Should hinge propositions be taken as given/factual for a language game to make sense ?

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Reply to Eskander Quoting Eskander

Another application would be in religious language game, the question of the existence of God from a nonreligious person makes no sense in a religious game where the whole language is based around the usage of the word ,"God" .

But the use of the word ‘God’ among the religious will
likely include doubt, since God would imply faith , which requires doubt.So I think the hinge proposition God likely includes all of this. Only in a situation where the non-religious had never heard of the concept of God could there be no shared language game.

Reply to tim wood Quoting tim wood

I may relatively presuppose my bicycle is in the entry or on the street. If not one then the other. But that I have a bicycle I absolutely presuppose. If my bicycle is neither on the street nor in the entry, I may well then question where it is. Stolen? Borrowed by a friend? Left by me somewhere else and I forgot where? But the question if I have one never arises. And if it did then the enterprise of wondering where it is would be rendered nonsensical.

This sounds more like a structure of propositional logic than a language game

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Quoting tim wood

Hinge propositions seeming to be what R. G. Collingwood calls absolute presuppositions.

When I looked up "hinge propositions" on the web, I got the same impression you did, but I'm not sure if they are the same as absolute presuppositions. Collingwood is very clear that presuppositions are not propositions, which is a conflict. Also, one of the examples of a hinge proposition in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy is "I have two hands."

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Quoting tim wood

I accept the correction.

I didn't intend it as a correction. I think I'm asking the same questions you are. What was Wittgenstein talking about?

Reply to Eskander

The expression is used only three times.

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.
342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.
343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

And later:

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn."

Hinger propositions are those which must be taken as true in order to play the game. They constitute the game in that to bring them into doubt is to stop playing. Hence the usual chess examples: to doubt that the bishop must remain on one colour is not to adopt a rational critique of chess but to misunderstand the game. But stop playing the game and one can move the bishop onto the wrong colour.

Searle points out that hinge propositions set out what something counts as for the purposes of the game. Moving the bishop diagonally counts as a move in chess. It sets up what it is to move the piece in the game. It rules many possible moves - putting the piece back in the box, for example - as not being moves in the game. Of course such moves might be moves in some other game or activity - tidying up.

"God exists" does not have the structure of a constitutive proposition in the requisite sense. Some interpretations might make it so.

Introducing Collingwood seems an odd way to try to understand Wittgenstein, especially seeing as Collingwood was writing before On Certainty was published.

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Quoting Eskander

Hinge propositions have to be taken as factual or given in the language game you are playing and you cannot change their usage/status with certain moves in a language game.

In another discourse, they are called axioms.

An axiom, postulate, or assumption is a statement that is taken to be true, to serve as a premise or starting point for further reasoning and arguments. The word comes from the Greek ?????? (axí?ma) 'that which is thought worthy or fit' or 'that which commends itself as evident'.[1][2]

The term has subtle differences in definition when used in the context of different fields of study. As defined in classic philosophy, an axiom is a statement that is so evident or well-established, that it is accepted without controversy or question.[3] As used in modern logic, an axiom is a premise or starting point for reasoning.[4]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom

Reply to baker The key difference is that a hinge proposition is not to be doubted.

An assumption might be subjected to subsequent rejection, as in a reductio argument. An axiom is taken as self-evident.

That the bishop stays on the same colour is neither subject to refutation nor self-evident, but it is a hinge for the purposes of playing chess.

A small distinction, but worth noting.

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I don't think of hinge-propositions as propositions in the normal sense of the word, which is why they're called hinges, basic. or bedrock propositions. They don't fall into the epistemological language we use, at least in terms of JTB. They're not truths, they don't need some kind of justification, at least in the way Moore was referring to them. They're more akin to the rules of chess, as has already been mentioned. Although, it seems, we can make more sense of the question, "Do bishops move diagonally?" - than we can of the question, "Do I have hands?" I don't think Wittgenstein worked this out, "having hands" seems more fundamental, more foundational, if you will, than the rules of chess (not foundational, though, as it's typically used in epistemology). Wittgenstein seems to think of them as a contingent function of the world in which we live, the backdrop of all acting, verbal and non-verbal. And, one of the things that sets them apart. as @Banno mentioned, is that doubting them, at least generally, is senseless.

It seems that just as chess needs the rules, the board, and the pieces, in order for there to be a game of chess, so too, do we need these hinge, bedrock, or foundational beliefs (I think of them as special beliefs, not as propositions) in order to have a language, especially the language of epistemology. This includes the language of doubting. They have a special place between the mind, the world, and our language, and that place is related to our actions in the world.

Quoting tim wood

Do you mean undoubtable, as with the chess bishop? Or do you mean doubtable but not in this circumstance to be doubted?

Isn't the movement of the bishop doubtable but not in this circumstance to be doubted?

Quoting Banno

Searle points out that hinge propositions set out what something counts as for the purposes of the game. Moving the bishop diagonally counts as a move in chess. It sets up what it is to move the piece in the game. It rules many possible moves - putting the piece back in the box, for example - as not being moves in the game. Of course such moves might be moves in some other game or activity - tidying up.

Quoting Sam26

They're not truths,

I think they are.

One might read "Here is a hand" as a definition of what counts as a hand, or as a real object. That's a way of understanding Moore - "This counts as a real object, therefore there are real objects". Moore would be seen as setting out the rules for discussions of reality.

While there are issues with unjustified knowledge I don't see an issue with unjustified truth. The alternative would presumably be some sort of antirealism.

Quoting Banno

While there are issues with unjustified knowledge I don't see an issue with unjustified truth. The alternative would presumably be some sort of antirealism.

Ya, I think we have a difference in the way we look at truth. If some proposition is true, then how would you know it's true without a justification? A simple claim that something is a truth, doesn't mean that it's true. I can't make any sense out of an unjustified truth, if you're saying that X is true without a justification, then the claim that it's true is more akin to an opinion. If it's an opinion, then it could just as easily be false. However, the way you're using it, is like saying, "I know it's true." A kind of knowing without justification, which seems contradictory.

Quoting Sam26

If some proposition is true, then how would you know it's true without a justification?

There's a distinction between being true and being known to be true. There are true statements that are not known to be true. Yes, that's presuming realism. That seems better option to me than working through the problems of antirealism in its various forms.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11900/realism/p1

Reply to Banno Give me an example of something that is true, but not known to be true? It would have to be some proposition, right?

Reply to Sam26

Quoting Banno

There's a mission to Mercury by the ESA and JAXA. Part of the mission is to decide if there is water at the poles - something hinted at by previous observations.

Both the realist and the anti-realist will agree that we do not know that there is water at the poles of Mercury.

A realist will say that either there is water at the poles, or there isn't - that either the statement or its negation is true.

An anti-realist may say that the statement "There is water at Mercury's poles" is neither true nor not true, until the observation is made.

DO you really wish to work with a non-binary logic? To reject the law of excluded middle?

Reply to Banno

Quoting Banno

One might read "Here is a hand" as a definition of what counts as a hand, or as a real object. That's a way of understanding Moore - "This counts as a real object, therefore there are real objects". Moore would be seen as setting out the rules for discussions of reality.

While there are issues with unjustified knowledge I don't see an issue with unjustified truth. The alternative would presumably be some sort of antirealism.

I don’t read Wittgenstein’s discussion of hinge propositions as a justification, defense or foundation for realism. On the contrary, the ‘rules for the discussion of reality’ are themselves only the pragmatic basis for one more language game.

403. To say of man, in Moore's sense, that he knows something; that what he says is therefore unconditionally the truth, seems wrong to me. - It is the truth only inasmuch as it is an unmoving foundation of his language-games.(On Certainty)

Quoting Joshs

I don’t read Wittgenstein’s discussion of hinge propositions as a justification, defense or foundation realism.

Indeed. He explicitly rejects the arguments of both in PI.

Quoting Banno

An anti-realist may say that the statement "There is water at Mercury's poles" is neither true nor not true, until the observation is made.

The anti-realist is confused. If I make a claim, that there is water on Mercury's pole, that by definition is a proposition, and propositions can be true or false, just as any claim that's not known. If I verify that there is water on Mercury's pole, now it becomes knowledge. The use of words by the anti-realist, is, for the most part, senseless.

By the way you didn't give me an example of something that is true, but not known to be true.

Quoting Sam26

Although, it seems, we can make more sense of the question, "Do bishops move diagonally?" - than we can of the question, "Do I have hands?"

There are circumstances; phantom limbs, numbness or paralysis, alien limb syndrome, perhaps some virtual reality aps, where the possession of a hand becomes a real question. But these situations where the question becomes real and meaningful, are outside the realm in which one discusses philosophy. If I don't know whether this is my hand or not, I won't be going to a philosophy site to find out. Here we assume that we each know how many hands we got if not which orifice we speak out of.

Reply to Sam26 What I've learned about multivalued logic over the last few months has left me a bit less reproachful of anti-realism. There may be ways of constructing viable multi-valued grammars around truth.

But in the end there is either ice on the poles of mercury, now, unknown to us; or there isn't, also unknown to us. While we don't know which is true, one or the other is true.

Therefore there are unknown truths.

Hence there are propositions for which the truth value is unknown.

But that is not the same as there being propositions which do not have a truth value.

So I'm going back to propositions as statements with a truth value. Not entirely without its own problems, but they seem to me to be fewer than supposing that there are propositions without truth values.

But as a final comment, if a hinge proposition is not true, then we could not make any deductions from them - hence rendering them pointless.

Reply to unenlightened I had a similar conversation with a refugee who had both legs removed curtesy of an American cluster bomb, and on waking would need to check if he had legs.

And again I much prefer Austin's explanation of "real" in terms of opposites to either Moore or Wittgenstein.

Quoting Banno

What does "unknown" mean in this use? Other than we don't know if the statement is true or false. What third option is there? There are unknown truth values, but that again, just means that the proposition/statement can be true or false.

[quote="Banno;643564"]But that is not the same as there being propositions which do not have a truth value.

Banno, these people are going in circles. Again, what does having a truth value amount to, other than being true or false? There just is no such thing as a proposition that is true, and not known to be true. What are they saying is true? That's my question, it amounts to nothing.

Quoting Banno

But as a final comment, if a hinge proposition is not true, then we could not make any deductions from them - hence rendering them pointless.

This is where I go beyond Wittgenstein, although Wittgenstein alludes to it, that these so-called hinge-propositions are just very basic beliefs, shown in our actions. With these come language itself, and then the whole of epistemology. So, they stand apart, as the background, so to speak, that gives us everything needed for our language-games. They are simply acts of a different kind than propositions, they are pre-linguistic. So, they are not pointless. In fact, they are extremely important.

Wouldn't a language with no factual basis that is nonsensical just be a private language? It seems so.

I guess it's just what we mean by nonsense.

Quoting unenlightened

There are circumstances; phantom limbs, numbness or paralysis, alien limb syndrome, perhaps some virtual reality aps, where the possession of a hand becomes a real question. But these situations where the question becomes real and meaningful, are outside the realm in which one discusses philosophy

Of course, and Wittgenstein gives examples which are exceptions to Moore's propositions, viz., that there are instances where a doubt can occur, but they are not the norm. When I talk of doubting, I'm referring to Moore's specific use of, "I know this is a hand," given in front of an audience where a doubt is meaningless.

Quoting Cobra

Wouldn't a language with no factual basis that is nonsensical just be a private language? It seems so.

I guess it's just what we mean by nonsense.

Is the game of chess based on facts, other than the rules of the game? So, language-games are based on, for the most part, the rules of grammar, and the way we use concepts within certain contexts etc. We use language to refer to facts in the world. You could say there are facts of language, some of those facts arise out of the meanings of our words. It's a fact that bachelors are unmarried, but I suppose you are referring to facts outside of language. I would say that there are pre-linguistic facts or beliefs that give rise to language.

Reply to Sam26 Again with the notion of prelinguistic propositions. Seems discussing them can't be avoided.

So you must have some way to square this with "The world is all that is the case".

How?

Reply to Banno Where did I say anything about pre-linguistic propositions, that wouldn't make sense. Propositions are by definition linguistic. I was talking about pre-linguistic beliefs. You seem to think all beliefs are propositional, I don't.

Quoting Banno

So you must have some way to square this with "The world is all that is the case".

How?

Well, something that I haven't talk much about, is my disagreement with Wittgenstein about what can be talked about in terms of metaphysics.

You need to be more specific, in what way do my statements, conflict with his statement?

Quoting Sam26

You seem to think all beliefs are propositional,

That seems to me the best grammar for beliefs. Their structure is a relation between someone and a proposition such that they hold the proposition to be true.

Hence any belief can be put into propositional form. Further if it cannot be put into that form it is not a belief as such, but perhaps an intuition, gut feeling, vague notion or some such.

Quoting Banno

That seems to me the best grammar for beliefs. Their structure is a relation between someone and a proposition such that they hold the proposition to be true.

There is no doubt that the grammar of a proposition is the best way for expressing one's belief in statement form. However, that is not the question, the question is, are beliefs only expressed in language (statements/propositions)? My contention is that beliefs can be expressed in two ways, acts that are not linguistic, and acts that are linguistic. This gets to Wittgenstein's idea of showing, viz., the showing of beliefs that are not propositional. For example, a religious person showing their religious belief through prayer, meditation, etc., the very act, shows the belief, apart from any statement or proposition. In fact, the very act of opening a door shows various beliefs about your surroundings. Language expression simply adds to the beliefs that are already there. That one can state the belief after the fact, is no argument against the view that the ontology of a belief, is not restricted to language use.

Quoting Banno

Hence any belief can be put into propositional form. Further if it cannot be put into that form it is not a belief as such, but perhaps an intuition, gut feeling, vague notion or some such.

It doesn't follow that because any belief can be put into proposition form, that all beliefs are of this form.

What's interesting is that Wittgenstein believed that some beliefs (religious beliefs, moral beliefs, etc.) could not be expressed as facts in the world. This, it seems, is why Wittgenstein was against arguments about the existence of God, there are no facts of metaphysics ("the world is all that is the case"), no facts that correspond to metaphysical propositions. I believe he was wrong about this.

Quoting Sam26

...facts outside of language...

Any fact can be stated. That's what a fact is, and that's what is said in Tractates 1 & 2, and I think these among the views that carried forward into his later work.

If to believe is to hold that some state of affairs is the case, then beliefs range over propositions.

If a belief does not range over some proposition, some state of affairs, what is it a belief in?

I'll add that statements such as "I believe in freedom" or "I believe in Sam26" use a different sense of belief.

Quoting Sam26

I would say that there are pre-linguistic facts or beliefs that give rise to language.

What do you mean by this?

Quoting Banno

Any fact can be stated. That's what a fact is, and that's what is said in Tractates 1 & 2, and I think these among the views that carried forward into his later work.

Facts are states-of-affairs quite apart from language. We use language to refer to facts, which is what the Tractatus is about, but the world of facts is separate from the world of propositions, which are just claims, that either match with the facts in the world or not. He did carry some of this through to his later work, no doubt.

Quoting Banno

If to believe is to hold that some state of affairs is the case, then beliefs range over propositions.

Yes, but that is what I'm disagreeing with, a belief is not just about propositions, but, it can be said that all beliefs have something to do with states-of-affairs (facts). All acts come into contact with states-of-affairs.

Quoting Banno

I'll add that statements such as "I believe in freedom" or "I believe in Sam26" use a different sense of belief.

They are still about states-of-affairs.

Quoting Cobra

I would say that there are pre-linguistic facts or beliefs that give rise to language.
— Sam26

What do you mean by this?

What I mean, and you have read other posts in here to follow my point, is that there were and are beliefs associated with pre-linguistic man that gave rise to language. Beliefs are not restricted to language. But to have a language, necessarily involves pre-linguistic beliefs, they're foundational to language. It's like the beliefs animals have, only animals weren't able to take it to the next level, language.

Quoting Sam26

What I mean, and you have read other posts in here to follow my point, is that there were and are beliefs associated with pre-linguistic man that gave rise to language. Beliefs are not restricted to language. But to have a language, necessarily involves pre-linguistic beliefs, they're foundational to language. It's like the beliefs animals have.

And what are examples of these beliefs? How can you have a belief, or claim to have one without language? I think we have discovered that animals have non-human languages, too.

Maybe you mean that pre-linguistic languages or facts, were not understood until grammar was added to the equation?

Quoting Cobra

And what are examples of these beliefs? How can you have a belief, or claim to have one without language?

Just think about your own life. Your beliefs and the beliefs of others are expressed in non-verbal actions all the time, not just expressed in linguistic terms. The very act of turning the key to start you car shows a myriad of beliefs, those beliefs, can be expressed in language, but they're also expressed in your actions apart from statements. You can't have a claim without language, but you can have beliefs without language.

Quoting Sam26

I believe he was wrong about this.

Whereas I think there's a misunderstanding here.

Beliefs can be expressed in words. What is expressed in certain acts goes beyond words, and hence beyond belief, into a form of life.

That's what was wrong with Moore's "Here is a hand" - it expressed a mere belief, a mere propositional attitude, that could indeed be subject to discussion, when what was needed was the form of life that shows us as embedded in the world. "Here is a hand" takes place in that form of life, as do all discussions.

A form of life is not a mere set of beliefs.

(Sometime I'll look for support for this view in OC.)

Quoting Banno

Beliefs can be expressed in words. What is expressed in certain acts goes beyond words, and hence beyond belief, into a form of life.

Forms of life are just acts, shown in what we do. Wittgenstein is focused on those forms of life that are connected with language use, and by extension, those acts done by a society or culture. I don't know what acts would go beyond words, maybe certain mental phenomena, but I'm not sure. Wittgenstein was wrestling with this very thing at the end of his life, not only in OC, but in other writings during this period.

Quoting Banno

That's what was wrong with Moore's "Here is a hand" - it expressed a mere belief, a mere propositional attitude, that could indeed be subject to discussion, when what was needed was the form of life that shows us as embedded in the world. "Here is a hand" takes place in that form of life, as do all discussions.

I'm not sure what you mean by a "mere belief," but if you mean one of W's hinge's or bedrock beliefs, I agree. Ya, his claim amounted to more of a conviction of a belief, an attitude is probably correct too, expressed in tone of voice or a gesticulation (OC 42 seems to suggest this).

Quoting Banno

A form of life is not a mere set of beliefs.

I would also agree with this. There are other things going on in a form of life besides belief expressions. A form of life expresses feelings, attitudes, etc, although these things can be phrased as beliefs. For example, "He has a bad attitude."

So, some of this, or most of this I agree with, depending on what you mean by "mere beliefs." I tend to use the phrase "mere beliefs" to refer to opinions, but I suppose you could also use it to refer to basic beliefs, like Moorean beliefs, e.g., "Here is a hand."

Well, time for bed, thanks for the discussion.

Reply to Banno

Searle points out that hinge propositions set out what something counts as for the purposes of the game. Moving the bishop diagonally counts as a move in chess. It sets up what it is to move the piece in the game. It rules many possible moves - putting the piece back in the box, for example - as not being moves in the game. Of course such moves might be moves in some other game or activity - tidying up.

"God exists" does not have the structure of a constitutive proposition in the requisite sense. Some interpretations might make it so.

I think the problem with taking "God exists" a hinge proposition is that, every reasonable person doesn't take this as a given. Whereas the statement "Here's a hand" is taken as a given by every single person on the planet and doesn't have any epistemic relation. However, religious people ( who are fit for participating in religious games as they live the life form) expect every sane person to take the conceptual scheme of God as a given/bedrock in religion game. So, it's still a hinge proposition.

But it's not simple, I wouldn't argue for a non cognitive religious game. Religious game is very special as it makes statement about reality ( the world ) + value statement + emotive statements as one whole. Religious statements are often multidimensional in their usage. Philosophers should bridge the divide between cognitive and non-cognitive statements here. I find religious language very interesting, and we will discover more about language studying the role/meaning of religious statements.

Reply to baker

In another discourse, they are called axioms.

An axiom, postulate, or assumption is a statement that is taken to be true, to serve as a premise or starting point for further reasoning and arguments. The word comes from the Greek ?????? (axí?ma) 'that which is thought worthy or fit' or 'that which commends itself as evident'.[1][2]

The term has subtle differences in definition when used in the context of different fields of study. As defined in classic philosophy, an axiom is a statement that is so evident or well-established, that it is accepted without controversy or question.[3] As used in modern logic, an axiom is a premise or starting point for reasoning

Axioms are self evident true statements we use for a foundation. This is meaningful for mathematics but l am not sure if we call hinge propositions self evident true statements ( true statements have epistemic relations) . A mathematical system is still meaningful if you remove certain axioms, but it's not the same for hinge propositions. Axioms in the true sense should stand on their own, they live in a logical space independent of any mathematical system and we can freely pick them. This isn't the same for a hinge propositions, every hinge proposition comes in a package with a langauge game, separating them is meaningless.

Reply to Joshs

But the use of the word ‘God’ among the religious will
likely include doubt, since God would imply faith , which requires doubt.So I think the hinge proposition God likely includes all of this. Only in a situation where the non-religious had never heard of the concept of God could there be no shared language game.

Doubt in religious game is not the same doubt you have when you are doing a scientific experiment in a lab or when you are guessing. The problem with non-religious people participating in religious game is that, they are using statements in a complete different sense. This isn't a simple confusion that can be removed if both parties sit together and decide the terms. Religious people and non-religious people live in a different world. Any supposed agreement between them will be based on a new misunderstanding.

Reply to Sam26

It seems that just as chess needs the rules, the board, and the pieces, in order for there to be a game of chess, so too, do we need these hinge, bedrock, or foundational beliefs (I think of them as special beliefs, not as propositions) in order to have a language, especially the language of epistemology. This includes the language of doubting. They have a special place between the mind, the world, and our language, and that place is related to our actions in the world.

The problem with using the word "belief" is it implies the bedrock hinge statements are epistemic. It's a matter of being a part of a form of life. People don't doubt hinge propositions, they avoid playing the game by not being a part of a community.

But how does belief fit in a language game, l still need to figure this out ?

Reply to Sam26

What's interesting is that Wittgenstein believed that some beliefs (religious beliefs, moral beliefs, etc.) could not be expressed as facts in the world. This, it seems, is why Wittgenstein was against arguments about the existence of God, there are no facts of metaphysics ("the world is all that is the case"), no facts that correspond to metaphysical propositions. I believe he was wrong about this.

There's actually a big disagreement between Wittgensteinian philosophers here ( esp, whether religious statements are cognitive or non-cognitive). Most religious people use religious statements to make statements about the world, Wittgenstein knew this but he wants us to looking for what's going on with religious statements in addition, and this extra dimension of religious statements could help us see why they are not ordinary statements about the world.

A religious person saying "the tree spoke with the saint", is thinking of the respect nature ought to have for a friend of God and his emotional attachment grows to such an extent, he also makes a statement about the world simultaneously.

I have a big problem with non-cognitive moral statements as they suffer from frege-geach problem. I haven't found a nice solution yet from a philosopher. You may read on Quasi realism to see if you agree with it.

Quoting Eskander

The problem with using the word "belief" is it implies the bedrock hinge statements are epistemic. It's a matter of being a part of a form of life. People don't doubt hinge propositions, they avoid playing the game by not being a part of a community.

But how does belief fit in a language game, l still need to figure this out ?

I would disagree that beliefs imply that "hinge-propositions" are epistemic. A belief must have two other components in order for it to be epistemological, viz., justification and truth. A simple claim, or a mere belief, is just that, a claim, it maybe true, or it maybe false. Hinge-propositions, which many interpret to not be propositions at all (and I agree), are a special kind of belief, with a special status, i.e., they stand outside of epistemological language. These beliefs form the backdrop that allow the language-games of knowing and doubting to take root. They function very similar to the rules of chess, the pieces, and the board, which need no justification, i.e., they form the backdrop which allows the game of chess to be played. And, it's that playing of the game that is a form of life.

People do doubt Moorean propositions (hinge-propositions), which is why Moore wrote his papers in the first place. Although, in practical terms, we don't (generally) doubt them in our everyday speech acts.

Quoting Eskander

every reasonable person doesn't take this as a given.

That's not a criteria for being a hinge proposition.

Many a novice has been flabbergasted by castling, and nonplussed by en passant.

"Here's a hand" might be might well be disbelieved by a non-english speaker, or by yourself at a magic show.

Quoting Sam26

Forms of life are just acts, shown in what we do. Wittgenstein is focused on those forms of life that are connected with language use, and by extension, those acts done by a society or culture. I don't know what acts would go beyond words, maybe certain mental phenomena, but I'm not sure. Wittgenstein was wrestling with this very thing at the end of his life, not only in OC, but in other writings during this period.

Forms of life are not just acts, but acts combined with language. "Block!" goes beyond words in that the block is moved. There is a way of understanding "Block" that goes beyond the rule "When I say 'Block!', you bring me a block", bit which is shown in going along with or against the rule.

Quoting Banno

Forms of life are not just acts, but acts combined with language.

No doubt that Wittgenstein concentrated on those forms of life associated with language, but forms of life go beyond language. Any act that people do together with or without language can be construed as a form of life.

My point is that all actions, even the ones you describe, don't go beyond language, i.e., we can further describe the command "Block!" using more sophisticated language forms. There is nothing that happens when someone gets the block that we can't describe using language. You're right, the command "Block!" in itself, doesn't describe all that happens, but my point is that it can be described. Surely you don't want to limit what happens to just that word. Moreover, what would "going along with or against the rule" amount to apart from language? Even if it's just a primitive way of correcting a particular action. It would have to be a language of some kind.

Reply to Banno

That's not a criteria for being a hinge proposition.

Many a novice has been flabbergasted by castling, and nonplussed by en passant.

"Here's a hand" might be might well be disbelieved by a non-english speaker, or by yourself at a magic show.

By reasonable l mean someone who is mentally sane and for a hinge proposition, there's a mutual understanding between people, a shared practice of taking it as a given to even begin to make sense.

As for your magic show, let's get serious. In a magic show, the language game is different, we expect ourselves to get fooled but the very idea of getting fooled presupposes an ordinary language game where we don't get fooled. Where , here's a hand is taken as a hinge proposition

I have been thinking of a hierarchy of language games, some languages games can be embedded in a more broadly practiced language game. Think of a group of people who have a common form of life and a subtype amongst them have their own "mini" form of life.

I think the non English speaker would say, I don't speak English. He will refuse to play along

Quoting Sam26

Surely you don't want to limit what happens to just that word.

No - that is what I thought you might be doing! Yes, the moving of the block can be described; but:Quoting Sam26

what would "going along with or against the rule" amount to apart from language?

Moving the block!

Quoting Banno

Moving the block!

Ya, but what's involved in the correcting part. Surely just moving a block is not enough, there has to be the correction of not following the rule (some hand signal, grunt, or words). Some form of communication would have to be involved, which brings us back to the linguistic part.

:broken:

Ok, this thread's about Wittgenstein. I hope I'm right. If I am then,

1. Meaning is use!

Question: Is anything that can be used (e.g. a hammer, a nail, etc.) a word?

Purpose! Meaning of life! (Albert Camus & Sisyphus)

Reply to Eskander Quoting Eskander

Religious people and non-religious people live in a different world. Any supposed agreement between them will be based on a new misunderstanding.

Whether or not they live in different worlds has to be determined by the context of the game. With endless religious denominations living in different worlds from each other , and just as many variants of non-believers whose outlooks oppose each other, there is as much likelihood of misunderstanding among the religious as between self-described religious and non-religious. By the same token , one could gather together adherents of liberal and heretical religious faith with self-described atheists , and find a surprising overlap of thinking on issues of faith. My point was that the words religious, non-religious and God by themselves don’t tell us how individuals and groups will align themselves with respect to each other in a language game.

Quoting Eskander

Religious people and non-religious people live in a different world. Any supposed agreement between them will be based on a new misunderstanding.

Quoting Eskander

Axioms are self evident true statements we use for a foundation.

To monotheists, "God exists" is an axiom.
To someone who is not a monotheist, it's at most a hinge proposition for the purposes of a particular conversation.

(Not all atheists believe that when they talk on the topic of "god", they are engaging in something that is merely a "language game", do they?)

Quoting Eskander

Do hinge propositions have a special status ?

Rather, it's that a conversation on the topic of "God" between a monotheist and someone who is not a monotheist has a type of "special status".

Like you said:

Quoting Eskander

Religious people and non-religious people live in a different world. Any supposed agreement between them will be based on a new misunderstanding.

Reply to Sam26

don't think of hinge-propositions as propositions in the normal sense of the word, which is why they're called hinges, basic. or bedrock propositions. They don't fall into the epistemological language we use, at least in terms of JTB. They're not truths, they don't need some kind of justification, at least in the way Moore was referring to them. They're more akin to the rules of chess, as has already been mentioned.

I think Banno has the right of it here. What makes hinge propositions different isn't that they aren't propositional, or cannot be true or factual- its not anything peculiar to their content that marks them out from other sorts of propositions. What makes them hinge propositions is the role they play: the fact that they form the hinge (or bedrock) upon which our other epistemic moves depend.

But by that same token they cannot be subject to evaluation the way other propositions or truths can: they must be held true, in order to play their role. But there presumably still is some fact of the matter regarding whether e.g. here is a hand, or any other hinge proposition or epistemic bedrock or whatever... its just that we cannot simultaneously rely on them as hinge propositions, while also entertaining the possibility that they are false.

Reply to Seppo I can't make any sense of the idea that there are propositions that are true, but I don't know if their true, it's contradictory. The problem, is the same problem Wittgenstein had with Moore's propositions, viz., that a claim to know (in Moore's cases) involves an objective verification or justification, but what would such a verification look like? Moore's propositions are not the kind of propositions that allow for a justification, which is why I call them beliefs, not propositions in the normal sense. In fact, Wittgenstein refers to them in the same way, "Moore's view really comes down to this: the concept 'know' is analogous to the concepts 'believe', 'surmise,' [etc] (OC 21)." Moreover, what does having knowledge amount to, other than having a true belief based on good reasons or evidence?

If Moore held up his hand, and said, "It's true that I have a hand," it would lack sense for the same reasons that "I know I have a hand," lacks sense. To the latter statement Wittgenstein says to consider it's negation (OC 4), "I don't know that I have hands," this negation tells us something about the queer nature of Moorean propositions. It also tells us something about the proposition "It's true that I have hands," it's just as strange as the Moorean proposition, in fact, it amounts to the same thing. Consider the negation of this proposition, "It's false that I have hands," the exact same problem raises it's ugly head. What in the world would that mean?

Now does it follow that in all cases we can't speak of these kinds of propositions as being knowledge or being true? Of course not, and Wittgenstein gives examples of where we can use the word know when referring to our hands. It also follows that there are cases where we can claim that these kinds of propositions are also true. It depends on the language-game or the context. However, saying a proposition is true, still amounts to having knowledge. Part of the problem is equating what we mean by knowledge and truth, with claims about knowledge and truth.

Reply to Sam26

I can't make any sense of the idea that there are propositions that are true, but I don't know if their true, it's contradictory

I guess I fail to see what is contradictory about an unknown truth. My truck has a certain weight. I don't know what it is, but it has one. So there is some truth, i.e. "my truck weighs X lbs/kg", I just don't know it. Similar examples aren't difficult to multiply: I don't know what the temperature is right now in Paris, but there is a temperature (and so a truth corresponding to that). I don't remember Wittgenstein's birth date, but there is some truth RE when he was born. So I don't see what is difficult about that.

But I do agree with you about justification (and therefore, by extension, knowledge). Given their role as hinge propositions, we cannot evaluate or justify these propositions as we can with other propositions, because any process of evaluation or justification proceeds on the assumption or against the background of these propositions (and so this would involve an obvious circularity). And so they cannot be known, because they cannot be justified. But truth and justification -> knowledge are not the same thing; as above, something can be true, without me knowing whether its true, or without my having rational justification/warrant for believing it.

Otoh, the proposal that hinge propositions could be propositional or beliefs without being truth-apt does strike me as contradictory; given the usual definition of propositions, isn't it necessary that they be truth-apt? And similarly for beliefs, at least, if those beliefs are cognitive and meaningful, mustn't the content of the belief be truth-apt?

So again I suggest that hinge propositions are propositional, are truth-apt, and do not have any special epistemic role because of their content, but rather because of their epistemic function and relation to our other beliefs and propositions and entire method for holding beliefs and evaluating propositions.

Quoting Seppo

I guess I fail to see what is contradictory about an unknown truth. My truck has a certain weight. I don't know what it is, but it has one. So there is some truth, i.e. "my truck weighs X lbs/kg", I just don't know it. Similar examples aren't difficult to multiply: I don't know what the temperature is right now in Paris, but there is a temperature (and so a truth corresponding to that). I don't remember Wittgenstein's birth date, but there is some truth RE when he was born. So I don't see what is difficult about that.

The proposition that, "My truck has an unknown weight," is true, but that proposition is known to be true, viz., you know that you don't know the weight. This is still a confusion, and it's not an example. You still haven't given a truth that you don't know is true.

I don't have time right now to answer the rest of your post. I'll answer later.

Reply to Sam26

The proposition that, "My truck has an unknown weight," is true, but that proposition is known to be true, viz., you know that you don't know the weight. This is still a confusion, and it's not an example. You still haven't given a truth that you don't know is true.

Of course its an example. My truck does have a particular weight. So there is some truth corresponding to its weight, whatever it may be. But its a truth I don't know. Just like there is some truth of the form, "the temperature in Paris right now is X", for some value of X... I just don't know what it is.

So the idea of a unknown truth, or of a proposition whose truth we cannot evaluate, doesn't appear contradictory- its almost trivial. But knowledge and justification are a separate matter.

Reply to Seppo I'll try one more time. Statements/propositions have two possible values (true or false), i.e., they either match with the facts or they don't. The claim that your truck has a particular weight, is a claim about a fact or state-of-affairs; and it's the state-of-affairs that is unknown. A statement that is true, is one that would line up with the fact (the correct weight of the truck). There is no statement or claim that's true independent of the facts. There are statements that have the potential of being true, but they also have the potential of being false. I believe that what's happening here is that people are trying to separate statements that are true (not intentionally) from the corresponding fact, and it can't be done. Again, it's a linguistic confusion.

Reply to Sam26 Its not that I don't know what you're saying; I don't agree. I don't see why we can't distinguish between the claim and the corresponding state of affairs- it seems we're doing so perfectly sensibly right now. And so whatever the weight of my truck, there is a true proposition corresponding to that value- if my truck weighs 2800 lbs, say, then "my truck weighs 2800 lbs" is true irrespective of whether I'm aware of it or not. And I'm not saying that the truth is "independent of the facts"- its certainly dependent on the facts, its only true in virtue of those facts.

And in any case the point is that we cannot evaluate the truth or falsity of hinge propositions not because they cannot be true or false (else they wouldn't be propositions, or the contents of belief), but because of the peculiar role they play in our epistemic process- the fact that they form the hinge or background, the part that is "held firm", around/against which we can evaluate propositions or beliefs. We cannot evaluate their truth or falsity because this involves us in a circularity. In other words, its not anything about their content, but about their role or function in our overall epistemic project.

Reply to Seppo Here's another way of making my point. If there is a proposition X that is an unknown truth, then the proposition, "X is true, but unknown" is true. If this is the case, then the proposition "X is true, but unknown," would be known to be true, leading, again, to a contradiction.

It seems we're ascribing some metaphysical existence to these "unknown truths," such that there is some future proposition X, that is not only true now, but true in the future, albeit unknown now, but known at some future time. It's as if the proposition is necessarily true, not contingently true. For if it were contingently true, then proposition could be false, which would violate the necessity of it being true.

I haven't completely thought the logic of this through, but there still seems to be a problem with this line of thinking.

Maybe hinge-propositions could have some third value, such that in some uses they are neither true or false, but have some other logical status.

To understand that the phrase "unknown truth" is nonsense or senseless, all we have to do is think of cases where in our ordinary use we speak like this. Ordinarily, we might say, "It's unknown what the weight of some random giant boulder is," not, there exists some unknown truth X, that is the weight of the boulder. This kind of talk is what Wittgenstein was fighting against, it's a kind of philosophical jargon that seems to say something, when in fact it represents a confusion.

Quoting Sam26

I can't make any sense of the idea that there are propositions that are true, but I don't know if their true

Reply to Sam26

You would deny, upon seeing said boulder, that one of these is true?

The weight of the boulder is 5000 kg
The weight of the boulder is not 5000 kg

Before you tell me that we don't normally talk like that etc., try this one: there is life on other planets. It could be true as far as we know. If it is, then it's currently true but nobody knows it yet.

We sometimes seek to prove statements to be true. This doesn't make any sense without this concept of truth. Your position implies that a proposition becomes true only when we come to know it, which seems confused.

"It might be true that there is life on other planets", an everyday, conventional thing to say, is to say precisely that "there is life on other planets" might be true--not that it might be true in the future, exactly at the moment when we find out.

It's just how the concept works in the language.

Quoting jamalrob

You would deny, upon seeing said boulder, that one of these is true?

The weight of the boulder is 5000 kg
The weight of the boulder is not 5000 kg

Before you tell me that we don't normally talk like that etc., try this one: there is life on other planets. It could be true as far as we know. If it is, then it's currently true but nobody knows it yet.

