them as being the same. There must be a reason why you judge two things as the same and not merely similar.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There you go again. They're not similar; they're the same. What makes them the same is that they are both of the same type; they're both dogs.
There is no hiding behind the type/token distinction here, you have made it front and centre, as the standard for interpretation. So I've used it to distinguish two possible meanings, you took type, I took token. These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". A third, is what I really believe, and that is that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible. But you refuse to even accept this as a possibility because it is unintelligible from your perspective of the model of a type/token dichotomy. But the referent is neither a type nor a token. That's what Wittgenstein indicates at 261 when he says " he has something—and that is all that can be said". I am quite confident that there are other possible meanings as well, but to find more, we'd have to look at the interpretations made by others.
Quoting Luke
There you have three now, and the means for deriving many more, ask other people. It seems the evidence of two was insufficient to convince you of the possibility of more. Of course this insufficiency is just a function of your type/token dichotomy. If it's not one, then it's the other, and there is no reason to believe in the real possibility of a multitude. But the possibility of a multitude is already a third option, and denying it doesn't make it unreal.
Quoting Luke
I think that you are spluttering nonsense here. I gave you the reason why I would judge two things as the same, it's just what Wittgenstein mentions at 253, they are perceived as being exactly the same as each other. And I gave you an example, when I see someone with a hat exactly like mine. This does not mean that I judge it as the same type, a fedora or something like that, I might not even know what type my hat is. I simply see all the features as being the same, and judge it as exactly the same. Imagine seeing two cars on the street which look exactly the same. You do not need to know the type (make, model etc.), to judge the two as being exactly the same.
I brought up "similar" because it is a comparable judgement, and I thought it might help you to understand. We judge two things as similar without classifying them by type, in the same way that we would judge two things as exactly the same (identical), without classifying then by type. Judging two things as exactly the same is just a stronger form of judging two things as similar.
Quoting Luke
You're really spluttering nonsense now, saying that two very different dogs are "the same". That two things are of the same type, does not make the two things the same. It is the type which is the same, not the two things. Can't you see that? You are saying the type which they are is the same, they are of the same type. You are not saying that the two things are the same.
Notice the difference between "these two things are the same type" which means in this case that they are both dogs, and "those two hats are the same". In the latter case, we are not saying that the type is the same, that's already given by calling them both hats. Saying "these two hats" tells us that the type is the same. So "the same" would just be redundant if it referred to type. However, "the same" is not redundant, it means that beyond them being the same type, they are also judged as being exactly the same, identical. And it makes no sense to say that it refers to a further type, fedora, because then we would just say "these two fedoras are the same". And if you say the type is "black fedora", so we now say "these two black fedoras are the same", it is still implied that other features are the same. "Same" in this context always refers to something further than the type.
For the last 10 pages or more, we have been discussing whether Wittgenstein's diarist is naming a type or a token of the sensation. Note that these are not the same question:
(i) "Does the diarist name a type or a token of the sensation?"
(ii) "What is the meaning of "sensation"?"
I don't see how you can answer question (i) without knowing the meaning of "sensation". Either you have greatly misunderstood this whole time, or else you are now pretending that we have been discussing question (ii) instead of question (i).
I've mentioned several times that I introduced the type-token distinction to distinguish two different meanings of "the same", viz. the same type and the same token. I have also explained that the type-token distinction is used to distinguish between a class and its concrete instances. Moreover, I recently said that you should firstly establish the sense of the word and then subsequently apply the type-token distinction.
You have insisted this entire time that you understand the type-token distinction, yet you now claim that the word "sensation" is being used by Wittgenstein at PI 258 to mean "a type" and "a token"? I find this difficult to believe.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The third possible meaning of "sensation" is that it has no determinate meaning? You cannot count "no determinate meaning" as one of its possible meanings; it isn't one.
So your "multitude of possible meanings" consists only of "type", "token" and "no determinate meaning". None of these are the obvious meaning of the word "sensation" at PI 258. Did you ever wonder why Wittgenstein talks a lot about "pain" in the surrounding passages as well as "sensation"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
By the same logic, you are saying that the two things look the same, you are not saying that the two things are the same.
Two things can be the same type without looking the same, and two things can look the same without being the same type. But things don't have the same name only because they look the same. Consider two dogs, for example.
Question #1 was never answered. I gave an opinion and you gave an opinion, they differed, so the question was left as unanswered, inconclusive, and we moved on. Now I'm trying to explain to you what that inconclusiveness entails.
Quoting Luke
No, I never said it means both a type and a token. I am saying that both of those, though they are possible interpretations, are incorrect interpretations, because they do not reflect what Wittgenstein intended, what he was actually doing. They each assign a determinate meaning to "the sensation" which is signified by "S", when he intended that the named sensation has an indeterminate referent.
I'm still saying that "the sensation" refers to neither a type nor a token. That's what I've been arguing since the beginning. The type/token distinction is inapplicable in this scenario because it makes a false dichotomy, rendering "neither" as impossible by the nature of a "dichotomy", and the law of excluded middle.
But I find it obvious that neither is what is intended by Wittgenstein. That's why I keep requoting 261 "he has something—and that is all that can be said". At this point he makes it very clear that we cannot say whether it is a type or a token. I suggest you reread this passage very carefully. He even states that what the diarist has, need not even be "a sensation", according to our use of "sensation" in our public language. He says: " And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; ".
Quoting Luke
This is false. What is said, is that the two things are the same. "His hat is the same as mine". That is how we speak. But you have a very bad habit of thinking that if it doesn't make sense to me, then the person cannot mean what they say. So, in your mind you change what the person has said, into something which makes sense to you, so that you now think that what the person said is "the two things look the same", when the person actually said "are the same".
This justifies my accusation that you misread Wittgenstein. When Wittgenstein explicitly says at 261, that we cannot say anything about whatever it is that "S" refers to, you have already concluded that it must refer to a type, because this is the only thing which makes sense to you. So you completely ignore what Wittgenstein actually said, opting for what you think he must have meant instead. Then you present what you think he must have meant, as what he said, like in this clear example above.
You claimed that the word "sensation" has a "multitude of possible meanings" in Wittgenstein's scenario. When I asked you to name some of this "multitude", you could only name "type" and "token" as two possible meanings. In your previous post, you attempted to include "no determinate meaning" as a third possible option. Now you claim to have never said that the word "sensation" means both a type and a token. So where is this "multitude of possible meanings"? You cannot even name one.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Why do you want to argue that "S" denotes neither a type of sensation nor a token of that type?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So do I. I never said that this is what Wittgenstein meant. Once again, I introduced it to clarify two possible meanings of "the same". I did this because it seemed to me from other discussions that, for you, "the same" can only mean the same token, as per the law of identity. That is, that you allowed only for the same token, but not the same type (nor of two things that looked the same, for that matter).
I am quite surprised to hear you recently stating that two distinct but similar things can be the same. You were previously adamant that they were not the same, only similar.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, but this does not imply what you said earlier: "that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible." At best, 261 implies this about the word/sign "S", not about the sensation(s) had by the diarist. Sensations don't have referents or meanings; sensations are not words.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein says at 253 that what makes it possible (although not necessary) to speak of "two exactly the same" is that it is the same (type of?) chair as the one you saw yesterday. The implication seems to be that it looks no different to the one you saw yesterday.
Now, you said earlier: "That two things are of the same type, does not make the two things the same." I replied, by the same logic, that two things look the same does not make the two things the same. Wittgenstein never says that if two things look the same then they necessarily are the same. He only talks about what makes it possible that we might speak of "two exactly the same"; and he appears to be saying that what makes it possible for us to say this is if they look or seem the same.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Luke
Because the interpretation of Wittgenstein's example which you gave me was based in the type/token distinction, and I've been trying to tell you, to no avail, that the type/token distinction is not applicable here
Quoting Luke
If meaning is given by the way a word is used, then very clearly, two distinct things can be the same. Whether or not this is a proper, "rule abiding" use of "same", is not the question here. But then the question is what exactly is meant when we say that two things are the same.. But you seem to think that all word use must be "rule abiding" to be meaningful. And that appears to be why you do not understand Wittgenstein's example, the so-called "private language argument", where the individual person names two occurrences as the same without a criterion of identity (rule).
Quoting Luke
Wow, your misreading never ceases to amaze me. Wittgenstein is explicitly talking about the use of the word "sensation" here, not the use of "S". "
Quoting Luke
Right. Now notice that whether or not they are the same, or "exactly the same" is not at question. We say that they are "two exactly the same", or in my example, "that hat is the same as mine", meaning "exactly the same", but whether or not they actually are, doesn't matter. As Banno pointed to at 148, it doesn't matter so long as misunderstanding is avoided.
[quote=PI 148]But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by our
sentence consists of four or of nine elements! Well, does the sentence
consist of four letters or of nine?—And which are its elements, the
types of letter, or the letters? Does it matter which we say, so long as
we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case?[/quote]
But I think, as I said to Banno, that Wittgenstein proceeds to demonstrate that misunderstanding cannot be avoided, as is evident from your misunderstanding, and the common misunderstanding in general, of the so-called private language argument
So you still have no examples to support your claim that the word "sensation" in Wittgenstein's scenario has a "multitude of possible meanings"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
At 253, Wittgenstein asks us to "consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of “two exactly the same”. So what makes it possible? When might we say that two physical objects are "exactly the same"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If word use is not rule abiding, then you must be using all of your words in a non-conventional manner. Therefore, you will need to explain how you are using all of your words. But then you will also be using all of the words in your subsequent explanation non-conventionally, and so you will then have to explain how you are using all of those words. And so on.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If you're correct, then address my argument that sensations don't have referents or meanings.
I'm really sorry that your inability to read English has left you incapable of understanding the examples I presented. You seem to be having a similar problem with Wittgenstein's example of the private language. No matter how many times and different ways I try to explain it to you, you just don't get it.
Quoting Luke
There is no specific criterion which tells us when to say that two things are exactly the same, that's the point Wittgenstein makes.
Quoting Luke
The issue I've been talking about is Wittgenstein's use of the word "sensation". I thought we were both talking about that, because you asked me why I thought the word's meaning was intentionally made ambiguous. He even explicitly states at 261 "the use of this word stand in need of a justification which everyone understands" ,indicating that his use has not been in a conventional way.
But now I really don't know what you're talking about.
What examples? Where? Quote them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Prove it. Where does he say this?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He refers to "S" here twice, which undermines your assertion that he is not talking about "S" here. Furthermore, you are misreading this. He is not using the word "sensation" in any unconventional way. The point is that the use of the word "sensation" stands in need of a justification which everybody understands because it is a word of our common language. If the word "sensation" has a public use then how can we be talking about a private language? "S" is meant to be a private word with a private meaning, but this cannot be if it refers to a sensation, where the word "sensation" has a public meaning. For the same reason, "S" cannot refer to "Something" which is also a word of our public language. In the end, the private language advocate has no recourse but to emit an inarticulate sound in defence of their claims. But that won't do either.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Luke
He calls "S" a sign, and "sensation" a word. Then he says the use of this word stands in need of justification. You really can't read.
Quoting Luke
This makes no sense at all.
"S", the private sign, is supposed to represent something which has been called "a sensation", public word. That "sensation" is the appropriate word to call whatever it is which the sign "S" represents is what needs to be justified
It is not the case that "S" cannot refer to a sensation, because S is part of a private language. What is the case is that if "S" is to be said to refer to "a sensation", this must be justified. There is nothing mentioned about "private meaning", or "private word".
But if we assume that "S' starts out as a private sign, then to be understood, even by the private person using the sign, it must be placed into the context of a language (justified). So a private language will always be unintelligible from the perspective of a person who understands through the means of a public language, because the private sign will always need to exist within that context, making it a part of a language which is not private.
However, there is no reason why there cannot be a private sign, and other private signs, and even a private language, which has no part of any public language.
The third is not a possible meaning of "sensation". Additionally, you later said:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As such, you have yet to provide any examples of your so-called "multitude of possible meanings" of the word "sensation" in Wittgenstein's scenario.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
See PI 243:
What were you saying about the inability to read?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Hence "the private language argument".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If a person speaks a public language, why would their private language be unintelligible to them? Why does the private sign "always need to exist within" the context of a public language?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How would that work? Or are you unable to tell me? If you can't justify the possibility of a private language, or provide anything more than a mere assertion that it is possible, then why should I believe you?
Furthermore, what role does the private sign play? Does it signify a type of sensation - or a type of whatever - or does each instance of a private thing get its own sign? How is this language used and what is it used for? You say there is no reason that there cannot be a private sign or private language, but there also seems to be no reason that there can be a private sign or private language.
A word's meaning is a function of the way the word is used. If it is used in a way so as to be ambiguous, then its meaning is ambiguous. Therefore the third option, "ambiguous", is a possible meaning.
Quoting Luke
Obviously, the example at 258 is not such a private language, because the terms are given to us in a way which we can potentially understand. I explained this to you already, 258 provides an example of naming a sensation, it does not provide an example of a private language, as described at 243. The fact that you do not understand the example at 258 does not mean that "another person cannot understand" it.
Quoting Luke
I didn't say "speaks" a public language, I said "understands through the means of" a public language. That's the example of 258, we as observers understand the use of "S", through public language, "S" is the sign of "a sensation". Further, it is written by Wittgenstein, so that the diarist is also recognizing what is signified by S as "the sensation". Therefore the meaning of "S" is within the context of a public language, as "sensation" is part of a public language. However, that whatever "S" refers to is actually what ought to be called "a sensation" is what needs to be justified.
In theory, a private sign does not necessarily exist within the context of a public language. That's why a private language is not impossible in theory. But since we as human beings learn language at a very young age, and language rapidly becomes a fundamental feature of how we understand things, it is impossible for a person to create a private language, because any attempt would be within the structured understanding provided by public language use, within one's own mind. Therefore it would not be a private language as described at 243.
Quoting Luke
I could tell you how it would work, just like Wittgenstein does at 243. The person would have unique signs and symbols referring to one's own experiences. That might happen if a person grew up in complete isolation from other human beings or something like that. If the person meets up later with other people speaking public language, the person's private language would need to be altered to become consistent with the others', to understand them, and would no longer be a "private language", even though it was a "private language" prior to this alteration.
That's similar to if an individual person travels to an isolated part of the world. The natives there speak a public language, and the stranger arrives with what is in relation to their language, a private language. The private language, as the context for understanding, must be altered to become consistent with the native language, in order for the person to learn the language. This alteration to the private language renders it as something other than a "private language", it's been affected by the public. But the fact that the new language, produced by the alteration is not a private language, does not mean that it wasn't a private language prior to alteration.
Quoting Luke
Clearly, there is no obvious reason for a "private language" as described at 243. We learn in the context of public language. Wittgenstein is producing these thought experiments as an aid toward understanding the nature of language. As for a private sign, one could think of many reasons for that. It could be used as a memory aid. You write something down, so that you do not forget it, and if it's a secret, you don't want anyone else to be able to understand it. And of course private meaning plays a big role in deception. Therefore we cannot exclude the "private" aspects of language as being irrelevant to language use. Hence Wittgenstein's discussion.
Since any word could be used in an ambiguous way, then all words mean "ambiguous". Right? You're an idiot.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein tells us what he means by a private language at 243; he doesn't tell us how a private language works.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein's private language is private in principle: "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language." (PI 243) That is, it's not possible for others to ever come to understand a private language, or for a private language to ever be translated into a public language (or vice versa).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The natives' language is not private if they all use it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's not what Wittgenstein means by a private language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are suggesting a translation from a public language into a private language. This is not what Wittgenstein means by a private language. Try and find another reason to use a private language.
The meaning of a word is only ambiguous when it is used in an ambiguous way. I agree that any word can be used in an ambiguous way, and therefore have "ambiguous" as its meaning. But do you not understand that the meaning of a word is dependent on how it is used? Often words are not used ambiguously, so in those situations we cannot say that their meaning is ambiguous. You seem to be especially thick on the subject of ambiguity.
Quoting Luke
As I explained, the example of 258 is not supposed to be an example of a private language as described at 243. So this is not relevant to our discussion.
I can't believe you're persisting with this crap. To use an example off the top of my head, if I say "I am going to the bank", then there is potential ambiguity in the word "bank" which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment. What the word "bank" does not mean here is "ambiguous" because "I am going to the ambiguous" makes no apparent sense. Although the meaning of the word "bank" may be ambiguous - because it has more than one possible interpretation - it does not seem that the word "bank" could possibly mean "ambiguous" or could be one of the possible interpretations.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You've already demonstrated that you don't understand what Wittgenstein means by a private language, so I won't bother addressing your unsupported assertions.
I do not understand why this is so difficult for you Luke. Let me provide a very clear explanation by referring to your example. You say "I am going to the bank". You also say "the word 'bank' which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment". Since you are the one making both these statements we can see the two as inconsistent with each other. If the first statement means that you are going to a financial establishment, then you would not allow that it possibly means the side of a river, and vise versa. You know where you are going, and you know what you mean by the statement, one or the other. If you meant that you are going to a financial establishment then it is not possible that you meant that you are going to the side of a river, However, you do say that this is a possibility. On the basis of this statement, your statement, that "bank" in this expression could mean either the side of a river, or a financial establishment, we can come to the conclusion that "bank" means neither.
Do you understand this so far? By saying that "bank" could mean either one, you are implying that it means neither one. This is because if it meant the former, it could not mean the latter, and if it meant the latter it could not mean the former. And if you were in fact telling me where you are going, you would mean one or the other. So by saying that it could mean either, you are saying that it does not mean the former, and you are saying that it does not mean the latter. Therefore, you are giving "bank" a third and very distinct meaning. You are saying that "bank" in this context does not mean a financial establishment, nor does it mean the side of a river.
To know what "bank" means we have to look and see what purpose the word serves in this context, what you are doing with it. And, here we can see that you are giving an example of ambiguity. You are using the word to create ambiguity for your example. The meaning of the word is ambiguous, and you have inserted into the sentence to create an ambiguous statement. Now, we can see that "I am going to the..." is irrelevant because you are not telling me where you are going at all. Your intention was never to tell me where you are going, it was simply to make an example of ambiguity. All that "bank" is doing for you is allowing you to make a statement of indeterminate meaning.
Further to this, we cannot say that "bank" in this context has no meaning. It definitely has meaning, because it definitely serves a purpose in your example of ambiguity. And since you are not telling us where you are going at all, as you are creating ambiguity with the word instead, we wouldn't say that you have said "I am going to the ambiguity", the word "bank" simply makes the entire statement an expression of ambiguity. And of course it is very reasonable to say that the meaning of "bank" here is ambiguous.
That is what I propose Wittgenstein is doing with "the sensation" at 258. He is making a statement of ambiguity. He is intentionally using it in a way which you might interpret as referring to a type, and someone else might interpret as referring to a particular token. And, since this way of using it is intentional, I can conclude that it refers to neither, as in your example of "bank". This is a third and distinct meaning for "the sensation". Its meaning is ambiguous.
Furthermore, when Wittgenstein says "S is the name of...", he is not at all saying what S is the name of (as indicated by 261), just like when you say "I am going to the..." you are not at all saying where you are going. "S is the name of..." is completely irrelevant in Wittgenstein's example, just like "I am going to the..." is completely irrelevant in your example. In each case, the word "sensation" and the word "bank" are simply being used to create an expression of ambiguity. Wittgenstein is not telling us what S names, he is simply creating ambiguity with "the sensation", just like you are not telling us where you are going, you are simply creating ambiguity with "the bank".
There aren't two statements; there is only one. That the one statement has more than one possible meaning is what "ambiguous" means.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see how I could prevent the ambiguity using that statement alone. I could proceed to clarify what I meant if questioned.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I don't see how that follows. How does either imply neither?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It could mean either. That's what makes it ambiguous.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
By saying It could mean either, then I am saying it does not mean either? Is that your argument?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, it could mean either. That's what it means for the word "bank" to be ambiguous.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We could imagine a context in which I often frequent both the financial establishment and the side of a river, and it is unclear from the statement which one I mean.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The word "bank" does that itself by having more than one common meaning/synonym.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You either don't understand my argument or you are purposefully ignoring it. It was your claim that the word "sensation" is ambiguous (having a "multitude of possible meanings") and that "ambiguous" is one of its possible meanings. It is the latter half of this conjunction that I find ridiculous.
It is one thing to describe the meaning of the word "sensation" as ambiguous, which is to say that the word "sensation" has more than one possible meaning. It is quite another thing to say that the word "sensation" itself has the possible meaning of, or is possibly synonymous with, the word "ambiguous". Can you not see the difference between a description about the meaning of the word and the meaning of the word? The former tells us that the word has more than one possible meaning, the latter tells us what those possible meanings are. You somehow make the leap from describing the use/meaning of the word “sensation”as ambiguous to giving the word “sensation” a use/meaning which is synonymous with "ambiguous". That's ridiculous.
What makes you think that Wittgenstein is using the word "sensation" to mean "ambiguous"? Please do not repeat your spurious reasoning that if the word "sensation" has an ambiguous (more than one) meaning, then the word "sensation" means "ambiguous". Look up the word "sensation" in the dictionary if you want to know its common meanings/synonyms.
Similarly with type and token: these are not readily apparent as possible meanings of the word "sensation". Types name a class of objects, and tokens are the instances of that class of objects. The type/token distinction can be applied to many words/nouns, but you would rarely consider most words to have the same meaning as, or to be synonymous with, the words "type" and "token". You are making some sort of category error here. Wittgenstein does not use the word "sensation" to mean "type" nor "token" nor "ambiguous", and it's absurd to think so.
You do not seem to be recognizing the difference between using a word with a specific intended meaning, but which could be wrongly interpreted because it is ambiguous, and intentionally using a word to create ambiguity. In the latter case there is no such thing as what the word means (or we can simply say as I did, its meaning is ambiguous). You do not seem to acknowledge the reality of intentional ambiguity, as a tool in creative writing.
This intentional ambiguity, I explained to you with reference to your example "bank". Your use of "bank" was meant as an example of ambiguity. Therefore there is no correct interpretation of "bank". It does not mean "financial establishment" nor does it mean "side of a river", because it was intended by you, the author, to signify the possibility of either one.
If you so desire, you can continue to refuse to acknowledge the reality of the intentional use of ambiguity. I suppose, then you will not have to address the issue of whether or not Wittgenstein is engaged in this activity. But, if he is, then you will have an incorrect interpretation, a misreading. So I really see no point in that approach, especially since you gave a clear example of intentional use of ambiguity in your post concerning "the bank". So it is hypocritical of you to deny the reality of the intentional use of ambiguity.
Quoting Luke
The first :"thing" here, is to unintentionally create ambiguity. In this case, the person attempting to interpret would have to choose between "possible meanings". However, one of the possible meanings is the correct interpretation; "correct" here means what was intended by the author. The ambiguity is not intentional, and there is a true meaning intended.
The "quite another thing", is the intentional creation of ambiguity, by the author. In this case none of the possible meanings which the interpreter might come up with is the "correct" meaning (the one intended by the author), because what the author intended was to write something ambiguous.
Quoting Luke
What is ridiculous, is your refusal to acknowledge the reality of intentional ambiguity. And, when someone uses a word to intentionally create ambiguity, the person does not intend that any of the apparently "possible meanings" is the correct meaning, because what was meant by the author (the intent), is that the meaning would be ambiguous.
Quoting Luke
I've read much philosophy in my life, and I am very well acquainted with the intentional use of ambiguity. It is a technique derived from poetry.
[quote=Wikipedia: Poetry] Poetry uses forms and conventions to suggest differential interpretations of words, or to evoke emotive responses. Devices such as assonance, alliteration, onomatopoeia, and rhythm may convey musical or incantatory effects. The use of ambiguity, symbolism, irony, and other stylistic elements of poetic diction often leaves a poem open to multiple interpretations.[/quote]
Plato teaches us very well, how to recognize the intentional use of ambiguity, through multiple examples including ancient poetry. Then he proceeds to attack the intentional use of ambiguity by the sophists, to produce fallacious logic, in the form of what we now call "equivocation".
There are key signifiers of intentional ambiguity. One is an absurd logical conclusion, which signifies a likelihood of equivocation, and the need to carefully consider the use of terms. Another is the author's alluding to one's own use of ambiguity. This is what Wittgenstein does throughout the PI, and especially at the passage I quoted from, at 261. What he is saying at 261 is that "sensation" has no referent (or, we cannot say what it refers to), and this is very consistent with intentional ambiguity, as I've described.
Whether intentional or not, “ambiguous” means that a word has more than one possible meaning, not - as you claim - that a word has no possible meaning or is meaningless. Any reasonable English speaker or dictionary could correct you on this, but so does your own quote on poetry:
Note that it says differential/different (i.e. more than one) interpretations.
You may claim that W uses the word “sensation” to be ambiguous (not to mean ambiguous), but then you will need to say what (more than one) meanings the word “sensation” could possibly have in the text.
You can’t have it both ways by saying that the word has more than one possible meaning but also no meaning.
Otherwise, simply stop using the word “ambiguous” incorrectly.
Right. Now do you see that if the author intends multiple interpretations, there is no such thing as the correct interpretation of the word? So if meaning is rule dependent, as you think it is, then the word has no meaning in these situations.
Quoting Luke
Didn't I already give you three possible meanings for the word "sensation" in that context?
Quoting Luke
As I said, the third is not really "no meaning". In the third possibility the meaning is "ambiguous": It's just your refusal to acknowledge the reality of this sort of meaning, and your insistence that meaning is given by following a rule, which creates the appearance that ambiguous meaning is no meaning.
What reason do you have for thinking that Wittgenstein intends multiple interpretations of the word "sensation"? This might seem like a silly question, but what makes you think Wittgenstein is not using the word "sensation" to mean a sensation such as pain?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I gave you arguments two posts ago for why your examples were not possible meanings of the word "sensation". You have not addressed them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That "ambiguous" really means that the word has no meaning is precisely what you said here:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You have still failed to explain how having more than one possible meaning implies having less than one possible meaning. Or, that is, how either implies neither.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Don't just spout this rubbish; tell me how it follows.
