I think that's Phenomenology of Mind - different book. But that's not to say the two prefaces won't compliment each other!
The German title is "Phänomenologie des Geistes". Geistes is translated as either Spirit or Mind. Same book. The link I provided is not the Kaufmann translation. It is Baille's.
Could you tell me the first few words of the translation you are using?
Here is another online translation, by Miller: http://www.faculty.umb.edu/gary_zabel/Courses/Marxist_Philosophy/Hegel_and_Feuerbach_files/Hegel-Phenomenology-of-Spirit.pdf
And another by Pickard: https://libcom.org/files/Georg%20Wilhelm%20Friedrich%20Hegel%20-%20The%20Phenomenology%20of%20Spirit%20(Terry%20Pinkard%20Translation).pdf
Is that remark purely about the link?
Or do you object to using Miller's translation?
It was about the Baille translation. I deleted the link.
I think the Miller is still widely used. It was what we used in the last class I took, but that was 20 years ago. The problem is not with the translation but with what happens when you copy and paste from it. Some letters do not copy correctly and have to be fixed.
I am going to start by using both Miller and Pinkard to see if there is much of a difference.
I am going to start by using both Miller and Pinkard to see if there is much of a difference.
Thanks for the links, Fooloso4. This morning, I downloaded both. Ater a quick look decided to go with Pinkard. It seems easier to read.
The Preface itself starts on p50 of the 539 page download.
Neat bud-flower-fruit metaphor. The numbering sequence escapes me. In Miller it is in paragraph 2.
Yes. That is a beautiful quote. Still trying to work out its meaning and better understand it in philosophical context. In Pinkard, it is found in the numbered paragraph 2. Will spend some time on this.
To understand any book or text requires first that it be read - and understood. That's the task of this thread, and that is the only task of this thread
With luck, 50-odd pages, maybe the thing can be done in under 50 - 100 posts!
I appreciate your aims here and taking on a difficult job. However, the reading group is just starting to assemble. Why the rush through ? It seems such a beautiful and worthwhile piece of writing to be savoured as a read.
Never thought I could be attracted to Hegel, but there ya' go.
Anyway, carry on as you decide. It will still be here, if and when, I catch up.
Best wishes.
I would be interested to know if it is 'geist' that is translated as 'spirit', and also if the 'science' that Hegel is referring to, could be understood as the German term Geisteswissenschaften, usually translated as 'sciences of the spirit' (a set of human sciences such as philosophy, history, philology, musicology, linguistics, theater studies, literary studies, media studies, and sometimes even theology and jurisprudence, that are traditional in German universities.)
I was struck by this phrase in #6:
If, namely, the True exists only in what, or better as what, is sometimes called intuition, sometimes immediate knowledge of the Absolute, religion or being - not at the centre of divine love but the being of the divine love itself - then what is required in the exposition of philosophy is, from this viewpoint, rather the opposite of the form of the Notion. For the Absolute is not supposed to be comprehended, it is to be felt and intuited; not the Notion of the Absolute, but the feeling and intuition of it, must govern what is said, and must be expressed by it.
The bolded sentence seems obviously mystical to me; it seems suggestive of Eckhardt.
ForgottenticketJuly 10, 2019 at 10:26#3055410 likes
It probably would be better if forums like this supported nested comments. Then people could interact with your crits freely without letting it interrupt the reading. That's one of the big reasons why reddit has succeeded in replacing the classic forum because nested discussions are almost impossible to hijack.
Anyway, I would be interested in a reading group for the complete Hegel book provided we can decide on a free pdf/html translation online. This doesn't seem to be the case with OP.
Terrapin StationJuly 10, 2019 at 10:55#3055500 likes
Yeah, although I wouldn't say that regularly asking oneself, "Is this correct? Why is the author claiming this? Is it well-supported? Is the author clearly communicating their ideas?" etc. is "hijacking" any sort of philosophy interaction--it's what we should be doing.
The Phenomenology of spirit (1807) is the first book Hegel published, and certainly one of his most famous and debated work.
This year we will read the Preface. Written by Hegel after the whole work was completed, the Preface represents one of the most beautiful and major text in the history of philosophy. Here Hegel defines his philosphical method and polemically debates with the main previous figures (Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte and Schelling beside others).
Tim, could you take a look at one of the translations I linked to and see if you can find some common numbering? The two I linked use the same numbering system.
Added: What you have as the beginning of #6 is the beginning of #3:
3. Those who demand both such explanations and their satisfactions may well look as if they are really in pursuit of what is essential. (Pinkard)
3. Demanding and Supplying these [superficial] explanations passes readily enough as a concern with what is essential. (Miller)
3. Those who demand both such explanations and their satisfactions may well look as if they are really in pursuit of what is essential. (Pinkard)
3. Demanding and Supplying these [superficial] explanations passes readily enough as a concern with what is essential. (Miller)
Thanks for the direct comparison. Confirmed my choice of Pinkard as a more natural read. For me.
I don't think it matters which online book is used. The great thing is that they are free and readily accessible to all.
because philosophy essentially is in the element of universality, which encompasses the particular within itself … its perfect essence, would be expressed in the goal of the work and in its final results, and that the way the project is in fact carried out would be what is inessential.
What is essential to the question of how to present philosophical truth is not how presentation is carried out, but the final result. The particular must be understood within the universal. The goal is the articulation of the whole. Short of that goal we have not reached what is essential.
#2
One must:
… comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive development of truth …
rather than seeing:
... only contradiction in that diversity.
It is as it is with the plant and its bud, blossom, and fruit:
… their fluid nature makes them into moments of an organic unity in which they are not only not in conflict with each other, but rather, one is equally as necessary as the other, and it is this equal necessity which alone constitutes the life of the whole.
Consciousness must know:
… how to free the contradiction from its one-sidedness …
and:
how to sustain it as free-standing.
It must:
… take cognizance of the moments as reciprocally necessary.
Reply to Fooloso4
Thanks. I think the meaning of para 2. is clearer to me.
So, philosophical systems have grown organically. The organic development of thought, if tended well and each part given its due consideration, should lead to a more complete and comprehensive understanding?
Is that about right ?
3. … the subject matter is not exhausted in its aims; rather, it is exhaustively treated when it is worked out. Nor is the result which is reached the actual whole itself; rather, the whole is the result together with the way the result comes to be.
The whole of the subject matter includes not just the result of what has been worked out but the working out itself, which is to say, the working itself out.
… differentiatedness is instead the limit of the thing at stake. It is where the thing which is at stake ceases, or it is what that thing is not.
The thing at stake, the subject matter, die Sache selbst, is not a thing-in-itself, Ding an sich. In other words, it is not something to be treated as a subject does an object that stands apart.
Instead of dwelling on the thing at issue and forgetting itself in it, that sort of knowing is always grasping at something else.
That is, instead of standing apart one must stand within. The term ‘subject matter’ rather than ‘object matter’ is suggestive.
5. The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of that truth.
The truth exists only in the system of knowledge of the truth.
To participate in the collaborative effort at bringing philosophy nearer to the form of science – to bring it nearer to the goal where it can lay aside the title of love of knowing and be actual knowing – is the task I have set for myself.
Hegel sees himself as a participant in a collaborative effort with those who are lovers of knowledge, that is, the philosophers who preceded him, of whom it can be said that they are not actual knowers. To the extent he succeeds he will be the first to actually know.
The inner necessity that knowing should be science lies in the nature of knowing, and the satisfactory explanation for this inner necessity is solely the exposition of philosophy itself.
Hegel’s task is the exposition of the inner necessity of knowing, that knowing is the system of science.
However, external necessity, insofar as this is grasped in a universal manner and insofar as personal contingencies and individual motivations are set aside, is the same as the internal necessity which takes on the shape in which time presents the existence of its moments. To demonstrate that it is now time for philosophy to be elevated into science would therefore be the only true justification of any attempt that has this as its aim, because it would demonstrate the necessity of that aim, and, at the same time, it would be the realization of the aim itself.
The exposition of the inner necessity is externally realized in time, and Hegel will demonstrate that now is with his philosophy the time for philosophy to become actual knowing.
... truth has the element of its existence solely in concepts
with the claim that it is not the concept but the feeling and intuition or immediate knowing of the absolute which are supposed to govern what is said of it.
Kaufman notes here that the German word for concept is "Begriff,.. closely related to begreifen (to comprehend),,,
Yes, but this needs to be understood within the whole, that is, it is comprehensive in the double sense of comprehend and inclusive of the subject matter as both subject and object together. See my comments about on #3.
To understand any book or text requires first that it be read - and understood. That's the task of this thread, and that is the only task of this thread! Opinions and arguments are not welcome! Exception: given a reading, if someone can add light or improve on - or correct - the explication given, then they're very welcome. Or if anyone wants to add their own parallel "reading," also welcome.
Fooloso4 asks a reasonable and relevant question given your approach as stated in OP.
So what is your take on this? Just quoting the whole of paragraph does not seem productive since the text is readily available.
It seemed clear that you hoped to give an explication of the Preface, paragraph by paragraph.
Then others were welcome to join in. This included anyone who wished to add a parallel 'reading'.
Just putting a paragraph out there, as a full quote, is not what was expected. A simple reference is enough so that people can follow your explication.
Explication:
'The idea and practice of explicate or explication is rooted in the verb to explicate, which concerns the process of "unfolding" and of "making clear" the meaning of things, so as to make the implicit explicit. The expression of "explication" is used in both analytic philosophy and literary theory'. Wikipedia
What is a philosophical explication ? Why is It carried out ?
Robert Burch:To explicate means literally to "fold out." The task is to unfold the meaning of the passage in context and to come to some assessment of its importance and its truth
To encourage the student to read actively. At its best, active reading is a process of critical appropriation, that is, a process of making the text 'properly one's own' by investigating its meaning and truth, ultimately with a view to how the position articulated in the text accords with or differs from, challenges or confirms, the constellation of your own fundamental philosophical beliefs and assumptions.
I think it would be preferable, to avoid cluttering up screen space, in simply referencing sections, rather than quoting whole chunks of text at a time. It is a format that has worked well before and will continue as long as we all use the same numbering system. I speak about clutter and screen space as one who browses solely via mobil, so perhaps it is a non-issue for most other members.
(I'm interested in this reading group and look forward to participating. Atm I'm in the French alps though and cannot keep pace until my vacance finishes).
I don't claim to have thought it through. Having the text up seems convenient. Nor do I feel it appropriate to hog the "commentary." I'm hoping more folks will jump in. At the same time, if taken in small bites, it may turn out to be not-so-mysterious. And anyone can add more of the paragraphs. I hope if they do, they'll try to maintain the format.
It would perhaps be wise to slow down. Take the time, as group leader, to read and think carefully before using the para as the basis for a group discussion,
To avoid the risk of doing the same I will hold off.
I hope you will continue to give your understanding of selected text.
I don't expect that a full explication is what is required for a forum discussion ?
I appreciated our discussion re para 2.
Thank you.
I would be interested to know if it is 'geist' that is translated as 'spirit', and also if the 'science' that Hegel is referring to, could be understood as the German term Geisteswissenschaften, usually translated as 'sciences of the spirit' (a set of human sciences such as philosophy, history, philology, musicology, linguistics, theater studies, literary studies, media studies, and sometimes even theology and jurisprudence, that are traditional in German universities.)
Good question but, as yet, unanswered. I wonder why that would be the case? I think it important that we ask that kind of question. This text warrants such attention. So...
Are there particular questions we should have in mind as we read the Preface? What process, if any, do you use in an attempt to understand ?
I am wondering about noting key words or phrases which might hold the key to the sense of the paragraph.
What difference would it make if a translation uses 'general' as opposed to 'universal' ?
And is the word being used in a technical v ordinary language sense ?
Which words or phrases are important to Hegel's whole philosophy ?
Does he give any explicit definitions of key terms and their relationship to each other ?
Part of the reading process is about such identification.
https://sites.ualberta.ca/~rburch/PhilosphicalText.html#long
Hegel index of terms pdf can be downloaded straight from Google search.
There are only 4 pages which I have printed off.
Hegel: Glossary (from Sebastian Gardner) It is extremely useful to...
SCIENCE ( Wissenschaft)
In Hegel, Science refers not to natural science but to philosophical knowledge, which must be in a systematic, articulate form. Thus it refers to his own philosophy. The Phenomenology was originally to be titled 'Science of the Experience of Consciousness'.
Also, a free downloadable dictionary: by Glenn Alexander Magee
www.scribd.com/doc/69965769/Hegel-Dictionary
Edit to add:
Pinkard has a Glossary of Translated Terms
German to English
English to German
In book - p475
In pdf - p522
Reply to Wayfarer
Yes. If done well, it is time consuming and other things take priority. I think some will have read the Preface before and so have a major head start. I will see how things go...
27. It is this coming-to-be of science as such or of knowledge, that is described in this Phenomenology of Spirit. Knowledge in its first phase, or immediate Spirit, is the non-spiritual, i.e. sense-consciousness.
- from Miller trans.
The above is important to stave of the prying noses of the religious zealots whom prefer to take “Spirit” as something akin to philosophical justification for an ‘immortal soul’. Note: “non-spiritual”.
Next the only paragraph I’ve marked ‘nice’ :
31. Quite generally, the familiar, just because it is familiar, is not cognitively understood. The commonest way in which we deceive either ourselves or others about understanding is by assuming something as familiar, and accepting it on that account; with all it’s pros and cons, such knowing never gets anywhere, and it knows not why. Subject and object, God, Nature, Understanding, sensibility, and so on, are uncritically taken for granted as familiar, established as valid, and made into fixed points for starting and stopping. While these remain unmoved, the knowing activity goes back and forth between them, thus moving only on their surface. Apprehending and testing likewise consist in seeing whether everybody’s impression of the matter coincides with what is asserted about these fixed points, whether it seems that way to him or not.
Also, the term Notion is worth addressing next:
33. (at the end of section) ... Through this movement the pure thoughts become Notions, and are only now what they are in truth, self-movements, circles, spiritual essences, which is what their substance is.
Next a brief look at Hegel’s approach to ‘negation’ and such:
36. The immediate existence of Spirit, consciousness, contains the two moments of knowing and the objectivity negative to knowing. Since it is in this element [of consciousness] that Spirit develops itself and explicates its moments, these moments contain antithesis, and they appear as shapes of consciousness.
... But Spirit becomes object because it is just this movement of becoming an other to itself, i.e. becoming an object to itself, and of suspending this otherness.
Note: You don’t want ‘opinion” here, but I would feel a little disingenuous if I didn’t remark that this comment is trying to unknot “knowing” as we commonly hold the term in colloquial use and frame “knowing” more or less as the common term ‘notion’. Also, the very next section calls back to attention the meaning of ‘knowing’ and how to reconcile such a take on ‘knowing’ with ‘truth’ ...
37. ... When it has shown this completely, Spirit has made its existence identical with its essence; it has itself for its object just as it is, and the abstract element of immediacy, and of the separation of knowing and truth, is overcome. ...
Context of the above is necessary, but I’m typing this by hand so look for yourself! :) In brief, negation is brought into play to explicate. I’ve also neglected to address the use of the term ‘essence’ which sprung up much earlier in the preface!
Forgive the backtracking ...
20. The True is the while. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development. ...
Note: a favourite term of mine may be useful here in place of ‘development’ (Nascent). I’m justified by stating this given the following lines of the text (go look).
Hegel then brings into focus, in the same section, the nebulous nature of some terms and how - harking back to section 31 - they are familiar, and thus paid dubious attention. This section being the set up for the later section (31).
Kaufman notes here that the German word for concept is "Begriff,.. closely related to begreifen (to comprehend),,,
— tim wood
Yes, but this needs to be understood within the whole, that is, it is comprehensive in the double sense of comprehend and inclusive of the subject matter as both subject and object together. See my comments about on #3.
The Hegel Glossary from Sebastian Gardner is useful here. Gives different translations and thoughts from Miller, Inwood, Solomon, Geraets et al, Kainz.
Excerpt from CONCEPT ( Begriff)
...
Sebastian Gardner:,..When Hegel speaks of the Concept, he sometimes just means concepts in general, but he also uses it to mean, per Solomon, the most adequate conception of the world as a whole...
Solomon...the Concept...has the force of 'our conception of concepts'...may also refer to the process of conceptual change...since for Hegel the identity of concepts is bound up with dialectical movement...
Reply to Amity Is this the snail’s pace you folks are working with?
Is it okay if I post regardless? I’ll probably be done with this sometime before you lot unless I take a large break.
The preface is about one tenth of the book so if you go at that pace you’ll be done by late 2020. If you were at university you’d be expected to sum it up the main points AND have a depth of understanding (usually parroting what others have said).
Reading from the end makes more sense with these kinds of texts. I’m assuming you weren’t joking? Once I’m done with the introduction I’m going straight to the last page.
The preface is about one tenth of the book so if you go at that pace you’ll be done by late 2020. If you were at university you’d be expected to sum it up the main points AND have a depth of understanding (usually parroting what others have said).
The thread is only about the Preface.
So, we are following Tim as leader of a group discussion.
As usual, readers are at various stages, levels of ability, and go at a pace which suits them.
Tim has set the general pace. It is his thread. So, people can either catch up, keep up, or keep ahead and comment at appropriate point.
As such, it isn't really helpful 'to cut to the meaning' by starting in the middle.
But hey, setting rules or guidelines, means some like to revolt and break 'em...
It makes for haphazard and incomplete understanding. Not usually the aim of a university course.
Signing off on the extraneous stuff to focus on text.
Apologies to Tim if my entries are seen as just the kind of 'noise' you were hoping to avoid.
Back to the Preface, armed with Glossary.
If such a requirement is grasped in its more general context ...
That is, the requirement that the absolute be felt and intuited. Then:
... it has gone beyond this immediacy of faith
The result is the opposite of what it intended. From this stage it:
... now demands from philosophy not knowledge of what spirit is; rather, it demands that it again attain the substantiality and the solidity of what is, and that it is through philosophy that it attain this.
But rather than:
unlock substance’s secret and elevate this to self-consciousness
it proceeds:
... to take what thought has torn asunder and then to stir it all together into a smooth mélange, to suppress the concept that makes those distinctions, and then to fabricate the feeling of the essence.
In its desire for oneness or unity it ignores or destroys the multiplicity or distinct elements that are essential to knowledge of unity.
What it wants from philosophy is not so much insight as edification. The beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion, and love itself are all the bait required to awaken the craving to bite. What is supposed to sustain and extend the wealth of that substance is not the concept, but ecstasy, not the cold forward march of the necessity of the subject matter, but instead a kind of inflamed inspiration.
Reading all this I am constantly reminded of Plato who is perhaps a primary target here.
Reading all this I am constantly reminded of Plato who is perhaps a primary target here.
It may be helpful to consider the Lutheran tradition where the democracy of conscience is opposed by "explanations" to contain it. Hegel and Kierkegaard held contempt for many of the same kinds of self righteousness that hid itself in "mysteries."
That is not to say Hegel did not describe Plato's work as part of keeping "substance" apart. But Hegel tends to describe that element in a kind of "ontogeny recapitulates ontology" fashion. He leveled more specific criticisms toward the Neo-Platonists. I think Hegel did not view Plato as making a system. In any case, Hegel just went through great pains to say he was not talking about setting various ideas against each other directly. In terms of his exposition of how these ideas appeared, everything has a place.
Whoops. That was opinion and speculation. I will return to my desk.
Given that the movement of history is central to Hegel's system, Plato is not to be understood as a static moment in the past of that history but as part of its ongoing development, which means not just the dialogues but all that follows, that is, his influence on the tradition. And, of course, when, for example, he talks about "the convictions of the present age" in #6 it is clear that he is addressing more than Plato and the influence of Plato. Having said that, such things as Plato's depiction of the love of wisdom as an erotic pursuit of something one does not posses, and knowledge of the Forms as ekstasis and noesis (intuition), are things worth pursuing. But since this is not a thread on Plato I thought it worth mentioning without pursuing it here.
Note: I have the Miller trans. It is worth looking at this to appreciate the use of Notion above concept. I’d also strongly argue that is indicative of an attempt to distinguish between ‘subjective’ thought and ‘sensibility’.
I mention this because reading the quotes given above by others the distinction between the use of Begriff seems to have been entirely ignored in the translation (“Notion” and “concept”, not simply “concept”)
[ Interesting and inspiring to hear different takes on the text; the interaction between readers who offer
the subjective ( opinion and comment) as well as objective matters, such as text and background. Making connections. It encourages active reading, keeping certain questions in mind ( as discussed earlier).
The latest on para 7 in particular - speaks to me: 'The beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion, and love itself are all the bait required to awaken the craving to bite. What is supposed to sustain and extend the wealth of that substance is not the concept, but ecstasy, not the cold forward march of the necessity of the subject matter, but instead a kind of inflamed inspiration.'
I asked earlier : What difference would it make if a translation uses 'general' as opposed to 'universal' ?
This might have been motivated by 'inflamed passion' and less of a 'cold forward march' but it can help progress an understanding. Most questions do.
What difference does it make if a translation uses 'Notion' instead of 'Concept' ?
The Hegel Glossary has both. It directs to Miller's translation as Notion.