We sometimes seek to prove statements to be true. This doesn't make any sense without this concept of truth. Your position implies that a proposition becomes true only when we come to know it, which seems confused.

No, that's not what I'm saying. I'm not denying that there are claims that are either true or false. I'm denying that there are unknown truths, there are facts that are unknown, but to say that X is a truth, but is unknown doesn't make sense. Ya, and we seek to prove statements to be true, but that's not what's being claimed here. We are not saying there is a claim, which can be true or false, and we are seeking to prove it's true. Here, what is implied is that there is a statement X, that is true, but we don't know it's true. How could you say it's true if you don't know it?

It's as if we have these propositions existing in some metaphysical realm that are true, but we don't know their true. We can say that of facts, but not of truths, which are just claims by themselves that can be either true or false.

There are claims that I don't know are true, but others do, but that's still different from what's claimed here.

Reply to Sam26 Nope, you've got this wrong.

Quoting Sam26

there are facts that are unknown

If I'm interpreting you correctly then you're agreeing to this. But this is to say that there are true statements that are not known. It's saying the same thing.

Quoting Sam26

How could you say it's true if you don't know it?

I can't say it's true, but it might be true. I think you need to look at this again.

Quoting Sam26

It's as if we have these propositions existing in some metaphysical realm

No, this is coming from you alone.

Quoting Eskander

Another application would be in religious language game, the question of the existence of God from a nonreligious person makes no sense in a religious game where the whole language is based around the usage of the word ,"God" .

Quoting Joshs

Only in a situation where the non-religious had never heard of the concept of God could there be no shared language game.

Or in which "God" has not been properly defined by those that are using the term. If the users of the term don't know the rules then how do they expect to teach others how to play the game?

It's not just the term,"god", but also "exists", of which both the religious and non-religious know the rule for using the term. All conclusions reached by all domains of knowledge (religious, science, philosophy) must be integrated. So the rules for playing the religious game must not contradict the rules in the science game if we're talking about the same reality.

Quoting Sam26

It's as if we have these propositions existing in some metaphysical realm that are true, but we don't know their true. We can say that of facts, but not of truths, which are just claims by themselves that can be either true or false.

A fairer response to this...

As far as we can talk about the existence of propositions, then yes, they exist when they're stated, or rather, they're part of various language games. Statements are made about things we don't know, and those statements are either true or false (if they're sensical). That is, some of them are true, whether we know them or not.

To clarify Wittgenstein's "epistemology", background historical context is required with regards to "Wittgenstein's Verification Principle" in 1930 that the Vienna Circle enthusiastically adopted for several years, but that Wittgenstein came to reject shortly after he proposed it. According to the verification principle, the sense of a proposition is its means of verification.

Wittgenstein explained the verification principle to Schlick:

"If I say, for example , 'Up there on the cupboard there is a book', how do i set about verifying it? Is it sufficient if I glance at it, or if I look at it from different sides, or if I take it into my hands, touch it, open it, turn over its leaves, and so forth? There are two conceptions here. One of them says that however I set about it, I shall never be able to verify the proposition completely. A proposition always keeps a back-door open, as it were. Whatever we do, we are never sure that we are not mistaken.
The other conception, the one I want to hold, says, 'No, if I can never verify the sense of a proposition completely, then I cannot have meant anything by the proposition either. Then the proposition signifies nothing whatsoever.'
In order to determine the sense of a proposition, I should have to know a very specific procedure for when to count the proposition as verified. "

But, in line with a common tendency displayed in this forum, the logical positivists mistook his idea of verification for a dogmatic theory of meaning. Indeed Wittgenstein himself was briefly seduced by this principle in 1930 before abandoning it. Wittgenstein told the Moral Science Club in Cambridge:

"I used at one time to say that, in order to get clear how a sentence is used, it was a good idea to ask oneself the question: 'How would one try to verify such an assertion?' But that's just one way among others of getting clear about the use of a word or sentence. For example, another question which it is often very useful to ask oneself is: 'How is this word learned?' 'How would one set about teaching a child to use this word?' But some people have turned this suggestion about asking for the verification into a dogma - as if I'd been advancing a theory about meaning. "

Hopefully everyone here will see that abandoning the identity 'meaning is verification' as well as it's weaker cousin 'meaning is dependent upon some process of verification' implies abandoning every theory of meaning , including meaning is proof or derivation, meaning is convention, meaning is contingent upon social verification, meaning is falsification etc. For each of these cases involves appealing to case-specific criteria of meaning that aren't universally employed across all language-games, and are mostly of relevance to formal language-games in which meaning is directly defined identified with verification. Verification criteria aren't generally present in other use-cases of propositions. For example, many everyday uses of "2+2 = 4" don't involve any checking for equality beyond one's immediate first impression.

His rejection of the principle of verification also demolishes common misconceptions referred to as "Private language arguments" that argue for a rejection of private meaning on the basis of an absence of independent or external verification criteria. Wittgenstein gave an example of private meaning without verification criteria as early as may 1930 in Philosophical Remarks:

"How do I know that the colour of this paper, which I call 'white', is the same as the one I saw here yesterday? By recognizing it again; and recognizing it again is my only source of knowledge here. In that case, 'That it is the same' means that I recognize it again"

As for the status of philosophical skepticism. Wittgenstein did not believe that "hinge-propositions", had prescriptive value. His criticisms of Moore weren't criticisms about the truth of Moore's assertion that he has hands (which depending on one's interpretation of Moore's intended meaning could either be viewed as true, false, both or neither) but were criticisms pointing out the distinction between the use of propositions as auxilliary hypotheses, versus the use of propositions under evaluation.

Reply to jamalrob :up:

Well said. I find Sam's position here sort of perplexing. The boulder has a weight, regardless of whether we know what it is or not. So one of these two propositions must necessarily be true... again, irrespective of whether we know which it is.

So again, hinge propositions aren't distinguished from other sorts of propositions in virtue of some peculiar inability to be true or false, but because of the pivotal epistemic role they play as the background assumptions against which we evaluate truth or falsity in general (and so therefore cannot themselves be so evaluated, on pain of circularity).

Reply to Seppo Yes. Hinges are not known, not because they are not true or false, but because they are not justified. That is, justification is not what we do with hinges.

The book is about certainty. Particularly, it's about those certainties that we hold to be true before we go on to know things. These certain beliefs do not stand in need of justification; justification here can never be as unquestionable as the belief you're trying to justify.

But I think I do understand the confusion. What is a belief? How can we talk of propositions (or propositional attitudes) that we somehow "have" but which we would never think to state, that obviously do not, as entities in the head or whatever, form an epistemic foundation for our knowing? If we can talk of such a basis then it is in the nature of ways of acting in a particular form of life. It's difficult to assign truth to something that really only exists as a set of practices.

The answer I think is to recognize that a belief just is a post-hoc rendering of these behaviours--and attitudes, in the sense of orientations--in the form of statements. To say that someone has a belief is not to say that they have an individuated statement-shaped object inside them. And yet, to talk about certainties and beliefs at all is to talk about statements/propositions.

And the fact is that we can and do pick out and individuate statements that we believe, that are true, even though it hadn't occurred to us to think of them before. I am certain that here is one hand and that the Earth did not pop into existence the moment I was born. These are true statements.

Make sense @Sam26?

Reply to jamalrob I appreciate your take, but I don't think that is what Wittgenstein is saying in OC. Moreover, I don't think that hinge-propositions are propositions in the normal sense, i.e., they don't have a truth value (generally speaking). In other words, there are uses where we can assign a truth value, but if the proposition is being used as a hinge, bedrock, or basic belief, then not only can we not talk about them in terms of knowing, but we can't talk about them in terms of truths either. They are outside our epistemological language games, which means that any talk of knowing, and by extension any talk of truth or justification, is meaningless (again, generally speaking, there are exceptions). They are arational beliefs. These beliefs function as the building blocks of our language-games of epistemology, and of language generally.

If W. is saying that Moore's use of know is senseless, then by extension truth is included, for what are we talking about, if not the truth of Moore's propositions. To say that Moore knows X, is to say that Moore knows the truth of X. What else would knowing mean in Moore's context, if not, that his propositions are true? So, again, when W. attacks Moore's propositions, he is not only attacking the use of the word know, but all that goes along with it, including truth and justification (repeating for emphasis).

It would be like asking, while coming up with a rule in chess (as the game is invented), "Is it true that bishops move diagonally?" It's just a rule. It's not about true or false. Now later, in a given context, you can speak of the truth of a rule, but note this is only after the rule has been established. The rule that bishops move diagonally is a kind of ground for the game, a bedrock statement. It has nothing to do with truth.

The status of W.'s hinge-propositions depends on it's status in a given language-game, which is why in some language-games it's appropriate to talk of these propositions in epistemological terms.

Reply to bongo fury That's funny!

Quoting Sam26

If W. is saying that Moore's use of know is senseless, then by extension truth is included, for what are we talking about, if not the truth of Moore's propositions.

This is incorrect. W is talking about the claim to know, and your "by extension" isn't supported. It's precisely because we can say that the statements are true that there is an issue about whether Moore can also know them.

Quoting Sam26

What else would knowing mean in Moore's context, if not, that his propositions are true?

What else? Knowing is more than truth, it's justification as well.

Quoting Sam26

So, again, when W. attacks Moore's propositions, he is not only attacking the use of the word know, but all that goes along with it, including truth and justification (repeating for emphasis).

You haven't made an argument for this. It doesn't follow. It's also clearly not what W is saying. I was hoping not to have to get into exegesis.

Quoting Sam26

It would be like asking, while coming up with a rule in chess (as the game is invented), "Is it true that bishops move diagonally?" It's just a rule. It's not about true or false. Now later, in a given context, you can speak of the truth of a rule, but note this is only after the rule has been established.

But hinges already have this kind of status. It makes sense to ask "Is it true that bishops move diagonally?" I don't understand why you've introduced this temporal dimension. We were not talking about the moment of hinge formation (and I wouldn't talk of such a thing anyway).

Quoting Sam26

The rule that bishops move diagonally is a kind of ground for the game, a bedrock statement. It has nothing to do with truth.

Again, this doesn't follow at all from anything else you said. Bedrock statements, as all statements, are true or false.

You can ditch truth only if you also ditch belief itself. That is, you can't take the route you're trying to take without abandoning the concept of belief.

Reply to bongo fury :rofl:

It was true that Stan had two legs, even before there was any question about it.

Reply to jamalrob Oh well, I know, everything I'm saying doesn't follow. From where I'm sitting it follows almost by necessity.

Reply to Sam26 But it's obvious. From your not knowing that the capital of Vanuatu is Port Vila it doesn't follow that it isn't true that it's the capital. To question a claim to know is not "by extension" to question the truth of what is claimed to be known.

Things are somewhat different in the case of hinges, but you haven't shown relevantly how. How does it follow "almost by necessity"?

Quoting Sam26

I don't think that hinge-propositions are propositions in the normal sense, i.e., they don't have a truth value

I hate to be the one to hand-wring over definitions, but I don't think I understand what you mean when you use the word "proposition" (and that is, perhaps, a source of our disagreement here): can you tell me how you define this term?

(At least in much contemporary analytic philosophy, a proposition just is something which can be true or false, and so the notion of a proposition that lacks a truth value would be a contradiction in terms.

And so, as both jamalrob and I have suggested, Moorean/hinge propositions are propositions- they can and do have a truth value- and are distinguished from ordinary propositions not by an inability to have a truth-value, but in their inability to be justified, and that inability to be justified isn't due to anything peculiar to themselves, but rather because of the role they play in our epistemic process)

Quoting jamalrob

But it's obvious. From your not knowing that the capital of Vanuatu is Port Vila it doesn't follow that it isn't true that it's the capital. To question a claim to know is not "by extension" to question the truth of what is claimed to be known.

Things are somewhat different in the case of hinges, but you haven't shown relevantly how. How does it follow "almost by necessity"?

The fact that you're saying, "From your not knowing that the capital of Vanuatu is Port Vila it doesn't follow that it isn't true that it's the capital," demonstrates that you're not following my point. Obviously not knowing the truth of a statement, doesn't mean the statement isn't true. It just means that you have no justification, or no epistemic right to claim it's true. Any claim, without some kind of justification, is a claim that can either be true or false, not just true, as some want to say about Moore's propositions.

Knowledge entails truth, by definition, so if knowledge entails truth, then Wittgenstein's attack of Moore's use of know is also an attack on the truth of those same propositions. This is why I believe it necessarily follows that to attack know, as W. does, is to also attack the truth of those same propositions. Otherwise, Wittgenstein's attack on Moore's use of know would be meaningless or vacuous.

By the way, this interpretation, which is an interpretation I primarily arrived at on my own, is confirmed by other philosophers, who have arrived at the same interpretation. This doesn't make the interpretation right or wrong, but does, I think, show that it certainly seems to follow from one's reading of the text.

Quoting Seppo

I hate to be the one to hand-wring over definitions, but I don't think I understand what you mean when you use the word "proposition" (and that is, perhaps, at the root of our disagreement here): can you tell me how you define this term?

No, you're quite right to point this out. Wittgenstein's wording, viz., hinge-propositions, bedrock proposition, etc., is pointing out something special about these statements. They aren't normal propositions, or normal statements, they have a special standing in our language-games. This is why the normal definition of a proposition doesn't work when applied to these kinds of statements. This is why we should look at their function in our language. I happen to think, and so do other philosophers, that these statements form a kind of arational belief system that allows our language-games to take root. Without them there would be no talk of knowing, justification, or truth. They form the bedrock from which we form our linguistic acts.

Keep in mind that Wittgenstein never sorted this out, and it's difficult to say how much of what's written in these notes would have remained after he edited it.

Quoting Sam26

Knowledge entails truth, by definition, so if knowledge entails truth, then Wittgenstein's attack of Moore's use of know is also an attack on the truth of those same propositions.

Or on these propositions ability to be justified. Knowledge entails not only truth, but justification, and it is our ability to justify hinge propositions that is lacking... due to the fact that hinge propositions are the background against which our process of justification takes place, and so justifying these propositions would become circular.

Quoting Sam26

They aren't normal propositions, or normal statements, they have a special standing in our language-games

On this we agree. But their special standing isn't due to anything intrinsic to the propositions themselves, but rather due to the role they play: hinge propositions form the bedrock upon which our entire process of knowing, evaluating, and justifying is built. But I (and jamalrob) are suggesting it is their inability to be justified, not an inability to true, which distinguishes them from ordinary propositions (and their inability to be justified is directly due to this peculiar role- or "special standing" as you say).

And there isn't anything contradictory about propositions or truths that cannot be justified, whereas the idea of a proposition which cannot be true is contradictory, or at least highly problematic (given the ordinary usage of the word "proposition").

Quoting Seppo

Or on these propositions ability to be justified. Knowledge entails not only truth, but justification, and it is our ability to justify hinge propositions that is lacking... due to the fact that hinge propositions are the background against which our process of justification takes place, and so justifying these propositions would become circular.

Yes, except, it's not a matter of them being circular, it's a matter of the statements being meaningful. Damn Seppo, it seems you have understood my point. I don't feel like I'm banging my head against a wall afterall.

Reply to Sam26:up:

Quoting Seppo

On this we agree. But their special standing isn't due to anything intrinsic to the propositions themselves, but rather due to the role they play: hinge propositions form the bedrock upon which our entire process of knowing, evaluating, and justifying is built. But I (and jamalrob) are suggesting it is their inability to be justified, not an inability to true, which distinguishes them from ordinary propositions (and their inability to be justified is directly due to this peculiar role- or "special standing" as you say).

And there isn't anything contradictory about propositions or truths that cannot be justified, whereas the idea of a proposition which cannot be true is contradictory, or at least highly problematic (given the ordinary usage of the word "proposition").

Oh no, we've gone backwards. Truth is included with knowing and justification, because, again, knowing entails truth, and what is it that you're justifying, other than the truth of the statement. So, no knowledge, justification, or truth in terms of these Moorean statements.

Moorean beliefs are prior to epistemic (knowing, justification, and truth) talk. Just as the rules of chess provide the context whereby we can talk of the fact that bishops move diagonally. In other word, we can say, based on the rules, that it's true that bishops move diagonally. The rule provides the background that allows truth to get a foothold.

Reply to Sam26 We cannot know Moorean/hinge propositions. In order to be known, something must be both true and justified. So, our inability to know hinge propositions could be due to their inability to be true, their inability to be justified, or both. But the idea that they cannot be true doesn't seem to work since, among other things, a proposition which cannot be true is a contradiction. So it seems that our inability to know hinge propositions is because they cannot be justified.

And they cannot be justified because of the foundational role they play in the process of justification. If they form a part of the background against/upon which we justify propositions in general, then they cannot themselves be justified. And if they cannot be justified, they cannot be known... even though they can be true.

Reply to Seppo Okay, well, I've said my peace, that's all I can do. Have a good one.

Reply to Sam26 Obviously you're free to disengage as you like, but I would have liked to hear where the above line of reasoning goes wrong.

Quoting Sam26

The fact that you're saying, "From your not knowing that the capital of Vanuatu is Port Vila it doesn't follow that it isn't true that it's the capital," demonstrates that you're not following my point. Obviously not knowing the truth of a statement, doesn't mean the statement isn't true. It just means that you have no justification, or no epistemic right to claim it's true. Any claim, without some kind of justification, is a claim that can either be true or false, not just true, as some want to say about Moore's propositions.

Knowledge entails truth, by definition, so if knowledge entails truth, then Wittgenstein's attack of Moore's use of know is also an attack on the truth of those same propositions.

This is very curious. First you show that you understand knowledge, but then completely undermine yourself.

I have followed your point perfectly well, and here you demonstrate your continued misunderstanding. My example was just to show that an attack on a claim to know a proposition is not necessarily an attack on the truth of it. You agree with this at first, regarding the ordinary empirical statement, but then fail to apply the same understanding of knowledge with regard to hinges.

So this needs some additional argument:

Quoting Sam26

Knowledge entails truth, by definition, so if knowledge entails truth, then Wittgenstein's attack of Moore's use of know is also an attack on the truth of those same propositions

I asked you to argue for this, but you didn't. Seppo has dealt with it already, and very clearly, but I'll put it in my own words too. W's attack of M's use of "know" is not an attack on the truth of those propositions; it's an attack on the applicability of justification. If M cannot be said to be justified, he cannot be said to know. Knowing requires truth, as you point out, but it also requires justification, so you can attack the claim to know by pointing out the lack of--or rather, the inapplicability of--justification, without attacking the truth of the statements. This is what W is doing.

Quoting Sam26

By the way, this interpretation, which is an interpretation I primarily arrived at on my own, is confirmed by other philosophers, who have arrived at the same interpretation. This doesn't make the interpretation right or wrong, but does, I think, show that it certainly seems to follow from one's reading of the text.

Can you point me in the direction of the relevant philosophers and their work?

Quoting jamalrob

Knowing requires truth, as you point out, but it also requires justification, so you can attack the claim to know by pointing out the lack of--or rather, the inapplicability of--justification, without attacking the truth of the statements. This is what W is doing.

:up:

Quoting jamalrob

Can you point me in the direction of the relevant philosophers and their work?

There is much being written on this subject, but here is some of what I'm talking about. Sorry I didn't get back to you sooner.

https://uhra.herts.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/2299/17388/Moyal_Sharrock_Animal_in_Epistemology_pre_imp_PdF.pdf?sequence=3

Reply to Sam26 She's the best interpreter of On Certainty that I know of. :up:

Reply to jamalrob I find that I agree with much of her interpretation.

Reply to Sam26 Me too. I'll read it some time and say something about it here.

Reply to jamalrob Pay close attention to how she talks about hinge-propositions and truth.

Reply to Sam26 Of course.

Another similar paper in line with my own thinking of this subject, at least generally.

https://www.academia.edu/61206520/Wittgensteins_Hinge_Certainty

I suggest that Wittgenstein's use of the term 'hinge' is related to his interest in mechanics and architecture.That is to say, we should keep in mind the function of a hinge.

I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

(OC 152)

Lest the analogy be misunderstood:

And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house

(OC 248)

And:

Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.

(OC 305)

There is no absolute fixed point around which things revolve:

It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were
hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.

The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I
distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself;
though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.

But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical science" he would be wrong. Yet this is
right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at
another as a rule of testing.

And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an
imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited.

(OC 96-99)

That such things are historically contingent is nicely, although inadvertently, illustrated here:

But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the
moon?" If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the
moon. Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system of physics forbids us to believe it.

(OC 108)

To understand what hinge-propositions are, one needs to understand what beliefs are; and if you don't agree or understand this, then you won't fully grasp the nature of hinge-propositions.

Beliefs fall into two categories of actions, those that are non-linguistic, and those that are linguistic. Those that are non-linguistic, as the name implies, are acts that are quite separate from language. For example, the act of opening a door, shows that you believe that there is a door, a hand, a body, and all the surrounding things enabling you to perform the act within the world. Specifically, we're referring to contingent states-of-affairs that make up the world (this idea has it's roots in the Tractatus). These kinds of beliefs are not limited to humans, but can also be seen in animals, i.e., in their actions too.

The second category of belief is the one most of us are familiar with, viz., beliefs that are a function of language (statements/propositions). These are necessarily dependent on the first category of non-linguistic beliefs, without which, there would be no linguistic acts of believing. So, linguistic beliefs are born out of non-linguistic beliefs, and all the contingent surroundings that enable such beliefs. Non-linguistic acts (beliefs) are necessarily prior to linguistic acts and all that amounts to language.

Hinge-propositions, which Wittgenstein identified in OC, are not propositions in the strict sense, although in certain language-games they can function as propositions. I identify them, as do other philosophers, as basic beliefs, or foundational beliefs. However, one must be careful not to think of them in terms of the traditional ideas of foundationalism (for e.g. Plantinga's epistemology).

Once we see these non-linguistic basic beliefs (hinge-beliefs) in this way it follows that they are outside any talk of epistemology. This means that any reference to these beliefs in terms of knowledge, true or false, is meaningless. The problem of course, is that as soon as you start talking of these beliefs, you bring them into the linguistic arena and change their nature in some respects. You change their nature because now they have different functions depending on the language-game. Also, there is no precise way of defining these basic beliefs within language because they have so many different functions. It's like trying to define the essence of a game (as per Wittgenstein). There are just a group of family resemblances tying together the many uses that define hinge-propositions or basic beliefs.

What has intrigued me about hinge-propositions is that they usher in, I believe, a new kind of foundational epistemology. One that answers many questions about the nature of epistemology, and solves, for example, the infinite regress problem, and the problems of how to refer to such foundational beliefs. My epistemology now revolves around the ideas presented here, and gives epistemology a more solid footing.

Quoting Sam26

Hinge-propositions, which Wittgenstein identified in OC, are not propositions in the strict sense,

What could that mean, i wonder?

Reply to Banno I already explained it above.

Quoting Sam26

This means that any reference to these beliefs in terms of knowledge, true or false, is meaningless.

You seem to think that hinge propositions are neither true nor false...

How can you validly make a deduction from a proposition that is neither true nor false?

@Banno @Sam26

I think the idea is that hinge propositions are not used in deductive logic. They are the background against which deductive logic and any other kind of coherent thought is feasible. On this view, statements such as "I know there is an external world..." or "I believe that some events have happened before other events..." or "I am currently doubting whether I have a body...." are as incoherent as their denials. Knowledge, belief, doubt and certainty do not apply.

This may be off-beam, but the discussion of an 'animal' (a-rational) aspect reminds me of the distinction between 'saying' and 'showing'. I cannot coherently say that I believe or know that there is an external world. However, I cannot live a human life without my every word and action showing that I 'hold' such a 'belief', the scare quotes meaning that it is not a 'proposition' as we usually understand propositions to be. This line of argument can end up with us saying that hinge 'propositions' lack most of the features of propositions, including truth-value.

All the above is 'for what it's worth'. I'm not on sure ground.

Maybe I'm not too off-beam -

[quote=Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, p8]Of course, their being ineffable does not prevent our hinges from showing themselves in what we say, but here too, certainty is animal. My hinge certainty that 'I have a body' is much the same as a lion's instinctive certainty of having a body.[/quote]

Reply to Cuthbert Reply to Banno First, I want to say that my view, although much the same as Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, was arrived at quite independent of her. I gave the link because @jamalrob wanted to know what other philosophers thought that hinge's were neither true nor false.

Quoting Banno

You seem to think that hinge propositions are neither true nor false...

How can you validly make a deduction from a proposition that is neither true nor false?

It's not that hinge's can't be used in deductive logic (@Cuthbert @Banno), it's that hinge's, in the language-game of being a hinge (think of Moore's propositions), isn't a proposition in the normal sense. However, there are language-games, deductive and inductive logic, where the hinge, can be used as a normal proposition. So, hinge's are not stuck in one particular role, no more than our use of game is stuck in one role, say, only chess games or board games.

Hinge's, however, in there most basic form have quite a different role, especially if you look at them as non-propositional or non-linguistic, they have no connection with language (logic is a language obviously) in this role. However, they do have an important function as Wittgenstein points out in OC.

So, yes, @Banno I do believe that hinge's, basic beliefs, bedrock beliefs, foundational beliefs, have the role of not being true or false. So, it's not that I seem to think this, it can be correctly applied to my thinking. In fact, if you remember there was another thread where I said that 2+2=4 was a hinge, i.e., that it's not true or false. I hadn't paid particular attention to certain mathematical propositions, so I began to doubt whether I was correct about this, but after considering my position again, I'm returning to that belief, with the caveat that, it depends on the language-game the proposition (mathematical or not) is being used in.

So, just as we shouldn't confuse language-games in terms of presenting the same use, i.e., as having the same meaning or function, we shouldn't confuse the language-games of hinge's. Again, in some language-games they do function as normal propositions, but generally I would say, they do not. In cases where they do not, then they are by definition, not true or false, as per basic belief status.

Quoting Sam26

because jamalrob wanted to know what other philosophers thought that hinge's were neither true nor false.

Note that this is not what I was criticizing. I even suggested a way for you to be able to treat hinges as neither true nor false, and this appears to be the route taken by Moyal-Sharrock.

But I won't be reading it in full until tomorrow at the earliest.

Reply to jamalrob Well, then we just disagree.

Reply to Sam26 What an odd thing to say. Kindly wait till I've read the papers, just as I waited for you to respond to my last substantive post. I'm still waiting for a good response, as it happens, aside from the links.

A key passage in OC is a quote from Goethe's Faust:

In the beginning was the deed.

(OC 402)

This is expanded upon:

But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or
unjustified; as it were, as something animal.

(OC 359)

I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination.

(OC 475)

Language games are an extension of man's acting in the world. Primitive hinges are pre-linguistic. They are not language games, they are an essential part of the form of life in which language games come to play a part. It is not that they cannot be doubted, it is simply that they are not.

A mistake that is frequently made is to treat hinges as if they are all the same. There are propositional hinges and pre-linguistic hinges. Empirical hinges and mathematical hinges.

I think it is also a mistake to think that hinges can be neither true nor false. We do not generally question whether they are true or false. If we did they would not function as hinges, but it is possible to be wrong. We do not ordinarily question the ground beneath our feet, we simply stand and walk, but what is ordinary is not what is beyond being true or false.

Reply to jamalrob Do I have to "kindly wait?" :wink:

Reply to Fooloso4
I think what Wittgenstein demonstrates, is that the idea of hinge propositions is fundamentally mistaken. Hinge propositions are simply something we want to assume the reality of, to prove to ourselves that our knowledge is adequately grounded, and quell the skepticism which constitutes the philosophical yearning of the human mind.

But when we investigate, as Wittgenstein did, we find that we must conclude that this assumption of hinge propositions is just not consistent with reality. The evidence for this conclusion is that when we try to describe the paradigm, or hold up anything as an example, of a hinge proposition, we find that it can never fulfil the criteria of what we want, as a hinge proposition. And the idea of hinge propositions remains fundamentally flawed.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

I think what Wittgenstein demonstrates, is that the idea of hinge propositions is fundamentally mistaken.

What you have demonstrated is that your idea of hinge propositions is fundamentally mistaken. When he says:

The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.

(OC 166)

it does not follow that hinge propositions are mistaken, but that:

This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

(OC 152)

This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

Eppur si muove. So the debate continues.

Reply to Fooloso4 Quoting Fooloso4

I think it is also a mistake to think that hinges can be neither true nor false. We do not generally question whether they are true or false. If we did they would not function as hinges, but it is possible to be wrong. We do not ordinarily question the ground beneath our feet, we simply stand and walk, but what is ordinary is not what is beyond being true or false.

Isn’t the hinge proposition the condition of possibility for determinations of truth and falsity? That is, something is true or false relative to a more encompassing
framework that is take for granted. In order for a hinge proposition to be found true or false it would no longer function as a hinge proposition. It would have a different sense.

Quoting Joshs

Isn’t the hinge proposition the condition of possibility for determinations of truth and falsity?

If they are it is not in the Kantian transcendental sense.

That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

(OC 341)

That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.

(OC 342)

If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

(OC 343).

Reply to Fooloso4

337: “One cannot make experiments if there are not some things that one does not doubt. But that does not mean that one takes certain presuppositions on trust. When I write a letter and post it, I take it for granted that it will arrive - I expect this.”

343. “But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason
we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.”

Once one decides to question an assumption it changes its sense from being a hinge proposition to something directly investigated, and thus no longer an assumption.

Reply to Joshs

As I understand it, hinge propositions are not immutable:

But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the
moon?" If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the
moon. Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system of physics forbids us to believe it.

(OC 108)

Within "our system" at that time, it was not doubted that no one has ever been on the moon. Today we doubt that proposition. We regard it as false.

Reply to Fooloso4 Quoting Fooloso4

Within "our system" at that time, it was not doubted that no one has ever been on the moon. Today we doubt that proposition. We regard it as false.

But that is a claim within a system. It is the claim
that can be true or false, not the system. Within a changed system, the claim becomes false. It is like Kuhnian paradigm shifts. Paradigms are not themselves true or false, only the particular facts they make intelligible.

Quoting Eskander

Just as you don't change the rules of chess when playing a chess game, in the similar manner, when you ask if we can know anything, you try to doubt everything but the "game" you are playing presupposes certainty. You have made a wrong move. This is just one application of hinge propositions in solving psuedo philosophical problems

Yes, it's why subjectivism and relativism are self-destructing concepts. Such a group of assertions have to be made from the perspective of reality, using a real language, made by real people, to communicate in the real world, about real concepts, formulated from real data, that the real brain gathered, from the real world. Here's a hinge position: Reality is begging the question, but requires the question to be begged for humans to notice that its invalidity doesn't care about human logic. Act accordingly.

Quoting Eskander

Moving on from the 2 examples, do you agree with Wittgenstein on this concept ?

So, look. Fundamentally, Wittgenstein is observing something that is the result of emotionally valenced coherence of integrated concepts, built around positions imparted to the human in a young age by his/her parents/community. These kinds of structures we build in our minds are not really open for argumentation, established by it, or displaced by it, irrespective of how salient the assertion, or logically valid, that doesn't mean anything to these kinds of positions. The positions have been used to navigate the world around them and have been endlessly reinforced throught the neural reward circuitry for years. You ain't yeetin that; people will build entirely new rules for reality for themselves, to accomodate and continue building coherence around their views, before they do such a thing. The only remedy is the active elevation of logic, reason, facts, evidence, data, falsifiability, and skepticism as values through executive action. Which, sure as I'm typing to you, ain't gonna happen.

Quoting Joshs

But that is a claim within a system. It is the claim
that can be true or false, not the system.

Do you take the claim to be a hinge proposition?

If we consider the shift from a geocentric to a heliocentric universe it seems to me that the geocentric system was false.

Quoting Sam26

hinge's, in the language-game of being a hinge (think of Moore's propositions), isn't a proposition in the normal sense. However, there are language-games, deductive and inductive logic, where the hinge, can be used as a normal proposition.

So you want your propositional cake and to eat it...

Perhaps this is an anti-realist bent on Wittgenstein. Reject antirealism and the bits fall into place easily.

There is a difference between being true and being known or believed true. Hinge propositions can then be true yet unjustified.

Reply to Fooloso4 Quoting Fooloso4

If we consider the shift from a geocentric to a heliocentric universe it seems to me that the geocentric system was false.

Not according to Kuhn, whose model of paradigm shifts was purportedly strongly influenced by Wittgenstein.

Reply to Joshs

Are you claiming that we can understand a hinge proposition better by looking at Kuhn's paradigms? It seems to me that compounds the problem of interpreting one thinker by introducing the problem of interpreting another.

Reply to Fooloso4 Quoting Fooloso4

Are you claiming that we can understand a hinge proposition better by looking at Kuhn's paradigms? It seems to me that compounds the problem of interpreting one thinker by introducing the problem of interpreting another.

Well, one would have to be familiar enough with the work of both thinkers in order to confidently make, or follow,
such comparisons. But I do think that the concept of scientific change as aesthetic rather than one of falsifiability that Kuhn offers is useful for understanding Wittgenstein’s idea of hinge propositions.

Quoting Banno

There is a difference between being true and being known or believed true. Hinge propositions can then be true yet unjustified.

:up:

@Sam26 I can see nothing in On Certainty to support the contention that Wittgenstein thought there were propositions that did not have a truth value.

The nearest is the text around §197-208, in which the truth of some propositions is found in our acting in certain ways.

Quoting Fooloso4

What you have demonstrated is that your idea of hinge propositions is fundamentally mistaken. When he says:

The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.
(OC 166)

it does not follow that hinge propositions are mistaken, but that:

This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.
(OC 152)

That's the problem, the axis itself (the proposed hinge proposition) is not fixed, so it revolves around something else, another "hinge", and so on. If we say that any belief, statement, or attitude, which has others hinged on it, is a hinge proposition, then everything becomes a hinge. And if we say that only things that are somehow fixed because they are beyond doubt, are hinge propositions, then nothing is a hinge.

So in reality the idea is just nonsense, there's simply varying degrees of fixedity, doubt, significance, etc., in relation to all beliefs, statements, and so on, and it makes no sense to think that some have a special significance as a "hinge proposition". We might say that some have more significance than others, for various reasons, but each and every one has its own special significance particular to itself, and this negates the generalized special significance of "hinge proposition".

Witt, On Certainty:93. The propositions presenting what Moore 'knows' are all of such a kind that it is difficult to imagine why anyone should believe the contrary. E.g. the proposition that Moore has spent his whole life in close proximity to the earth.—Once more I can speak of myself here instead of speaking of Moore. What could induce me to believe the opposite? Either a memory, or having been told.—Everything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favour of the opposite.

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.

My take, which will probably just be a terrible rehash of Moyal-Sharrock:

I think it needs to be kept in mind that Wittgenstein is talking about empirical propositions, which are traditionally considered to be contingently true (or false). Hinge propositions, however, have the special status of being empirical statements that are quasi-necessarily true. W likens them to mathematical statements (e.g. see §340). Hinge propositions are beyond doubt, beyond truth (see §94 above), beyond justification, and non-epistemic.

I say "quasi-necessarily true", because they are treated as necessarily true and beyond true (beyond doubt) only when they form part of the background assumptions that we do not usually consider consciously and that we use (consciously or not) "as a rule of testing" (§98). When these same empirical propositions are instead consciously considered and used as "something to test by experience" (§98), then they revert to being normal, contingent, empirical statements that lie within the scope of epistemology, knowledge, doubt, truth and justification.

Witt, On Certainty:87. Can't an assertoric sentence, which was capable of functioning as an hypothesis, also be used as a foundation for research and action? I.e. can't it simply be isolated from doubt, though not according to any explicit rule? It simply gets assumed as a truism, never called in question, perhaps not even ever formulated.

96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.

98. But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical science" he would be wrong. Yet; this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing.

100. The truths which Moore says he knows, are such as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them.

Quoting Luke

I think it needs to be kept in mind that Wittgenstein is talking about empirical propositions, which are traditionally considered to be contingently true (or false). Hinge propositions, however, have the special status of being empirical statements that are quasi-necessarily true. W likens them to mathematical statements (e.g. see §340). Hinge propositions are beyond doubt, beyond truth (see §94 above), beyond justification, and non-epistemic.

I say "quasi-necessarily true", because they are treated as necessarily true and beyond true (beyond doubt) only when they form part of the background assumptions that we do not usually consider consciously and that we use (consciously or not) as a rule of testing (§98). When these same empirical propositions are instead consciously considered and used as "something to test by experience" (§98), then they revert to being normal, contingent, empirical statements that lie within the scope of epistemology, knowledge, doubt, truth and justification.

We actually agree on something here Luke. But how we both interpret this is bound to differ. I see what you describe here as clear evidence that there is no reality to what is called "hinge propositions".

From what you say, it is evident that the same thing can be described both as a hinge proposition, and not a hinge proposition, depending on how you look at it. This indicates that "hinge proposition" is a feature of how we look at things, the observer's attitude. It is not a feature of the thing being looked at, and called a "hinge proposition", it is a feature of the attitude which looks at the thing. Therefore there is no objective reality, or truth, to any statement of "X is a hinge proposition". Such a judgement is always, necessarily, a subjective judgement because what makes something a hinge proposition or not, is the attitude of the subject who makes that judgement.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Therefore there is no objective reality, or truth, to any statement of "X is a hinge proposition". Such a judgement is always, necessarily, a subjective judgement because what makes something a hinge proposition or not, is the attitude of the subject who makes that judgement.