You've just finished stating "there is no such thing as what the word means" and equated this with saying "its meaning is ambiguous", but now you're trying to blame me for your dual claims that the word has multiple possible meanings and (at the same time) no meaning? Please. I'm not the one saying these silly things.
If one intends to use the trail as a path to a destination in mind, then the trail is ambiguous. If one merely intends to use the trail without a destination in mind, then the trail is vague. And if one doesn't intend to use the trail, then the trail is neither vague nor ambiguous.
I answered this:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Luke
I didn't say "less than". And, I explained very clearly how the appearance of either, implies neither, when the appearance of either is intentionally created. You just seem to be incapable of apprehended the intentional use of ambiguity. That's your failure, not mine
Go back to your "bank" example and reread my reply carefully. Remember, you, as the author said both, "I am going to the bank", and, "the word 'bank' which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment". In saying that the word could mean either of the two, you are admitting to intentional ambiguity, and you are saying that neither one is the correct one, because if there was a correct one you would have to say which one is the one which is meant, thereby negating the possibility of either.
Here, I'll repost, and don't get distracted by the question of whether "I am going to the bank", and "'bank' which could mean either... or..." is two distinct statements. Just accept the reality of the example, that you are saying both, I am going to the bank", and "bank" in this phrase has an indeterminate meaning. This implies that you are intentionally creating ambiguity with the word.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
See, if a person intentionally uses a word ambiguously, the appearance is that the word has numerous possibilities for meaning. However, since the use of ambiguity is intentional, we can conclude that the author cannot possibly mean any single one of these possibilities. Furthermore, it is impossible that the author means all of the possibilities because that would be contradictory. Therefore we can conclude that the author means none of the possibilities.
Ad so I continued the explanation with this:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If you are still having difficulty understanding, that if an author intentionally uses a word to create the appearance of numerous possibilities, then not any one of .these numerous possibilities is what is meant by the author, then please let me know what aspects of the explanation are insufficient
Quoting sime
The issue is the intent behind the creation of the thing. So the trail with a fork is not analogous, because each fork may have been created and intended to lead you somewhere different. Instead, we could talk about a sign which is intended to lead you in two distinct and incompatible directions. Such a sign is really not intended to lead you anywhere. However, this does not mean that it is not intended to do something, i.e. it does not mean that the sign is meaningless.
Where does he say at 261 that "sensation" has no referent or that we cannot say what it refers to?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Let's say that what I meant by the statement "I am going to the bank" is "I am going to the financial establishment". How does my intention remove the ambiguity from the statement? It could still mean either the financial establishment or the side of the river.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This can also occur when a person unintentionally uses a word ambiguously. Again, having more than one possible meaning is what "ambiguous" means. Do you understand that?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You have a lot of work to do to demonstrate that Wittgenstein intentionally uses the word "sensation" ambiguously (or at all ambiguously). And I know you're wrong about it, but you cannot be reasoned with, so I'm out.
I roughly concur; although by "trail" i wasn't necessarily implying a man-made trail. Tea leaf patterns at the bottom of a cup would suffice as an example, as would mental imagery that spontaneously arises inside the mind of a water-diviner. A sign's public information (e.g grammar, syntax, history of ostensive definition etc) under-determines any supposed external referent of the sign. The referent of anything interpreted as being a "sign" is subjective and relative to the intentions of a particular user who interprets the "sign" in a manner that is dependent on the user's personal history including his past observations of similar appearances of said sign, among other things.
In my understanding, semantic realists tend to think of signs as teleological entities that express future-contingent propositions. They reason on the basis of past experience that a trail must lead somewhere, and consequently interpret the trail as signifying one or more unexplored possibilities, even if nobody ever follows it. They do this by imagining a fictional use of the trail that accords with their past experiences and they then conflate this fictitious extrapolation of memory with an actual use of the trail, which they then ironically attribute to a space of possible futures, in spite of the future playing no actual role in their experiences or use of words.
My understanding of Wittgenstein's point, which is presumably related to your point, is that there is nothing a priori about a sign that can be called it's 'future-contingent' referent in any literal sense of the word "future". A forteriori, there is nothing a priori about a sign that can be called it's external bearer or referent.
A person makes predictions with signs, but their predictions are merely reports of their observations in relation to their present mental state. Therefore if a contradiction arises between a previous prediction and presently observed circumstances, it isn't that the previous prediction is really wrong, rather the contradiction refers to the fact that the previous prediction is now labelled "wrong" as part of a post-hoc revision of linguistic convention.
I've quoted it numerous times already.
Quoting Luke
I didn't say intention removes ambiguity, I distinguished between intentionally creating ambiguity, and unintentionally creating ambiguity.
But if we define "meaning" as what is meant, then what you say here would be contradiction. If, what you meant was "I am going to the financial establishment", then it is impossible that what you meant was " I am going to the side of the river. So we cannot say that it could mean either.
And, in the example, you are the one saying both, "I am going to the bank", and "it could mean 'financial establishment' or 'side of river'". Being the person who made the statement, you would know whether it means the former or the latter, in that instance of use. So for you to say that it could mean either, indicates that it really means neither, because you would know which of the two is the case, if it meant one of them, so you could not say that it could be either one. If one of the two is the case, you cannot truthfully say that it could be either, because you know which one it is. Therefore you are intentionally being ambiguous.
Quoting Luke
I don't intend to make any such demonstration. I don't know how such a thing could be demonstrated. I am simply stating my opinion, and demonstrating the reality of, and the effects of, intentional ambiguity. But I know that you are very set in your ways, and could never be convinced of something you refuse to even try to understand.
That's interesting. If I understand you correctly you are saying that what a person derives from a sign, is dependent on what they want to derive from the sign. But what role does the intent of the author play in this act? Does the intent of the author enter into the act, or is it only through pretense, as the reader pretends to want to derive the intent of the author?
Wittgenstein uses the word "sensation" to refer to an "inner experience" such as pain. There is no ambiguity about it and none has coherently been pointed out.
There is no question that defining "sensation" as "an inner experience" is extremely ambiguous, just like defining "green" as "a colour" is extremely ambiguous. And it doesn't help to say "such as pain", just like it wouldn't help to say "such as red".
But that is not the issue here. The issue concerns what Wittgenstein refers to with "the sensation", at 258, what he has called "a certain sensation". You have consistently ignored Wittgenstein's use of the definite article "the" at 258, when referring to "the sensation", since we engaged in this thread. And it appears, you will continue to do so.
How is it ambiguous to define green as a colour? Green is a colour.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Then the issue is not with the meaning of the word "sensation". That is not in question.
What is in question is whether the phrase "a certain sensation" refers to a one-off particular instance of a sensation or to a recurrent particular type of sensation. I have given you all the quotes about "recurrent" and "every time" to support that he means the latter.
Red is a colour. Pink is a colour, so are brown and blue, and many more. The definition is very ambiguous because there are many colours and it provides nothing to distinguish the colour green from the others.
Quoting Luke
After discussing this issue for a month or two, with no consensus between us, I came to the conclusion that "a certain sensation" is ambiguous. Further, I gave some reasons why I believe that Wittgenstein practiced a technique of creative writing which employs the intentional use of ambiguity.
I thought we were making some progress. But obviously you just want to go back and argue the same thing, all over again, so that we can establish once again, that "sensation" is ambiguous.
You might have an argument for your interpretation of "type", if Wittgenstein hadn't used the definite article "the", four times at 258, when referring to "the sensation". Do you understand the grammar of this definite article?
It appears to me, that we have established beyond any reasonable doubt, that "a certain sensation" is ambiguous. The question which remains is whether that ambiguity is intentional or not. If it's not intentional, then one or the other interpretation might be the correct one. But if it is intentional, then neither interpretation is the correct one.
I don't know what you mean by "ambiguous" here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The meaning of the word "sensation" is not ambiguous. It is the meaning of the word "certain" that is ambiguous. Does he mean a certain type of sensation or a certain instance of a sensation? If you also want to question what the word "sensation" means then that is a different matter.
Take another example: If we were questioning whether he meant a certain type of car or a certain instance of a car, then that is not questioning what the word "car" means. We must already know what the word "car" means in order to discuss whether he is talking about a certain type or a certain instance of a car.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Let's take a look at what he says at PI 258 then:
He uses the definite article ("the sensation") here twice, but he is also talking about writing "S" for "every day on which I have the sensation". Therefore, he clearly indicates that it is not a once-off instance of the sensation. If he writes "S" for every day that he has the sensation, then this implies that the diarist has the sensation and writes "S" on more than one occasion. Hence, "S" does not refer only to a once-off instance of the sensation.
These third and fourth times that Wittgenstein uses the definite article is to discuss how the diarist is supposed to define the sign "S", or to link the sign with the sensation. We can imagine that the definition of "S" is established on the first occasion of having the sensation and committed to memory, so that on the next day that the sensation occurs, the diarist recognises it as such and writes "S" again. Again, this suggests that the diarising occurs on more than one occasion. Otherwise, there would be no point in committing to memory the link between the sign and the sensation.
I said very early on in the discussion that the diarist ultimately fails to define the sign "S" in this manner. Nonetheless, it is supposed from the outset that "S" refers to a certain type of sensation that is had on more than one occasion.
Sorry Luke, I will not go back to where we were two months ago, and pretend that we didn't already discuss this.
And you do not seem to have any grasp of the reality of ambiguity, or the desire to discuss it. So, I don't see any point in proceeding.
You brought it up again. It looks like you've now recognised your mistake in claiming that Wittgenstein uses the word "sensation" ambiguously, too. Good.
I brought it up, because our disagreement on interpretation, and the fact that we could not resolve that disagreement with two months of discourse, is very clear evidence that what Wittgenstein said is ambiguous.
And, I believe that we will never resolve that disagreement because what Wittgenstein wrote actually is ambiguous, as the evidence indicates. So I think that after two months, any further discussion on the particulars of that disagreement is pointless because we will both be reiterating the same points.
Therefore I think we should both agree to disagree on the interpretation of that passage, and accept the fact that it is ambiguous. It appears like you need more time to maturate. But I will not be your sitter. So I'll leave you to do that on your own time
The only potential ambiguity here, which I identified from the beginning, was Wittgenstein’s use of the word “certain” in the phrase “a certain sensation”. This could possibly mean either a certain type of sensation or a certain token of a sensation. I have identified for you the textual evidence which proves that a certain type of sensation is the only logically possible meaning.
You erroneously mistook the ambiguity to be located in the word “sensation” instead.
Apparently, you don’t understand the meaning of the word “ambiguous”. You think that the names of colours are ambiguous, but you refuse to explain what you mean by this. Disagree all you want. Your utter failure to grasp the basics of Wittgenstein’s philosophy or to understand even the most basic English words is abundantly clear. I tried to give you guidance in reading the text but you’re arrogant and think you know better. Trust me, you don’t.
OED: ambiguous 1. "having an obscure or double meaning".
Maybe you have something else in mind for "ambiguous", or maybe you don't think that Wittgenstein's writing at this part of PI is obscure. But if the latter is the case, I think it's time for you to justify this claim. I already justified my assertion, that the writing is ambiguous, with the evidence that you and I discussed this section for two months without being able to come to any agreement as to the meaning.
Your “justification” was that Wittgenstein uses “sensation” ambiguously to mean either “token”, “type” or “ambiguous”. I have pointed out several times now that it makes no sense for the word “sensation” to mean the same as any of these words, and you have not justified this claim at all. Furthermore, I have just told you again, and you have ignored it again, that the ambiguity lies not in the word “sensation” but in the word “certain”. What we discussed for two months was whether Wittgenstein means a certain type of sensation or a certain token of a sensation. What we did not discuss was the meaning of the word “sensation”. There is ample textual evidence that what Wittgenstein means by “sensation” throughout the text is an “inner experience” such as pain. All that your bare assertions to the contrary constitute are evidence of your profound misunderstanding.
You incessantly refuse to acknowledge Wittgenstein's use of the definite article "the". The issue is not strictly concerning the word "sensation". The issue is with the particular referent identified as "the sensation", at 258. This is the thing which the diarist names with "S".
And, as you admit we spent two months discussing what was meant by "the sensation" with no agreement. Therefore I can conclude that there is ambiguity here. The only question which remains is whether the ambiguity is intentional or not.
It is my opinion that ambiguity is a prevalent and significant feature of philosophy, which is often simply the result of the nature of language. But I also believe that intentional ambiguity is a feature of bad philosophy.
You recently made the issue about the meaning of the word “sensation”, with your claim that its meaning was not only ambiguous but that it could also mean “ambiguous” (as well as “token” and “type”). I’ll take the quote above as your retraction of this foolish claim.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I just provided you with a detailed response and reading of 258 here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/617672.
You declined to respond.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Our disagreement does not prove that there’s any ambiguity in the text. It only proves that you’re unreasonable and that you have no genuine interest in attempting to understand Wittgenstein’s philosophy.
Luke, my issue has always been with Wittgenstein's use of the word "sensation", in particular, his reference to "the sensation" at 258. Our disagreement as to what "the sensation" refers to in this context indicates very clearly that his use is ambiguous.
Quoting Luke
You provided nothing that we hadn't already discussed, therefore nothing to resolve the disagreement, and nothing which would alter the judgement of "ambiguous".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Make up your mind.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Let me try one last time…
Let’s say that the diarist has a single token of the sensation which lasts for 10 years. The diarist recognises it as the same sensation every day and so they write “S” in their diary every day. After 10 years the diarist does not have any further experience of the sensation until exactly one year later when the diarist recognises the sensation again. Should the diarist now mark “S” in their diary as per Wittgenstein’s instructions, or does “S” refer only to a single token of the sensation?
I don't know, because as I say, what you call "Wittgenstein's instructions", are ambiguous. Why would the person mark a new "S" every day for ten years, if that time period is only one occurrence of "the sensation"? The person is not keeping track of the temporal duration of "the sensation", only how often "the sensation" occurs. Wouldn't that entire time period just qualify for one S, one occurrence of "the sensation?
And when "the sensation" (same token in your words) appears a year later, the diarist ought to mark another S. Both occurrences must be "a single token" (as in Wittgenstein's example of the chair), because that's what the definite article "the" signifies, that an identified particular is being referred to, i.e. a single token.
Yes, it’s very ambiguous :roll:
You don’t even know what the scenario of 258 says yet you claim to understand it better than all of us. Pull your head in.
I think we all know that it's ambiguous. Only a few, including yourself, refuse to admit it, despite knowing that it is..
My mistake, but that's not where the ambiguity lies.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So the ambiguity is with respect to how that person, or anyone else for that matter, knows that this sensation which occurs at a later time is "the sensation".
Should the diarist now [after one year] mark “S” in their diary as per Wittgenstein’s instructions, or does “S” refer only to a single token of the sensation?
How does the person know to write “S” every day for 10 years? Same problem.
So if you have a pain and it goes away for one year and then returns, it is still the same instance of the pain? You were just unaware of it for a whole year? Garbage.
"S" clearly refers to only one token, as is indicated by the definite article, "the" sensation. That's what "the" means, a particular member of the type signified by "sensation" is being talked about.
We can't say whether or not the diarist should mark "S" because of the ambiguity as to what "the sensation", or "S" is supposed to refer to. We have no criterion of identity. Whether It is, or is not what is called "the sensation", named "S", cannot be answered. There is no such thing as "what should be done" in this context.
Quoting Luke
You're quite right, it's the same problem. We went through this already weeks ago,. It's very clear in Wittgenstein's example, that the person doesn't "know" when to write S. No one knows this. The person decides when to write "S", but this in no way implies that the person "knows" when to write "S".
Quoting Luke
I would never refer to them both as "the sensation" in the same context of speaking. However, Wittgenstein is talking about "the sensation" when referring to both occurrences, the use of "the" indicating that one particular sensation is being referred to two different times.
'
The definite article can be used for both the type and a token. For example:
"The blue whale is the largest mammal."
"The giraffe has a very long neck."
"The sensation is a tingling in the toes resulting from a lack of oxygen."
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The word "sensation" refers to the sensation in question, as does the symbol "S". If the word "sensation" signifies a type (as you say here), then the symbol "S" also signifies a type.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You said in the quote at the top of this post that "S" refers to a single token of the sensation. You have also argued previously that "a certain sensation" refers to a single token of the sensation. You are now arguing that neither the symbol "S" nor the word "sensation" can refer to the sensation. So which is it? Do "S" and/or "sensation" refer to a single token of the sensation or can they not refer to the sensation?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is all you could possibly mean by saying that "S" and/or "the sensation" refer to a single token of the sensation. If there are two tokens, then you face the same contradiction that "one particular sensation is being referred to two different times". But let's assume for a moment that "the sensation" does not refer only to a single token of the sensation and that it instead refers to a type of sensation. This may help to explain why Wittgenstein says:
To associate a "certain sensation" with a name/symbol is (supposedly in this scenario) to establish a type, not merely to name a single token. This has been my point. In the most basic terms, it is not logically possible to have the recurrence of a single token, which has only one instance, so Wittgenstein could only be referring to a type of sensation.
I've told you already, type or token is not the question, it's only how you represent the issue.
Let's suppose that Wittgenstein's use of "the sensation" is meant to single out a particular type, like in your examples, then unlike your examples he hasn't given anything to identify this particular type. So he is using "the sensation" to single out a particular type of sensation, which supposedly has been identified, and made definite as his use of the definite article "the" indicates, yet the particular type has not been identified and made definite. Hence the ambiguity.
Imagine that I have an imaginary type of thing in my mind which I refer to as "the thing" and I name it with "T". I can talk about this type, "T", and you can talk about it. So we can talk about this type all we want, as "T", asking me is T in your mind now, was it in your mind yesterday, etc.. But talking about it, unless the talk is aimed at discussing the identifiable features, does not remove the ambiguity (obscurity) as to what T is the name of.
And in Wittgenstein's case, he doesn't even go so far as to say that "S" represents a type of thing. that is simply your assumption. At 261, he explicitly says we cannot make such a judgement. It is only you who is claiming that "S" names a type, as an attempt to remove the inherent ambiguity, and make the passage intelligible to you.
Quoting Luke
I've been telling you over and over, it's ambiguous, that means "which is it" cannot be determined. That's why I can coherently argue both sides. There is no answer to "which is it", that's the nature of ambiguity. You just don't seem to grasp the nature of ambiguity. We can apprehend ambiguity as either this or that, or neither. If the ambiguity is unintentional, the meaning is either this or that, with potentially a correct answer, but a lack of capacity to determine the correct answer. If the ambiguity is intentional it is neither this nor that, because there is no correct answer. We can't say "both" because we'd be allowing contradiction. If we do not know whether the ambiguity is intentional or not, there is the three basic options, this or that, or neither. Both is nonsensical. We do not know whether Wittgenstein's ambiguity is intentional, so we cannot rule out "neither".
Quoting Luke
This is not contradiction, and that's what Wittgenstein shows with the chair example. You keep insisting that we cannot experience the same token twice, but this is blatantly false. I see the same token of chair here today, which I saw here yesterday, therefore I experience one token two different times, and refer to it as "the chair". If I didn't believe it was the same token, I would just say that there is a chair here today, and there was a chair here yesterday. But since I believe both instances of "chair" to be instances of the very same token, I refer to them both with "the chair".
Quoting Luke
This is completely wrong. "Recurrence" signifies another occurrence of the very same thing, a sort of repeating. The mistake you are making is that you produce the assumption "it is not logically possible to have the recurrence of a single token", and you apply this to what Wittgenstein has said, and this causes you to misread. You refuse to accept what he has said, because you believe strongly in your assumption that it is not logically possible to have a recurrence of the same token. But the chair example proves otherwise, that sensation commonly provides a repeated or recurring experience of the very same token.
Why do you refuse to consider the example of the chair? Every day I see the same chair in front of me. Is it not true that my sensation of that chair is a recurrence of a sensation of a single token?
When you come around to accepting the reality that what you claim to be "not logically possible", regularly happens on a daily basis, then you'll reject this assumption that such "is not logically possible", and allow yourself to understand what Wittgenstein is exemplifying.
The type is "a certain sensation".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Exactly.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The particular type has been identified - as "a certain sensation". What's your definition of "definite"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So we can only ever talk about something if "the talk is aimed at discussing the identifiable features" of that something? The purpose of all discussion about something is always to better define it? Go back to PI 71 - sometimes a blurry (or more general) picture is just what we need.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He doesn't even go so far as to say that "S" represents a token of thing either, but that has been your position for more than a month.
You're jumping to Wittgenstein's conclusion about the scenario at PI 261 here. I am (and we previously were) discussing the scenario at PI 258 itself.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I've said numerous times that a token of a chair is not your experience of the chair, but the chair itself. One chair is one token of a chair, no matter how many times you experience it. So, I have not insisted that you cannot experience the same token of a chair twice. If I've "insisted" anything, it's that you cannot experience the same token of a sensation (e.g. a pain) twice.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What do you think "occurrence" means? It need not have anything to do with "experience". Your experience of a chair is not the chair's occurrence. The chair's occurrence is its existence. The chair has one existence or instance, and thus there is one token of the chair. You can experience the chair's existence many times. Or zero times. There is still one token of the chair.
Definite: clear and distinct, not vague..
If you don't see "a certain sensation" as indefinite and ambiguous, I don't think I can help you to understand ambiguity. You need some elementary level training. Which sensation is he talking about? He's talking about a certain sensation. How does that identify the particular type of sensation referred to, making clear and distinct that type of sensation?
Quoting Luke
I've clearly indicated that we can talk about an unidentified thing, Such talk is most likely ambiguous though.
Quoting Luke
When the ambiguity is unintentional, we often get beyond it through the use of contextual references, and circumstantial aids like gesturing.
That Wittgenstein says "sometimes a blurry (or more general) picture is just what we need." is further evidence to my accusation that he employs intentional ambiguity. You ought to take notice of such hints, if you want to really understand what he was doing.
Quoting Luke
When ambiguity is evident, we need to make contextual references, to make a determination of the intended meaning (what was meant by the author). The contextual references which we've looked at in this case, all indicate that the ambiguity is intentional. If it is intentional we can conclude that there is no correct interpretation of what "the sensation" named "S" refers to at 258. as I explained are the consequences of intentional ambiguity.
Quoting Luke
And, as I've already explained to you it's nonsense to claim that there is such a thing as a token of a sensation. But there is no point to revisiting that, you have no inclination toward understanding any metaphysical principles.
Quoting Luke
You've already made it very clear that you are completely uninterested in trying to understand any complex metaphysics. So I'm not going to waste my time on any complicated explanation when you have not the will to follow. If you truly have the intent to enter into such an endeavour, and have an honest desire to understand, then demonstrate to me that you understand the following, simple principle.
Any sensation requires an object of sensation, the thing sensed, and the object sensed is distinct from the act of sensing it. In the case of a sensation of a chair, the object is the chair itself, and in the case of a sensation of pain, the object is the pain itself. The object of the sensation is distinct from the act of sensing, such that the thing we call "the pain" is separate and distinct from the act of sensing it, just like the thing we call "the chair" is separate and distinct from the act of sensing it.
My request from you, is to demonstrate that you understand the logical necessity for this principle. If there was no object of the sensation, then the sensation would be completely imaginary, totally within the individual's mind, without any objectivity. Consider the sensation of the chair, if there was no object, called "the chair" which was being sensed, existing independently of the act of sensation, then the sensation would be completely imaginary. The same principle is applicable to the sensation of pain. If there is no object called "the pain", which was being sensed, existing independently of the act of sensation, then the sensation would be completely imaginary. Do you recognize this need, to assume an object which is being sensed, in any form of "sensation", as a requirement for producing a real representation of what a sensation is?
In terms of the type-token distinction, the type is “a certain sensation”.
How definite do you need him to be? What more information do you need and why do you need it?
Let’s assume that instead of “a certain sensation” Wittgenstein had said that the diarist has “a certain fruit”. Then you would complain that Wittgenstein was using the word “fruit” ambiguously because he does not tell us what type of fruit it is. And if he said it was an apple you would then complain that he doesn’t tell us what type of apple it is, etc. How far does Wittgenstein need to go before you are satisfied that he is no longer being ambiguous, vague, unclear or indefinite? There is nothing unclear in the first place about what he means by “fruit” or what he means by “sensation”. If there is, then you need to be more exact about what you mean by “definite” and tell us: At what level of detail does it stop being “indefinite” and become “definite”? Otherwise you face the same charge of “ambiguity” in your use of the word “definite”.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You’ll need to remind me why you think this is nonsense.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Okay, we sense sensations. What’s your point?
Luke, if he says "a certain type of fruit", then the type of fruit is left unidentified and this is ambiguous. If he says "a certain type of apple", then the type of apple is left unidentified and this is ambiguous. If he is saying "a certain type of sensation" then the type of sensation is left unidentified and this is ambiguous.
Quoting Luke
I don't believe you can be so persistent in your ignorance of Wittgenstein's use of "the".
Quoting Luke
No, I will not do that, because you totally ignored me the last time, saying you refuse to follow any metaphysics. Until you change your attitude I will not waste my time.
Quoting Luke
No, this is not an acceptable relation between sense and sensation. Sensations are the result of sensing, and they are apprehended by the conscious mind. Sensations are not what is sensed. So you have things backward. Sorry Luke, but I see no attempt by you to demonstrate what I asked for.
How definite do you need him to be? What more information do you need and why do you need it?
How far does Wittgenstein need to go before you are satisfied that he is no longer being ambiguous, vague, unclear or indefinite?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
At what level of detail does it stop being “indefinite” and become “definite”?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Is pain not a sensation? Or can we not sense pain? Or both? You said:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Are you arguing against yourself? I still don't see the point of this.
Well, if he's talking about a particular item, or a particular type, referring to it as "the...", then this particular "something" ought to be identified. I mean, this is philosophy, not a guessing game. "I have a type of fruit in my bag, can you guess what type it is?"
Of course the real ambiguity is as to whether he's talking about a particular object, or what you call a type, because this is the question of Platonic realism, what sort of existence the so-called "objects" of inner experiences have. But you refuse to acknowledge this.
