But... names, variables, and so on can be given an interpretation. So logic does define its elements. As is validity. ...of the logical system being u...
No. I think the posited position of the identity theorist is that the brain state exists if and only if the pain exists. Supposing otherwise would fal...
But then: It seems I must be mis-reading Kripke; that he is saying that it will not suffice to claim that 'B caused A' is contingent. It must be neces...
That water is H?O is something we discovered - it is a posteriori, and synthetic. Kripke shows that, that water is H?O is true in all possible situati...
The following seems to be the key paragraph for understanding Kripke's rejection of any form of the identity thesis with regard to consciousness. Now ...
Put simply, he invites us to reconsider necessity and possibility in a slightly different way. He thus re-introduced them into analytic philosophy aft...
Fixing a rigid designator is just using a name. How that name came to be used to talk about its referent is a quit seperate issue to how it is used to...
Not at all. It is a simple matter to move from orthogonal to perspective; two drawings of the same thing. Similarly it's simple to move from the prese...
If I am going to treat Kripke's book as setting out an acceptable approach to grammar, then I'm not that interested in some sot of substance ontology....
Well, they might. I'm not sure that Kripke thinks they must; and I certainly don't. I just don't see for a dubbing or baptism. The use of the name wil...
No, they are not. "Nixon might have had a different name" is about Nixon. "The person named 'Nixon' might have had a different name" is about a person...
No. "Nixon" refers to Nixon. "The man named 'Nixon'" refers to the man with that name. That he has that name is a contingent fact about Nixon. Yes; bu...
Just introduce a bill to remove everybody's rakes. Threatening to take away the god-given freedom to rake a forest or grassland will result in a renew...
And Kripke showed that these two categories were insufficient, given a decent grammar of modality. That is, there are necessary a posteriori facts. Se...
This isn't like being certain you have five fingers. It's more like being certain the bishop moves diagonally. Validity is defined by logic. How could...
Apocryphal has it that there are a group of First Nations folk in Australia who don't see time as a line, but as walking backwards. You can see where ...
Tell you later. In the mean time, consider that you already grasp that meaning, as is evidenced by your ability to make use of it in your everyday wor...
And that's one issue with Feyerabend; incommensurability. Davidson's argument against incommensurability, in On the very idea of a conceptual schema, ...
Here's the rub. Popper, who is deservedly admired, set out a logic for science that is pretty neat. But the problem with logic, as Feyerabend showed, ...
Footnote 74 draws attention to the obvious distinction between a corpse and a person; that the person is a body with a particular structure, and a cor...
Then there is a discussion of the cartesian distinction between mind and body (p.144-146). Kripke argues that the distinction must be taken seriously....
There's a rejoinder that he is restricting the discussion to type-type identities. Now at one stage earlier - I'm sorry, the post is lost in the confu...
Let's do that, then. SO we get to p.144, and identity. Three different ones: 1. Identity of mind with body 2. Identity of (for example) pain with a ce...
@"schopenhauer1", see how the account of the name "chess" does not rely on a substance? So I am reluctant to conclude that there is a connection betwe...
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