Is there an objective reality or truth to what falls within the purview of a hinge proposition? Is there an objective reality or truth to the facts that are defined with a Kuhnian paradigm, a feature of the thing being looked at?

Quoting Luke

Hinge propositions are... beyond truth (see §94 above),

Witt, On Certainty:94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.

§94 is about one's picture of the world, not propositions. That picture is the background against which propositions can be seen to be true or false. That picture shows hinge propositions to be true. Or better, as becomes clear in other sections, our actions mkae the truth of the proposition.

"Here is a hand" is like "the bishop stays on it's own colour". It is inherent to the game we are playing; denying it voids the game. "Here is a hand" and "the bishop stays on it's own colour" are both true.

Truth is not like justification, belief, or knowledge. The latter are relations: Jim justified P; Jim believed P; Jim knew that P. Truth is not relational: P is true. Or P is false.

Antirealism denies this, resulting in the problematic notion of propositions without truth values.

So deny antirealism and solve the problem.

Reply to Banno
I am confused here. I thought some of what Wittgenstein was resisting was the utility Moore put in placing some propositions outside of what could be doubted. Moore's intent seems to be denying 'antirealism.' Section 94 seems to be saying: not so fast, if the measuring stick I have been given can only be used under certain conditions, its use tells me jack about those conditions in the way Moore says they do.

Quoting Joshs

Is there an objective reality or truth to what falls within the purview of a hinge proposition? Is there an objective reality or truth to the facts that are defined with a Kuhnian paradigm, a feature of the thing being looked at?

I'd answer both those questions with no. And I agree with your relating Kuhn to Wittgenstein, I think Kuhn most likely built on Wittgenstein's idea. And what Kuhn demonstrates is that this notion, that a hinge proposition is somehow excluded from doubt, is a false idea. Doubt of the so-called hinge proposition is a requirement for the paradigm shift.

But if the so-called hinge proposition is not excluded from doubt by its nature, it must be excluded from doubt for some other reason, such as its usefulness. Then it would only hold the status of "hinge proposition" to those who find it useful. Those who doubt it would just consider it to be a proposition which may or not be true, like any other proposition. So the supposed "hinge proposition" really has no special place, unlike the self-evident truth which is supposed to have a special place. The so-called hinge proposition is just an ordinary proposition which has proven itself to be extraordinarily useful. Most likely it has been found to serve a multitude of purposes.

Reply to Paine Ok, I'm not sure what is confusing. SO I read both Moore and Wittgenstein as realist - that is, as differentiating between something being true and something being known, believed or justified as being true.

I am aware that there are antirealist readings of Wittgenstein, with which i disagree.

There is I think a reading of Wittgenstein such that all propositions have truth value, including hinge propositions. On Certainty is incomplete, of course, and so no finished argument to that end is present. But roughly speaking, the activities of a form of life are such that there are things that are taken to be true in order for those activities to occur. These form the "hinge" of action for the form of life. "Here is a hand" sets up the form of life in which there are hands, tables, trees and so on.

Reply to Banno
I am unsure how the element of 'truth value' fits into this work. I have no idea what an "antirealist" reading of Wittgenstein might look like.

But the work shows Wittgenstein questioning Moore's confidence in the use of certain propositions. That is not presented as an argument against him or what should be accepted as a set of facts. From that point of view, Moore wants to have done with a set of issues that Wittgenstein is not ready to close the door upon.

Quoting Paine

But the work shows Wittgenstein questioning Moore's confidence in the use of certain propositions. That is not presented as an argument against him or what should be accepted as a set of facts. From that point of view, Moore wants to have done with a set of issues that Wittgenstein is not ready to close the door upon.

Yes.

Quoting Banno

§94 is about one's picture of the world, not propositions.

The picture can be expressed in propositional form:

95. The propositions describing this world-picture ...

In the not too distant past that picture expressed as a proposition would have included a statement along the lines that we cannot not step into a machine and fly from one place to another. That picture of the world, where such a thing is not possible is no longer true.

Quoting Fooloso4

The picture can be expressed in propositional form:

Yes.

Quoting Fooloso4

In the not too distant past that picture expressed as a proposition would have included a statement along the lines that we cannot not step into a machine and fly from one place to another. That picture of the world, where such a thing is not possible is no longer true.

Yes.

Quoting Banno

§94 is about one's picture of the world, not propositions. That picture is the background against which propositions can be seen to be true or false. That picture shows hinge propositions to be true. Or better, as becomes clear in other sections, our actions mkae the truth of the proposition.

As Moyal-Sharrock writes, from the article that @Sam26 posted here:

Yet the clear message of On Certainty is precisely that knowledge does not have to be at the basis of knowledge. For Wittgenstein, underpinning knowledge are not default justified propositions that must be susceptible of justification on demand but nonpropositional certainties – certainties 'in action' or ways of acting – that can be verbally rendered for heuristic purposes and whose conceptual analysis uncovers their function as unjustifiable rules of grammar. So that basic certainties stand to nonbasic beliefs, not as propositional beliefs stand to other propositional beliefs, but as rules of grammar stand to propositional beliefs. Hence the absence of propositionality as regards them.

This also demonstrates that not all empirical statements can be hinge propositions. Hinge propositions are only those that function as "unjustifiable rules of grammar". A statement like "my truck weighs 2800 pounds" is something that is verifiable but not something that everyone acts like they know with certainty. Maybe a statement like "most people cannot lift a truck over their head" would be closer to a hinge proposition, as it goes without saying.

Quoting Luke

not all empirical statements can be hinge propositions.

Yes.

Quoting Luke

Hinge propositions are only those that function as "unjustifiable rules of grammar".

Roughly. Might post more on that later.

Quoting Luke

Maybe a statement like "most people cannot lift a truck over their head" would be closer to a hinge proposition, as it goes without saying.

Yes.

Quoting Fooloso4

The picture can be expressed in propositional form:

The problem with expressing the picture in the propositional form, is the gap between the particular and the universal. A picture is always a particular, and the propositional form always employs universals. So for instance, "this is a hand" employs the universal "hand" to describe the particular image, which is the picture.

So the issue is, how does that gap between the particular (picture), and the universal (proposition) get bridged. What validates the use of this universal "hand", to refer to this particular image? This is the difficult problem in philosophy of mind, and epistemology, we cannot simply assume 'we call it a hand therefore it is a hand', because "hand" must involve criteria to make it epistemically useful.

If the senses receive particular images, and the mind employs universals in understanding the particular images, and there is a gap, a categorical difference between a particular and a universal, then how do we know whether the mind is mistaken in its application of universals? And, because the philosophical mind is naturally led into this skepticism concerning the application of universals, requesting criteria, the use of the universal ("hand") must be justified. This is what we know as 'proving a theory' (that it is correct to call the thing in the image, a hand, must be demonstrated).

As for "hinge propositions", the idea that there are propositions which may be excluded from that request for criteria and justification, is itself unjustifiable. And, as we see from Joshs' example of Kuhn's paradigm shifts, the so called hinge propositions actually do get subjected to the skeptic's doubt, sometimes with substantial effect.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

As for "hinge propositions", the idea that there are propositions which may be excluded from that request for criteria and justification, is itself unjustifiable. And, as we see from Joshs' example of Kuhn's paradigm shifts, the so called hinge propositions actually do get subjected to the skeptic's doubt, sometimes with substantial effect.

There's actually a good paper on it here: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330091267_Hinges_Disagreements_and_Arguments_Rationally_Believing_Hinge_Propositions_and_Arguing_across_Deep_Disagreements

It's really not the beat-all that Wittgenstein thought it was, nor is it particular useful to look at hinge propositions as propositions that somehow negate the rationality of the mind. Hinge propositions are specifically the propositions that have enough coherence within the mind's perception of a given subject to warrant a conclusion predicated on the minimal information necessary to do so. It is the mind's way of building conceptual understandings of points of reality to be used in thought and to inform behavior. But, the idea that they cannot be challenged or put under rational scrutiny is bizarre. Every single proposition, not matter how coherent, is sibject to valid argumentation and scrutiny. The paper I sent you is excellent on this subject.

Nota bene: Also, remember that Wittgenstein was a mystic and was not really in touch with reality. Logic and language is exactly the place anti-materialists like to hide to try to justify their views in non-reality.

Reply to Garrett Travers Quoting Garrett Travers

Also, remember that Wittgenstein was a mystic and was not really in touch with reality. Logic and language is exactly the place anti-materialists like to hide to try to justify their views in non-reality

You’ll have to do better than that. Plenty of researchers within psychology and related sciences have adopted a Wittgensteinian approach, including the idea of hinge propositions, or, as I have argued, the related concept of paradigms. I appreciate that you’re wedded to a 300 year old framework of rationality, but others have moved beyond it. Of course, you could continue your philosophy career at the Claremont Institute. They’ll
love your ideas there.

Quoting Joshs

You’ll have to do better than that. Plenty of researchers within psychology and related sciences have adopted a Wittgensteinian approach, including the idea of hinge propositions, or, as I have argued, the related concept of paradigms. I appreciate that you’re wedded to a 300 year old framework of rationality, but others have moved beyond it. Of course, you could continue your philosophy career at the Claremont Institute. They’ll
love your ideas there.

An argument ad populum is a fallacy. The Wittgensteinian approach being adopted by researchers in psychology is irrelevant, especially when you provide nothing to review from the field. You'll have to do better than that. I see also that the paper I sent, which thoroughly disassembles this odd idea of hinge propositions being "unapproachable," has not been addressed. Care to have a look? It's certainly not something you'll be finding in cognitive neuroscience, not in the manner Wittgenstein asserts anyway. And those moving on from rationality can go live in make-believe land as they wish, have at it.

I see that you are wedded to a 2000 year old tradition of mysticism, within which Wittgenstein and Kant share intellectual lineage with eachother, and which is imbedded in the not so philosophical domains of Western philosophical history, and I appreciate it. But, I'm going to need you to actually address assertions that I make if you're going to respond to me, and I request that you not insult me again for having standards that are superior to Wittgenstein's make-believe ones. Oddly, the only thing he has done with hinge propositions, a proposition itself hinged on the belief in the realm of god, is verify that the human has evolved a brain that produces concepts and value structures (paradigms) through sensory data abstractions from reality to help better perceive that reality within which he/she is suspended. Hinge propositions are an argument for rationality, although unintentionally so. I recommend Daniel Dennett on the subject of consciousness, relevant to this discussion as a start. Real paradigm shifter, that one.

Reply to Garrett Travers Quoting Garrett Travers

The Wittgensteinian approach being adopted by researchers in psychology is irrelevant, especially when you provide nothing to review from the field.

You should probably familiarize yourself with those arguments, since they are becoming more and more
prevalent.

Quoting Garrett Travers

Hinge propositions are an argument for rationality, although unintentionally so. I recommend Daniel Dennett on the subject of consciousness, relevant to this discussion as a start. Real paradigm shifter, that one.

Dennett is a good example of someone who has been strongly influenced by Wittgenstein. I dont think his view of rationality is what you think it is. Certainly it isnt compatible with your direct realism.

Quoting Garrett Travers

I request that you not insult me again for having standards that are superior to Wittgenstein's make-believe ones.

I’m not trying to insult you , just get you to realize that dismissing out of hand the ideas of a thinker like Wittgenstein as ‘mystical’ and ‘out of touch with reality’ shows not just a complete lack of familiarity with his work but a poor grasp of where cognitive psychology and cognitivr neuroscience is heading.

Quoting Garrett Travers

I see also that the paper I sent, which thoroughly disassembles this odd idea of hinge propositions being "unapproachable," has not been addressed. Care to have a look?

I took a look at Siegel’s argument. I love how he tries to critique Popper by holding onto the ideas that a critical rationalism can be self-reflexive. Anyone familiar
with the era from Descartes through Leibnitz won’t have any trouble with Siegel’s assertions. But his approach to the rational simply doesnt grasp how it is that the rational is embedded with a frame of interpretation that gets turned on its head when paradigms shift. You can’t turn that gestalt shift into a rational formula. There is no meta-position from which to do so.

Think of an empirical theory as being like one of those optical illusions where you can either see the young woman or the old woman but not both at the same time. A gestalt shift is required to make one or the other appear. Now think of the individual facts comprising the body of an empirical theory as akin to the points within the picture. Notice that as one shifts from the old woman to the young woman, the role that all of the features of the picture play change their meaning. What was a line in one image becomes something else in the other image.

In the same way, when a paradigm undergoes a gestalt shift , all of the subordinate facts it contains change their meaning in the new paradigm. The choice of which paradigm to pick becomes one of aesthetic and pragmatic preference rather than ‘rationality’ since each paradigm is describing different facts. That doesn’t mean a kind of progress isn’t possible , just that this progress is a linear accumulation of knowledge.

Quoting Joshs

You should probably familiarize yourself with those arguments, since they are becoming more and more
prevalent.

I have, they're not good. Nor, are they useful. Cognitive neurscience is superior for drawing conclusions, without contest.This being mainly because it is predicated on science (induction) and rationality (reason and logic).

Quoting Joshs

Dennett is a good example of someone who has been strongly influenced by Wittgenstein. I dont think his view of rationality is what you think it is. Certainly it isnt compatible with your direct realism.

I know he is. I'm referring to his work on the nature of Consciousness and how it was evolved to operate, not his conclusions he formulates about rationality. Reason and logic are methods of clarifying the representations of data received from the real word. To assert any proposition of any kind whatsoever, at anytime, requires rational assessment of correspondents from perceptions gathered from that reality, using a brain made by reality to rationally assess sensory data. But, feel free to generate languages and paradigms from non-data, or whatever it is you think replaces rational thought, if you wish.

Quoting Joshs

But his approach to the rational simply doesnt grasp how it is that the rational is embedded with a frame of interpretation that gets turned on its head when paradigms shift.

And the paradigm/ frame of interpretation shifts in revolution around new data that informs perceptions. The rationality of the human is what allows for that shift to take place. The paradigm shift doesn't somehow negate the rational assessments of those that came before, it merely adds to it. That's why Newton is still relevant in the age of gravitational waves. The paradigms, Kuhn asserts, are more about the culture and people within that framework, not the rationally gathered data and concept formulation that leads to paradigm shifts. A perfect example of this is the strong program of the sociology of science. They too, thought that culture was more relevant than data, you'll be pleased to know the program fell apart in humiliated shambles as a result of a paradigm shift that placed sociology back within the realm of rationally assessed data.

Quoting Joshs

Think of an empirical theory as being like one of those optical illusions where you can either see the young woman or the old woman but not both at the same time. A gestalt shift is required to make one or the other appear. Now think of the individual facts comprising the body of an empirical theory as akin to the points within the picture. Notice that as one shifts from the old woman to the young woman, the role that all of the features of the picture play change their meaning. What was a line in one image becomes something else in the other image.

That's not how rationality works. Rationality works like : think of an empirical theory as something that could shift its course depending on what data are added to it, or oppose it. So, no, I won't think of a theory in any such way, nor would I have any reason to. You're talking to a phantom of the mysticism that Wittgenstein predicates his logic on, not rationality.

Quoting Joshs

In the same way, when a paradigm undergoes a gestalt shift , all of the subordinate facts it contains change their meaning in the new paradigm. The choice of which paradigm to pick becomes one of aesthetic and pragmatic preference rather than ‘rationality’ since each paradigm is describing different facts.

No, they do not change their meaning, or reality. They change their contributive status to the system that all of the data represent both independently, as well as in the Gestalt collection. It only changes meaning for those within the paradigm (culture), not for the actual system of related date. For example, I operate under the pretense that evolution is a fact of nature, that's one of my hinge propositions predicating all of the rest. In science, it is rare that such a theory finds itself utterly debunked. Normally, there will be pieces missing that new data add onto what something like evolution generally posits, but enhances the resolution of it. That's how science itself works, irrespective of the culture those hinge propositions produce around them. If it comes time that the evidence suggests that there is more to evolution, data that negates previous propositions - because it turns out ALL propositions are subject to falsifiablity (thank you, Popper) - but doesn't negate the entire theory, then the views surrounding the theory will change, including my own, as a result of the integration of new, more coherent data. That's a rational progression of events, predicated on inductive data gathering. Again, hinge propositions are rationally developed, and rationally changed. They are not, in any manner, the hammer blow to the real world that Wittgenstein thought. A good way of knowing as much, is by asking yourself how Wittgenstein even generated this concept. The answer: rationality, his evolutionarily developed tool for understanding the reality within which he was suspended.

Reply to Garrett Travers The paper uses a pretty common misunderstanding of Wittgenstein.

Tell me, could you use the article for your argument while at the same time doubting that it was in English?

Then in presenting your argument using the article, you are not in a position to be able to doubt that it is in English.

Or we might take the fallibalist approach, and claim that we are working on the assumption that the article is in English in order to make the argument, and that we will do so until there is sufficient evidence that the article is not in English... At which point I will probably reach for the poker.

Reply to Garrett Travers Quoting Garrett Travers

That's a rational progression of events, predicated on inductive data gathering. Again, hinge propositions are rationally developed, and rationally changed.

Your model of rationality seems to revolve around the notion that you can peel data and evidence apart from
the theoretical edifice that makes sense of them. But Kuhn’s argument is that what constitutes evidence and data is dependent on the larger framework of interpretation. For someone without a background in modern or Newtonian physics, what constitutes
data for the later will be utterly invisible to them. Data for a stimulus-response psychologist is different than data for a cognitive theorist.

There is no empirical object apart from
some account or other , no fact of the matter independent of a value system.

“…interpretationism provides a penetrating critique of objectivism that is worth pursuing in some detail. To be objective, the interpretationist points out, one would have to have some set of mind-independent objects to be designated by language or known by science. But can we find any such objects? Let us look at an extended example from the philosopher Nelson Goodman.

A point in space seems to be perfectly objective. But how are we to define the points of our everyday world? Points can be taken either as primitive elements, as intersecting lines, as certain triples of intersecting planes, or as certain classes of nesting volumes. These definitions are equally adequate, and yet they are incompatible: what a point is will vary with each form of description. For example, only in the first "version," to use Goodman's term, will a point be a primitive element. The objectivist, however, demands, "What are points really?" Goodman's response to this demand is worth quoting at length:

If the composition of points out of lines or of lines out of points is conventional rather than factual, points and lines themselves are no less so. ... If we say that our sample space is a combination of points, or of lines, or of regions, or a combination of combinations of points, or lines, or regions, or a combination of all these together, or is a single lump, then since none is identical with any of the rest, we are giving one among countless alternative conflicting descriptions of what the space is. And so we may regard the disagreements as not about the facts but as due to differences in the conventions-adopted in organizing or describing the space. What, then, is the neutral fact or thing described in these different terms? Neither the space (a) as an undivided whole nor (b) as a combination of everything involved in the several accounts; for (a) and (b) are but two among the various ways of organizing it. But what is it that is so organized? When we strip off as layers of convention all differences among ways of describing it, what is left? The onion is peeled down to its empty core.

Quoting Joshs

I’m not trying to insult you , just get you to realize that dismissing out of hand the ideas of a thinker like Wittgenstein as ‘mystical’ and ‘out of touch with reality’ shows not just a complete lack of familiarity with his work but a poor grasp of where cognitive psychology and cognitivr neuroscience is heading.

Yep. Wittgenstein was an engineer. He was responsible for the maintenance of heavy machinery during the first war, worked on wing design in England, and built several houses.

And again, I will say that the anti-realist reading of Wittgenstein is not the only reading, and I think it mistaken.

Firstly, it is anachronistic, since the notion of antirealism postdates his work.

Secondly, he clearly differentiates truth value from propositional attitudes.

Quoting Banno

Tell me, could you use the article for your argument while at the same time doubting that it was in English?

Of course not. However, I'm not sure why my commentary would lead you to ask such a question. You'll notice I have not claimed that hinge propositions are somehow not a thing in the human mind. That's because I would be lying if I said as much. I simply do not like the mystic's conclusions. That is what I am challenging.

Quoting Banno

Or we might take the fallibalist approach, and claim that we are working on the assumption that the article is in English in order to make the argument, and that we will do so until there is sufficient evidence that the article is not in English... At which point I will probably reach for the poker.

The use of english is the hige proposition required to engage in a reflexive manner. Again, actually assess what I am saying, so that we don't waste time on debating phantoms.

Quoting Garrett Travers

I simply do not like the mystic's conclusions.

Nor I; it's a poor representation of what Witti is up to.

Quoting Garrett Travers

Again, actually assess what I am saying, so that we don't waste time on debating phantoms.

You might do the same. In the interest of avoiding mere acrimony, might we not agree that it would be odd to call into question such things as that we are here using English and the internet?

Quoting Garrett Travers

But, the idea that they cannot be challenged or put under rational scrutiny is bizarre.

On Certainty is not saying that. The article you linked to does not seem to understand that Wittgenstein is questioning the extent of Moore's use of self-evidence as the basis for argument. That purpose is the opposite of saying that some propositions are given special status for the sake of advancing a theory. And it doesn't sound very mystical if Wittgenstein is using a shared reality to limit the utility of Moore's certainty:

155. In certain circumstance a man cannot make a mistake. ("Can" is here used logically, and the proposition does not mean that a man cannot say anything false in those circumstances.) If Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions which he declares certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard him as demented.

Quoting Joshs

Your model of rationality seems to revolve around the notion that you can peel data and evidence apart from
the theoretical edifice that makes sense of them.

That's because the human is the theoretical edifice maker, and data analysis sometimes indicates one's framework is faulty, misaligned, or sometimes even completely off the mark. String theory springs to mind. Good on paper, but not applicable to reality, no correspondence. A bit like logic in that regard. Once logic breaches the domain of reason, it fails, just like when reason breaches the domain of logic, it fails. For example A=A is correct, no matter what. It's also a circular argument, meaning logic fails to account for that which is of itself so in this particular example. Logicians call it a tautology and wash their hands. Doesn't mean the logical framework, or tradition generally are dismissed, that would be nonsense.

Quoting Joshs

But Kuhn’s argument is that what constitutes evidence and data is dependent on the larger framework of interpretation. For someone without a background in modern or Newtonian physics, what constitutes
data for the later will be utterly invisible to them.

Yes, this is how the human mind works, we do this naturally across all domains of knowledge. That isn't what I am challenging. I am challenging the idea that these hinge propositions that inform our frameworks are unchallengable, and that such frameworks determine reality for us, rather than the reverse. If you focus on what I am actually saying to you, you will notice that.

Quoting Joshs

There is no empirical object apart from
some account or other , no fact of the matter independent of a value system.

One, you just made a statement of objective fact. Two, objective, empirical entities, phenomena, and patterns are used to formulate systems of thought, action, and value. The greater the amount of data, the higher the resolution, the more refined the methods of analysis. It is exactly the opposite. There are only, in the universe, empirical objects and patterns.

Quoting Joshs

interpretationism provides a penetrating critique of objectivism that is worth pursuing in some detail. To be objective, the interpretationist points out, one would have to have some set of mind-independent objects to be designated by language or known by science. But can we find any such objects? Let us look at an extended example from the philosopher Nelson Goodman.

There is nothing penetrating about this critique, other than the objective claim that objects do not exist independent of a value structure. Yes, there are many such objects, everything in the universe. The humans of Nagasaki didn't need a value structure to be vaporized by an atom bomb. But, we might have needed the bomb to go off, if only to know that such a thing is subject to human value structuralization. Values come from analysis of reality, not the other way around.

Quoting Joshs

The objectivist, however, demands, "What are points really?" Goodman's response to this demand is worth quoting at length:

This is not what an objectivist demands about matters of relativity, which space is always subject to by its nature - meaning this guy specifically chose this specific topic to obfuscate his opposition. An objectivist would ask what the point is relating to, as "point" is a subjective measurement. An objectivist doesn't ask "what are inches really?" The ask what are you measuring? So that they can understand what you are investigating.


Quoting Joshs

But what is it that is so organized? When we strip off as layers of convention all differences among ways of describing it, what is left? The onion is peeled down to its empty core.

No, there's no onion. And "convention" isn't the proper term. Method, or metric, or standard are much more appropriate. And those are based upon empirical results from induction, and theorization (concepts) that comes from that induction. Over time, as coherence builds and validates the structure of evidentiary, empirically established theory, we formulate values and more concepts on top of them. All of this being based on empirical processes as the result of gathering data from reality. In other words, Wittgenstein's correct, he just has his conclusion backwards. As do you, and this gentleman above who doesn't understand objectivism.

Reply to Paine Yep.

The accusation of mysticism might be a result of a misguided reading of the notion of silence, or of Wittgenstein's scantly articulated thoughts on religion and ethics.

Quoting Banno

The accusation of mysticism might be a result of a misguided reading of the notion of silence, or of Wittgenstein's scantly articulated thoughts on religion and ethics.

My scantily articulated thoughts on religion and ethics bear a distinct difference.

Reply to Garrett Travers A difference to... What?

155. In certain circumstance a man cannot make a mistake. ("Can" is here used logically, and the proposition does not mean that a man cannot say anything false in those circumstances.) If Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions which he declares certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard him as demented.

" In order to make a mistake, a man must already judge in conformity with mankind."

Here's the point I'm making with his next statement: the conformity with mankind bit, is mankind's creation. Not the other way around. If I make a mistake in conformity with MY standards, I am still making a mistake, and have now added MY standard to the "conformity" of which Wittgentein spoke. My mistake was not the creation of this dissociated "conformity of mankind." Yes, this is a very mystical mind/body type dissociative idea, mentally speaking.

Again, it's Wittgenstein's conclusions from these ideas that are the issue. Not the issue of the hinge proposition, or how young people develop their thoughts before verification, or any of that.

Quoting Banno

A difference to... What?

"From" what, is the proper question.

Quoting Banno

You might do the same. In the interest of avoiding mere acrimony, might we not agree that it would be odd to call into question such things as that we are here using English and the internet?

No question.

Quoting Garrett Travers

Every single proposition, not matter how coherent, is sibject to valid argumentation and scrutiny. The paper I sent you is excellent on this subject.

Yes, in the paper you referred, the author argues, as I do, that there is no reality to "hinge propositions" as described by Wittgenstein. A real "hinge proposition" would have to be something completely different from what Wittgenstein describes.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, in the paper you referred, the author argues, as I do, that there is no reality to "hinge propositions" as described by Wittgenstein. A real "hinge proposition" would have to be something completely different from what Wittgenstein describes.

I'd say that such would be correct, if we were to accept Wittgenstein's assertion that hinges are not open to rational confirmation, or falsifiability. From that perspective, there is no such thing as a hinge proposition. And such is logically valid because there aren't any propositions that are not up for either. All are subject to both. Or else, logic simply has no point at all.

@Garrett Travers
SO where do you think mysticism enters into this discussion?

I'm not following your argument.

157. Suppose a man could not remember whether he had always had five fingers or two hands? Should we understand him? Could we be sure of understanding him?
158. Can I be making a mistake, for example, in thinking that the words of which this sentence is composed are English words whose meaning I know?

Quoting Garrett Travers

Here's the point I'm making with his next statement: the conformity with mankind bit, is mankind's creation. Not the other way around. If I make a mistake in conformity with MY standards, I am still making a mistake, and have now added MY standard to the "conformity" of which Wittgentein spoke.

I don't understand what you are saying here. Perhaps you can bring in more of Wittgenstein's language that you object to for the purposes of clarification. Or maybe you could show how the article you linked to relates to passages in Wittgenstein's text.

One aspect I do think I understand is that Wittgenstein is not saying that hinge propositions are "beyond rational confirmation." You will have to do more than assert it when Wittgenstein specifically rules that out.

Edit to add:
Oh wait, I get it, It is the shared reality you oppose to objectivity. By that measure, you will never be wrong.

Quoting Garrett Travers

I'd say that such would be correct, if we were to accept Wittgenstein's assertion that hinges are not open to rational confirmation, or falsifiability. From that perspective, there is no such thing as a hinge proposition. And such is logically valid because there aren't any propositions that are not up for either. All are subject to both. Or else, logic simply has no point at all.

Wittgenstein's notion of "hinge proposition" is really useless. All propositions are "hinges"; "hinge" describes the use of a proposition. Some propositions just have a bigger weight hanging on them than others do. As time passes, and they hang around for a while, more and more stuff gets hung on them.

Quoting Banno

SO where do you think mysticism enters into this discussion?

I'm not following your argument.

No where in particular. I just like to remain aware of it when dealing with linguists.

My argument is that hinge positions are certainly within the boundries of assessment, even from within the framework. And that they are produced from the human as a result of sensory data collection. Little more than that. Neuroscience sheds more light on this phenomenon than Wittgenstein does. Although, I do agree with him on much of his views, as I have stated.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein's notion of "hinge proposition" is really useless. All propositions are "hinges"; "hinge" describes the use of a proposition. Some propositions just have a bigger weight hanging on them than others do. As time passes, and they hang around for a while, more and more stuff gets hung on them.

Yeah, I mean I might as well posit the idea of door frame propositions, because even hinge propositions have to have a stable set of facts to work with, so as to remain stationary in use. In which case, I'll then have to have wall propositions, as door frames have to be constructed from... so on and so on......

Quoting Paine

I don't understand what you are saying here. Perhaps you can bring in more of Wittgenstein's language that you object to for the purposes of clarification. Or maybe you could show how the article you linked to relates to passages in Wittgenstein's text.

Hinge propositions are predicated on facts accrued by humans through data gathering and analysis. The presupposition of belief is not necessarily a factor. I am radically skeptical about everything for which there is no, or little evidence of. That's fundamentally what I'm saying. Again, I'm not denying much of anything Wittgenstein has posited. If Wittgenstein is not saying that hinge propositions are not open to verificaion, or falsification, please clarify the issue for me, as I may be coming in contact with a fundamental misunderstanding.

Reply to Garrett Travers Ok, understood.

Now what you have said does not mesh with what I understand of what Witti is describing.

He is quite explicit in saying that what counts as a hinge changes over time - the riverbed analogue.

Further, they are not mere observation. Hinge propositions are inherent in actions. They are the things taken as true in order to engage in a given activity. Hence the two quotes cited by myself above...

So the link to neuroscience, at the least, would need considerable explanation. Neuroscience is doing a very different thing to Wittgenstein. That's not to say there could be no overlap, but that would be a grand enterprise.

Quoting Banno

Now what you have said does not mesh with what I understand of what Witti is describing.

He is quite explicit in saying that what counts as a hinge changes over time - the riverbed analogue.

Further, they are not mere observation. Hinge propositions are inherent in actions. They are the things taken as true in order to engage in a given activity. Hence the two quotes cited by myself above...

So the link to neuroscience, at the least, would need considerable explanation. Neuroscience is doing a very different thing to Wittgenstein. That's not to say there could be no overlap, but that would be a grand enterprise.

That is, quite literally, 100% more clear of an explanation than anything I've been able to glean from Wittgenstein. You see, it's this linguist shit that loses people. I can't stand a philosopher that won't speak straight, or does so in paucity. Yes, this goes without question. His teleology is making more sense now. In fact, my own epistemology incorporates these concepts, although my langauge is much clearer. What I was pulling from neuroscience was the process by which we incorporate data to build concepts, concepts being what we use to predicate action, action to experience (more data), concepts form into value systems and you get moral codes. It's a whole process. I thought Wittgenstein was commenting on that, and, in a certain way, I'd say he's still kind of relevant to it. But, yeah. Way more clear.

Quoting Garrett Travers

Hinge propositions are predicated on facts accrued by humans through data gathering and analysis

Wittgenstein said as much.

Quoting Garrett Travers

The presupposition of belief is not necessarily a factor.

A factor of what? People more or less agreeing that some things happen but others don't? Common sense versus some other kind? Wittgenstein seems to be militating against a set of propositions being the last word on why propositions are used. The propositions in question are not like the many used to convince people of something despite good reasons to doubt them.

Quoting Garrett Travers

I am radically skeptical about everything for which there is no, or little evidence of.

Wittgenstein is asking what evidence is or looks like in this text. He may be more skeptical than you are.

Quoting Paine

Wittgenstein said as much.

Yeah, Banno provided an explanation that cleared up my confusion.

Quoting Paine

A factor of what? People more or less agreeing that some things happen but others don't? Common sense versus some other kind? Wittgenstein seems to be militating against a set of propositions being the last word on why propositions are used. The propositions in question are not like the many used to convince people of something despite good reasons to doubt them.

Yes, that's coming to my attention as we speak.

Quoting Paine

Wittgenstein is asking what evidence is or looks like in this text. He may be more skeptical than you are.

I doubt it, but I see what you mean. A good deal of my current reading is being obfuscated, I believe, as a result of relying on online sources.

Reply to Garrett Travers Cheers. If you wish to understand Witti better, I would commend Anthony Kenny's Wittgenstein. A short book that covers the whole of his philosophy in detail, the only such by one of the executors of Witti's literary estate.

Reply to Banno

I'll go grab a pdf. I appreciate it. I had written an essay on Wittgenstein the other day where I characterized his view on hinges entirely inaccurately. I am now updating that exploration with a follow up essay revising my position. So when I say I appreciate it, that's exactly what I mean. Is this what the beliefs are propositional debate is in relation to, by the by?

Quoting Garrett Travers

Is this what the beliefs are propositional debate is in relation to, by the by?

I suppose it must be related, at least in some minds. There was an article being discussed here that seemed to be arguing that there were "animal" propositions that did not have a truth value, but which somehow were hinge propositions.

I can't make sense of the idea of a proposition that does not have a truth value - not a proposition for which we don't know if it is true or false, but a proposition which is not eligible for truth or falsehood. @Sam26 was entertaining that idea here.

There are plenty of very odd interpretations of Wittgenstein out there.

Did you find a PDF for Kenny? Happy to read it with you.

Quoting Banno

Did you find a PDF for Kenny? Happy to read it with you.

I did, and I really prefer his language; I'm telling I can't stand the word salad shit. It's the quickest way for me to dismiss someone. But, no, it wouldn't make sense, in the basic logic sense of truth tables and, well, propositional logic. All true propositions are tautological in the nature of their premises, as I am seeing Kenny remark upon, and all untrue are contradictive. It quite literally doesn't make sense for a proposition to be devoid of a truth value. Which again, is what I though Witt was saying in regard to hinges. As a rationalist, I can't even let that type of assertion slide; my hinge proposition of the human faculty for reason and all. Actually, you should check my hinge proposition in my bio and tell me what you think. I'd love to test it against someone knowledgeable, see if it can withstand some heat. Let me know if that sounds fun.

Reply to Garrett Travers "Hinge proposition" is not a term that Kenny uses; if you wish to cut to the chase, look for "Certainty" and "Doubt".

Will take a look for your essay.

Reply to Garrett Travers

If i were you, I would skip trying to decipher Wittgenstein's informal, vague and incomplete prose which constitutes the beginning of post-analytic philosophy, and jump straight into reading Quine's Word and Object, which gives a more developed and precise account of the semantic holism that both he and Wittgenstein arrived at. From their similar points of view, the classical distinction between idealism and materialism loses it's intelligibility.

Quoting Garrett Travers

Yeah, I mean I might as well posit the idea of door frame propositions, because even hinge propositions have to have a stable set of facts to work with, so as to remain stationary in use. In which case, I'll then have to have wall propositions, as door frames have to be constructed from... so on and so on......

Yes, I see your point, but facts are not propositions, and this is what gives so many people the problem in understanding what supports the hinge propositions. Is it facts (objective reality), or attitude (subjective disposition) which supports hinges? People seem to be hesitant to consider that both are required, because it leads into dualism and a conception of reality which is far to complex for a simple mind to understand.

Quoting Garrett Travers

I had written an essay on Wittgenstein the other day where I characterized his view on hinges entirely inaccurately.

I wouldn't worry about that. There are as many different interpretations of Wittgenstein as there are people who read him. It's very clear that he is intentionally ambiguous. Banno distorts what Wittgenstein has actually written, by cherry picking items, to make it appear as if "hinge proposition" is a conception which is coherent and reasonable. Likewise, Banno might argue that the author of your article, Siegel, cherry picks in a way to create the opposite impression. Of course this is a reflection of the ambiguity which is inherent in Wittgenstein's writing. Ambiguity is a very common feature of word use which makes itself particularly evident in philosophy.

Wittgenstein was very much aware of the role of ambiguity in language. Hence Banno's claim that one and the same hinge proposition can change over time, like a river bed. But despite Banno's cherry picking to make Wittgenstein appear to be intelligible, Banno doesn't even seem to understand what it means to have a changing proposition.

Quoting Banno

I can't make sense of the idea of a proposition that does not have a truth value - not a proposition for which we don't know if it is true or false, but a proposition which is not eligible for truth or falsehood.

How could a proposition which changes over time (therefore necessarily ambiguous) have a truth value? What it means for a proposition to not have a truth value, is that the proposition is ambiguous. And that is also what it means for the same proposition to change over time; the proposition is mutable, and may be adapted by the different human minds who put it to use, to different purposes.