And it is quite possible that Wittgenstein is talking about a particular (or a particular type), and hiding the thing he is talking about from us, for the purpose of making a philosophical point, but then we must conclude that the ambiguity is intentional.
Quoting Luke
If you refuse to acknowledge a difference between the thing sensed, and the sensation, then we simply cannot go any further in this philosophical discussion. Do you apprehend a difference between the chair, as the thing sensed, and the sensation of the chair. If so, then why not recognize a difference between the thing sensed, and the sensation, in the case of pain?
Suppose we assign "pain" to the sensation itself. We still need a thing sensed, let's say the thing sensed is a wound, or an injury, what I'll call the source of the pain. Can we discuss Wittgenstein's so-called private language argument while maintaining this distinction, without conflating the two in ambiguity? Would you agree, that at 261, when he says "he has something", what the word "something" refers to here, is not the sensation, but the thing sensed, the source of the pain? Would you concur, that at 258 he is talking about the sensation itself, which we call "pain", but at 261 he switches and proceeds from this point onward to refer to the thing sensed (the source of the pain). If a person is not careful in one's reading, one might think that the "something" here is the sensation itself, rather than the source of the sensation.
The particular something is identified, as "a certain sensation".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Is that the real ambiguity? You keep saying that the type-token distinction is irrelevant here, except where it suits you to say that the type-token distinction is the main problem here.
The diarist is supposedly naming a type of "certain sensation" with the use of "S". This means that "S" is the type and its tokens are also called "S", being instances of the type. The "objects" of inner experiences can only be tokens or instances of the type "S". The type "S" cannot be an object, token or instance itself because it is only a conceptual category.
My point has been that the diarist is not (supposedly) naming only a single token of "a certain sensation", but is (supposedly) naming a type of "a certain sensation".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There is no hiding. The particular type "S" refers to "a certain sensation". All you need to know is how he is using the word "sensation", just as all you would need to know in my alternative example is how he is using the word "fruit". It is obvious in my example from my reference to an apple what the word "fruit" means, and it is obvious from Wittgenstein's scenario and the surrounding passages from his references to "inner experiences" and "pain" what the word "sensation" means. What type of sensation (or fruit) it might be is irrelevant to the scenario.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm reluctant to be dragged into this metaphysical argument unless you can explain its relevance to the current topic.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not necessarily. What sort of thing is "the sensation of the chair"? And why do you insist that this relationship must hold in every case? It seems that, in the case of pain, pain is both the thing sensed and the sensation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The source or cause of the pain sensation is not the pain sensation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't really follow the distinction or why it should be maintained.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I would not agree.
At PI 261 Wittgenstein tries to accommodate the private linguist by getting us to imagine that she names a sensation by/for herself. However, strictly speaking, in order to be a truly private language, she cannot make reference to a "sensation", "For sensation is a word of our common language". Although she cannot speak of a "sensation", Wittgenstein tries to accommodate the private linguist by allowing that she could instead have "Something" (that is possibly like a sensation, only different). However, strictly speaking, "has" and "something" are also words of our common language, so the private linguist can't rely on those, either. In the end, the private linguist can do nothing but emit an inarticulate sound, but even that doesn't help her.
"Something" doesn't refer to the source of the pain; it doesn't really refer to anything. It is just Wittgenstein's way of playing along with the idea that a private language is possible, in order to ultimately show that a private language isn't really possible after all.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I would concur that at 258 he is talking about "a certain sensation", and, yes, the sensation itself. However, I would not agree that this sensation is "pain". Wittgenstein does not specify what type of sensation it is.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I would not concur.
Uh-huh, just like I can identify a particular colour, as "a certain colour". It might be good for a guessing game, but not too good for philosophy
Quoting Luke
There is no type/token distinction here, only a distinction between a type and a particular object. The reason why a type/token distinction is insufficient in Wittgenstein's example is that "a token" is necessarily a representative of a type, and Wittgenstein wants to avoid this necessity. That's why he asks at 261, what reason do we have for calling this a sensation. And the answer, eventually, is that it's a sensation because that's what it's called. At this point it becomes a token of a type, when "sensation" is justified. but prior to this, Wittgenstein intends that we just recognize it as a particular. But he has to give it some identity as an internal experience, to be able to even lay out his example, so he just calls it a sensation. The hidden thing must be referred to, in order to set up the guessing game.
Quoting Luke
This doesn't make any sense to me. As I said "certain sensation" and "the sensation" can only refer to a particular to me. Yet you insist it can only refer to a type. Therefore any reasonable person would conclude ambiguity. I don't know why you're being so unreasonable, insisting that it is not ambiguous.
Quoting Luke
This is ambiguous though. The "thing sensed" is the wound, injury, or whatever it is which is the source of the pain. If you say "pain" refers to both, the sensation which we call "pain", and the injury which is the source of the pain, you may be charged with equivocating.
If you deny that there is a thing sensed, as the source of the pain, then you deny the reality and objectivity of the sensation which is called "pain". The sensation of "pain" would be completely imaginary. This is what I tried to explain to you earlier, but you refused to attempt to understand the metaphysics.
You still refuse to attempt to understand this. But I've made clear the distinction for you, so if you continue to insist that "pain" refers to both the sensation, and the injury, or source of the pain, I will continue to insist that you equivocate.
Quoting Luke
Come on Luke, you must see how ridiculous this looks. Wittgenstein explicitly says, "He has something", and this is what he means, that there is something which is being referred to. We can either say that "the sensation" has a real source, or it is imaginary. If it's imaginary we can't say that he has something, because he made it up, therefore he would not really be sensing anything and there would be no sensation being referred to. Therefore "something" must refer to the fact that there is a source of the sensation.
It makes no sense for you to try and say that it isn't anything. That's explicitly contrary to what Wittgenstein said. What he has explicitly done, is create the highest degree of ambiguity possible, a guessing game where the intent is to remove the thing referred to from any category of type whatsoever. Ever play "twenty questions"? That's the type of guessing game we're into here. The thing referred to must be something in particular, something definite, so the person cannot just make it up as the game proceeds.
Quoting Luke
Right, that's why it's ambiguous, and just like a guessing game. I have a sensation named "S". I cannot show it to you, therefore it cannot be a token (example) of a type. Can you guess what type it is? See, he is attempting to create the highest degree of ambiguity possible.
If you think you have to guess what "sensation" means then you have missed the surrounding context.
If you think it's necessary to guess what type of sensation he means, then you don't understand the purpose of Wittgenstein's remarks on private language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Can you not know what "sensation" means unless you are told what type of sensation? Can you not know what "fruit" means unless you are told what type of fruit?
Saying that he identifies it as an internal experience shows that you know how he is using the word.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
At 261 he questions calling "S" the sign for a sensation. There is no such “answer” given.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It sounds much more natural to me to say that the "thing sensed" is the pain. It sounds very unnatural to me to say that the "thing sensed" is the wound or injury. Regardless, you haven't explained what this has to do with the private language argument.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Actually, he says "And it would not help either to say...that when he writes “S” he has Something."
We've been through this so many times now that I can't count them. The issue is not what "sensation" means. The question is what does "the sensation" refers to in the context of 258.
Quoting Luke
Knowing that a sensation is an internal experience, as defined by Wittgenstein, does not tell me what he is referring to with "the sensation". Yes, "the sensation" is supposed to refer to a sensation, which is an internal experience, as defined, but knowing this does not indicate to me, the particular which "the sensation" refers to.
Suppose I define "chair" as a seat for one person. Then I tell you that I have named a certain chair "C". And then I proceed to talk about "the chair" named C, without telling you any of its identifying features, only that it is a chair. How can you not see that there is ambiguity with respect to what "the chair named C" refers to. Suppose I asked you to bring me the chair named C, so I could sit on it, because it's my favourite chair. How would you know which chair is named C?
This is why I call it a guessing game. Wittgenstein is saying, that there are many different things, which go by the name "internal experience", further, many of these are called "sensations". Now, out of these many things called sensations, I have taken one and named it "S". Then he leaves it completely ambiguous (a guessing game if you will), as to which sensation is the one which he has named S.
Quoting Luke
The answer is at 270, that's why I said the answer is given "eventually".
Quoting Luke
Yes I have, but you haven't been paying attention. At 258, Wittgenstein leaves it ambiguous as to whether "the sensation" as an internal experience, refers to the sensation itself, or the source of the sensation (what I called the thing sensed), as both are internal in sensations like pain. In the case of the chair, the thing sensed is external, so the separation between the sensation and the thing sensed is obvious. At 261 he makes it clear, when he says all we can say is that he has something, that "something" here must refer to the source, rather than the sensation itself. This is because if there was no source (or cause) of the sensation, we could not say that he had anything, the sensation would be completely fictitious. We could not say that he has any sensation
What makes it not fictitious is that there is an object, a thing being sensed. Otherwise we could not say that he has something, because he might have nothing, and be naming nothing with "S", i.e. using S randomly.
So, as I explained in the other post, he makes a switch at 261, so that "S" refers to the object, the thing sensed, rather than the sensation itself, from this point onward. That's why it's very important to understand the ambiguity, in order to understand the so-called private language argument, and why the "switch" is made. From 261 onward "S" does not refer to the sensation itself anymore (if it ever did, because that was ambiguous in the first place), it refers to the object being sensed, the source, or cause of the sensation. This "switch", is what allows his use of "S" to be justified, as explained at 265. That there is an object sensed, or that there is a source, or cause of the sensation is what justifies the use So at 270 "S" might simply refer to his blood pressure.
Quoting Luke
Right, this exemplifies the ambiguity he has employed. The use of "sensation" needs to be justified because nothing has indicated to us, that "S" actually refers to something we would call "a sensation". It has not been justified, that whatever it is which is being called by "S" is a token of sensation, that has simply been asserted, S is a certain sensation. So, it does not help, as a means of justification, to say that he must have "something". This is because we still do not know what it is which is referred to as "S", that was left ambiguous, and remains ambiguous. That it must be something does not justify that it is a sensation. And if it's nothing it's totally fictitious, and still not a sensation.
Why do you need this question to be answered in the context of 258?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Does "C" have only a private use? No one else but the diarist is supposed to know what "S" refers to.
However, I know what "chair" refers to, because you have defined it as "a seat for one person". And I know what "sensation" refers to in Wittgenstein's scenario because he talks about it in the context of "inner experiences" and "pain".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The type of sensation that "S" refers to is irrelevant to Wittgenstein's point. "S" has a private use so you can imagine any type of sensation you like. It makes no difference. Moreover, Wittgenstein proceeds to establish that the diarist cannot rely on the public word "sensation", so "S" cannot name a sensation anyway.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
270 is notoriously difficult. I'm not going to touch it until you can show better comprehension of the earlier passages. The section from 270 you quoted does not give you the "answer" you think it does. Suffice it to say that 270 is not a continuation of 258 and 261 but a totally different scenario.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The example you gave for the source of pain was an injury or wound. Wounds are not internal and injuries are not necessarily internal, so the source of pain is not necessarily internal.
You are saying that Wittgenstein might not use "the sensation" to refer to the sensation. You offer no textual support for this absurd claim.
What makes you think he uses "the sensation" to refer to anything else but the sensation, and in particular that he uses it to mean "the source of the sensation"? Wittgenstein says nothing about "the source".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He doesn't say "all we can say is that he has something." He says: "And it would not help either to say...that when he writes “S” he has Something."
That is, according to Wittgenstein at 261, we cannot say that the diarist has Something.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We cannot say that he has something. Wittgenstein shows us that the diarist fails to establish a use of "S" by inwardly associating it with a particular sensation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There is zero textual evidence to support this bizarre claim. What at 261 provides any indication that "S" now refers to the source of the sensation (i.e. "the thing sensed")?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What is (further) explained at 265 is that the private use of "S" is not justified, since "justification consists in appealing to an independent authority."
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He says: "And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes “S” he has Something."
Wittgenstein disallows the private use of "S" to name a sensation because "sensation" is "a word of our common language". But Wittgenstein also disallows "that when he writes "S" he has Something" for the same reason - because "has" and "something" are also words of our common (public) language.
You have misread if you think Wittgenstein allows the use of "S" to name Something, and you are wrong that what "S" refers to "must be something". The entire point is that a private language is not possible.
Quoting Wikipedia article 'Private language argument'
Quoting SEP article 'Private Language'
The question does not need to be answered. The point is that with no way of knowing what "the sensation" refers to, we can conclude that it is used ambiguously. And if the ambiguity is judged as intentional (and I believe it can be), then we need to determine what he is doing with this ambiguity, in order to understand what he is demonstrating with the example.
In other words, if we judge the ambiguity as intentional, then we conclude that the question of what the thing is which "the sensation called S" refers to, cannot be answered, as I explained to you already. Then to understand the meaning of the passage we need to determine what Wittgenstein intended to do with that ambiguity.
Quoting Luke
"C" in my example has the same use as "S" has in Wittgenstein's example. The fact that you claim to know what "S" refers to in Wittgenstein's example, as "a sensation", indicates that Wittgenstein is not giving us an example of a "private language". Remember, as I explained to you, 258 is not an example of a "private language" as you define it. A true "private language" in that sense, could not be described like that, using words of common language, like "sensation". It is impossible for Wittgenstein to give an example of a "private language" as you define it, because that would be unintelligible to us, so he gives us an example of something different; "S" is the sign for a certain sensation, but no one knows what that sensation is.
So the scenario he sets up at 258 is not a "private language". It is a supposed situation where a person has named something (a sensation in this case) with a symbol, and according to what is described at 257, Wittgenstein wants to examine how the person would establish a relationship between a particular thing (the sensation), and the symbol. It is concluded that this is unintelligible, as "private".
Quoting Luke
You seem to be missing the fact that Wittgenstein is making a demonstration, he is giving us an example for the purpose of demonstrating something. Therefore we need to consider the big picture, what he is trying to demonstrate. That's what we learn from experience of studying much philosophy, how to determine what the person is trying to demonstrate.
We definitely cannot say, as you do, "the type of sensation that 'S' refers to is irrelevant to Wittgenstein's point", because Wittgenstein has clearly taken steps to set up this scenario intentionally. And since expressions like "a certain sensation", and "the sensation" are very deliberately employed at 258, we must respect the reality of this situation, that this is very significant to Wittgenstein's point.
What you propose, "so 'S' cannot name a sensation anyway", directly contradicts what Wittgenstein says in the example, that "S" is the sign for a sensation, therefore we must reject your proposal. The problem appears to be that you believe Wittgenstein is giving an example of a "private language", when he is not, because this is impossible, so you can only support your belief by contradicting what Wittgenstein actually wrote. Therefore your belief is incorrect.
Quoting Luke
I believe you are misreading this. He is talking about justifying the use of the word "sensation" here. He is saying "it would not help", (in relation to the attempt to justify this use), to point out that when he writes "S" he has "something" which "S" refers to. This is simply due to the obvious, saying that it is "something" doesn't justify calling it a "sensation".
Quoting Luke
He does not say that we "cannot" say this. He says that it would not help, either, in the attempt to justify the use of "sensation", to say that he "has something". Therefore he says that saying this does not help (in relation to the attempt to justify the use of "sensation").
Quoting Luke
You are stuck in your faulty representation of 261 which I pointed out to you earlier. What needs to be justified, according to Wittgenstein, is the use of "sensation" here. He has already shown at 258 that the use of "S' by the diarist cannot be justified, there is no "right" here.
The diarist has a use of "S", that cannot be denied, because it is stipulated by Wittgenstein's example. Therefore your claim that the diarist "fails to establish a use of 'S'" is false. What Wittgenstein claims, is that whatever criteria, or principles which the person applies in making the judgement of "S", they cannot be understood or described by words. This is the "private" part. It is simply the person's memory, and the application of "private" judgement which cannot be described in words, because we describe things in terms of rules, and this is not a matter of following rules. This "private" aspect of language we cannot describe, so even metaphorical, or analogous description, such as 'it's sort of like rules' or "impressions of rules", are not really useful according to Wittgenstein:
Therefore you need to respect the fact that he is asking a question at 260, when he asks did the man make a note of "nothing". He is not stating that "S" signifies nothing. The parameters of the example stipulate that "S" signifies something, so this would be contradictory. However, he has set up the example with so much ambiguity as to what "S" signifies, that it might appear like "S" could signify nothing. That is why, in our attempt to answer the guessing game, what "S" signifies, we must first rule out the possibility that "S" signifies nothing.
Remember how I treated your example of "bank". You set up the example of "bank", with intentional ambiguity so as to make an example of ambiguity. Because this ambiguity was intentional, I could say that "bank" in your example referred to neither the financial establishment, nor the side of the river. Because you intended "bank" to be ambiguous, it actually referred to neither. However, this does not mean that "bank" has no meaning in your example. The meaning is ambiguous. But you refused to accept "ambiguous" as meaning.
Quoting Luke
According to my translation, this is incorrect. What I have is "—But justification consists in appealing to something independent."
Furthermore, we are not talking about justifying the use of "S" here. That is the misunderstanding which I dealt with already. It is well established at 258, that the use of "S" cannot be justified. So we must drop this notion at that time. Now, proceeding onward he is talking about justifying 'our' use of "sensation" to refer to what the diarist signifies with "S", not the diarist's use of "S".
The example stipulates that the diarist, Wittgenstein himself, has classed the thing which "S" refers to as "a sensation". Since "sensation" is a word of public language (261), we need to justify that the thing which "S" refers to is a token (to use your word) of the type, sensation. It is asserted by the diarist that it is, but this does not justify it.
Quoting Luke
Again, this is a bad interpretation. We cannot say that Wittgenstein "disallows" such. He is saying that use of these public words needs to be justified, he is not disallowing them. Obviously the claim that he has "something" does not justify the claim that "the something" is a sensation.
This is the guessing game I described to you. The person has named a thing, "S", and this naming is private to the person. Whatever method the person employs when attaching the name to the thing is completely private, as not being a matter of following a rule, and so it is unintelligible to us. So the person cannot justify the use of "S", that has been ruled out. Therefore, we are given the task of 'guessing' what "S" refers to. The first possibility to rule out, is that "S" refers to nothing (260).
However, we can rule out this possibility based on what is stipulated in the example. The demonstration stipulates that the person is using "S" to signify "a certain sensation". Therefore the proposal that he has "nothing", can be ruled out as contrary to the premises. Next, Wittgenstein wants us to justify "sensation", that what he has is a sensation. That we've ruled out nothing, and assume that the person has something, does not necessitate the conclusion that what the person has is a sensation.
Once again, we can turn to the parameters of the example, it is stipulated that what the person has is a "sensation". But this is where it gets complicated. The word "sensation" implies that there is an object sensed, as I explained. If there is nothing sensed, no source of the sensation, then it is not a real sensation, and we're back to nothing. But this is not what is stipulated, it is stipulated that there is a sensation. Therefore we can conclude that there is an object sensed, a source or cause of the sensation. That there is a sensation implies that there is something sensed, and like the example of the chair, the something sensed is the "something independent", which serves to justify the use of "sensation". If there is nothing sensed we cannot call it a sensation, the use of "S" would be a fiction.
Quoting Luke
Obviously, it is you who has misread. The demonstration is set up very clearly so that "S" is the sign of a sensation. This is very deliberate and explicitly stipulated. You want to turn back on the premises of the demonstration, and deny the principle premise, saying that Wittgenstein disallows such a use. But this would be blatant contradiction. Instead, we must accept what is shown at 258, as Wittgenstein's word on this matter. He shows that the person can use "S", in the way described, but there is no such thing as "right" here. The person uses "S" according to some judgement which is private (not by a public rule), so the person's use of "S" cannot be judged as to whether the rule is followed or not.
What you are claiming, that Wittgenstein disallows such a use of "S", certainly contradicts the premises of Wittgenstein's demonstration.
The only reason we use language is to communicate individual ideas others. You, as an individual, are already privy to your ideas and thoughts. There is no need to communicate them to yourself.
Like most everything else, the fundamental components of language are visuals and sounds - part of the basic, fundamental components of mind, along with olfactory, gustatory and tactile sensations that all come together in what we commonly refer to as conscious experience. The brain naturally compares and distinguishes all of these sensations and tries to find patterns to improve its chances of survival. In a way, all the sensations are themselves a language in which the mind tries to understand. In a sense, the world communicates its various states to the mind of the individual via its senses. The senses are, in a way, the translators of the state of the world (which aren't mental states) into mental states for the brain to interpret. If any type of communication, or informative process, could qualify as a "private language" maybe this could be it.
Once again, "sensation" is not ambiguous given the context, as it clearly refers to an "inner experience" such as pain. It doesn't seem sensible for it to have any other meaning. Only "S" or the type of sensation denoted by "S" might be considered ambiguous or vague.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't claim to know what "S" refers to in Wittgenstein's example, except as a type of "certain sensation".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Where have I defined it? I'm following Wittgenstein's description at 243:
What definition of a private language are you using?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
258 is a kind of reductio ad absurdum, where Wittgenstein attempts to play along with the private language advocate only to show that their assumptions lead to an impossible conclusion. It is not Wittgenstein contradicting himself, but the idea of a private language contradicting itself.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
At 261 he starts out questioning the reasons for calling "S" the name of a sensation. Wittgenstein's description at 243 requires that a private language refers only to what the speaker can know so another person cannot understand the language. He notes at 261 that "sensation" cannot be a word of a private language because it is "a word of our common language, which is not a language intelligible only to me."
When he goes on to say: "And it would not help either to say it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S" he has Something," he is talking about "Something" as being a lesser claim than a "sensation". The private linguist may accept that "S" cannot refer to a sensation, as Wittgenstein notes, however he may try to respond that "S" could still refer to "something" (not nothing), even if it is does not refer to a sensation. Wittgenstein is saying that it would not help to make the lesser claim that "S" refers to "something" instead of a "sensation", either. This is because ""has" and "something" also belong to our common language". Just like "sensation", "something" is also "a word of our common language which is not a language intelligible only to me."
Your account does not explain why Wittgenstein refers to "a language intelligible only to me" at 261.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Where does Wittgenstein make this claim?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But it is supposed to be a private language. You cannot have a language without rules. For example, a definition is a rule for how a word is to be used. "A definition serves to lay down the meaning of a sign, doesn’t it?" (PI 258)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He says at 260:
You appear to be considering it a matter of course that the person is making a note of something, despite what Wittgenstein says here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's like a reductio.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's not incorrect. You're using an older edition.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
At 258 Wittgenstein asks us to imagine that he keeps a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation that he associates with the sign "S". He can only be talking about the diarist's use of "S" at 261. "What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation"… in the imagined scenario at 258?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If it is "well established at 258" that the use of "S" cannot be justified, then why would we need to justify the use of "S" at 261?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The use of all words of our common language need to be justified such that everyone understands them. This is independent of the supposedly private use of "S".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein poo poos the idea that the private linguist could have something (if not a sensation). But, assuming you are correct, what do you view as Wittgenstein's supposed reason for stating that "something" cannot be justified as a sensation?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Surely the private linguist has their own rule for the use of "S". Otherwise, how do they recognise the same thing as "S" again each time? How do they use "S" in the same manner each time? Surely the use of "S" is at least intelligible to the user of "S". If "S" denotes a different type of thing each time, what purpose could that possibly serve?
Anyway, according to Wittgenstein's original description of a private language at 243, the words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations."
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How and why would we justify whether what Wittgenstein has is a sensation?
The use of this word, like all words of our common language, stands in need of a justification which everybody understands. We don't need to justify the use of "sensation"; it's already justified.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How does the source of the sensation justify the use of the word “sensation”?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Perhaps "disallow" is not the right word, but Wittgenstein shows at 261 that "S" cannot refer to a sensation if "S" is supposed to have only a private use.
Good, we finally have agreement, "the sensation", referring to the particular sensation named "S" is ambiguous.
Now we can ask whether this ambiguity is intentional or not. In any attempt to understand the meaning of an ambiguous passage of writing, it is necessary to determine whether the ambiguity is intentional or not. It seems obvious to me that in this case it is intentional, as it is meant to be this way for the purpose of the demonstration. Do you agree?
Quoting Luke
The definition you stated, referring to 243. The demonstration of 258 is not an example of a "private language" according to the description of 243, for the reasons I explained.
Quoting Luke
There is no contradiction, 258 is simply not an example of a private language. It is only if you think it is supposed to be an example of a private language that the appearance of contradiction arises. But that's only because the example is not consistent with the description of "private language".
Quoting Luke
Right, so it is very clear, that at 258, where Wittgenstein proceeds to name "a certain sensation" with "S", this is not an example of a private language. What is being named with "S" is "a sensation", and "sensation" is a word of our common language. Therefore this is not an example of a private language
So the example at 258 is already set up within the bounds of common language, to talk about something which is being referred to through the use of common language as a certain sensation. Therefore it is impossible that this is an example of a private language.
Quoting Luke
This is totally confused, and going in the wrong direction. Wittgenstein never says "'S' cannot refer to a sensation", nor is this implied. That explicitly contradicts the premise of the demonstration, that the diarist is using "S" to name a certain sensation, as I've already told you.
I think you need to pay closer attention to the subtleties of the demonstration. Notice that at 258, the author, Wittgenstein, is providing the first person perspective: "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation." Then by 261 he switches to the third person perspective "when he writes "S", he has something". This switch is not accidental.
It is demonstrated at 258, that from the first person perspective, the use of "S" need not be justified.: "whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'." There is no such thing as the diarist justifying his use of "S" in naming something, because he can use "S" however he wants, to name whatever he wants. That's the way Wittgenstein set up the example.
Now proceed to 261. The author of the demonstration, Wittgenstein, has switched places. He is no longer the diarist, but is now an observer, one of us, or "we", and he refers to the diarist as "he". From this perspective, that the thing named with "S" is "a sensation" needs to be justified. This is because "sensation" is a word of the public language, and therefore has meaning within such a language game. We are no longer concerned with how the judgement is made whereby something is judged as fitting the name "S", we are concerned with whether the thing which has been given the name "S" qualifies as a "sensation".
