Banno

I think we can cut through all that. See the incidental treatment of concept as a noun? But we can't quite identify what it is the name of... We talk ...

SO is a concept something in the brain - or should I say mind - that is different to the word and the thing?

OK, now to get bit pedantic. You've given me the difference between "democracy" - the word, note the quote marks - and democracy - the thing. But is t...

So maybe a definition is the wrong way to go. Let's look at... democracy. How does the concept of democracy differ from democracy? Or... how does the ...

Maybe we should talk about concepts then. What sort of thing is a concept?

And you don't see these as word games?

Are there any such paradoxes?

"The world consists of..." We are now playing a play a parlour game called "metaphysics". Why not? Let's just be sure to mark the transition. When the...

So, instead someone insists it's not a real picture. We seek clarification. They say it is made up of particles and space. If they say it was not a re...

Meh. I'll wait until you finish with @"Terrapin Station"

Are they? Are they? IF one of them says, "sure, it's not a forgery - but it's not real..." what do we say?

So, if someone insists the painting is real, what do they mean? Is the chair real?

If you like; the point being that context is all. It's a real paining as opposed to an illusion, but it's not a real McCubbin. The frame is real wood,...

Ok, let's look at the word real. We talk of a real coin as opposed to a counterfeit. A real McCubbin as opposed to a fake. A real gem as opposed to an...

I'm using Austin rather than Wittgenstein. More direct, yet along the same lines.

I guess it's when you stop asking that question and start asking others. Do you want to talk about realism and chairs? Another example? IS the issue t...

Sure. Do you want to have this discussion here?

Well... at the least, if we sort out our language use we might find ourselves in a much better position to actually state the problem. 42.

I would expect nothing less... But I hope you see the thrust of this very powerful approach to doing philosophy.

Not sure about neuroscience, but I don't see a philosophical issue. If red is not the name of a thing, then there is no need for there to be a thing t...

Yep. It's worth keeping an eye on. But that does not bear directly on the case in hand: that he whole philosophical exercise of explaining universals ...

Sure. An ongoing debate again. As I understand it, Chalmers thinks we can have metaphysical language games in an unproblematic fashion. That is, he is...

Speaking roughly, The Greeks treated all words as if they were nouns, and hence sort after the "thing" that words like "red" named; hence the forms......

see https://www.gondwana-collection.com/blog/how-do-namibian-himbas-see-colour/

@"Marchesk",even if you disagree, perhaps this discussion will help you to see why someone such as I would come to the conclusion that the problem of ...

Well, isn't that so? There are documented cultural differences between colour names and ongoing discussions of perceptions - the contention that the G...

Sometimes we don't. At the edges, we do differ as to our opinions of which colour word is appropriate. Could it be that what red things have in common...

Good. Moving on, then. I wonder if you might reconsider whether it is the case that there must be something had in common by everything to which we as...

Fine. What I am trying to establish is, is the example a suitable one for the problem of universals?

Cheers. So we ask what is it that red sprots cars and red sunsets have in common, such that they both deserve to be called red? Something like that? I...

A neat example. The answer is found more clearly in Austin than Wittgenstein. Is the problem that of working out what a universal refers to? What sort...

I've no idea where to go with that. I guess we are talking past each other. Cheers.

Neat switch. But I was watching.

The point is that the contextual frameworks Quantum Mechanics and Every Day both contain cats. They do not "disappear on that view, so the statement t...

I just find this quite confused on many levels. So we cannot talk in QM terms about the cat being on the mat? And yet Schrödinger has a quantum cat in...

Didn't think we were too far apart.

Rolling this back to the OP, if truth is not dependent on what we know, and if objective truth is known only objectively and subjective truth is known...

...and the upshot is not that you are stuck in your own conceptual schema, but that the notion of such a conceptual schema is incoherent. (@"Janus")

This is an excellent sentence. I love "we can indeed... think about how things might be conceptually and epistemologically different in extra-human co...

But we are talking about what is true, not about what we know... When we introduce knowledge, we add belief. If we are going to talk about what is tru...

Yes, I am taking it out of a context into which it was erroneously placed. Here's the thing, undeniable, yet denied: Either it is true or it isn't, re...

That's pretty much right. Thank you.

Rubbish. Either it is true or it isn't, regardless of what one sees. Your approach is just wrong.

"Le chat est sur le tapis" is true IFF the cat is on the mat. There are two things to be decide here - that the cat is indeed on the mat, and that "Le...

Neat bud-flower-fruit metaphor. The numbering sequence escapes me. In Miller it is in paragraph 2.

That's how you can be certain that there is other stuff. It limits what you can choose. It's working perfectly.

That's unclear. Is it a bit like @"creativesoul"'s "thought/belief" that wants it's language before it can speak? Perhaps the judgement is in choosing...

I don't disagree with any of this; but then i don't quite agree, either. One way to put it is that we say too much about true and truth. Yes, truth is...

Because the answer to philosophical issues is often found in language.

That's not what I said. The relationship between you and other stuff is what you choose.