The outcome of all this is that Wittgenstein is completely wrong. It is not such ambiguous propositions, which can be molded and shaped at the will of human beings to maintain relevance in an evolving body of knowledge, which forms the foundation of that knowledge. To the contrary, it is actually clear and precise propositions, which in philosophy are called self-evident truths, because they appear to be impossible to be wrong, which forms the base for knowledge. But as you and Siegel indicate, a self-evident truth might still be wrong. It is only when we try to justify the claim that it is impossible for them to be wrong, that we get led down the path of deception, into believing that ambiguity (in the form of ambiguous propositions which change their meaning to maintain relevance in an evolving world)), are at the base of knowledge.

So stick with what Siegel tells you Garrett, as a fair enough representation, and don't get drawn into the ambiguity of Wittgenstein. Allowing ambiguity (which is the only way to support the idea of a proposition without a truth value) to be a first principle of knowledge, is simply wrong, for obvious reasons.

Hinges are obsolete. Now we have sliding door! :joke:

According to my copy of On Certainty, Wittgenstein only used the word "hinge" in 3 places, two of which concern the same remark, and none of which refer to a type of proposition.

"
340. We know, with the same certainty with which we believe any mathematical proposition, how
the letters A and B are pronounced, what the colour of human blood is called, that other human
beings have blood and call it "blood".

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted."

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason
we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put. "


From which it becomes clear that 'hinges' refer to the calculations that determine the meaning of "truth" in a given instance of reasoning.

"
653. If the proposition 12x12=144 is exempt from doubt, then so too must non-mathematical
propositions be.

654. But against this there are plenty of objections. - In the first place there is the fact that "12x12
etc." is a mathematical proposition, and from this one may infer that only mathematical propositions
are in this situation. And if this inference is not justified, then there ought to be a proposition that is
just as certain, and deals with the process of this calculation, but isn't itself mathematical. I am
thinking of such a proposition as: "The multiplication '12x12', when carried out by people who
know how to calculate, will in the great majority of cases give the result '144'." Nobody will contest
this proposition, and naturally it is not a mathematical one. But has it got the certainty of the
mathematical proposition?

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn."

656. And one can not say that of the propositions that I am called L.W. Nor of the proposition that
such-and-such people have calculated such-and-such a problem correctly.

"

In other words, "necessarily true propositions" are either in fact only contingently true, else they refer to those which are held true by convention, but whose necessary truth is nevertheless subject to revision whenever the convention changes.

Similar considerations led Quine to publish his rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction a couple of years later in "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism".

Reply to sime

Yes, very great info coming from you. I actually downloaded a pdf of Anothny Kenny's book. I had completely misconstrued the concept. I normally stray away from linguists because of the ambiguity with which they operate. Banno actully gave me a clear description that dismissed my confusion. Thanks for your explication, it's excellent.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I see your point, but facts are not propositions, and this is what gives so many people the problem in understanding what supports the hinge propositions. Is it facts (objective reality), or attitude (subjective disposition) which supports hinges? People seem to be hesitant to consider that both are required, because it leads into dualism and a conception of reality which is far to complex for a simple mind to understand.

There's actuall a strange phenomenon here in this. Even though you are correct, technically speaking, the hinge proposition is actually accepted by the individual as having true premises. Or, humans couldn't use those propositions to inform action. This is true both in terms of formal propositional logic, as well as cognitive operation. I'm doing some writing now expanding on this topic. If I come up with anything of serious value, I'll show it to you.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

So stick with what Siegel tells you Garrett, as a fair enough representation, and don't get drawn into the ambiguity of Wittgenstein. Allowing ambiguity (which is the only way to support the idea of a proposition without a truth value) to be a first principle of knowledge, is simply wrong, for obvious reasons.

Yes, it is logically not possible. You can see this clearly in truth tables:

p > q
p
---------
q

p q p / > / q / p // q
t t t t t t t
f t f f t f t
t f t t f t f
f f f f f f f

It's not a concept that makes sense. Every proposition has truth values associated with its premises. This messaging application is messing up my table.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein's notion of "hinge proposition" is really useless. All propositions are "hinges"; "hinge" describes the use of a proposition. Some propositions just have a bigger weight hanging on them than others do. As time passes, and they hang around for a while, more and more stuff gets hung on them.

Hinge describes implicit presupposition. If one can call this is a use, it is a different use than rational belief.Duncan Pritchard suggests that hinge commitment is a more appropriate way to understand what Wittgenstein is getting at than hinge proposition.

https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/64250343/OnHingeEpistemology.pdf?1598171534=&response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DON_HINGE_EPISTEMOLOGY.pdf&Expires=1644692999&Signature=GuP306rI9Aba0nTuE1~Z-UY92YpEAQbZUnpsDNSuKd-tppGY7G9oShqkfIOz2L3m2dyuBWO3A6T71tWpVY4DD0w7smC-03k2xD4Y2nL2l8ln3xPMHlBtzABGSLFOiGNXOSwOei60hA4uHz19nGuVDUyaQRW9hoBpVOeKLPiiwftEEcGweBVd~2DrYV5Cg3nAuM6xpXrExXlBf6t9g4Gjss231M-712-cMznhGKl5udfYAMSAZYdufzDl~KepH2UjHWsLD18etT0M9iVSouvciPigVPWRPxyhRCWXWoSeaQeBcpS256iguBiy-rSJuxhEqPl-zTP2C5jQbOh47QeEHA__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA


I think a comparison with Heidegger’s notion of a frame of interpretation may be instructive here. Heidegger defines propositional logic and statement of belief in terms the ‘as’ structure of seeing something as something.

“...in interpretatively addressing something as something, one addresses the thing encountered against the background of a more or less explicit acquaintance with it: as a tool as suitable for this or that, etc. These 'as what', in light of which one interprets the surrounding world as well as the concern that is immersed in it, are not usually newly discovered by Dasein. As being-together-with-others, Dasein grows up in and into this fixed interpretedness. The interpretative undertaking has a firm fore-conception. At the same time, it fixes the point of view from which those things that fall within the fore-conception are, as it were, targeted. The possible lines of 'sight' remain within circumscribed limits. Interpretation has its fore-sight. The world with which we are concerned and being-in itself are both interpreted within the parameters of a particular framework of intelligibility.”
(Heidegger, Concept of Time)

Quoting Joshs

I think a comparison with Heidegger’s notion of a frame of interpretation may be instructive here. Heidegger defines propositional logic and statement of belief in terms the ‘as’ structure of seeing something as something.

Searle develops a not dissimilar account based on speech act theory. It goes along the lines of there being sentences of the form "A counts as x in F", that set a role for A in the activity F; so putting the ball through the goal counts as scoring in soccer; that piece of paper counts as $10 in the economy, and so on. These are hinge propositions in that one cannot play soccer or pay for a book unless one takes these propositions as true.

Wittgenstein says a bit about interpretation in PI which would be at odds with it's use in this context. Interpretation is saying the same thing in different words: "2", "Two" and "deuce". Interpretation already assumes language use; one interprets one piece of language with another. Wittgenstein is getting behind that, and so in a way "interpretation" is inadequate to the task.

Again, hinge propositions might well be thought of as forming the join between our language games and the things that make up our world.

Quoting Garrett Travers

Even though you are correct, technically speaking, the hinge proposition is actually accepted by the individual as having true premises. Or, humans couldn't use those propositions to inform action.

I think that action is generally based in probability rather than in truth. We usually act when we believe that there is a probability for success, not when we believe that it is true that we will have success. So it is not true premises (what is) which inform action, it is understanding the relations between means and ends (this action ought to produce the desired result) which informs action.

Quoting Joshs

Hinge describes implicit presupposition. If one can call this is a use, it is a different use than rational belief.Duncan Pritchard suggests that hinge commitment is a more appropriate way to understand what Wittgenstein is getting at than hinge proposition.

If you go in this direction, then the hinge says something about the attitude of the subject rather than saying something about the world (something objective). Therefore it could not be a basic presupposition or proposition forming a foundation for knowledge about the world, objective knowledge. It would be a type of psychological principle only. So take Sime's example:
Quoting sime

340. We know, with the same certainty with which we believe any mathematical proposition, how
the letters A and B are pronounced, what the colour of human blood is called, that other human
beings have blood and call it "blood".

The 'hinge proposition', as an objective fact about the world, would be "human beings have blood". The "hinge commitment" would be 'I have faith that my belief that human beings have blood is true'. The latter is not what Wittgenstein is saying, because attitudes, even strong ones like faith can be doubted, whereas Wittgenstein is talking about something we cannot doubt. Therefore it is the former, something we believe to be an objective fact about the world, not a subjective attitude toward a proposition, like a commitment.

Go back a few steps.

PI §2

Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right: the language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass him the stones and to do so in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. —– Conceive of this as a complete primitive language.

What would be the hinge propositions here?

"Here is a bock"
"Here is a slab"
"Here is a beam"

Compare:
"Here is a hand!"

These form the implicit link between the language game and the bits and pieces around the building site.

The key to understanding Wittgenstein is to forget about meaning and look instead to use. The meaning of the command "Block!" in the language game is found in the assistant bringing a block. That game can only occur if "Here is a block" is indubitable.

Quoting Banno

That game can only occur if "Here is a block" is indubitable.

Does what it means to bring a block also indubitable?

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

If you go in this direction, then the hinge says something about the attitude of the subject rather than saying something about the world (something objective). Therefore it could not be a basic presupposition or proposition forming a foundation for knowledge about the world, objective knowledge. It would be a type of psychological principle only.

Unless you hold with Heidegger and Wittgenstein that any such separation between subjective attitude and objectivity is incoherent. It is the hinge that makes the world objectively intelligible in the first place.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

The 'hinge proposition', as an objective fact about the world, would be "human beings have blood". The "hinge commitment" would be 'I have faith that my belief that human beings have blood is true'. The latter is not what Wittgenstein is saying, because attitudes, even strong ones like faith can be doubted, whereas Wittgenstein is talking about something we cannot doubt. Therefore it is the former, something we believe to be an objective fact about the world, not a subjective attitude toward a proposition, like a commitment.

“One’s hinge certainty, in normal circumstances, that one has hands would not be the least bit affected by the recognition that one has no rational basis for the truth of this proposition. This reflects the fact that, for Wittgenstein, such commitments are not rooted in ratiocination at all. Indeed, this is manifest in how we acquire our hinges. We are not explicitly taught them, but rather ‘swallow them down’ (OC, §143) with everything that we are explicitly taught, as part of the worldview that is thereby acquired. No-one teaches you that you have hands, for example; you are rather taught to do things with your hands, which presupposes their existence.”

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

despite Banno's cherry picking to make Wittgenstein appear to be intelligible, Banno doesn't even seem to understand what it means to have a changing proposition.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

How could a proposition which changes over time (therefore necessarily ambiguous) have a truth value?

“On the one hand, hinge commitments are completely unresponsive to rational considerations, in the sense that they are commitments that we would retain, and be no less certain of, even if we became aware of the fact that we have no rational basis for their truth. In
particular, our continued certainty in them would be manifest in our actions, so that even if we might claim to doubt them, this ‘doubt’ would be in an important sense fake. On the other hand, however, hinge commitments clearly can change over time, and change in ways that seem to be at least superficially rational. Indeed, the very same proposition can be at one time a hinge commitment and another time an ordinary belief, where this change seems to involve a rational response to changed circumstances.”

Reply to Fooloso4 No.

Reply to Banno

So:

Quoting Banno

The meaning of the command "Block!" in the language game is found in the assistant bringing a block.

but it is not indubitable that this is what it means? How can the game be played, how can they work, if the command is in doubt?

Quoting Fooloso4

how can they work, if the command is in doubt?

Doubt a command? Commands to not have truth value. IF the assistant brought a slab, then they have made an error. IF the builder asked for a slab when they wanted a block, they have made an error.

Reply to Banno

IF the assistant did something else with the block rather than bring it to the builder then he would have made a error as well.

Reply to Fooloso4 Have you a point here? Or is this just idle chat?

Reply to Banno

If the game only occurs if block is indubitable it is equally true that it only works if bringing it is indubitable.

It is not only:

Quoting Banno

the implicit link between the language game and the bits and pieces around the building site.

but the link between the language game and the activity. It is not just the objects but the activity that is at issue.

We might ask: "what are we to do with Moore's 'here is a hand'".

Quoting Fooloso4

If the game only occurs if block is indubitable

That's not a sentence. And even if we make it a sentence: 'If the game only occurs if "this is a block" is indubitable it is equally true that it only works if bringing it is indubitable', your conclusion doesn't follow.

Try harder.

Having a bad day?

You are right, the half of a sentence you quoted is not a sentence, although, as you quoted:

For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. —– Conceive of this as a complete primitive language.

If this is a complete language then "block" is a sentence in that language.

Quoting Banno

... your conclusion doesn't follow.

B must have no doubt about not only what a block is but what he must do with it. How could the game be played otherwise?

Reply to Fooloso4 You appear to be, most adamantly and at superfluous length, agreeing with me.

Reply to Banno

I pointed out that what he was to do with the block is also indubitable. You disagreed.

I agree with you that there is a difference between the builder's language and Moore's claim. That difference is not made clear by "Here is a block".

But if you regard this as being adamant an superfluous, I'll leave it there.

Quoting Fooloso4

But if you regard this as being adamant an superfluous, I'll leave it there.

Might be better if you did.

For the assistant to be mistaken in bringing a block when commanded "Slab!", This must be a block; This must be a slab. The error is as dependent on the hinge propositions as is the correct use.

I supect you have an interesting point, but have failed to articulate it.

But further, the point you might be making is not helpful in the context of this thread.

My understanding of a hinge is that something must revolve around it. In this case it is not enough simply to correctly identify a block but to do the correct thing with it. The assistant will be mistaken if he picks up a block and does something other than bring it to the builder. If I am new on the job "here is a block" does not function as a hinge proposition in the builder's game if I don't know what to do with that information.

Whether Moore's "here is a hand" is a hinge depends on what hangs from or turns around it, with what we do with that the statement. We may not doubt it, but simply identifying or naming myriad things does not make them hinges.

Quoting Fooloso4

k but to do the correct thing with it.

Sure. Note that "doing the correct thing" with a block rests on the hinge proposition "This is a block".

Again, the assistant can't even get it wrong unless "this is a block" is true. Compare Wittgenstein's comments on skepticism.

Now given that, where does your argument lead?

Quoting Banno

Note that "doing the correct thing" with a block rests on the hinge proposition "This is a block".

This is where we differ. I am not denying the indubitability of what a block is. I am arguing that not doubting what a block is is not sufficient for doing the correct thing.

You have not explained this:

Quoting Fooloso4

How can the game be played, how can they work, if the command is in doubt?

Doubt here means not being certain what the command is. Note: As Wittgenstein says:

B brings the stone which he haslearnt to bring at such-and-such a call.

Bring the stone is something he had to learn, just as he had to learn "this is a stone". He cannot doubt what a stone is or doubt what to do with it.

Quoting Fooloso4

This is where we differ. I am not denying the indubitability of what a block is. I am arguing that not doubting what a block is is not sufficient for doing the correct thing.

No, it is requisite to perform the action. Nothing to do with sufficiency.

Quoting Joshs

Unless you hold with Heidegger and Wittgenstein that any such separation between subjective attitude and objectivity is incoherent. It is the hinge that makes the world objectively intelligible in the first place.

Let me state the problem using other words then. If you proceed in this direction, you have no "truth" as correspondence, because you've denied that there's a separation between the thing, and what corresponds with the thing by denying the separation between subjective (of the subject), and objective (of the object). Then we have no "knowledge" in the traditional sense because there is no separation between truth and justification. We'd have to say that if it is justified then it is true, because any other form of truth (correspondence with the object) has been excluded. But this is contrary to experience. We know from experience that what is justified sometime still turns out to be false. That's why we uphold a difference between justified and true.

Quoting Joshs

“One’s hinge certainty, in normal circumstances, that one has hands would not be the least bit affected by the recognition that one has no rational basis for the truth of this proposition. This reflects the fact that, for Wittgenstein, such commitments are not rooted in ratiocination at all. Indeed, this is manifest in how we acquire our hinges. We are not explicitly taught them, but rather ‘swallow them down’ (OC, §143) with everything that we are explicitly taught, as part of the worldview that is thereby acquired. No-one teaches you that you have hands, for example; you are rather taught to do things with your hands, which presupposes their existence.”

This is exactly why the so-called hinges are the most dubious of all propositions. We simply pick them up, acquire them through some sort of animalistic habituation without any type of ratiocination. Therefore they are the least reliable, and ought to be the first to be doubted. And, in philosophy, through methods like Platonic dialectics we learn the process for doubting them. That's why Wittgenstein is simply wrong when he suggests that it is for some (unexplainable) reason, unreasonable to doubt the hinges.

Because the hinges may be archaic remnants, left over from some ancient traditions, which are maintained in common language for simplicity sake only, they are the propositions most in need of the skeptic's doubt. Consider phrases like "the sun rises in the morning, and sets in the evening". We know that it's not true that the sun literally rises, it stays put, relatively, while the earth spins. This demonstrates how simple statements which we acquire, and use ("swallow them down"), may be very misleading. They can appear to correspond precisely with our observed world, they are also simple and very useful, yet sometimes they are actually false. That's why they are actually in need of the skeptic's.

Quoting Joshs

“On the one hand, hinge commitments are completely unresponsive to rational considerations, in the sense that they are commitments that we would retain, and be no less certain of, even if we became aware of the fact that we have no rational basis for their truth. In
particular, our continued certainty in them would be manifest in our actions, so that even if we might claim to doubt them, this ‘doubt’ would be in an important sense fake. On the other hand, however, hinge commitments clearly can change over time, and change in ways that seem to be at least superficially rational. Indeed, the very same proposition can be at one time a hinge commitment and another time an ordinary belief, where this change seems to involve a rational response to changed circumstances.”

I don't agree with this, and that's why I think Wittgenstein is wrong. Plato, throughout his dialogues demonstrated how Socrates doubted such commitments. And it wasn't just moral commitments which were doubted, but he doubted commitments throughout the entire sphere of knowledge, including technical practice, science, mathematics, law, and even the meaning of "knowledge" itself. To doubt the meaning of a word, like "love", "virtue", "just", or "knowledge", is to doubt how one's society uses that word, and therefore the hinge commitments which support that usage.

Quoting Fooloso4

...not doubting what a block is is not sufficient for doing the correct thing.

SO what?

Yes, the assistant has to learn that "Block!" is a command, and how to respond.

Where is it you think your argument leads? What's the point of your comment? Do you think it shows a problem with hinge propositions? then set it out.

Reply to Banno
The real problem is that the person can choose not to play that game. And that is why the whole game analogy, and the described "hinge propositions", as some sort of rule system which supports the game, is fundamentally flawed, as a descriptive tool for "language" in general. Language as a whole must consist of a multitude of games, under the game analogy, and the individual user of language has freedom of choice with respect to which games to play.

So the supposed "hinge propositions" which must be, of necessity, accepted for the purpose of playing a specific game, and cannot be doubted from within the confines of that game, can always be doubted from the play of another game. The character of "hinge" is specific to, as a feature of, a particular game.

Therefore portraying such hinge propositions as somehow indubitable is fundamentally wrong. All the hinge propositions of any, and every particular game, are always the subject of doubt from the play of another game. And, a human being has the freedom of choice to play one game one day, and another game the next day, at will. Therefore it is completely reasonable for a human being to doubt any supposed "hinge proposition".

What cannot be exposed by the game analogy is the relationships between the various games, becuase these are by definition outside any particular game and are not captured by the analogy. Since this type of language use, which is outside any particular game, is a key aspect of the philosophical use of language, as the means by which we doubt linguistic activity, the game analogy completely fails as a representation of the philosophical use of language. Philosophical use of language is the use of language which is outside the game analogy.

The relationship between freedom of choice to choose a linguistic game, and dogmatic enforcement of a game, is very evident in the history of "The Inquisition". The Inquisition was formed to resist the infiltration of secular language (as heresy) into the pure language, Latin, and the perceived threat of doubt, and inevitable corruption of theological principles, from such cross-gaming. History teaches us that the enforcement of the game (The Inquisition) did not win over the freedom of the will of individuals to choose their own games. In fact, efforts at enforcement appear to have had a negative effect overall.

Quoting Banno

Where is it you think your argument leads? What's the point of your comment? Do you think it shows a problem with hinge propositions?

It is not a problem with hinge propositions but with what counts as a hinge.

You asked:

Quoting Banno

What would be the hinge propositions here?

"Here is a bock"
"Here is a slab"
"Here is a beam"

For something to be a hinge something must turn on it. "Here is an X" is not a hinge proposition. Even a primitive language like the builder's consists of more than just identifying or naming objects.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover Sure, one can choose not to play one game or another, or to change the way the game is played. But it is not possible not to play any game. Even being a hermit i playing a game. And further, there is nothing to speak of outside of the games.

Your argument is that a hinge in one game need not be a hinge in another, and I agree; but one cannot thereby conclude, as you would, that there are no hinges. That argument would be like saying that an American dollar is not an Australian dollar, and concluding therefore that money is worthless.

There is no language use that is outside language games. Looking at the relationship between language games is yet another language game. Philosophers who think they can step outside language while still using language are mistaken.

Quoting Fooloso4

For something to be a hinge something must turn on it. "Here is an X" is not a hinge proposition. Even a primitive language like the builder's consists of more than just identifying or naming objects.

Sure. What turns on "This is a slab" is the whole process described in the game. A better parsing would be "This counts as a slab". This is implicit in the playing of the builder's game. And yes, of course the game consists in more than identifying and naming objects.

Quoting Banno

A better parsing would be "This counts as a slab".

A better parsing would be: "Bring me this when I call slab".

Quoting Fooloso4

"Bring me this when I call slab".

But that is not a proposition, it is a command.

And further, it will not work unless what you call a slab is the same as what I call a slab; it will not work unless it serves to differentiate slabs from blocks for both of us.

Reply to Banno

Strictly speaking, "block", "slab", "beam" are the commands. What to do when you hear ""Slab!". is not a command but an explanation.

Both what a slab isis and what to do with it are learned ostensibly. Both what a slab is and what to do with it must be the same for both of us.

Quoting Fooloso4

Strictly speaking, "block", "slab", "beam" are the commands.

Yes.

Quoting Fooloso4

What to do when you hear ""Slab!". is not a command but an explanation.

Not sure what this means. Bringing a slab is not an explanation.

Quoting Fooloso4

Both what a slab isis and what to do with it are learned ostensibly. Both what a slab is and what to do with it must be the same for both of us.

Yes.

The question on this thread is "What is a hinge proposition", so I gave an example from the simplest language game.

And?

Quoting Banno

Bringing a slab is not an explanation.

It is an explanation of what to do when you hear "slab!".

Reply to Fooloso4 Ok.

Again, where is this leading?

I gather that you do not think "This is a slab" a suitable example of a hinge proposition, but I am unable to see why.

Quoting Banno

I gather that you do not think "This is a slab" a suitable example of a hinge proposition, but I am unable to see why.

I would only be repeating myself. In the builder's language "slab" means more than "This is a slab." Knowing what a slab is is requisite, but knowing what to do with it is as well.

Do you think Moore's "here is a hand" is a hinge proposition?

Quoting Fooloso4

I would only be repeating myself. In the builder's language "slab" means more than "This is a slab." Knowing what a slab is is requisite, but knowing what to do with it is as well.

There's nothing here with which i would disagree...?

Quoting Fooloso4

Do you think Moore's "here is a hand" is a hinge proposition?

"This counts as a hand" might be. Use is what counts. SO in so far as Moore was setting up a langauge game in which this counted as a hand, yes.

Quoting Banno

I can't make sense of the idea of a proposition that does not have a truth value - not a proposition for which we don't know if it is true or false, but a proposition which is not eligible for truth or falsehood. Sam26 was entertaining that idea here.

What reason is there to assume that hinge propositions are no different to ordinary propositions? It may be worth noting that Wittgenstein doesn't use the phrase "hinge proposition" in OC. If hinge propositions are just ordinary propositions then why does W appear to indicate that they cannot be doubted or known? We can doubt and know ordinary propositions. Or do you think he is talking about some other (third) type of proposition in this regard?

Quoting Luke

It may be worth noting that Wittgenstein doesn't use the phrase "hinge proposition" in OC.

Oh, yes indeed. It is an contrivance grafted post hoc onto the apparatus - a bit like the private language argument. The plain way to make his point might be to claim that in any given game there will be some aspects that are indubitable. One gets to hinge propositions by then inferring that one could state what it is that is indubitable - not a long stretch, and that's in effect what I did here:
Quoting Banno

"Here is a bock"
"Here is a slab"
"Here is a beam"

So a hinge is not so much a type of proposition as a way one might make use of some propositions.

Hence, Searle's constitutive propositions are interesting because they might give a grammar for one way that a proposition can be used as a hinge - "this counts as a slab".

Quoting Banno

One gets to hinge propositions by then inferring that one could state what it is that is indubitable

I don’t follow why you would accept that hinge propositions are not like ordinary propositions in the sense that hinge propositions are indubitable (and therefore unknowable) whereas ordinary propositions are not. Yet you insist that hinge propositions must be like ordinary propositions in the sense of having a truth value.

Reply to Luke I don't see an issue. What am I missing?

Hinge propositions are indubitable, and hence true. Hence they have a truth value.

The argument is that the notion of justification does not apply to them, and that hence they cannot be known. It is not that they cannot be known because they do not have a truth value...

Quoting Banno

Hinge propositions are indubitable, and hence true.

Hence we know them?

Quoting Banno

It is not that they cannot be known because they do not have a truth value...

I haven’t made any such argument. I’m asking why they must have a truth value when they are not ordinary propositions and they are distinguished from ordinary propositions in other ways.

Quoting Banno

SO in so far as Moore was setting up a langauge game in which this counted as a hand, yes.

Is that what he was doing? Is it only in certain games that it to count and not others?

Quoting Fooloso4

Is that what he was doing? Is it only in certain games that it to count and not others?

That is a damn good question. It's an issue of exegesis as well as epistemology. Did Wittgenstein think that beng beyond doubt was only within a given game - it seems likely. Was he right? I suspect so, but it remains an open question.

Quoting Luke

I’m asking why they must have a truth value when they are not ordinary propositions and they are distinguished from ordinary propositions in other ways.

Yeah, I must have missed something. What is an "ordinary" proposition here?

SO we have that in order to participate in some given language game, one must take certain things as indubitable.

Those things can presumably be stated.

Some folk call such statements hinge propositions.

Hence hinge propositions are true. Hinge propositions are undoubted. Hinge propositions are unjustified.

Hence the conclusion that if what is known must be justified, then hinge propositions are true but unknown.

That right?

Quoting Banno

That is a damn good question.

Actually two questions, both about Moore's "Here is a hand".

With regard to Wittgenstein, I agree that what is beyond doubt is only within a given game. For one of Wittgenstein's tribes very different things might be beyond doubt, just as in earlier times different things were beyond doubt in western culture.

Reply to Luke Quoting Luke

If hinge propositions are just ordinary propositions then why does W appear to indicate that they cannot be doubted or known? We can doubt and know ordinary propositions.

Quoting Luke

I don’t follow why you would accept that hinge propositions are not like ordinary propositions in the sense that hinge propositions are indubitable (and therefore unknowable) whereas ordinary propositions are not. Yet you insist that hinge propositions must be like ordinary propositions in the sense of having a truth value.

Well, most obviously, because hinge propositions are propositions. Propositions are the sorts of things that have a truth value. A proposition without a truth value would be a contradiction in terms. And I don't think W ever gives us reason to believe he doesn't think there is some fact of the matter as to whether e.g. "here is a hand" or whether "I've spent my entire life in close proximity to the Earth"- in other words, that these propositions have a truth-value. What he questions is whether Moore is correct to say he knows these propositions.

Now, at least on the standard account, we know a given proposition if the proposition is true, and if we are justified in our belief in that proposition. So if W is questioning whether Moore knows these propositions, he could either be questioning whether the proposition is true, or whether we can be justified in believing these propositions (or both). And so the idea is that W is attacking whether these propositions can be justified, and is ultimately arguing that they can't be justified (and therefore cannot be known) because they form the background against which we evaluate and justify propositions in general: they therefore cannot themselves be justified, upon pain of circularity.

Quoting Banno

What is an "ordinary" proposition here?

Unless you know of any other types, ordinary propositions are those which are not hinge propositions. Do you acknowledge that ordinary propositions are not the same as hinge propositions?

Quoting Banno

Those things can presumably be stated.

Some folk call such statements hinge propositions.

Hence hinge propositions are true. Hinge propositions are undoubted. Hinge propositions are unjustified.

Your argument appears to be that if a proposition can be stated then it must have a truth value. But this is just to ignore the distinction between ordinary propositions and hinge propositions and does not explain why hinge propositions must have a truth value, especially given your acceptance of the other differences between hinge propositions and ordinary propositions that have been noted.

Quoting Seppo

Well, most obviously, because hinge propositions are propositions.

But that is also in question here. Again, W does not refer to “hinge propositions” in OC. Also, if they cannot be doubted or known, then they are unlike (ordinary) propositions in at least some other ways.

Quoting Luke

Your argument appears to be that if a proposition can be stated then it must have a truth value

No, the argument is that if its a proposition, then it must have a truth-value, because that just is what a proposition is (i.e. the sort of thing that has a truth-value).

Quoting Luke

But this is just to ignore the distinction between ordinary propositions and hinge propositions and does not explain why hinge propositions must have a truth value

The distinction that myself, Banno, and Jamalrob have urged between ordinary propositions and hinge propositions is that the difference lies in the latter's inability to be justified (and that because of the role hinge propositions play in language, particularly in the process of justification).

Quoting Luke

But that is also in question here. Again, W does not refer to “hinge propositions” in OC. Also, if they cannot be doubted or known, then they are unlike (ordinary) propositions in at least some other ways.

No, but he does refer to the claims in question as propositions. And a proposition without a truth-value would be a contradiction in terms. And the argument here is that hinge propositions cannot be doubted or known, not because they differ from ordinary propositions in lacking a truth-value, but because they differ from ordinary propositions in being unable to be justified.

Quoting Luke

, ordinary propositions are those which are not hinge propositions. Do you acknowledge that ordinary propositions are not the same as hinge propositions?

Well, the way you set this up, no. But I'm not seeing the point of the exercise. Pins are not the same as not-pins.
Quoting Luke

Your argument appears to be that if a proposition can be stated then it must have a truth value.

What gave you that impression? Where'd I say that? Arguably, "the present king of France is bald" does not have a truth value...

A proposition - stated or no - is the sort of thing that can have a truth value...

And if a proposition is to be taken as undoubted - and that seems to be the case - then by that very fact it is true.

I'm still not seeing your line of thought here.

Reply to Seppo Glad to see you are having trouble following this... Thanks. Seems pretty direct, to me.

Reply to Banno Yeah I find this all perplexing, it seems pretty straightforward to me: Moore doesn't know whether "here is a hand", not because "here is a hand" is neither true nor false (how could it be neither true nor false? What is a proposition without a truth-value, other than a contradiction in terms?), but because "here is a hand" is, to use your previous analogy, one of the rules of the game: that here is a hand is one of the hinges upon which our evaluation of other propositions swings.

Quoting Seppo

No, the argument is that if its a proposition, then must have a truth-value, because that just is what a proposition is (i.e. the sort of thing that has a truth-value).

By the same logic, if it is a proposition then it must be justifiable, dubitable and capable of being known, because that is just what a proposition is. Yet hinge propositions are none of these things.

Quoting Seppo

The distinction that myself, Banno, and Jamalrob have urged between ordinary propositions and hinge propositions is that the difference lies in the latter's inability to be justified (and that because of the role hinge propositions play in language, particularly in the process of justification).

I’m aware. I’m “urging” the further distinction that they do not have a truth value either.

Quoting Seppo

And a proposition without a truth-value would be a contradiction in terms.

But a proposition that cannot be justified, known or doubted isn’t a contradiction in terms?

Reply to Seppo :up:

Quoting Luke

By the same logic, if it is a proposition then it must be justifiable, dubitable and capable of being known, because that is just what a proposition is. Yet hinge propositions are none of these things.

Nuh. That'd be the anti-realist error.

Quoting Luke

But a proposition that cannot be justified, known or doubted isn’t a contradiction in terms?

That's right.

SO what we have here is a problem with our understanding of "proposition". Seems as we differ.

Quoting Luke

By the same logic, if it is a proposition then it must be justifiable, dubitable and capable of being known, because that is just what a proposition is.

No, being justifiable, dubitable, or capable of being know are not part of the standard definition of a proposition. A proposition, in contemporary philosophy, is something which has a truth-value, a bearer of truth/falsity.

So we could have an unknowable, indubitable, or unjustifiable proposition (and it doesn't take much imagination to think of examples of each of these)... but not a proposition lacking a truth-value.

Quoting Luke

I’m aware. I’m “urging” the further distinction that they do not have a truth value either.

And again, that can't be the case, since a proposition without a truth-value is a contradiction in terms.

Quoting Luke

But a proposition that cannot be justified, known or doubted isn’t a contradiction in terms?

Right. Again, a proposition is a bearer of truth-value. And W explicitly refers to these as propositions. So they have a truth-value. He argues that Moore cannot say he knows these propositions, because these propositions cannot be justified, and justification is a condition for knowledge.

This may be of some use here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/

Quoting Banno

Your argument is that a hinge in one game need not be a hinge in another, and I agree; but one cannot thereby conclude, as you would, that there are no hinges.

If hinges are defined as propositions which it is unreasonable to doubt, or, are indubitable, then there are no hinges. Each person is involved in numerous different games and it is only unreasonable to doubt a supposed hinge, from within the game that it is a hinge. From another game, in which the proposition is not a hinge, it is not unreasonable to doubt that proposition. Therefore it is not unreasonable for a person to doubt a hinge.

Quoting Banno

There is no language use that is outside language games. Looking at the relationship between language games is yet another language game. Philosophers who think they can step outside language while still using language are mistaken.

A relation between two games is not itself a game. That would just imply a third game between the two, but then we'd require two more games to account for the relation between the third game and the first game and the third game and the second game. And we'd need more games to account for the relations between these games, ad infinitum. This is the type of infinite regress Aristotle demonstrated would be the result of mischaracterizing the difference (or relation) between two things, as a third thing. That infinite regress is the result here, is evidence that the description is faulty. The relation between two games is not a third game.

So it is not a matter of philosophers thinking that they can step outside of language, when using language, it is just a matter of demonstrating that language consists of more than just games. So a philosopher can place oneself outside of any particular game, and therefore potentially outside of every game, yet still be using language. Wittgenstein's intentional use of ambiguity is clear evidence of the act of a philosopher putting oneself outside of the games.

Quoting Seppo

No, being justifiable, dubitable, or capable of being know are not part of the standard definition of a proposition. A proposition, in contemporary philosophy, is something which has a truth-value, a bearer of truth/falsity.

Quoting Seppo

This may be of some use here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/

Thanks for the link. Its opening paragraph states:

The term ‘proposition’ has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other “propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.[1]), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences.

So the article you cited in support of your claims does not limit the definition of a proposition to being only “a bearer of truth/falsity”. The article you cited explicitly states that a proposition is also the object of belief, doubt and other “propositional attitudes”. So it appears that the capacity to be doubted is also part of the definition of a proposition in contemporary philosophy. It’s not a huge leap to infer that the capacity to be known and justified could also be included.

As the article rightly states:

The best way to proceed, when dealing with quasi-technical words like ‘proposition’, may be to stipulate a definition and proceed with caution, making sure not to close off any substantive issues by definitional fiat.

If we can agree that the definition of a proposition includes being the bearer of truth/falsity and having the capacity to be doubted, known and justified, then the question remains why hinge propositions should differ from ordinary propositions in one (or three) respect(s) but not the other.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

If hinges are defined as propositions which it is unreasonable to doubt, or, are indubitable, then there are no hinges. Each person is involved in numerous different games and it is only unreasonable to doubt a supposed hinge, from within the game that it is a hinge. From another game, in which the proposition is not a hinge, it is not unreasonable to doubt that proposition. Therefore it is not unreasonable for a person to doubt a hinge.

*sigh*.

You've misunderstood, again, and as usual.

Doubt takes place within a language game.

What you suggest above is tantamount to someone, learning chess, complaining that they could move the bishop anywhere they like; and that hence they are a sceptic as concerns keeping the bishop on its own colour.

Now I am pretty confident that you will not grasp this. And that's why i don't usualy address your comments. But have a go.

Quoting Banno

Do you acknowledge that ordinary propositions are not the same as hinge propositions?
— Luke

Well, the way you set this up, no.

If you cannot acknowledge that ordinary propositions are not the same as hinge propositions, then it appears that you don't know what a hinge proposition is.

Quoting Banno

And if a proposition is to be taken as undoubted - and that seems to be the case - then by that very fact it is true.

Hinge propositions are not merely "undoubted"; they are indubitable. More accurately, they cannot be an object of doubt, and (hence) neither can they be an object of knowledge.

Quoting Banno

A proposition - stated or no - is the sort of thing that can have a truth value...

Then that true proposition is (or should be) knowable. But hinge propositions are unknowable.