So the diarist has said at 258, 'I am naming something "S"', and naming this thing this way is his own little private language game. No justification is required for this simple private game of naming something with "S". However, since the diarist has said that the thing named is a "sensation", and "sensation" is a word from a public game, then from the perspective of the people in that game, 'us', or 'we', the diarist needs to justify the assertion that the thing called "S" is a sensation.
Quoting Luke
It is not a matter of course, but it is stipulated by the parameters of the demonstration. From the first person perspective, 258, it is stipulated that the diarist is making a note of something. That is a premise of the example, so it cannot be otherwise, and we cannot ignore this.
However, when Wittgenstein switches to the third person perspective, he has to allow that from the perspective of the observers, within the example, it is possible that the diarist is completely lying, and there is absolutely nothing which "S" refers to, he is using the symbol in a completely random way. This is why justification is required. The diarist has claimed 'I have a sensation which i am calling S". That the diarist has something, and that the something is a sensation needs to be justified.
Quoting Luke
You are not abiding by the switch in perspective. "What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation". Notice "we"? He is no longer talking about the diarists use of "S", he is talking about our use of "S", as indicated by "we". "Sensation" is our word, in our language game, and if we want to allow "S" into our game, as the name of a sensation, that the thing called S is a sensation must be justified.
Quoting Luke
The use of "S" in the private game (258) cannot be justified. But when 'we' (the public) refer to 'his' use of "S", saying that "S" is the sign of a sensation (261), where "sensation" is a word of our language, then justification is required.
The key to understanding the demonstration, which you are not getting, is that when we switch to the perspective of the observers, 'we', it is not a question of whether his use of S is justified, it is a question of whether our use of "sensation", to refer to the thing which he has named S is justified. That is why the first question is whether there is even "something" which the name refers to.
Quoting Luke
If I claim that I am using "S" to refer to a certain sensation, and you ask me to justify this claim, that the thing I am calling S is a sensation, how is proving that there is something which S refers to, justification for the claim that the thing is a sensation?
Quoting Luke
No, the possibility of a private rule is denied by Wittgenstein. To think of oneself as following a rule, does not mean that the person is actually following a rule. So whatever means the diarist uses to judge the occurrence of a sensation as qualifying for the name "S", it cannot be a rule. That is why we cannot talk about "right" here. According to Wittgenstein there can be no rule being followed here, therefore no such thing as the "right" judgement.
So all these points you raise, are from Wittgenstein's perspective, unanswerable, and therefore ought not be asked in that way. These questions get approached from the third person perspective outlined at 261. We look for justification that S actually names a sensation.
Quoting Luke
This is not true. What is shown is that the diarist's claim 'S refers to a sensation' remains unjustified (i.e. no such thing as correct or incorrect use) so long as the use of "S" remains private. The problem though is that the diarist already steps outside the bounds of a "private language", by using "sensation" to say what "S" refers to, because "sensation" is a word of public language. So the diarist has already gone beyond private use with this claim. "Private use" and "private language" are two distinct things.
That's not how language works, and not what you've been saying for several pages now.
It is "S" which supposedly refers to the sensation, not the sensation which refers to "S". And the argument you have been making this whole time is that "the sensation" is ambiguous, not that "S" is ambiguous. You are conveniently trying to conflate the two now, instead of admitting your error.
It's good to see you finally agree that "sensation" is not ambiguous.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I agree that Wittgenstein does not specify the type of "certain sensation" that he associates with "S". I suppose he could have said more about it, but describing it using more words from our common language would defeat the purpose. He tries his best at 258 to depict a private language scenario based on the assumptions of the private language advocate without it turning into a public language. He does not succeed, but that's the point.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What would be an example of a private language?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, that's the point. Do you at least agree that Wittgenstein attempts to give an example of a private language at 258?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You're right. What I implied was that "S" cannot refer to a sensation and still be a word/symbol of a private language, which is intelligible only to me. That is the point of 261. You still have not explained why Wittgenstein says "intelligible only to me" at 261.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He actually begins 258 by saying: "Let's imagine the following case:" Expand the contraction and it becomes "Let us imagine the following case". Please pay closer attention to the subtleties.
Or did you think he was talking to himself at 258 and then to his audience at 261? I won't bother with the rest of your "perspective" argument.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This isn't the concern at 258.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That isn't the concern at 261. You still have not stated what reason Wittgenstein might have for raising this "concern". How does this reading help to make sense of the text? Do you at least acknowledge that Wittgenstein is arguing against the possibility of a private language?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But you said that 258 is not an example of a private language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He can't possibly justify it because "sensation" is a word of our common language. The fact that the diarist must rely on the word "sensation" implies that the language is not private.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Maybe he only thinks he's making a note of something but he really isn't. See 260 again: so far "S" has no function.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We don't want to allow "S" into our (public) game. Then it would no longer be private! We are trying to determine whether a private language (or even a private word) is possible.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is so confused. We are told at 258 that "S" refers to a sensation. We are also told at 258, and you have acknowledged, that "the use of "S" cannot be justified". But now at 261 you claim that we are supposed to justify our use of "sensation" to refer to what one person has? That's not how language, or how the word "sensation", works.
It wasn't the community of public language users who used the word to refer to what the person has [how would that work exactly?], so why would we need to justify it? Even if it were the community of public language users who used the word to refer to what the person has, to whom would we justify it? To the private language user?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That doesn't answer my question. And you are not being asked to justify this claim.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The possibility of a private language is denied along with it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I put them to you because you seem to think a private language is possible. Do you? If so, then Wittgenstein is not your defender.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What possible (non-rule) means could there be?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You already said this was denied at 258. Your position at 261 is that we are looking to justify that "sensation" fits what the person has.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How is what you said different to what I said? I said that "S" cannot refer to a sensation if "S" is supposed to have only a private use. You just repeated it back after saying it's not true.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What distinguishes the private use of "S" from a private language?
That is how Wittgenstein dictates the example. There is "a certain sensation" which is signified with "S". Then Wittgenstein refers to this sensation as "the sensation". So, in the demonstration "the sensation" refers to a particular sensation which has been named with "S". You can't change the way the demonstration has been written just because you don't like it, or it's "not how English works" in your opinion.
Quoting Luke
He does not "try his best at 258 to depict a private language scenario". He already knows that as impossible, so he is depicting something different. He is depicting a private game (though he doesn't call it a game) within the context of a public language. He starts with the premise of "a certain sensation", a public name, and he assumes that thing which is described by the public word "sensation" is something private.
That is why there is two layers of representation, "the sensation" refers to "a certain sensation signified with S", and this refers to what we know not, something private. But to understand the context, and therefore the meaning of the demonstration, you need to order the layers correctly, because each layer opens up a wider context. So, naming something with S is the immediate, direct description of what the person is doing. Referring to that named thing with "the sensation": is the way that the person is describing that activity to us. So this, describing the thing as a sensation, is less immediate and therefore a wider context. The fact that he in no way points to, or otherwise signifies the thing which "the sensation" refers to (as this is meant to be private), leaves "the sensation" as ambiguous.
Quoting Luke
One cannot give an example of a private language, because "give an example" is something already public. You are just giving a person an impossible (self-contradicting) task by asking for this. It is the same issue as to why the type/token distinction is not applicable to Wittgenstein's demonstration. A "token", under the confines of the type/token distinction is necessarily an example of a type. And "a type" is something public, being limited by rules, or criteria.
If Wittgenstein wanted to portray a private language, he would have to remove the naming of a thing from the confines of these public rules, to make it something private. He'd have to name a thing without naming it as a member (token) of a type, because that would put it within a public language.
He doesn't do this. The premise states: "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation." So the thing is clearly named in the context of a type (public language). Therefore the idea of a private naming has already been defeated by the premise. However, he proceeds to show that since the thing named is hidden from the public (kept private), it cannot be a token or example of a type. The ambiguity as to why the thing is not a token of a public language throws you off. It is not as you seem to think, that the naming is an act of a private language, which makes it that the thing cannot be a token of "sensation", it is the case that the thing named is kept private, and cannot serve as an example, which makes it so that it cannot be a token.
You did not seem to grasp this the last time I brought it up. A token is an example of a type. A type is public, and an example of a type must be public as well, only being "a token" in relation to the conception of the type. The thing named with "S", though it is stipulated by the person naming it, as a member of a type, is held private by that person, and therefore cannot serve as an example (token) of that type. The thing cannot be considered as a token of a public language, because the thing itself is held private. This is not an example of a private language because that would require that the naming of the thing would be held private. It is impossible to exemplify such a thing.
A true "private language" would require that the naming of the thing be private. Wittgenstein does not keep the naming of thing private, he only keeps the thing private. The result is the problem of justification. But this is not at all an example of a private language, it is an example of naming a private thing through the use of public language, and this is meant to portray what commonly occurs in language use. It is not meant to portray a private language, which is something which does not occur.
Quoting Luke
Yes, this is the switch in perspective which I described to you. At 258, from the first person perspective, the use of "S" cannot be justified "there is no right here"; "I" can apply S to whatever I want. But at 261, from the perspective of the observers, "we", that the thing named with "S" has been called a "sensation" and this needs to be justified.
These are the two layers of representation described above. The first layer is naming something with "S". The second layer is the person claiming that the thing named as S is a sensation, thereby referring to the thing as "the sensation". The first is portrayed as a private act, but it is not an activity of a private language, because according to the parameters of the example, the person already apprehends the thing as a "sensation", which is the word of a public language. The second layer, the use of the public word "sensation" to refer to the thing, requires justification.
Quoting Luke
Consider that the person could be using "S" completely privately without knowing that "S" refers to something which we would call a "sensation". The use of "S" could be completely private, yet from our perspective, "S" refers to a sensation. That is the difference.
You have reversed the layers of representation so that "the sensation" is between "S" and the object named. This makes it so that "S" cannot have a private use without excluding "the sensation". But this is an improper representation of the layers. When properly represented, "S" refers directly to the object, and "a sensation" is a description of that object. Then we can portray the private application of "S' to an object, and allow that this object may or may not be a sensation. That is why our use of "sensation" to describe this object needs to be justified.
This is not how Wittgenstein dictates the example. He associates "the recurrence of a certain sensation" with the sign "S" and writes the sign "S" in a calendar for every day on which he has the sensation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's different, is it?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What definition of a private language are you using? Earlier you said you agreed to Wittgenstein's description of a private language that he gives at 243:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We don't know what "S" refers to, so how is it not private?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If he applies it to whatever he wants, then he is not applying it only to his immediate private sensations, as per the description of a private language at 243.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's not merely "something" in the first place. This is why Wittgenstein intercepts this anticipated response from the private language advocate at 261:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So you're saying that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S" he has Something — and that is all that can be said?
You are not grasping this correctly. He does not associate "the recurrence of a certain sensation" with the sign "S". "The recurrence of a certain sensation" is a phrase of language. This is not what he marks with an "S", but he uses this phrase to describe to us what he marks with an "S". He has something (private) which he signifies with "S". He is telling us (publicly) about this activity of marking in the diary, with that phrase, and is calling it (the thing signified by S) "the sensation". Therefore this phrase, "the recurrence of a certain sensation" refers to the thing he is signifying by marking with an "S", as does "the sensation", not vise versa.
Quoting Luke
Yes that's the one, 243: "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be
known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language".
The example at 258 is not such a "private language" because he explicitly states: "Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation." He is talking about "a diary", and "a certain sensation", He is not using words which another person cannot understand. Nor is he even attempting to do such. He is arguing that the concept of a private language doesn't even make sense, words are already public, by the nature of what words are, they exist in the context of other words which provide grammar (257), so it doesn't even make sense to speak of words which another person can't understand.
It's not at all accurate to say that the demonstration at 258 is an example of a private language, nor is it an attempt at exemplifying a private language.
Quoting Luke
It's not private because we have a public word which refers to the thing named "S", it is "sensation". But you can't seem to get the referencing right. The issue though, which Wittgenstein brings up, is are we justified in using this word.
Quoting Luke
I know, it's not an example of a private language. How many times do I have to demonstrate this to you? See, "private sensations" is a public concept, and it is the confines of that public concept which restricts the way that he may use the name. So even the idea of "private language", as described, is self-refuting, as nonsensical. Why would the person with the supposed private language be restricted only to naming private sensations with that language? If "private language" made any sort of sense we couldn't say that this language would be restricted by any conceptions imposed by the confines of our public language. It couldn't be restricted at all. But then how could it be a language?
Quoting Luke
Sorry, I just can't help you. I don't know what you're asking.
What I wrote is almost verbatim from 258.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Seriously?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's "a phrase of language" that you have much difficulty with.
According to the description, he writes the sign "S" in a calendar for every day on which he has the sensation. The word "recurrence" implies that it's the same type of "certain sensation" each time. Otherwise, you need to provide an alternative account of the word "recurrence".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You said in your previous sentence that the sensation is not what he marks with an "S".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He says that he associates the recurrence of a certain sensation with the sign "S". You are saying that he associates Something (or "the thing") with the signs "S", "sensation" and "recurrence of a certain sensation". Therefore, what you are saying is not what Wittgenstein is saying.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You've just told me that "S", "sensation" and "recurrence of a certain sensation" all refer to Something. Now you are saying that "sensation" refers to "S". Is that different again?
Also, I said that we don't know what "S" refers to, and you have responded to say that "sensation" refers to "S". Does that mean that "S" also refers to "sensation"? Are you saying that we do know what "S" refers to?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You've missed the point. He must apply "S" only to his immediate private sensations per the definition of a private language given in 243. Therefore, YOUR claim that he "applies it to whatever he wants" is wrong. He cannot apply "S" to whatever he wants.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Because that's the definition of private language you have agreed to, as per 243. Otherwise, provide your own definition of a private language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's right. How could it be a language?
Luke, your post is so confused, and your replies so brief and unexplained, that I cannot even begin to understand what you are trying to express, in the majority of your replies.
We have two principal disagreements. First, how Wittgenstein uses "S", and "the sensation" at 258, and second, whether 258 is meant to be an example of "a private language".
Let's start with the first. Do you agree that "S" is supposed to signify, or be "the name of" whatever it is which is described as recurring? This is not only consistent with, but very clearly what he is talking about in the context, i.e. 256, 257. He is talking about establishing a direct relationship between a name and a sensation, and that's what's meant, and described at 258, establishing a direct relationship between a sensation, and its name "S", by giving that sensation a name, "S".
So, from the first person perspective which Wittgenstein provides us at 258, we have a recurring 'thing' (whether type or token is irrelevant here), we have "S" as the sign, or name of this thing, and we have the person referring to this thing as "the sensation", in telling us about the thing he has named "S".
Do we have agreement on this, or not?
I think that if we cannot come to some agreement on this fundamental understanding as to what Wittgenstein is giving us as his example, there is no point in going further. We'd have such completely different ideas about what is going on in that example, that any discussion of the example would be completely pointless. Accordingly, discussion of our second principal disagreement, whether this is meant to be an example of "a private language" or not, is pointless until we have agreement as to what has been given to us in the example.
If you don't agree with what I propose above, there is still another possibility for agreement. We could simply agree that the example is ambiguous. If we agree on that, then we can conclude that discussion of the second disagreement will be fruitless, and therefore unnecessary, because there is no correct understanding due to the ambiguity.
What do you say?
Wittgenstein clearly specifies it is the recurrence of a sensation. I don't see why you call it "whatever it is".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I agree.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, why call it a "thing"? It's a sensation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
For the most part.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Compare 243 with 258. He is clearly talking about the same thing here:
Ask yourself why a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. The reason he performs this "ceremony", as he calls it, is in an attempt to have "S" refer to his immediate private sensation, just as he describes at 243, which you have agreed describes a private language.
Why would you say this, right after insisting that he is talking about a "sensation" at 258? When he talks about the private language at 243 he says "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know". Obviously "sensation" doesn't refer to something only he can know, and S is described as a sensation.
Quoting Luke
The reason why a definition cannot be formulated is because what is proposed is a direct relation between a word and a thing (a sensation in this case). So the situation is a naming, like what a proper noun does. There is no definition in this type of usage, just a direct relationship between the name and the thing named, such that the thing named defines the name. That's why he proceeds to say that he can give himself a sort of ostensive definition by pointing to the thing inwardly.
However, the thing is described as "a sensation", or an "inner experience", and these are words of a public language, Therefore there is no real attempt at exemplifying a private language here. There is a private naming, within the context of a public language. The parameters as to what type of thing is being named are laid out by the public language. This he describes at the end of 257, just before launching into the example.
"And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed." ---257
As explained, "sensation" shows the post where the new word "S" is stationed. This is not a private language.
Nice cherry picking. Are you blind? How many times do I need to quote the passage from 243 before you comprehend that it contains the word "sensation"? Look:
Are you trying to pretend that he does not talk about "sensations" at 243? Or do you have a reading difficulty?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No shit, Sherlock. But "sensation" is given as part of the description of a private language at 243 that you agreed to. Did you agree to that definition by mistake? Again, if you don't like it, then provide your own definition of a private language. But bear in mind that you will no longer be discussing Wittgenstein's private language argument.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No real attempt? You said that it was not possible to provide an example of a private language, so what sort of attempt do you expect? Wittgenstein's point is that it is not possible and this is what he is showing us. That's why he tries to provide an example of a private language and fails. If you think there's a way to successfully provide an example of a private language, then show us. Otherwise, stop complaining that it's not an example. I said from the outset that he attempts to provide an example, that he does not succeed, and that that's the point. If you think he is saying or showing something else, then spit it out.
I don't see how the mention of "sensations" at 243 is relevant. The words of this proposed "private language" cannot be understood by another person. "Sensation" is not such a word. But "S" at 258 is said to be the name of a sensation. Therefore 258 is not an example of a private language.
Quoting Luke
The description, or definition, of "private language", is not itself a private language. So "sensation" might be used in the definition of a private language, but since it is a publicly understood word, it cannot be part of a private language. This is very simple. Do you understand this?
Quoting Luke
As I demonstrated with the quote from the end of 257, he is not at all trying to provide an example of a private language. Please read 257 again. He is showing how a new word, produced from a private experience might fit into, or receive a place. in an existing public language, as indicated by the last sentence in 257.
Once you understand this, you might then move on toward understanding why he says at 261, that the use of "sensation" as the word for what S is, must be justified. "S" is the new word with the private referent, and "sensation" is the public word. That the thing, if there even is a thing, which is named by "S", is consistent with the criteria of "sensation", must be justified. This is how "S" might receive a place in the public language.
You cannot ignore these parts of 243:
You are ignoring everything here except "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know". How can you possibly think this gives you a better understanding of the text?
The mention of "sensations" is relevant because sensations are the basis of Wittgenstein's private language; immediate private sensations are what "the words of this language are to refer to".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So you do know what "sensation" means now? It's no longer ambiguous and has no meaning?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I agree. As I said, he tries and fails to provide an example of a private language according to the description he gives at 243 which includes the word "sensations".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is new. Who said that it was?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Why is it only the word "sensation" that requires justification at 258? Why not all the other words too? What makes this word so special? Does the "sensation" at 243 also require justification? And what is this process of justification? How are these words justified? Please answer these questions to help support your argument.
I don't see your argument. A private language is a language in which a person speaks about one's inner sensations, and no one else can understand the words (243). At 258 is given an example of the naming of an inner sensation in which we have the ability to understand the name, as the name of a sensation. You seem to conclude that since they both concern inner sensations, the latter is a private language.
It's ironic how we've changed positions. I spent days arguing that we cannot know exactly what "S" refers to because of ambiguity (we can't understand the meaning of S), while you argued that we can understand what S signifies, a sensation. Now you're saying that this is an example of a private language. If this is the case, then you must concur that we cannot understand the meaning of S, as indicated by the description, or definition of "private language".
The difference between us, is that I attribute the inability to understand "S" to intentional ambiguity by the author, and you seem to think that this is because it is supposed to be a private language. We could discuss whether intentional ambiguity constituted a private language, to see if there is consistency between us, but we wouldn't get far. With intentional ambiguity the words cannot be understood by others, as required for a private language, but they do not refer to private sensations. As I explained earlier, with intentional ambiguity the word has no proper referent, its meaning is ambiguous.
To have a private language, as defined, both conditions, must be fulfilled, reference to inner sensations, and impossible for others to understand..
Quoting Luke
I'm not ignoring it, I'm just pointing out the insufficiency to you. It's basic logic. If a definition stipulates two requirements, then fulfilling one of the requirements is insufficient for designating that the thing meets the conditions of the definition.
Quoting Luke
You continue to refuse to consider the immediate context of the example. As I've explained already, 257 makes it very clear that he is not trying to provide an example of a private language with the first person perspective laid out at 258. The existence of the grammar of the word "sensation" is presupposed, and it acts as a post where the new word "S" is stationed. That's made very clear at the end of 257. Obviously this is not intended to be an example of a "private language" as defined. And, from 260 onward, when he looks at the example from the third person perspective, he discusses justifying the use of "sensation" for the positioning of the new word "S".
You might see the mention of "private language" inserted at 259, and think that this means 258 is supposed to be an example of a private language, but this is only evidence of intentional ambiguity. Clearly Wittgenstein indicates at the end of 257, that the proposed new word "S", is given it's position relative to the grammar of "sensation". To suggest that the new word is given position according to some sort of private system of rules, directly contradicts this.
Now, do you see what Wittgenstein intends, for us to do, in understanding, to avoid the apparent contradiction creating the appearance ambiguity at 259? We must reject the notion of private rules, as explained earlier in the text, and reject that there is even impressions of rules (259) involved here. "The balance on which impressions are weighed is not the impression of a balance". Therefore we are left to conclude that the new word "S" finds its place according to the grammar of "sensation", as described at 257. And so there is no intent that 258 is an example of a private language, because this would require that the position of S would be done through some private sort of balance. That is not the way that the example is expressed.
Quoting Luke
The use of the word "sensation" requires justification because it is the word used to describe the thing which S is directly related to, as the name of. That is the layering of reference. The diarist names something S, then tells the public that the thing named S is of the type "sensation". The diarist cannot point to the thing named by S, to show that it is an example of a sensation, demonstrating that the use of "sensation" is called for (the thing is correctly classified), so "sensation" must be justified in some other way, i.e. we turn to something independent.
Quoting Luke
Justification of such words is done through reference to something independent, as explained by Wittgenstein. This is actually quite similar to scientists making revelations about things which cannot be directly observed. These things are in a sense "private", as not directly revealed to to the senses of any human being. They are as the religious would say, private to God Himself. Through hypothesis, the scientist will name such unrevealed things. giving the newly named things contextual position by means of the grammar of the words of the hypothesis. The name of the thing is positioned within a conceptual structure of other known names. Then the hypothesis, that the newly named thing deserves that contextual position which it is given, must be justified through independent experimentation.
What insufficiency? You said in your previous post "I don't see how the mention of "sensations" at 243 is relevant". Now you claim to be "pointing out the insufficiency"? Rubbish.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is a lie. You spent days arguing that the meaning of "sensation" is ambiguous, not that "S" is ambiguous.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There are not two conditions.
When he says "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know", the word "this" is indicative of the language he mentioned earlier, namely: "a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use".
Your attempt to recast your ignorance of the text as "basic logic" is a sham. You clearly don't accept Wittgenstein's description of a private language, however you refuse to provide your own.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I did say that:
Quoting Luke
You responded:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You don't concur with yourself.
You are no longer talking about Wittgenstein's private language argument, and it is obvious now that you never were, because you don't understand it. All you have is misplaced condescension. I have wasted too much time already trying to help you understand it. Since you are not actually discussing Wittgenstein's PLA, there's little point in continuing. I'll leave the following quotes here for the sake of anyone else who might accidentally take you seriously. They're not aimed at your reading level, because you fail to notice even the relevance of the word "sensations" at 243.
Luke, think about what "only the speaker can know" means. If I talk about my pains, can you know what I'm talking about? Of course you can. Then I am not using a private language, despite talking about my inner feelings. Therefore, the conditions for being a "private language" must be more than just a language about one's inner feelings. The second condition is that only the speaker can know what the words refer to. Obviously this second condition is not fulfilled when "S" is described as a "sensation". This is because "the existence of the grammar of the word...[sensation]... shews the post where the new word...(S).. is stationed." (257).
Describing S as a "sensation", "a word of our common language" (261), so that we can all know what "S" refers to, negates the possibility that the demonstration is intended as an example of a private language, as defined.
Quoting Luke
My condescension is aimed only at those who assume to have a thorough understanding of what Wittgenstein has demonstrated when they obviously do not. I don't think that's misplaced when directed toward you.
You have not described two conditions. You have described the same condition of privacy twice.
If there actually were two conditions the second one would be 'the reference to sensations': that the words of the language refer to the speaker's immediate private sensations. And, as I have pointed out several times, Wittgenstein is using the word "sensation" here in the singular sense of one's "inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on".
You have attempted to argue that the second condition of 'the reference to sensations' is irrelevant. If the condition of privacy is met, then you are right, because it won't matter what the words refer to, and so there is no need to meet the second condition of reference to sensations. However, this is not the private language that Wittgenstein describes. These two conditions are inseparable in Wittgenstein's description, and they are therefore not two separate conditions.
"The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations." (PI 243)
If you could manage to read a whole sentence, you might have noticed that. But you wanted to talk about your own version of the private language argument instead, in which the words do not necessarily refer to one's sensations. Unfortunately for you, we are discussing Wittgenstein's private language argument, not yours.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How many times do you need to be told that he attempts to give the private language advocate what he wants but fails, because he is showing us the incoherency of the concept of a private language? THAT'S THE POINT. And yet you still complain that it isn't really a private language. Well, no shit.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You don't know enough to know any better.
If the words of a language which talks about inner feelings could not be known to another, we could not coherently talk about our inner feelings. Therefore, what makes the private language incomprehensible to others must be something other than that it refers to inner feelings.
Quoting Luke
You are neglecting the statement "So another person cannot understand the language."
Obviously we understand another person's language when they talk about their private sensations. Talking about our private sensations, and understanding each other is a common part of natural language. Therefore, "so another person cannot understand the language", is a condition other than referring to one's immediate private sensations. The language has to refer to private feelings in a particular way so that others cannot understand.
