Luke

The result of the argument seems to be that all unknown truths are unknowable, as there is no unknown truth of the form "p & ~Kp" that can change into...

I mean that the unknown truth "p & ~Kp" of NonO cannot possibly become a known truth. If that is impossible from the outset, then so is knowability.

To borrow @"Andrew M"'s example: Suppose there are 163 coins in the jar and no-one knows there is. It's thus true that there's 163 coins in the jar an...

Aye, there's the rub. If a truth is knowable, then it can come to be known; that is, it can change from being unknown to being known. However, as you ...

As I understand it, the conclusion of the independent result is not that there must be unknowable truths. The conclusion of the independent argument i...

Possibly. What's your reasoning? The move from unknown to unknowable is given in the "independent result" in lines 4-9 of the SEP proof. The logic of ...

As I said in my post above to Andrew, one reason that an unknown truth would be unknowable (or impossible to know) is if all truths were already known...

What is knowable or unknowable in Fitch’s proof is not an unknowable truth, but an unknown truth.

Right, but neither should the contradiction imply that “p & ~Kp” is necessarily unknowable. If the contradiction is false, then “p & ~Kp” is either kn...

If the contradiction is not that “p & ~Kp” is both knowable and unknowable, then what is the contradiction?

But there is no contradiction unless “p & ~Kp” is both knowable and unknowable.

In that case there would be no contradiction, but as the SEP proof asserts:

Fair enough. Isn't the unknown truth "p & ~Kp" both knowable and unknowable, according to the argument?

If the unknown truth is expressed by "p & ~Kp", then it is not expressed by "p". The unknown truth expressed by "p & ~Kp" is equivalent to your "t": I...

My thinking was that p is just a true proposition and "p & ~Kp" represents that it is an unknown truth. You now appear to be saying that it is this un...

Is the knowability principle that 'all truths are known'? No. Neither is NonO that 'there is an unknowable truth'.

I find it epistemologically interesting that if we reject NonO then all truths are not only knowable but known, and if we reject KP then there is not ...

Yes, my mistake. I mistook @"Andrew M" to be saying that "p & ~Kp" stands for an unknowable truth.

There wasn't a problem. As per Banno's summary of the argument: The above describes what follows when NonO is denied. But given the contradiction betw...

How is that any different to what I said here and here?

The argument may have implications for KP, but what is presented in the SEP article is what follows from rejecting the NonO principle (my emphasis): A...

The SEP article states: Doesn't "~Kp" therefore mean that "it is not known by someone at some time that'? That is, p is unknown. I don't see why "p & ...

Someone could come to know the unknown truth, t, but no-one could come to know Alice's statement about t is true? Couldn't Alice come to know that the...

The two principles of Fitch's argument are that all truths are knowable (Knowability Principle - KP) and that there is an unknown truth (Non-Omniscien...

In an attempt to justify the scare quotes in the title of the OP, I will explain why I find the results of Fitch’s argument unsurprising. As noted in ...

Right. I think my failure to note this distinction may have caused some issues earlier in the discussion.

It isn't that we do know there are unknown truths, it is that it is possible to know there is an unknown truth. If it is possible to know, then it is ...

I'll have a go. It might not be correct (or helpful) but maybe others can chime in to correct and clarify. Suppose both of these principles: All truth...

But, according to the independent argument, starting with the assumption K(p ? ¬Kp) leads to the conclusion ¬?K(p ? ¬Kp). That is, if the conjunction ...

Known by everyone always, or known only by someone at some time? I take it all truths are known implies that no truths are knowable (because they are ...

So there are unknown truths? Are they knowable? This is what I am denying, since if an unknown truth becomes known, then it is not an unknown truth. N...

Also, if there are no unknown truths, then only known truths are known.

In order to disprove my claim, which is that the argument demonstrates that only known truths are known, then you would need to show that there are no...

You disagreed with my claim that the argument implies only that known truths are known. However, in order to show otherwise, you would need to demonst...

I don't believe that you have. Is "either the Riemann hypothesis is correct or the Riemann hypothesis is not correct" a known truth or an unknown trut...

Well, I'm saying that the argument implies only that known truths are known, which excludes knowing unknown truths. The independent argument given in ...

Yes, my mistake. It is the substitution of NonO into KP which is the problem. These principles combine to imply that an unknown truth is knowable. How...

What I'm trying to say is that we can abandon the principle of non-omniscience (as given) without implying that all (known and unknown) truths must be...

The crux of my argument is that "Kp" conflates the knowledge that: (a) p (where "p" represents a meaningful proposition); and (b) p is true These are ...

See the OP and the rest of the discussion. I can see no reason why any true statement might be unknowable. Let's agree to disagree.

The meaning of a sentence is irrelevant to its truth value?

My point is that you don't know whether those statements are true or not; they are only possibly true statements. Therefore, they cannot be used to di...

The knowability thesis is that all truths (i.e. all true statements) are, in principle, knowable. In order to disprove this, you want me to assume som...

But you cannot justify that they are true. Neither can you justify that "there are no justifications" is true.

I thought you were making a point about (not) all truths being knowable?

Knowing that P could equally mean knowing the meaning of the sentence. If you don't know the meaning of the sentence then neither can you know that P ...

But you said that it was true. You both know and don't know that it's true?

I don't see that it matters.

But you said that it was true? I'm asking how you know that in the first place before you tell me that it can't be known to be true.

Then how do you know that "there are x number of blades of grass in the world and nobody believes it" is true?