Quoting Seppo

Moore doesn't know whether "here is a hand", not because "here is a hand" is neither true nor false (how could it be neither true nor false? What is a proposition without a truth-value, other than a contradiction in terms?), but because "here is a hand" is, to use your previous analogy, one of the rules of the game: that here is a hand is one of the hinges upon which our evaluation of other propositions swings.

Witt, On Certainty:93. The propositions presenting what Moore 'knows' are all of such a kind that it is difficult to imagine why anyone should believe the contrary. E.g. the proposition that Moore has spent his whole life in close proximity to the earth.— Once more I can speak of myself here instead of speaking of Moore. What could induce me to believe the opposite? Either a memory, or having been told.— Everything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favour of the opposite.

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.

95 . The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules.

93 shows that Wittgenstein is talking about Moorean (hinge) propositions at 94. 94 shows that hinge propositions are the background against which we distinguish between true and false (and therefore lack a truth value themselves). 95 shows that hinge propositions needn't be articulated (and 87 does the same).

All of this adds weight to the suggestion that hinge propositions are unlike ordinary propositions in that hinge propositions are indubitable, unknowable, unjustifiable and lack a truth value.

I can imagine Wittgenstein drawing an analogy and questioning whether we can attribute a truth value to (e.g.) the law of identity, or to the rule of a game, while leading us in the direction of a negative answer. (And that these examples are equally not the objects of doubt, knowledge, or justification.)

Quoting Banno

Doubt takes place within a language game.

That's what you might think, but quite obviously "doubt" is created when the appropriate language game cannot be determined. That's what Plato demonstrated. This is the nature of ambiguity, the word appears as if it could be employed according to multiple different games, and there is uncertainty as to which game is the correct one.

The idea of doubt "within a language game" doesn't even make sense. Think about it, there can be no doubt as to how to use the word from within the game, just like there can be no doubt about the moves of the chess piece. There can be doubt as to whether one's moves will be successful or not, but that's a completely different type of doubt, far more general, and far outside of any language use. It's the doubt as to whether my actions will be successful or not. That form of doubt is obviously not confined to within a language game.

Doubt within a language game would be like doubt as to whether one's logic is valid or not. Such a judgement is very decisive, either it is or is not valid logic, and there is no room for doubt. One could be in doubt in such a judgement, if the rules of the logic being employed were not known by the person, or if the propositions were ambiguous, but that's what constitutes being outside the game. From within the game there can be no doubt, that's what constitutes being within the game.

Quoting Banno

Now I am pretty confident that you will not grasp this.

That's right, I cannot grasp it because what you've said is completely nonsensical. It appears like you have no idea what "doubt" is. Do you recognize "doubt" as indecisiveness, uncertainty in relation to a required judgement? If one is playing chess, i.e. "within the game", there can be no doubt as to how to move the bishop. If the person was doubting how to move the bishop we could not say that the person is playing the game. So how does your example put doubt within the game?

Doubt within the game makes no sense. The person might have doubt with respect to strategy, but strategy is not "within" the game, it's what the individual brings to the game by way of experience and intuition.

Perhaps we could start a mutual understanding through a distinction between "the game", and "playing the game". Do you accept that "playing the game" is not the same as "the game", because the former refers to what an individuals is doing, or what individuals are each doing, and the latter refers to a unity of the actions of the individuals? If so, do you see that "doubt" is proper to the individual, not to the game?

Quoting Luke

So the article you cited in support of your claims does not limit the definition of a proposition to being only “a bearer of truth/falsity”. The article you cited explicitly states that a proposition is also the object of belief, doubt and other “propositional attitudes”. So it appears that the capacity to be doubted is also part of the definition of a proposition in contemporary philosophy.

Well, no, not exactly; doubt is a propositional attitude, and being the object of propositional attitudes is part of how a proposition is typically defined (it sort of follows from the fact that they are bearers of truth-value, since propositional attitudes just are the different positions we may take wrt the truth or falsity of a proposition)... but that doesn't necessarily mean that every proposition can coherently be the object of every propositional attitude at all times. Think of Descartes and his cogito, "I exist" is a proposition, but it cannot coherently be doubted (since doubting something entails that you exist to do the doubting). So the suggestion that a proposition cannot be doubted isn't the same as the suggestion that a proposition can lack a truth-value.

Quoting Luke

f we can agree that the definition of a proposition includes being the bearer of truth/falsity and having the capacity to be doubted, known and justified, then the question remains why hinge propositions should differ from ordinary propositions in one (or three) respect(s) but not the other.

There's nothing that says a proposition has to be able to be known or justified, and as above a proposition needn't necessarily be able to be doubted either. There are certainly unknowable propositions, and apparently indubitable ones, but there are no propositions that lack a truth-value. And hinge propositions differ from ordinary propositions in that they cannot be justified.

Witt, On Certainty:Everything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favour of the opposite.

I want to use this to support some claims about hinges before:

It is not that a hinge cannot be doubted, but that they are not doubted. So much hangs and turns around them that there would have to be a major change in the riverbanks of knowledge to make a hinge doubtful.

Hinges are not all timeless and immutable. It was only a few years later, in 1961, that a man had been far from the earth.

They have not functioned as hinges for all peoples everywhere.

Quoting Luke

All of this adds weight to the suggestion that hinge propositions are unlike ordinary propositions in that hinge propositions are indubitable, unknowable, unjustifiable and lack a truth value.

I do not think it is the case that hinges are unknowable and lack truth value:

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn."

Certainly we know that 12x12=144 and that this is true.

Quoting Luke

All of this adds weight to the suggestion that hinge propositions are unlike ordinary propositions in that hinge propositions are indubitable, unknowable, unjustifiable and lack a truth value.

No, not the lacking a truth-value part. There are no propositions that lack a truth-value, any more than there are triangles that lack three sides.

But hinge propositions are indubitable (in a sense), unjustifiable, and in virtue of being unjustifiable, unknowable... because they form part of the background against which we doubt, justify, or come to know propositions in general (and hence themselves being subject to those processes would involve circularity).

Quoting Seppo

Well, no, not exactly; doubt is a propositional attitude, and being the object of propositional attitudes is part of how a proposition is typically defined (it sort of follows from the fact that they are bearers of truth-value, since propositional attitudes just are the different positions we may take wrt the truth or falsity of a proposition)

I would say that the only “different positions” we can take wrt the truth or falsity of a proposition is that a proposition is either true or false. I don’t see how being an object of a propositional attitude, such as doubt, follows from the fact that propositions are bearers of truth-value. That a proposition is an object of doubt, and that we have propositional attitudes more generally, is something in addition to a proposition simply being a bearer of truth-value.

Quoting Seppo

... but that doesn't necessarily mean that every proposition can coherently be the object of every propositional attitude at all times.

Nowhere in the SEP definition of a proposition does it refer to “every propositional attitude at all times”. According to the SEP article you provided, a proposition is defined in contemporary philosophy as being not only a bearer of truth-value, but also as being an object of doubt (and other propositional attitudes).

Your argument was that a hinge proposition must have a truth-value by definition (SEP). By the same logic, a hinge proposition must also be an object of doubt (and other propositional attitudes) by definition (SEP). However, a hinge proposition cannot be an object of doubt because a hinge proposition is indubitable. Therefore, if a hinge proposition does not meet the SEP definition of a proposition wrt being an object of doubt, then why must a hinge proposition meet the SEP definition of a proposition wrt to being a bearer of truth-value? Hinge propositions are not the same as the (ordinary) propositions defined in the SEP article, so you cannot justify that a hinge proposition must bear a truth-value based on the definition of an ordinary proposition.

Quoting Seppo

Think of Descartes and his cogito, "I exist" is a proposition, but it cannot coherently be doubted (since doubting something entails that you exist to do the doubting).

“I exist” might be the ultimate example of a hinge proposition, and the fact that a hinge proposition cannot be an object of doubt is precisely the point, because it contradicts the SEP definition of a proposition. Conforming to the definition of a proposition is the only argument you have offered for why a hinge proposition must be the bearer of a truth-value. If hinge propositions do not conform to the SEP definition of a proposition wrt being an object of doubt, then why must hinge propositions conform to the SEP definition of a proposition wrt being a bearer of truth-value? That is, if the definition can be contradicted by not being an object of doubt, then it can also be contradicted by not being a bearer of truth-value. Hinge propositions are not ordinary propositions.

Your argument is that hinge propositions must be bearers of truth-value because they are propositions (e.g. as defined by the SEP). Using the same logic, hinge propositions must also be objects of doubt because they are propositions (e.g. as defined by the SEP). However, hinge propositions are not objects of doubt (as W demonstrates), so your argument fails. Hinge propositions needn't have a truth-value merely because they are propositions (e.g. as defined by the SEP). In fact, hinge propositions are not propositions (e.g. as defined by the SEP).

Quoting Seppo

There's nothing that says a proposition has to be able to be known or justified, and as above a proposition needn't necessarily be able to be doubted either.

Now you are contradicting the SEP article that you cited. If you are to insist that a proposition must be the bearer of a truth-value due to the definition, then you must equally insist that a proposition must be an object of (propositional attitudes such as) doubt due to the definition. After all, you provided the definition.

Can anyone provide a clear explanation of the difference between a hinge proposition, and a self-evident truth? That might be a good start toward understanding what a hinge proposition is supposed to be.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover Several folk hav, but you haven't understood it.

Doubt is a language game. Sometimes, you verge on making sense, as here: Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

there can be no doubt as to how to use the word from within the game

Or here:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Doubt within a language game would be like doubt as to whether one's logic is valid or not. Such a judgement is very decisive, either it is or is not valid logic, and there is no room for doubt.

But as with your perverse view of instantaneous velocity, the next step illudes you.

I'm sorry, Meta, but there is nothing in your posts.

Quoting Luke

you don't know what a hinge proposition is.

I don't think that problem belongs to me. Indeed, your comments concerning propositions show some deep misconceptions.

Reply to Banno Yeah, reading Luke's latest post, I'm afraid this is a bit of a lost cause (and it goes without saying that talking to MU about Wittgenstein is an exercise in futility).

Reply to Seppo The misconceptions around propositions are odd, and appear to be becoming more common.

I am beginning to think the construct "hinge proposition" is problematic in that it changes the focus form doubt and certainty to something like grammatical structure; so we look for the common structure within a proposition as if it made it a hinge, rather than at the role it takes in the wider language game.

Quoting Banno

Doubt is a language game.

No, doubt is not a language game. It is an attitude of uncertainty which does not require language for its existence. Likewise, certitude is an attitude of confidence which does not require language for its existence.

So for example, when I'm hiking and come to a brook, I might have certitude, and be confident that I can, or cannot, jump across it. Or, I might have doubt as to whether I can, meaning I am uncertain. It's not language which facilitates the attitude which I have in this case, and that attitude is completely independent of any language game.

You continue to demonstrate that you really have no idea as to what doubt actually is. So you simply create a fictitious description of doubt which fits into your game analogy, instead of attempting to understand what doubt really is, and how the game analogy is incapable of capturing it. Uncertainty, doubt, negates the will to act, rendering games, which are activities, as relevant only by an extrinsic relationship. In the example above, if I am certain that I can jump across the brook, or certain that I cannot, I will act accordingly. But doubt leaves me indecisive and unwilling to act.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

No, doubt is not a language game.

Not being able to see that this is wrong is why you have presented such nonsense here, and why you have thoroughly failed to grasp what Wittgenstein found.

Reply to Banno
Well Banno, I take your reply as a joke. You have put no effort into it, being afraid to look at anything which is inconsistent with what you claim. As you have not been able to indicate to me how I am wrong, I will conclude that you are just stubbornly adhering to a description of "doubt" which was created by your imagination, for a particular purpose, rather than by looking at the way the word is actually used by people in the world.

It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects
about on a surface according to certain rules . . ."—and we replied:
You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You
can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those
games.

That's what you do with "doubt", define it in a way which expressly restricts it to being a language game. What about all the other times we use "doubt", to refer to non-academic instances of uncertainty?

Quoting Banno

Indeed, your comments concerning propositions show some deep misconceptions.

Such as?

Quoting Seppo

Yeah, reading Luke's latest post, I'm afraid this is a bit of a lost cause

What's wrong with the argument?

A reminder of the definition that you introduced into the discussion:

Quoting SEP article on Propositions

The term ‘proposition’ has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other “propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.[1]), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences.

You have argued that a hinge proposition is a bearer of truth-value because all propositions are bearers of truth-value.

The same argument could be made that a hinge proposition is an object of belief and other "propositional attitudes" (including doubt) because all propositions are objects of belief and other "propositional attitudes" (including doubt).

However, a hinge proposition is not an object of belief and other "propositional attitudes" (including doubt), because a hinge proposition excludes doubt:

OC:341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.

Therefore, a hinge proposition need not be an object of belief and other propositional attitudes (including doubt).
Therefore, a hinge proposition need not have a truth-value.

ETA:

OC 308:What interests us now is not being sure but knowledge. That is, we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is to be possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is one.

Quoting Luke

What's wrong with the argument?

Its sort of a trainwreck of non-sequiturs, and in this post you've simply reiterated things that I already addressed in my last post, as if you didn't read what I said. So, I think the conversation is a lost cause. Maybe Banno has more patience/spare time.

Quoting Banno

The misconceptions around propositions are odd, and appear to be becoming more common

yeah, and silly me for thinking that posting the SEP article on propositions would help clarify things... :yikes:

not what I expected, but live and learn I guess...

Quoting Luke

Such as?

They are many and varied. With I and Seppo have tried to show you some of the issues.

Quoting Seppo

Maybe Banno has more patience/spare time.

No. The problem goes beyond Luke to a half-dozen threads hereabouts. It seems to be an issue of basic literacy; as if folk have lost the capacity to follow or construct a sequence of expressions that lead to a conclusion...

Quoting Seppo

...a trainwreck of non-sequiturs...

indeed.

Quoting Seppo

Its sort of a trainwreck of non-sequiturs, and in this post you've simply reiterated things that I already addressed in my last post, as if you didn't read what I said.

You're right, I didn't read closely enough. You said in your last post:

Quoting Seppo

But hinge propositions are indubitable (in a sense), unjustifiable, and in virtue of being unjustifiable, unknowable... because they form part of the background against which we doubt, justify, or come to know propositions in general (and hence themselves being subject to those processes would involve circularity).

You make a distinction here between hinge propositions and "propositions in general". This is the same distinction that I have been trying to get you and @Banno to acknowledge. If hinge propositions are different from "propositions in general", then hinge propositions need not bear a truth-value. Or, at least, you cannot use the definition of a "proposition in general" to support any claims about a hinge proposition.

As Daniele Moyal-Sharrock points out (here), a hinge proposition is not a proposition at all, but a rule of grammar:

Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Wittgenstein's Hinge Certainty:
Hinges are really logical bounds of sense or rules of grammar; they form ‘the foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language)’ (OC 401). For Michael Williams (2001, 97) and many epistemologists, to ask for the ground of a belief is to ask for yet another belief, for only propositional beliefs (and other intentional states) can stand in logical relation to other propositional beliefs. What Wittgenstein makes clear is that this is an invalid assumption; for grammatical rules can stand in logical relation to propositional beliefs – as, indeed, they must: as the necessary enablers or determinants of sense. I cannot come to the belief that ‘It is indeed a hand I see on a blurry photograph’ unless I am ‘hinged’ on the grammatical rule that ‘This is what we call “a hand”.

Quoting Luke

If hinge propositions are different from "propositions in general", then hinge propositions need not bear a truth-value.

Well, no, they need to differ in some way. But if they are propositions, then having a truth-value is not where they can differ, because having a truth-value is what propositions do. If hinge propositions don't have a truth-value, then they are not propositions. Hinge propositions not being propositions is self-contradictory.

Hinge propositions are set apart from other propositions not in virtue of lacking a truth-value (else they wouldn't be propositions at all), but in their inability to be justified, seeing as they are part of the background against which we evaluate and justify propositions in general, and so cannot themselves be so evaluated and justified on pain of circularity.

Quoting Luke

If hinge propositions are different from "propositions in general", then hinge propositions need not bear a truth-value.

That's not valid reasoning, and it's not cogent. All propositions are truth-bearing. If hinge propositions were sufficiently different to other propositions so as not to be truth bearing, they would arguably no longer be propositions.

Quoting Luke

a hinge proposition is not a proposition at all, but a rule of grammar:

I'm not sure one can have a rule that is not a proposition. A rule presumably says how things should be, and how they should be is a possible state of affairs, and hence a proposition.

But what you quote here does not say "...a hinge proposition is not a proposition at all".

Quoting Seppo

Well, no, they need to differ in some way. But if they are propositions,

You beat me to the post.

Again, it seems odd that this relatively simple stuff can be so misunderstood.

Reply to Banno Yeah... you may have noticed that I have a hard time walking away from conversations, even when they aren't productive. Time to sign off now though, I have episodes of Breaking Bad to watch. :grin:

Reply to Seppo Enjoy.

Quoting Seppo

Well, no, they need to differ in some way. But if they are propositions, then having a truth-value is not where they can differ, because having a truth-value is what propositions do.

That would depend on how they differ. You cannot just assume that they are the same in the respect of being the same.

Quoting Seppo

If hinge propositions don't have a truth-value, then they are not propositions.

Ya, that's my point. You've simply reiterated things that I already addressed in my last post as if you didn't read what I said, so this may be a lost cause. Did you read the article? Hinge propositions are not propositions, but rules of grammar.

Quoting Seppo

Hinge propositions not being propositions is self-contradictory.

Wittgenstein never called them "hinge propositions". Apparently you have no interest in discussing whether or not hinge propositions are propositions, or in discussing Wittgenstein's work.

Quoting Seppo

Hinge propositions are set apart from other propositions not in virtue of lacking a truth-value, but in their inability to be justified,

You keep repeating this without any apparent regard for Wittgenstein's work, but based solely on the designation of "hinge proposition".

Quoting Banno

If hinge propositions are different from "propositions in general", then hinge propositions need not bear a truth-value.
— Luke

That's not valid reasoning, and it's not cogent.

It is valid reasoning. Seppo's argument is:

All propositions (in general) are bearers of truth-value
Hinge propositions are propositions (in general)
Therefore, hinge propositions are bearers of truth-value

If hinge propositions are different from propositions (in general), then hinge propositions are not propositions (in general). I'm not sure about you, but Seppo has acknowledged a difference between hinge propositions and propositions (in general).

If hinge propositions and propositions (in general) are in some respects the same, then it needs to be explained in what respects they are the same, without assuming that they must be the same because they are both propositions (in general). They are not both propositions (in general).

Quoting Banno

If hinge propositions were sufficiently different to other propositions so as not to be truth bearing, they would arguably no longer be propositions.

Yeah, as I said in my last post, and according to the article I linked to in my last post, hinge propositions are not propositions.

Quoting Banno

I'm not sure one can have a rule that is not a proposition.

This is a very anti-Wittgensteinian sentiment imo.

Quoting Banno

A rule presumably says how things should be, and how they should be is a possible state of affairs, and hence a proposition.

What "possible state of affairs" or "[way] things should be" is given by a rule of grammar, logic, or chess?

As Moyal-Sharrock (again) notes:

Quoting Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Wittgenstein's Hinge Certainty

When we learn rules, we do not learn content, but a technique, a skill, a mastery – how to proceed. To follow a rule is not to make a judgement, but to make a move.

Quoting Luke

If hinge propositions are different from propositions (in general), then hinge propositions are not propositions (in general).

Ah, I see. You are using an odd version of "different" - hence you have confused yourself.

Siamese are different from other cats, lets' say.

You want to conclude that Siamese are therefore not cats.

But I give in. Correcting your simple errors is both arduous and thankless.

For what it is worth, there may be a point in Moyal-Sharrock, but I see nothing to indicate you have understood it.

Where's @Sam26?

Quoting Banno

Siamese are different from other cats, lets' say.

You want to conclude that Siamese are therefore not cats.

It remains to be demonstrated that hinge propositions are of the same type as propositions in general.

Quoting Banno

Where's Sam26?

Yeah, where is he? He was also arguing that hinge propositions do not have a truth-value.

Reply to Luke :roll:


It remains to be demonstrated that siamese cats are of the same type as cats in general.

Quoting Banno

It remains to be demonstrated that siamese cats are of the same type as cats in general.

More like: It remains to be demonstrated that koala bears are of the same type as bears in general.

The argument being offered is akin to: All bears hibernate in the winter, therefore koala bears must hibernate in the winter. Otherwise, they wouldn't be called bears. ...Solid argument.

Quoting Luke

Yeah, where is he? He was also arguing that hinge propositions do not have a truth-value.

He was also arguing that propositions in general cannot be true unless they're known.

Reply to jamalrob Sorry, I haven't been feeling well, so it's difficult to post.

I'm just going to do a general post because I just don't have the energy to respond to all of you.

Much of the problem probably stems from the different ways we view beliefs. My contention is that beliefs can function quite apart from language (Wittgenstein's showing), i.e., we can observe beliefs in non-linguistic actions (even in animals). And, epistemological language-games (knowing, justification and truth), in terms of hinge's or bedrock beliefs, come later as language develops.

If we think of very primitive language-games (for e.g. W.'s example at the beginning of the PI), I think it follows, again, necessarily, that epistemology, and all the concepts involved (even truth), will not, and cannot obtain, until the conceptual framework develops. So, bedrock or hinge beliefs at their core, i.e., because of how they come about as part of the framework or backdrop of reality, have a status that excludes them from all epistemological talk (including truth - OC 204, 205, 206).

All epistemological talk (as arguments against my position), even truth, is always after the fact, we tend to bring it into the conversation as though its always been there. Even in young children, who learn what it means to know only later in their language talk, have these primitive beliefs long before they develop the concepts involved in epistemology.

Now some of you might argue that it doesn't matter that the concepts of justification and truth come later, that doesn't, in itself, negate the truth of these bedrock beliefs. If this, however, was true, then it would seem to follow that it wouldn't negate our use of justification either, or it wouldn't negate Moore's use of the concept know within the the context Moore is using the word.

One of the key features W. points out about Moorean propositions is that when seen against their negation (e.g. "I don't know this is a hand.") it's not clear what their sense is (OC 4). After all if we're not sure of the very backdrop of reality, then how can you be sure of the very words used to talk about such things (W.). It also seems clear to me that truth (as an epistemological function) has the same problem, viz., if Moore had said, as he held up his hand, "It's true that I have a hand," it would have the identical problem that Moore's use of know has, especially since knowing entails truth. Again, consider the negation, "It's not true that I have hands," this proposition also lacks sense in the same way.

One last point, W. pointed out through examples that Moore's use of "I know..." can have a sense in other settings or language-games, but this use is different from the use as a hinge, which is the use Moore is being criticized for. The same is true when speaking of bedrock or hinge beliefs when it comes to truth, in a bedrock setting, they are neither true nor false. However, in other settings or language-game, they can be true or false. I think to fail to acknowledge this is to fail to understand W. point about hinges, or as I like to refer to them, bedrock beliefs.

Reply to Sam26 Me too as it happens. No problem.

Reply to jamalrob Take care and get well.

Quoting Luke

That would depend on how they differ. You cannot just assume that they are the same in the respect of being the same.

Having a truth-value is an essential, characteristic trait of propositions. Just as having three sides is an essential, characteristic trait of triangles. Different types of triangles can and do differ from one another... just not in having three sides, since if they don't have three sides they aren't a triangle. And in exactly the same fashion, different types of propositions- hinge propositions, for instance- may differ from one another in various ways, but not in having a truth-value or not. If hinge propositions lack a truth-value, then they are not propositions, just as a triangle that didn't have three sides wouldn't be a triangle.

This is why this is frustrating, neither I nor anyone else should have to explicitly make such an argument.

Quoting Luke

Wittgenstein never called them "hinge propositions".

Right, he never uses the phrase "hinge propositions"... but, as I have already pointed out, and you either ignored and forgot, he does refer to them as "propositions". So, they have a truth-value. Because having a truth-value is to propositions what having three sides is to triangles.

So this is what this conversation is amounting to, me having to explicitly draw out tautologies and argue for trivialities, and re-iterate things you ignored or forgot. Not a very rewarding discussion from my perspective.

Quoting Luke

Apparently you have no interest in discussing whether or not hinge propositions are propositions, or in discussing Wittgenstein's work.

:yikes: Yikes, man, just yikes.

Quoting Banno

It remains to be demonstrated that siamese cats are of the same type as cats in general.

its sad that this isn't even an exaggeration or caricature...

Quoting Sam26

The same is true when speaking of bedrock or hinge beliefs when it comes to truth, in a bedrock setting, they are neither true nor false.

As stated this is misleading. It not not that they are neither true nor false, but rather that the question of their being true is not there from the beginning. When a baby takes its first steps it is either true or false that the floor or ground will support their weight, but such a consideration does not come into play.

200. Really "The proposition is either true or false" only means that it must be possible to decide for
or against it. But this does not say what the ground for such a decision is like.

Not all hinges should be regarded as the same. The hinge proposition that 12x12=144 is true. How could such propositions not be true? The student learning their times tables might even doubt it. They may ask you to justify it. And you can via demonstration. But, of course, not all mathematical propositions can be required to be justified in order to justify 12x12=144.

Quoting Fooloso4

As stated this is misleading. It not not that they are neither true nor false, but rather that the question of their being true is not there from the beginning. When a baby takes its first steps it is either true or false that the floor or ground will support their weight, but such a consideration does not come into play.

:up: Exactly, good analogy. Its absurd to think that there is no fact of the matter as to whether there is a hand here, or whether I've spent my life in close proximity to Earth. Of course there is some fact of the matter, and therefore a truth-value to the proposition that "here is a hand" or "I've spent my life in close proximity to the Earth"- either this is a hand, or it isn't, and either I have spent my life in close proximity to the Earth, or I haven't. One or the other is, necessarily, true, and the other false.

What distinguishes these propositions, and our beliefs in these propositions, is that they are taken to be true, rather than evaluated to be true, and that they are not doubted, rather than somehow being immune to doubt in and of themselves.

Quoting Fooloso4

Not all hinges should be regarded as the same. The hinge proposition that 12x12=144 is true. How could such propositions not be true?

Because the basic propositions of mathematics function like rules, grammatical rules, it's not a matter of them being true or false, generally speaking, no more than a rule of chess is true or false in it's background setting. Can they function as truths, yes, in certain settings/contexts language-games they can. You're failing to see the dual function of these bedrock statements.

Quoting Seppo

he does refer to them as "propositions

The fact that something can be stated as a proposition does not mean that all hinges are propositional, or should be analyzed in terms of propositions.

But that means I want to conceive it [certainty] as something that lies beyond being justified or
unjustified; as it were, as something animal.(OC 359)

I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination. (OC 475)

Quoting Sam26

Because the basic propositions of mathematics function like rules, grammatical rules, it's not a matter of them being true or false, generally speaking, no more than a rule of chess is true or false in it's background setting.

If mathematical propositions were neither true nor false then my bank account might be in big trouble, but then again, it might be a windfall when I deposit $100 and my balance goes from $200 to $2,000,000.

Reply to Fooloso4 The mathematical propositions you're referring to are not bedrock. Their use in terms of your bank account have nothing to do with what I'm am talking about, and definitely nothing to do with what W. is trying to communicate in OC.

Quoting Sam26

The mathematical propositions you're referring to are not bedrock. Their use in terms of your bank account have nothing to do with what I'm am talking about, and definitely nothing to do with what W. is trying to communicate in OC.

You seem to be confusing the mathematical propositions with their application. It is because the mathematical propositions 1+1=2, 100+100=200, 12x12=144 an so on are true that we can calculate a bank balance correctly.

340. We know, with the same certainty with which we believe any mathematical proposition

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn."

Quoting Fooloso4

You seem to be confusing the mathematical propositions with their application. It is because the mathematical propositions 1+1=2, 100+100=200, 12x12=144 an so on are true that we can calculate a bank balance correctly.

I don't learn to calculate because 1+1=2 is true, no more than I learn to move a bishop because it's true that bishops move diagonally. I act in accord with how others act when they calculate or move bishops. It has nothing to do with truth or falsity. Sure, in some language-games I can say that it's true that 1+1=2 or that it's true that bishops move diagonally, or that it's true that a given statement, which at times doesn't have a truth value (Moorean propositions), can at other times have a truth value. When we learn to calculate we simply learn a skill, like learning any language, i.e., we apply the grammatical rules that others use, and we learn to use them in ways that accord with particular language-games.

There is a certainty to mathematical propositions, but that certainty is a way of acting, not a certainty based on truth or falsity. What are the truths that language sits on? There are no prior linguistic truths, no more than there is something prior to the rule that bishops move diagonally. In a sense it's just an arbitrary grammatical move that we choose to use as part of the language-game of mathematics. It's a useful tool like any of our concepts.

You're right, there is a sense where they are incontestable, but that's not because they are true, it's because we choose to act with these propositions in ways that are incontestable - not because there is some intrinsic sense of truth. They have a bedrock function that's completely devoid of truth. They are arational beliefs, so they function apart from ratiocination in their bedrock role.

For myself I don't think of hinge-propositions as propositions, which is why they're referred to in a number of ways (bedrock propositions, basic beliefs, foundational beliefs, hinge certainties, etc). For me, and I believe for W. they are just very basic certainties or beliefs that lack a truth value or justification.

Quoting Seppo

Wittgenstein never called them "hinge propositions".
— Luke
Right, he never uses the phrase "hinge propositions"... but, as I have already pointed out, and you either ignored and forgot, he does refer to them as "propositions". So, they have a truth-value. Because having a truth-value is to propositions what having three sides is to triangles.

Moyal-Sharrock does not use the phrase "hinge proposition".

He talks of "hinges", and there is some small merit in the account he gives. @Luke is too gormless to articulate it, but it is there.

I disagree with it. I suggest that an analogy for this thread would be an argument between builders as to whether the hinge is part of the door or part of the wall. Of course, it is part of both - that's it's purpose. Is a hinge an "animal" thing or is it propositional? It's were these two come together.

So a hinge is propositional in that it is true; and "animal" in that it is part of the background against which language can occur.

Quoting Sam26

For myself I don't think of hinge-propositions as propositions,

Then best to stop referring to them as such. Better to call them just "hinges". Moyal-Sharrock uses "Hinge certainties", a small improvement over "Hinge propositions", although to my eye a certainty is propositional.

Quoting Sam26

I don't learn to calculate because 1+1=2 is true, no more than I learn to move a bishop because it's true that bishops move diagonally. I act in accord with how others act when they calculate or move bishops.

Those who know how to calculate have learned that it is true that 1+1=2. Those who know how to play chess have learned that it is true that bishops can only move diagonally.

Suppose you grew up in an isolated area where the few people who are around add 1+1=3. In your defense you might point out that this is how everyone calculates. It does not follow that if you live here 1+1=3 and if you live somewhere else 1+1=0.

It does not follow that if you have one stone in one hand and one in the other that you have three stones. You have this one in this hand and that one in the other, where is the third? If you claim that 1+1=1 then if you this one in this hand and that one in the other, do you hide one in order to get 1 from 1+1?

The baker's apprentice does not learn that 6+6=13 but that with a baker's dozen you get one free.

Quoting Sam26

When we learn to calculate we simply learn a skill

Part of that skill is learning 1+1 equals some number other than 2 false.

Quoting Sam26

There is a certainty to mathematical propositions, but that certainty is a way of acting, not a certainty based on truth or falsity.

654. "The multiplication '12x12', when carried out by people who know how to calculate, will in the great majority of cases give the result '144'." Nobody will contest this proposition, and naturally it is not a mathematical one. But has it got the certainty of the mathematical proposition?

It does not.

Quoting Banno

Then best to stop referring to them as such. Better to call them just "hinges". Moyal-Sharrock uses "Hinge certainties", a small improvement over "Hinge propositions", although to my eye a certainty is propositional.

I've referred to them in multiple ways, especially as bedrock beliefs.

For me, the language-game of certainty is wider in its scope. In particular, one's certainty expressed in acts apart from language. When I sweep the floor my actions show my certainty (the certainty of the existence of a broom and floor for e.g.), apart from any expression of that certainty. Language is something I add on to that basic certainty, it's a further linguistic action.

Quoting Fooloso4

The fact that something can be stated as a proposition does not mean that all hinges are propositional, or should be analyzed in terms of propositions.

Sure, in most contexts, its not necessarily the most helpful way to analyze them, and I think Banno was right when he remarked that the phrase "hinge proposition" was unfortunate in some ways. But in this context, its being asked/disputed whether they are truth-apt, and so the fact that hinge propositions are propositions, and that W refers to them as propositions, is directly relevant and hard to omit.

(and again, its just absurd on its face that they are not truth-apt, as if there is no truth-value to the proposition "here is a hand"- of course there is a truth-value, and its truth or falsity depends on whether there is a hand there or not... but as hinges, they are taken to be true, not evaluated or justified in the usual manner that we evaluate propositions and form our beliefs, in order that we can evaluate, justify, doubt, believe, etc other propositions/propositions in general)

Quoting Banno

Moyal-Sharrock uses "Hinge certainties", a small improvement over "Hinge propositions", although to my eye a certainty is propositional.

As is a belief. Which makes me wonder what motivates this denial that they are truth-apt, particularly since no one seems to be able to give a coherent argument for why we should doubt or deny that they have a truth-value, while simultaneously characterizing them as the sorts of things that are truth-apt (propositions, certainties, beliefs). I mean, where did this notion even come from?

Quoting Sam26

Language is something I add on to that basic certainty, it's a further linguistic action.

"Here is a floor, here is a broom" - this statement is an act that expresses the same certainty as sweeping the floor. Sweeping and stating are both acts that are grounded on hinges.

I don't think you would disagree with this. I'm just making it explicit.

Reply to Seppo Yep.

Quoting Seppo

But in this context, its being asked/disputed whether they are truth-apt, and so the fact that hinge propositions are propositions, and that W refers to them as propositions, is directly relevant and hard to omit.

As far as the question of truth, I have stated that they are true or false. Sam and I started arguing about this years ago, starting on another forum.

Of course hinge propositions are propositions! The question is whether all hinges should be regarded as propositional. Sam and I argued about this as well.

From another thread ten months back:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/523914

The best way to proceed, when dealing with quasi-technical words like ‘proposition’, may be to stipulate a definition and proceed with caution, making sure not to close off any substantive issues by definitional fiat. (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/)

It is not Moore's statements about his hand that function as a hinge. If Moore's propositions about his hands are hinges then what revolves around them? Most people do not know who Moore is. It makes little or no difference if he claimed to have hands. Not much hinges on the statements that any of us make about having hands.

It is the fact of our having hands around which things pivot. Our doing things with our hands, our holding tools and other things designed for hands. Even our statements about hands hinge on our having hands.

and:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/523937

Language games are an extension of man's acting in the world. Primitive hinges are pre-linguistic. They are not language games, they are an essential part of the form of life in which language games come to play a part. It is not that they cannot be doubted, it is simply that they are not.

A mistake that is frequently made is to treat hinges as if they are all the same. There are propositional hinges and pre-linguistic hinges. Empirical hinges and mathematical hinges.

Quoting Seppo

what motivates this denial that they are truth-apt,

Earlier I suggested it was creeping anti-realism. Those who think only justified propositions are true are obliged to think unjustified propositions are not true. The muddled notion of a hinge proposition leads them to the contradiction that hinges are not true.

If basic propositions are not true, they could not be used to justify anything.

And that should be the end of the issue.

There is an anti-realist reading of Wittgenstein, but I don't think it can be made consistent. The term "anti-realism" post-dates his writing on the topic, so he uses "idealism" and "realism", and explicitly states that neither is quite right (PI §402)

Quoting Fooloso4

The question is whether all hinges should be regarded as propositional.

That wasn't the question I was addressing in the post you quoted, which was my point. The question was whether hinge propositions are truth-apt, to which the fact that hinge propositions are propositions (and that W refers to them as such) was directly relevant.

I mean, I think the question of whether all epistemic hinges are propositional is a good and valid question... it simply wasn't the one I was discussing.

Quoting Seppo

The question was whether hinge propositions are truth-apt

I think my answer was clear. They are.

In my previous post to you:

Quoting Fooloso4

As far as the question of truth, I have stated that they are true or false.

And before that, in response to Sam:

Quoting Fooloso4

As stated this is misleading. It not not that they are neither true nor false, but rather that the question of their being true is not there from the beginning.

To which you responded:

Quoting Seppo

Exactly, good analogy.

Quoting Fooloso4

I think my answer was clear. They are.

We've clearly had a miscommunication or misunderstanding here, I wasn't saying it was unclear. You had said that "the question is whether all hinges should be regarded as propositional", and I pointed out that that wasn't the question I was talking about in the post you had quoted.

I also was agreeing that analyzing hinge propositions as propositions isn't necessarily a helpful way to frame the matter... except when, as in the discussion I was having with Luke (and previously Sam), the question is explicitly whether hinge propositions are propositional and therefore truth-apt.

Quoting Banno

"Here is a floor, here is a broom" - this statement is an act that expresses the same certainty as sweeping the floor. Sweeping and stating are both acts that are grounded on hinges.

I don't think you would disagree with this. I'm just making it explicit.

It depends on what you mean by grounded? Are you using grounded as a synonym for justification?