We need to consider both, I think. As part of the dialectic which Hegel celebrates.
I think it helps to shape or firm up own thoughts, even as it might shake up and confuse. As we read this, it will no doubt inspire different directions of thought. Are we to dismiss this as 'opinion' ? I think not.
Sometimes, in posts, it is not easy to separate out readings from individual speculation.
When taking notes, I find it helpful to distinguish own thoughts or questions by use of [ ].
I will do this here.
Finally, I am taking time out to return to the Translator's Notes to understand the reasons for word choices. In Pinkard pdf this is on p38. And yes, I might even look at 'The Conclusion of the Book'.
What is it all about, Alfie? ]
'What's it all about, Alfie?
Is it just for the moment we live?
What's it all about when you sort it out, Alfie?
Are we meant to take more than we give
Or are we meant to be kind?'
- Burt Bacharach
It's also important to note that 'Notion' (or concept) is used here (beginning in section 6 iirc) in contrast to 'intuition'. Hegel is critiquing those thinkers, and philosophies, which propose truth can be apprehended in an unmediated way; Via some kind of direct experience. Instead truth is aprehended through a systematic process - which is what hegel regards as 'scientific'. The word begriff itself signifies a grabbing onto. Notion therefore, conveys an image of ascertaining truth through effort, whereas intuition does not.
... truth has the element of its existence solely in concepts
with the claim that it is not the concept but the feeling and intuition or immediate knowing of the absolute which are supposed to govern what is said of it.
But Hegel's polemical regard for "edification" could use some edifying explication.
To edify is to instruct, to lift up or improve in a moral or spiritual sense. Etymologically, to build up. From #8:
Corresponding to this requirement is a laborious and almost petulant zeal to save mankind from its absorption in the sensuous, the vulgar, and the singular. It wishes to direct people’s eyes to the stars ...
More on #8 to follow but note the movement from a time when people gazed upward followed by a turning back to the earth and now a need for elevation.
That is, for ecstasy, elevation, "insight as edification".
... to save mankind from its absorption in the sensuous, the vulgar, and the singular.
As if people :
... were like worms, each and all on the verge of finding satisfaction in mere dirt and water.
Their eyes must be directed to the stars, to what is higher, to the divine.
But:
There was a time when people had a heaven adorned with a comprehensive wealth of thoughts and images. The meaning of all existence lay in the thread of light by which it was bound to heaven and instead of lingering in this present, people’s view followed that thread upwards towards the divine essence; their view directed itself, if one may put it this way, to an other-worldly present.
In other words, the felt need for what is higher is not simply reactionary, the result of man's lowliness. There was a time when meaning was found in the thread of light binding all existence to the divine.
Hegel's image can be likened to an inversion of Plato's image of the cave. Instead of being forced to leave the cave under duress:
It was only under duress that spirit’s eyes had to be turned back to what is earthly and to be kept fixed there ...
And as with being compelling to return to the cave:
... a long time was needed to introduce clarity into the dullness and confusion lying in the meaning of things in this world, a kind of clarity which only heavenly things used to have ...
It is not, however, to a cave with the artificial light of the fire and shadows on the cave wall that the spirit's eyes (German Geist - spirit/mind, as in phenomenology of) were now turned:
... to draw attention to the present as such, an attention that was called experience, and to make it interesting and to make it matter.
But:
Now it seems that there is the need for the opposite, that our sense of things is so deeply rooted in the earthly that an equal power is required to elevate it above all that.
It is not a simple back and forth movement from the heavens to the earth and back to the heavens:
Spirit has shown itself to be so impoverished that it seems to yearn for its refreshment only in the meager feeling of divinity ... That it now takes so little to satisfy spirit’s needs is the full measure
of the magnitude of its loss.
The spirit has undergone a change. The felt need for elevation is too easily satisfied. Note the change from the "spirit’s eyes" that looked back to the earth from above to "people’s eyes" that must now be directed to the stars.
Why were the spirit's eyes compelled to turn to the earthly? Perhaps it has something to do with the tension between "this present" and "an other-worldly present". Does this turn mark the advent of modern science?
From a review of Yovel's translation of the Preface:
The Preface explains just what this transformation of philosophy into science fundamentally involves. In the first place, it involves the repudiation of the romantic notion, associated with Hegel's friends from the Tübingen Stift, Hölderlin and Schelling, that absolute truth can be grasped only in intuition or immediate feeling. In his younger days, Hegel shared with Hölderlin and Schelling the aspiration to overcome the dichotomies of Kant's critical philosophy, in particular its denial that we can have knowledge of the absolute or thing in itself. In the Phenomenology, Hegel does not abandon this aspiration, but he rejects Hölderlin's and Schelling's conception of absolute knowledge in terms of immediate intuition or feeling. Such a conception, he argues, dissolves the rich differentiation and determination of empirical content into a "night in which all cows are black" (94).
Reply to tim wood
Another element in rejecting Romanticism is that one of the main goals of the book is to show how individual experience is interwoven with developments of ideas that unfold over time.
At the same time, the developments are changes in what is possible for the individual to experience.
Reply to tim wood
For "edify" and "edification" the original text uses "Erbauung".
This word ist usually used to describe a spiritual or moral type of experience. One might find Erbauung in church, in nature, or in art.
Erbauung has positive connotations ( unless you use it in an ironic fashion), as in: it strengstens your personality. But it's usually more intuitive and spiritual, not rational and intellectual.
I believe that Hegel thus connects the word to the romantic "Schwärmereien" he mocks. And when her states that philosophy may not be "erbaulich", he is trying to say that it is a strictly rational enterprise, not a vague spiritual feel-good Type of experience.
... Interesting Reading project! Thank you for bringing this Text to my attention!
I'll be following along with the German original. I'm a German native, so the original text is actually easier for me to read... Let me know whenever you need any further explanation on German words and phrases
Hegel is not entirely unsympathetic to the impulse of those he is criticizing. The impulse is to seek the infinite and divine and stems from spirit's loss (#8) The problem is that it sees science as the very thing that limits rather than frees the spirit. They
... intentionally stands aloof from both the concept and from necessity, which it holds to be a type of reflection at home in mere finitude.
What it fails to see is that:
The force of spirit is only as great as its expression, and its depth goes only as deep as it trusts itself to disperse itself and to lose itself in its explication of itself.
But they:
... While abandoning themselves to the unbounded fermentation of the substance ... suppose that, by throwing a blanket over self-consciousness and by surrendering all understanding, they are God’s very own, that they are those to whom God imparts wisdom in their sleep.
11:
This kind of intellectual passivity or receptivity:
... is interrupted by the break of day
For:
... spirit is never to be conceived as being at rest but rather as ever advancing.
As with gestation and birth there is:
... the gradualness of only quantitative growth [and then] it makes a qualitative leap and is born.
In the same way:
... in bringing itself to cultural maturity, spirit ripens slowly and quietly into its new shape, dissolving bit by bit the structure of its previous world, whose tottering condition is only intimated by its individual symptoms.
The activity of those Hegel is critical of in #10 is seen as:
The kind of frivolity and boredom which chips away at the established order and the indeterminate presentiment of what is yet unknown are all harbingers of imminent change. This gradual process of dissolution, which has not altered the physiognomy of the whole ...
But with Hegel the process:
... is interrupted by the break of day, which in a flash and at a single stroke brings to view the structure of the new world.
Hegel is not entirely unsympathetic to the impulse of those he is criticizing
Well, yeah, he gets where they're coming from. But isn't he accusing them of choosing the easy path, which they claim leads to deep understanding but is really just a superficial dream?
In §11, when he chooses the metaphor of the child: However, just as with a child, who after a long silent period of nourishment draws his first breath and shatters the gradualness of only quantitative growth – it makes a qualitative leap and is born – so too, in bringing itself to cultural maturity, spirit ripens slowly and quietly into its new shape
Do you think that he's picking up the bud and flower metaphor from earlier?
I think he is. Again, it's about development. Things are changing, that's his message. But the new is not refuting or replacing the old, the old is merely developing into the new. As in, the old state of things is a necessary precursor to the new.
And while we're looking at metaphors: note that §10 ends in a sentence about sleeping and dreaming, i.e. Romanticism, while §11 ends with the "break of day" of Enlightenment.
But I'm not sure yet what this "qualitative leap" is supposed to be exactly?
But basically, Hegel is still criticizing and deconstructing the main ideas of German Romanticism in §10, right?
Yes. But one point I was trying to make is that from a historical perspective, and this means the working out of self-consciousness, we should not just dismiss what they say as wrong - even though they are, it is part of the development.
Well, yeah, he gets where they're coming from. But isn't he accusing them of choosing the easy path, which they claim leads to deep understanding but is really just a superficial dream?
I think his own development went through a similar stage but he was able to see beyond it and why it is self-defeating.
Do you think that he's picking up the bud and flower metaphor from earlier?
It's another metaphor for development, but here there is a shattering of the gradualness, a qualitative leap - birth, a new world. In addition, and more importantly, here we are dealing with development but birth of self-consciousness.
And while we're looking at metaphors: note that §10 ends in a sentence about sleeping and dreaming, i.e. Romanticism, while §11 ends with the "break of day" of Enlightenment.
Good point. I think there might also be a religious note - revealed truth coming in dreams, that is, from above as opposed to the spirit's working itself out and realization.
OK, interesting point. After reading these paragraphs about 3 times, I mostly agree with the above points, but I'm wondering if we aren't reading a little too much into it.
I can't put it into such poetic words as my predecessor in this thread, but I'm guessing that Hegel is not aiming for any eternal spirals or cycles of life and death.
Instead, he might simply be defending himself against the criticism of being too simplistic or too elitist: "The wealth of its bygone existence" - He says that the old concept(s) of science where broad and diverse in scope and well founded in a wealth of particulars.
And this broad scope is still what people expect from science: "consciousness misses both the dispersal and the particularization of content,"
Right now, however, he's at a bottle neck or turning point. His concept of the new science is currently "enshrouded in its simplicity" and "the esoteric possession of only a few individuals"
But he hastens to assure us that this simplicity is not the goal or core of his project, but merely an initial stage. From here on, the "new" science will unfold and realize its potential.
Right now his theory may be a small acorn, and only few can work with it and understand it. But it's supposed to grow into a large tree and be accessible to a broad audience: "Only what is completely determinate is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and possessed by everybody."
It's also important to note that 'Notion' (or concept) is used here (beginning in section 6 iirc) in contrast to 'intuition'. Hegel is critiquing those thinkers, and philosophies, which propose truth can be apprehended in an unmediated way; Via some kind of direct experience. Instead truth is aprehended through a systematic process - which is what hegel regards as 'scientific'. The word begriff itself signifies a grabbing onto. Notion therefore, conveys an image of ascertaining truth through effort, whereas intuition does not.
Consider it noted with appreciation for clarity, drawing out the distinction.
From Gardner's Glossary:
Sebastian Gardner:
CONCEPT ( Begriff ) ...The verb begreifen incorporates greifen, to seize...
INTUITION ( Anschauung)
A term of Kant's, referring to the immediate, non-conceptual presentation of a thing.
Hegel's attitude to the concept of intuition is mostly negative.
Another element in rejecting Romanticism is that one of the main goals of the book is to show how individual experience is interwoven with developments of ideas that unfold over time.
At the same time, the developments are changes in what is possible for the individual to experience.
Helpful. The unfolding of developing ideas and the effect on individuals.
Good to know one of the main goals of the book.
For "edify" and "edification" the original text uses "Erbauung".
This word ist usually used to describe a spiritual or moral type of experience. One might find Erbauung in church, in nature, or in art.
Erbauung has positive connotations ( unless you use it in an ironic fashion), as in: it strengstens your personality. But it's usually more intuitive and spiritual, not rational and intellectual.
I believe that Hegel thus connects the word to the romantic "Schwärmereien" he mocks. And when her states that philosophy may not be "erbaulich", he is trying to say that it is a strictly rational enterprise, not a vague spiritual feel-good Type of experience.
Reply to Fooloso4
I haven't reached this point yet. However, your clear thoughts and writing make me want to try and catch up. Quoting Fooloso4
Hegel is not entirely unsympathetic to the impulse of those he is criticizing.
I'm glad about that. It seems to me that his writing style reflects that positive spirit of Erbauung of which WerMaat spoke. The spirit lying in the artful use of metaphors.
Reply to Fooloso4
The discussion between you and WerMaat is instructive and enjoyable to read.
Reciprocal exchanges and informative interaction.
It is exactly what I appreciate in a book discussion. Especially when I am behind and need a bit of motivation. Thanks :smile:
Right now his theory may be a small acorn, and only few can work with it and understand it. But it's supposed to grow into a large tree and be accessible to a broad audience: "Only what is completely determinate is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and possessed by everybody."
I am not there yet. I guess you are one of the few :wink:
The tree again, seed, seedling, sapling, mature tree, finally fallen tree. But the source for a whole new beginning, that future grounded in the rotting tree, but itself not determined by its ground
And the past is archive of the new, being its ground and providing reference points, and without which the "child" both feels and is insecure, lacking the structure and bounds of the old, and not yet establishing its own.
In this inchoate condition, "science" is owned and understood only by the few. But in its logic and the working out of that logic it becomes an offering of participation to all, because as Being itself, it is necessarily accessible to all beings.
Some selective pruning required ?
Metaphysician UndercoverJuly 17, 2019 at 11:53#3075320 likes
But I'm not sure yet what this "qualitative leap" is supposed to be exactly?
When being and not being are subsumed within becoming, in the manner of Hegelian dialectics, the "qualitative leap" is difficult to make sense of. Such a leap, under its own definitive terms is an end, a not-being of the past existence, and a beginning of the being of the future existence. Such a leap must be understood in terms of process, a coming-to-be, to be made sense of in Hegelian terms, but then the term "leap" is misleading. Hegel's challenge is to describe these occurrences which appear as qualitative leaps, in terms of processes or comings-to-be, "slowly and quietly" ... "reshaping itself", because the leap for him is an illusion. You might call this "qualitative leap" a faulty description.
Yet this newness is no more completely actual than is the newborn child, and it is essential to bear this in mind. Its immediacy, or its concept, is the first to come on the scene.
As the oak is in the acorn, the man is in the child, but it its immediacy, that is, at this moment it has not actualized itself.
In the same way, science, the crowning glory of a spiritual world, is not completed in its initial stages. The beginning of a new spirit is the outcome of a widespread revolution in the diversity of forms of cultural formation ...
Just as each stage of gestation is necessary, each moment leading to the new birth of spirit is necessary. And just as each stage in the development of the fetus is itself a revolution (Miller has upheaval) that brings about something that was not present before this stage and adds to the whole of what is developing, each stage of cultural development adds to the diversity of forms that comprise:
... the whole which has returned into itself from out of its succession and extension and has come to be the simple concept of itself.
Returning into itself is to become what from the beginning it is to be. Each stage of this new whole no matter how different it is from earlier stages is not a move away from but within itself, adding to to the completion of itself.
The actuality of this simple whole consists in those embodiments which, having become moments of the whole, again develop themselves anew and give themselves a figuration, but this time in their new element, in the new meaning which itself has come to be.
The moments in the development of spirit do not understand themselves and are not understood by subsequent moment until this moment when it has come to the simple concept of itself. It is in this new element that each of those moments is understood anew as part in the development of the whole.
13:
On the one hand, while the initial appearance of the new world is just the whole enshrouded in its simplicity, or its universal ground, still, on the other hand, the wealth of its bygone existence is in recollection still current for consciousness.
Hegel is not talking just about the development of some intellectual pursuit, philosophy, or even a science of the whole, but of a new world in its incipience. It is not the study of or reflection on the whole but the whole itself. In its simplicity it is not yet revealed itself as what it is to be. At the same time its existence as it was is still present or active in its recollection of itself, that is, its history in the sense of bringing it back to itself in its consciousness of itself.
In that newly appearing shape, consciousness misses both the dispersal and the particularization of content, but it misses even more the development of the form as a result of which the differences are securely determined and are put into the order of their fixed relationships.
Its new shape, the whole enshrouded in simplicity, as the universal ground is no longer what it was in its earlier stages of differentiation and particularization, of fixed relationships. Here we see that Hegel is not completely at odds with those he criticizes.
Without this development, science has no general intelligibility, and it seems to be the esoteric possession of only a few individuals – an esoteric possession, because at first science is only available in its concept, or in what is internal to it, and it is the possession of a few individuals, since its appearance in this not-yet fully unfurled form makes its existence into something wholly singular.
Science appears to be esoteric, that is, shrouded, hidden from view of all but a few who are, so to speak, initiated into its secrets, its specialized language and practices. But it appears this way because it has not yet fully unfurled. It is not something wholly singular but a part of the development of the whole. It is from within this development that science has its general intelligibility.
Only what is completely determinate is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and possessed by everybody. The intelligible form of science is the path offered to everyone and equally available for all.
Up until this point science has not been completely determinate, that is to say, it has not yet completed itself and so cannot be understood. With the completion of its movement it has become comprehensible. Perhaps @WerMaat can comment on whether there is in German this double sense of comprehensive as complete and understandable.
To achieve rational knowledge through our own intellect is the rightful demand of a consciousness which is approaching the status of science. This is so because the understanding is thinking, the pure I as such, and because what is intelligible is what is already familiar and common both to science and to the unscientific consciousness alike, and it is that through which unscientific consciousness is
immediately enabled to enter into science.
What does Hegel mean by "our own intellect"? Is it something uniquely mine or ours? The "pure I" is the thinking I. As such it is the I of thinking. What is intelligible is so to any consciousness whether scientific or unscientific, because the intelligible is what is already familiar to consciousness.
Reply to Fooloso4 Only what is completely determinate is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and possessed by everybody.
German:
Erst was vollkommen bestimmt ist, ist zugleich exoterisch, begreiflich, und fähig, gelernt und das Eigentum aller zu sein.
Forget about the double sense, we're talking "understandable" only, "completeness" is not implied in the German Text.( At least not in this sentence.)
Hegel uses "begreiflich", from the root greifen: the action of grasping an object with your hand.
With the prefix be- you get begreifen, literally: the action of touching an object repeatedly in order to explore its shape - but usually used in the more abstract sense of understanding or grasping something in your mind
Each stage of this new whole no matter how different it is from earlier stages is not a move away from but within itself, adding to to the completion of itself.
This makes sense to me. There are distinct stages of development of an individual, the core spirit of whom remains intact. It is a becoming.
Hegel is not talking just about the development of some intellectual pursuit, philosophy, or even a science of the whole, but of a new world in its incipience. It is not the study of or reflection on the whole but the whole itself
Each individual experience, and reflection thereof, adds new ideas to the old.
The effects, more evolutionary than revolutionary ? Leading to an exciting new world.
Forget about the double sense, we're talking "understandable" only, "completeness" is not implied in the German Text.( At least not in this sentence.)
Okay, thanks. I think it may be more accurate to say that completeness is not implied in the German term begreiflich, but completeness is certainly central to the text and paragraph: "Only what is completely determinate ...", and this is why prior to this moment it has not been understood or, as both Miller and Pinkard have it "comprehended". Whether they made a connection between comprehend and comprehensive I cannot say. With regard to the root meaning of the term in German you provided I am reminded of the parable of the blind men and the elephant. Each can touch a part but since none can grasp the whole, and so none of them understand or comprehend the object.
Hegel uses "begreiflich", from the root greifen: the action of grasping an object with your hand.
With the prefix be- you get begreifen, literally: the action of touching an object repeatedly in order to explore its shape - but usually used in the more abstract sense of understanding or grasping something in your mind
This clarity helps my understanding. Much better than the glossary explanation . Thanks.
With regard to the root meaning of the term in German you provided I am reminded of the parable of the blind men and the elephant. Each can touch a part but since none can grasp the whole, and so none of them understand or comprehend the object.
Readers each explore the form, shape, substance and nature of the text from their unique perspective.
So, a group affair is more likely to fare well.
Feedback loop leads to improved comprehension. Hopefully.
With regard to the root meaning of the term in German you provided I am reminded of the parable of the blind men and the elephant. Each can touch a part but since none can grasp the whole, and so none of them understand or comprehend the object.
Yes definitely, a good point!
Still, in this context I think that Hegel is mainly trying to contrast the "esoteric" and the "exoteric", stating that only the latter is easily and immediately "graspable": begreiflich.
He may still be arguing against Romanticism, which believes in the opposite: that the true core of a thing can best be comprehended and grasped by immediate intuition, circumventing reason and intellect.
By the way, scrolling back to the earlier paragraphs, please note that you have already encountered the noun form of "begreiflich".
The word "Begriff", translated as "concept" in #6, stems from the exactly same root...
Still, in this context I think that Hegel is mainly trying to contrast the "esoteric" and the "exoteric", stating that only the latter is easily and immediately "graspable": begreiflich.
Right, but what is it that makes it graspable? How is it that what was once esoteric has become exoteric?
By the way, scrolling back to the earlier paragraphs, please note that you have already encountered the noun form of "begreiflich".
The word "Begriff", translated as "concept" in #6, stems from the exactly same root...
Kaufman notes here that the German word for concept is "Begriff,.. closely related to begreifen (to comprehend),,,
— tim wood
Yes, but this needs to be understood within the whole, that is, it is comprehensive in the double sense of comprehend and inclusive of the subject matter as both subject and object together. See my comments about on #3.