Quoting Luke
There is no attempt to give the private language advocate what he wants, that's nonsense. What is provided as an example at 258 is not even close to an example of a private language, as indicated from my quote of 257. It is an example of something completely different.
That the concept of a private language is incoherent is self-evident. This requires no demonstration, it's obvious. Private language is an oxymoron. The demonstration is not meant to show that a private language is incoherent, it is meant to show that something very similar to private language, the integration of a private word into a common language, is a very real aspect of language, even though "private language" itself is incoherent.
Here's a proposal. Let's look at the word "only" at 243. Let's assume that all the words of the proposed "private language" can only refer to private sensations, nothing else. Every word in this language can only refer to a private sensation, just like "S", and this might be the reason why the language cannot be understood by others. We can see why Wittgenstein would say that such a language would not be understandable to others, at 265, because he says justification requires reference to something independent. But the demonstration at 258 shows one private word, "S", in the context of common words, "recurrence" and "sensation", so it is clearly not an attempt to portray a private language.
Explaining it again does not change the fact that you described the same condition twice.
You claimed that a private language had two conditions but you repeated the same condition of privacy twice. What's the other condition?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I haven't neglected anything. I stated that the two separate conditions - privacy and the reference to sensations (assuming this was your second condition) - are actually inseparable. In contrast, you said that sensations are irrelevant.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A common part of a public language, yes.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What's the other condition? Is it "referring to one's immediate private sensations"? You said earlier that sensations are irrelevant. On the other hand, I never said it was irrelevant that "another person cannot understand the language". Don't try and project your failed understanding on to me.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This word salad is very comical. Does the demonstration succeed in its attempt to show that the integration of a private word into a common language is "a very real aspect of language"? What private word is being integrated into a common language at 258?
Hint: 258 has nothing at all to do with integrating a private word into a common language. You are lost.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are aware that an attempt can fail, and that a failed attempt is still an attempt?
I can't believe how you stubbornly resist understanding something so simple. Words can refer to internal things or external things. That the proposed private language uses words to refer to internal things is one condition. Also, a word might be understood by someone else, or it might not. That the words of the private language cannot be understood by another, is a second condition.
That these two conditions are not the same condition, as you seem to think, for some strange reason, is evident from the following. A person can talk about internal things in words which others can understand. And, a person can talk about external things with words that someone else cannot understand. Therefore the two conditions are not the same condition, nor are they equivalent.
It's very clear that the necessary relationship between the one and the other, required to say that they are the same, is simply not there. It is simply not the case that "referring to internal feelings" is equivalent with "not understandable by others". What makes a word understandable to someone else, rather than not understandable, is not that it refers to something external rather than internal. Understandability depends on the mode of learning which the person has undergone, not whether the thing referred to is internal or external.
For example, physicists give names to external things which I cannot understand. Obviously, it is not because these things are supposed to be internal and private, that I do not understand these names, it is because I do not understand the conceptual structure which provides the context where the names have their positions. That is what makes a name understandable or not, to another person, whether the person understands the context. And the case is exactly the same with names of internal things. That the name "S" refers to something internal does not make it fundamentally impossible to another person to understand. You argued this incessantly already, that we can understand "S" through the understanding of "sensation". However, Wittgenstein makes it appear like we cannot understand what "S" refers to, through the use of ambiguity.
That the use of ambiguity makes it impossible to understand what a word refers to, while internal/external is completely irrelevant, is irrefutable evidence that the two conditions are separate conditions.
Quoting Luke
The separate condition I'm referring to is "another person cannot understand the language". That's why I said you are completely neglecting this phrase. And, in insisting that the second condition is "privacy", rather than "another person cannot understand the language", you continue to neglect that condition. What's with that? You quoted my statement as "another person cannot understand the language", and you referred to it as "privacy"
That a person owns something as "private" does not necessitate that others cannot have access to it. The person can allow another access to one's private property, or another might take it with the use of force. So, stating the second condition as "privacy" is a straw man misrepresentation. "Private" is not the same as "another person cannot use it".
A person may intentionally allow, what is held as private (the use of S in this example), to be shared by others. That the person shares it does not negate the fact that the thing shared remains that person's private property. And, of course this is why the example is not an example of a "private language", as defined by "another person cannot understand the language". It is allowed that the person with the private naming ("S"), shares the use of the name, through the means of the common understanding of "sensation". Therefore the condition "another person cannot understand the language" is violated, despite the fact that the naming itself is something private.
Do you understand this? The naming is something "private", it is a private language-game. But it is described as occurring within the context of a public language. This private language-game, expressed at 258, is not "a language", and therefore not "a private language". The private language-game is not "a language", because a language consists of many different language-games, and the private language-game is just one language-game. This is an example of the difference between one and many, explored by Plato in "The Parmenides"
Quoting Luke
Luke, the private word is "S". The word of the common language is "sensation". The private word "S" is made public (integrated into common language) through the proposition "S is the sign of a sensation". However, this proposition ought to be justified, and that's where we find a problem. How do we confirm that the thing referred to with "S" conforms to the grammar of "sensation"?
Quoting Luke
Your proposed "hint" is obviously misunderstanding misrepresenting itself as guidance. That's a very good example of what fuels my attitude of condescension, and why it is "not misplaced when directed towards you", despite your implication that you know what I know.
You still refuse to acknowledge the last line of 257 despite the fact that I've quoted it a number of times now. I'm going to keep repeating it, over and over, until you accept that it is relevant to the example expressed at 258:
[quote=PI 257]And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed. [/quote]
At least you finally recognise the relevance of sensations at 243.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know how many times you need to read 243 until it sinks in. Don't think, but look:
Wittgenstein does not mention internal/external or what "a person can talk about". He mentions "what only the speaker can know". The words of the private language refer to what only the speaker can know; that is, to his immediate private sensations. "External things" are not things that only the speaker can know. One's sensations are private and the words of this language are supposed to refer only to these private sensations. Another person cannot understand the language because it refers to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How have I neglected this phrase? I haven't neglected anything. To say that your two conditions are inseparable is not to neglect either one of them. Let's not forget it was you who could not see the relevance of sensations.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Nobody can access your immediate private sensations. Even if you wanted to, you cannot show them to anyone. And we are not necessarily talking about private property, only private.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know how many times I need to repeat that the attempt to give an example of a private language fails, and Wittgenstein show us this to demonstrate that the idea is incoherent.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Wrong again:
Do you understand misplaced condescension?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What do you mean it's "made public"? "S" never had a private use before.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not going to get into other sections of the book when you have so much difficulty with just one or two.
You're just being tedious Luke. He does mention "inner".
"256. Now, what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand?"
Notice that he says my inner experiences "and" which only I can understand. There are two described features here, " describes my inner experiences", and, "only I myself can understand".
Why do you refuse to recognize that a person might describe one's private sensations in words that another can understand? And so, "describing one's private sensations", and "describing one's private sensations in words which another person cannot understand", are two distinct things.
We were discussing 243, not 256. Remember? You said:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I pointed out to you how very relevant the mention of "sensations" is, then you tried to distract from your egregious oversight by claiming to be "pointing out the insufficiency" with your two conditions - neither of which I had ignored, and one of which was that the words of the private language "refer to internal things" - the very thing you initially found irrelevant. Now you are trying to distract further by introducing 256.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein does not talk about "describing one's private sensations in words which another person can understand" at 243. If another person could understand the language, then the language could not "refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations."
To repeat: Another person cannot understand the language because it refers to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations.
Luke you're being ridiculous, the quote from 256 is a reference to what was meant at 243. Do you think that 256 is referencing a different type of private language from the one mentioned at 243? If so then we have intentional ambiguity. Clearly 256 indicates that referring to one's private sensations, and "only I can understand" are two distinct things. The issue is to determine whether there is a relationship of logical necessity between these two, as proposed at 243. Does "referring to private sensations" necessitate "only I can understand".
Quoting Luke
Of course not, that's already given, It's a known fact that we can talk about private sensations in words that people can understand. That's the reason for the second condition of the private language. 1. It refers to private sensations. 2. it uses words which no one else can understand. The second condition is necessary to distinguish the private language from a common or public language which refers to private sensations. This would be using words like "pain".
Quoting Luke
You are begging the question Luke. The question at 243 is "can we imagine" such a language. Is such a proposal a logical possibility. Would having a language which refers only to one's private sensations cause that language to be only understandable to that person. At 265 you'll see that the answer implied is "yes". Justification requires reference to something independent, so if the language referred only to one's private sensations, it would be incomprehensible to others.
You need to respect exactly what he is asking at 243, "can we imagine" such a language. He is not asking you to imagine such a language. The answer he reveals is that though we can imagine such a language ( justification requires something independent, 265), as it is fully logical, such a language is not a real description of language. In reality, having the words refer to one's private sensations does not necessitate, or cause, the words to be incomprehensible to others because we have independent sources of justification. Therefore we can imagine such a language one which reference only private sensations making it impossible that another person cannot understand the words, but this is not a real language, in the sense of how languages actually exist.
You seem to have jumped the gun, and actually proceeded toward attempting to imagine such a language, prior to determining whether it is logically possible to imagine such a language. So you beg the question, assuming that such a language is logically possible. If you didn't already assume that this language was logically possible, you would not proceed toward imagining it.
The "first condition" is not only that it "refers to private sensations". The "condition" - if you must call it that - is that "the words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know", which is the speaker's immediate private sensations.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not begging the question; I'm explaining to you what Wittgenstein means by a private language, because you said that you couldn't see how sensations were relevant to it:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is clear evidence that you do not understand Wittgenstein. And yet, despite this resounding misread, you admit no fault and continue to act as though your reading was correct all along.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
According to the concept of a private language that Wittgenstein describes at 243, a language that refers to what only the speaker can know is a language that is understandable only to the speaker.
You haven't been addressing anything I say, only tediously repeating that nonsense, so it appears there's no discussion here.
Let's take a familiar example - pain. As far as I can tell, we can talk about what pain is (public because there are observable physical correlates) but we can't seem to have a conversation on what pain is like (exclusively private).
It has been addressed.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
These "two distinct things" are both described and/or entailed by: "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know" (PI 243). Therefore, one "distinct thing" does not necessitate the other; instead, both "distinct things" are necessitated by "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know".
You have a lot of trouble accepting all of 243. You first ignored that the words of the private language refer to the speaker's immediate private sensations. Now you are ignoring that the words of the private language refer to what only the speaker can know.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's a different question from what Wittgenstein means by a private language, which is the question we were previously discussing. You initially thought that it did not matter what the words of the language referred to and all that mattered was "only I can understand". You have now tried to change the subject.
You Luke, are the one not accepting "all of 243". You don't seem to recognize that 243 is asking a question, and that the question contains two parts. 1( Can we imagine a language in which a person gives expressions to one's inner experiences, and ,2) That another person cannot understand the words of this language.
That these are two distinct parts is clear from the fact that Wittgenstein answers 1) with "Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language?". Then he proceeds to the second condition "the individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking".
Obviously, these are two distinct conditions. And, as I explained to you already, this phrase "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know", does not necessitate that the language refers to inner experiences, as you claim. One might make a language referring to external things, in which no one understands what the words refer to.
Quoting Luke
Since, I've always been arguing that there are two distinct conditions of the private language described at 243, this is obviously a strawman representation. I "changed the subject" to adopt a new approach, because I was not getting through to you the other way. The new approach was to show that you ignore the essence of Wittgenstein's question, 'could we imagine such a language', with your claim that you have already imagined it. Therefore you are begging the question, claiming to have the answer to Wittgenstein's question, prior to going through the logical process required to answer the question.
The point being that we need to determine whether there is logical consistency between 1) and 2), before we can answer whether such a language can be imagined. If you simply assume that 1) and 2) are united in a logically coherent way, as you do, you beg the question, claiming to have already imagined such a language.
That wouldn’t work. The words of such a language would not refer to “what only the speaker can know.” Other people can know external things. Other people cannot know one’s immediate private sensations.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Obviously, we can and do talk about pain and other sensations using our public language. What Wittgenstein proceeds to show is that our public talk and its grammar are based on external behaviours, not on immediate private sensations. Hence, Wittgenstein’s beetle, where “the [sensation] object drops out of consideration as irrelevant”. See also PI 307. He introduces the private language only to reveal it as a common philosophical misconception about how language actually works.
You're misreading again Luke. The phrase "refer to what can only be known to the person speaking" ;means only the person speaking can know what the words refer to. He is talking about knowing what the words refer to, not knowing the things themselves. Whatever knowing the thing itself would mean, I don't know, but it's clearly not what is indicated by the context, talking about language. This is clarified by the sentence which follows. "So another person cannot understand the language". Knowing the thing itself (whatever that is supposed to mean) is not necessary for understanding a language, knowing what the words refer to is.
One can make up a language with words that refer to external things, so that other people do not know what the words refer to, and therefore cannot understand the language.
Quoting Luke
So, do you apprehend the two distinct conditions now? 1) the language talks about inner experiences (which we might do with our public language), and 2) another person cannot understand the language (which also could be the case with a language that refers to things other than inner experiences).
What Wittgenstein is investigating is the logical relationship between these two, whether a language which uses words only to refer to "immediate private sensations", would necessarily be a language which no one else could understand.
Your accusation that I’m misreading is supported by a fictional quote. He does not say “refer to what can only be known to the person speaking”. Get the quote right before you accuse me of misreading, otherwise you might be accused of misreading.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, he is talking about “what only the speaker can know.” An actual quote carries a lot more weight than your constant misinterpretation and made up quotes.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It’s not about what other people do or do not know, but about what only the speaker can know. Re-read 243.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, and I’ve given you my argument. Your only counterargument is that a person could have a private language which refers to external things. That is not a valid response because Wittgenstein tells us that the language refers to “what only the speaker can know”, which implies that it refers to what other people cannot know. External things are not something that other people cannot know. He also says that “another person cannot understand the language”, not merely that they do not understand it.
EDIT: I note that the third edition has 243 as:
This is slightly different in the fourth edition that I am using, which has it as:
Nonetheless, the point remains that he is talking about what only the speaker can know (and, therefore, what other people cannot know); he is not talking about what the speaker does know or what other people do not know. The point is that this language is private in principle; it cannot possibly come to be understood by others and it has no possibility of translation into another language.
Those are the exact words of the translation I am using. The complete passage is: "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language." The key sentence is the last one, "So another person cannot understand the language". This provides the context which indicates that he is talking about knowing what the words refer to, not knowing the things themselves (whatever that might mean).
Quoting Luke
Right, and "what only the speaker can know" is in the context of the language proposal, and what the words of the language refer to. So he is saying that only the speaker can know what the words refer to, so "another person cannot understand the language".
Quoting Luke
You have removed the phrase from it's context, to give it your own private meaning. This I've noticed is your habitual way of arguing. It is a type of strawman procedure. Here you are strawmanning what Wittgenstein has written, by removing the phrase from the context which he provided, for the sake of supporting your misunderstanding of what he wrote.
In the context he is talking about what the words refer to, and he is saying that only the speaker can know this, such that only the speaker can understand the language. It is proposed that this (only the speaker can know what the words refer to) is the result of the words referring to inner experiences. However, it is demonstrated at 258-270, that this is not the case, others can know what the words refer to when they refer to inner experiences. So long as there is something independent to act as justification, having a word which refers to one's inner sensation does not render the word incomprehensible to another, when there is something independent to justify the use.
Furthermore, Wittgenstein suggests at 269, that the phrase you quote, "what only the speaker can know", is itself incoherent, because knowledge requires justification, and one cannot justify ones own use of words. This is only a case of the person "thinking he understands", which does not qualify as actual knowing, or understanding. "And sounds which no one else understands but which I
'appear to understand' might be called a 'private language'.
Quoting Luke
Sure, but you are still neglecting the context. He is asking at 243, a question, could we imagine such a language. This means that he is asking whether we can conceive of it, is it logically possible. He shows with the demonstration 258-270, that if all the words of the private language refer only to inner experiences, with no words referring to anything independent to act as justification, this language could not be understood by anyone else. However, the person using the private language could not be said to "know" or "understand" one's own private language, the person would only "appear" as if the language was understood.
But we need to acknowledge that this conclusion is due to the way that Wittgenstein restricts "know" and "understand" to rule (criteria) following activities, and claims that a person cannot privately follow a rule. Thinking that one is following a rule does not qualify as actually following a rule, therefore thinking that one knows does not qualify as actually knowing. But the fact that one can choose not to obey one's own 'private rule', and choose to act either according to one's 'private rule', or not, implies that if this cannot be called acting by a "rule" , we must still allow that it is something similar to a "rule". And since Wittgenstein offers no alternative to "rule", for describing why a person would appear to act as if one is following a rule, when the person is really doing something other than following a rule, the "private language" demonstration is really useless.
The word "So" indicates that another person cannot understand the language because, or as a consequence, of the preceding sentence, which states that the language refers to "what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations."
1. Do you acknowledge that Wittgenstein's private language refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations?
2. Furthermore, do you acknowledge that another person cannot understand Wittgenstein's private language because it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's not what Wittgenstein says. You have it backwards. He says that the words refer to what only the speaker can know, or "to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations."
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I haven't removed the phrase from its context. That's a non-argument. If you think that "what only the speaker can know" does not imply or is not equivalent to "what other people cannot know", then explain why not.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are trying to twist it to read as "only the speaker can know what the words refer to". What Wittgenstein actually says is that "the words refer to what only the speaker can know." Furthermore, he indicates quite clearly - in the same sentence - that what the words refer to, and what only the speaker can know, are the speaker's immediate private sensations.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That may well be, but we are still in the process of clarifying what Wittgenstein means by a private language. You initially said that you could not see the relevance of sensations, but you seem to have since changed your view on this. You are now still arguing that Wittgenstein's private language has two conditions: referring to one's immediate private sensations and that another person cannot understand the language. So I ask again:
1. Do you acknowledge that Wittgenstein's private language refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations?
2. Furthermore, do you acknowledge that another person cannot understand Wittgenstein's private language because it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations?
I don't think we should rush to discuss other sections until we have clarity on what Wittgenstein means by a private language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Sure, but you are neglecting that you said you could not see the relevance of sensations in relation to Wittgenstein's private language, so let's get clear about that first.
Right, that is what he is asking, if we can imagine such a language. Is it logically possible that a language which refers to inner sensations would make it so that the language could no be understood by others. And as I said a few days ago, the answer is yes, if all the words of the language referred only to inner sensations, because justification requires something independent. However, as I said yesterday, even the person using this language could not be said to know or understand the language (269). But this conclusion is due to Wittgenstein's definition of knowing and rule-following, which is not really consistent with common usage.
Quoting Luke
You are continuing to separate this phrase "what can only be known to the person speaking" from its context. It makes no sense to say that a person's private sensations can only be "known" to oneself. I can't even imagine what this could mean, to know one's own sensations. And it's clearly demonstrated at 258, that such a thing is impossible. There is no criterion of identity, no justification, and no such thing as "right". From the context, at 243, it appears very clear to me, that what Wittgenstein is talking about "knowing", is what the words of the private language refer to. He is not talking about knowing the private sensations themselves, whatever that might mean.
We might say that the passage at 243 appears ambiguous, if we were reading the book in order and hadn't gotten to 258 yet. But then, at 258 it is made very clear that what he is talking about is knowing what the words refer to, the particular thing referred to with "S", "the sensation" which gets named this way. What else could "know that sensation" mean, other than to be able to identify what "S" refers to? Now it ought to be clear to you that "what can only be known to the person speaking" is how to identify the thing called "S", so as to apply the name correctly. Therefore, 'I know that sensation', means I know how to identify it and properly apply the name. So, the ambiguity is resolved, "known" in the context of "only be known to the person speaking" means being capable of identifying, and applying the name, which is the same thing as knowing what the words refer to.
Quoting Luke
Yes, but this is the question he is asking. Can we imagine such a thing, is it logically consistent, that if only the person creating the language can know what the words refer to, does this necessitate (your use of "because" above) that the language cannot be understood by another? The answer is yes, but there are repercussions, the person speaking the language cannot even understand one's own private language. (But that is the consequence of another premise, Wittgenstein's restricted sense of "rule following", and "knowing" being dependent on justification and therefore rule-following.
So in reality Wittgenstein demonstrates the fault to be in the very first premise, 'the words of the private language refer to what can only be known to the person speaking'. This is incoherent, because "knowing" requires justification, which is a judgement of rule-following, implying more than one person, making "knowledge" necessarily something shared.
This is probably why the first premise was expressed a little bit ambiguously, to disguise the fact that his use of "known" is already logically inconsistent with the principles of rule-following which he has already laid down, and therefore incoherent.
Quoting Luke
The incoherency is clear in your question here. "Knowledge" for Wittgenstein is necessarily something public. That's the way he defines his terms, "rule-following", "criterion" "justification", etc.. Therefore, "what only the speaker can know", is in itself incoherent. There is no such thing as something known to only one person. The speaker can believe oneself to know something privately, and even act as if something is known privately, but as my quote from 269 demonstrates, for Wittgenstein this is just the appearance of knowing, it is not really knowing, just like thinking that oneself is following a rule, is not really following a rule.
Quoting Luke
I know that you think this way Luke, your private mode of understanding is to remove passages from their contexts, to ensure an interpretation which is consistent with your preconceived ideas. You have to look at what Wittgenstein says about rule-following and justification to understand what he means by "know".
Quoting Luke
"Out of context strawman." This phrase must mean something to you by now. What I said is that whether the words refer to inner sensations, or external things, is irrelevant to the meaning of 'only the person speaking can know what the words refer to'.
The 3rd edition of 243 states:
The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations.
My question was:
Do you acknowledge that Wittgenstein's private language refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations?
I'm not "separating" it from its context. Take it up with Wittgenstein if you can't imagine what it would mean, because that's what he says at 243. I want to know how you are reading 243 and what you think Wittgenstein means by a private language. That's why I asked you the question. But you just deflect and evade.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I want to know what you think Wittgenstein means by a private language as he describes it at 243, which is why I asked you the question. Whether or not this private language is possible or impossible is another matter. Let's get clear on what a private language is, first.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What evidence do you have for this reading? This does not appear to be supported by the text at 243.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein describes what he means by a private language at 243. How is it ambiguous?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Let's get clear on what he means at 243 before changing the subject to what he means at 258.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You do acknowledge that another person cannot understand Wittgenstein's private language because it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations? Then you must also acknowledge that Wittgenstein's private language refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. Right?
And if you acknowledge both of these things, then you must acknowledge that there are not two separate conditions of Wittgenstein's private language, but that it refers to one's immediate private sensations and that another person cannot understand it (both) because it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Let's not get ahead of ourselves. Let's first settle what Wittgenstein means by a private language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein says (in the 4th edition) "what only the speaker can know". Wittgenstein says in the 3rd edition "what can only be known to the person speaking". There is no incoherency in my question. I asked you how Wittgenstein's use of these phrases does not imply or is not equivalent to "what other people cannot know". I am talking about Wittgenstein's own description of a private language at 243. You are evading the question and trying to change the subject.
Yes I agree, but "known" is being used as indicated by258, as I explained. To know the sensation called S is to to be able to identify it and correctly apply the symbol. For instance, 'I know I have a toothache' means that I can correctly identify my sensation as a "toothache". So the phrase "the individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking" can be interpreted as meaning only the person speaking can identify the things being referred to by the words. "Know" means to be able to identify.
Quoting Luke
I interpret 'known' such that "to know" one's own sensations means 'to be able to correctly identify them, therefore to know what the words of the private language refer to. You seem to interpret "to know" in some other way which you have yet to explain. Unless we can agree as to what "known" means here we must concede that it is ambiguous.
Quoting Luke
How do you draw that conclusion? I think you can only draw that conclusion by omitting the fact that he is asking a question. 'Can we imagine such a language?' This question indicates that we are being asked to assess the validity of your use of "because". You say "another person cannot understand Wittgenstein's private language 'because' it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations". The "because" separates two distinct things which are implied to be causally related with the use of "because". When Wittgenstein asks 'could we imagine this' he is asking whether we can validate this supposed causal relation as logically necessary. That's what you are ignoring.
You appear to ignore the question, and assume that the necessary relation is dictated, or stipulated. Let's assume the following:
X=the words refer to what is known only to the person speaking, to his immediate private sensations.
Y=another person cannot understand the language.
Your use of "because" indicates that you interpret this proposition as a conditional statement If X then Y, Y is the necessary conclusion from X. I agree that this proposed "private language" can be interpreted as such a conditional proposition. However, you seem to take this proposition as a premise, from which to proceed, without recognizing that Wittgenstein has asked, could we imagine such a thing. So instead of stating as a premise, 'if X then Y', he is asking us to separate the hypothesis "X", from the conclusion "Y", to examine the validity of the proposed conditional statement. That's what he means by 'could we imagine such a language?'. He is asking, is it logically coherent.
What language? We need to know what sort of language it is before we can answer the question of whether we can imagine such a language. Wittgenstein tells us what sort of language it is at 243:
The first sentence can be read as:
The individual words of this language are to refer:
(i) to what can only be known to the person speaking; (that is:)
(ii) to his immediate private sensations.
The second sentence can be seen as a consequence of the first: The language refers to what can only be known to the speaker; to his private sensations. So [consequently] another person cannot understand the language.
You have been arguing against this reading for the last several pages. What's your reading?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So you now agree?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You said above that you agree that the private language can be interpreted as the conditional proposition.
You need to know what he means by a private language - what sort of language he is talking about - before you can proceed to question whether such a language can be imagined or whether it is a coherent concept. The private language is described by the conditional proposition; by the quote above of 243. Otherwise, what is the private language?
Yes, the question Wittgenstein asks at 243, is can we imagine a language such as the one described . Do you see this question at 243? Wittgenstein is asking us, can we imagine a language such as the one described, meaning is such a language logically possible.
Quoting Luke
Right, so the question. Can we imagine a language which has words that refer to a person's private sensations, and this produces the consequence that every other person cannot understand the language? Remember, with a common language a person uses words to refer to one's private sensations, but this does not produce the consequence that other people cannot understand it.