If I utter, "Here is a broom," to someone familiar with English they would probably say, "Ya, what's your point?" So, one way of seeing a context where such a statement would be useful, is in the context of teaching the word broom to someone who doesn't know English. We are justified or grounded in calling the object a broom, because that is part of the language-game associated with the concept. In other words, it's justification or grounding lies in linguistic training, or in its grammar.

All linguistics are depended on hinges or basic/bedrock beliefs, i.e., they grow out of these beliefs necessarily, so in this sense they are grounded in hinge's. However, I'm not sure if I would say that the hinge's justify their use, so, grounding here is a bit different than justification. This would get into the development of language against the backdrop of these basic beliefs. This relationship has to be seen as a kind of evolutionary process, which eventually leads to very sophisticated language-games, including the language-game of epistemology.

I wouldn't agree that sweeping the floor and the statement "Here is a floor," have the same certainty. They both express a certainty, that's true, but in different senses. My act of sweeping the floor shows a kind of certainty that's grounded in the world itself, so any act of knowing, and by extension justification and truth claims, is dependent on this backdrop. Moreover, any act of doubting is also dependent on this backdrop (contingent states-of-affairs). One can see the difference, as a function of certainty, in these two acts, if one compares the doubting of one (the act of sweeping) with the doubting of the other "Here is a floor." I don't see the language-game of doubting getting any footing as I sweep the floor, but I can see in certain contexts how I could doubt "This is a broom," viz., in contexts where I'm unsure of how to use the English word broom.

The act of sweeping the floor shows my certainty. It's not the kind of certainty that is justified in some sense, it's a certainty has it's footing in the very act itself. One could say they are almost one and the same thing.

So, would I disagree with your statements? It depends on a more careful assessment of what you mean.

Finally, as a side note, we must keep in mind that W. never finalized OC, so almost any dogmatic assessment of what he's saying is problematic. We don't know what would have been left in or out once edited. Although we can compare OC with his other writings and get a clearer picture of some passages.

Quoting Sam26

If I utter, "Here is a broom," to someone familiar with English they would probably say, "Ya, what's your point?" So, one way of seeing a context where such a statement would be useful, is in the context of teaching the word broom to someone who doesn't know English. We are justified or grounded in calling the object a broom, because that is part of the language-game associated with the concept. In other words, it's justification or grounding lies in linguistic training, or in its grammar.

I think you're missing an important point Sam. When you say "here is a broom", as a proposition, it is a proposal which may or may not be accepted. If someone has reason not to accept the proposal, then you asserting that there is a language-game, in which this object is called a broom, is not justification. In fact, that is exactly what the person is rejected, the language game in which the thing is called a broom. Therefore justification must consist of more than reference to a "language-game". The game itself, (calling this a broom) needs to be justified (reasons given). And that's where the problem is.

You cannot refer to the act of sweeping the floor, and say that it is necessary to call this a broom in order to be able to sweep the floor, because that is not true. Hence we have a separation between knowing-how and knowing-that. I can know how to sweep the floor without knowing that I am sweeping the floor.

The question now is whether there is a real distinction, in the means of justification, between these two types of knowledge. It appears like knowing how to sweep the floor is justified by the act. But a description of "sweeping the floor" is required for this justification, to compare the act with. So "knowing-how" can only be justified with "knowing-that". Obviously though, we cannot place "knowing-that" as more fundamental, or prior to "knowing-how", because we need to know how to use words, before we can make the required description.

Therefore we are left with the conclusion that knowing-how fundamentally cannot be justified, and this is simply a type of knowledge which exists without justification. Any attempt to demonstrate its justification will be a failure, because that justification does not exist. This is the problem we encounter with any attempt to justify knowing how to use language. Knowing how to use language cannot be justified because it is a type of knowledge which cannot be justified.

Instead of invoking an idea such as "grounding" which creates an image of some lessor form of justification, we ought to dispense with the idea of justification altogether. Instead, we might move toward the internal feelings of certitude and doubt, which influence our actions. Then we can see that these descriptive terms, which may be applicable toward "knowing-that", are inadequate for describing these feelings and motivations behind "knowing-how". For example, we commonly proceed with an activity when we still have a large degree of doubt as to whether the outcome will be a success. Furthermore, we employ strategies such as trial and error, in this case we act when we are very unsure.

So as much as certitude and doubt constitute descriptive features of knowing-how, they are not the best terms to employ, because I can still be said to know-how to sweep the floor, without being certain that there will be a successful outcome every time I try. In fact, it doesn't even make sense to ask me, when I pick up the broom, 'are you certain that you will get the floor swept?'. Likewise, it doesn't make sense to ask someone using language, 'are you certain that the other person will properly understand what you're saying when you open your mouth to speak?' That's why talking is a rapid back and forth, often consisting of many clarifications, so texting and email are not the best choice for any complicated discussion. Then we can see that this discussion of certitude and doubt, in relation to hinge propositions, is completely misguided, barking up the wrong tree, in an activity which will never get us anywhere, because it is instead irrelevant to the true nature of knowing how to use language.

Knowledge is a success word, it refers to a process that achieves its goal. What is that goal? The goal is simply the truth. So, an attack on knowledge is necessarily an attack on truth, and the process of arriving at truth. It follows by extension that W.'s attack on Moore's propositions, viz., that he doesn't know what he claims to know, is an attack on the process Moore uses to determine the truth. Therefore, if you agree that W. is correct in his assessment of Moore's propositions, i.e., that they are not knowledge claims, then it follows by necessity that they are not truth claims either.

Put in argument form it looks like the following:

(1) If knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then Moorean propositions are necessarily about truth claims.
(2) If Moorean propositions are about truth claims, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions.
(3) Hence, if knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions. (Hypothetical Syllogism)

It also follows from the above argument that Moorean propositions are not propositions at all, since they have no truth value (they are not truth-apt either) in Moore's context, i.e., they have no epistemological status. They are simply contingent arational bedrock beliefs based on our interactions between mind, body, and the world.

I would further make the claim that this argument is definitive. A denial is contradictory, and strips from W. anything of value, in terms of his attack on what Moore is claiming.

Quoting Sam26

(1) If knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then Moorean propositions are necessarily about truth claims.

Or about justification claims. Truth is only one aspect of knowledge claims, there is also justification. To claim to know some P isn't only to claim that P is true, it is also to claim that one has good and sufficient reasons for believing P to be true: i.e. that the belief is justified.

Quoting Sam26

(2) If Moorean propositions are about truth claims, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions.

Or on the justification of these propositions, as above.

Wittgenstein is saying that Moore's claim to know such propositions is incorrect, not because the claims aren't truth-apt, but because they are not justified. Because hinge propositions/beliefs/certainties are not justified. They are taken to be true, in order that we can justify propositions in general. In order that the door may swing, the hinge must hold firm.

Quoting Seppo

Or about justification claims. Truth is only one aspect of knowledge claims. Knowledge claims are also claims about justification.

Of course there about justification. Why do you think I say there about the process of arriving at truth. That is the justification process.

Quoting Seppo

Wittgenstein is saying that Moore's claim to know such propositions is incorrect, not because the claims aren't truth-apt, but because they are not justified.

It's not that justification stands alone in this process, apart from truth, the very act of justification is supposed to lead to the the goal of knowledge, viz. truth. You're stuck in a contradictory place. The goal of knowledge and the justification process, is, again, the truth of the claim; and here it's Moorean claims.

Knowledge claims are logically intertwined with justification and truth claims.

Quoting Sam26

Of course there about justification.

Well but that shipwrecks the above argument, since you argue that since knowledge is about truth, W's attack on Moore's claim to know is an attack on the truth of the claims.

But, since a claim to know isn't just a claim about truth, but also a claim about justification, the conclusion doesn't follow: instead of attacking the truth of the claims, W could also be attacking the justification of the claims.

Which is precisely what he's doing: Moore is incorrect to say he knows these propositions (according to W), not because they are not true (or cannot be true, even in principle), but because the belief in their truth isn't justified.

Reply to Seppo Don't spin my argument into what it isn't, since it's about justification and truth. Justification and truth are necessarily intertwined. What in the world do you think I mean by the process of arriving at truth if not justification? The process of arriving at truth, is the process of giving evidence or reasons, for example, to support the truth of the claim.

Reply to Sam26 I'm not "spinning your argument", your argument was unclear. But if by "arriving at truth" you meant justification, then the argument is just nakedly invalid, since (2) cannot follow, for the reason already mentioned: from the fact that W criticizes Moore's claim to know these propositions, we cannot infer that he is attacking the truth of the claims, because he could instead be attacking the justification, since claiming to know something entails both a claim that it is true and a claim that it is justified.

Either way, the argument you presented above doesn't work.

Quoting Sam26

Are you using grounded as a synonym for justification?

No.

Quoting Sam26

It also follows from the above argument that Moorean propositions are not propositions at all,

No, it doesn't, unless one also adopts an anti-realist view that is not found in Wittgenstein. Hence Reply to Seppo is correct. Conflating knowledge and truth is an error. Wittgenstein is saying that Moore's knowledge claimed are not incorrect because they are not true, but because they are unjustified.

It seems you have hidden the anti-realism in your reading in the notion of "arriving at the truth"... what could that be if not providing a justification? Arriving at a truth is not being true. Propositions can be true regardless of wether you have "arrived" at their truth.

Quoting Sam26

It also follows from the above argument that Moorean propositions are not propositions at all, since they have no truth value

Quoting Banno

No, it doesn't, unless one also adopts an anti-realist view that is not found in Wittgenstein. Hence ?Seppo is correct. Conflating knowledge and truth is an error. Wittgenstein is saying that Moore's knowledge claimed are not incorrect because they are not true, but because they are unjustified.

Moreover, the claim that they are not propositions directly contradicts Wittgenstein, who refers to them as "propositions" throughout OC. Maybe Sam doesn't think they are propositions, but evidently W did.

"I've never been to the moon" is a meaningful assertion, we all understand what the moon is, and what I am asserting/denying when I say this. "I have two hands" is a meaningful assertion, we know what hands are, and we understand what I am asserting when I say this.

Now, either I've been to the moon or I haven't. I either have two hands, or I do not. The assertion "I've never been to the moon" is true iff I've never been to the moon, and the assertion "I have two hands" is true iff I have two hands.

I hope you'll believe me when I tell you, I've never been to the moon, and I do have two hands. Both the assertions "I've never been to the moon" and "I have two hands" are true; they have a truth-value. So, they are propositions (propositions being defined as the sort of things that have a truth-value).

Now, Moore would say I know that I've never been to the moon, and that I have two hands. Wittgenstein, however, says I do not know these propositions. And to deny that I know these propositions, W could either be saying that the propositions are not true, or that I do not have good and sufficient reasons to believe them, or both; to know a proposition, that proposition must be true, and I must have good and sufficient reasons for it (it must be justified/warranted).

As above, they are propositions. Not only are they propositions, they're both true- I assure you, I've never been to the moon ("I've never been to the moon" is true), and I have two hands ("I have two hands" is true). And W is a reasonable guy, and he never gives any explicit indications he believes these claims are not true (or are not truth-apt; he refers to them as "propositions", after all), so its not unreasonable to conclude that he isn't disputing that they are truth-apt, or even that they're true.

He does, however, seem to be saying that we don't believe these things on the basis of a process of reasoning and evidence-gathering and weighing of reasons, but rather that we take them to be true, fundamentally or axiomatically; they are the rules of the game. In other words, we do not believe them on the basis of good and sufficient reasons: they are not justified or warranted. And we do not believe them on the basis of good and sufficient reasons, since those reasons would have to involve propositions that we are even more certain about. But what could those reasons look like? What am I more certain about, than the fact that I've never been to the moon? You might say that, if anything is true, its that I haven't been to the moon. That much is certain. So we believe and indeed are certain about these propositions, but not on the basis of good and sufficient reasons: they are not justified, even though they are true. The help form the basis on which we evaluate and justify other propositions.

But since they themselves cannot be justified, we cannot say we know them, according to Wittgenstein.

Quoting Seppo

Having a truth-value is an essential, characteristic trait of propositions. Just as having three sides is an essential, characteristic trait of triangles. Different types of triangles can and do differ from one another... just not in having three sides, since if they don't have three sides they aren't a triangle. And in exactly the same fashion, different types of propositions- hinge propositions, for instance- may differ from one another in various ways, but not in having a truth-value or not.

You've made a category error. Equilateral triangles and triangles (in general) are not two different types of triangle. Triangles (in general) are simply triangles. Likewise, propositions (in general) are not a type of proposition, and cats (in general) are not a type of cat. Therefore, hinge propositions and propositions (in general) are not two different types of proposition. This is why I said "it remains to be demonstrated that hinge propositions are of the same type as propositions in general."

An isosceles triangle may be a different type to a scalene, but a particular type of triangle cannot be different from triangles in general. Triangles in general are simply triangles, so if a particular "type" of triangle is different from triangles (in general) then it is not a triangle. Likewise, if hinge propositions are different from propositions in general then they are not propositions, and if siamese cats were different from cats in general then they would not be cats. You have acknowledged that hinge propositions are different from propositions in general, which implies your acknowledgement that hinge propositions are not propositions.

Even if this was not implied, you would still need to specify in what respects hinge propositions and propositions (in general) are the same, despite being different (as you have acknowledged), without merely presupposing that hinge propositions are propositions.

Quoting Seppo

If hinge propositions lack a truth-value, then they are not propositions, just as a triangle that didn't have three sides wouldn't be a triangle.

This is not a problem for me, because I agree that hinge propositions are not propositions. While you and Banno have been patting each other on the back so loudly that you cannot hear anyone else, this has been my point the entire time. It's sad that this isn't even an exaggeration or caricature.

Quoting Seppo

This is why this is frustrating, neither I nor anyone else should have to explicitly make such an argument.

You really shouldn't have. Not because it's so obvious, but because you've been oblivious to the possibility that "hinge proposition" could be a misnomer. Your repeated argument of "otherwise it wouldn't be a proposition" has been both futile and tone deaf.

Quoting Seppo

Not a very rewarding discussion from my perspective.

Join the club.

Quoting Seppo

Right, he never uses the phrase "hinge propositions"... but, as I have already pointed out, and you either ignored and forgot, he does refer to them as "propositions".

As Moyal-Sharrock points out in her book, Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty, Wittgenstein was "still in the process of determining whether a certain kind of statement is a proposition or not (e.g. OC 167)" while writing OC. Furthermore, it is "his translators who are more often than not responsible for its [the word "proposition"'s] appearance in his works."

Quoting Seppo

Which makes me wonder what motivates this denial that they are truth-apt, particularly since no one seems to be able to give a coherent argument for why we should doubt or deny that they have a truth-value, while simultaneously characterizing them as the sorts of things that are truth-apt (propositions, certainties, beliefs). I mean, where did this notion even come from?

As Moyal-Sharrock says in the same book, "For Wittgenstein, to be a proposition is to be bipolar; that is, to be susceptible of truth and falsity." Given that a hinge (qua hinge) cannot be false, then it is not susceptible of both truth and falsity, so it cannot be a proposition and neither can it be true. The same applies to grammatical and mathematical "propositions" (rules). As the author notes more generally: "nonpropositionality is attributed to any string of words that constitutes a rule or a norm".

Quoting Banno

Moyal-Sharrock does not use the phrase "hinge proposition".

He talks of "hinges"

She.

Quoting Fooloso4

I do not think it is the case that hinges are unknowable and lack truth value:

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn."

Certainly we know that 12x12=144 and that this is true.

Could it be false? (see my post to Seppo above regarding bipolarity)

It's a fair point, but I don't consider mathematical propositions to be the sort of hinge propositions that Wittgenstein is concerned with in the text. What motivates W's concern in OC is the "peculiar logical role" of Moore's statement "Here is a hand", which has the form of an empirical (i.e. bipolar) proposition, but which functions more like a mathematical or logical proposition:

Wittgenstein, OC:136. When Moore says he knows such and such, he is really enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions.

308. [...] we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is to be possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is one.

401. I want to say: propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language).[...]

I believe W would categorise mathematical propositions in the same or a similar class as logical propositions. Wittgenstein draws the distinction and compares mathematical/logical propositions (i.e. rules) with empirical propositions, for instance:

Wittgenstein, OC:350. "I know that that's a tree" is something a philosopher might say to demonstrate to himself or to someone else that he knows something that is not a mathematical or logical truth.[...] [W's italics, indicating that the philosopher does not technically (JTB) know this]

Quoting Seppo

The assertion "I've never been to the moon" is true iff I've never been to the moon, and the assertion "I have two hands" is true iff I have two hands.

But this is more or less a correspondence view of truth, if the aim is to understand what Wittgenstein was getting at in OC, what do you think using such a non-Wittgensteinean definition of truth brings to that project? Aren't you liable to end up with no less an incoherence, just from a different angle?

If we're expecting Wittgenstein to be consistent (which, with an unfinished work is not by any means a given) then surely we'd be best at least fitting the important concepts to Wittgenstein's own understanding of them.

Expecting Wittgenstein's view of certainty to be explicable in terms of, say, Davidson's understanding of truth seems quite a tall order.

Quoting Banno

No, it doesn't, unless one also adopts an anti-realist view that is not found in Wittgenstein. Hence ?Seppo is correct. Conflating knowledge and truth is an error. Wittgenstein is saying that Moore's knowledge claimed are not incorrect because they are not true, but because they are unjustified.

Where did I conflate knowledge with truth? The problem is in how you're interpreting what I'm saying, not that I'm conflating knowledge with truth.

A proposition standing alone, i.e., without justification, can have a value of either being true or false, it's a simple claim or belief. Thus, we say propositions are truth-apt. Knowledge on the other hand, refers to propositional claims that have been justified in some way (evidence or good reasons, for e.g.). In my argument I make this clear. At least it should be clear with a little thought.

Quoting Sam26

(1) If knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then Moorean propositions are necessarily about truth claims.
(2) If Moorean propositions are about truth claims, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions.
(3) Hence, if knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions. (Hypothetical Syllogism)

The first premise in my argument says, "knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth." The process of arriving at truth, is any process (I use the word process because there are many different ways of justifying a claim) that justifies that claim, belief, statement, or proposition. I've said this plenty of times, so to say I'm conflating the two, isn't so.

The force of this argument ends the discussion as far as I'm concerned. To deny that Wittgenstein's attack on knowing isn't an attack on justification and truth, fails, in my opinion, to understand the gist of what W. is arguing. Moreover, it fails to understand the implications of W. attack on Moore's claims to know.

Happy Hunting!

Quoting Luke

Could it be false? (see my post to Seppo above regarding bipolarity)

Could a mathematical proposition that is true be false? No. Could a mathematical proposition be false? Yes.

Quoting Luke

It's a fair point, but I don't consider mathematical propositions to be the sort of hinge propositions that Wittgenstein is concerned with in the text.

This much I know: he uses several examples of mathematical propositions in the text.

Quoting Luke

Wittgenstein draws the distinction and compares mathematical/logical propositions (i.e. rules) with empirical propositions, for instance:

350. "I know that that's a tree" ...

See his rejoinder:

352. "... And what is it supposed to be doing?"

As I understand it, Wittgenstein's concern is not with a theory of knowledge @banno @Seppo @Sam26. He is examining how ordinary (non-philosophical) claims of knowledge function in our language games and with one of his ongoing concerns, how philosophers confuse themselves:

31. The propositions which one comes back to again and again as if bewitched - these I should like
to expunge from philosophical language.
32. It's not a matter of Moore's knowing that there's a hand there, but rather we should not
understand him if he were to say "Of course I may be wrong about this." We should ask "What is it
like to make such a mistake as that?" - e.g. what's it like to discover that it was a mistake?
33. Thus we expunge the sentences that don't get us any further.

Moore might as well have waved his hand about or wiggled his fingers.

Quoting Sam26

Knowledge is a success word, it refers to a process that achieves its goal. What is that goal? The goal is simply the truth.

These two statements are fundamentally incompatible. If "knowledge is a success word", then success is its goal, and knowledge is reduced to justification. Then there is no necessity for a specific type of success called "truth". In fact, that truth is a form of success would need to be justified. This would require a purpose for truth, then truth would simply be a means to a further end. So truth cannot be treated as a form of success, nor can it be a form of justification, therefore "truth" and "justification" (as a type of success) must be distinct things.

The result of this is that if "truth" is proposed as a goal, and "justification" is the means toward this end, then the two must be classed separately. Truth, as a goal, is an object, and must be understood in relation to other goals. Justification, is an act, therefore the means to achieving a goal. The danger of misunderstanding, which we must avoid is that justification and success are more general than the particular object, truth, therefore an act of justification can be judged as successful without producing truth, if it is judged in relation to a goal other than truth. And the notion that truth actually is a goal still needs to be justified or the whole appeal to truth falls apart.

Quoting Fooloso4

As I understand it, Wittgenstein's concern is not with a theory of knowledge banno @Seppo @Sam26. He is examining how ordinary (non-philosophical) claims of knowledge function in our language games and with one of his ongoing concerns, how philosophers confuse themselves:

I agree with you on this point. Wittgenstein is not concerned with a theory of knowledge. And, he definitely believes that ordinary use (not to be confused with every utterance the ordinary man on the street makes), viz., a kind of general picture of how language is used in our ordinary forms of life, can keep us from philosophical (I'm using philosophical in a very broad sense, because even the man on the street is subject to these confusions) confusion.

Quoting Isaac

But this is more or less a correspondence view of truth

No, its the deflationary view of truth (i.e. "snow is white" is true iff snow is white), to which Wittgenstein's later views (i.e. post-Tractatus) are very sympathetic/consistent. But this is to miss the point in any case: the point is that not only are these claims/beliefs truth-apt, they are true, for all but the rarest cases (the handful of people who actually have been to the moon, and the people who don't have two hands, for whatever reason).

So, hinge propositions are propositions, they have a truth-value, and at least in the examples considered here, they are true.

Reply to Sam26 The argument is invalid, its conclusion doesn't follow (as has already been pointed out to you) and the "force" of an invalid argument can't really "end the discussion", obviously. If you want to end the discussion, you could venture a reply to my post here.

Quoting Seppo

Moore is incorrect to say he knows these propositions (according to W), not because they are not true (or cannot be true, even in principle), but because the belief in their truth isn't justified.

What, if anything, would justify such a clam?

Quoting Seppo

No, its the deflationary view of truth

Oh, that's not my understanding of the deflationary position at all (which, for me, is admittedly mostly from reading Ramsey). Do you have to hand any sources you use for yours? For me deflationary positions on truth cannot include the expression ""x" is true iff..." in any sense at all because 'true' cannot be a property of a proposition in a deflationary understanding. Truth not being properly a property of anything.

Quoting Seppo

this is to miss the point in any case: the point is that not only are these claims/beliefs truth-apt, they are true, for all but the rarest cases (the handful of people who actually have been to the moon, and the people who don't have two hands, for whatever reason).

Well, it is if that's the position on truth that Wittgenstein held, yes. As I say, I'm not sufficiently expert in his works to gainsay your assertion, but I always thought he took a more Ramseyan attitude to truth, which would impinge directly on the point of whether hinge propositions are 'true' as Wittgenstein understood the term. That's all I was saying.

If Wittgenstein did indeed understand 'true' to mean something such that ""I've never been to the moon" is true iff I've never been to the moon", then you're right, but I've never read anything to that effect so I'd be grateful for a pointer in the right direction.

Quoting Fooloso4

Could a mathematical proposition that is true be false? No. Could a mathematical proposition be false? Yes.

What I meant, wrt my post to Seppo regarding the bipolarity of propositions, was: is 12x12=144 susceptible of being false? If not, then it is not a proposition (in Wittgenstein’s view), and neither is it susceptible of being true.

Quoting Seppo

The argument is invalid, its conclusion doesn't follow (as has already been pointed out to you) and the "force" of an invalid argument can't really "end the discussion", obviously. If you want to end the discussion, you could venture a reply to my post here.

You apparently haven't studied logic. The argument is a hypothetical syllogism, which means that it's valid. What you have to demonstrate is that one of the premises is false, i.e., that it's not sound. So, the valid form of the argument is...

If p, then q.
If q, then r.
Therefore, if p, then r.

And, since you apparently don't know the difference between a valid deductive argument and an invalid one, I'm not even sure you're qualified to say whether the argument is good or not. And, by the way, your statement that the conclusion doesn't follow is also false, because given the premises, and the validity of the form of the argument, the conclusion follows necessarily. Again, the only way to defeat the argument is to show that at least one of the premises is false.

So, maybe you should rephrase your statements.

Quoting Isaac

If Wittgenstein did indeed understand 'true' to mean something such that ""I've never been to the moon" is true iff I've never been to the moon", then you're right, but I've never read anything to that effect so I'd be grateful for a pointer in the right direction.

Wittgenstein had a more pragmatic idea of truth. It was never outlined as some are doing in this thread. It was never, something is true, iff such and such (unless you're thinking in terms of the Tratatus), at least as a general rule. This would be anathema to W.'s later philosophy. For W. one looks at a variety of uses within the context of our everyday lives.

Quoting Luke

is 12x12=144 susceptible of being false? If so, then it is not a hinge.

Are you claiming that a hinge is not susceptible to being false? Or are you making a claim about mathematical hinges?

Is the concept (I am trying to avoid the term proposition and the confusion it may cause, independent of OC) of the earth revolving around the sun a hinge? Is it susceptible of being false? At one time the sun revolving around the earth was a hinge.

Reply to Sam26

Thanks. My reading of Wittgenstein is limited to PI and OC plus a few random papers, I acquired the impression I outlined to @Seppo only from a single lecture given by Cheryl Misak (placing Wittgenstein amongst the Cambridge pragmatists), so I didn't have a lot of textual support. I appreciate the guidance.

Quoting Fooloso4

Are you claiming that a hinge is not susceptible to being false? Or are you making a claim about mathematical hinges?

My immediate point was that the equation 12x12=144, and similar fundamental mathematical statements more generally, are not susceptible to being false. That this can also be extended to some empirical statements was W’s concern in OC.

Quoting Fooloso4

Is the concept (I am trying to avoid the term proposition and the confusion it may cause, independent of OC) of the earth revolving around the sun a hinge? Is it susceptible of being false? At one time the sun revolving around the earth was a hinge.

Yep, hinges can become propositions and propositions can become hinges. I think that today it is incontrovertible that the earth revolves around the sun, so it would be a hinge, unless or until some new scientific discovery were to change that.

Quoting Luke

Yep, hinges can become propositions and propositions can become hinges

This is an important point I tried to make earlier in the thread, and it's where a lot of confusion happens. Moore's propositions (not really propositions if they are hinges) for the most part are hinges, but W. gave e.g.s, where in some contexts, they are not hinges, and therefore propositions. It's this back and forth that causes many interpretative errors in my view.

Quoting Luke

I think that today it is incontrovertible that the earth revolves around the sun, so it would be a hinge ...

@Sam26

And therefore not a proposition? And that is because a proposition can be either true or false and a hinge can't? So at one time, the sun revolves around the earth was a hinge and not a proposition? But now it is not a hinge but a proposition?

Where does Wittgenstein make this distinction between hinges and propositions?

I think the distinction he makes is not between hinges and propositions, but between propositions that function as hinges and propositions that do not. That is not to say that all hinges are propositions, but to say that the statement "the earth revolves around the sun" is not a proposition because it is a hinge is to make restrictive demands on its usage.

It reminds me of a quip by Wittgenstein:

Philosophers use a language that is already deformed as though by shoes that are too tight.

Just as waking is made difficult in shoes that are too tight, thinking is made difficult by a language that is too restrictive.

Quoting Fooloso4

I think the distinction he makes is not between hinges and propositions, but between propositions that function as hinges and propositions that do not. That is not to say that all hinges are propositions, but to say that the statement "the earth revolves around the sun" is not a proposition because it is a hinge is to make restrictive demands on its usage.

I have no problem with that view. It's probably a better way to say it.

I think there are different kinds of hinges too. I believe that non-linguistic actions, like the action of opening a door, shows my belief in the door, my hands, objects, etc. It's the certainty of the background that is the springboard to epistemology and doubt.

Quoting Isaac

But this is more or less a correspondence view of truth, if the aim is to understand what Wittgenstein was getting at in OC, what do you think using such a non-Wittgensteinean definition of truth brings to that project?

Throughout On Certainty Wittgenstein takes great care to keep truth, certainty and knowledge seperate. Wittgenstein also takes care to treat truth as belonging to propositions, but certainty and belief and knowledge as relations between people and propositions.

Wittgenstein made explicit in the tractates that "the world is what is the case", that what is true is what is the case (for a start see 4.02 and thereafter, 4.06 and thereafter). Now this is not quite correspondence, there is some nuance, but it remains that the world is what makes certain statements true. I am not aware of anything in his subsequent writings that leads this approach into doubt; if you are, point us to them.

Again, the ani-realist reading of Wittgenstein is relatively recent, and I think unsupported by the text. It's folk reading their anti-realism into his writings.

Quoting Sam26

A proposition standing alone, i.e., without justification, can have a value of either being true or false, it's a simple claim or belief.

Where did you conflate truth and belief? Right there. A proposition standing alone can have a value of true or false; but it is not a claim or a belief until it enters into relation with the person claiming our believing.

"P is true" is a single-place predicate.

"A believes that P is true", "A claims that P is true","A is certain that P is true","A knows that P is true","A doubts that P is true" - these are all relations between proposition P and person A.

Anti-realism denies this.

Quoting Sam26

(1) If knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then Moorean propositions are necessarily about truth claims.
(2) If Moorean propositions are about truth claims, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions.

Again, this not only does not follow, but is not supported by the text. Wittgenstein's attack is very really against the justification of Moore's claim, not it's truth.

Here's one place he discusses the issue:

204. Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.
205. If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, not yet false.
206. If someone asked us "but is that true?" we might say "yes" to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say "I can't give you any grounds, but if you learn more you too will think the same."?
If this didn't come about, that would mean that he couldn't for example learn history.

While §205 might at a glance appear to give support to an anti-realist view, look at §206. It is clear the proposition is true, yet ungrounded. §205 says the grounding is neither true not false, §206 says that the corresponding proposition is [i]true[/I].

Going back to my previous analogy, it is pointless to argue whether the hinge is part of the door or part of the wall. (§205 is about that part of the hinge that is on the wall, §206 is about that part of the hinge that is on the door?)

But the hing can be expressed as a propositions and that proposition is true.

So please reconsider this:
Quoting Sam26

(2) If Moorean propositions are about truth claims, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions.

Do you really wish to claim that when Moore held up his hand and said "Here is a hand", that what he said was neither true nor false? That strikes me as absurd.

And again, if basic propositions are to ground our knowledge, then we must be able to set out their logical consequences. But if they have no truth value, they can have no place in any sort of deduction. They are useless.

Quoting Sam26

It was never, something is true, iff such and such (unless you're thinking in terms of the Tratatus), at least as a general rule. This would be anathema to W.'s later philosophy.

Oh, take care here. For example, Kenny lists as one one the elements common to the whole of Wittgenstein's work, including the Tractatus, that "a proposition is true or false in virtue of its relation to reality". The change is what that relation to reality consists in. He also lists "A proposition must be independent of the actual state of affairs that makes it true or false".

Your anti-realist reading is one of several, and a comparatively recent addition to the exegesis off Wittgenstein. I think it misguided.

@Isaac, what I have been saying here is not dependent on Davidson's T-sentence, if that is what you are thinking. Davison's considerations mostly take place within the scope of Wittgenstein, as it were. After all, T-sentence presuppose that the right hand side is understood.

Reply to Seppo The argument is valid but has a false premise.

Quoting Fooloso4

I think the distinction he makes is not between hinges and propositions, but between propositions that function as hinges and propositions that do not. That is not to say that all hinges are propositions, but to say that the statement "the earth revolves around the sun" is not a proposition because it is a hinge is to make restrictive demands on its usage.

Indeed, the term "hinge proposition" is the source of much of the confusion here.

A hinge is a way of acting in the world, it is "animal"; but it can also be stated. So Moore acts in such a way that it is beyond doubt that he has a hand. And "Here is a hand" is true.

And again, it is patently absurd to suppose that since the proposition "Here is a hand" presents a hinge, it is false[/I], or worse that it is not truth-apt. If it is beyond doubt, how could it be considered not to be true? As if something that is neither true nor false could yet be [i]beyond doubt... As if something could be certainly true and yet not truth-apt...? Or is the supposition that we can be certain that this is a hand and yet not certain that "this is a hand" is true?

Better to consider being a hinge as a role a proposition might play within given language game.

Quoting Banno

Where did you conflate truth and belief? Right there. A proposition standing alone can have a value of true or false; but it is not a claim or a belief until it enters into relation with the person claiming our believing.

I don't mean by "stand alone"' that it's not connected to a person. Why do you think I said it's a claim or belief? A claim or belief, is by definition, connected to a person. Claims and beliefs don't pop into thin air without people. What I mean by alone, is without justification. A mere belief without justification can be either true or false. It's not true, until there is some kind of justification involved. Otherwise it's just a simple claim or belief - an opinion.

Quoting Banno

Do you really wish to claim that when Moore held up his hand and said "Here is a hand", that what he said was neither true nor false? That strikes me as absurd.

Yes! Because that is what Moore is claiming, that he knows his statements are true. And, that is what W. is arguing against. What is it that Moore is claiming to know, if not the truth of his claims, and that he's justified in claiming they're true. The only thing that's absurd is keeping truth in Moore's statements while W. is saying he doesn't know what he thinks he knows. If he doesn't know that he has hands, then it necessarily follows that he doesn't know that they're true.

You have completely gutted Wittgenstein's arguments. Moreover, it is supported by the text. In fact, the quotes you took from OC don't support your position.

If my argument doesn't follow, then you have to demonstrate which of my premises are false, which you haven't done. Simply saying it doesn't follow, doesn't suffice.

Quoting Luke

...it is not a proposition (in Wittgenstein’s view), and neither is it susceptible of being true.

So your argument, if I understand it, concludes that 12 x 12 =144 is not true.

Hence why not reject your argument by reductio?

Reply to Banno I don't give two shits about anti-realists. My reading has nothing to do with anti-realists. Good God, have you lost your mind. Go talk to MU, maybe you'll get you mind back.

Here you express an anti-realist view:Quoting Sam26

A mere belief without justification can be either true or false. It's not true, until there is some kind of justification involved.

Then:Quoting Sam26

I don't give two shits about anti-realists.

Yeah, might have to leave you to it for a while. Cheers.


Edit: Had you instead said "it is not known to be true until there is some kind of justification" I would agree.

Quoting Sam26

Because that is what Moore is claiming, that he knows his statements are true. And, that is what W. is arguing against.

Wittgenstein is arguing that Moore uses the word "Know" in "I know I have a hand" incorrectly; that what he might instead have said is "I am certain that I have a hand".

"I know I have a hand" is incorrect because knowledge requires justification.

"I am certain that I have a hand" is correct because it is not a statement, the truth of which he could doubt.

In neither case is Wittgenstein entertaining the view that "Here is a hand" might be anything other than true.

Reply to Banno I don't recognize my thoughts as you repeat them back to me. This isn't going anywhere, so ya, we should move on.

Reply to Sam26 Sure. Time to clear the air.

Do you agree with Quoting Banno

Wittgenstein is arguing that Moore uses the word "Know" in "I know I have a hand" incorrectly; that what he might instead have said is "I am certain act I have a hand".

"I know I have a hand" is incorrect because knowledge requires justification.

"I am certain act I have a hand" is correct because it is not a statement, the truth of which he could doubt.

If so, then our difference is probably trivial. If not, then where and why?

Quoting Banno

So your argument, if I understand it, concludes that 12 x 12 =144 is not true.

Hence why not reject your argument by reductio?

Perhaps you could if it implied that 12 x 12 = 144 was false. But, according to Wittgenstein, the mathematical equation is nonpropositional, so it is neither true nor false.

But feel free to present an argument.

Quoting Luke

according to Wittgenstein, the mathematical equation is nonpropositional

Where does he say this?

Quoting Banno

Do you agree with
Wittgenstein is arguing that Moore uses the word "Know" in "I know I have a hand" incorrectly; that what he might instead have said is "I am certain act I have a hand".

Here is a quote from one of Moore's papers, A Defense of Common Sense (second paragraph of first page).

"The method I am going to use for stating it is this. I am going to begin by enunciating, under the heading (1), a whole long list of propositions, which may seem, at first sight, such obvious truisms as not to be worth stating: they are, in fact, a set of propositions, every one of which (in my own opinion) I know, with certainty, to be true."

He's arguing against Moore's use of the word know, as an epistemological use, and all that entails. For me, that entails justification and truth. Moreover, Moore is stating above, what he knows, viz., he knows these truisms are true with certainty. And, he does use the word certain, as you can see, but certainty has different uses. It can be used as a synonym for knowing as W. points out in OC 8. It can also be used to emphasize my subjective certainty, i.e., as an expression of my conviction. The use of the word know is often used like this too. Of course the use of the word know and certain when used to express the subjective, is not an epistemological use, or an objective use (that I have evidence or good reasons), it's akin to a feeling or maybe an intuition. One often confuses an expression of conviction (e.g., someone might say with emphasis, "I know I'm right." - this is just an expression of a subjective conviction) with actual knowledge, but knowledge, as you know, is established objectively (OC 14, 15).