— Fooloso4
The Hegel Glossary from Sebastian Gardner is useful here. Gives different translations and thoughts from Miller, Inwood, Solomon, Geraets et al, Kainz.
Excerpt from CONCEPT ( Begriff)
...
,..When Hegel speaks of the Concept, he sometimes just means concepts in general, but he also uses it to mean, per Solomon, the most adequate conception of the world as a whole...
Solomon...the Concept...has the force of 'our conception of concepts'...may also refer to the process of conceptual change...since for Hegel the identity of concepts is bound up with dialectical movement...
— Sebastian Gardner
And in #12 that the beginning of a new spirit is the outcome of a widespread revolution.
Yes, I read that. However, I am wondering how long this took in real life.
How long was 'the winding path' ?
12. The beginning of a new spirit is the outcome of a widespread revolution in the diversity of forms of cultural formation; it is both the prize at the end of a winding path just as it is the prize won through much struggle and effort.
Hegel died before the publication of The Origin of Species and so we should not attribute Darwin's vocabulary of evolutionary change to Hegel.
The word 'evolution' was in use before Darwin. From the 1660s it meant a growth to maturity and development of an individual living thing. A process. Unfolding over time.
This would tie in with Hegel's biological analogies.
I think talk of a revolution and leaps is confusing. I think MU makes a similar point:
Such a leap must be understood in terms of process, a coming-to-be, to be made sense of in Hegelian terms, but then the term "leap" is misleading. Hegel's challenge is to describe these occurrences which appear as qualitative leaps, in terms of processes or comings-to-be, "slowly and quietly" ... "reshaping itself", because the leap for him is an illusion. You might call this "qualitative leap" a faulty description.
6 hours ago
Again, it's about development. Things are changing, that's his message. But the new is not refuting or replacing the old, the old is merely developing into the new. As in, the old state of things is a necessary precursor to the new.
Thank you, Tim.
Although initially critical of need to cut and copy whole paragraphs, thinking a reference sufficient, I now appreciate this very much.
It means I can easily find and copy relevant pieces of text in response to others.
My own pdf is Read Only.
11. Spirit has broken with the previous world of its existence and its ways of thinking ... just as with a child, who after a long silent period of nourishment draws his first breath and shatters the gradualness of only quantitative growth ... This gradual process of dissolution, which has not altered the physiognomy of the whole, is interrupted by the break of day, which in a flash and at a single stroke brings to view the structure of the new world.
It is the difference between process and product. The product is not simply the continuation of the linear process that led up to it. It is birth of something new, something revolutionary.
12. ... it is both the prize at the end of a winding path and, equally as much, is the prize won through much struggle and effort.
That is, the prize is the product that one comes at the end of the process and, equally as much, what comes through the through the process of struggle and effort. We do not simply follow along the path we bring about the prize. It is not simply there to be found but brought out through our struggle and effort.
Ah yes. The movement of history. I had been thinking about the duration of Hegel's own journey.
His time of revolution within the overall evolutionary process, meaning changes over successive generations.Ideas changing individuals.
It is the difference between process and product. The product is not simply the continuation of the linear process that led up to it. It is birth of something new, something revolutionary.
Understood. The product can be both an end and a beginning. Just like the conclusion of an argument can become a premise of another in an inference chain.
Still, I wouldn't describe it as revolutionary. The term 'revolution' is debatable.
Struggle and effort are involved in both evolution and revolution.
Hegel has not given us any examples. The rise of modern science was revolutionary and among other things established the authority of the individual based on reason. The American Revolution, French Revolution.
I think this is important and speaks to my earlier point:
Hegel is not talking just about the development of some intellectual pursuit, philosophy, or even a science of the whole, but of a new world in its incipience.
Here a disagreement - maybe. For anything to be teleological, in a classical sense at least, there has to be a telos - a "finally." That is, something specific that is the final stage. The kitten's telos is to become a cat, and so forth. Hegel had no need to invent a new "science" for this; the Greeks had it long since covered. And if that were what he was trying to accomplish, his contemporaries would have had his number immediately.
It is not a question of a new science of teleology, but of the movement of spirit from consciousness to self-consciousness, which is the movement of the whole to self-realization. I am not going to defend that argument now, but I think it will become clearer as we move forward.
In this inchoate condition, "science" is owned and understood only by the few. But in its logic and the working out of that logic it becomes an offering of participation to all, because as Being itself, it is necessarily accessible to all beings.
The book, beyond the Preface, builds on how other people take things away from us when they appear before us. The new thing being proposed is to live without doing that. And it is an empty idea unless a different sort of life happens. To that extent, the esoteric relies upon what is determined by the "exoteric." It has to work for everybody or at least enough of us to not be stuck in a previous level of development.
This paragraph ends with a rather surprising statement given what was said above in paragraph 11 about:
... the break of day, which in a flash and at a single stroke brings to view the structure of the new world.
Here he speaks of:
... the boredom and indifference which result from the continual awakening of expectations by promises never fulfilled.
How are these to be reconciled? The answer comes at the beginning of paragraph 14:
At its debut, where science has been brought neither to completeness of detail nor to perfection of form ...
To return to an earlier analogy it is as if one were to look at a baby or toddler or child or youth or teen and on that basis alone judge what it is to be a human being. The potential is there but at each of these stages it has not been actualized and thus cannot even be realized or known.
We must identify the demands on science that he says:
... are just, those demands [that] have not been fulfilled.
They are the demands of those who are critical of science who:
... insists on immediate rationality and divinity
It might help to think of this in relation to the analogy in 12 of the prize at the end of the path, won through struggle and effort.
That prize is:
... the whole which has returned into itself from out of its succession and extension and has come to be the simple concept of itself.
In each of its moments it has not yet completed itself via its return to itself. With its return to itself there is no longer any mediacy. This is the satisfaction of the demand for immediate rationality and divinity, where science has been brought to completeness of detail and to perfection of form.
It's useful background to know that the book was published in 1807. I am not a student of the Napoleonic period, but I think Hegel is writing while Napoleon is tearing Europe to pieces, at times within the sound of cannon.
The beauty of having a pdf is its search function. Type in 'Napoleon' to read of Hegel's claim.
For context and understanding, I think it helpful to read Pinkard's Introduction which tells of 'Hegel's Path to the Phenomenology'. Hegel calls it his 'voyage of discovery' (p10).
The Intellectual, Political and Social Ferment of the Time (p12).
2 major upheavals:
1. When Hegel was 19yrs old - the French Revolution upended all conventional thought.
2. Intellectual upheaval - brought in by Kant's writings with his insistence on freedom of thought revolutionised philosophy (p13).
Then 3. Goethe changed the outmoded Jena University from stuffy, conventional orthodox to a place where a professor could be a hero following Kant's injunction to 'think for oneself', laying the blueprint for the emerging modern world itself (p14).
This ties in with Fooloso4's important point re para 13:
Hegel is not talking just about the development of some intellectual pursuit, philosophy, or even a science of the whole, but of a new world in its incipience.
The emergence of a new Spirit.
p18 continues with 'What is a Phenomenology?'.
And so on.
Hegel envisaged his audience to be the people of modern Europe (p10).
it strikes me there are two distinctly different meanings of over-thinking, over-working, and worth noting, even if just in passing. First is the idea of existing material over-worked, over-wrought; second the idea of additional and too-much material added. If we try to eat all the thistles in the field, there won't be any left, nor appetite nor capacity for them.
Yes. It is right to point out the problem of over-thinking.
For sure, the Preface won't be completely understood after a first read through.
Individual appetites and capacity for close reading and analysis vary.
While the thread and the 'we' of a reading group might need or wish to proceed quickly, it is about finding the right balance.To take time to discuss. To share thoughts.
The thread appears steady and on course to reach its aim of understanding the Preface.
As well as possible.
OK, #15
I think I get most of that. I'd summarize like this:
Hegel has just presented and defended his idea, saying that the new concept of science is still at an initial starting point, and now needs to grow, to unfurl, to develop. So in the end we'll have a well-ordered universal system.
Now in #15 he describes a false way of growing.
He complains that the "others" take two unrelated elements: the available content and material gathered by the older stages of science, and their own idea.
And then they pretend that this existing material is all nicely explained by their one idea, like they were the ones who invented and gathered it all. Which is not the case, and neither is the material explained better nor their own idea improved or developed by this artificial joining.
Like: they're just piling up stuff that was already there, and spray-paint it pink, and then expound how this perfectly shows the superiority of the theory of pinkness.
Or like some guy with a conspiracy theory, who will copy and paste all kind of unrelated stuff from all over the internet then then go on how this is all proof for his pet theory.
Unfortunate detail: I'm not totally sure who exactly those "others" are he's complaining about, and what exactly that "absolute idea" is which they are trying to pass off as the pinnacle of all science.
Thoughts?
Is he still complaining about Romanticism?
To return to an earlier analogy it is as if one were to look at a baby or toddler or child or youth or teen and on that basis alone judge what it is to be a human being. The potential is there but at each of these stages it has not been actualized and thus cannot even be realized or known.
Yes. That is a helpful way of looking at and understanding para 14. As is :
Unfortunate detail: I'm not totally sure who exactly those "others" are he's complaining about, and what exactly that "absolute idea" is which they are trying to pass off as the pinnacle of all science.
Thoughts?
Good questions.
I don't know. However, I think it might refer to Hegel's critique of Kantian idealism.
Perhaps the contemporary 'Empty Formalism Objection' as googled after reading:
'this other view instead consists in only a monochrome formalism' (para 15 ).
[my bolds]
Others will know better and in greater detail. I look forward to hearing from them.
Note: I am reading outwith the text. I find the SEP article on Hegel useful:
In Hegel, the non-traditionalists argue, one can see the ambition to bring together the universalist dimensions of Kant’s transcendental program with the culturally contextualist conceptions of his more historically and relativistically-minded contemporaries, resulting in his controversial conception of spirit, as developed in his Phenomenology of Spirit.
When it comes to content, at times the other side certainly makes it easy for itself to have a vast breadth of such content at its disposal.
This is a continuation of 14, of the:
... opposition [that] seems to be the principal knot which scientific culture is currently struggling to loosen and which it does not yet properly understand.
The other side refers to those who reproach science. But in doing so they make use of what science has accomplished.
It pulls quite a lot of material into its own domain, which is to be sure what is already familiar and well-ordered, and by principally trafficking in rare items and curiosities, it manages to put on the appearance of being in full possession of what knowing had already finished with but which at the same time had not yet been brought to order.
It treats knowledge as a collection of things known, as a collection of items, and in doing so it does not see the order that science has not yet brought to order, that is, the order of the whole.
It thereby seems to have subjected everything to the absolute Idea, and in turn, the absolute Idea itself therefore both seems to be recognized in everything and to have matured into a wide-ranging science.
The absolute is the unconditioned, that is, what is determined in and of itself. It not to be recognized in everything at this point because there is not yet a science of the whole, which is not wide-ranging but self-contained.
However, if the way it spreads itself out is examined more closely, it turns out not to have come about as a result of one and the same thing giving itself diverse shapes but rather as a result of the shapeless repetition of one and the same thing which is only externally applied to diverse material and which contains only the tedious semblance of diversity.
It is as if it (he is still talking about the reproach to science) lays out the items of knowledge before itself and applies the idea of the absolute to them. It fails to see that it is one and the same thing, namely the absolute idea, giving itself diverse shapes, and instead it repeats one and the same thing, giving to them the idea of the absolute. Rather than finding the absolute idea in them it imposes the idea on them.
... what is demanded is for the shapes to originate their richness and determine their differences from out of themselves ...
A word about the 'idea'. In paragraph 12 Hegel says:
It is the whole which has returned into itself from out of its succession and extension and has come to be the simple concept of itself. The actuality of this simple whole consists in those embodiments which, having become moments of the whole, again develop themselves anew and give themselves a figuration, but this time in their new element, in the new meaning which itself has come to be.
In the history of philosophy the 'idea' at one stage is the 'eidos' of Plato's Forms, that is, the things themselves as they are known in direct immediate intuition. Even as it develops and becomes in Descartes and others something that exists in the mind as an image, it is to be taken up again in its new element in each of its moments. An idea for Hegel is not an image in the mind, something which gives rise to the problem of the relationship between idea and those real things they are ideas of.
[Edited to add the close quote in the second to last paragraph. The next paragraph should not have been enclosed.]
Reply to tim wood
Thanks for that. All opinions welcome :smile:
It sounds good.
Kaufmann as an authority on the subject is more than likely to be right :cool:
Re #15, two things I get - infer - from it is that "idea" is itself not static, and thus anyone or anything, any system, that claims to "have" it, is wrong.
You are correct in that the idea is not static, it does not follow, however, that anyone or anything, any system, that claims to "have" it, is wrong. Hegel's claim is that he has it.
Your assumption seems to be that since the idea is not static that it does not complete itself. But Hegel claims that it has completed itself, at least to the extent that it understands itself within the whole of itself.
I find in this idea an opposition to the Platonic eidos - the perfect form that is the model for the Greek's imperfect reality.
That too is correct, but you seem to have missed the point.
When Hegel says:
... having become moments of the whole, again develop themselves anew and give themselves a figuration, but this time in their new element, in the new meaning which itself has come to be.
that does not mean a return to Plato but a dialectical rethinking of not only Plato but of the whole history of philosophy. Although he has not used the term, it is aufheben, both to cancel or negate and preserve. You referred to "aufheben and sublation" on page 4. Sublation is the English translation of aufheben. It is the preserve part that you seem to have overlooked. It is not a matter of leaving the past behind. If we are to understand the ontological status of 'idea' for Hegel we must see that he does not mean what we ordinarily mean when we talk about ideas. On the other hand, he does not mean some transcendent realm of unchanging beings either.*
On the relationship of Hegel to Plato by a quick search I found this: https://www.academia.edu/20121186/Platos_Positive_Dialectic_Hegel_Reads_Platos_Parmenides_Sophist_and_Philebus
I only skimmed parts but it might give you a better sense of what is at issue.
*Of course, it should not be overlooked that Plato himself rejected this. In the dialogue Parmenides, the Forms, as presented by a young Socrates, are shown to be incoherent by Parmenides. The Forms are Plato's poetry, designed to replace the theology of the poets. I have written about this elsewhere on the forum. Plato was, after all, both a master dialectician and rhetorician.
The wiki article on Naturphilosophie might be helpful, particularly the following:
Schelling's Absolute was left with no other function than that of removing all the differences which give form to thought. The criticisms of Fichte, and more particularly of Hegel (in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit), pointed to a defect in the conception of the Absolute as mere featureless identity.
Reply to Fooloso4
Thank you for that.
It seems that Schelling is indeed a target of Hegel. And vice versa.
Bearing in mind the need to focus on the text, I only add this as a matter of interest.
*Of course, it should not be overlooked that Plato himself rejected this. In the dialogue Parmenides, the Forms, as presented by a young Socrates, are shown to be incoherent by Parmenides. The Forms are Plato's poetry, designed to replace the theology of the poets. I have written about this elsewhere on the forum. Plato was, after all, both a master dialectician and rhetorician.
I agree that Parmenides, the Dialogue, is important to this discussion of what is an "absolute" and what not so absolute elements might have to do with it.
But, while the dialogue brings up many problems to the notion of "participating in the eidos", I don't read it as kicking it to the curb. Parmenides and Zeno, in so far as they spoke for themselves (in pre-Socractic texts) presented a unity that did not permit a way to understand change. This view has often been contrasted to Heraclitus who made it difficult to understand what continues to exist after accepting the complex world of change as the primary state. The introduction of the idea of forms was, in some part, to bridge the gap between the two.
So, in one way, this dialogue, written later in Plato's life, was not a disavowal of an idea but the gift of a problem to future generations.
A most generous gift! (and I love how you phrased that)
Thank you all for your helpful comments! I currently feel that I have nothing useful to add, but I'm following this discussion with great enjoyment.
One comment, perhaps: I find the translation to be very good. I, at least, found no clues or meanings in the German text of #15 and #16 that weren't adequately represented in the English translation also. In #16, the English was even easier to read than the rather convoluted German sentences...
I don't want to derail the topic, so I will only make a few quick comments. I would be glad to discuss the issue elsewhere. While I agree that the Forms can be seen as situated between Parmenides and Heraclitus (there is interestingly enough no dialogue Heraclitus), the setting of the dialogue at the time when Socrates was young suggests that it was not simply in his later years that Plato came to question the Forms as some claim. The Forms are not things known, they are images and despite all the talk of them being what things are the image of, they are themselves images. Further, since Plato makes clear that, contrary to what Neo-Platonists, mystics, and some religious believes hold to be true, anamnesis or recollection is a myth, and as such does not support the Forms but makes their existence even more problematic. They are, in my opinion, and in no way only my own, a gift of philosophical poetry, which does not to diminish their importance and value.
I currently feel that I have nothing useful to add, but I'm following this discussion with great enjoyment.
On the contrary, your take of how German text sounds to a German reader is very helpful. It is the sort of information that is typically added in footnotes to translation as a back up argument for why a phrase appears as it does. Responding as a reader is a different thing.
Keep going, please.
Reply to Fooloso4
You are right. The topic requires its own discussion.
I am not sure how Hegel understood what happened in regards to the topic.
I really like the observation that there is no Platonic dialogue called Heraclitus.
Like: they're just piling up stuff that was already there, and spray-paint it pink, and then expound how this perfectly shows the superiority of the theory of pinkness.
Hegel speaks of monotonous formalism being not that difficult to handle. It is like the limited palette of red and green. The painter using red for a historical piece, green for landscapes ( para 51, p79 ).
I am now wondering just how much of that is a true depiction of Schelling's view ( if he is the target ).
But that would be another book, another time - I guess...
It is reassuring to know you find the translation to be good. I think having German as a first language will come in very useful when it comes to deciding meaning. For example:
Although he has not used the term, it is aufheben, both to cancel or negate and preserve. You referred to "aufheben and sublation" on page 4. Sublation is the English translation of aufheben. It is the preserve part that you seem to have overlooked. It is not a matter of leaving the past behind. If we are to understand the ontological status of 'idea' for Hegel we must see that he does not mean what we ordinarily mean when we talk about ideas. On the other hand, he does not mean some transcendent realm of unchanging beings either.*
Pinkard discusses 'aufheben' and 'sublate' in his Translation Notes.
He leaves it up to the reader to judge whether it is being used simply as 1.negate 2.preserve or 3.both.
Another suggested meaning: to raise up.
He gives an example of 3. both.
A move in a philosophical conversation where an interlocutor might deny an opponent's point but there is still something worthy in it. So it is kept in a changed format in the ongoing discussion.
' ...this other view instead consists in only a 'monochrome formalism' (para 15 ).
I referred to this earlier, thinking it might have to do with the formalism of Kant.
I would be grateful for some clarity on this, thanks.
I just looked into this a bit. Hegel says that Kant's Categorical Imperative, his moral formula of universal law, is "empty formalism". It is empty because it has no content just the form. Although we find here the absolute and the universal, I don't think that it is Kant's formalism that is at issue.
So, what is the formalism that Hegel rejects? That "in the absolute everything is one ... in the absolute everything is the same" or, as he mocks it in #7: " to stir it all together into a smooth mélange".
In so doing, this formalism asserts that this monotony and abstract universality is the absolute ...
In its formulaic universality it abstracts from every difference, every particularity, and thus renders everything the same. It is not the universal Idea that he objects to but:
... the universal Idea in this form of non-actuality
It calls itself speculative knowledge but:
... what counts as the speculative way of considering things turns out to be the dissolution of the distinct and the determinate, or, instead turns out to be simply the casting of what is distinct and determinate into the abyss of the void, an act lacking all development or having no justification in its own self at all.
As opposed to this:
... whereas in the absolute ...
that is, in the absolute as it is properly understood:
... in the A = A, there is no such “something,” for in the absolute, everything is one.
At first glance it may seem as if the two views are the same, that there is no difference between them, but in unity there is difference, otherwise there is nothing to be unified.
What does it mean for A=A? Traditionally it means identity, but to say that this equals that is to assert some difference. In identity there is difference. Is it then that A=A means this equals this? What then is the function of the equal sign, what does it mean for something to equal itself?
To oppose this one bit of knowledge, namely, that in the absolute everything is the same, to
the knowing which makes distinctions and which has been either fulfilled or is seeking and demanding to be fulfilled – that is, to pass off its absolute as the night in which, as one says, all cows are black – is an utterly vacuous naiveté in cognition.
The opposition here is not between the affirmation and denial that in the absolute everything is the same. Both sides agree on this. The difference is between the knowing which has only this one bit of knowledge and the knowledge which makes distinctions and either has or seeks to fulfilled itself in knowing the same in difference, the one out of many.
Reply to Fooloso4
Thanks.
I appreciate the time, patience, knowledge and experience you bring.
Will be taking some time out now but will follow with interest.
everything hangs on
grasping and expressing the true not just as substance but just as much as subject.