It is common in language that people use words to refer to their private sensations, and
this does not lead to the consequence that others cannot understand. But Wittgenstein is asking can we imagine a situation where this will lead to the consequence that others cannot understand.
Do you agree, that this is the question being asked at 243. Is it possible that a language which refers to one's private sensations could produce the consequence that no one else could understand? In common language a person refers to one's private sensations, but it does not produce this consequence.
The premise is not only that the language refers to one's private sensations. The premise is that the language refers to "what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations". You continue to overlook that the language refers to what can only be known to the person speaking. Remember, with a common language a person does not use words to refer to what can only be known to them.
Furthermore, you stated that you accepted the conditional proposition that another person cannot understand the language because it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's not what he's asking because the premise is not only that the language refers to one's private sensations. The premise is that the language refers to "what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations".
This premise is the one shown to be incoherent, at 258. Remember, there is no "right" here, so a person using a private symbol cannot be said to "know" the thing referred to with the symbol. It is impossible that only the person speaking can know one's own sensations. This is due to the way that Wittgenstein describes understanding and knowing, as requiring justification and rule-follow, which is something requiring the judgement of another person. And this is why Wittgenstein's "private language" is logically incoherent.
Read 269, and the relationship between what he calls "subjective understanding", and the private language. The person using the private language cannot be said to "know" his immediate private sensations, he only appears to, as it is a subjective understanding, not true knowing.
You're rushing ahead again and you've missed my point. Let's be clear on what the private language is before you start denouncing it as incoherent.
What Wittgenstein means by a private language is that its words refer to what can only be known to the speaker, and what can only be known to the speaker are his immediate private sensations.
If this is the premise, then Wittgenstein's private language does not have two separate conditions. You previously claimed that it did (e.g. see the quote at the top of this page).
As a result of this premise, the language cannot be understood by another person.
Regardless of whether this is incoherent or why, this is what Wittgenstein means by a private language. Do you agree?
That is the second condition.
You see the two as one, because you think that the second necessarily follows from the first. But the second does not follow from the first, because of the incoherency of the first. If the hypothesis of a conditional is incoherent, then the proposed conclusion does not follow, and the two must be apprehended as distinct.
So your statement "As a result of this premise, the language cannot be understood by another person" is a false statement. This does not follow from the premise, "as a result", because the premise is incoherent so nothing can follow logically from it. You want to reject the incoherency of the premise as irrelevant and claim that the second thing "the language cannot be understood by another" follows logically from the premise, but we cannot proceed from an incoherent premise to claim that anything follows logically from it.
You continue to ignore the fact that Wittgenstein asks a question at 243. Can we imagine such a language? He is not telling us to imagine a language such as..., he is asking if it is possible to imagine a language such as... Do you grasp the difference?. He is not telling us that the second follows from the first, he is asking us if it does. Of course he knows that it does not, because he is about to demonstrate that the first is incoherent. So he would be a fool to stipulate that "the language cannot be understood by another person" follows necessarily from the premise, as you insist, because he is about to demonstrate that it does not.
You said earlier that "this proposed "private language" can be interpreted as such a conditional proposition."
That is, you earlier seemed to be saying that the private language is described by the conditional proposition, if X then Y. However, you now appear to be saying that the private language is described only by the premise X.
If the private language is described only by the premise X, then the conclusion Y does not describe the private language and cannot be a condition of the language. Therefore, it is not a second condition.
Also, you are now saying that only X is incoherent, but that Y is not. Whereas I see Wittgenstein as saying that both X and Y describe the private language and that both are incoherent. What makes you think that the conclusion, Y, is coherent? .
Don't you think that Wittgenstein's private language argument is an argument against the coherency of a private language; against the coherency of a language that another person cannot understand?
Luke, the concept of "a private language" is incoherent from the outset, so there is no point in trying to determine what Wittgenstein means by "private language". There is nothing there but an incoherency, and we would go around in circles forever trying to understand a logical incoherency, when such a thing is impossible.
Suppose he had said 'Can we imagine a square circle? And what I mean by a square circle is an equilateral rectangle which has a circumference with each point equidistant from the centre.' You would see right away that we cannot imagine such a thing as the named "square circle" because it is logically incoherent, so there would be no point in discussing what does he mean by "square circle" because it's an incoherency. There would be no such thing as what he means by "square circle", because he has presented us with something incoherent.
This is exactly what he does with the proposition 'could we imagine a private language, and by "private language" I mean...'. He presents us with something logically incoherent and asks us if we can imagine such a thing. Of course the incoherency is a lot more subtle, and difficult to apprehend, and this was intentional by Wittgenstein, to create the appearance that what he proposes might actually hold the possibility of being logically coherent. But once the description given is understood as logically incoherent, then we must conclude that it is impossible to understand what Wittgenstein means by "private language".
Quoting Luke
No, I do not think it's an argument "against the coherency of a language that another person cannot understand". When the hypothesis of the conditional (the words refer to what is only known by the speaker) is demonstrated as incoherent, there is nothing we can logically say about the proposed conclusion of the conditional. So there is nothing presented to validly produce the conclusion you present me with. What is demonstrated is that a person who is privately using symbols (call this a private language-game if you want), cannot actually know or understand one's own usage, because knowing and understanding requires an independent justification.
There is no demonstration whereby we might conclude that other people cannot come to know or understand the private language-game. And so, "sounds which no one else understands but which I
'appear to understand''' (269) might become understood and known by others, as this private game is endowed with rules, becoming part of a common language.
Furthermore, I think that Wittgenstein presents this as a common occurrence and feature of natural language, that a private language-game (one in which the user of the language-game cannot be said to understand or know the language-game being played) gets integrated into the common language. And I think he presents this as a possible reason why the common languages consist of so many different language-games. .
Let me reply to this in a way which might be more clear to you Luke. A person could have a language, which oneself does not know or understand the usage of the words, yet the person could appear to understand the usage of the words (269), and Wittgenstein does not provide the required demonstration to show that it is necessarily the case that another person would be able to understand that language. So there is no argument "against the coherency of a language that another person cannot understand". That the person cannot know and understand one's own usage, in a private language-game (which is what is demonstrated), does not lead to the conclusion that another person will necessarily know or understand that language-game. So the person would have a private language-game, and it is not necessarily the case that others could understand it. Therefore "a language that another person cannot understand" is not ruled out as incoherent, but this language would not be known or understood to the person using it as well.
If we cannot understand what Wittgenstein means by a private language, then how does his private language have two conditions as you claim?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How can the concept of a private language be incoherent on the one hand, but then a private language can exist and become integrated into the common language on the other hand? How can a private language exist if the concept of a private language is incoherent?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In what sense could a person "have" this language? They don't know or understand the language, but yet they "have" it? How?
Just like any logically incoherent proposal can have two conditions. That's why I presented the square circle example. In this example, the one alone is not logically incoherent, it is the inconsistency between the two which produces the incoherency.
Quoting Luke
This is why I explicitly referred to it as a "private language-game" rather than a "private language", to avoid this problem. What is presented at 258 is a language-game. A "language" consists of a multitude of language-games. The example at 258 is not an example of a "private language". We discussed this already, it is an example of a private language-game (the private use of S to name something) within the context of a common language (S is a sensation).
Quoting Luke
The person can have, and use this language In the same sense that the person has and uses the private language-game described at 258. We can imagine that a person might have an entire language full of such private language-games. This person does not know or understand the use of "S", but is still using "S".
[quote=PI 258] But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'[/quote]
What produces the incoherency in Wittgenstein's "private language" definition, is the condition that the person "knows' what the words refer to. If we remove this condition we could define "private language", such that the person has a "private" language, and does not know what the words refer to, as in the example at 258. But the person might still "appear to understand" what the words refer to (269). That is why 258 is not an example of a "private language" as defined at 243. The person at 258 does not "know" what the symbol "S" refers to, as required by 243.
I believe that what Wittgenstein was trying to demonstrate is that any proposed form of a "private" language could not produce "knowledge", as knowledge is understood in epistemology, requiring justification. The proposed form of "private language", defined at 243, requires that the speaker knows what the words refer to, and so is ruled out as impossible. But other forms of "private" language, similar to the language-game described at 258, which consist of word use without knowing, might be very possible and very real.
So your two conditions of the private language are:
(i) it refers to one's immediate private sensations; and
(ii) another person cannot understand it.
Is that right? If so, what about:
(iii) "the words of this language refer to what can only be known by the person speaking".
How does this fit in? Is it another condition? How does it differ from (i) and (ii)?
I don't consider these to be different conditions or criteria at all. Given your square circle example, your two conditions appear to be instead that:
(i) it's a language; and
(ii) it's private.
That it's a language is a given in Wittgenstein's description. At 243 he describes how it's private: it refers to one's private sensations, it refers to what only the speaker knows, and another person cannot understand it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Nonsense. You cannot have a language-game without a language, and you cannot have a private language-game without a private language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is supposed that the person at 258 associates a certain sensation with the sign 'S'. Wittgenstein has us question the purpose of this ceremony and how or whether it could constitute a language, or a language-game.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I cannot imagine it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How is it a language? The person is using "S" for what purpose?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is supposed that the person knows what "S" refers to at 258 because they are associating
"S" with a certain sensation and "writ[ing] this sign in a calendar for every day on which [they] have the sensation."
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The language is not private because a person might appear to understand? What does "appear to understand" mean in terms of a private language? How can an outsider know how it appears to understand a private language?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You said that a private language was an incoherent concept and that we cannot understand what Wittgenstein means by it, but you are now speaking as though it is not only a perfectly coherent concept, but that a private language could actually exist. That's quite a turnaround. Next you'll tell me that square circles can exist.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So it's a private language but the speaker does not know what the words mean? How is it a language? What is it used for?
There is no language-game described at 258. There is nothing more than an association of a sign with a sensation.
You can take it as another condition if you want, that might be best way.
Quoting Luke
Where's your proof of this? If a language consists of a multitude of language-games, then most likely there was a first language-game prior to there being a language.
Quoting Luke
It is explicitly stated at the end of 258, that there is no such thing as the correct use of S, there is no right here. "There is no criterion of correctness" Therefore we can conclude that the person cannot "know" the sensation called S. You seem to be missing the gist of the example. "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation", does not mean that I actually can do that. "Want" implies a lack of. That I want to know my own sensations implies that I actually do not know them. The conclusion at the end of 258 is that I cannot come to know "a certain sensation" in the way proposed by the example.
Quoting Luke
Have you read 269 yet. I keep referring to it, and you refuse to acknowledge it, insisting that we must understand what "private language" at 243 means first. But you need to accept that "private language" as described at 243 is incoherent, and move along to Wittgenstein's next proposal of "private language", the one at 269, which is inconsistent with 243, as different from it. The definition at 243 has been demonstrated as incoherent because the person cannot "know" what the words refer to. So at 269, there is a proposal that the "private language" user has a "subjective understanding" of what the words refer to, rather than actually knowing what the words refer to as "private language" at 243 requires . In this sense of "private language", at 269, the person might "appear to understand", rather than actually "know" which is required at 243.
Quoting Luke
Yes, the revised definition of "private language", offered at 269, is coherent, and describes something which could actually exist.
Quoting Luke
Perhaps you ought to read Wittgenstein a little bit closer, to provide yourself with a better understanding, then the answers to these questions might be revealed to you.
Quoting Luke
Why do you think that associating a sign with a sensation does not qualify to be called a "language-game"?
How does (iii) differ from (i) and (ii)?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I quoted PI 7. You failed to comment.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Then that language-game would constitute the language. See PI 7. Therefore, a private language and/or private language-game cannot exist because they are incoherent concepts.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Right. Therefore, the supposed private language cannot get off the ground.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is not a "next proposal" or a new proposal for a different sort of private language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
269 focuses only on a person's behaviour, and on the behavioural criteria for saying that a (another) person understands or does not understand a word. Wittgenstein also gives a third option: "criteria for his ‘thinking he understands’, attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one." To be clear, this is about understanding a word of our public language, and the person does not actually understand here.
In this latter case, "sounds which no one else understands but which I ‘appear to understand’ might be called a “private language”." But that does not mean that it is a private language (or any language). Having shown the incoherency of a private language "from the inside" as it were, Wittgenstein allows for the possibility that, from an outsider's perspective, others might refer to this sort of behaviour as a "private language". The point is that this ascription has nothing to do with any private internal object.
Here is what the SEP article on Private Language says about it:
Quoting SEP article on Private Language
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What's the definition? Why is this not as incoherent as the private language of 243?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Hiding behind your misplaced condescension does not answer the question.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Because:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Your suggestion that one can speak or know or "have" a language that one does not understand is ludicrous.
Sorry Lujke, I don't follow your logic. What makes the "private language" described at 243 incoherent is the condition that the speaker "knows" what the words refer to. If we remove that condition, as Wittgenstein does at 269, and replace it with the condition that the speaker has a "subjective understanding", or might merely "appear to understand" what the words refer to in a private language, then "private language" is no longer incoherent.
Quoting Luke
What kind of nonsense is this? Of course it is not a "private language" as described at 243, but now Wittgenstein has decided to call something else a "private language". Do you remember or discussion about ambiguity? If "private language" is intentionally used ambiguously, then its meaning is ambiguous. We cannot say that either the first or the second "private language: is "the private language" intended by Wittgenstein, the meaning is left ambiguous.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's not my logic; it's Wittgenstein's. Did you read the part of PI 7 that I quoted above? Here it is again:
What Wittgenstein calls a language-game includes "the whole, consisting of language and the activities into which it is woven". As I said, you cannot have a language-game without a language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How does this "condition" make it incoherent?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Appearances can be deceiving. What is it that he appears to understand? Wittgenstein tells us at 269 that the alleged private linguist is "attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one". Doesn't this imply that he does not understand the meaning of the word? To paraphrase 246, if we are using the word “understand” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then this person does not understand the meaning of the word. It is not coherent for a person to have or to know a private language that they do not understand.
Do you consider there to be a difference between having and knowing a language?
The SEP article offers a different reason for the incoherency:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Nah, he's talking about the same private language throughout.
That definition of :"language" at 7, is itself logically incoherent, by a fallacy of composition. It is incoherent to have the whole, and the parts which make up the whole, go by the same name (language-game).
Quoting Luke
We went through this already. As demonstrated at 258, there is no criterion of correctness, no "right" here, so the condition, that what the words refer to is "known" by the speaker, is necessarily violated. It is logically impossible, by the principles employed by Wittgenstein, that the speaker knows what the words refer to. This makes the "private language", as described at 243, incoherent.
Quoting Luke
Yes, all of this I agree with. Wittgenstein demonstrates at 258 that the diarist does not know or understand one's own usage of the symbol "S". That is what is intended with "I have no criterion of correctness".
Remember the example I gave, when I see someone with the same hat as me. I judge it as "the same" the moment I apprehend it, without applying any criteria. At that moment when I see it and judge it as 'the same" I cannot say that "I know" the hat is the same as mine, nor can I say that "I understand" why I judge it as the same as mine, it simply appears to me to be the same, so I judge it as the same.
Quoting Luke
Now, what makes the private language described at 243 incoherent, is the condition that the speaker must know what the words refer to. So, if you take this sentence and remove "or to know" as a requirement, then we can also remove "not" from in front of "coherent". So we are left with "It is coherent for a person to have a private language which they do not understand.
That, "the private language which they do not understand", I tell you, is the "private language" presented at 269. This is a fully coherent "private language" (if we overlook Wittgenstein's problematic definition of "language" referred to above, which is really not relevant at this point)), in which the speaker might "appear to understand" the use of the words, through some form of "subjective understanding", which does not qualify as "knowing".
Quoting Luke
Of course there is a difference between having and knowing a language. There is a huge difference between having a capacity, and knowing the capacity which you have. But of course there are many different definitions of "know", and one might make "knowing" synonymous with "having", in the case of language. And this would not be the sense of "knowing" which Wittgenstein employs because each time a person who has, (and "knows", if it is supposed to be synonymous with having) a language, yet incorrectly uses a word, we'd have the contradiction of the person both knowing and not knowing the same language at the same time. You might see that this also could be a feature of the incoherent definition of "language" that you insist on above, which produces a fallacy of composition.
Quoting Luke
How can you not see the inconsistency of "private language" between 243 and 269? At 243, what the words refer to, is "known" to the speaker of the language. At 269 the speaker of the private language has a "subjective understanding", which causes him to "appear to understand" what the words refer to. Surely you will not insist that these two are "the same".
How does that help your reading of Wittgenstein?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This presupposes that the words have an established (private) use, are used to refer, and it is only that the speaker doesn't know how to use them. It is far more catastrophic than this: there is no such private language to be known, because there cannot be such a language.
This is no different for the purported "other" private language at 269.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
"S" cannot have a usage because there is no criterion of correctness. A usage implies a repeatable technique of applying the word; implies a rule for using the word/sign in such-and-such a way. Without this, there can be no language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Does "subjective understanding" qualify as understanding? Because you are claiming that a person can have a private language which they do not understand.
How is it "fully coherent" that there can be a speaker of a private language who does not understand, know, or speak his own private language?
No it doesn't presuppose any such thing, it is the example at 258, where the person is establishing a use for the sign "S". The person privately develops a use for "S" without knowing what "S" refers to.
Quoting Luke
Right, they are the very same thing. But "private language" as described at 243 requires that the person knows what the symbols refer to (that's one of the conditions). So the example at 258 does not qualify as a private language because the person doesn't know what the symbol "S" refers to. Yet the description at 269, which is not different from the example at 258, is called a "private language". That's because Wittgenstein offers two distinct meanings for "private language", one at 243, the other at 269.
Quoting Luke
But usage is not excluded from "S". That's what Wittgenstein demonstrates(270). Even when the person does not know what the symbol "S" refers to, there may still be a use for "S". After he dismisses the requirement that the person "knows" what "S" refers to, in order for "S" to be useful, the "private language", under the new description, is a reality.
Quoting Luke
No, "subjective understanding", as Wittgenstein uses it does not qualify as understanding, it might make the person "appear to understand" though. He describes it as "attaching some meaning to the word,
but not the right one". A good example of "subjective understanding" is your supposed "understanding" of Wittgenstein's "private language".
ed.: Just so that you don't take this as an insult, there is no "correct" understanding of Wittgenstein's "private language". Because of the two descriptions, it is ambiguous, so there is no "correct understanding".
Quoting Luke
Of course the person speaks the private language, he just does not understand or "know" it. That's what's exemplified at 258. "One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'". See, the person has a use for "S", and uses "S", but it cannot be the "correct" use of "S", because there is no such thing as the correct use of "S". So the diarist has a "subjective understanding" of what "S" refers to, meaning that he might appear like he understands the meaning of "S", but what he is thinking is the meaning cannot be "the right" meaning, so he really doesn't understand.
The person does not "develop a use for "S"". Wittgenstein asks us to imagine this development, but upon closer inspection, this development cannot get off the ground.
At 258, he notes that "S" cannot be defined. However, he tries to give himself a "kind of ostensive definition" by "concentrating [his] attention on the sensation" while he writes the sign down. But this is problematic:
Wittgenstein tells us at 258 that he cannot commit to memory the connection between the sign and the sensation because there is no criterion of correctness here. If he cannot commit the connection to memory, then no use for "S" can be developed. Therefore. "S" cannot refer to anything.
Here is the SEP article on 258:
Quoting SEP article on Private Language
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are still presupposing that the symbols can refer. You are missing the fact that a use for "S" cannot be developed.
It's not that knowledge of a private language is impossible; it's that a private language is impossible.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I quoted the SEP article regarding 269 and 270 the other day if you'd care to read it. What 270 shows is that the sensation is irrelevant to the usage of "S" and/or that the usage of "S" is not really private.
"S" is said to signify the sensation that one's blood pressure is rising. Whether one's blood pressure is actually rising (or has actually risen) is something that can be publicly verified with a manometer.
If one incorrectly uses "S" at a time when one's blood pressure is not rising, then "S" does not actually signify the sensation that one's blood pressure is rising. Otherwise, one has made an error and misused "S". However, such an error is not meant to be possible in a private language with no criterion of correctness. On the other hand, if one correctly uses "S" at a time when one's blood pressure is rising, then there is no difference between using "S" to refer to one's sensation and using "S" to refer to one's (publicly verifiable) blood pressure. In this latter case, "S" is effectively a public sign.
Either way, "S" cannot be a private sign.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What might make the person "appear to understand" though? If "subjective understanding" is not understanding, then what is it?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There can be no such language, so there is nothing to "understand" (whatever "understand" means).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Oh right, of course. I speak Japanese, except that I don't know or understand it.
Sure it gets "off the ground", keep reading, by 270 "S" has a use.
Quoting Luke
The meaning of "S" cannot be known by the person. There is no disagreement between us here. That's why the demonstration at 258 does not qualify as a "private language" as described at 243. However, it does qualify as a "private language" as described at 269, where it is not required that the meaning is known. It is only required that the word has a use, as developed at 270.
Where we seem to disagree is whether "S" can have a use when its meaning is not known. You do not seem to be able to grasp this fact of language, that people sometimes use words when they do not know the meaning of them.
Quoting Luke
You are distorting what Wittgenstein wrote with your habitual misreading. He did not say that "S" cannot refer to anything, nor did he demonstrate that, and it is an invalid conclusion on your part. Every time he writes "S" in the book, it refers to something. That it might refer to something different every time he uses it does not negate the fact that it refers to something each time. He said "whatever is going to seem right to me is right".
We have now uncovered a second sense of ambiguity, distinct from the other sense we discussed. What we discussed was using a word once, to imply possible different meanings, like your example of "bank". Now we have using a word numerous times "S" in the example at 258, each time potentially referring to something different.
This is what has happened with Wittgenstein's use of "private language". At 243 it refers to one thing, then at 269 it refers to something different.
Quoting Luke
This is simply incorrect. And that's very obvious. The symbol "S" does refer, and a use is developed, despite the fact that the use is described as "whatever is going to seem right to me is right".
Quoting Luke
Sorry, I'm not interested in secondary sources, and appeals to authority. The only authority here is Wittgenstein's writing itself.
Quoting Luke
Regardless of what you got from SEP, the use described at 270 is purely private. "So I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus." That's a private use, he is describing, regardless of how you depict as "something that can be publicly verified". It cannot necesaarily be publicly verified because the public, just like the private language user has no criterion as to whether he has the "correct" sensation. The manometer will say whether the blood pressure rises, but the private language user could say whatever he wants, refusing to cooperate with your proposed public verification. Therefore the use described at 270 is purely private.
Do you accept that "private language" as described at 269, is completely different from "private language" as described at 243?
Quoting Luke
Obviously, that's what is explained at 270. Something like the manometer would serve that purpose. "Subjective understanding" is use for a purpose. "Let us suppose I regularly identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least. And that alone shews that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show. " For the person using "S" there is purpose and use, for the public it is pure show, it appears like the person knows what he is doing. Neither of these justify "the person knows what he is doing".
I've read it, thanks. The use of "S" cannot be private in the scenario of 270, as I explained.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There is a disagreement. Unlike you, I don't presuppose that "S" has any meaning or use.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The only use "S" has at 270 is public. At 269 it is the public who describe the person as "appearing to understand" and as having a "private language". These descriptions are made in a public language, not a private one. At 270 "S" can only have a public use, as I explained.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein says this in order to demonstrate that the repeatable technique for applying "S" cannot be established, not to say that "S" will simply have a different use each time. What sort of use is that? How can a word mean something different every time and still function as a word? How is that language? It's just some random association without any persisting meaning. It cannot have any meaning even on one occasion.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The only purpose of this "intentional ambiguity" line of argumentation is to account for your own inability to understand. You complain that the author is being intentionally ambiguous (why would he?) for no other reason except that you fail to grasp what he means.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is not using a private language; it is misusing the public language.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What does it refer to?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What is its use?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That explains your own terrible reading. Why trust the experts or even hear them out, right?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's not my depiction, it's Wittgenstein's:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's not my public verification; it's the manometer's. Otherwise he would not be able to say that his blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus, as Wittgenstein tells us.
If you think 270 helps support the possibility of a private language, then why are you attempting to deny the scenario presented there? Do you think that Wittgenstein - as the diarist in the scenario at 270 - will refuse to cooperate with his own scenario at 270?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If the use described at 270 were purely private, then there could be no possibility of error. As 258 tells us, a private language has no criterion of correctness and whatever seems right to the private linguist is right. However, it is possible that the diarist could mark "S" in their diary and yet the manometer tells us that his blood-pressure is falling, not rising. But "S" is supposed to signify that his blood-pressure is rising. How do you account for this possibility of error if the use is "purely private"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I must have missed it. Could you explain it?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Serve what purpose?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How can the private linguist misidentify their sensation? What criterion of correctness is there? Whatever is going to seem right is right.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What purpose or use?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How does this make the private language possible? If the person doesn't really know what they are doing, then - contrary to Wittgenstein's scenario - are they not really able to say that their blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus?
This is such a blatant misreading, I think it must be intentional. "I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus" is very clearly a private purpose. Whether he has a public audience when he says "my blood pressure is rising", is completely irrelevant to this use. And, as he describes, if there was a public audience, they would have no way of knowing if he was getting it wrong (which would always be the case, as per269, because he doesn't "know"), and it would be as if the machine (being replaced by him now) is just for show, not even turned on. This is an example of the "subjective understanding" described at 269, he would appear like he knew when his pressure was rising, but he really didn't, because he really can't know the sensation called "S", as described at 258.
Quoting Luke
There is no discussion of a "public verification" at 270, there is the exact opposite. After the diarist discovers, for himself (privately), with the use of a manometer, that the sensation coincides with a rise in blood pressure, he starts to say "my blood pressure is rising" instead of "S". He does this without the use of the machine. So there is no public verification. Now, his use of "my blood pressure is rising" is equivalent to his use of "S" at 258, and there is equally no such thing as "right" here. So he is just pretending to know when his blood pressure is rising, as described at 270, and this is an example of "subjective understanding" (269), what Wittgenstein describes as "...'thinking he understands', attaching some meaning to the word but not the right one.".