There is a kind of certainty that is expressed in our actions, i.e., as we act within the world, our actions show our certainty. However, this use is similar to subjective certainty above, but without the use of language. I act with certainty as I open the door. My actions show that I'm certain there is a door, that I have hands, etc.

So, again, what is it that Moore knows? He's claiming to know, and also that he has the proper justification (a proof) for, the truth of his propositional claims.

Quoting Banno

"I know I have a hand" is incorrect because knowledge requires justification.

I agree, knowledge necessarily requires some justification. Again, ask yourself, what are we trying to justify if not the truth of Moore's claims? Note in OC 21 W. says that Moore's assertions are more like the concepts of a belief, a surmise, or be convinced of "...in that the statement "I know... can't be a mistake. And if that is so, then there can be an inference from such an utterance to the truth of an assertion." This is the point of Moore's claims, their truth. However, W. argues, it's as if Moore's claims, that aren't justified, force us to the truth, but how in the world do they do that if they aren't justified, i.e., how do we know their truth without justification? Moore's supposed propositions are akin to mere beliefs or mere claims, which maybe true, or they maybe false. The truth of the claims have not been established without justification, which is why they cannot be true or false, neither has been established. Moore's propositions have the potential to be true, but they also have the potential to be false; and without justification one way or the other, we just don't know, which is why they aren't truths. Moore claims they are truisms, but W. argues against this whole view of Moore's. Any claim without justification, is a claim that only has the potential to be true or false. It cannot be said to be true unless there is a justification for that truth.

There is much more to this, but I'd have to do more exegetical work.

Quoting Banno

Wittgenstein also takes care to treat truth as belonging to propositions, but certainty and belief and knowledge as relations between people and propositions.

Does he? I defer to your greater knowledge here, but your assertion really surprises me as it upturns a huge portions of my understanding of Wittgenstein's approach to truth (not to mention making a hash of Cheryl Misak's lecture).

Here's where I'm getting my understanding from, see if you can say where I'm going wrong.

Firstly in OC...

The big reveal for me is at 607, which I took to be a complete agreement with Ramsey's deflationary/pragmatist approach

607:A judge might even say "That is the truth - so far as a human being can know it." But what would this rider [Zusatz] achieve? ("beyond all reasonable doubt").

He seems, to me, to be quite clearly saying that 'so far as a human being can know it' adds nothing to 'truth', that the term already implies the limit of human ability, the asymptote to which our investigatory endeavours approach.

Then there's

The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference.

Again, placing truth relatively, not absolutely. Same with...

It is the truth only inasmuch as it is an unmoving foundation of his language-games

At 108, Wittgenstein answers a question about the objective truth of a proposition with a measure of our certainty about it.

108:"But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the moon?" If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon.

Then at 200, he seems abundantly clear (perhaps clearest of all)

200:Really "The proposition is either true or false" only means that it must be possible to decide for or against it. But this does not say what the ground for such a decision is like.

You said earlier that Wittgenstein was clear in PI that neither idealism nor realism were quite right, and yet you seem adamant that 'creeping anti-reslism' be kept out of Wittgensteinean exegesis. If we know Wittgenstein wasn't for full throated realism, then wouldn't 'creeping anti-realism' be exactly what we'd be looking for in finding his meaning?

Reply to Banno Another point to be made about propositions and Wittgenstein's hinge's, is that propositions, since they have the potential as claims or beliefs to be true or false, allow for doubt. The doubt arises because of the potential for the claim to be other than what we believe. This also extends to knowing, i.e., even if I'm justified in believing that x is true, there is still the possibility that I'm incorrect (W. says we often forget the phrase "I thought I knew." OC 12); and where this possibility doesn't exist, viz, where it is senseless to doubt, then we're dealing with hinge's.

Given the nature of propositions as claims or beliefs, viz., that they are truth-apt (can be true or false), this is what allows for doubt. If this possibility wasn't part of what we mean by proposition, then there would be no reason to doubt. What would the doubt be about? Other than you are wrong, the proposition isn't true, or you are wrong the proposition isn't false. This is the doorway to doubting someone's claim. There is much more to this though, because I think in some sense W. was trying to go beyond our conceptual framework. He was trying to come up with a conceptual framework that allowed him to talk about hinge's, and their role in our language-games. You can see this in his many descriptions of hinges, which gives rise to some of the disagreements about hinges. In one setting he seems to say one thing, in another setting something else. It's an unfinished and unpolished work. We need to keep this in mind.

There are hinges (bedrock beliefs) that are so fundamental to our lives that they are non-propositional arational beliefs. Why is this important? You've heard it many times from me and others, but it's important to this particular conversation, because these kinds of beliefs are outside the impetus for doubting. What does that mean? It means that the impetus for doubting, viz., that the belief can be true or false is removed, which is why hinges can't be doubted. Moreover, it's why hinges are neither true nor false. The language-game of doubting has no foothold, no grounding, nothing bedrock to support it. These kinds of bedrock beliefs are needed for our conceptual framework of knowing, doubting, true and false to even function as a part of our forms of life. To doubt such bedrock beliefs, is to doubt that which gives rise to doubting in the first place. If one doubted such beliefs, then as W. has said, one couldn't even be sure of the meaning of our words. Our conceptual framework (including the concepts of true and false) would simply fail to have meaning. The uses of our concepts are reality dependent, viz., they are dependent on the interactions, at a very basic level (in an animalistic sense), that allow for the structure of language, and the many kinds of language-games to evolve (again, the conceptual framework).

And, @Banno, this is a realist position, a pragmatic look at language from the framework of reality being "...all that is the case." There is no need to point to some ideal to understand what W. is saying, no need for the anti-realist position, in terms of understanding these points. However, one needs to be careful not to put W. into some particular theoretical box, be it realist or anti-realist, there are bits of both in his thinking, but W. does lean heavily in the realist direction, as do I, by the way.

Quoting Sam26

He's arguing against Moore's use of the word know, as an epistemological use, and all that entails.For me, that entails justification and truth.

Indeed, for you.

That is not how I, and others, read Wittgenstein. We read him, as pointed out, as saying that it is the justification that is faulty, not the truth value. And again, both Moore and Wittgenstein are certain that "Here is a hand" is true. What they are certain of is the truth of the proposition.

Consider the absurdity of someone being certain that "here is a hand" and yet not certain that "Here is a hand" [i]is true[/I].

I suppose that there might be something in what you are saying if we remove the quotes; that someone might be certain act this is a hand, and yet not certain that "This is a hand" is true - perhaps they do not speak English, or perhaps they do not speak any language. Is this part of your thinking?

I don't see this as more than trivial.

I am puzzled by your approach. More to come.

Quoting Banno

according to Wittgenstein, the mathematical equation is nonpropositional
— Luke

Where does he say this?

From Moyal-Sharrock's book again:

Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty, pp. 35-38:For Wittgenstein, to be a proposition is to be bipolar; that is, to be susceptible of truth and falsity. From the first, Wittgenstein’s technical concept of the proposition is internally related to bipolarity: ‘In order for a proposition [Satz] to be capable of being true it must also be capable of being false’ (NB 55); ‘Any proposition [Satz] can be negated’ (NB 21); ‘A proposition [Satz] must restrict reality to two alternatives’ (4.023) [...] In the thirties, Wittgenstein still upholds bipolarity: ‘In logic we talk of a proposition as that which is true or false, or as that which can be negated’ (AWL 101); ‘ “A proposition [Satz] is whatever can be true or false” means the same as “a proposition [Satz] is whatever can be denied” ’ (PG 123); ‘it is a part of the nature of what we call propositions [Satz] that they must be capable of being negated’ (PG 376). The ruling out of the possibility of falsity amounts to the ruling out of propositionality: ‘There is no such proposition as “Red is darker than pink”, because there is no proposition that negates it’ (AWL 208; my emphasis). In other words, so-called analytic and synthetic a priori propositions are not propositions.
The claim that propositions are essentially bipolar cannot be consistent with accommodating rules, tautologies or anything else which is necessarily true within the propositional fold.

[...]

G.E. Moore reports Wittgenstein as asserting both that a proposition ‘has a rainbow of meanings’ (MWL 107) and, of the ‘kind of “proposition” ’ that has traditionally been called ‘ “necessary”, as opposed to “contingent” ’, such as ‘mathematical propositions’,

...he sometimes said that they are not propositions at all...They are propositions of which the negation would be said to be, not merely false, but ‘impossible’, ‘unimaginable’, ‘unthinkable’ (expressions which [Wittgenstein] himself often used in speaking of them). They include not only the propositions of pure Mathematics, but also those of Deductive Logic, certain propositions which would usually be said to be propositions about colours, and an immense number of others. (MWL 60)

However Moore may have taken Wittgenstein’s ‘puzzling assertion that 3 + 3 = 6 (and all rules of deduction, similarly) is neither true nor false’ (MWL 80), there is no ambiguity about Wittgenstein’s ‘declaration’ and ‘insistence’ that mathematical ‘propositions’ are ‘rules’, indeed ‘rules of grammar’ (MWL 79) and that these ‘rules’ are ‘neither true nor false’ (MWL 62, 73). And this cannot be dismissed as ‘early Wittgenstein’. He is still making the same claim in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics:

There must be something wrong in our idea of the truth and falsity of our arithmetical propositions [Sätze]. (RFM, p. 90)

It is important to underline that Wittgenstein does not only attribute nonpropositionality to mathematical ‘propositions’ but, as he makes clear in the AWL passage above, and it is worth repeating, to any ‘proposition’ of which the negation would be said to be, not merely false, but ‘impossible’, ‘unimaginable’, ‘unthinkable’ and these

...include not only the propositions of pure Mathematics, but also those of Deductive Logic, certain propositions which would usually be said to be propositions about colours, and an immense number of others. (MWL 60)

Quoting Luke

By the same logic, if it is a proposition then it must be justifiable, dubitable and capable of being known, because that is just what a proposition is. Yet hinge propositions are none of these things.

That's because "hinge-propositions" are a neurological phenomenon. Meaning, the acceptance of a truth value, much like logical validity itself, does not imply the accurate conclusion of truth value one way or the other. But, that such an acceptance must take place before action, and thereby function, can be initiated.

Reply to Banno I could write much more, but I don't see any point. There are other philosophers who are expressing the same views or close to it, so it's not an interpretation that's absurd. Much of what I've argued for has not even been addressed.

Time for a break, at least I hope so, my mind sometimes works overtime on some of these arguments, and that gets tiring. Cheers from sunny Florida.

Quoting Garrett Travers

That's because "hinge-propositions" are a neurological phenomenon. Meaning, the acceptance of a truth value, much like logical validity itself, does not imply the accurate conclusion of truth value one way or the other. But, that such an acceptance must take place before action, and thereby function, can be initiated.

Sorry, but I don't really know what you're trying to say. Could you express it more plainly?

Quoting Luke

Sorry, but I don't really know what you're trying to say. Could you express it more plainly?

Yeah. Normal propositions in logic are written, and represent a simple argument that is either valid, or invalid based on certain straight forward rules. Hinge-propositions are not that at all. There propositions that emerge in thought, and are either accepted by us individually, or rejected. The acceptance or rejection of those propositions inform our behavior, and behavior is function.

Thus, if I'm to move to open a door to leave my home, I must have accepted the hinge proposition that the door will open in the first place to let me out. Furthermore, if I am leaving the house to go to whole-foods, the action is predicated on the belief of such a places existence. Does that make sense? That's what Witt's talking about.

Oddly, couple reasons why the concept kind of breaks down is because:

1. it has appropriated a clearly defined concept in logic that doesn't actually apply to itself
2. any given action one engages in is actually probably predicated on hundreds of these 'hinge-propositions' at base function

Quoting Sam26

There is a kind of certainty that is expressed in our actions, i.e., as we act within the world, our actions show our certainty. However, this use is similar to subjective certainty above, but without the use of language. I act with certainty as I open the door. My actions show that I'm certain there is a door, that I have hands, etc.

This is what I object to, as false, or unrealistic. Our actions do not demonstrate our certainty, and the randomness of an individual's mistakes shows this. Just because a person acts, and proves to be successful in that act, does not mean that the person was certain. In its extreme form, we have the practice of trial and error, in which a person acts without any degree of certainty, and there might still be success. So it is false to conclude that our actions express, or consistently demonstrate, certainty.

This is where justification enters the picture. Justification is what is used to demonstrate one's certainty. So, prior to an act for example, one might justify one's certainty concerning the act. But such justification is generally carried out with language, and that's where the problem lies, because using language, and justification itself, is an act. Therefore, there might not be certainty behind this act of justifying with the use of language. Now the problem, justification is an act designed to demonstrate certainty, but as an act, it is not necessarily based in certainty, so this undermines the concept of "justification" in a very fundamental way.

To resolve the issue one might propose hinge propositions, or other such propositions like self-evident truths, or analytic a priori, but none of these actually resolves the problem, in a way so as to remove the possibility of uncertainty. And the problem is that justification is fundamentally fallible because it is a human act which is not necessarily supported by certainty. This does not mean that it isn't most often supported by certainty, but it isn't always supported by certainty, therefore it is fallible. Because justification is fallible, it is necessary to distinguish between justified and true.

Reply to Luke

Given Wittgenstein's assumption that mathematics is a human construct, it follows that 1+1=2 is neither true nor false in that it not an empirical statement and so is outside the concept of truth as correspondence.

But is he going against his own admonition to just look? Does his theory of mathematics as well as modern number theory get in the way of what we actually do and say? For the ancient Greeks a number was not an abstraction but tells us how many of something. Saying how many is an empirical statement that is either true or false.

Quoting Fooloso4

Given Wittgenstein's assumption that mathematics is a human construct, it follows that 1+1=2 is neither true nor false in that it not an empirical statement and so is outside the concept of truth as correspondence.

But is he going against his own admonition to just look?

I believe W's view is that "1+1=2" is not counting, but is instead a rule or a preparation for counting, much like learning the meaning of a word is not actually using the word, but is instead a rule or preparation for the use of that word in a language-game. This also helps to explain why W considers it neither true nor false that the Paris metre is one metre long - because it is a rule or a preparation for making metric measurements and is not itself a measurement.

(And I still owe you a response to your previous post, which I am still considering)

Quoting Garrett Travers

Hinge-propositions are not that at all. There propositions that emerge in thought, and are either accepted by us individually, or rejected. The acceptance or rejection of those propositions inform our behavior, and behavior is function.

Not sure that I agree with this. Hinge "propositions" are not conscious judgments, so we do not accept/reject them in any rational or considered manner.

Quoting Garrett Travers

Thus, if I'm to move to open a door to leave my home, I must have accepted the hinge proposition that the door will open in the first place to let me out. Furthermore, if I am leaving the house to go to whole-foods, the action is predicated on the belief of such a places existence. Does that make sense?

Yes, this sounds more like it.

Quoting Luke

Not sure that I agree with this. Hinge "propositions" are not conscious judgments, so we do not accept/reject them in any rational or considered manner.

I genuinely don't know how you could have concluded that I asserted the opposite of what I specifically highlighted in the specific statement you quoted.

"There propositions that emerge in thought..."

They are conscious, but they are exclusively operating in the domain of your neural systems, not on paper in logical formality. They are the beliefs that proposals for behavior that one consideres rely upon to initiate that behavior.

Quoting Luke

Yes, this sounds more like it.

That's really all it is. Not that profound, and modern neuroscientific understandings of the actual process are astronomically more inspiring, enlightening, applicable, and relevant to human existence qua human existence.

Quoting Garrett Travers

They are conscious, but they are exclusively operating in the domain of your neural systems, not on paper in logical formality.

I don’t know what this means. They are conscious but they are not conscious?

Quoting Luke

I don’t know what this means. They are conscious but they are not conscious?

Hm, I can't imagine why that is appearing to you like that. No, I'm saying that formal logic is arranged in a systematic way, it's formulaic. Thought is organic and complex. A proposition in thought is not the samerigid process as the formality of actually doing logic on paper. Is that a bit more clear? The mind operates on very rapid analyses to induce action, it uses accepted or rejected facts of perceived reality to initiate those behaviors, it isn't formal. This is why using the term proposition is folly on Witt's part, it simply doesn't apply. It's better understood as: all human action is predicated on coherent networks of data for initiation.

Quoting Luke

I believe W's view is that "1+1=2" is not counting, but is instead a rule or a preparation for counting, much like learning the meaning of a word is not actually using the word, but is instead a rule or preparation for the use of that word in a language-game. This also helps to explain why W considers it neither true nor false that the Paris metre is one metre long - because it is a rule or a preparation for making metric measurements and is not itself a measurement.

There may be a point where I am no longer arguing about the correctness of your understanding of Wittgenstein and arguing against his understanding of arithmetic. This much seems to agree with what I said:

Put two apples on a bare table, see that no one comes near them and nothing shakes the table; now put another two apples on the table; now count the apples that are there. You have made an experiment; the result of the counting is probably 4. (We should present the result like this: when, in such-and-such circumstances, one puts first 2 apples and then another 2 on a table, mostly none disappear and none get added.) And analogous experiments can be carried out, with the same result, with all kinds of solid bodies.---This is how our children learn sums; for one makes them put down three beans and then another three beans and then count what is there. If the result at one time were 5, at another 7 (say because, as we should now say, one sometimes got added, and one sometimes vanished of itself), then the first thing we said would be that beans were no good for teaching sums. But if the same thing happened with sticks, fingers, lines and most other things, that would be the end of all sums.

(Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics)

The child does not learn a rule or preparation for counting, she learns how to count. If she learned correctly she not only affirms that it is true that there are 4 apples on the table, but by counting beans, sticks, fingers and other things she can affirm that it is true that 2 units + 2 units, or, in short, that 2+2=4.

Quoting Fooloso4

The child does not learn a rule or preparation for counting, she learns how to count. If she learned correctly she not only affirms that it is true that there are 4 apples on the table, but by counting beans, sticks, fingers and other things she can affirm that it is true that 2 units + 2 units, or, in short, that 2+2=4.

I don’t disagree with this, except to say that the expression “2+2=4” is not necessarily counting anything.

Reply to Fooloso4 It's clear the discussion here is not exegesis.

You are on the right track here. There are two related language games, one in which statements are justified empirical, another in which they are justified by mathematical proofs. The justifications are different; the use of "true" and "false" are to some extent common.

Quoting Luke

I don’t disagree with this, except to say that the expression “2+2=4” is not necessarily counting anything.

Right, it is an abstraction, but we can determine whether it is true or false by counting. The rule is derived from counting.

Reply to Fooloso4 I think you have it backwards. One needs to learn the rule first, and the meanings of the terms (“1”, “2”), before they can actually count anything. Just as one needs to learn how to use a word before they can (meaningfully) use it in a language game, or to learn how the pieces move before one can play chess.

Quoting Isaac

it upturns a huge portions of my understanding of Wittgenstein's approach to truth

That's a bit sad.

OC§607 sits in the context of a physicist giving evidence fr the boiling point of water... OC§202-620...

620. In particular circumstances one says "you can rely on this"; and this assurance may be justified or unjustified in everyday language, and it may also count as justified even when what was foretold does not occur. A language-game exists in which this assurance is employed.

It seems to me to be clearly about justification; and incidentally about the justification that such-and-such is true.

Let's look at the context:

196. Sure evidence is what we accept as sure, it is evidence that we go by in acting surely, acting without any doubt.?
What we call "a mistake" plays a quite special part in our language games, and so too does what we regard as certain evidence.
197. It would be nonsense to say that we regard something as sure evidence because it is certainly true.
198. Rather, we must first determine the role of deciding for or against a proposition.
199. The reason why the use of the expression "true or false" has something misleading about it is that it is like saying "it tallies with the facts or it doesn't", and the very thing that is in question is what "tallying" is here.
200. Really "The proposition is either true or false" only means that it must be possible to decide for or against it. But this does not say what the ground for such a decision is like.
201. Suppose someone were to ask: "Is it really right for us to rely on the evidence of our memory (or our senses) as we do?"

§196-7 are about evidence - justification. "it tallies with the facts or it doesn't" - what else could "tally with the facts" be if not a justification? But still, the facts are what is the case.

But to the point, there is nothing here about propositions that are neither true nor false.

Reading Wittgenstein as anti-realist is a post hoc back construct; the term was invented long after his demise. It is not the only, nor the main, reading.

The larger problem for the anti-realist reading is that it has Wittgenstein positing a positive metaphysical theory: that there are no facts of the matter until the evidence is shown; and this is at odds with his overall dismissal of such philosophical pretences.

And the problem with anti-realism per se is Fitch's paradox; “all truths are knowable” entails “all truths are known”. Of corse, there may be ways to make sense of this.

Quoting Sam26

Much of what I've argued for has not even been addressed.

Indeed, I've not the stomach for the argument. Reading Wittgenstein as anti-realist is a post hoc back construct; the term was invented long after his demise. It is not the only, nor the main, reading. But if you must, then so be it. See my reply to Isaac above.

Reply to Sam26

Ah, poor Sam. Yes, I've studied logic; intro to deductive logic was a prerequisite for a major in philosophy, and having some personal interest in the philosophy and foundations of logic I also took several intermediate/advanced courses.

So yes, I know exactly what I'm saying when I point out that your conclusion does not follow. Specifically, I pointed out that your premise contained an inference which doesn't follow, and I explained why. An explanation you refused to engage or rebut (I'm noticing a pattern here, in your refusal to meaningfully engage with what I say to you), preferring instead to speculate incorrectly about my background in logic (which, given your sloppy argument, is sort of an amusing pot/kettle situation).

But I get it, you can't really argue/defend your position and so I should stop badgering you to try. Fair enough, whatever floats your boat.

Quoting Isaac

Oh, that's not my understanding of the deflationary position at all (which, for me, is admittedly mostly from reading Ramsey). Do you have to hand any sources you use for yours?

Yes, "'P' is true iff P" (the classic example is "'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white") is the standard deflationary formulation. I linked the Stanford page for the deflationary theory, in that post (click on the word "deflationary").

Quoting Luke

One needs to learn the rule first,

What is the rule? How does one learn to count by being told that 1+1=2? What happens if they forget the rule? If they memorize the rule do they then need to be told that 1+1=1=3 and 2+1=3 and 1+2=3, for every combination of numbers?

What if a child does not accept the rule? Can it be demonstrated?

Quoting Luke

and the meanings of the terms (“1”, “2”), before they can actually count anything

It helps to learn the names of the numbers, but it is not necessary. A child can first learn that there are this many apples on the table, holding up the right number of fingers. We learn the meaning of "2" and "3" by counting, saying the name for the number that comes next. Correcting them when they get it wrong.

The multiplication table is a rule, but one does not need to memorize or consult the table in order to multiply. One need not remember the rule: 12x12=144 to figure it out.

But this may be getting us too far off track,

Reply to Seppo Geez, for someone who studied logic you didn't even know what a valid argument was. Yes, indeed, poor Seppo.

That depends.

Quoting Fooloso4

We learn the meaning of "2" and "3" by counting, saying the name for the number that comes next. Correcting them when they get it wrong.

But this is not really counting; it is teaching someone to count. Just like saying “this is red” to someone while exhibiting a red patch is, in many cases, not really using language in a language game, but teaching someone how to use the word “red”. Wittgenstein provides several examples in OC where stating rules like “this is a hand” in the course of an actual language game arrests the game, and why people might think you insane to say such things.

Nature does not teach us to call this “red”, this “a hand”, or this many “2”; these are arbitrary conventions.

I found the following example helpful in coming to understand the meaning of a hinge certainty, so I thought it might be helpful to others here:

Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty:...if I were to say to the cloakroom attendant as I hand him my token: ‘This is a token’, he would look at me nonplussed. That is not information for him, so why am I saying it? Nothing warrants my saying it. The information he requires in order to retrieve my coat is not that this is a token, but what the number on the token is. That this is a token is the ineffable hinge upon which his looking for the number on the token revolves. Our shared certainty that ‘this is a token’ can only show itself in our normal transaction with the token; it cannot qua certainty be meaningfully said. To say a hinge in an ordinary context is to suggest that it does not go without saying, that it needs support, grounding, context. To say a hinge within the language-game invariably arrests the game, produces a caesura, a hiatus in the game. Conversely, think of the fluidity of the game poised on its invisible hinges: I hand the attendant my token, he glances at the number on it and fetches my coat. Our foundational certainty is operative only in action, not in words. This is well conveyed by Wittgenstein’s image of a certainty which is like a taking hold or a grasp:

It is just like directly taking hold of something, as I take hold of my towel without having doubts. (OC 510)

And yet this direct taking-hold corresponds to a sureness, not to a knowing. (OC 511)

Moyal-Sharrock identifies this "sureness" with what Wittgenstein refers to as "objective certainty" (OC 194) (aka hinges), which Wittgenstein says is/are categorically different from knowledge (OC 308).

Reply to Banno

Thanks.

Quoting Banno

That's a bit sad.

I hope you mean 'sad' the way my generation uses the term, and not the way my children's generation do.

Quoting Banno

to the point, there is nothing here about propositions that are neither true nor false.

No, but that wasn't exactly what I was looking for. What i was looking for was evidence of Wittgenstein's understanding of truth being such that ""x" is true iff x". I'm not seeing it in what you've provided, but I'm not in a position to resolve the conflict between your exegesis and @Sam26's when he writes...

Quoting Sam26

Wittgenstein had a more pragmatic idea of truth. It was never outlined as some are doing in this thread. It was never, something is true, iff such and such (unless you're thinking in terms of the Tratatus),

Quoting Banno

Reading Wittgenstein as anti-realist is a post hoc back construct; the term was invented long after his demise. It is not the only, nor the main, reading.

I see. So how do you square, in Wittgenstein's conclusion that neither idealism nor realism were quite right, the bit where realism isn't quite right? He's not an anti-realist, he's not a realist. What is he?

Quoting Banno

And the problem with anti-realism per se is Fitch's paradox; “all truths are knowable” entails “all truths are known”. Of corse, there may be ways to make sense of this.

Indeed. One of which is Ramsey's deflationary position, which is something I thought Wittgenstein had some sympathy with. I've spent a lot of time with Ramsey, less so with Wittgenstein so don't have the knowledge to pick this apart. I'll defer to either your or Sam's better judgment, but at the moment it seems they are opposed...?

Quoting Seppo

Yes, "'P' is true iff P" (the classic example is "'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white") is the standard deflationary formulation.

From the SEP article you linked (my bolding)...

In the instances of schema (T) (sometimes called “Convention (T)”), the ‘X’ gets filled in with a name of the sentence that goes in for the ‘p’, making (T) a version of (ES). Tarski considered (T) to provide a criterion of adequacy for any theory of truth, thereby allowing that there could be more to say about truth than what the instances of the schema cover. Given that, together with the fact that he took the instances of (T) to be contingent, his theory does not qualify as deflationary.

Using the 'truth' of a belief as a criterion is non-deflationary, as is using a JTB definition of truth because both use truth as a property of some entity (a belief in this case), whereas deflationary positions hold that...

there is no property of being true at all, or, if there is one, it is of a certain kind, often called “thin” or “insubstantial”.

Notwithstanding those quotes, you've not provided the support for your view that later Wittgenstein was even of this sentential version of deflation and not the more eliminative Ramseyean version which would hold that there was no such property even in the insubstantial sense.

Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty:That this is a token is the ineffable hinge upon which his looking for the number on the token revolves.

This is where Wittgenstein goes wrong with the idea of hinges. The proposition that this is a token is completely irrelevant, and not even taken into consideration when the person retrieves the coat. The person reads the number and gets the coat without considering whether it is a token or not. You could steal someone else's coat by making something which looks like a token, but is a false token, and the attendant would not even notice. So Wittgenstein's representation of what appears like things we take for granted, as hinges of our activities, is inaccurate. We may make our actions without having any idea of any underlying assumptions, therefore no sense of certainty involved with such.

At some point, in retrospect, one might analyze the action and say something like the idea that this is a token must underlie the attendant's action. But this is just a proposition produced from analysis, and does not necessarily represent the attendant's action. It simply represents the mode of analysis, which is to proceed from the particular toward the more general. That this is a faulty method is evident from the appearance of infinite regress, or getting to the most general, which is extremely vague. So Wittgenstein proposes hinges instead. In reality though, the action is grounded in a multitude of judgements concerning the circumstances of the particular situation, so the appeal to such general propositions is to proceed in the wrong direction. The coat check attendant reads the number, notices the person's gender, perhaps remembers the person, etc., and the action cannot be reduced by analysis to being based in any hinges of any game, because its supported by a synthesis of all sorts of different ideas and associations which for some reason seem relevant to the person in the situation.

At the risk of being banned for responding to you, MU:

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

The proposition that this is a token is completely irrelevant, and not even taken into consideration when the person retrieves the coat. The person reads the number and gets the coat without considering whether it is a token or not. You could steal someone else's coat by making something which looks like a token, but is a false token, and the attendant would not even notice.

Being a token is irrelevant but being a false token is not?

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

At some point, in retrospect, one might analyze the action and say something like the idea that this is a token must underlie the attendant's action.

It is not the only certainty underlying the attendant’s actions, but one example. There are also the underlying certainties (e.g) that coat checking is a custom, that people own coats, that people have jobs, that there are other people, etc, etc. It’s unthinkable that any of these could be false or doubted. Of course it is imaginable, but not within the confines of our actual lives and what we know of life and society as it is today.

115. If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.

232. "We could doubt every single one of these facts, but we could not doubt them all."
Wouldn't it be more correct to say: "we do not doubt them all”. Our not doubting them all is simply our manner of judging, and therefore of acting.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

It simply represents the mode of analysis, which is to proceed from the particular toward the more general.

Nope.

I’m happy to discuss further if you think that my reading of Wittgenstein is incorrect, but not if you think that Wittgenstein himself is incorrect.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

its supported by a synthesis of all sorts of different ideas and associations which for some reason seem relevant to the person in the situation.

This is not inconsistent with what Wittgenstein says except that many of these certainties are shared and are not purely subjective.

Quoting Luke

Being a token is irrelevant but being a false token is not?

Neither is relevant to the attendant, who will get the coat either way. That's the point, the attendant doesn't even consider whether or not the thing is a token, only looking at the number. So it could just as easily be counterfeit.

Quoting Luke

It is not the only certainty underlying the attendant’s actions, but one example. There are also the underlying certainties (e.g) that coat checking is a custom, that people own coats, that people have jobs, that there are other people, etc, etc. It’s unthinkable that any of these could be false or doubted. Of course it is imaginable, but not within the confines of our actual lives and what we know of life and society as it is today.

These are not necessarily certainties for the attendant. The attendant is not necessarily certain that coat checking is a custom, or that people own coats, or have jobs. It is wrong to describe such things as certainties to the person performing the act. A monkey might be trained to do the coat check.

In an analysis we might say that such things are implied by the person's actions. Then we might be inclined to say the person must take them for granted when acting, so they must be certainties within the mind of the person taking the action. But this is false, because the person doesn't even think about such things when taking action. So the analysis is proceeding in the wrong direction, using false assumptions. And when we look at the true reality of human actions we see no need for anything like hinge propositions. The concept of hinge proposition is a product of the faulty analysis.

Quoting Luke

I’m happy to discuss further if you think that my reading of Wittgenstein is incorrect, but not if you think that Wittgenstein himself is incorrect.

Obviously I think Wittgenstein is incorrect, I've been saying that in all my participation in this thread. So if you're not ready to consider that possibility, then I don't think we should go any further with this.

Reply to Sam26
I think what you're wanting to say is that hinge propositions aren't truth apt? I think fdrake said they aren't necessarily propositions. They can be ways we behave to which propositions are secondary.

But where they really are propositions (the content of the utterance of a sentence), whether they're truth apt depends on your theory of truth.

If you had a theory that says fiat statements can't be truth apt because they can't be verified, or they don't correspond to anything in the world, or they're only true relative to a particular game, and not true elsewhere, then you could say that by that theory, they aren't truth apt.

Per the folk theory of truth that we can attach to common uses of "true" they are truth apt. They're declared true by the playing of the game. Or the playing consecrates them, something like that.

Quoting frank

I think what you're wanting to say is that hinge propositions aren't truth apt?

Actually I did say that. First, I don't think hinge-propositions are propositions, so they aren't truth apt. You have to read OC as Wittgenstein working through these ideas. So, it may appear that Wittgenstein is saying one thing, but later he may change it a bit. His thinking is developing as he writes.

I think of these hinges as bedrock beliefs. In the past I've talked about them as pre-linguistic, which I think fits with Moyal-Sharrock's animal beliefs. If you think of them as pre-linguistic, especially in terms of epistemology, then, I believe, it removes them from the concepts of knowing, justification, and truth. I'm thinking of beliefs in this context, not as propositions, but as acts apart from language, or more specifically, as acts apart from the language-games of epistemology. All of our accounts of epistemology are language dependent, but animal beliefs have no such dependency. Moreover, we are not free of these animal or bedrock beliefs. They are fixed as part of the background of reality, and the way we interact with reality.
So, much of this has to do with the way you think of beliefs, and only later, truth.

By the way, I've actually talked with one of the philosophers (Prichard). I sent him a paper I wrote just to get some feedback on some of my thoughts. Nothing I was proposing was out of the ordinary, i.e., it was in line with what other philosophers were saying. This doesn't mean that I'm right, but it does go to what some are saying in here, that my proposals are absurd, or that they don't follow.

Quoting Sam26

First, I don't think hinge-propositions are propositions

Yes. So you see language use as secondary to actions that are the real hinges. :up:

Reply to frank Yes, language is in some sense is a function of these very basic beliefs; and it's these very basic beliefs that are the hinges that W. is referring to. The concepts of knowing, and therefore, justification and truth, are later in our development or evolution. You can think of these bedrock beliefs as non-linguistic, and that removes them from the concepts of knowing, justification, and truth. It's when they are incorporated into language that the confusion starts, because we fail to see where and how they originate. They are foundational or bedrock to all the language-games of ratiocination, which is why Moore fails when using the concept of know.

Reply to Sam26
I see. Yes, at base, the nervous system doesn't deal with truth because there's no falsehood at the level of reflex.

Falsehood is a resident of passive reflection, and so is secondary.

Reply to frank I think there is a causal or correlatory relationship between the world and our sensory experiences that produce these beliefs and/or mind states. I haven't thought much of it beyond this.

Quoting Sam26

His thinking is developing as he writes.

I don't think it is a matter of development but of looking at things in different ways, giving different examples, reminders of what we say and do, so as to obtain an overview, an übersichtlichen darstellung, a surveyable or perspicuous representation or overview:

A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. - Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.
The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?)

(PI 122)

Hinges should be viewed in the larger context of the problem of knowledge, doubt, and certainty, which, in turn, are viewed in the context of a form of life, as a matter of practice rather than theory.
Our actions occur along a continuum from the prelinguistic to the linguistic. Hinges do not function exclusively linguistically or prelingistically.

I have not been able to find anywhere where Wittgenstein talks about bedrock beliefs.
In PI he says:

Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do."

(217)

This was in regard to following rules.

What this means is simply that we can dig no further to uncover some underlying principle or foundation or stable unshakable ground

The difficulty is to realise the groundlessness of our believing.

(OC 166)

Hinges are not timeless or immutable. It is not that they stand free of doubt, but that we need to look at all that hangs on and revolves around them. We cannot call one into doubt without calling a great deal more into doubt. Hinges have their place within a system.

Does your picture of "very basic beliefs" correspond to what prelinguistic humans believed and practiced? How do you know? Did they believe certain objects and animals possess powers? Did totems exist in prelinguistic groups? Were there prelinguistic ritual dances, such as those before the hunt? Burial practices? In each case such beliefs are foundational, but not beliefs we accept.

Quoting Sam26

I think there is a causal or correlatory relationship between the world and our sensory experiences that produce these beliefs and/or mind states. I haven't thought much of it beyond this.

In terms of behavior, we aren't blank slates. Biology would suggest that some hinge propositions are genetic in origin.

But we can't reasonably say that sense data arranges itself into ideas. Neuroscience suggests that there is some sort of ideation ROM that we bootstrap up from as we leave infancy and begin to think rationally. From there, truth becomes significant because we know what falsehood is. We hypothesized and we were wrong. We were told there's a Santa and that was wrong. It's out of this that truth means something, although logic says that truth is very primal, too basic to even define.

But at this point, we turn and notice that all I've just said rests upon untestable hinge propositions. Part of the connotation of "true" is that it's something solid I can push off from. To the extent that I'm confidently pushing off from hinges as I speak, I can say they qualify as true.

I guess my answer would be: yes and no. Depends on how you look at it.

Quoting frank

In terms of behavior, we aren't blank slates. Biology would suggest that some hinge propositions are genetic in origin.

No doubt we aren't blank slates, but I don't see how hinge beliefs (I don't see them as propositions. However, since OC starts out addressing Moore, and Moore's claim that they are propositions, that's how W. talks about them.) could be genetic, but genetics sure influences many of these basic or bedrock beliefs. In other words, my position is that hinge's come into existence as beliefs, based on our sensory interactions with the world around us. So, at the very least, there is some correlation between genetics and such beliefs. However, if you are saying that the belief itself is genetic, that seems very problematic.