Now, I'm not an expert, but this part reminds me of Plotin a little. It sounds like substance is To Hen, the platonic oneness which is totally abstract, and according to Hegel it requires a notion of being a subject, an awareness, a reflection on itself - as the platonic "nous", intellect.
if thinking only unifies the being of substance with itself and grasps immediacy, or intuition grasped as thinking, then there is the issue about whether this intellectual intuition does not then itself relapse into inert simplicity
"inert simplicity" - I think this is what Hegel tries to avoid at all cost. He likes the idea of there being a universal principle, but an unchanging, abstract oneness is useless in his eyes. He wants this highest notion to be aware, dynamic, "begreiflich" (graspable...)
Or am I getting that wrong? I feel that I may be over-simplifying matters.
it is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of self-positing, or, that it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself.
And here we have another notion of change, of constant movement and reflection, right? The living substance.
Would it be too speculative to go back to our child and acorn metaphor?
As in: a newborn child is a fully realized human in itself. But at the same time, it is in some ways only a potential, it is in constant change. A human being is can be grasped only in their current state, in their current age and development. And in the next moment, they will already have changed.
But in a way, a human is also the sum of all his moments, past and present: Quoting tim wood
it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself.
I trust that everything I have said in this discussion is taken as tentative, but here it may be necessary to state it. I have worked and re-worked this, each time seeing it somewhat differently. But since, as Hegel says, we cannot see clearly what has not yet completed its development, there may be errors here that will become evident to me as we move forward.
In my view … everything hangs on grasping and expressing the true not just as substance but just as much as subject.
It is instructive to compare this to what Spinoza says about substance.
By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception. (Ethics , Part One, Definitions, III)
Hegel continues:
At the same time, it is to be noted that substantiality comprises within itself the universal, or, it comprises not only the immediacy of knowing but also the immediacy of being, or, immediacy for knowing.
The universal is unity of the immediacy, direct and unmediated, of knowing and being, of knowing and for knowing.
However, in part, the opposite view, which itself clings to thinking as thinking, or, which holds fast to universality, is exactly the same simplicity, or, it is itself undifferentiated, unmoved substantiality.
In what sense is this the opposite of the view Hegel presents above as his view? In Hegel’s view the universal is within substance, here thinking is itself undifferentiated, unmoved substantiality, the universal.
But, thirdly, if thinking only unifies the being of substance with itself and grasps immediacy, or intuition grasped as thinking, then there is the issue about whether this intellectual intuition does not then itself relapse into inert simplicity and thereby present actuality itself in a fully non-actual mode.
Intellectual intuition is given in its immediacy to thought by thought. It is inert simplicity because as given it does no work.
In the middle of these distinctions there is what seems to be a non-sequitur:
However much taking God to be the one substance shocked the age in which this was expressed, still that was in part because of an instinctive awareness that in such a view self-consciousness only perishes and is not preserved.
I take this is a direct reference to Spinoza’s God. Hegel thinks it shocked the age not because, as is commonly assumed, threatening the status of God as distinct and separate, but because it threatens the status of man as distinct in his self-consciousness. It is not a non-sequitur because this is precisely what is at issue - the relationship between God, man, thinking, and the whole.
Reply to tim wood
I am not sure how this works out in the Preface but Hegel discusses the immediacy of knowing in the early chapters of the book itself. He takes away the platform Kant gave himself. Or one gives oneself.
I see that Fooloso4 has posted already. He quotes Spinoza, "By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception."
Our hazard here - maybe just my hazard - lies in accepting something like this from Spinoza as explanation.
It is not a question of accepting Spinoza for an explanation of what Hegel means by substance. I introduced Spinoza because of what Hegel goes on to say about God as the one substance. Why does he introduce this here, at this point?
My problem is that I have no idea what it means to have a single unitary conception "formed independently of any other conception.
I do not want to get into a discussion of Spinoza but it means that there is only one substance and that it is not derived from or dependent on anything else.
I think Fooloso4 just above has got some of it, but not all.
Hence my comment about the tentativeness of what I said. One disadvantage of the way we are proceeding is that we have not read the whole of the preface or the whole of the book.
But at the moment it seems to me Hegel is allowing himself to float a bit, no feet on the ground.
One assumption that guides my reading of the philosophers is that when things do not make sense to me the problem is probably with me and not the text. Hegel is certainly not floating. If anything, the density and compactness of what he is saying is likely to sink us. But the sense of not having your feet on the ground is apt. He is talking about the whole from within the whole, there is no ground on which to stand.
Nice resource. Maybe not a Dummy's Guide, but helpful.
Yes. This glossary is more in-depth and explanatory than the previous Gardner one.
It links concepts and shows how Hegel uses them.
A glossary is an essential piece of kit when trying to understand or explicate the meaning.
Care needs to be taken that it is a reliable source. I think this one is.
However, I agree, even the definitions can be difficult to understand !
Some will already have acquired and are adept at using this specialised language.
It might be helpful to build own glossary along the way.
And edit it as understanding progresses.
Just a thought...
One assumption that guides my reading of the philosophers is that when things do not make sense to me the problem is probably with me and not the text.
One disadvantage of the way we are proceeding is that we have not read the whole of the preface or the whole of the book.
Agreed. I was taught to scan or skim through the first time, not stopping at obstacles or confusing parts. Then return to take notes, look up specialised key terms and issues. But each to their own. I like to note and understand key words first...
This group discussion is a bit of a mix. Apparently taking place during a first read, hence the advice to carry on and not get bogged down. It seems we carry on - in various stages of ignorance - and return later, having gained an overall picture. Or in the perhaps vain hope of Quoting tim wood
I don't know but it might be an idea to use the quote function, stating Hegel as source.
Otherwise, when your post is used as reference, it looks like Hegel's words are yours.
Confusing enough already.
This group discussion is a bit of a mix. Apparently taking place during a first read, hence the advice to carry on and not get bogged down. It seems we carry on - in various stages of ignorance - and return later, having gained an overall picture. Or in the perhaps vain hope of
... looking at Hegel to supply that clarity. — tim wood
Wise words.
I guess that Hegel wrote this text with his peers and contemporaries in mind. It was probably much easier for them to get his allusions and references. And without that whole background, it's indeed a challenge for us to find any stable ground at all.
For that reason we should probably rely on our more knowledgeable participants as well as secondary literature to point us in the right direction (thank you for linking all those useful resources!)
Good idea. If we can at least keep track of some key words, that's a big step already, and the glossary is a huge help there.
I myself like to use a kind of falsification method... not sure how to describe that in English, an "Ausschlussverfahren"? As in, I see what ideas, associations and hypotheses I can come up with myself, and then check if they hold up under scrutiny: Test them against the text itself, and with external sources, shave them with Occams razor and see what remains.
For example, my association with Plotin is probably nonsense if we have much closer, more contemporary candidates in Spinoza and Kant.
(I take this from the way I tackle Latin translations... I go with my first vague understanding of a sentence, and then check the grammar in detail to see if it matches my thesis. A lot of times I have to discard my first idea, or at least revise it significantly, but it gives me a starting point)
#19
Is it just me, or was that one rather more easy?
Hegel:However, this in-itself is abstract universality, in which its nature, which is to be for itself, and the self-movement of the form are both left out of view.
Until here, we continue from before, right? Abstract universality is nice, but useless, because it's somehow incomplete (not sure I get the "otherness" and the overcoming of that alienation, though).
Hegel:Precisely because the form is as essential to the essence as the essence is to itself, the essence must not be grasped and expressed as mere essence, which is to say, as immediate substance or as the pure self-intuition of the divine. Rather, it must likewise be grasped as form in the entire richness of the developed form, and only thereby is it grasped and expressed as the actual
Now, this is actually rather clear, isn't it?
The key words are "form" and "essence" I guess. Thankfully no trouble with the translation, the German "Form" and "Wesen" have pretty much the same range of meanings.
Well, "Form" has the additional meaning of "mold", and "Wesen" can also be a "creature" (as anyone who watches the series "Grimm" would know...) - but Hegel's context is clear enough to avoid those ambiguities.
(I take this from the way I tackle Latin translations... I go with my first vague understanding of a sentence, and then check the grammar in detail to see if it matches my thesis. A lot of times I have to discard my first idea, or at least revise it significantly, but it gives me a starting point)
Yes, that makes sense to me. Try an initial understanding before grabbing the dictionary.
That is kinda what I do. Have to say though, Latin, German and Italian are easier for me to understand than Hegelese.
I see what ideas, associations and hypotheses I can come up with myself, and then check if they hold up under scrutiny: Test them against the text itself, and with external sources, shave them with Occams razor and see what remains.
I like that. I would like it even better if I could do it in German. Consider me in awe !
My favourite German word: Ausgezeichnet :cool:
For that reason we should probably rely on our more knowledgeable participants as well as secondary literature to point us in the right direction
Yes. I think that is the point of a group discussion. To benefit from others sharing their views and insights. And also to keep questioning...as you do so well.
I myself like to use a kind of falsification method... not sure how to describe that in English, an "Ausschlussverfahren"? As in, I see what ideas, associations and hypotheses I can come up with myself, and then check if they hold up under scrutiny: Test them against the text itself, and with external sources, shave them with Occams razor and see what remains.
I do something similar. I start with what I think he is saying and then go back to the text to see how well that squares with what it says. It may seem as though I am on the right track but then I ask myself how this or that statement fits in. Without forcing it I see if I can make it fit and whether this helps make sense of the larger context or if I need to change how I initially understood it. This process continues as I read. Sometimes what I thought fit together must be torn apart and rebuilt if I cannot get what I am now reading to fit. Maybe what I had put together is not right and maybe what I am now trying to put together is not right and sometimes neither is right and the whole thing needs to be revised. But it may be that there are pieces that come later, and so, everything remains tentative.
Each part must be understood in its details and taken together all the parts should form a whole with those parts serving their function within the whole. The parts themselves can form wholes in the same way that a hand is a whole but a part of a larger whole. The process of reading is both analytic and synthetic, breaking things down and putting them together.
Furthermore, the living substance is the being that is in truth subject, or, what amounts to the same thing, it is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of self-positing, or, that it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself.
In #17 he said:
... substantiality comprises within itself the universal, or, it comprises not only the immediacy of knowing but also the immediacy of being, or, immediacy for knowing.
How are we to reconcile these statements? Is it immediacy or mediation?
#17 begins as a view from the end or completion, a view which Hegel says:
... must be justified by the exposition of the system itself ...
Hegel identified two modes of this exposition. Both are the consequence of thinking identity without difference. These should not be thought of as simply abstract logical consequences but as having occurred within the history of philosophy, the logic of the development of spirit.
In the first it is the identity of thinking with itself - universality, simplicity, undifferentiated, unmoved substantiality.
In the second the identify of thinking and being as immediacy - inert simplicity, actuality itself in a fully non-actual mode.
In #18 he shifts from lifeless categories to living substance, the being that is in truth subject. In its immediacy it is both the knower and what is known (#17). But in is in truth only insofar as it
is the movement of self-positing. The term comes from Fichte:
Fichte is suggesting that the self, which he typically refers to as "the I," is not a static thing with fixed properties, but rather a self-producing process. Yet if it is a self-producing process, then it also seems that it must be free, since in some as yet unspecified fashion it owes its existence to nothing but itself. https://www.iep.utm.edu/fichtejg/
Hegel adds that it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself. As self-determining it is other than itself in that it is not yet what it determines itself to be.
As subject, it is pure, simple negativity, and,as a result, it is the estrangement of what is simple, or, it is the doubling which posits oppositions and which is again the negation of this indifferent diversity and its opposition.
Self-positing is negative in that it is a rejection of what it is in order to become what it will be.
That is, it is only this self-restoring sameness, the reflective turn into itself in its otherness.
The movement is within the subject, a turning from within itself away from and back to itself. In its otherness it is still its sameness. That is, it is never wholly other.
The true is not an original unity as such, or, not an immediate unity as such. It is the coming-to-be of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal and has its end for its beginning, and which is actual only through this accomplishment and its end.
The subject here is not the individual or only the individual but mankind.
Reply to Fooloso4 just great... now I don't just have Hegel to read and reread again, now I need to do the same AGAIN with your posts..
(just kidding. :grin: Thank you for your insightful words! It's just that, when I read them the first time, I'm swept away by the elegance of your sentences, It's like watching somebody dance. And then I tend to loose sight of the actual content and need to start over.)
just great... now I don't just have Hegel to read and reread again, now I need to do the same AGAIN with your posts..
Fooloso4 works hard at this; note his reading process above. His practice means an ever-increasing fluency in Hegelese. If anyone doesn't understand, he is accessible and amenable to answering questions like: 'Eh? You what ?!'
Fooloso4 is a teacher in the best sense, having patience and a desire to help others understand.
However, right now, I am a bit like the 3yr old girl in:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6244/i-simply-cant-function-without-my-blanket
Only with me, it's 'I Simply Can't Function Without My Glossary!' ( and Friends ).
And even then, I struggle.
I realise that I am not ready to climb Everest, being more of a rambler.
That is why I have downloaded a free pdf from scribd.com:
Peter Singer's 'HEGEL: A very short introduction'.
I'll continue to follow this fascinating discussion, from the foothills.
Happy climbing!
This process continues as I read. Sometimes what I thought fit together must be torn apart and rebuilt if I cannot get what I am now reading to fit. Maybe what I had put together is not right and maybe what I am now trying to put together is not right and sometimes neither is right and the whole thing needs to be revised. But it may be that there are pieces that come later, and so, everything remains tentative.
Reply to tim wood
Thanks. This SEP article is very helpful. It describes various interpretations of Hegel's Dialectics.
[ It also provides a link to another resource. Hegel on Dialectic, Philosophy Bites podcast interview with Robert Stern (https://philosophybites.com/2010/04/robert-stern-on-hegel-on-dialectic.html). ]
The first moment I didn't copy, but the three together comprise what is called thesis, antithesis, synthesis (in some books, and as noted above somewhere, is terminology Hegel disavowed).
Yes. Here, it spells out that Hegel rejects the technique of using a triadic form:
Instead of trying to squeeze the stages into a triadic form (cf. Solomon 1983: 22)—a technique Hegel himself rejects (PhG §50; cf. section 4)—we can see the process as driven by each determination on its own account: what it succeeds in grasping (which allows it to be stable, for a moment of understanding), what it fails to grasp or capture (in its dialectical moment), and how it leads (in its speculative moment) to a new concept or form that tries to correct for the one-sidedness of the moment of understanding. This sort of process might reveal a kind of argument that, as Hegel had promised, might produce a comprehensive and exhaustive exploration of every concept, form or determination in each subject matter, as well as raise dialectics above a haphazard analysis of various philosophical views to the level of a genuine science.
So how would this process be reconciled with an organic growth - thinking back to the analogy of bud, blossom, fruit (para 2 )? Distinct from the more formalised pattern of: positive >negative > aufheben.
Perhaps, a more important, overarching question should be kept in mind:
How does this process lead to what is important to Hegel - The Absolute Spirit or Idea ?
This “textbook” Being-Nothing-Becoming example is closely connected to the traditional idea that Hegel’s dialectics follows a thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern, which, when applied to the logic, means that one concept is introduced as a “thesis” or positive concept, which then develops into a second concept that negates or is opposed to the first or is its “antithesis”, which in turn leads to a third concept, the “synthesis”, that unifies the first two (see, e.g., McTaggert 1964 [1910]: 3–4; Mure 1950: 302; Stace, 1955 [1924]: 90–3, 125–6; Kosek 1972: 243; E. Harris 1983: 93–7; Singer 1983: 77–79). Versions of this interpretation of Hegel’s dialectics continue to have currency (e.g., Forster 1993: 131; Stewart 2000: 39, 55; Fritzman 2014: 3–5). On this reading, Being is the positive moment or thesis, Nothing is the negative moment or antithesis, and Becoming is the moment ofaufheben or synthesis—the concept that cancels and preserves, or unifies and combines, Being and Nothing.
We must be careful, however, not to apply this textbook example too dogmatically to the rest of Hegel’s logic or to his dialectical method more generally (for a classic criticism of the thesis-antithesis-synthesis reading of Hegel’s dialectics, see Mueller 1958)...
...Ultimately, Hegel thought, as we saw (cf. section 1), the dialectical process leads to a completely unconditioned concept or form for each subject matter—the Absolute Idea (logic), Absolute Spirit (phenomenology), Absolute Idea of right and law (Philosophy of Right), and so on—which, taken together, form the “circle of circles” (EL §15) that constitutes the whole philosophical system or “Idea” (EL §15) that both overgrasps the world and makes it understandable (for us).
[ I'm kinda back in the game after reading Peter Singer's Introduction to Hegel.
A short but clear overview - well explained.]
From this I get that negating isn't something I do, either consciously or unconsciously, rather it is a step intrinsic to understanding as the thing in revealing itself also conceals, and as (my) the understanding becomes aware of the concealment, the original insight/understanding is "destabilizes" (from above).
I don't understand this. Would it be possible to give a practical example of how this operates ?
From Gardner's glossary:
NEGATIVE, NEGATION, NEGATIVITY, NEGATE
Gardner:The negative is that which is different from, opposed to, other than. Negation is for Hegel determinate, as determinate as what is negated. Hegel's thought characteristically observes the dialectical sequence:
1. affirmation
2. negation
3. negation of negation = affirmation of something new.
Applied to consciousness, per Pinkard, negativity is the capacity to critically undermine its own form of rationality; (determinate) negation is the sceptical undermining of a form of rationality
.
Note that the meaning of negation changes according to how or where it is applied.
As someone else advised: 'a glossary can be helpful but it can also be misleading. The general meaning of a term or even the way an author uses the term in general might not be the way he is using it in a specific instance.'
This is why I think it might be useful to compile one's own glossary along the way. Referencing context.
As mentioned earlier, this would be part of the active reading process - 'making the text 'properly one's own' by investigating its meaning and truth'.
Thank you, again, for your insights. Bit by bit, I think we're touching some stable ground here and there. Quoting tim wood
So indeed those of us accustomed to trying to think categorically and to reason everything back to some fundamental ground as providing a foundation for knowledge, with Hegel have got to get comfortable with process itself as ground, and not from the world - which imposes its own constraints - but from mind.
Yes, but we need not discard our immediacy of perception, right? We need to find the synthesis of both world and mind, Wesen(essence) and Form
#20
I don't see fundamentally new happening in this paragraph. Actually, Hegel is being quite patient with us, isn't he?
I think he's carefully and repeatedly explaining the fallacy that lies in immediate perception of the absolute: You end up with "big" words that are empty: In their universality they become vague and indeterminate.
They are not totally useless, however, they are still the right starting point for the following mediation.
Hegel:However, it is this mediation which is rejected with such horror
Now, this sounds like he faced some lively opposition to his ideas already, doesn't it?
Hegel:as if somebody, in making more of mediation (...), would be abandoning absolute cognition altogether.
Would it be too forward to translate into modern vernacular:
"Calm down, folks! I'm NOT abandoning the absolute"
Yes, but we need not discard our immediacy of perception, right? We need to find the synthesis of both world and mind, Wesen(essence) and Form
I agree. We can't discard this. It is part of a 3 stage process. Leading to knowing ? Truth ?
1. Immediacy comes first. If it means intuitive and simple perception of the world. A vagueness.
Non conceptual. Universal.
2. Mediation is opposed to immediacy. If it means conceptualization. Cognition. Particular.
3. The process of reasoning ( ? involving 1. and 2. ) > Self development > Individuality
What appears in consciousness is the immediacy of the chair. it "self-posits" itself there - don't ask how*. In its immediate self-positing it then becomes the ground, or first movement, in its own sublation into whatever it is to be in its completeness.
* How can a chair self-posit ? There is no consciousness.
Note that the meaning of negation changes according to how or where it is applied.
Some of the difference between Kant and Hegel is that the individual is not the only theater in town. Hegel relates the negation of person-hood as happens between Master and Slave as part of the process of becoming aware of the "other." Reason, with a capital R, is not possible without lots of awful experience.
The substance of my point is that he separates thinking from the world. In contrast to Kant who wants to figure out how we know about the world (in a scientific sense), Hegel just seems to find it in his perception.
Or another way, with Kant, on land, your feet are always on ground. At sea with Hegel, floating, or if in the water, then treading water to stay afloat. Two different ways.
Hegel deals with the world and consciousness at different levels. Thinking is part of being in the world. It includes and leads to all kinds of knowledge.
As far as I can tell, Hegel's intent to explicate the whole as a practical and human concern. The world and society are basic to individuals self-development or self-realisation.
The general theme of human self-realization in the practical sphere presupposes a conception of potentiality elaborated by Aristotle in Greek antiquity. For Aristotle, human being is rational as well as political. Subordinating ethics to politics, he sees life as realized in the political arena, what we now call society. Distantly following Aristotle, Hegel has constantly in mind a view of human beings as realizing their capacities in what they do. Society forms the real basis for human life, including knowledge of all kinds.
Hegel considers the practical consequences of two main views of human self-realization. Individual self-realization founders on the inevitable conflict between the individual and social reality, or between the individual and other people. The Kantian view, which focuses on strict application of universalizable moral principles in substituting rigid obedience for human self-realization, is self-stultifying for two reasons. First, universal principles binding on particular individuals cannot be formulated; and, second, proposed principles are unfailingly empty. Although human beings are intrinsically social, neither view of human subjectivity comprehends them in the sociohistorical context. Accordingly, Hegel turns to a richer conception, with obvious roots in Greek antiquity, of human action as intrinsically teleological. We must comprehend a person as acting teleologically to realize universal goals through action within the social context.
