Banno

Chess. https://www.ichess.net/blog/history-of-chess/ It started out as something else - perhaps "the elephant game", but in a form that we might not r...

:grin: I wasn't going to bother. Janus refuses to read the book anyway. But thanks.

Cheers. I use Safari, so no go.

Chicken wing. No meat. To all: So is there a way to block a user? So that their posts do not appear in threads?

Might leave this for the moderators then.

This thread was explicitly set up to address issues in the third lecture. Quite specifically it was set up so that we could move on from @"Janus" view...

Chess is an interesting example. Its antiquity means we don't know if it was a one-off, as you suppose, or if it grew in the playing, as Tolkien might...

Might help if you read the first lecture.

Actually...

He seems to think he is solving metaphysical issues. I take him as recommending a way to use language.

feyerabend wins. But if you want to know why, you will have to tell me what Popper and Kuhn And Lakatos said.

And this is exactly what Kripke shows is bunk. Read the bloody book.

I'm just pointing out again how you jump around. We were half way through a discussion of if a definite description can be a rigid designator, and now...

At some place - and forgive me for not finding the reference - Kripke is quite explicit in saying that identity is about individuals, not names. He cr...

I'm just not sure about the "not deluded"part. I'd like more on that. it's in the text, indirectly, but I hadn't paid it much mind, so I may have miss...

See PM

I guess that's not a bad interpretation from a non-analytic perspective. I guess that sounds patronising - tough. Substance is not a term that an anal...

I'm not at all keen on what might be called Kripke's theory of reference. But then, I don't think he is either. He just posits it as an alternative. M...

I can't find anything like this. There is stuff about illusion elsewhere. I must have missed it. I haven't thought in these terms - I'd like other to ...

I think you are off track.

Not by definite descriptions.

French black magic?

...becasue we both know which Nixon it is about, but for some odd reason you pretend otherwise. Yes you will.

Which only shows that you have not understood definite descriptions. That is, you are talking about something else. A question about Nixon is not abou...

I suspect something like this is what @"andrewk" is thinking, too... There is no crevasse between natural and formal languages. Adopting mor formal gr...

I quite agree. Kripke thinks he is giving a metaphysical account, when all he is doing is commending one way of talking about modality, amongst others...

You are not reading the book, so you have no idea what he is saying - as is clear form your posts. Read the book.

And without a hint of irony. Now that's just not true. As has been shown multiple times here. We can refer when there is no available description. And...

So let's consider how Kripke might treat "Could Nixon have been a golfball?" First, that's a question about Nixon. That's stipulated; and fixed in all...

The individual is identified by some set of stipulated atributes. Atributes that may not be true of that individual in some possible world.

so the individual is both stipulated and identified by a set of attributes. And you don’t see your problem here. Read the book.

Yes, you are right.

No, it doesn't. Counting as the same individual is stipulated, not discovered. Having a different name in other possible worlds is trivial. Read the b...

Drop the 'really', and then read Kripke as recommending one way among many to talk about modality. Yes, we might have decided to group animals with pl...

Nice.

Further, if a substance with new, astonishing qualities were found, that had the chemical form H?O, then it would be a form of water. Kripke uses the ...

Now to the controversial stuff. p.128 That water is H?O is an empirical discovery. If we were to find a substance that looks, feels and otherwise func...

Slowly and with care. Can a definite description be a rigid designator? Now a rigid designator refers to the very same individual in all the possible ...

I'd value your contribution at Naming and Necessity Lecture Three

Naming and Necessity Lecture Three A new thread for those interested in things other than definite descriptions.

From the other thread, some lost stuff Lecture three. Kripke does a brief summation again, claiming to have made two hits on the descriptivist account...

Yeah, I agree. You win. Now can we get on with it?

I doubt even you could give a concise summary of you position. No, Janus. Not interested. Read the book.

Given that there are folk here who will not read or refer to the actual text at hand, I have no reason to think secondary or tertiary texts wold help....

Yes. The thread has been ruined by the odd insistence of two folk that we not progress past the first few pages. A new thread is appropriate.

Seriously?

I did. Lost in the fog of Janus' posts.

Do you have any thoughts on the critique of identity theorists at the end of the book? That is for me the interesting part. Kripke's account looks fra...

No, it isn't. Again, you show your own confusion. My* definition is "The x such that ?(x)" For what you say here to work you would need a predicate so...