Quoting frank

But at this point, we turn and notice that all I've just said rests upon untestable hinge propositions. Part of the connotation of "true" is that it's something solid I can push off from. To the extent that I'm confidently pushing off from hinges as I speak, I can say they qualify as true.

I think of hinges, when put into statement form, (as opposed to non-linguistic hinge beliefs) as contingent rules of reality, like a rule of chess. As such, there is no need for testability, they give testability it's very grounding. And, this grounding supports the very concepts of epistemological language (knowing, justification, and truth). The rule in chess that bishops move diagonally, gives the grounding for us to say, in some contexts, that it's true that bishops move diagonally.

What we push off of is what allows for the concept of truth to take root.

Reply to Sam26 I see what you're saying.

Quoting Fooloso4

I don't think it is a matter of development but of looking at things in different ways, giving different examples, reminders of what we say and do, so as to obtain an overview, an übersichtlichen darstellung, a surveyable or perspicuous representation or overview:

My point is that W. never finished developing his ideas in OC. In one passage (I forget the number), he expresses some frustration that he won't have time to finish his thoughts in OC.

Quoting Fooloso4

Hinges should be viewed in the larger context of the problem of knowledge, doubt, and certainty, which, in turn, are viewed in the context of a form of life, as a matter of practice rather than theory.
Our actions occur along a continuum from the prelinguistic to the linguistic. Hinges do not function exclusively linguistically or prelingistically.

I have not been able to find anywhere where Wittgenstein talks about bedrock beliefs.

I agree with all of this. And, you're right he doesn't specifically talk about bedrock beliefs, but I think it's one way of expressing what hinges are, from the prelinguistic to the linguistic. They are just very basic kinds of beliefs within our forms of life.

Quoting Fooloso4

Does your picture of "very basic beliefs" correspond to what prelinguistic humans believed and practiced? How do you know? Did they believe certain objects and animals possess powers? Did totems exist in prelinguistic groups? Were there prelinguistic ritual dances, such as those before the hunt? Burial practices? In each case such beliefs are foundational, but not beliefs we accept.

There are many different kinds of hinges or basic beliefs, but there are those that are common to all of us, prelinguistic as well as linguistic. When primitive man or modern man interacts within his environment, they show their basic beliefs by what they do, or the way they act. So, if a primitive man picks up a stone, that shows that he or she believes something about his or her environment, something fundamental, something very basic. For example, it shows that they believe there is a stone there, that they have hands, that they are a body distinct from other bodies or objects. These kinds of hinges, for the most part don't change. On the other hand, there are other kinds of hinges that we accept as certain (not epistemologically certain, but a certainty that's reflected in our actions), and they are expressed in other ways, maybe ritual dances, praying, that the Earth is flat, etc. These kinds of hinges change over time, and they are culturally dependent, and also dependent on our current fund of knowledge.

So, yes, there are hinges that some people accept as basic, but others do not. Religious people act as though belief in God is a hinge, but others reject this idea, so it's not a hinge for them. What we can ask, is, does it make sense to doubt what others take to be a hinge? And if it makes sense to doubt what's normally considered a hinge, then that belief is no longer a hinge (e.g. the Earth is flat).

There is obviously much more to this, and I'm sure I left some important ideas out, but this is basically how I think of hinges.

Quoting Sam26

When primitive man or modern man interacts within his environment, they show their basic beliefs by what they do, or the way they act. So, if a primitive man picks up a stone, that shows that he or she believes something about his or her environment, something fundamental, something very basic. For example, it shows that they believe there is a stone there, that they have hands, that they are a body distinct from other bodies or objects. These kinds of hinges, for the most part don't change. On the other hand, there are other kinds of hinges that we accept as certain (not epistemologically certain, but a certainty that's reflected in our actions), and they are expressed in other ways, maybe ritual dances, praying, that the Earth is flat, etc. These kinds of hinges change over time, and they are culturally dependent, and also dependent on our current fund of knowledge.

What you, many others in this thread, and Wittgenstein himself, fail to recognize, is that doubt and uncertainty is what underlies human actions, as inherent within them, essential to them, and impossible to remove. Certainty is just an illusion we create when we're asked to justify our actions. But as Wittgenstein demonstrates, such justification cannot be applied to the foundation. Therefore, uncertainty, the possibility of mistake, and the consequent risk management, is what truly shapes and forms our actions, at the most fundamental level. You might say that we have a very deeply seated fear of failure, because it manifests as pain.

This is simply a feature of the reality of the human being's presence in a temporal reality. The future is indeterminate, and the human being is inadequate in its capacity to bend the future, to suit its will. This manifests as the fallibility of human knowledge. To represent human actions as based in some underlying certainty about the future, rather than as based in an underlying uncertainty, produces a false attitude of certitude, by those who represent actions in this way, and this is conducive to grave mistake, and the consequent suffering.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

What you, many others in this thread, and Wittgenstein himself, fail to recognize, is that doubt and uncertainty is what underlies human actions, as inherent within them, essential to them, and impossible to remove.

Then you typing and submitting your post is evidence of your underlying uncertainty? You seem certain of what you say, but if your admitting that your certainty of what you are saying is an illusion and that you know its an illusion I would have expected a lot less of telling others what they fail to realize (as if they are wrong and you are right) and more humility on your part. Are you certain that certainty is just an illusion?

Here's an example of what I am saying. We can represent the certainty as the basis for the habitual activity. I know that the act X will have the outcome of Y, so act X for the purpose of Y becomes habituated, and I tend to proceed with very little doubt. The light turns green, I walk across the street, for instance.

However, before I cross the street I glance around to see if anyone is running the red. This is "the check", which is a manifestation of the fundamental uncertainty. The check has to be more fundamental than the certainty, in order that it might at any time overrule the certainty. The habit can be broken. If the check is allowed to be overruled by the certainty, then eventually I will step in front of an errant vehicle.

One might model the certainty as more fundamental than the uncertainty, as is the case when hinge propositions are modeled as free from the tendency to doubt, but this is a false model. It is proven false, because those who do not perform the check get the Darwin award, and this trait of relinquishing the check, is not maintained. So the uncertainty of the check is supported by evolution, and its overruling the certainty of habit, as a more fundamental aspect of living beings is verified in this way. And the check as an uncertainty based activity cannot be modeled as a habit because it is different (habit being similar) in every field of activity yet common to them all.

Quoting Harry Hindu

Then you typing and submitting your post is evidence of your underlying uncertainty?

Right, the reason for posting here is to submit my ideas to the criticisms of others. My ideas are forever evolving, because of my uncertainty, and the role that others play in changing my mind.

Quoting Harry Hindu

You seem certain of what you say, but if your admitting that your certainty of what you are saying is an illusion and that you know its an illusion I would have expected a lot less of telling others what they fail to realize (as if they are wrong and you are right) and more humility on your part. Are you certain that certainty is just an illusion?

To state something as a proposition, is to make a proposal. It does not imply 'I am certain of what I wrote'. This is your misinterpretation, derived from, (and a very good demonstration of), that faulty notion that actions are based in certainty. That you interpret my proposal as an indication that I am certain of the truth of what I write, shows that you are committed to this faulty way of understanding. I write in my habitual way, but this does not mean that I am not ready, willing, and actively looking for reasons, to break the habit if necessary. I walk across the street right after the light turns green, and it appears like I am certain in that act, if you do not notice the more subtle act of me looking around before crossing. In the case of writing, the more subtle act occurs within my mind, as thinking, so it's even more difficult to notice.

Quoting Sam26

My point is that W. never finished developing his ideas in OC.

I agree, but my point is that more generally we should not read the later Wittgenstein in the same way we read someone whose work leads from premise to conclusion.

Quoting Sam26

So, if a primitive man picks up a stone, that shows that he or she believes something about his or her environment, something fundamental, something very basic.

This is something that we should not assume. We should not impose the way we look at things on him. We do not know how he might see the world on him. He might regard all things as animistic. The way he sees a stone at a basic, fundamental level may be very different than your own.

Quoting Sam26

For example, it shows that they believe there is a stone there, that they have hands, that they are a body distinct from other bodies or objects.

I don't want to get into the quagmire that is the concept of 'belief'. I would say he sees a stone there, not that he believes there is a stone there or that he believes he sees a stone there. He does not believe he has hands, he uses them. Neither certainty or doubt play a part. Lack of doubt does not mean certainty, but rather that to doubt in such cases does not make sense. There is here no basis for doubt.

Quoting Fooloso4

I agree, but my point is that more generally we should not read the later Wittgenstein in the same way we read someone whose work leads from premise to conclusion.

I agree, but that doesn't mean you can't formulate an argument based on some of his ideas. Although doing that may distort his ideas.

We disagree about the nature of a belief. And ya, I'm not going to go over this ground again, at least not right now.

Quoting Sam26

We disagree about the nature of a belief.

A few remarks from OC:

478. Does a child believe that milk exists? Or does it know that milk exists? Does a cat know that a mouse exists?

Some, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, for example, take this to mean we should consider these things to be a matter of belief rather than knowledge. But:

90. "I know" has a primitive meaning similar to and related to "I see" ("wissen", "videre") ... "I know" is supposed to express a relation, not between me and the sense of a proposition (like "I believe") but between me and a fact. So that the fact is taken into my consciousness.

Wittgenstein's point here is not simply etymological. The relationship is between the child and the milk It sees the milk and reaches for it. The cat sees the mouse and chases it.

Clearly Wittgenstein is connecting beliefs and propositions here. Does he distinguish between propositional beliefs and non-propositional beliefs elsewhere?

424 ... One says too, "I don't believe it, I know it". And one might also put it like this (for example): "That is a tree. And that's not just surmise."

But much of this is bound to be misunderstood unless we keep the following in mind:

482. It is as if "I know" did not tolerate a metaphysical emphasis.

Quoting Fooloso4

Clearly Wittgenstein is connecting beliefs and propositions here. Does he distinguish between propositional beliefs and non-propositional beliefs elsewhere?

"People have killed animals since the earliest times, used the fur, bone etc. etc. for various purposes; they have counted definitely on finding similar parts in any similar beast.

"They have always learnt from experience; and we can see from their actions that they believe certain things definitely, whether they express their belief or not [my emphasis] (OC 284)."

This is about as clear as it gets. These kinds of beliefs are not tied to propositions and/or statements, they are primitive, animal if you will. They are belief states revealed in a non-propositional way. We show these beliefs in innumerable ways. They are non-linguistic beliefs.

All beliefs are expressed in acts of one kind or another, i.e., either in linguistic and/or nonlinguistic acts.

Wittgenstein continues this thinking, viz., that beliefs are shown in our actions (OC 285). I interpret this to mean that our actions reflect what we believe apart from statements/propositions.

Reply to Sam26

If one limits propositions to spoken statements then the belief that we will find the parts of animals is not propositional if it is not expressed. But is this what Wittgenstein means by a proposition?

In the Tractatus he says:

4: A thought is a proposition with a sense.

4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality.
The proposition is a model of the reality as we think (denken) it is.

4.1: Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.

Although Wittgenstein later rejected the idea that propositions are built from simple elements,
he not reject the idea that propositions are pictures of reality that need not be expressed in words.

Quoting Sam26

This is about as clear as it gets. These kinds of beliefs are not tied to propositions and/or statements, they are primitive, animal if you will. They are belief states revealed in a non-propositional way. We show these beliefs in innumerable ways. They are non-linguistic beliefs.

All beliefs are expressed in acts of one kind or another, i.e., either in linguistic and/or nonlinguistic acts.

I think you misunderstand the nature of "belief". There is always some degree of doubt, insecurity, uncertainty, underlying all belief, inherent within belief, and this feature allows us to adapt to the unknown aspects of an ever changing environment. The more primitive the belief, the greater the degree of uncertainty, as is evident by the capacity of base instincts such as 'fight or flight', and superstitions, to overpower fundamental rational beliefs.

To represent "belief" as a sort of foundational certainty which excludes an individual's inclination to assess the possibility of mistake, is simply a false representation of belief. In reality, the possibility that I am wrong, therefore uncertainty, is the foundational aspect of belief, which we attempt to overcome through training. Certainty is acquired, while uncertainty is instinctual, and the acquired will never completely suppress the instinctual, as it is structured on top of that foundation.

Quoting Fooloso4

If one limits propositions to spoken statements then the belief that we will find the parts of animals is not propositional if it is not expressed. But is this what Wittgenstein means by a proposition?

In W. later philosophy propositions are functions of use, rule following, and forms of life; and, the definition of a proposition shouldn't be seen as some one essence that governs what we mean by all propositions. The definition of a proposition should be seen under the rubric of family resemblance. To demonstrate this it would take a separate thread, and an in depth analysis of the nature of a proposition in the T., and W.'s criticisms of how a proposition functions in the PI and in OC. And, not only how his view changed, but specifically, what remains of his early thinking, and, of course, what was discarded.

Finally, there is not going to be some final correct interpretation of W. which we can all agree is what W. meant by this or that. Wittgenstein's writing style, in particular, doesn't lend itself to easy interpretations. This doesn't mean that we can't agree on W. general themes (although, even here there is disagreement, to some extent), it just means that some of these difficulties will never be resolved.

Quoting Sam26

... the definition of a proposition shouldn't be seen as some one essence that governs what we mean by all propositions.

But you seem to be doing exactly what you council against doing. You restrict the term to what is expressed in words. You say, for example:

Quoting Sam26

They are belief states revealed in a non-propositional way ... They are non-linguistic beliefs

Unless you can show that Wittgenstein limited propositions to verbal statements, your distinction between beliefs and propositions does not hold.

In any case, what I was pointing to in OC 90 was the distinction he makes between a primitive meaning of knowing (related to "I see" "wissen", "videre") and believing. The difference between knowing as a relationship between me an a fact and believing as a relationship between me and the sense of a proposition. If I understand it correctly, the difference between seeing something and representing something.


Quoting Sam26

Finally, there is not going to be some final correct interpretation of W. which we can all agree is what W. meant by this or that.

This is true of philosophers in general. Each year there are hundreds of books and articles on Plato, for example.

Quoting Sam26

Wittgenstein's writing style, in particular, doesn't lend itself to easy interpretations.

This is what attracted me to him. Everyone is reading the same book and coming up with very different interpretations. It is not, in my opinion, a matter of a final correct interpretation, but rather, on the one hand, of improving my understanding of what he is saying and showing us, and, on the other, of working on my own way of thinking, seeing, and interpreting things.

As he put it:

Work on philosophy – like work in architecture in many respects – is really more work on oneself. On one's own interpretation/conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them).

(CV p. 16)

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Here's an example of what I am saying. We can represent the certainty as the basis for the habitual activity. I know that the act X will have the outcome of Y, so act X for the purpose of Y becomes habituated, and I tend to proceed with very little doubt. The light turns green, I walk across the street, for instance.

However, before I cross the street I glance around to see if anyone is running the red. This is "the check", which is a manifestation of the fundamental uncertainty. The check has to be more fundamental than the certainty, in order that it might at any time overrule the certainty. The habit can be broken. If the check is allowed to be overruled by the certainty, then eventually I will step in front of an errant vehicle.

One might model the certainty as more fundamental than the uncertainty, as is the case when hinge propositions are modeled as free from the tendency to doubt, but this is a false model. It is proven false, because those who do not perform the check get the Darwin award, and this trait of relinquishing the check, is not maintained. So the uncertainty of the check is supported by evolution, and its overruling the certainty of habit, as a more fundamental aspect of living beings is verified in this way. And the check as an uncertainty based activity cannot be modeled as a habit because it is different (habit being similar) in every field of activity yet common to them all.

I get what you're saying but I think that it can be argued that habitual behavior has also been selected as a trait conductive to surviving. For me, it is one of those yin/yang relationships. Certainty has no meaning without doubt.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Right, the reason for posting here is to submit my ideas to the criticisms of others. My ideas are forever evolving, because of my uncertainty, and the role that others play in changing my mind.

[quote="Metaphysician Undercover;662815"]To state something as a proposition, is to make a proposal. It does not imply 'I am certain of what I wrote'. This is your misinterpretation, derived from, (and a very good demonstration of), that faulty notion that actions are based in certainty. That you interpret my proposal as an indication that I am certain of the truth of what I write, shows that you are committed to this faulty way of understanding. I write in my habitual way, but this does not mean that I am not ready, willing, and actively looking for reasons, to break the habit if necessary. I walk across the street right after the light turns green, and it appears like I am certain in that act, if you do not notice the more subtle act of me looking around before crossing. In the case of writing, the more subtle act occurs within my mind, as thinking, so it's even more difficult to notice.

Right. So here on a philosophy forum, discussing topics that are on the fringes of human knowledge, there would be a higher degree of playing devil's advocate - in proposing ideas that you don't necessarily believe but would like to see if there are any rebuttals to. The forum does have it's fair share of fundamentalists that you find in the religious and political discussions where what people say, they really mean, or "know" is true. And then there is the every-day-talk where most of what people say, they believe because we talk about each other, the events of the day, the world, etc.

Quoting Harry Hindu

I get what you're saying but I think that it can be argued that habitual behavior has also been selected as a trait conductive to surviving. For me, it is one of those yin/yang relationships. Certainty has no meaning without doubt.

I am not dismissing the importance of habitual behaviour, or the role of certainty. What I am saying is that it must be the case that uncertainty, doubt, is necessarily more basic or fundamental than certainty. This is due to the fallibility of certainty. Since a living being can still be wrong, even in instances when that individual has the attitude of certainty, then there must be a mechanism whereby we doubt even the most basic certitudes, or else we'd all die from our mistakes. Some of us do not doubt our fundamental certitudes, and some of us die from our mistakes. Some of us do doubt our fundamental habits and certitudes, and since this trait often saves us, it is selected for in evolution.

The conclusion therefore, is that the beliefs are fundamentally not certainties, because the living being who holds a belief is conditioned through instinct and genetics, to naturally doubt the belief. This is an evolutionarily beneficial trait which has been selected for. So positing something like hinge propositions, as fundamental beliefs which are somehow beyond doubt, is simply an incorrect representation. The evolutionary process has ensured that beliefs do not actually exist in this way. The propensity to doubt, is fundamental to, and inherent within all belief. The condition of certainty, I suggest, is added to the belief afterward, therefore not fundamental to belief. It is layered on, as an attitude toward belief, not actually part of the belief.

Quoting Harry Hindu

Right. So here on a philosophy forum, discussing topics that are on the fringes of human knowledge, there would be a higher degree of playing devil's advocate - in proposing ideas that you don't necessarily believe but would like to see if there are any rebuttals to. The forum does have it's fair share of fundamentalists that you find in the religious and political discussions where what people say, they really mean, or "know" is true. And then there is the every-day-talk where most of what people say, they believe because we talk about each other, the events of the day, the world, etc.

I think you misrepresent "believe" here. That a person believes something does not imply that the person is certain of that. So I can propose ideas, which I believe in, but not certain of, with the intent of allowing rebuttals from others. Then I might be inclined to change my mind. The fact that I change my mind does not mean that I actually did not believe what I claimed to have believed. It simply means that I allow the uncertainty which is inherent within belief, and more fundamental than certainty, to rule within my mind, such that I am always capable of changing my mind, no matter what the particular belief might be. I do not allow myself to develop the attitude called certitude. This is what is called having an open mind, and it is the trait of an honest human being who is true to one's own nature as an evolved life form. Professing certainty as fundamental to one's beliefs, to justify one's attitude of certitude, is the self-deception of closing one's mind to the reality of belief.

Reply to Fooloso4 I feel like he does reject that idea about propositions. I seem to remember a whole section where he is criticising the way a picture is entailed by a proposition or something like that.

Quoting Apustimelogist

I seem to remember a whole section where he is criticising the way a picture is entailed by a proposition or something like that.

Can you find the section you are referring to? He rejects the idea that meaning is a picture or representation of reality, in favor of the idea that meaning is determined by use. But the issue here is about the relationship between beliefs and propositions. Sam's contention is that non-verbal beliefs are not propositional, on the assumption that propositions are are verbal statements, and so pre-verbal beliefs are not propositions.

See above: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/662920

Quoting Fooloso4

Can you find the section you are referring to? He rejects the idea that meaning is a picture or representation of reality, in favor of the idea that meaning is determined by use. But the issue here is about the relationship between beliefs and propositions. Sam's contention is that non-verbal beliefs are not propositional, on the assumption that propositions are are verbal statements, and so pre-verbal beliefs are not propositions.

If meaning is determined by use, then something is used to accomplish some goal. What is being used if not our representation (knowledge) of reality, and what is the goal? In using propositions we are using scribbles and sounds, or pictures, to communicate (represent) some state-of-affairs that isn't the use of scribbles and sounds, or pictures to others that we believe do not possess the same knowledge (representation) of reality that we do.

In telling someone it is raining, we only do so because we believe the person we are using a proposition with isn't aware that it is raining. If we believed they already knew it was raining, then what use would it be in telling them?

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

I am not dismissing the importance of habitual behaviour, or the role of certainty. What I am saying is that it must be the case that uncertainty, doubt, is necessarily more basic or fundamental than certainty. This is due to the fallibility of certainty. Since a living being can still be wrong, even in instances when that individual has the attitude of certainty, then there must be a mechanism whereby we doubt even the most basic certitudes, or else we'd all die from our mistakes. Some of us do not doubt our fundamental certitudes, and some of us die from our mistakes. Some of us do doubt our fundamental habits and certitudes, and since this trait often saves us, it is selected for in evolution.

The conclusion therefore, is that the beliefs are fundamentally not certainties, because the living being who holds a belief is conditioned through instinct and genetics, to naturally doubt the belief. This is an evolutionarily beneficial trait which has been selected for. So positing something like hinge propositions, as fundamental beliefs which are somehow beyond doubt, is simply an incorrect representation. The evolutionary process has ensured that beliefs do not actually exist in this way. The propensity to doubt, is fundamental to, and inherent within all belief. The condition of certainty, I suggest, is added to the belief afterward, therefore not fundamental to belief. It is layered on, as an attitude toward belief, not actually part of the belief.

I disagree. If doubt were fundamental then what would you be doubting if not some certainty? It seems that in order to doubt you must have some certainty to doubt prior to doubting it.

Personally, it don't like the terms being used to explain what you are trying to explain. I think of certainty and knowledge as the same thing. And I think of knowledge as a set of instructions that we go by. These instructions are dynamic - capable of being updated with new (sensory) information. In other words, knowledge can change with new information.

The instructions we use aren't much different than instructions in a computer language. Given some goal, reference the instructions we have for attaining that goal. If we don't have instructions then acquire them through learning (observe someone with the same goal and how they do it or trying instructions that we already have that are used for similar tasks and observe the results and then modify as needed and try again).

Doubt stems from our knowledge (certainty) that the world is complex and changes constantly and that we acquire new information by the use of our senses, and that any set of instructions may need to be updated, given new information.

Reply to Harry Hindu

We must understand how a term or symbol is being used in order to understand how it is being used to represent a state of affairs. The same term can be used in the representation of different states of affairs.

The proposition: 'it is raining' is not used only to convey meteorological information. It can be an expression of exasperation or pleasure or surprise.

Quoting Harry Hindu

I disagree. If doubt were fundamental then what would you be doubting if not some certainty? It seems that in order to doubt you must have some certainty to doubt prior to doubting it.

You're not making sense Harry. To doubt a certainty is contradiction. The fact that you are doubting it means that it is not a certainty. To doubt is to be uncertain. To be certain of something is to be free of doubt concerning it.

I don't see why you believe that it is required to have certainty prior to having uncertainty (doubt). Obviously human beings are evolving creatures, and human knowledge has come into existence as have human beings. Therefore, if certainty is knowledge, as you propose, uncertainty is prior to certainty, as the form of animalistic belief prior to knowledge. It makes no sense to say that uncertainty (doubt) requires an underlying certainty, or else knowledge would have to come into existence from some form of certainty which is prior to knowledge. But this undermines your proposition that knowledge and certainty are the same thing.

Quoting Fooloso4

We must understand how a term or symbol is being used in order to understand how it is being used to represent a state of affairs. The same term can be used in the representation of different states of affairs.

The proposition: 'it is raining' is not used only to convey meteorological information. It can be an expression of exasperation or pleasure or surprise.

You missed my point which was that we use scribbles to convey information about states-of-affairs that are not just another use of scribbles, to others that are not aware of said states-of-affairs. Using scribbles to convey meteorological information or mental information is not useful if the other person is already aware of the meteorological or mental states. So it appears that while we use things, it doesn't necessarily mean that we accomplished our goal (that it was useful). We are simply wasting our time and energy using scribbles to inform others of what they already know.

Quoting Harry Hindu

You missed my point

I'm afraid that I still miss your point. On the one hand, I don't see how it relates to the discussion. On the other, telling someone that telling someone something they already know is a waste of time is itself wasting our time since this is already known.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

You're not making sense Harry. To doubt a certainty is contradiction. The fact that you are doubting it means that it is not a certainty. To doubt is to be uncertain. To be certain of something is to be free of doubt concerning it.

How do you know that you are doubting anything? Can you be certain that you are doubting? As I have said before certainty and doubt go hand-in-hand. It seems to me that you cannot doubt without the certainty that you are doubting. If you doubt that you are doubting, then you are doing something. What are you doing if not exhibiting a certainty of what you are doing whether it be doubting or not?

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see why you believe that it is required to have certainty prior to having uncertainty (doubt). Obviously human beings are evolving creatures, and human knowledge has come into existence as have human beings. Therefore, if certainty is knowledge, as you propose, uncertainty is prior to certainty, as the form of animalistic belief prior to knowledge. It makes no sense to say that uncertainty (doubt) requires an underlying certainty, or else knowledge would have to come into existence from some form of certainty which is prior to knowledge. But this undermines your proposition that knowledge and certainty are the same thing.

I can see that we may be more likely to doubt knowledge coming from others than we are in doubting our own knowledge. This is why we have rules of logic about pleading to popularity and authority. In using these rules of logic, are we doubting the propositions of others or becoming more certain that what they are saying is wrong and you are right?

Quoting Fooloso4

Sam's contention is that non-verbal beliefs are not propositional, on the assumption that propositions are are verbal statements, and so pre-verbal beliefs are not propositions.

Quoting Fooloso4

We must understand how a term or symbol is being used in order to understand how it is being used to represent a state of affairs. The same term can be used in the representation of different states of affairs.

And a symbol can be a scribble, picture, or behavior to represent the belief of the one writing scribbles, drawing pictures and behaving in certain ways. Propositions are those effects (written scribbles, drawn pictures and behaviors) that we observe that we then use to get at the causes of these effects - which is the beliefs of the one causing the scribbles, pictures and their body to move in certain ways, which can include making sounds with your mouth.

Quoting Harry Hindu

Propositions are those effects (written scribbles, drawn pictures and behaviors) that we observe that we then use to get at the causes of these effects - which is the beliefs of the one causing the scribbles, pictures and their body to move in certain ways, which can include making sounds with your mouth.

As Wittgenstein uses the term 'proposition' it is not its expression. According to the Tractatus a thought with a sense is a proposition (4). It does not become a proposition when it is expressed. The belief is not the cause of a proposition. The belief or thought is the proposition, it is expressed in symbols or words or scribbles or pictures.

Quoting Harry Hindu

How do you know that you are doubting anything? Can you be certain that you are doubting? As I have said before certainty and doubt go hand-in-hand. It seems to me that you cannot doubt without the certainty that you are doubting. If you doubt that you are doubting, then you are doing something. What are you doing if not exhibiting a certainty of what you are doing whether it be doubting or not?

I really don't see your logic Harry. Why do you think that when a person is doing anything, doubting for example, the person must be certain of what oneself is doing? Do I need to be certain that I am running, in order for me to be running? The person who doesn't even know the word "running" would still run, and it would be impossible for that person to know oneself to be running. Likewise, the person who doesn't know the word "doubt" would be doubting without the possibility of being certain that they are doubting.

Quoting Harry Hindu

I can see that we may be more likely to doubt knowledge coming from others than we are in doubting our own knowledge. This is why we have rules of logic about pleading to popularity and authority. In using these rules of logic, are we doubting the propositions of others or becoming more certain that what they are saying is wrong and you are right?

I can't grasp your question here. When I ask someone to justify something, then, generally I am doubting that person. What this says about my own belief is that I believe that I ought to doubt others. It doesn't mean that I am certain that I ought to doubt others.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

I really don't see your logic Harry. Why do you think that when a person is doing anything, doubting for example, the person must be certain of what oneself is doing? Do I need to be certain that I am running, in order for me to be running? The person who doesn't even know the word "running" would still run, and it would be impossible for that person to know oneself to be running. Likewise, the person who doesn't know the word "doubt" would be doubting without the possibility of being certain that they are doubting.

This is ridiculous, Meta. A person or animal decides to doubt, to run, or whatever. How can an organism decide to do something without knowing it's doing it?? When you raise your arm you have to decide to do it prior to it raising. Doing so may be simple and effortless now,, but it required a lot of practice when you were an infant to control your limbs - to bend them to your will. A person doesn't need to know language to know it is running. Knowing how to use a language and knowing how to run are two different things.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

I can't grasp your question here. When I ask someone to justify something, then, generally I am doubting that person. What this says about my own belief is that I believe that I ought to doubt others. It doesn't mean that I am certain that I ought to doubt others.

Not necessarily. You could be asking a question because you simply don't understand what they are saying. There is a lot of word salad on these forums. You can't doubt something you don't understand. In a sense you're not doubting what they said yet. You are doubting your own understanding of what they said.

When you were born and while you were an infant did you doubt anything your parents, or anyone in a position of authority, told you? Do you doubt everything everyone says, or are there some that you trust more than others, like your family and friends?

Quoting Fooloso4

As Wittgenstein uses the term 'proposition' it is not its expression. According to the Tractatus a thought with a sense is a proposition (4). It does not become a proposition when it is expressed. The belief is not the cause of a proposition. The belief or thought is the proposition, it is expressed in symbols or words or scribbles or pictures.

I really couldn't care what Wittgenstein says because it isn't useful. There is too much of a dependency on what dead philosophers have said with no regard to what we know now. Some people on this forum treat Witt like he was some kind of prophet.

I never said the belief is the scribble. I said it is the cause of the scribble. What form does your belief take if not visual imagery, sounds, feelings, etc.? How do you know that you are believing or knowing anything at any moment? What are you pointing at when you say that you believe, or know, such-and-such. You don't need to prove it to me. Prove it to yourself that you believe something, and tell me how you did it.

Reply to Harry Hindu

I can only speak for myself. I read and attempt to understand the philosophers whose work interests me because of what I can learn from them. Their work does not come with an expiration date. Unless you have some understanding of a philosopher you are not in a position to judge whether his work is useful.


Quoting Harry Hindu

What are you pointing at when you say that you believe, or know, such-and-such.

That depends on what it is I say I believe or know. The statement may be about me or what I say I believe or know or both.

Quoting Harry Hindu

Prove it to yourself that you believe something, and tell me how you did it.

I don't know what you are getting at. Why would I prove to myself that the things I believe are things I believe? What role do you think proof plays here?

Quoting Harry Hindu

A person or animal decides to doubt..

I don't think you know the meaning of "doubt", Harry. It signifies an uncertain state of mind. Therefore your assertion that a person must decide to doubt is directly contradict to the nature of "doubt", as deciding signifies a form of certainty.

Quoting Harry Hindu

How can an organism decide to do something without knowing it's doing it??

Now you are misusing the word "decide". Many, in fact most, actions performed by living beings are not produced from a decision. Biologists don't really know the true impetus behind most living actions, but we can surely say that the majority of them are not derived from decisions. So your question here is derived from the false premise, that an act of an organism proceeds from a decision, when in reality most of these acts do not derive from decisions.

Quoting Harry Hindu

A person doesn't need to know language to know it is running. Knowing how to use a language and knowing how to run are two different things.

I agree, knowing how to use language is completely different from knowing how to run. But notice that the question here concerns knowing that oneself is running, which is completely different from knowing how to run. In order for a person to know that oneself is running, I think It's quite obvious that the person must know what "running" is. Otherwise it is more likely that the person would misjudge oneself as running, because the judgement would be nothing better than a guess, when the person doesn't know what "running" signifies.

Quoting Harry Hindu

When you were born and while you were an infant did you doubt anything your parents, or anyone in a position of authority, told you?

Of course. This is just more evidence that you do not understand the meaning of "doubt".

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think you know the meaning of "doubt", Harry. It signifies an uncertain state of mind. Therefore your assertion that a person must decide to doubt is directly contradict to the nature of "doubt", as deciding signifies a form of certainty.

It just doesn't make any sense to assert that doubt is fundamental. If it were, then how could we ever store any information in our brain? How is it that we have memory? What is memory for if not to store valid and useful information that can be relied on for similar situations in the future?

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Now you are misusing the word "decide". Many, in fact most, actions performed by living beings are not produced from a decision. Biologists don't really know the true impetus behind most living actions, but we can surely say that the majority of them are not derived from decisions. So your question here is derived from the false premise, that an act of an organism proceeds from a decision, when in reality most of these acts do not derive from decisions.

You seemed to be berating scientism in the other thread, but here you are embracing it. All I know is that when I decide to do something I can often times take time to simulate different actions and predictions of their outcomes of those actions and then choose the one that has the best predicted outcome. It can also involve comparing what is presently observed and integrating it with a vision of how I would like things to be and applying the best action to achieve that goal. So the way I am using "decide" is such that computers can make decisions to. It's simply a matter of being able to process sensory information (input) and then producing actions (output) based on one's programming (instincts and learned behaviors).

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

I agree, knowing how to use language is completely different from knowing how to run. But notice that the question here concerns knowing that oneself is running, which is completely different from knowing how to run. In order for a person to know that oneself is running, I think It's quite obvious that the person must know what "running" is. Otherwise it is more likely that the person would misjudge oneself as running, because the judgement would be nothing better than a guess, when the person doesn't know what "running" signifies.

Well yeah, running isn't the scribbles, "running". It is an observable action. You know you are running because 1) you decided to run and 2) you can observe yourself running. If you decided to run but you are not running, then there is something wrong with your muscles, nervous system, etc. You don't need language to know you or anyone else is running. You simply need eyes and a brain.


Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

When you were born and while you were an infant did you doubt anything your parents, or anyone in a position of authority, told you?
— Harry Hindu

Of course. This is just more evidence that you do not understand the meaning of "doubt".

It seems to me that you have a strange notion of "doubt" and "fundamental".

Quoting Fooloso4

I can only speak for myself. I read and attempt to understand the philosophers whose work interests me because of what I can learn from them. Their work does not come with an expiration date. Unless you have some understanding of a philosopher you are not in a position to judge whether his work is useful.

What information do others (philosophers or not) have that you don't when it comes to understanding the mind and it's relationship with the world? It seems to me that we are all stuck in the same predicament with no one having any special place in trying to explain it. I am more interested in what you have to say about your own perceptions of your own mind which includes its thought, beliefs and knowledge and the forms they take, without any influence from others.

Quoting Fooloso4

What are you pointing at when you say that you believe, or know, such-and-such.
— Harry Hindu

That depends on what it is I say I believe or know. The statement may be about me or what I say I believe or know or both.

Quoting Fooloso4

Prove it to yourself that you believe something, and tell me how you did it.
— Harry Hindu

I don't know what you are getting at. Why would I prove to myself that the things I believe are things I believe? What role do you think proof plays here?

Yes, but there must be some similarity between your various beliefs for you to identify them all as beliefs, no? What is the similarity that all your beliefs have that you point to when you say "I have a belief"? What form do beliefs take so that you can identify them as beliefs?

Quoting Harry Hindu

I am more interested in what you have to say about your own perceptions of your own mind which includes its thought, beliefs and knowledge and the forms they take, without any influence from others.

None of us are without influence. That influence extends to everything we think and believe and know ... or at least that is what my influences say.

Quoting Harry Hindu

What is the similarity that all your beliefs have that you point to when you say "I have a belief"?

Wittgenstein actually gives a very good and influential answer to that, but he's a dead philosopher.

Quoting Harry Hindu

It just doesn't make any sense to assert that doubt is fundamental.

Does it make sense to say that living beings were certain before they became uncertain? Is knowledge prior to a lack of knowledge. Of course not. Therefore it make sense to say that doubt (the mental state of uncertainty) is prior to, therefore more fundamental than certainty.

Quoting Harry Hindu

You seemed to be berating scientism in the other thread, but here you are embracing it. All I know is that when I decide to do something I can often times take time to simulate different actions and predictions of their outcomes of those actions and then choose the one that has the best predicted outcome. It can also involve comparing what is presently observed and integrating it with a vision of how I would like things to be and applying the best action to achieve that goal. So the way I am using "decide" is such that computers can make decisions to. It's simply a matter of being able to process sensory information (input) and then producing actions (output) based on one's programming (instincts and learned behaviors).

OK, so you do not even need to be certain in order to make a decision. How does this help your argument that certainty is more fundamental than doubt? It just shows how human acts, which are based in conscious decisions, do not even require certainty to be engaged into.

Quoting Harry Hindu

You don't need language to know you or anyone else is running.

Yes you do need language to decide whether something is running. I can't understand why you don't apprehend this. "Running" stands for a specific activity. If you do not know what "running" stands for (which would be the case if you had no language), it is impossible that you could judge whether something is running or not.