Hegel relates the negation of person-hood as happens between Master and Slave as part of the process of becoming aware of the "other." Reason, with a capital R, is not possible without lots of awful experience.
Thanks. I would be grateful if you could provide a reference for this.
In the Pinkard translation, it can be found in Section B, Self Consciousness, starting with Chapter A, titled: Self-Sufficiency and Non-Self-Sufficiency of Self-Consciousness;Mastery and Servitude.
The paragraphs 179 to 181 specifically involve "sublating" the other.
Hegel relates the negation of person-hood as happens between Master and Slave as part of the process of becoming aware of the "other."
'The process of becoming aware of the other' seems central to Hegel's theory.
We only become self-aware or self-conscious via our relationships to others.
In the Pinkard translation, it can be found in Section B, Self Consciousness, starting with Chapter A, titled: Self-Sufficiency and Non-Self-Sufficiency of Self-Consciousness;Mastery and Servitude.
The paragraphs 179 to 181 specifically involve "sublating" the other.
Thanks. I have taken note of the pdf page - starts p155, para 178. Jotted down p160 para 190 where I think the discussion starts in earnest. ( but I could be wrong ! )
I'm currently reading Tom Rockmore's 'Concept - An Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit' - (again, the search function is proving useful ).
Didn't realise that this passage was so famous, particularly from the Marxist perspective.
Conscious individuals in their conflicting interrelationships the basis for the master-slave relationship.
...Hegel further sees that self-awareness is not all or nothing but a question of degree. Like Rousseau, he understands social life as an ongoing struggle for recognition that can have vastly different outcomes. Both his exposition of the master-slave relation in the first section and his further exposition of free self-consciousness in the second section concern the social constitution of the cognitive subject...
...The German terms in the title of the passage suggest a distinction between those who are self-sufficient, hence independent, and those who are not. Hegel's surprising point is that in inherently unstable relations of social inequality, the master is not self-sufficient but dependent on the slave. When such a relationship has finished evolving, the unexpected result is that the slave is the master of the master and the master is the slave of the slave. The relation of inequality remains, although its terms reverse themselves.
Hegel's reputation as a social liberal is justified. His liberalism is not restricted merely to his early period. He composed this passage against the backdrop of the still recent French Revolution. It is at least arguable that what is still the greatest political upheaval of modern times resulted from the emergence of social awareness. For the change in our way of looking at ourselves and our world leads to their transformation.
Reply to Amity
I think Rockmore speaks too generally when he says: "The relation of inequality remains, although its terms reverse themselves". The master's dependency on the servant develops over time and when the relationship is superseded by a new one. The ground is not the same as at the beginning.
This touches on what Tim Wood is saying about the process of understanding being prior to the description of a knowing agent and what is known. Reading backwards from paragraph 190 to the initial discussion of perception, the process is not separated into different agents with different objects.
I think Rockmore speaks too generally when he says: "The relation of inequality remains, although its terms reverse themselves". The master's dependency on the servant develops over time and when the relationship is superseded by a new one.
Perhaps you are right.
However, I read it that the inequality remains when the roles are reversed.
Yes, the relationship develops over time. Rockmore says the relationship evolves.
In any case, I think it probably time I backtracked to para18 of the Preface !
Thanks for your thoughts.
Well, what is the reverse of a condition made only possible through development?
The term or idea of 'development' usually has positive connotations but not always.
What do you mean by it ?
What 'condition' are you talking about ?
What is the point of the question?
In the middle of these distinctions there is what seems to be a non-sequitur:
"However much taking God to be the one substance shocked the age in which this was expressed, still that was in part because of an instinctive awareness that in such a view self-consciousness only perishes and is not preserved."
I take this is a direct reference to Spinoza’s God. Hegel thinks it shocked the age not because, as is commonly assumed, threatening the status of God as distinct and separate, but because it threatens the status of man as distinct in his self-consciousness. It is not a non-sequitur because this is precisely what is at issue - the relationship between God, man, thinking, and the whole.
Thanks for spelling out what is at issue.: 'The relationship between God, man, thinking, and the whole' Although still not sure what kind of God Hegel is speaking of. Nor what the 'whole' is in practical terms *. Are we supposed to be at One with each other ?
The allusions to God as one substance (§17, 10) refer to the controversy about Spinoza, after G. H. Lessing's death, in correspondence between Jacobi and Moses Mendelssohn. This correspondence, published in 1785, led to a famous "struggle over pantheism" (Pantheismusstreit ). Eventually, Kant, J. W. Goethe, J. G. von Herder, J. C. Lavater, and others became involved. In the Encyclopedia, recalling Lessing's famous remark that Spinoza was treated like a dead dog, Hegel later comments that the treatment of speculative philosophy is scarcely better. His sympathy for Spinozism is apparent in his claim, redolent of pantheism, that "the living Substance is being which is in truth subject" (§18, 10).
Hegel further stresses his idea of the true as substance and as subject.
The object of knowledge is, like a subject, active in that it develops within consciousness.
For "the living substance is being which is in truth Subject, or, what is the same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its self -othering with itself" (§18, 10).
He echoes a passage in the Diffirenzschrift in comparing the process through which the object changes as we seek to know it to a "circle that presupposes its end as its goal, at its beginning, and is only actual through the carrying out and its end" (§18, 10*).
What does this mean ? Is God the Subject, the living Substance - and we are the object (or small subject ) endeavouring to become at one with the Subject ? Do we reject our self so as to move on, to process and progress?
The movement is within the subject, a turning from within itself away from and back to itself. In its otherness it is still its sameness. That is, it is never wholly other.
The true is not an original unity as such, or, not an immediate unity as such. It is the coming-to-be of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal and has its end for its beginning, and which is actual only through this accomplishment and its end.
The subject here is not the individual or only the individual but mankind.
Do you mean the subject or the object which changes, developing through increased awareness ?
The relationship between our particular selves > the world > reaching some whole Truth via the process of reason or thought ?
Are we meant to get tied in knots ?
* from Rockford on 'the whole':
Tom Rockford:Now returning to his view of substance as subject, he draws the consequence in writing that "the True is the whole" (§20, 11); what we seek to know, which he calls the absolute, can only be known when it is fully developed, as a result. For it is in the result, in which its essence (Wesen ) is effectively realized, or actual, that it has become and can be known. The result follows from a process.
I don't see fundamentally new happening in this paragraph. Actually, Hegel is being quite patient with us, isn't he?
Well, there is nothing new here in the sense that I still don't get it no matter how often he may repeat himself. This:
Hegel:The true is the whole. However, the whole is only the essence completing itself through its own development. This much must be said of the absolute: It is essentially a result, and only at the end is it what it is in truth.
I have read this and similar phrases over and over. It seems to be the nub of the matter.
I am tempted to throw my arms in the air and shout 'So what !?' :meh:
1. Immediacy comes first. If it means intuitive and simple perception of the world. A vagueness.
Non conceptual. Universal.
2. Mediation is opposed to immediacy. If it means conceptualization. Cognition. Particular.
3. The process of reasoning ( ? involving 1. and 2. ) > Self development > Individuality
Or something like that ?
Yes, pretty much. I agree!
I feel that the Immediacy is more focused on the moment, timeless and floating, while the mediation is more temporal, looking at the whole process.
Or another thought I had, a more modern metaphor:
The immediacy of the absolute could be compared to the DNA of an animal. If you know the DNA, then apparently you have the ultimate knowledge about this creature, its innermost structure, the core, the absolute.
Then Hegel might say that the DNA alone is just a mirage, a potential. You need to see the animal born, observe while it grows and develops, if you want to understand it fully.
DNA, the genotype, may be the essence, but the particular body, the phenotype: that is the form.
Well, there is nothing new here in the sense that I still don't get it no matter how often he may repeat himself. This:
The true is the whole. However, the whole is only the essence completing itself through its own development. This much must be said of the absolute: It is essentially a result, and only at the end is it what it is in truth. — Hegel
I have read this and similar phrases over and over. It seems to be the nub of the matter.
I am tempted to throw my arms in the air and shout 'So what !?' :meh:
You know, I get the feeling that you have grasped all that pretty well already. Perhaps you are at that point when you have trained and practiced a lot, and learned something well, and suddenly it's pretty easy to do... And then you get the feeling that you're missing something or doing it wrong, just because you think "it can't be that easy".
That sentence you quote - doesn't it describe the same 1-2-3 process that you yourself summarized above?
"The whole": point 3, the completed understanding
"The essence": point 1, immediacy
"completing itself through its own development": point 2, the mediation. negation, questioning, and in the end sublation to a new understanding.
Otherwise the both of us are missing the point, 'cause I'm no further than you are (I've not even read all of the articles you've linked.)
In taking control and making your own tentative (though firm) decisions, likely you will try to apply the ideas concretely - or I do, at least - where they both make sense and work. And in our present circumstance with Hegel, I think that serendipitously turns out to be the right way
Agreed! The only thing we need to guard against is a too strong fixation on our ideas and decisions. We need to keep checking if they work and adjust as necessary, or we run the risk to become Quoting tim wood
And his style doesn't help. His audience understood his language and context. But they too are long gone, so nothing for us in this is easy.
Yeah. The style is typical for the time, but it could be wielded with more elegance and clarity. Take Goethe - his reputation as a master of language is sometimes a bit blown up, but not undeserved. Texts by Goethe are far easier to read. On that note: Kant's style is even worse, in my opinion
Even in such an elementary example of seeing a tree, (I argue) Hegel's "universal" of that tree is not complete until and unless you "see" the tree in 360 degree view all the way 'round, including roots, and its history from seed through and including its death and long decay. Together with its interconnectedness with its world - which includes you!
Very good summary!
I also like your suggestion that "negation" is in understanding what's missing, in grasping the inadequacies of the "universal" view.
The style is typical for the time, but it could be wielded with more elegance and clarity. Take Goethe - his reputation as a master of language is sometimes a bit blown up, but not undeserved. Texts by Goethe are far easier to read
Now this captured my attention. I am very fond of Goethe.
Having read one or two pieces of his literary work, I hadn't thought of Goethe in terms of German Idealism. Wanting to know where his theoretical texts fitted in...I googled.
So, up they pop, here:
1790 - Metamorphosis of plants
1810 - Theory of colours.
1801 - Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_German_idealism
Goethean Science -
Goethean Science defines and values "expansion of knowledge" as: 1) Observing organic transformation in natural phenomena over time (historical progression); and 2) Organic transformation of the inner life of the experimenter.
"Individual phenomena must never be torn out of context. Stay with the phenomena, think within them, accede with your intentionality to their patterns, which will gradually open your thinking to an intuition of their structure.”
—?Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
[ Article includes the Kantian Problem]
So, there we have it, Goethe developed a phenomenological approach to natural history or natural philosophy. This gave me an increased understanding and appreciation of historical progress. The changing ideas...
The timeline picks up on the 'Pantheism Controversy' ( see para 17 discussion ).
This a major event in German cultural history (1785 - 1789 )
Goethe is linked to this via his poem 'Prometheus' published in 1789.
So, it seems that Hegel and Goethe were kindred spirits, even dying within a year of each other.
If we wanted to attach a label to their cold, white big toes, then perhaps 'humanist' would fit the bill...as well as any other...
I had an epiphany about restaurants a long time ago. You don't go to a restaurant to get what you like, rather you go to a restaurant to (because you) like what you get. That is, they do what they do and you cannot change their menu - and you like it or you don't.
Would you go to the Restaurant at the End of the Universe ?
All the jargon, then, applies to something concrete. So far I find that concreteness best laid out in his metaphor of plant-flower-fruit, and acorn seed-tree. The totality of a thing, then, lies not in any moment, but all of its moments considered as a one, a unity.
Yes. That is what drew me in. The first mouthwatering bite...and then look what happened...
A great discussion. Thanks to you and all.
I think you are entirely right. It would be helpful to circle back. After all, the circle is the best and most powerful image of the self-movement of spirit. Since it is so easy to get lost in the details and opacity of Hegel's writing, before moving forward I want to collect a few things together that he has said.
12: ... the whole which has returned into itself from out of its succession and extension and has come to be the simple concept of itself.
Returning to itself from out of itself the whole comes to know itself. This is the fundamental movement of spirit in its self-realization. It is articulated by Hegel in various ways. It is important to see that this is a self-enclosed movement whose progress is not linear. There is nothing outside of it.
13: Only what is completely determinate is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and possessed by everybody. The intelligible form of science is the path offered to everyone and equally available for all.
Until the whole completes itself, that is, comes to know itself, knowledge is still indeterminate, incomplete and the possession of the few. Who are these few? The philosophers who have moved knowledge forward. Knowledge is self-knowledge is a double sense - the movement from the Delphic "know thyself" to knowledge of the spirit's knowledge of itself. With the completion of this movement the individual, the subject knows itself in the truth of the whole. It is not available for all in the sense that information is, but rather as self-realization.
13: To achieve rational knowledge through our own intellect is the rightful demand of a consciousness which is approaching the status of science. This is so because the understanding is thinking, the pure I as such, and because what is intelligible is what is already familiar and common both to science and to the unscientific consciousness alike, and it is that through which unscientific consciousness is immediately enabled to enter into science.
The understanding is thinking, thinking is the pure I, the pure I is the understanding. Knowledge and understanding are in this way distinguished. How is it that what is intelligible is what is already familiar and common? What is intelligible is what is or can be understood, that is, made intelligible through the understanding, through the I that thinks, and is thus found not in the object but in thinking the object. What is made intelligible in thinking is then available to all. It is through the thinking of the few that knowledge is made possible to all who think. Thinking is carried forward by the few and becomes the available possession of all.
17: In my view … everything hangs on grasping and expressing the true not just as substance but just as much as subject.
Hegel is not just expressing an opinion. It is his view that will become what everyone will be able to see. In this moment of the movement substance and subject are distinct. But the true is as much one as it is the other.
17: ... substantiality comprises within itself the universal, or, it comprises not only the immediacy of knowing but also the immediacy of being, or, immediacy for knowing.
Substance is the whole, knower and known. Substance is not in or a name for the universal. The universal is within substance. It should be noted that Hegel is not rejecting immediacy. We know the immediacy of being in that we are. The immediacy for knowing is 'der Sache selbst', the thing itself that is to be known. I intentionally translated it in this way to draw the connection with Kant.
17: However much taking God to be the one substance shocked the age in which this was expressed, still that was in part because of an instinctive awareness that in such a view self-consciousness only perishes and is not preserved.
If substance is the whole, and as such there can only be one substance, then God is in truth subject. It is not just that God was taken or regarded to be subject. It is something now understood if not yet known. And because it is not fully realized, self-consciousness perishes, but this is only half of it. It is also preserved, taken up anew.
18: Furthermore, the living substance is the being that is in truth subject, or, what amounts to the same thing, it is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of self-positing, or, that it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself.
The movement of self-positing is the movement described in paragraph 12, the movement in which the subject returns to itself from out of itself. It is a mediated process, but not, as for example with Kant, the mediation of the object given in experience by the subject's understanding, but rather the mediation of the subject with itself. This is not to exclude the object. The object is taken up in the understanding, the I thinks it. In taking up the understanding itself, the understanding is mediated, that is, becomes an object for knowledge for the subject.
[Edited to add:
18: The true is not an original unity as such, or, not an immediate unity as such. It is the coming-to-be of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal and has its end for its beginning, and which is actual only through this accomplishment and its end.
I think you are entirely right. It would be helpful to circle back. After all, the circle is the best and most powerful image of the self-movement of spirit. Since it is so easy to get lost in the details and opacity of Hegel's writing, before moving forward I want to collect a few things together that he has said.
Well, we are roughly a quarter of the way up the mountain. And sidetracks have been explored.
Good to have a picnic break to survey the scenery. I will digest later.
Summaries are always useful, thanks.
19. The life of God and divine cognition might thus be expressed as a game love plays with itself.
“Thus” indicates that the life of God and divine cognition follow from what has been said. God and the divine are not separate from but within the circle. A game love plays with itself, the game of uniting two as one, but to play the game one must first become two, dividing and uniting itself with itself. Divine life and divine cognition are being and knowing.
Hegel immediately adds that this idea must be thought with due seriousness, that it was won through the suffering, the patience, and the labor of the negative. The reference is to the life and death of Christ and the themes of suffering and sacrifice, death of the body and life of the spirit. Whatever Hegel’s own beliefs were on such matters, they are an important part of the history of spirit, if not in terms of actual events then in terms of the shaping of consciousness.
Precisely because the form is as essential to the essence as the essence is to itself, the essence must not be grasped and expressed as mere essence, which is to say, as immediate substance or as the pure self-intuition of the divine. Rather, it must likewise be grasped as form in the entire richness of the developed form, and only thereby is it grasped and expressed as the actual.
What does the pure self-intuition of the divine mean? First, this intuition is the subject’s intuition. As immediate substance it takes the divine to be other than itself. To be grasped and expressed as form requires that it be articulated both as self-forming and formed, as both the development of form and the entire richness of the developed form. It is only from this stage of its development, when it has become actual, that it can know itself.
This is summed up in #20:
20: The true is the whole. However, the whole is only the essence completing itself through its own development. This much must be said of the absolute: It is essentially a result, and only at the end is it what it is in truth.
He goes on to express this:
The beginning, the principle, or, the absolute as it is at first, or, as it is immediately expressed, is only the universal. But just as my saying “all animals” can hardly count as an expression of zoology, it is likewise obvious that the words, “absolute,” “divine,” “eternal,” and so on, do not express what is contained in them; – and it is only such words which in fact express intuition as the immediate.
Zoology is not adequately expressed by the universal “all animals”, for in the universal the particular is negated or not expressed. All animals tells us nothing about any particular animal. In the same way, “absolute,” “divine,” “eternal,” tell us nothing about the particulars within the universal.
Whatever is more than such a word, even the mere transition to a proposition, is a becoming-other which must be redeemed, or, it is a mediation.
Hegel goes on to explain mediation:
21: ... mediation is nothing but self-moving self-equality, or, it is a reflective turn into itself, the moment of the I existing-for-itself, pure negativity, or, simple coming-to-be.
The transition from a word to a proposition is mediation for it must be thought and expressed. So too the absolute, the divine, eternal, must be mediated, that is, thought and expressed, given shape and content. But they are mediated by, the I. Existing-for-itself, the I is other than the subject or object of thought. At the same time it negates this otherness by making it one’s own by the understanding. What is thought, the universal, comes to be the subject matter, which is to say, the subject’s matter.
The I, or, coming-to-be, this mediating, is, on account of its simplicity, immediacy in the very process of coming-to-be and is the immediate itself. – Hence, reason is misunderstood if reflection is excluded from the truth and is not taken to be a positive moment of the absolute.
Reason is not unmediated intuition. It is not the understanding. It is positive in that it reflects on what is taken up in the understanding as immediacy without reflection on the process of unity. It is, in other words, reflection on a central problem of philosophy at least since it was first expressed by Parmenides: thinking and being are the same.
The movement in consciousness is from the immediacy of objects in consciousness, to their difference or negativity as objects of rather than from consciousness, to the immediacy of objects of consciousness, their sameness or positivity as objects from consciousness.
Reflection is what makes truth into the result, but it is likewise what sublates the opposition between the result and its coming-to-be. This is so because this coming-to-be is just as simple and hence not different from the form of the true, which itself proves itself to be simple in its result. Coming-to-be is instead this very return into simplicity.
Hegel expresses the same idea in yet another way, this time making explicit that it is not just something that occurs in the consciousness of the individual:
However much the embryo is indeed in itself a person, it is still not a person for itself; the embryo is a person for itself only as a culturally formed and educated rationality which has made itself into what it is in itself.
It is not the capacity for rationality but the culturally formed and educated rationality that allows the person to become for herself what she is in herself. While the importance of culture was recognized by the Greeks, it was to a large degree atemporal. The importance of history as self-moving and self-development was not a factor. The truth was regarded as unchanging. Today both views are represented and defended.
I don't know what this means. Did Spinoza "go theological"?
The first question should not be whether he believed in God but what he means by God. Once that question is answered the answer to whether he believed in God would be, for those who hold traditional beliefs, no. But that is not the end of the matter. Like talking about man when he is but an embryo, we should wait to see how things develop.
He does not reject:
... taking God to be the one substance
When he talks about:
The life of God and divine cognition ...
this reads to me like an affirmation. But it seems clear from what he has said that his concept of God is not the God of the Bible or the God the traditional theologians.
I also think even in his time it was unwise to be to clearly or explicitly anti-religious.
There is some truth in this and I am sure that Hegel, like his predecessors, was well aware of the practice of philosophical esotericism - hiding your meaning from those who are not ready for it. I think that what he says would be regarded as anti-religious by many both in his time and ours, who consider themselves religious. His comment about:
Reply to tim wood
As a contrasting parallel to Foolso4's remarks involving Spinoza, it is interesting how Spinoza complained how certain thinkers were sure what was possible for the "Absolute" without being in a favorable spot to observe such things. That sort of thing reminds me of:
Thus, not only is the former anticipation that the absolute is subject not the actuality of this concept, but it even makes that actuality impossible, for it posits the concept as a point wholly at rest, whereas the concept is self-movement."