Quoting Luke
Again this is a blatant, apparently intentional, misreading, to support a completely wrong interpretation. What Wittgenstein concludes at 258 is not as you claim, "there could be no possibility of error", it is "And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'."
Your conclusion "no possibility of error" implies 'always right', which is the exact opposite of Wittgenstein's conclusion "here we can't talk about 'right'", which implies 'always wrong".
That the use of "S" is always wrong is the basis for the description of "subjective understanding" at 269, "attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one". It is only by this conclusion of "always wrong", that Wittgenstein can say that the user of the "private language" (as per the description at 269), associates a meaning which is "not the right one".
Quoting Luke
There, I explained it above, ruminate on that for a while. You clearly do not understand 270 because you think that the manometer serves as a public verification, when it does not. it just provides a private use. or a meaning for the private language user. The meaning of "S" is now "my blood pressure is rising". But as described, it is a subjective understanding, and therefore "not the right" meaning.
Quoting Luke
It is what is concluded at 258, "here we can't talk about right". When "right" is ruled out, we're left with necessarily wrong. And that's the basis of the second option at 269 "thinking he understands", which "might be called a 'private language'"
Quoting Luke
It's not "contrary to Wittgenstein's scenario, it is the exact scenario. The person clearly does not know when their blood pressure is rising, it's all just a show, a pretense. It appears as if the person knows when his blood pressure is rising but he does not, as 269 explains. The possibility that he "make a mistake" is excluded because he's not even doing what he appears, or pretends to be doing (determining when his blood pressure is rising) to begin with. It's a completely mistaken scenario, as if the machine is not even turned on. The machine cannot make a mistake if it's not even turned on. But pretending that it is turned on when it is not creates what is necessarily wrong, as in, 'we can't talk about the machine being right here'.
Now, let's get to the real issue, of disagreement between us. Do you apprehend that "private language" at 269 refers to something completely different from "private language" at 243?
Anybody else with a manometer could also measure his blood pressure. That's what makes it publicly verifiable whether or not his blood pressure is rising.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There is such a thing as "right" here. We can verify whether his blood pressure is actually rising with a manometer.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is inconsistent with the presentation of the scenario:
There is no pretence in this discovery.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
They would have a way of knowing if his blood pressure was rising or falling: by using a manometer.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He says this in relation to misidentifying the sensation, not in relation to being wrong about his blood pressure rising. We can verify whether or not his blood pressure is rising and whether he is right or wrong about that. What we cannot verify is whether he has correctly identified the sensation that he associates with his rising blood pressure. If he marks "S" in his diary and his blood pressure is measured as rising, then it makes no difference whether he identifies the sensation correctly or not.
When he identifies the sensation correctly, he marks "S" in his diary and his blood pressure is measured as rising, so the association between the sensation and his blood pressure holds true. But when he does not identify the sensation correctly, then he still marks "S" in his diary and his blood pressure is still measured as rising. In other words, he was correct about his blood pressure rising even though he misidentified the sensation. Therefore. it makes no difference to the correct use of "S" whether he identifies the sensation correctly or not. (This explains the 'mere ornament in the machine' metaphor.)
But, of course, it does make a difference to the use of "S" whether his blood pressure is measured as rising or falling, because then we have a criterion of correctness and can say whether or not his use of "S" was correct.
This might now lead you to question whether "S" actually refers to a sensation at all. Wittgenstein is well aware of this and invites the question:
The only reason to call "S" the name of a "particular sensation" is that the scenario presents it as such; that this is what is supposed. But the sensation effectively drops out of consideration as irrelevant here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is inconsistent with the scenario at 270 where he discovers from experience that whenever he has a particular sensation, a manometer shows that his blood pressure is rising. How can he discover this association from experience if he can't know the particular sensation called "S"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
At 258 he says that whatever is going to seem right to the private linguist is right. This means that we public linguists cannot talk about either "right" or "wrong" here (in the public sense of these words).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
At 269 we can talk about "wrong" and "right", because Wittgenstein is using these words in the public sense. A person attaches a meaning to a word, "but not the right one". The judgment that the person attaches the wrong meaning to the word is based on their publicly observable behaviour. Wittgenstein tells us that "one might speak of a subjective understanding" in this case. And what might be called a "private language" are "sounds which no one else understands but which I ‘appear to understand’".
"S" has a supposedly private use/meaning, so here we cannot talk about 'right' or 'wrong' (in the public sense of these words).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The meaning of "S" was not established privately in principle, because the rising of one's blood pressure is not private in principle. It can be verified by anyone with a manometer. If the meaning of "S" is now "my blood pressure is rising", then "S" can be used correctly or incorrectly and one's blood pressure can be verified as rising or falling. This is neither a subjective understanding nor a subjective correctness.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That the person knows when their blood pressure is rising is not ruled out as impossible at 270. In fact, it's how the meaning of "S" was supposedly established in the first place. Once again:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There is no mention of blood pressure at 269.
Getting back to the reason this thread was started, which had to do with the idea or belief that knowing can be something coming from within, i.e., it can be generated from the mind, a kind of self generation of what it means to know. I think this confusion may arise from the use of the word know as a kind of subjective certainty. In other words, one may say, "I know X is true," as a way of emphasizing one's subjective certainty. Hence, one confuses one use of the word know with another. In the case of the quote above, Gertie equates know with an experience, but not a sensory experience, but a kind of pointing to something unknown, the beetle-in-the-box kind of thing. Often religious people do this when they say that the Holy Spirit revealed something to me.
The reason the PLA was invoked was to dispel the notion that meaning can arise in this way. It seems then, that using know as an a kind of emphasis, can be shown in the way one expresses the word know, or gestures as one uses the word know. This is legitimate use, but it shouldn't be confused with objective knowledge or objective certainty.
It's as if Gertie has some private interpretation of know, an epistemological use without any objective confirmation.
Read what is written! It is "I" who uses the manometer, and "I" who can then say 'my blood pressure is rising'. There is absolutely no public verification described. And, if such a verification were proposed, the person who is "I" could decline it. Therefore a "public verification" is not even implied.
Quoting Luke
None of this is at all relevant to the text. It's all your imagination, based on your assumption of a public verification, which is so obviously not what is described at 270. What is described is that the person can say 'my blood pressure is rising' "without using any apparatus". There is no comparison between the person saying "my blood pressure is rising" and the readings of the machine described. What is described is that the person says "my blood pressure is rising' without any machine.
Quoting Luke
We've been through this already, you're not paying attention.
Quoting Luke
That's not what is written. He said "here we can't talk about 'right'". He does not say neither right nor wrong. Then, at 269, he provides a description of a "private language" which has the person " attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one." This "private language" at 269 is completely consistent with what is described at 258. At 269, the person attaches a meaning to the words, but a meaning other than 'the right meaning', because there is no such thing as "the right" meaning here, as explained at 258.
Almost all of your post consists of you persistently insisting that Wittgenstein wrote something different than he did.
Quoting Luke
Right, now do you agree that "private language" at 269 refers to something completely different from "private language" at 243.
Further, do you see that the "private language" referred to at 269 is completely consistent with the example at 258, while the "private language" referred to at 243 is not consistent with the example at 258?
Quoting Luke
The "correct" meaning of "S" is not established by the manometer, that's what Wittgenstein is explaining. That "S" means "my blood pressure is rising", is the "subjective understanding". The person thinks that they understand the meaning of "S", with reference to the manometer, but they really do not. The person has found a use, and therefore meaning, but it is not "the right meaning". It is the subjective understanding which is described at 269, as a "private language". The person appears to understand, having associated S with a meaning, but the meaning is not the right meaning.
The right meaning is that "S" is the name of "a sensation". As described at the end of 270, "S" is associated with a particular "sensation". And "sensation" is a public term, so the person must turn to the public language, justify that the thing referred to with "S" is actually "a sensation", as described (260-261), in order to understand the "right" meaning of "S"
I agree with you on that point, Wittgenstein is rejecting that subjective sense of "know", in favour of a criterion based, epistemological standard for "know". This is why the "private language" described at 243 has the speaker of the language knowing what the words refer to. And when this "private language" is shown to be incoherent at 258, because the speaker is lacking the required criterion for knowing, he proposes a different sort of "private language", at 269, one in which the speaker of the language has a "subjective understanding" of the words, rather than knowing them.
In case you've forgotten, Wittgenstein is investigating the possibility of a private language. Moreover, he is investigating the possibility of a private language in principle. That you might choose to be uncooperative or to keep a secret are beside the point, These have nothing to do with the privacy of language, in principle.
At 270, the relevant word/sign is the symbol "S" that Wittgenstein uses to refer to a particular sensation that he has found to be associated with his blood pressure rising.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He says at 258:
A private language has no criterion of correctness. Having no criterion of correctness implies having no criterion of incorrectness. If I think that the connection between the sign "S" and this particular sensation defines the sign correctly, this implies that I think that the connections between the sign "S" and other sensations define the sign incorrectly. By implication, whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct and whatever is going to seem incorrect to me is incorrect. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'correct' or 'incorrect'.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What makes you think that the diarist does not use "S" to refer to a sensation, or that they do not understand that they are using "S" to refer to a sensation?
Obviously, choice is a significant factor if we consider "private language" in any real way. The "private language" at 243 is fundamentally incoherent, so choice does not become a factor in this proposed private language. The "private language" at 269 is proposed as a real private language, existing in the context of real common language. Here, choice is relevant because the person must choose to maintain the "subjective understanding" of what the words refer to, rather than opting for "the right" understanding, which is given by integrating the private language into the common language. This is done when the speaker recognizes that "S" (private) is a "sensation" (common), rather than "S" (private) means "my blood pressure is rising" (private).
Quoting Luke
That's your interpretation, but it's obviously not what Wittgenstein actually wrote. He said "here we can't talk about 'correct'. He said nothing about 'incorrect'. It is very clear to me (but incomprehensible to you), that if we have a situation with no possibility of being correct, the possibility of being correct is excluded, then we can say that everything in this situation is incorrect.
Regardless, the "private language" described at 269, as "attaching some meaning to the word,
but not the right one", is very clearly consistent with both, yours and my interpretations. If there is neither correct nor incorrect in this situation, it is still consistent to say "not the right one", because 'neither correct nor incorrect' rules out the possibility of being correct. In the situation described at 258, if there is neither right nor wrong, we can say that whatever the diarist is thinking, is not right, because the possibility of being right has been excluded. And that is exactly what is said about the private language at 269, attaching a meaning but not the right one.
Quoting Luke
If 258 is supposed to be an example of a "private language", (I deny that it's a valid example as per 243, but accept that it is a valid example as per 269), then the user of that language does not understand "S" as referring to a "sensation", because "sensation" is a word of common language. If the diarist understood "S" as referring to a sensation, this would mean that the person understands "S" in the right way (consistent with, and part of, the common language), therefore the "subjective understanding" described at 269 would be ruled out, and it could not be a private language.
Quoting Sam26
How many months has it taken Luke and I to work through the chaff, and get to the topic of the thread? I think that either Luke and I are very dim, or Wittgenstein is very difficult to understand. Or both.
The private language described at 243 is one where the word/symbol refers to what can only be known by the speaker. This is not merely “a sensation” or just any old sensation. It is a “certain sensation” or a “particular sensation”, the nature of which is private and known only to the speaker (one’s “immediate private sensations”). The word/symbol does not simply refer to any general sensation, or to the common meaning of the word “sensation”, as you suggest. And “my blood pressure rising” is not private in principle, because it can be verified by others.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not right = wrong. If there is neither right nor wrong, then we cannot say that whatever the diarist is thinking is not right. That would be wrong. You know what “neither” means?
Regarding 269, I view it as Wittgenstein’s view of the only possible thing that we might actually call a private language, which is where some individual behaves as though they actually understand sounds or words that nobody else understands. We are not told what the words or sounds of this language refer to, and I don’t see how such an individual understanding would be possible, but it is Wittgenstein’s concession regarding the possibility of a private language.
If Wittgenstein is correct about meaning, viz., that it’s a rule-based use that happens in social settings, then it’s an error to think that one’s use of know is based on some internal mechanism of the mind. In other words, the association of the word know with some internal or subjective mechanism gives us the false idea that we have privileged internal access to knowledge. This idea removes the concept know from its social foundation where its meaning, again, is derived.
Wittgenstein asks the following question in PI 243, “…could we imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and the rest—for his private use?” He’s not asking if we can use the language that we’re familiar with, to write down our private feeling, moods, etc., obviously we are able to do this. He’s asking if we can use words “…to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations.” So, the person in this example is using a completely private language, to refer to his/her private sensations. Remember, no one else understands the language of this person, it’s completely devoid of any social context.
Next, Wittgenstein asks, “In what sense are my sensations private?—Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense (PI 246).” It’s wrong to think that people “surmise” you’re in pain, as if they have to guess it, i.e., they see your screams of agony, or they see your injury - it’s not a matter of surmising. Of course, someone could be faking their pain, or lying, but generally it’s true that for the most part we know when someone is in pain. Wittgenstein’s interlocuter asks, “Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself (PI 246)!” It’s here that we get to the crux of the matter, for what could such a statement mean? Do I discover or learn that I’m in pain? Having knowledge, or the process of knowing, is a process of discovery. Again, do I discover that I’m in pain, or learn that I’m in pain? This seems to be, and is, nonsense. Wittgenstein asks, “It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain (PI 246)?” The adding of the word know is meaningless in this situation. It’s as if you’re discovering your own awareness, “Oh, I’m in pain, gee, I didn’t know that until just this moment.”
Could you be in pain and not know it, then somehow discover it? The closer we look at these kinds of statements, the more nonsensical they become. We need to ask, “What would it mean to not know I’m in pain?” One of the ways to understand the use of the word know, is to consider its negation, again, “I don’t know I’m in pain.” Knowing and not knowing have to be seen in juxtaposition. This seems to be why “I know I’m in pain,” amounts to no more than, “I’m in pain.” Why? Because there is no not knowing I’m in pain. I’m either aware of my pain, or I’m not aware. It’s part of being conscious.
Clearly, at 270, "my blood pressure is rising" is not verified by others, so it remains a private principle. And if the individual refuses, it cannot be verified.
Quoting Luke
So, do you think that what is said at 270 relates to the "private language" described at 243, or to the one described at 258 and 269?
Quoting Sam26
Actually adding the word "know" to "I'm in pain", to say instead "I know I am in pain" does a lot more than what Wittgenstein admits here. "I am in pain" states a simple opinion which the audience ought to allow as possibly true or false. "I know I am in pain" implies that I know what pain is, and what I experience has been judged to fulfill the criteria of "pain".
The issue is with the example which he has chosen. Since we take it for granted that everyone knows what "pain" means, then when someone says "I am in pain", unless we have reason to believe the person is lying, we take it as synonymous with "I know I am in pain" because everyone knows the criterion for "pain" as unpleasantness.
If we take as examples, more complex medical or psychological conditions, the difference starts to becomes evident. If someone says for example. "I have ..." a specified disorder, we might ask "have you been diagnosed?" But if the person says instead, "I know I have..." the specified disorder, we would tend to think that there's been a diagnosis.
Of course you don't actually know what Wittgenstein means by a private language. No wonder this has been so difficult. Here are two separate explanations:
Quoting Private language argument (Wikipedia)
Quoting Private language (SEP)
All that matters regarding the rising blood pressure is that it is possible that others can know it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think that they all relate to the same concept of a private language.
Luke, I told you the way I feel about secondary sources. They are an invalid form of appealing to authority, because the only true authority is the author.
You continue to ignore the facts of what has been written in the text. What Wittgenstein "means by a private language" is distinctly different at 243, from what it is at 269. These two are incompatible as logically inconsistent with each other.
Now, just like you said to me, there is no point in proceeding with the discussion until I fully understand what Wittgenstein says at 243, I can now say that there is no point in proceeding until you come to respect the difference between 243 and 269.
I think we can look at two possible reasons for Wittgenstein's 'change of mind' We might decide that he is intentionally being ambiguous. As I explained earlier, if this is the case there would be no such thing as "what Wittgenstein means by a private language". Another possibility, and I believe this is what the evidence indicates, is that he changed his mind as to what would constitute a "private language". The example at 258 shows that a "private language" as described at 243 is completely incoherent. So he proceeded to offer another proposal, a more realistic proposition as to what constitutes a "private language". This is actually a common practise in philosophical writing, initiated by Plato. It's called Platonic dialectics. And Wittgenstein is known to have read some Plato. You'll see in the Theaetetus for example, that the participants in the dialogue move through a number of proposed definitions of "knowledge", demonstrating each to be unacceptable, for one reason or another.
Therefore I think you ought to recognize that it would not be at all unusual for a writer of philosophy, like Wittgenstein, to propose a definition of "private language", demonstrate the definition to be unacceptable, then proceed to offer another definition. If, in the end, an acceptable definition is not found, as in the Theaetetus an acceptable definition of knowledge is not found, this does not that there is no such thing as what is meant by the words. It means that we do not properly understand the meaning of the words. It is only if the ambiguity is created intentionally that it is actually the case that there is no such thing as what the words mean.
.
What's your argument for this?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How is the private language described at 269 completely coherent?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
258 does not mention the word "know".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are conflating two things here. 269 states:
The last sentence of 269 does not refer back to the earlier sentences. There are two separate descriptions here:
(1) We might speak of a "subjective understanding" in relation to the behavioural criteria of a man 'thinking he understands' the meaning of a word, but who does not really understand because he attaches the wrong meaning to the word.
(2) Sounds which no one else understands but which I 'appear to understand' might be called a "private language".
You seem to think that (1) and (2) both continuously refer to a private language. I disagree as I think that only (2) refers to a private language.
We are told that the man attaches the wrong meaning to a word at (1), but not at (2). However, as I have argued, if you accept the reasons for the incoherency of a private language given at 258, then we can talk about neither "right" nor "wrong" regarding the meaning of a word/sign in a private language, because it lacks any criteria of correctness and/or incorrectness. As such, it is not possible to correct the private language user on the use/meanings of its signs, which can have no regularity or rules for their usage. We might give the name "private language" to the sounds which only one person appears to understand, but this doesn't abrogate the incoherency issues of a private language cited at 258.
I went through this. At 243 "private language" requires that what the words refer to is "known" to the user of the language. This is shown to be incoherent by the example at 258. So at 269, it is suggested that we could call it a "private language" when the speaker has a "subjective understanding" of the words; when one attaches meaning to the words, but not the right meaning, and therefore appears to know the meaning of the words when no one else does.
Quoting Luke
Well, I don't see any incoherency demonstrated by Wittgenstein for what he is calling a "private language", at 269. I suppose that if you think it's incoherent you ought to be able to demonstrate that. Do you not believe that attaching meaning which is not the right meaning, and having that 'meaning'. private to oneself, is a coherent concept?
Quoting Luke
Yes, you've demonstrated to me very clearly that you enjoy removing statements from their context, to give them your own 'private meaning'. That, despite your appeals to authority, you have shown me consistently in this discussion. Why would you remove the final sentence of a paragraph, from the context of that paragraph, and place it into a different context? In some schools of formal writing we are taught to use the final sentence as a sort of summary of the paragraph.
I think it's very clear that "sounds which no else understands, which I appear to understand", is a form of what has been called "subjective understanding". What he is saying can be described in this way: these are words which no one understands (there is no 'right' here), but I pretend to understand. That's why i used the word "pretense" earlier, which you objected to. The person is "thinking he understands", and so is acting as if he understands, even to the point of exuding certitude, when he really does not understand.
When you apprehend that this sort of "subjective understanding" as a very real situation, (not necessarily in the context of 'private language', but in general) as for instance, your attitude toward Wittgenstein's use of "private language", then we can extrapolate and relate this type of 'understanding' to the possibility of a "private language". A person could have a "private language" which no one knows the meaning of the words, including the user of that language, but the person 'appears', or pretends to understand. "Pretends" is a good word here because it underscores the pretentiousness associated with that false attitude of certitude, when someone pretends to know what no one else knows.
Quoting Luke
What kind of nonsensical argument is this? Why do you think Wittgenstein uses the word "appear" here? We say that something "appears" to be a certain way, when we want to distinguish this from the way it really is, this is fundamental in German philosophy, from Kant. The person 'appears to understand', is a distinction from 'actually understanding'. In the context, that's very clear and ought not even be a point to be discussed.
Furthermore, Wittgenstein does not use the word "wrong" here, he says "attaches some meaning to the word, but not the right one". By removing this sort of understanding from that which is said to be "right", Wittgenstein is completely consistent with 258, "here we can't talk about 'right'", making the rest of your argument irrelevant gibberish.
How is the incoherence shown to be a result of the private language user’s knowledge at 258?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Pretending one understands means appearing to understand without the belief one understands.
Thinking one understands means appearing not to understand with the belief one understands.
These are not the same.
‘Thinking he understands’ is not acting as if he understands. On the contrary, his behaviour shows that he has attached the wrong meaning to the word and that he does not understand its meaning.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What does the word “appear” have to do with the man attaching the wrong meaning to the word?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If you think that we can talk about ‘not right’ or ‘wrong’ wrt a private language, then you don’t understand why we can’t talk about right.
Luke, we've been through this. He has no criterion, there is no such thing as "right". Therefore it is impossible that he could identify and "know" the thing which "S" refers to.
Quoting Luke
I don't agree with these distinctions. Not all senses of "pretend" require intentional deception, And your explanation of "thinking one understands" doesn't make any sense to me, and is clearly not consistent with Wittgenstein's use.
Quoting Luke
Are you serious? Because the meaning attached to the words by the person is not the right meaning, his behaviour is that of "appearing to understand" (he thinks he understands and therefore is pretending to understand) when he really does not understand.
Quoting Luke
Again this makes no sense to me. As I explained to you, the situation in which we cannot talk about right, is necessarily not right. How can you not understand this? When "right" is excluded as a possibility, such that we cannot even talk about the possibility of the person being right, then the person is necessarily "not right", meaning something other than right. How can you not understand this? When right is excluded, what we are left with is necessarily not right.
How we portray "not right" in this context is another matter. Wittgenstein portrays the 'not right understanding' as "subjective understanding", "thinking one understands". This is clearly not the opposite of being "right". I'd say it is categorically different from being "right". So what he has done is to place subjective understanding, which is the type of understanding associated with the private language, into a different category from "right" understanding, which is to be consistent with the common language.
Quoting Sam26
I believe there is a very real problem with Wittgenstein's perspective on subjective understanding. In all writing and speaking there are elements of private meaning, idiosyncrasies which are unique to the individual, and these are the elements of subjective understanding. Now, when we go to interpret a piece of oration, or writing, it is the common opinion that we ought to try to determine what was meant by the author. This means that we must delve into, and make our best attempts to understand the private elements, to reach the "true" meaning, as the one intended by the author. However, Wittgenstein dismisses this "true" meaning, as not the "right" meaning, because it strays from the rule-based social conventions. Therefore "the right meaning", which is a strictly rule based interpretation, is not necessarily in tune with "the true meaning", which is what the author meant, including all of one's idiosyncrasies, which are the private aspects of the person's speech. It is often an individual's use of particular idiosyncrasies which makes one into a great orator.
Where does it say at 258 that he does not or cannot know what "S" refers to? What is it that "S" refers to that he does not or cannot know?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Probably because you overlooked the important part. I said:
Quoting Luke
This is perfectly consistent with what W says at 269:
You claim that 'thinking he understands' means acting as if he does understand, but at 269 Wittgenstein distinguishes between the criteria in a man's behaviour for 'thinking he understands' and for 'understanding the word correctly'. It is only the latter where the man shows that he understands.
Wittgenstein tells us that the man does not understand because he attaches a meaning to the word which is not the right one. That is, he misunderstands the meaning of the word. Here we might speak of a "subjective understanding", but Wittgenstein distinguishes this from the criteria in a man's behaviour for understanding the word correctly (i.e. right).
This may not make any sense to you because you don't understand it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If he appeared to understand then he would not appear to not understand. Wittgenstein tells us that the criteria in a man's behaviour for 'thinking he understands' is that he attaches a meaning to the word which is not the right one. If he understood the meaning of the word, then the criteria in his behaviour would be that he attaches the right meaning to the word and understands the word correctly. Alas, he does not.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's not necessary. The situation could be that we can talk about neither right nor not right.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What is excluded is our talk about right, not that the person is right. Therefore, it is not implied that the person is "not right".
He doesn't explicitly say he cannot "know", but if you think 'whatever seems right to me is right', is a description of knowing what "S" refers to. then I suppose that the "private language" described at 243, where the person knows what the words refer to, appears coherent to you. Notice I use the word "appears" here.
Quoting Luke
This is clearly wrong. When a person believes oneself to understand something, the person will proceed to act under the assumption that the thing is understood. This means the person will act in a way which appears like he understands when he does not understand.
Now, when we take into account the context, that we are talking about a private language, there cannot be a third person judgement as to whether the person actually understands or not. Your statement assumes such a judgement. The person is thinking himself to understand, and acts accordingly, and is judged to be misunderstanding, according to your statement. But because no one else knows the meaning of the words such a judgement cannot be made. Notice here, "no one else understands". This indicates that he cannot be judged to be misunderstanding, as you assume in your statement. He appears to understand because he acts as if the words have meaning to him, but he cannot be judged as to whether he actually understands or not.
Quoting Luke
There are three possibilities outlined 1) does not understand at all, 2) misunderstands, 3) understands the word right. The second lends itself to the private language. However, in the case of the private language, no one knows the meaning of the words, so the person misunderstands but cannot be judged as misunderstanding. Therefore the person thinks he understands, and he acts as if he understands (a sort of pretense because he doesn't really understand), and so he "appears" to understand. However, he cannot be judged to be acting according to 2) (acting as if he misunderstands), because no one knows the meaning of the words which he "appears" to be understanding. Therefore "thinking he understands", in the case of the private language cannot be judged as misunderstanding, it can only be judged as "appears to understand".
