Luke

Is there any reason/argument why "¬Kp" can only mean that p's truth value is unknown, and not that the sentence p is unknown? Doesn't "p" entail that ...

That's the assumption that I'm challenging. Simply asserting that assumption is not an argument.

It can be true, but is it true? The argument speaks only of possible knowledge (of true statements), not of possible truth.

Where does it use the wrong assumption? I accept the conclusion, but there is an equivocation whether Kp means knowledge of the sentence or knowledge ...

You said that it wasn't part of Fitch's paradox. Anyway, I agree that it is impossible to know an unknown sentence. You appeared to be arguing that it...

And what about ?K(p?¬Kp)?

What does "¬Kp" refer to there?

Read the OP and see the Wikipedia proof given there (or see Janus' partial quote above). I am following its use of an unknown p.

Oh I see. I take it you're no longer arguing that it's possible to know an unknown sentence?

Was there a point to your question?

Yes, I agree.

I don't disagree with the conclusion of Fitch's argument, but I don't interpret it to mean that knowability implies the superhuman knowledge of all (k...

If I know the sentence, then how is it an unknown sentence? No such example can be given. As the Wiki article tells us:

What if the Riemann hypothesis is false? Then we do not reject 1. It is not enough that we don't know whether p is true; it must also be true. "p" mea...

Must get to bed. I'll respond further tomorrow.

That's what I'm disputing about the argument. This is the equivocation I'm talking about.

It's not the truth value of p which is unknown, because we know that p is true. It is the true statement, p, which is unknown.

I agree with you completely on this. That we do and/or do not know something is not about the same sort of temporal possibility/knowability that you d...

I think the argument implies that every known true statement is known to be true: As I said in the OP, this excludes all unknown statements and statem...

My view is that if it is a true statement, then it cannot be unknown that it is a true statement (see the Wiki quote again). And that's because in ord...

That's not Fitch's argument, which assumes the truth of p. It's not that we don't know which statement is true (and which is false); it's that we don'...

I would say that we (now) know both of these statements, particularly since you have stated them. However, Fitch's argument speaks only of our knowled...

Thanks for your responses. I'm not arguing along these lines, but I would be interested in an argument for it. I'm not sure I would agree. As the WIki...

Don't you exist independently of other conscious beings? Since those conscious beings each have material bodies, then there is something material whic...

Does this refer to thinking about nothing or not thinking?

What is it like to see a moth? You could say that what it is like for a bat to see a moth is different from what it is like for a human to see a moth....

I admit to being not very familiar with Aristotle's Four Causes, but the Wikipedia article on the topic associates efficient cause with an Agent: It s...

It's great to know I'm not the only one who reads him this way! Little is more seemingly absurd than "it's not a Something, but not a Nothing either!"...

What I was questioning and what I poorly attempted to articulate in the OP was supposed to be whether there is a particular set of "why" questions tha...

:up:

Yes, this is what I was getting at. Right. I think what these type of "why" questions have in common is that they are givens or necessities of our exi...

You can download a copy of Matt Farr's paper that @"Kuro" mentioned here: https://philpapers.org/rec/FARCOT-2. It might help to clarify the distinctio...

At the risk of being banned for responding to you, MU: Being a token is irrelevant but being a false token is not? It is not the only certainty underl...

I found the following example helpful in coming to understand the meaning of a hinge certainty, so I thought it might be helpful to others here: Moyal...

But this is not really counting; it is teaching someone to count. Just like saying “this is red” to someone while exhibiting a red patch is, in many c...

I think you have it backwards. One needs to learn the rule first, and the meanings of the terms (“1”, “2”), before they can actually count anything. J...

I don’t disagree with this, except to say that the expression “2+2=4” is not necessarily counting anything.

I don’t know what this means. They are conscious but they are not conscious?

Not sure that I agree with this. Hinge "propositions" are not conscious judgments, so we do not accept/reject them in any rational or considered manne...

I believe W's view is that "1+1=2" is not counting, but is instead a rule or a preparation for counting, much like learning the meaning of a word is n...

Sorry, but I don't really know what you're trying to say. Could you express it more plainly?

From Moyal-Sharrock's book again:

Perhaps you could if it implied that 12 x 12 = 144 was false. But, according to Wittgenstein, the mathematical equation is nonpropositional, so it is ...

My immediate point was that the equation 12x12=144, and similar fundamental mathematical statements more generally, are not susceptible to being false...

What I meant, wrt my post to Seppo regarding the bipolarity of propositions, was: is 12x12=144 susceptible of being false? If not, then it is not a pr...

Could it be false? (see my post to Seppo above regarding bipolarity) It's a fair point, but I don't consider mathematical propositions to be the sort ...

She.

You've made a category error. Equilateral triangles and triangles (in general) are not two different types of triangle. Triangles (in general) are sim...

More like: It remains to be demonstrated that koala bears are of the same type as bears in general. The argument being offered is akin to: All bears h...