The limits of observation sounds like a good place to start a Phenomenology.
Reply to Amity
I asked about the reversibility of terms because the logic that seems to be operating here does not seem to be focused on corresponding necessity to event in the way other ideas of causality are often discussed.
I asked about the reversibility of terms because the logic that seems to be operating here does not seem to be focused on corresponding necessity to event in the way other ideas of causality are often discussed.
OK. It would be helpful if you could expand on this objection.
If this is about the Master/Slave dialectic, then there are many views and interpretations.
If it is about the particular Rockmore quote I linked to, then he probably had more to say on the subject.
For me, this is only an awakening which will hopefully lead to a deeper understanding, given time and application. Clearly you have read more and have developed opinions which you are sharing. Thanks.
So, to return to your objection. It requires more detail from you. What is it that concerns you ?
Where is the weakness ?
How does it affect the overall drive of the argument, the acceptance of Hegel's theory - or its importance in the progress of philosophy ?
I need to read more about this. To this end, I place the following links:
( any other help would be appreciated)
Like talking about man when he is but an embryo, we should wait to see how things develop.
Perhaps. However, the Preface is by its very nature limited.
For a more expansive, possibly clearer view, we would need to read the chapter on Religion.
A foray into Rockmore...
One of the great, enduring mysteries of Hegel scholarship is the role of religion in his mature theory, including the Phenomenology. More than a century and a half ago, the breakup of the Hegelian school after his death into different factions already turned on different approaches to this mystery. In simplest terms, the orthodox, or Hegelian middle, desired to maintain what was perceived as his synthesis of religion and philosophy, the Hegelian right wished to subordinate philosophy to religion, and the Hegelian left wanted to eliminate the religious component entirely.
The idea that Hegel is a basically religious thinker is very strong, for instance, in British Hegelianism, which routinely relates all phenomena to the self-development of religious spirit that is equated to the Christian God, thereby further expanding the traditional right-wing reading of Hegel.
Thus, not only is the former anticipation that the absolute is subject not the actuality of this concept, but it even makes that actuality impossible, for it posits the concept as a point wholly at rest, whereas the concept is self-movement."
— tim wood
At first glance the quote looks to be the words of tim wood. As suggested before, to avoid any confusion on requotes, it is good to give Hegel his due by either naming him and/or paragraph.
WerMaat agreed with this and changed accordingly.
I know that clicking on the link returns you to the post where you can see it relates to para 23.
However not everyone clicks, it is simply read as is, especially in requotes. As can be seen when I quoted you just now.
Unfortunately, Tim continues the practice of posting Hegel paragraphs without using the quote function.
Why ?
[ I only recently mastered the art of the quote function from external sources (different from internal quoting other posters) due to similar concerns.
In my case, I didn't wish to take credit for words not my own.]
Hegel expresses the same idea in yet another way, this time making explicit that it is not just something that occurs in the consciousness of the individual:
Hegel:However much the embryo is indeed in itself a person, it is still not a person for itself; the embryo is a person for itself only as a culturally formed and educated rationality which has made itself into what it is in itself.
It is not the capacity for rationality but the culturally formed and educated rationality that allows the person to become for herself what she is in herself.
[ On requoting this, I noted the original Hegel quote marks were not transferred. I needed to use the quote function again :roll: ]
Re: para 21:
So, becoming all that you can be depends not only on capacity for reason but being part of a society of others with whom you can relate and depend on for nourishment and enrichment. Combined with reflection it leads the way to an improved understanding of particulars and the universal. Is that about right ?
While the importance of culture was recognized by the Greeks, it was to a large degree atemporal. The importance of history as self-moving and self-development was not a factor. The truth was regarded as unchanging. Today both views are represented and defended.
I am surprised that the importance of history in or as self-development wasn't recognised by the Greeks.
What did they see as the truth ?
How does this compare with the Romans ?
That will probably come later...
I think one thing is clear, God is not known by revelation or by intuition or by feeling. Since truth has the element of its existence solely in concepts (6), what is necessary is the expression of the concept of God.
In paragraph 4 we find the following statement:
However, the commencement of cultural education will first of all also have to carve out some space for the seriousness of a fulfilled life, which in turn leads one to the experience of the crux of the matter, so that even when the seriousness of the concept does go into the depths of the crux of the matter, this kind of acquaintance and judgment will still retain its proper place in conversation.
What is a fulfilled life? Given the themes of wholeness and completion, a fulfilled life is only realized within the movement of or perhaps with the completion of the whole. In any case, it must be a life guided by reason. If is the life that is self-positing. The life in which the thinking I, the subject, is its own authority.
Hah. Talk about circling back...
We kinda skipped over that right at the beginning.
(Amidst the confusion of Kaufmann v Pinkard and their different paragraph numbering )
Glad you rectified that and added your understanding. Most helpful.
So, becoming all that you can be depends not only on capacity for reason but being part of a society of others with whom you can relate and depend on for nourishment and enrichment. Combined with reflection it leads the way to an improved understanding of particulars and the universal. Is that about right ?
Yes, the development of the individual is through the development of the culture. But also, it is "the few" the philosophers who are responsible for the development of the culture.
I am surprised that the importance of history in or as self-development wasn't recognised by the Greeks.
Human nature, according to the Greeks, is unchanging. Self-development is toward this end. The realization or actualization or completion of one's nature is not dependent on history. We are no more or less capable of this than the Greeks.
The importance of history, the ability to think change, was one of if not the most important contributions of Hegel's philosophy. It has been said (I don't know by who) that Hegel is Spinoza plus time.
The truth is what they sought. Whatever it is, they thought, or perhaps more accurately publicly professed, it must be unchanging. If the truth can become false then the truth has no meaning.
It became the standard, the eternal verities, veritates aeternae. One might think of it as the victory of Parmenides over Heraclitus, but with Hegel Heraclitus lives to fight another day.
Yes, the development of the individual is through the development of the culture. But also, it is "the few" the philosophers who are responsible for the development of the culture.
So, we should thank our lucky stars ? For the 'few' - who knew what to do?
And the opposing view ?
Hegel:However much the embryo is indeed in itself a person, it is still not a person for itself; the embryo is a person for itself only as a culturally formed and educated rationality which has made itself into what it is in itself.
It is not the capacity for rationality but the culturally formed and educated rationality that allows the person to become for herself what she is in herself. While the importance of culture was recognized by the Greeks, it was to a large degree atemporal.
Fooloso4, don't put to much weight on this sentence... Upon rereading this passage I stumbled across a mismatch in the translation.(It stood out - the translation is usually excellent!) I believe that the translator as inserted a clear interpretation, while the passage in the original is ambiguous.
The German sentence reads:
Hegel:für sich ist er es nur als gebildete Vernunft
The English goes:
Hegel: is a person for itself only as a culturally formed and educated rationality
"gebildet" means nothing but "formed". It has the second meaning of "educated", true, but Hegel's context leaves it open whether the rationality has simply "formed" and developed itself, or whether it was "educated" from an outside source. And the word "cultural" does not show up at all.
I feel that Hegel is leaning more towards the self-formed. A reference to culture and education - the social environment forming the individual - is entirely missing from the whole passage. Instead, it's all about self-reflection:
Hegel:... which has made itself into what it is in itself.
Hegel's context leaves it open whether the rationality has simply "formed" and developed itself, or whether it was "educated" from an outside source. And the word "cultural" does not show up at all.
Not from an outside source. As I said in an earlier post, there is no outside, all is within the whole.
I feel that Hegel is leaning more towards the self-formed.
Yes, I think that this is right, but self-formation is a cultural formation. We are shaped by and within our culture. As individuals we are not wholly separate or other. To use the agricultural root from which we get culture, it is the soil in which we grow and are nourished.
From the Wiki article on Bildung:
Bildung (German: [?b?ld??], "education, formation, etc.") refers to the German tradition of self-cultivation (as related to the German for: creation, image, shape), wherein philosophy and education are linked in a manner that refers to a process of both personal and cultural maturation.
More specifically:
The concept of Bildung. What is a fundamental theme of Hegel's philosophy is Bildung. This term might be translated as 'education', but it could also be rendered, more appropriately in many contexts, as 'formation', 'development' or 'culture'. For Hegel, the term refers to the formative self-development of mind or spirit (Geist), regarded as a social and historical process. Bildung is part of the life process of a spiritual entity: a human being, a society, a historical tradition. (Allen W. Wood, "Hegel on Education". https://web.stanford.edu/~allenw/webpapers/HegelEd.doc
Reply to Fooloso4 You are probably correct about Hegel's concept of "Bildung" in general.
But in this precise passage of the Vorrede, in this specific context? I don't see a reference to culture, to society or education in its literal sense. (Latin e, ex: out, out of & ducere: lead - the "leading s.o. out" implying the involvement of an outside party)
The self-development of the individual takes places within the self-development of the whole, which in turn is led by the philosophers from within the whole. We do not each of us come to think as we do on our own. The development of the thinking I is a historical development not something that develops on its own in each individual.
The development of the thinking I is a historical development not something that develops on its own in each individual.
I'm not disagreeing. But I still posit that this is not in the specific passage I quoted - Hegel is using the Embryo-to-aware-self as a metaphor, he's not expounding a theory of education.
Concerning #24: I had been a bit vague about Hegel's definition of "negation" - this passage helps me out a lot. The whole process of universal-negation-sublation is explained here in very clear words, isn't it?
Hegel is using the Embryo-to-aware-self as a metaphor, he's not expounding a theory of education.
I agree. What I am stressing is the importance of culture in the development of the thinking I. In terms of the context and history of the term it seems to me to not be an interpretation rather than translation, although the line between them is not always clear.
You don't go to a restaurant to get what you like, rather you go to a restaurant to (because you) like what you get.
This statement is clearly false, and does not make sense. There is an illusion of sense, which you have created with ambiguity of verb tense. When you properly distinguish between what you've gotten from the restaurant in the past, from what you expect to receive in the future, then you will see that the reason you are going to the restaurant is your expectation to get what you want, not because of what you've gotten in the past.
The fact that you like what you've received there, in the past, does not motivate you to go there, in the future. What motivates you to go is the expectation of getting what you like, in the future. And this is the very opposite of what you say. This is the very difficult aspect of consciousness to understand, the conversion of past experiences into an expectation for the future. And understanding this conversion is very necessary because it is the expectation for the future which motivates one to act, not the experiences of the past. You cannot avoid this difficult aspect of consciousness, hiding it behind smoke and mirrors, by creating the illusion that it is past experiences which motivates one to act.
Hegel notes that this claim has fallen into disrepute, because nature is regarded to be above thinking and without external purpose. He says that this misconstrues thinking and that purpose does not entail external purpose. He appeals to Aristotle’s determination of nature as
... purposive doing, purpose is the immediate, the motionless, which is self-moving, or, is subject.
This is important in several ways. It shows that the development of knowledge is not simply a linear progression in which those who come later see more clearly and accurately than the ancients did. Aristotle is taken up again anew, which is not to say ahistorically. In addition, nature as purposive means that nature is not the action of blind forces, there is purpose in its doings. Nature as subject means that thinking is not below or above nature. Aristotle’s unmoved mover is the movement of the subject, the thinking I.
Its abstract power to move is being-for-itself, or, pure negativity. For that reason, the result is the same as the beginning because the beginning is purpose – that is, the actual is the same as its concept only because the immediate, as purpose, has the self, or, pure actuality, within itself.
The beginning is purpose, the result the actualization of purpose. From beginning to end, in moving away from itself the move is back to itself, it is the actuality of purpose, being for itself.
What has returned into itself is just the self, and the self is self-relating sameness and simplicity.
But what is the self? Is it the same or different from myself or yourself?
23:
The need to represent the absolute as subject has helped itself to such propositions as “God is the eternal,” or “God is the moral order of the world,” or “God is love,” etc.
Does Hegel intend for us to draw a connection between “God is love”, “The life of God and divine cognition ... as a game love plays with itself” (19),and the goal of philosophy as moving “nearer to the goal where it can lay aside the title of love of knowing and be actual knowing (5)?
In such propositions, the true is directly posited as subject, but it is not presented as the movement of reflection taking-an-inward-turn.
That is, such propositions only reflect the negative movement, the movement away from itself, its otherness, which has not yet reached the moment of the movement when reflection turns back to itself. So, what’s love got to do with it? Love is the desire for unity. In religious terms it is the unity of man and God. In philosophical terms the unity of man and knowledge. In knowledge the desire for unity with God is overcome, for the movement has returned back to the self from the otherness of God.
One proposition of that sort begins with the word “God.” On its own, this is a meaningless sound, a mere name. It is only the predicate that says what the name is and is its fulfillment and its meaning. The empty beginning becomes actual knowledge only at the end of the proposition. To that extent, one cannot simply pass over in silence the reason why one cannot speak solely of the eternal, the moral order of the world, etc., or, as the ancients did, of pure concepts, of being, of the one, etc., or, of what the meaning is, without appending the meaningless sound as well.
Instead of saying: “God is the eternal” or “God is the moral order”, etc., why can’t we just say the eternal or the moral order without appending the meaningless sound God? The answer is provided in the next sentence:
However, the use of this word only indicates that it is neither a being nor an essence nor a universal per se which is posited; what is posited is what is reflected into itself, a subject.
We should keep in mind that Hegel says the subject is self-positing (18).In other words, the positing of God is the self-positing of the subject. But:
... at the same time, this is something only anticipated. The subject is accepted as a fixed point on which the predicates are attached for their support through a movement belonging to what it is that can be said to know this subject and which itself is also not to be viewed as belonging to the point itself, but it is solely through this movement that the content would be portrayed as the subject.
The positing of God is at that moment the positing of something fixed and unchanging, something wholly and completely other. But:
... not only is the former anticipation that the absolute is subject not the actuality of this concept, but it even makes that actuality impossible, for it posits the concept as a point wholly at rest, whereas the concept is self-movement.
The problem is that the subject, God, is thought of as being at rest and unchanging. As the theologians have argued, God is perfect and thus unchanging, for change implies imperfection.
gebildet" means nothing but "formed". It has the second meaning of "educated", true, but Hegel's context leaves it open whether the rationality has simply "formed" and developed itself, or whether it was "educated" from an outside source. And the word "cultural" does not show up at all.
Interesting to read of this translation. However, as you say it is ambiguous.
Within a specific passage it could and probably does take on the particular meaning, as suggested.
I feel that Hegel is leaning more towards the self-formed.
— WerMaat
Yes, I think that this is right, but self-formation is a cultural formation. We are shaped by and within our culture. As individuals we are not wholly separate or other. To use the agricultural root from which we get culture, it is the soil in which we grow and are nourished.
Agreed. Self-formation is related to recognition and relationships.
What I am stressing is the importance of culture in the development of the thinking I.
Yes, I think we all agree on that, don't we ? Perhaps not.
I have been reading an article by Andy Blunden - ' Hegel, Recognition and Intersubjectivity'.
Number 19 - its download title is 'Mediation and Intersubjectivist Interpretations of Hegel', 2007.
From:
https://ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/works/on-hegel.htm
It is a broad, pragmatic interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of Spirit.
Blunden distinguishes this from the narrow pragmatism which ignores the meaning already invested in cultural inheritance.
The notions of culture and education that are going back and forth, I'm agnostic on, but I am pretty sure that in as much as Hegelian motion is in things like the plant and the tree, I think he is going to argue that history/culture is similarly shaped and conditioned by impersonal movement -
So, are you saying you don't know about - or recognise - the importance of culture ?
What particular notion of 'culture' do you have difficulty with ?
But you are 'pretty sure that...Hegel is is going to argue that history/culture is shaped by impersonal movement'.
Why would you think that ?
How could it be 'impersonal' ?
The notions of culture and education that are going back and forth, I'm agnostic on, but I am pretty sure that in as much as Hegelian motion is in things like the plant and the tree, I think he is going to argue that history/culture is similarly shaped and conditioned by impersonal movement -
...you are 'pretty sure that...Hegel is is going to argue that history/culture is shaped by impersonal movement'.
Why would you think that ?
How could it be 'impersonal' ?
WW1 was a war of individual people? Jim and Steve and Gunter and Heinrich? Or the immigration/refuge crisis in the world today - a matter of individuals not liking where they are? Or is there some more elemental force at work?
OK. Good examples of individuals getting caught up in events outwith their control.
Within which there is still that search - desire - for freedom, progress - where hope might prevail as fear encompasses them. Desire and Fear being basic driving forces in human activity.
Reason appears to fly out the window when political rhetoric is used to stir up communal emotion.
Where there was progress, regress steps in.
So far, so human.
To return to the initial metaphor cleverly employed to draw us in; the natural, organic growth of bud, blossom, fruit. This can only take us so far in understanding.
It is not sufficient. It takes no account of all of the above.It is 'impersonal' in the sense of not having human qualities, emotions or reason. We are more than physical, passive growth. We are active, interacting, to grow spiritually, academically, socially, whateverly - interdisciplinary.
So, this 'impersonal movement' you talked of above - which you appeared to specifically relate to the metaphor - why would you think that this is how Hegel will progress his argument or theory ? Or is it a different kind of 'impersonal movement' you have in mind ?
And what is meant by your question: 'is there some more elemental force at work' ?
What do you mean by 'elemental' ? Your 'clarification' needs clarifying.
Take your pick. From:
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/elemental
Elemental biological needs.
Essential constituent of something.
Forming an integral part. Inherent.
Resembling a great force of nature. Violent rains or passion.
A supernatural being. Spirit.
An elementary part or principle.Two different epistemologies:
1. Science > strives to understand the elementals of material existence ( empiricism)
2. Theology > our universality, existence described through faith.
Or perhaps none or all of the above...I look forward to your explication.
-----------
And so we return to Hegel and questions arise as to his meaning. Quoting Fooloso4
23:
"The need to represent the absolute as subject has helped itself to such propositions as “God is the eternal,” or “God is the moral order of the world,” or “God is love,” etc." - Hegel.
Does Hegel intend for us to draw a connection between “God is love”, “The life of God and divine cognition ... as a game love plays with itself” (19),and the goal of philosophy as moving “nearer to the goal where it can lay aside the title of love of knowing and be actual knowing (5)?
It is only as a science or as a system that knowing is actual and can be given an exposition; and that any further so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, if it is true, is for this reason alone also false just because it is a fundamental
proposition or a principle.
There is no first principle of philosophy upon which everything else rests and is supported. Both the truth of a proposition and its negation are moments within the movement of the system of knowledge.
Conversely, the genuinely positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much a negative posture towards its beginning; namely, a negative posture towards its one-sided form, which is to be at first only immediately, or, to be purpose. It may thereby be taken to be the refutation of what constitutes the ground of the system, but it is better taken as showing that the ground, or the principle, of the system is in fact only its beginning.
Contrary to the assumption that the ground or principles of reason must be firm and unchanging, the movement of reason has no fixed ground. A principle is a starting point. The positive movement is via the negative, the negation of what is taken as true. It is not the truth but in the movement, the development, the working out of truth.
That is, there is a scale appropriate to the actions and motivations of individuals, and that scale not-so-much appropriate for understanding movements on a larger scale.
I think the matter of scale you describe is important to what Hegel is presenting. The "unconditioned" is present in all the instances of determination. But how that is so is not some kind of phenomena without conditions. Self-awareness has to happen in many ways for it to happen in one.
In as much as there is nothing personal, still, though, you are pressed for some reason or reasons. I think Hegel is going to investigate those reasons via his analysis of history, in a dialectic of history.
That is, there is a scale appropriate to the actions and motivations of individuals, and that scale not-so-much appropriate for understanding movements on a larger scale.
I think the matter of scale you describe is important to what Hegel is presenting
As already discussed, the movement of history is central to Hegel's system.
Of course, there are matters of 'scale' within this.
Paraphrasing some previous references and thoughts:
We develop from individual consciousness to self consciousness - seeking knowledge from an individual perspective to the universal. Via the development of the culture.
A kind of global humanism dealing with problems of humanity.
We have intrinsic purpose. We follow both intuition, insights and reason on the path to self-realisation.
The scale concerns relative degrees; measuring both the quantitative gradations and the qualitative leaps.
The subject matter of the text is both the Concept of Geist (Spirit) and its working out in real life.
Theory and Practice.
Philosophical theories are neither true or false. They offer different perspectives on progressive development.
Philosophy is viewed and understood from a historical perspective.
Philosophical concepts made by humans who relate to each other in action and reaction.
The practical role is to formulate ideas which might lead to new ways of thinking about the world and our place in it.
There is no first principle of philosophy upon which everything else rests and is supported. Both the truth of a proposition and its negation are moments within the movement of the system of knowledge.
Yes. It is about the testing of ideas or concepts. The dance of the dialectic.
The dialectic of discussion. In a properly conducted debate, an idea is put forward (the Thesis) and is then countered by the opposing view (the Antithesis) which negates it. Finally, through a thorough process of discussion, which explores the issue concerned from all points of view and discloses all the hidden contradictions, we arrive at a conclusion (the Synthesis). We may or may not arrive at agreement but by the very process of discussion, we have deepened our knowledge and understanding and raised the whole discussion onto a different plane.