Quoting Luke
You are neglecting the conditions of the context, the "private language". No one knows the meaning of the words. Therefore no one can judge whether his actions indicate that he attaches the right meaning or not. All we can say is that his actions are consistent with 'understanding the words', because he acts as if he attaches some meaning to the words, but we cannot judge whether it is "the right meaning". Therefore all we can say is that he appears to understand, he acts as if he understands.
@Metaphysician Undercover @Luke Can you please use PM or email for these discussions instead of hijacking threads. It's basically a private conversation that you're having, spread out over numerous discussion threads. I'm pretty confident that nobody else is interested, and you're spoiling things for everyone else.
We are told that his actions indicate that he attaches a meaning to the word, but not the right one. This is why only the last sentence of 269 is about private language.
I’ve stayed on topic and tried to correct MU in his reading of the PLA because I’m passionate about Wittgenstein. I also engaged with other posters earlier in the discussion. I don’t want to have a private discussion with MU, so thanks for having me.
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"There are numerous interpretations of precisely what Wittgenstein's Private Language argument is, where it begins and ends in Philosophical Investigations, what its target is, and whether it is successful...so it was nice to discover Stewart Candlish's one sentence summary of it in Edward Craig (ed.) The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy:"
' ...a language in principle [is] unintelligible to anyone but its user would necessarily be unintelligible to the user also, because no meanings could be established for its signs'
The above was take from the following link:
https://virtualphilosopher.com/2006/10/the_private_lan.html
_____________________
How does Wittgenstein demonstrate that a private language is unintelligible? In order to be clear about what Wittgenstein is doing, you must be clear about what is meant by a private language. It is a language that is only understood by the person inventing it. This means, obviously, that the meanings of the words or signs are also generated by the person creating the language, and herein lies the rub.
Wittgenstein wants us to imagine, in PI 258, trying to give meaning to a sign “S” (Think of a sign as any written designation used to refer to something, be it a sensation, as in this example, or some other object.) by associating “S” with a private sensation, and this we do by keeping a diary. So, every time I have a sensation, I mark it in my diary. The only kind of definition I can give is a kind of ostensive definition, that is, it is a kind of pointing to the sensation, but “[n]ot in the ordinary sense.” What I am doing is focusing my attention on the sensation, “…and so, as it were, point to it inwardly.” Thus, the meaning is supposedly established by my focus on the sensation, where the “impression” is made between the sign and the object of the sign, namely, the sign’s designation. However, Wittgenstein points out that the impression can only serve as a future reminder, namely, that I have made the correct association between the sign and the object. “But in the present case [forget about remembering in the future] I have no criterion of correctness (PI 258).” Therefore, it is not about our memory, as some might interpret this passage, but about how we could establish any correct use of sign “S.” And, if there is no correct use of the sign, then how could any remembrance of its use have anything to do with future uses in terms of meaning?
Another example Wittgenstein used to explain the problematic nature of associating meaning with the private inner thing, is the beetle in the box example (PI 293). It shows how associating meaning with the private inner thing, which is based on a misunderstanding of the “grammar of the expression,” in terms of “object and designation (PI 293)”, cannot gain a foothold.
“Now someone tells me that knows what pain is only from his own case!—Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a ‘beetle’. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.—But suppose the word ‘beetle’ had a use in these people’s language?—If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a : for the box might even be empty.—No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
“That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant (PI 293).”
Again, keep in mind that the purpose of these paragraphs is to say something about the meaning of a word in relation to the “object and designation” model. And, what stands out about what Wittgenstein is saying, is that the object could literally be anything, any internal thing we could imagine. This thought experiment demonstrates that the language-game used in such a context would not be dependent, especially in terms of meaning, on the thing in the box. Thus, it would be irrelevant, again, irrelevant in terms of the “object and designation” model of meaning.
Let us continue with Wittgenstein’s thinking: “If you say he sees a private picture before him, which he is describing, you have still made an assumption about what he has before him. And that means that you can describe it or do describe it more closely. If you admit that you haven’t any notion what kind of thing it might be that he has before him—then what leads you into saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him? Isn’t it as if I were to say of someone: ‘He something. But I don’t know whether it is money, or debts, or an empty till (PI 294).’”
Even if you say that the inner thing is a kind of picture, you are still making an assumption with no content. There is no way to describe it, you cannot see inside the other person’s box, so it is an empty assumption. And, of course, if you admit, Wittgenstein says, that you have no notion of the thing in the box, then how is it that you want to say there is something there? Maybe you could respond, “Because I have these kinds of inner things.” Yes, there are these internal experiences going on, but none of us can observe these internal happenings, it is like the beetle in the box example. Does it then follow from this that we cannot talk about our internal experiences of pain, hope, joy, sadness, etc? Obviously we can talk about these things, we do it all the time. This then brings us back to the notion of how meaning does get a foothold.
Notice how you've moved from "object and designation" here, toward "description". These two are fundamentally different types of language use which cannot be conflated without the creation of misunderstanding and confusion.
An object can be named without the requirement of any description, there is simply some form of pointing it out. On the other hand, a description can be made without the requirement of a thing being described. In the case of an "inner experience" there is no possibility of pointing out the particular object, just some general sort of "feeling", therefore there is no possibility of object designation. So we produce a description without a thing being described.
Therefore we must bear in mind that descriptions do not require any object designation. In fact, they are based in general feelings where there is no object being described. And, the inclination to request the object being described (point it out for me), is a mistaken adventure. There is no "thing in the box", and descriptive terms are derived from something other than 'the properties of a thing'. They are derived from general feelings.
In logical language use we employ both types of language use together. We point to a thing, giving it a name, and we utilize descriptive terms for that thing. What we need to respect is that the descriptive terms are not justified by the features of any particular things, they are justified by consistency in general feelings.
The point here, is that if someone says (not me or W.), that the inner thing is a kind of picture of some thing (which it's not, i.e., it can't be construed in this way), then this use of the word picture is a bit weird in terms of W.'s beetle example. Why? Wittgenstein answers, "If you [who do you think the "If you..." refers to?] admit that you haven’t any notion what kind of thing it might be that he has before him [referring to the beetle] —then what leads you into saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him? Isn’t it as if I were to say of someone: ‘He has something. But I don’t know whether it is money, or debts, or an empty till (PI 294).’”[/quote]
The only misunderstanding, is if someone wants to talk about the thing in the box in this way (again it's not me or W.). It would be the interlocutor responding to Wittgenstein's beetle example, i.e., they would be trying to describe the thing in the box as a kind of picture. So, the only confusion here, is you not understanding the point of W.'s remarks.
I don't know what to tell you MU, you do this all the time, and no matter how many times people try to explain it to you, you seem stuck in a place that no one can free you from. And, this is why I generally don't respond to your posts. @Luke spent a long time with you trying to explain your misunderstandings, but to no avail. All I can tell you is that your interpretations of W. are so far from the norm, that I wonder if we're both speaking English.
Clearly it is indicated by Wittgenstein that it is not necessary that there is something which the description refers to. So you seem to ignore this part: "then what leads you into saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him?", to support your claim that I misunderstand.
What you are missing (misunderstanding), is, as Wittgenstein says, that it is not necessary that there is anything in the box. So it is you who demonstrates misunderstanding when you talk about "the thing in the box". If it is not necessary that there is something in the box, then you display misunderstanding by referring to "the thing in the box".
And as I explained, that's why naming is completely different from describing. Naming ("beetle", for example) requires that there is an object which is named, otherwise it is not an act of "naming". "Describing" does not require that there is an object which fulfills the stated description.
And that is why we can describe our inner feelings, but we cannot name them, because there is no "thing" there to be named. To say "I have a pain", is not to name something that I have (like naming it 'beetle" for instance), it is to describe a feeling.
Quoting Sam26
Oh, so here we go with the ad hominem fallacy. You thought that I misunderstood something in the past, therefore everything I say ought to be dismissed as misunderstanding.
Did I say anything close to, "...therefore everything [you] say ought to be dismissed as a misunderstanding[?]" No! Again, another misinterpretation of what's being said. I'm just going to move on MU. I can't talk philosophy with you, it's pointless.
It's no wonder you can't discuss philosophy with me, you refuse to accept the points that Wittgenstein makes, which I point out to you, insisting that I misunderstand. If you wouldn't be so encapsulated by your own interpretation you'd see that there is much more to his writing than could possibly be grasped by any particular individual, and you'd approach interpretations which are radically different from your own interpretation with more of an open mind.
So the fact remains, that you are denying, or ignoring the importance of the phrase "what leads you into saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him?". If you would accept this, you would see that it is not necessary that there is anything in the box, "...for the box might even be empty". Then the word "beetle" cannot be the name of a thing. The possibility that the use for the word "beetle" is to name a thing , has been ruled out by the fact that the box might be completely empty.
Instead, you state "the object could literally be anything". But this is a misrepresentation. What Wittgenstein has actually said is that there might not be an object. This misrepresentation appears to cause you to be stumped in your understanding because you end your passage with:
,Quoting Sam26
But if you would simply recognize the difference between naming, and describing, which I explained to you, and the fact that a description does not require a thing which is described, as it might be totally fictional, then you would have no problem with understanding how "the thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all". This "game" being referred to is a game of description, where descriptive terms like "pain" are being employed not to describe "things", but to describe inner feelings, which are decidedly not things. The proposed "thing in the box" is actually not a thing at all, and we ought not assume that one could assign a name to it as if it were thing.
Now there is no issue, or problem, of how meaning gets a foot hold, because it is demonstrated by Wittgenstein as a matter of describing inner feelings, which is distinctly not a matter of naming things. A problem only arises when we assume the inner feelings to be things. Then we have the incompatibility demonstrated by Wittgenstein, between what it means to be a thing which can bear a name, and what it means to be an inner feeling which can only be described.
In your opinion, does Wittgenstein's strategy of semantic reduction (as you understand it) successfully solve or dissolve the hard-problem? (to recall his earlier logical behaviourism)
If you want to know what consciousness is from a conceptual view, or how we think about consciousness in our everyday lives, then you have to understand how it is that we acquire, or attach meaning to our words. Moreover, it must be said over and over again, our concepts don't necessarily equate to reality, which also means, that what we mean by this or that, doesn't necessarily equate to reality. This is the difference between language about reality, and reality itself.
Wittgenstein linguistic analysis doesn't answer the "hard problem," it's still there. However, understanding Wittgenstein helps with how we talk about consciousness, which inevitably will influence one's theories of the self, and what can be sensibly said. Part of the problem with understanding consciousness is that we lack the advanced conceptual framework to discuss it (viz., its composition or source). It would be like the ancient Romans trying to understand the physics of today, they lack the concepts, so there's no foundation to work with. I don't think we're even close to understanding what consciousness is. I wonder if we even know how to frame the questions. That's my take.
(I had to re-write this post to clarify what I was thinking.)
I can’t help but think that in his alter work he did dissolve the hard problem.
His later work is a form of phenomenology, which dissolves the hard problem by showing the incoherence nod splitting apart what things are ( the factual) from how
things matter( their valuative sense).
Yeah, I think the concept of ‘facts of reality’ is highly problematic for both Wittgenstein and phenomenology.
I would not say that Wittgenstein is a phenomenologist or even close to a phenomenologist, and I don't think that "facts of reality" is problematic, nor is it problematic for Wittgenstein.
Quoting Sam26
There are those who disagree with you.
“…if we look at what Wittgenstein actually does in the Philosophical Investigations and in his many manuscripts on the philosophy of psychology, we will be presented with a perspective remarkably similar to that of the phenomenologists.First of all, one should note that Wittgenstein tries to re-describe subjectivity or the mind along basically the same lines as the phenomenologists”
(The problem of other minds: Wittgenstein’s Phenomenological perspective , SØREN OVERGAARD )
Ya, there are always those who disagree, that's part of the philosophical world. But, I don't want to turn this thread into an argument about Wittgenstein and phenomenology. But there is a connection between the PLA and consciousness.
Wittgenstein has an important point, namely, that the meaning of our words or concepts is primarily a function of a norm of use within a given language-game. These norms are mostly governed by the rules of the language-game (the logic of the language-game), which take place socially as a cultural practice, in what Wittgenstein calls the activity of a “form of life (e.g., PI 23).” And, it is in this social activity (non-linguistic and linguistic activity woven together) that words or concepts get their sense. Just as the pieces in chess get their sense from how they are used in a chess game, which is also a form of life. Outside the social practice of playing a game of chess, the pieces lose their sense. In other words, how would we talk about chess pieces without referencing their place of origin, that place where chess pieces get their life? The same would be true if we wanted to talk of cellular function apart from the language-game of biology. The word cell, as a biological concept, would lose its sense apart from biology. This is why we say words have a home in which they reside, that is, they have a function, and get their life within their respective language-games.
The meaning of our words or concepts is established necessarily within a social construct, and it necessarily follows that meaning is not a function of an individual’s privately derived sense of meaning; assuming that a privately derived sense of meaning is even linguistically possible, as Wittgenstein’s private language comments seem to suggest.
Any interpretation of a social convention is subjective. Wittgenstein was especially clear about this (e.g how can I know the intended direction of an arrow? how I am supposed to interpret a look-up table? ) . So there is no escape from purely private meaning, at least for Wittgenstein, even if such meaning cannot be linguistically translated.
Of course, he did understand that there is no logical room for an intermediate "private language" mediating between one's percepts and one's use of public language, recalling his attack on the Is/Seems distinction with regards to perceptual judgements.
Used for what? To accomplish what goal? To win the game? Or to communicate? How does one communicate without the understanding of representation -that something (scribbles and sounds) can mean something else (that isn't scribbles and sounds, like apples and trees)? Unless Witt is saying that individuals don't exist, then it would logically follow that individuals will have varying experiences with the rules of any language which will lead to varying degrees of understanding the rules of some language, which is to say that they have a subjective view of any language.
Sime, you're wrong about the arrow example, and about a "look up table." Let's see if I can make this clear. Wittgenstein asks in (PI 454), "How does it come about that this arrow -----------> points?" Any sign, be it a word or an arrow, only has an application, a use, that we together as a people, i.e., in socially given situations, give to it. "This pointing is not a hocus pocus which can be performed only by the soul [the soul, as used here, should be understood as the inner thing, the subjective]. So, it seems to me, and not only me, but many other interpreters, that Wittgenstein is saying the exact opposite of your point. This is clear throughout the PI, starting at the beginning when he talks about language-games.
Moreover, much of the point of the PI is to escape from the idea of a purely private meaning. I don't understand where you're getting this interpretation from, but I'd run from it. It can't be further from the truth. Anyway, that's my take.
Oh, I get it Harry, you're joking, right? You're trying to be funny, because I can't make any sense of this apart from a joke. If I say a word has a use, then I'm saying that it has a use within a particular language-game or a particular social context. There may be many uses of a word, so your question, "Used for what?" isn't taking into account that there may not be any one use, but many uses. And yes, we do use words/concepts, and sentences to communicate. However, the sense of a word is never the result of your subjective view. We can use words to communicate a subjective view, but we learn to use the words, and the meanings of words, in social contexts apart from the subjective. Not only is this the case, but as far as I can tell, it's necessarily the case.
Ok, but what other uses? That is what I'm asking. Strange that you can't even provide any examples of what it is that you are trying to say.
Quoting Sam26So you've never heard of mass delusions, or ideas that propagate within a group that are just wrong - like the Earth being flat?
Quoting Sam26
If words have meaning apart from the subjective and is necessarily the case, then how did you misconstrue my intent as being funny when that wasn't my intent?
I haven't given any examples because I've assumed that most people know, that any use of a word in a sentence, is an example of how it's used. So, if I'm talking about epistemology for example, and I say, "I know John is guilty of murder," then the sense of the word know, (namely, how it's used in this sentence), is that I'm justified in some appropriate way. Another use or sense of the word know that is common, is to use it as a kind of emphasis. The emphasis on know would reflect a conviction, i.e., how one feels about the belief their expressing. Wittgenstein pointed this out in OC, where he says this kind of use can express itself in tone of voice. These are two specific examples of different uses of the same word. An epistemological use, and a use that expresses my subjective conviction. However, don't confuse a use that expresses the subjective, as a use that gives the word meaning.
Quoting Harry Hindu
First, I don't think that because people believe in something that's false, that that necessarily means that they are deluded; and I don't believe this is an argument against my point. And, even if you're under the spell of a mass delusion, it doesn't follow that your words have lost their sense. It just means that you're convinced of something that's false, among other things.
The idea that it's you (emphasis on the subjective) that's convinced, gives people the false idea that it's you that gives meaning to the word. Again, the difference between understanding an expression of the subjective, and understanding how meaning comes about within a social context.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I was being facetious Harry.
" This pointing is not a hocus pocus which can be performed only by the soul "
Does not support your thesis or yield the conclusion
"Any sign, be it a word or an arrow, only has an application, a use, that we together as a people, i.e., in socially given situations, give to it."
unless by that you mean
"Any sign, be it a word or an arrow, only has an application, a use, that a person gives to it."
Which is logically coherent, and avoids the unintelligible requirement of social consensus with respect to meaning and truth, that you often appear to imply.
Notice the context of the PI 454, in which he barely mentions social consensus. He is merely remarking on the distinction between what is said or thought a priori in relation to a sign (e.g the sign's stipulated definition) in comparison to it's actual a posteriori application. The difference between the definition of a sign and it's eventual application - that is under-determined by the definition, undermines the possibility of any theory of semantics, whether private or public.
?"Infinity" is a striking example of a word whose use necessarily belies any stipulated definition. Our convention defines "infinity" as meaning boundless, endless, or larger than any number..., and yet any particular use of the sign of "infinity", such as in an executed computer program, eventually halts and involves strictly finite reasoning and demonstration, - in apparent contradiction to it's stated definition as being "endless" - until that is, it is remembered that the actual uses of the phrases "boundless energy" , "infinite love" and what have you, are also finitistic...
In other words, "infinity" and "going on forever" can be considered as synonymous, but no two applications of either are the same, for they halt at different times or finite numbers, if at all.. Hence the synonymous definition of infinity is a misleading tautology that says nothing of implicative relevance and isn't the semantic ground of anything. This is the logical content of the so-called "private" language argument, and as demonstrated, applies equally to the shared definitions offered by public languages.
The "private language argument" isn't "no private meaning, therefore only public meaning", but rather "no private theory of meaning, therefore no public theory of meaning either".
The concept of "potential infinity" partially circumvents the above issue by defining "infinity" to be an indexical referring to a fallible promise of a future finite number (as is done in computing), but fallible promises, by definition, lie outside of what is determinable by convention,implying the meaninglessness of a theory of so-called "infinite numbers" except as an empty syntactical construct.
Wittgenstein undoubtedly noticed that what is true regarding the definition of "infinity" is also true of every sign in every language, complementing Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction. For example, we say "Bachelor" is a synonym for "Unmarried Man", but no two individuals use the expressions synonymously. Synonymy isn't use - except when writing definitions.
And since the sentences of our language are infinite, we cannot even ground the linguistic notion of synonymy in personal or social conventions without appealing to a notion of logical implication, which leads to vicious regress if we think of logical implication as being reducible to convention. This observation of Quine in his attack on "truth by convention" predates the post-humus publication of PI by nearly two decades, and Wittgenstein was likely influenced by it. It rules out every stripe of meaning-theory so that neither phenomenalism, physicalism nor communitarianism can serve as semantic or epistemological "givens".
And Sam26 says my interpretations of Wittgenstein are "so far from the norm". What Sam refuses to accept, is that when we are talking "private language", there is not such thing as the norm. How can one even discuss the possibility of private language if one insists that language use must be normative?
"A misleading parallel”: Wittgenstein on Conceptual Confusion in Psychology and the Semantics of Psychological Concepts. It's definitely worth reading.
Just search, "A misleading parallel”: Wittgenstein on Conceptual Confusion in Psychology and the Semantics of Psychological Concepts by Stefan Majetschak, and download pdf.
This article is from the Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy Volume 9, Number 4.
Geez MU, who in the world ever said there was a norm of use with regard to a private language? Norms of use, as discussed by Wittgenstein, have to do with language-games as part of a social use. It's our social uses of concepts that give us a norm of use. Moreover, there is not one norm of use, but many norms of use, depending on the context, and the language-game associated with that concept and context.
We are only able to talk about the false assumption of having a private language, in light of the social nature of meaning, namely, it's a necessary feature of a concept that its meaning happens socially within forms of life, both linguistically and non-linguistically.
My turn. Sime, you're wrong about the arrow example." How an arrow is understood is not private; the arrow has a use only because we (not "I") agree as to which end of the arrow is which. The example leads in exactly the other direction to the oen you suppose.
I agree.
Also, @Sime think of how playing a game of chess would go if the rules for chess were determined privately - no one would understand what in the world you were doing. It wouldn't correspond with the moves the rest of us were making. Of course, it's even worse than this, at least people in the chess example could point out how the correct moves are made; but in your private language, one where there is no interaction with others, it would be even more problematic.
You criticized me for interpretations of Wittgenstein which are "far from the norm". Aren't we discussing private language? As you say here, in regard to a private language, there is no norm. So, how is 'far from the norm" something to be critical of, rather than what is intended by Wittgenstein in his discussion of "private language"? And if it is what was intended by Wittgenstein, I would say that it is "the true" interpretation which is far better than any 'normal' interpretation.
Quoting Sam26
It really doesn't matter if private language is a true or false assumption. Mathematics is full of axioms which are neither true nor false, yet we must adhere to the principles if applying the mathematics. Now we are discussing "private language". So we must adhere to the principles of that premise. Therefore there can be no such thing as "the norm" for interpreting Wittgenstein's conception of "private language". If there was a norm, then it would not be "private language".
So, the proposition is a language which is not based in norms. We cannot just dismiss the proposition as impossible, or false, because that would just circumvent the intent behind Wittgenstein's discussion of "private language", leaving Wittgenstein's whole discussion as pointless. Therefore we must accept the proposition, a language which is not based in norms, rather than rejecting it as false, in order to engage with his discussion.
Exactly. Words are used to point to states-of-affairs that are not just another use of words. To know is to both be justified and to reflect a conviction because it is justified. Why would you reflect conviction unless you were justified in doing so? So it seems to me that your use of "to know" points to the same state-of-affairs and you're unnecessarily complicating the meaning of "to know" as being used in two or more separate states-of-affairs, when it is really being used in just one way - to point to one's justified conviction (a redundancy).
Quoting Sam26
In today's world, is the phrase "The Earth is flat" of any use? Does it make sense to say such a thing? No, because it doesn't point to any state of affairs that exists outside of our heads. It can only point to an idea, or a delusion, and that is what it pointed to a 1000 years ago when people used that phrase. The difference between today and a 1000 years ago is that today, most of us now know that it only points to an idea, not to a state-of-affairs that exists outside of our heads.
Quoting Sam26
Meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. Intent precedes the use of words. The idea that I intend to convey is what my words point to. My ideas, in turn, either point to some state-of-affairs that exists outside my head or they don't. So depending on how accurate my ideas of the world are will determine how useful my words are to others. The meaning of words comes about within a social context only after they are deemed useful in pointing to actual state-of-affairs that exist outside your head.
Just look at all the conversations on this forum in which words are used in ways that are confusing and require the user to define how it is that they are using it (what state-of-affairs the words point to outside one's head) for the readers to understand what it is that they are actually saying. Some people use words ("consciousness" and the distinction between "natural" and "artificial" are prime examples) in ways that they think that they know how they are using them (the way that they learned to use it from others in a social context) only to find that when their way of using it isn't consistent with the other things that they have said or that we know, hence their use of words are not useful.
Like babytalk or glossolalia?
Words, symbols essentially, begging for meaning? A sign desperately seeking a referent, a partner?
OR
A primitive/superadvanced tongue with referents lost to history/waiting to be (re)discovered?
:up:
What might be added, to comfort those who find this troubling, is that these social constructs aren't rigid and eternal. Meanings can drift. Wittgenstein himself kicked a few around.
That ignores the fact that
1) People tend to say "I understand" when they mean "I recognize that" - not to mention the fact that people regularly change their mind as to whether they previously understood.
2) Conventions amount to a finite description or prescription of language use, and therefore cannot pin-down the meaning of "understanding".
For example, in the case of Modus Ponens
"For all x, x and x -->y implies y"
is not equivalent to giving a complete table of uses, and does not pin down any particular table of uses. At most it pins down the sense of Modus Ponens by appealing to innate cognitive judgements of the learner, but it cannot pin down the references and use-cases of Modus Ponens, since the meaning of "for all" is left under-determined.
Compare this to the social definition "All Bachelors are unmarried men" - the public certainty do not apply "Bachelor" and "Unmarried man" synonymously, because their cognitive judgements vary - the definition of "bachelor" amounts to a mythology or prescription of word use.
3) Cognitive judgements not only make no recourse to social guidance , but they cannot make recourse to social guidance, on pain of begging the question as to how one is being guided.
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True.
Time is not the only variable. Social constructs are not universal. That would be too simplistic. Social or professional groups of insiders create meaning for themselves. These groups can be plural making for ambiguity, and be larger or smaller for wider or narrower understanding. That's one reason we need linguists to sort out the details.
:up:
Of course. Time is just the most obvious variable.
Yet the most simple and obvious can have the deepest implications. PI, e, -1 are only simple numbers. But over millennia additional meanings were developed which led to surprising relations to be discovered suggesting an ancient original hidden symmetry. But only after mastery of the details will that simplicity of the whole be seen as obvious.
Those of us who are not mathematicians never master the details of any of the branches of math. Each branch invents necessary precise terms, for private understanding and also for public insider communicability so that proofs can be developed and verified.
Philosophy does not have any exact terms therefore understanding of any sort is an art and reliable communication can only be had by specialists of the subject with historical and sociocultural perspective. Which makes it very difficult for professionals to not talk past each other all while using a common language.
In other words, unlike other philosophical ideas, Wittgenstein's views remain unchanged or static since the time of its inception. Is it, in that case, a work that's perfect as it is?
I wouldn't quite go that far. There are people who are trying to work out the implications of his ideas, but as far as I know, and I'm just guessing, it's a small number. Moreover, I'm not up to date on some of this.
Don't worry, you'll get there. Keep at it, that's a motto, not sure!