Contrary to the assumption that the ground or principles of reason must be firm and unchanging, the movement of reason has no fixed ground. A principle is a starting point. The positive movement is via the negative, the negation of what is taken as true. It is not the truth but in the movement, the development, the working out of truth.
I think this is a good summary. It relates to my last post regarding the subject matter of the text.
Geist - the concept of and its working out in real life.
The spirit of philosophy.
That the true is only actual as a system, or, that substance is essentially subject, is expressed in the representation that expresses the absolute as spirit – the most sublime concept and the one which belongs to modernity and its religion.
What is the religion of modernity? Without venturing an answer it can be noted that “the most sublime concept” belongs to it, the expression of the absolute as spirit.
The spiritual alone is the actual; it is the essence, or, what exists-in-itself. – It is what is self-comporting, or, the determinate itself, or, otherness and being-for-itself – and, in this determinateness, to be the self-enduring in its being-external-to-itself – or, it is in and for
Itself.
The spiritual is what exists-in-itself and comports itself to itself. But this means it must be to itself other than itself for itself.
However, it is first of all this being-in-and-for-itself for us, or, in itself, which is to say, it is spiritual substance. It has to become this for itself – it must be knowing of the spiritual, and it must be knowing of itself as spirit. This means that it must be, to itself, an object, but it must likewise immediately be a mediated object, which is to say, it must be a sublated object reflected into itself.
Spirit comes to know itself through us, by becoming an object to itself, an other whose otherness is immediately negated so that it is taken back into itself
It is for itself solely for us insofar as its spiritual content is engendered by itself.
It is not us who engender the spiritual content, it is engendered for us. It is as it is for us.
Insofar as the object for itself is also for itself, this self-engendering, the pure concept, is, to itself, the objective element in which it has its existence, and in this manner, it is, for itself in its existence, an object reflected into itself.
I take this to mean that the object, that is, spirit becoming an object to itself, is self-engendering, it conceives itself. It is pure concept, reason, logos.
Spirit knowing itself in that way as spirit is science. Science is its actuality, and science is the realm it builds for itself in its own proper element.
Man does not engender the concept but thinks it, develops it dialectically, actualizes it.
I take this to mean that the object, that is, spirit becoming an object to itself, is self-engendering, it conceives itself. It is pure concept, reason, logos.
Spirit knowing itself in that way as spirit is science. Science is its actuality, and science is the realm it builds for itself in its own proper element.
Man does not engender the concept but thinks it, develops it dialectically, actualizes it.
When I think of spirit, beginnings and qualitative leaps, Goethe comes to mind. With his:
In the beginning was the act. Im Anfang war die Tat - Faust.
As opposed to the Word of the Bible.
Goethe's Faust:(He opens a tome [of the New Testament] and begins.)
It says: ‘In the beginning was the Word [Wort].’
Already I am stopped. It seems absurd.
The Word does not deserve the highest prize,I must translate it otherwise
If I am well inspired and not blind.
It says: In the beginning was the Mind [Sinn].
Ponder that first line, wait and see,
Lest you should write too hastily.
Is mind the all-creating source?It ought to say: In the beginning there was Force [Kraft].
Yet something warns me as I grasp the pen,
That my translation must be changed again.
The spirit helps me. Now it is exact.
I write: In the beginning was the Act [Tat]
Ten years of office work, of literary projects left incomplete, finally took their toll. In 1786, in a spirit of adventure characteristic more of a young poet than of a middle-aged civil servant, Goethe abruptly threw aside his work and left Weimar without telling friends and colleagues where he was going. Travelling under an assumed identity, he made his way to Italy, where he spent the next two years studying art and enjoying the country that he described, in one of his most famous poems, as “the land where lemon blossoms blow, / And through dark leaves the golden oranges glow.”
The concept of Bildung—a word that means learning and education but also implies a cultivation of the self and of maturity—was central to Goethe’s thought, and he, in turn, made it central to German culture. For Thomas Mann, whose admiration of Goethe took the form of spiritual imitation, Goethe was above all an educator, but one who had first to learn, through experience, the wisdom he taught. Mann wrote that a “vocation towards educating others does not spring from inner harmony, but rather from inner uncertainties, disharmony, difficulty—from the difficulty of knowing one’s own self.”
When I think of spirit, beginnings and qualitative leaps, Goethe comes to mind. With his:
In the beginning was the act. Im Anfung war die Tat - Faust.
As opposed to the Word of the Bible.
The Greek word used by John in the New Testament is logos. It seems likely Hegel in using the term is mindful of both the Greek and Christian tradition, and since both are historically important his use reflects the full range of meaning.
As used by John it connotes the tradition of revelation, what God speaks to man. It is primarily what man is told by and about God. For the Greeks logos is an ordering of words intended to give an account or explanation, literally to gather together and lay out. One who is wise is able to give a logos that reflects the intelligible order of the cosmos, why and how all things are as they are. But the logos is not simply ordered speech, it is the ordering of what speech is
Perhaps what Goethe was getting at is the impotence of mere words. Actions not words are primary. Hegel's use of terms such as 'logos', 'reason', and 'concept' are self-generative, that is, not passive descriptions of something separate and other.
Perhaps what Goethe was getting at is the impotence of mere words. Actions not words are primary. Hegel's use of terms such as 'logos', 'reason', and 'concept' are self-generative, that is, not passive descriptions of something separate and other.
No, I don't think that's it. Goethe was a poet and thinker. Faust was the character trying to translate the New Testament into German. From what I remember, he was seeking inspiration having dried up in more ways than one. Then came the Spirit...
What I can share is one of Goethe's short poems which speaks to his understanding of natural process.
Paraphrased from 'Goethe - poet and thinker' by Wilkinson and Willoughby, pp21-25.
Wilkinson and Willoughby:3 brief statements of facts (no metaphors or similes) are followed by an assertion for the future.
Uber allen Gipfeln
Ist Ruh.
In allen Wipfeln
Spurest du
Kaum einen Hauch.
Die Vogelein schweigen im Walde,
Warte nur, balde
Ruhest du auch.
By the very order of the poem, Goethe is embraced in it, the last link in the chain of being.
From the inanimate to the animate, from the mineral, through the vegetable, to the animal kingdom, from the hilltop, to the treetops, to the birds, and so at last to man.
The subjective and objective experience are completely fused.
The appearances of Nature are rendered, but also the organic relations between them; man's mind is shown as the final link in the chain of creation, Nature become conscious of itself, but it also takes its place within nature. It does not stand outside or over against it.
It was Goethe's way of being - the poet; not here offering conscious opinions, intellectual convictions and philosophical beliefs. The latter don't always express the self, they may even disguise.
At the level of his deepest thought, the subjective and objective modes are quite evidently harmonised.'
No, I don't think that's it. Goethe was a poet and thinker. Faust was the character trying to translate the New Testament into German. From what I remember, he was seeking inspiration having dried up in more ways than one. Then came the Spirit...
I am not sure I follow. I am at a disadvantage not having read Goethe (and have been scolded by you for this omission). Isn't it the translation of logos that Goethe's Faust is grappling with, the term translated as wort in German and word in English, as in: "In the beginning was the ..."?
Inspiration is, literally, the indwelling of spirit. If I understand you, Faust is moved the the spirit. If that is the case then doesn't this point to the insufficiency of words, that words alone are not what provides the movement both for him and in the beginning? I take it as being for this reason that he translates logos as deed or act, something done rather than something said.
This may be off though, since what God does to begin is to speak, to say: "Let there be ...". [Added: Perhaps Goethe shares Hegel's view of continuous development. It is not simply what was said or done at the beginning, but the continued active doing. From what you presented it also seems that Goethe shares Hegel's rejection of a transcendent God who acts upon the world.
Wilkinson and Willoughby:It was Goethe's way of being - the poet; not here offering conscious opinions, intellectual convictions and philosophical beliefs. The latter don't always express the self, they may even disguise.
At the level of his deepest thought, the subjective and objective modes are quite evidently harmonised.'
There is much in what you quote that is consonant with Hegel. I think Hegel's response might be that Goethe represents it but does not raise it to the level of science, he does not:
... [posit] that the true shape of truth lies in its scientific rigor – or, what is the same thing, in asserting that truth has the element of its existence solely in concepts –
Of course one might claim that this reflects the superiority of poetry. With Hegel we are still within what Socrates calls the ancient battle between philosophy and poetry.
Self-engendering spirit. Man's role is in the articulation and working out of the absolute. As a teleological movement, what comes to be, what develops is the potentiality that is realized or actualized in what is there from the beginning.
Isn't it the translation of logos that Goethe's Faust is grappling with, the term translated as wort in German and word in English, as in: "In the beginning was the ..."?
Yes. That is word for word translation. So, no difficulties there. I guess there was more to it.
Anti-religion ? What comes first...not words. Nor a Bible.
Faust is moved the the spirit. If that is the case then doesn't this point to the insufficiency of words, that words alone are not what provides the movement both for him and in the beginning? I take it as being for this reason that he translates logos as deed or act, something done rather than something said.
I am no Goethe scholar. I would need to read it again. The pact with the devil spirit I think came after that point. And it wasn't the literary spirit they engaged in. In the words of Elvis:
'A little less conversation, a little more action, please
All this aggravation ain't satisfactioning me
A little more bite and a little less bark
A little less fight and a little more spark...'
I hope the sparkling spirit of @WerMaat is visited upon us, soon.
I think you have a better handle on this than I have, even if you haven't read Goethe.
You are right. It takes more than words alone.
I think Hegel's response might be that Goethe represents it but does not raise it to the level of science
Goethe does that elsewhere. Possibly even at the same time. One can write poetry even as one studies rocks. He was multi-talented that guy. I mentioned his theories earlier.
Hegel/Pinkard:Science may be in its own self what it will, but in its relationship to immediate self-consciousness, it presents itself as an inversion of the latter, or, because immediate self-consciousness is the principle of actuality, by immediate self-consciousness existing for itself outside of science, science takes the form of non-actuality.
This observation strikes in many directions. I will throw out two.
It recasts the argument between Hume and Kant regarding causality. If Hume's skepticism is a "natural" development in the advance of "science", Kant's rejection of that argument is another one.
Arguments about free will versus various expressions of necessity tend to misrepresent why the proposal of a system that ties them together would be rejected out of hand. At the very least, Hegel is asking for the problem to be approached from a different direction.
Hegel/Pinkard:The individual’s right is based on his absolute self-sufficiency, which he knows he possesses in every shape of his knowing, for in every shape, whether recognized by science or not, and no matter what the content might be, the individual is at the same time the absolute form, or, he has immediate self-certainty; and, if one were to prefer this expression, he thereby has an unconditioned being.
If I had the opportunity to cross the river and pour some of my blood into Kierkegaard's bowl in Hades, I would ask him about this passage.
The individual’s right is based on his absolute self-sufficiency, which he knows he possesses in every shape of his knowing, for in every shape, whether recognized by science or not, and no matter what the content might be, the individual is at the same time the absolute form, or, he has immediate self-certainty; and, if one were to prefer this expression, he thereby has an unconditioned being.
— Hegel/Pinkard
If I had the opportunity to cross the river and pour some of my blood into Kierkegaard's bowl in Hades, I would ask him about this passage.
Oh no, not your blood - that is a sacrifice too far !
Perhaps we could all chip in...and pray for a positive outcome.
Why Kierkegaard and not Hegel himself ? ( assuming that wasn't an error )
What position did Kierkegaard take - for or against Hegel. Or a little of both?
Curious about this, and philosophical, historical developments.
Also how sure can we be that what is reported or criticised is the correct version. Bring on the blood.
I think it helpful to look at objections to Hegel as a way to understand him.
According to standard interpretations of 19th-century European philosophy, a stark ’either / or’ divided Hegel and Kierkegaard, and this divide profoundly shaped the subsequent development of Continental philosophy well into the 20th century. While left Hegelians carried on the legacy of Hegel’s rationalism and universalism, existentialists and postmodernists found inspiration, at least in part, in Kierkegaard’s critique of systematic philosophy, rationality, and socially integrated subjectivity. In Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel Reconsidered, Jon Stewart provides a detailed historical argument which challenges the standard assumption that Kierkegaard’s position was developed in opposition to Hegel’s philosophy, and as such is antithetical to it.
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/kierkegaard-s-relation-to-hegel-reconsidered/
Review of:
Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel Reconsidered, Cambridge University Press, 2003
I guess there was more to it.
Anti-religion ? What comes first...not words. Nor a Bible.
I cannot say what more there is for Goethe but for Hegel it is the sublation of both the Greek logos and John's logos. Some read Hegel as anti-religious and others as religious. At this point perhaps it is prudent to just suggest that Hegel sublates religion.
Yeah, I got that. I just don't get it. What is there at the beginning...
If I remember correctly and understood it correctly (it has been a very long time since I last read Hegel) it begins with the eternal negating itself and giving rise to time. In its embryonic stage it contains all that it will come to be, but must work itself out over time, eventually there is the development of consciousness and finally self-consciousness and knowledge of itself as the whole.
The method of science that Goethe practiced was in certain respects diametrically opposed to the objective science described above. Goethe believed that the outer physical world and the inner world of our senses were mirror images of each other, the inside view and the outside view of the same reality. Therefore, paying attention to the outer world leads to necessary inner responses in us that tell us directly about qualities of what we are observing. The science that Goethe advocated was also one of deep observation. The difference that Goethe brought was that the scientist, while observing the outside world, would pay attention to their own inner responses which would reveal essential elements of what was being observed. It was in a sense a science of subjectivity, or what you might see as a mystical approach to science.
His literary works certainly addressed contemporary philosophical concerns: Iphigenie auf Tauris (Iphigenia in Tauris) (1779–86) seems a prophetic dramatization of the ethical and religious autonomy Kant was to proclaim from 1785; in his novel Die Wahlverwandtschaften (The Elective Affinities) (1809) a mysterious natural or supernatural world of chemistry, magnetism or Fate, such as ‘Naturphilosophie’ envisaged, seems to underlie and perhaps determine a human story of spiritual adultery; in Faust, particularly Part Two, the tale of a pact or wager with the Devil seems to develop into a survey of world cultural history, which has been held to have overtones of Schelling, Hegel or even Marx. But whatever their conceptual materials, Goethe’s literary works require literary rather than philosophical analysis. There are, however, certain discrete concepts prominent in his scientific work, or in the expressions of his ‘wisdom’ – maxims, essays, autobiographies, letters and conversations – with which Goethe’s name is particularly associated and which are capable of being separately discussed. Notable among these are: Nature and metamorphosis (Bildung), polarity and ‘intensification’ (Steigerung), the ‘primal phenomena’ (Urphänomene), ‘the daemonic’ (das Dämonische) and renunciation (Entsag
Goethe's Faust and Hegel's Phenomenology: A Comparison
Ingrid Poole - abstract:In two different media, poetic drama and philosophic prose, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) explored the same subject: man's perilous journey to discover his consciousness along a course of doubt and despair.
The basis of this new epistemology was the “fundamental conviction that the relation of the human mind to the world was ultimately not dualistic but participatory…. In this view, the essential reality of nature is not separate, self-contained and complete in itself, so that the human mind can examine it ‘objectively’ and register it from without. Rather, nature’s unfolding truth emerges only with the active participation of the human mind. Nature’s reality is not merely phenomenal, nor is it independent and objective; rather, it is something that comes into being through the very act of human cognition. Nature becomes intelligible to itself through the human mind” (Tarnas, 1991).
If I remember correctly and understood it correctly (it has been a very long time since I last read Hegel) it begins with the eternal negating itself and giving rise to time. In its embryonic stage it contains all that it will come to be, but must work itself out over time, eventually there is the development of consciousness and finally self-consciousness and knowledge of itself as the whole.
Eh ? :chin:
Huh ? :confused:
OK... :nerd:
Deleted UserAugust 03, 2019 at 15:51#3126900 likes
This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.
Reply to Amity
I agree with Stewart that Hegel and Kierkegaard collide in many places but that the differences are not a simple matter of thesis versus antithesis.
I brought up Kierkegaard since he emphasized the centrality of the Single Individual. In the passage I quoted by Hegel, I wonder if the statement can be be seen as a shared point of departure, a moment of agreement before struggling with each other.
Stewart depicts faith as something like the Romantic's criticism of reason as insufficient. Kierkegaard is better understood as a follower of Pascal who recognized that Christianity was absurd in a fundamental way but who also argued that it is a better model of the human condition than others.
So, in addition to the specific arguments made in regards to what must exist, there has been introduced a psychological register where some models fit better than others. The "long path" reference in Hegel's text is an acknowledgment that experience is not a simple thing given to anybody.
I brought up Kierkegaard since he emphasized the centrality of the Single Individual. In the passage I quoted by Hegel, I wonder if the statement can be be seen as a shared point of departure, a moment of agreement before struggling with each other.
Thanks for explanation and point to ponder on our path. It's good to linger a while.
So, in addition to the specific arguments made in regards to what must exist, there has been introduced a psychological register where some models fit better than others. The "long path" reference in Hegel's text is an acknowledgment that experience is not a simple thing given to anybody.
The idea of the 'path', I think was first introduced in para 12. I look back at the discussion about the prize at the end of a 'winding path' being won through struggle and effort. The prize of the 'beginning of a new spirit' being the final outcome. It seems clearer now. As is 'this path to science is itself already science'.
I think it perfectly understandable that it is life's journey itself, with all its experiences, that can help move us. In different ways at different times. There is no single appropriate fit or model.
I don't know where the image of the spiral staircase to the Absolute is referenced. Anyone ?
I don't think it helpful. Again, it smacks of religiosity. A glorious path ascending to Perfection.
This idea of reaching, or grasping at, a perfect ideal might be fine for a few philosophers.
It might be the case that philosophy is an essential part of the whole but it isn't everything.
Our knowledge/understanding of the human condition is gained via many sources.
Not so much a ghost but a host of many coloured disciplines.
It is this almost religious sense of the importance of Western, European or German philosophy in our historical development or culture that I take exception to. So very narrow...and it is not available to all, even if it were so desired.
It is this almost religious sense of the importance of Western, European or German philosophy in our historical development or culture that I take exception to. So very narrow...and it is not available to all, even if it were so desired.
Your statement has been articulated in many ways. Hegel, himself, said many things that compared his "culture" in a better light than others.
But, as a matter of intellectual inheritance, his work paved the way for you to express your objection.
Your statement has been articulated in many ways. Hegel, himself, said many things that compared his "culture" in a better light than others.
Yes. Such criticism ( and more ) is supported by others more articulate than whot I am.
For example, 'In the Spirt of Hegel' by Robert Solomon.
https://www.scribd.com/document/321486406/SOLOMON-Robert-In-the-Spirit-of-Hegel-pdf
Also, Bertrand Russell offers a critical analysis of Hegel in his 'History of Western Philosophy'.
https://archive.org/details/RUSSELLHEGEL1946
This is counterbalanced by John Cottingham's 'Western Philosophy - an Anthology'.
And so it goes.
But, as a matter of intellectual inheritance, his work paved the way for you to express your objection.
'Intellectual inheritance' - sounds good but what does it mean ?
If it is about the history of philosophy then I agree Hegel played his part.
However, it is a strong claim to make that his work paved the way for me to express my objection.
This is not about intellectual inheritance but intellectual or cognitive development.
I don't need to read a 'Who's Who' in Western Philosophy to reach an understanding of individual progress to self-realisation or wellbeingness, holistically.
Yes it does. Sarcasm too. Especially when there are difficulties in communicating ideas from one brain to another in writing. And through the lens of bias.
Is it science in Hegel's sense of the term, that is, knowledge of the whole?
— Fooloso4
I don't know. I doubt it is exactly Hegel's approach. Goethe wasn't such a brilliant, mad philosopher.
It would be interesting to see how they compare.
Exchange of letters between Hegel and Goethe. Did Hegel appropriate Goethe's idea ?
https://ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/works/on-hegel.htm
No 43 Goethe, Hegel and Marx
( 19 page downloadable pdf )
Yes it does. Sarcasm too. Especially when there are difficulties in communicating ideas from one brain to another in writing. And through the lens of bias.
I meant no offense. The irony applies to my own efforts to criticize Hegel.
I had a teacher who once asked me how I could separate using tools made by others from one's I forged myself. I used to think the question was about authenticity versus imitation. An Hegelian point of view says to me that the new is both.
If I use something made before for my purposes, that is a new "determination." If I organize elements in a way that gets other people to start talking in a new way, that too, is a kind of new "determination."
The "Concept" beyond the boundaries of an individual are developed by both kinds of change. It introduces a Z axis where previously there was only X and Y.
Deleted UserAugust 05, 2019 at 21:48#3132670 likes
This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.
I had a teacher who once asked me how I could separate using tools made by others from one's I forged myself. I used to think the question was about authenticity versus imitation. An Hegelian point of view says to me that the new is both.
If I use something made before for my purposes, that is a new "determination." If I organize elements in a way that gets other people to start talking in a new way, that too, is a kind of new "determination."
The "Concept" beyond the boundaries of an individual are developed by both kinds of change. It introduces a Z axis where previously there was only X and Y.
Interesting story. If I understand correctly, then I agree.
The tools you forged yourself could be a direct copy, an imitation of the original product - X.
However, I think there would be differences even if same materials were used. Humans are not robots who churn out identikits.
If handmade then differences in skills, experience and ability would result in something unique to you; even if not original. That reproduction would be new but not significantly different - Y.
If you then use some imagination ( ? a movement of spirit - inspiration ) to create or invent a new product by tweaking the old and adding a new element, then - Z.
You are a design genius.
Same with concepts.
I am not sure what you mean by 'beyond the boundaries of the individual'.
As individuals, don't we in the main have an inherent drive - an inner necessity- to progress either to benefit self or with others.
Are you talking about the consciousness which moves us to a heightened awareness of the possible ?
Pure self-knowing in absolute otherness, this ether as such, is the very ground and soil of science, or, knowing in its universality.
All knowing takes place in unconditioned otherness, that is, in what is other than self. As its ground and soil, the otherness to self cannot be separate from self-knowing. Pure self-knowing is purity from otherness.
The beginning of philosophy presupposes or demands that consciousness is situated in this element.
Both Plato and Aristotle say that philosophy begins in wonder (‘thaumazein’) (Theaetetus 155c-d; Metaphysics 982b). There can be no wonder without a sense of the otherness of what engenders wonder. It is what lies beyond or outside of what can be understood or taken within consciousness, what remains a mystery.
However, this element itself has its culmination and its transparency only through the movement of its coming-to-be. It is pure spirituality, or, the universal in the mode of simple immediacy. It is pure spirituality, or, the universal in the mode of simple immediacy.
The coming to be of otherness is not the coming to be of the object in and for itself but of its coming to be for us, that is, as an object of consciousness. It is pure spirituality in that it is for us in its immediacy, in its otherness, its mystery, understood universally rather than as a particular object of consciousness.
Because it is the immediacy of spirit, because it is the substance of spirit, it is transfigured essentiality, reflection that is itself simple, or, is immediacy; it is being that is a reflective turn into itself.
The substance of spirit is the union of consciousness and what is for consciousness. Otherness is transfigured from what is other than or independent of consciousness to what is for consciousness in its immediacy. Being becomes conscious of itself.
For its part, science requires that self-consciousness shall have elevated itself into this ether in order to be able to live with science and to live in science, and, for that matter, to be able to live at all.
Science requires that self-consciousness be situated in the ether of absolute otherness. It must become other in and for itself, its own object.
Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that science provide him at least with the ladder to reach this standpoint. The individual’s right is based on his absolute self-sufficiency, which he knows he possesses in every shape of his knowing, for in every shape, whether recognized by science or not, and no matter what the content might be, the individual is at the same time the absolute form, or, he has immediate self-certainty; and, if one were to prefer this expression, he thereby has an unconditioned being.
The individual in his conscious awareness is not aware of his awareness but of what is given immediately in awareness. His absolute self-sufficiency, his being unconditioned, his immediate self-certainty of being, requires for its self-sufficiency self-knowledge. He must be both knower and known.
However much the standpoint of consciousness, which is to say, the standpoint of knowing objective things to be opposed to itself and knowing itself to be opposed to them, counts as the other to science – the other, in which consciousness is at one with itself, counts instead as the loss of spirit – still, in comparison, the element of science possesses for consciousness an other-worldly remoteness in which consciousness is no longer in possession of itself.
The standpoint of consciousness is its awareness of things as other than itself. This standpoint, the opposition of subject and object, is the other of science. Science is self-consciousness, the unity of consciousness with itself, is the loss of spirit because it is the loss of consciousness of the world.
Each of these two parts seems to the other to be an inversion of the truth.
The one part is consciousness as knowing objective things, the other consciousness knowing itself. Each taken by itself is an inversion of the truth because each by itself leads away from the truth, that is, away from the concept of the whole in which both parts are united, identity in difference.
For the natural consciousness to entrust itself immediately to science would be to make an attempt, induced by it knows not what, to walk upside down all of a sudden. The compulsion to accept this unaccustomed attitude and to transport oneself in that way would be, so it would seem, a violence imposed on it with neither any advance preparation nor with any necessity.
The natural consciousness is consciousness of objects and is thus not sufficient to move immediately to science. It is one sided, undeveloped, not yet prepared to be knowledge of the whole, that is, of the identity in difference between subject and substance, knower and known.
Science may be in its own self what it will, but in its relationship to immediate self-consciousness, it presents itself as an inversion of the latter, or, because immediate self-consciousness is the principle of actuality, by immediate self-consciousness existing for itself outside of science, science takes the form of non-actuality.
Self-consciousness is immediacy. Science is mediated, the conception of or thinking about rather than the immediacy of self-consciousness.
Accordingly, science has to unite that element with itself or instead to show both that such an element belongs to itself and how it belongs to it. Lacking actuality, science is the in-itself, the purpose, which at the start is still something inner, at first not as spirit but only as spiritual substance. It has to express itself and become for itself, and this means nothing else than that it has to posit self-consciousness as being at one with itself.
Science is the in-itself but must become for itself, that is, it must move from self-consciousness as being something inner, by which substance is other or object to self-consciousness, to self-consciousness being for itself, the whole as the union of substance and subject. Here spirit is no longer substance, that is, object of consciousness but the actualization of spirit, as in itself and for itself; not something that is mine or particular, or even as universal, but as absolute, the identity of difference, one with itself.
Hegel/Pinkard:Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that science provide him at least with the ladder to reach this standpoint. The individual’s right is based on his absolute self-sufficiency, which he knows he possesses in every shape of his knowing, for in every shape, whether recognized by science or not, and no matter what the content might be, the individual is at the same time the absolute form, or, he has immediate self-certainty; and, if one were to prefer this expression, he thereby has an unconditioned being
The individual in his conscious awareness is not aware of his awareness but of what is given immediately in awareness. His absolute self-sufficiency, his being unconditioned, his immediate self-certainty of being, requires for its self-sufficiency self-knowledge. He must be both knower and known.
Discussion:
That makes sense to me.
In that the claim is that it is philosophy alone which is supposed to lead to increased understanding of self via others.
If this is the case, then it should provide the means, the ladder - the structure of reason - to facilitate this process. The path to knowledge or science.
The starting point is the individual, the subject who is aware of his limitations and is curious to know more about the awesome world out there. As you point out:
Both Plato and Aristotle say that philosophy begins in wonder (‘thaumazein’) (Theaetetus 155c-d; Metaphysics 982b). There can be no wonder without a sense of the otherness of what engenders wonder. It is what lies beyond or outside of what can be understood or taken within consciousness, what remains a mystery.
The image of the ladder reminds me of the Wittgenstein thread you participated in.
In that case, wasn't the ladder kicked away ? Do you think that it might be a different kind of ladder ?
I can't remember the details.
Anyway, as always, Fooloso4, thanks for the in--depth analysis, requiring time and effort.
Most helpful.
In that the claim is that it is philosophy alone which is supposed to lead to increased understanding of self via others.
Standard disclaimer: in trying to work out what Hegel says I am forced to frequently revise what I think he is saying. What follows is no exception.
I think that absolute otherness as discussed here does not refer to others but to pure self-knowing, that is, knowing that has itself as its object, which is to say, that treats itself as other. What is absolute is not relative to or conditioned by anything else. The otherness of objects in the world as well as other people are other relative to me, and so, cannot be absolute otherness. The otherness of myself is not relative to anything other than myself. But absolute otherness cannot be the otherness of myself to myself either, because that would make it dependent on me. Knowing in its universality means what is common to all knowing, the unification of subject and object, identity in difference. All knowledge is self-knowledge. Absolute otherness must be the otherness of the whole within itself as the condition for the whole's self-knowledge. The circle of self-knowledge plays out on the levels of the individual, the culture, and the whole. The first two are limited wholes, the last the whole of wholes.
If this is the case, then it should provide the means, the ladder - the structure of reason - to facilitate this process. The path to knowledge or science.
Others do come into play but here we are led to the same question as in the ascent from Plato's cave. If one is led up and out, then who led out those who can lead us out? Is there first one individual who did not require others? In line with the metaphor of the ladder, the rungs may have been put in place by the work of those who came before, but each new step requires going further than what culture and education provided. There must still be someone whose step goes beyond what was already provided. But now with Hegel all the rungs are in place.
Hegel goes on to claim that the individual has immediate self-certainty, an unconditioned being. I think that what he is getting at here is the certainly of our being. Descartes' self-certainty was his Archimedean point, from which he could move the Earth. Perhaps Hegel is suggesting that Descartes science was incomplete because he failed to otherness into account.
I think it is more than curiosity. It is desire, eros, love. And here again we are reminded of Hegel's claim that the title of love of knowing can be set aside and replaced by actual knowing (5).
The image of the ladder reminds me of the Wittgenstein thread you participated in.
In that case, wasn't the ladder kicked away ? Do you think that it might be a different kind of ladder ?
I can't remember the details.
There are some similarities but the image of the ladder is an old one. There is, for example, Jacob's ladder (Genesis 28:10-17). Hegel's ladder is to reach the standpoint of absolute otherness, the ground and soil of science. Wittgenstein's ladder is leads to what is beyond the limits of science.
I think you are right about the importance of others for self-consciousness, but what I am still struggling with the concept of absolute otherness. It seems to be a contradiction in terms. What is other is so relative to something, but if relative then it is not absolute.
Reply to tim wood
With these paragraphs, Hegel draws in sharp relief the comparison of individual experience to what makes that possible. This "universal self" is central to what is being presented but is very hard for me to understand.
Deleted UserAugust 12, 2019 at 23:15#3151950 likes
This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.
Reply to tim wood
Then the difference between Kant and Hegel is about how this stuff is happening in time or not.
Kant describes time as a component of individual experience.
If this "Spirit" is the shape of history, then Kant is wrong.
Deleted UserAugust 12, 2019 at 23:25#3151970 likes
This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.
Deleted UserAugust 12, 2019 at 23:29#3151980 likes
This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.
Kant's "knowledge," then, is based in perception. Hegel places it in reason; he seems to take perception uncritically and for granted. That is, there is what we know and how we know it - which for Hegel seems to happen after perception, while for Kant it's all in one batter, baked together.
Good observation.
I am not sure how to read that against the background of negation and exclusion being the default position and something other than that being an advance or at least something different.
Deleted UserAugust 12, 2019 at 23:35#3152010 likes
This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.
Reply to tim wood
Well, the logic of both the stuff in time combined with the idea of a dialectic as producing results through a process suggests that "exclusion" is a very important activity in what Hegel has in mind.
The inclusion part only gets recognition after the conflict is over.
Or put another way, there is factor in play that Kant was not able to locate. And Hegel tried to.
the logic of both the stuff in time combined with the idea of a dialectic as producing results through a process suggests that "exclusion" is a very important activity in what Hegel has in mind.
The inclusion part only gets recognition after the conflict is over.
I find this excerpt from para 28 helpful:
Hegel/Pinkard:The individual whose substance is spirit standing at the higher level runs through these past forms in the way that a person who takes up a higher science goes through those preparatory studies which he has long ago internalized in order to make their content current before him; he calls them to mind without having his interest linger upon them. In that way, each individual spirit also runs through the culturally formative stages of the universal spirit, but it runs through them as shapes which spirit has already laid aside, as stages on a path that has been worked out and leveled out in the same way that we see fragments of knowing, which in earlier ages occupied men of mature minds, now sink to the level of exercises, and even to that of games for children.
So, knowledge for the particular individual is internalised as he progresses through life and learning via study and experience. All of this happens within a universal culture.
We proceed by laying aside ( a kind of exclusion ) previous baby steps in learning, but they are necessarily incorporated into our whole (inclusion).
The spirit grows. Rung by rung.
Hegel now relates human beings to the process of knowledge. The individual, who participates in the knowing process, does so from both individual and universal perspectives. What was earlier central, as the current view of knowledge, afterward subsists as a mere trace (Spur), like Jacques Derrida's own view of the trace (la trace ).18 We cannot separate prior from present views of knowledge. The process of education consists in making our own what was already known by our predecessors, "a past existence" now described as "the already acquired property of universal Spirit which constitutes the substance of the individual" (§28, 16). Human history records the immense efforts of human beings over a period of many centuries to know the world and themselves through the elaboration of a satisfactory view of knowledge. "The goal is Spirit's insight into what knowing is" (§29 , 17).
In the course of human history, mere existence is transformed into a series of shapes. To transform experience into knowledge, we must consider the movement of shapes preserved in memory, which must be represented and with which we must become acquainted. Through representation, we arrive at what is familiar to us, but which, to become scientific knowledge, requires the more refined cognitive "activity of the universal self, the concern of thinking" (§30, 18).
This "universal self" is central to what is being presented but is very hard for me to understand.
I don't fully understand it either. I think I remember discussing it earlier - but it never quite sinks even with all the repetition. It is linked to mediation and sublation.
We need others to become more. To connect. To be global. Universal.
We keep our sense of self as we progress and are lifted up into a higher Self.
Or something along these lines...
I don't know if this will help.
From an Outline of Hegel's Phenomenology:
Universality of Self-Consciousness.
38. The universal self-consciousness is the intuition of itself, not as a special existence distinct from others, but an intuition of the self-existent universal self. Thus it recognises itself and the other self-consciousness in itself, and is in turn recognised by them.
39. Self-consciousness is, according to this its essential universality, only real in so far as it knows its echo (and reflection) in another (I know that another knows me as itself), and as pure spiritual universality (belonging to the family, the native land, &c.) knows itself as essential self. (This self-consciousness is the basis of all virtues, of love, honour, friendship, bravery, all self-sacrifice, all fame, &c.)
Experience or knowledge? My preference and instinct is to not wrestle with this aspect at the moment, but to see what comes.
And that it has got to be possible to re-say Hegel in more accessible language - to be striven for. And gained, though perhaps through successive approximations.
To even try 'to re-say Hegel' we need to know what he is saying in the first place. To focus on the text. This means careful reading - not a swift, superficial skipping over of paragraphs 'to see what comes'. And yes, even then, approximations are the most we can hope to achieve.
I think, as a group, we are doing quite well. Getting there...
All of this, requires understanding important philosophical terminology, related to Hegel.
From Sebastian Gardner's glossary:
Gardner:EXPERIENCE ( Erfahrung). In the Phenomenology, experience refers to the experience of consciousness on its way to Science. It does not have the usual implication of restriction to the sensory but rather hinges on thought; so it does not mean for Hegel what it means for the emliricists or for Kant. Hegel originally planned to give Phenomenology the title 'Science of the Experience of Consciousness'.
Gardner:CONSCIOUSNESS ( Bewusstsein). Note that Hegel sometimes uses consciousness as a generic term for cognitive awareness, of which self-consciousness is one species; and sometimes as a species of consciousness in the generic sense, where it contrasts with self-consciousness.
Gardner:SCIENCE (Wissenschaft). In Hegel, Science refers not to natural science but to philosophical knowledge, which must be in a systematic, articulate form. Thus it refers to his own philosophy.
Science is the in-itself but must become for itself, that is, it must move from self-consciousness as being something inner, by which substance is other or object to self-consciousness, to self-consciousness being for itself, the whole as the union of substance and subject. Here spirit is no longer substance, that is, object of consciousness but the actualization of spirit, as in itself and for itself; not something that is mine or particular, or even as universal, but as absolute, the identity of difference, one with itself.
what I am still struggling with the concept of absolute otherness. It seems to be a contradiction in terms. What is other is so relative to something, but if relative then it is not absolute.
I am going to refer to Gardner's glossary in an effort to understand the above.
Gardner:ABSOLUTE adj.,n. (absolute, das Absolute). Complete, self-contained, all-encompassing. Per Inwood, the Absolute 'is not something underlying the phenomenal world, but the conceptual system embedded in it'.
FOR ITSELF (fur sich). Reflective, explicit, self-comprehending, fully developed. Contrasts with: in itself, in-and-for-itself.
IN ITSELF (an sich). Merely potential or implicit...Something is 'in itself' when it is considered separately from other things, and ( in the case of a form of consciousness) when it is unreflective. That is why, for Hegel, the in itself is mere potentiality: actuality requires determination, negation, relations with other things. Note that a thing may be 'in itself for us'...an expression Hegel uses often: this just means that we are considering it as it is separate from other things. Contrasts with: for itself, and in-and-for-itself.
IN-AND-FOR-ITSELF (an und fur sich). Completely developed; both at home with itself, and finding itself in the other. It contrasts with mere being in itself and being for itself. Being in-and-for-itself is the condition of the Absolute, God, Spirit actualised.
So, what can be meant by 'absolute otherness', as per para 26.
"Pure self-knowing in absolute otherness, this ether as such, is the very ground and soil of science, or, knowing in its universality" - Hegel.
Taking absolute as an adjective: all-encompassing. There is a sense of a complete or whole otherness wherein we as individuals find ourselves.
We move from our separate, individual potential ( in itself) to actual, full self-realisation in a personal and global sense ( in-and-for-itself) via socio-cultural relationships and being actively reflective ( for itself).
That is, we are relative within an absolute whole.
That's my current understanding. Open to review.
Absolute otherness must be the otherness of the whole within itself as the condition for the whole's self-knowledge. The circle of self-knowledge plays out on the levels of the individual, the culture, and the whole. The first two are limited wholes, the last the whole of wholes.
Reply to Fooloso4
Just noticed this part I bolded. I think you answered your own question. Where is your struggle ? There is no contradiction in terms, is there ?
If we were to draw the circles of wholes where would absolute otherness be? If it is complete otherness it would be a circle that is not encompassed in some larger whole, otherwise it would not be absolute otherness.
Perhaps what Hegel is getting at is the movement from absolute otherness to its sublation, its negation.
Deleted UserAugust 13, 2019 at 15:54#3153250 likes
This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.
If we were to draw the circles of wholes where would absolute otherness be? If it is complete otherness it would be a circle that is not encompassed in some larger whole, otherwise it would not be absolute otherness.
Agree. If we take it 'absolute' as 'all encompassing', it would be the outer circle.
I think, according to Hegel, it is the universality of philosophical science or knowing ?
It would seem like the end point of his conceptual system.
Perhaps what Hegel is getting at is the movement from absolute otherness to its sublation, its negation.
Perhaps indeed.
Isn't this what he says in para 26 ? It is the ground. The beginning of the circle or spiral upwards.
"Pure self-knowing in absolute otherness, this ether as such, is the very ground and soil of science, or, knowing in its universality" - Hegel.
Given the eternal thinking process, and the dialectic, it is the beginning of new concepts and ideas.
Perhaps some other philosopher, post-Hegel, takes one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind.
Quantitative evolutionary steps up a ladder.
Followed by qualitative revolutionary leaps in thought ?
We blow thought bubbles, then burst them or they are burst, sometimes they join up...
And so it goes...
Another thing might be that each thing must be other than all other things. Is the whole other than itself? In one sense since there is nothing other than the whole of what is then there would be nothing other than the whole. But self-knowing requires the self to treat itself as is object of knowledge.
Another thing might be that each thing must be other than all other things. Is the whole other than itself? In one sense since there is nothing other than the whole of what is then there would be nothing other than the whole. But self-knowing requires the self to treat itself as is object of knowledge.
OK. Yes, in one sense, each thing or person is other than the rest, but there are similarities as well as differences. As we all know.
If we take the 'whole' as meaning the whole of 'what is', we cannot know that that is all there is. There could easily be more than the whole of what we currently know. But that pertains to scientific knowledge, doesn't it, not philosophical knowledge such as it is. Given that both take place within a changing world, neither can be complete or whole.
'Self knowing' if that is the same as self consciousness requires a self-regarding as an object. To be able to detach and be objective. And that can never be complete either. It is an ongoing process.
However, a union can obtain between individual knowledge of the self/subject, that is 'subjective' and philosophical knowledge - the knowing of reason (objective). They are not distinct entities. It takes two to tango. Ain't that the tangled truth ?
I linked to 'the Outlines of Hegel's Phenomenology' earlier. I find it helpful as an aid in understanding.
In particular this part seemed relevant.
THIRD PHASE.
Reason.
40. Reason is the highest union of consciousness and self-consciousness, or of the knowing of an object and of the knowing of itself. It is the certitude that its determinations are just as much objective, i.e. determinations of the essence of things, as they are subjective thoughts. It (Reason) is just as well the certitude of itself (subjectivity) as being (or objectivity), and this, too, in one and the same thinking activity.
41. Or what we see through the insight of Reason, is: (1) a content which subsists not in our mere subjective notions or thoughts which we make for ourselves, but which contains the in-and-for-itself-existing essence of objects and possesses objective reality; and (2) which is for the Ego no alien somewhat, no somewhat given from without, but throughout penetrated and assimilated by the Ego, and therefore to all intents produced by the Ego.
42. The knowing of Reason is therefore not the mere subjective certitude, but also TRUTH, because Truth consists in the harmony, or rather unity, of certitude and Being, or of certitude and objectivity.
I need to review some other parts of Hegel that is influencing my perspective.
I think it is wise to take time to review difficult aspects of Hegel. All the better to clarify and hopefully reach a better understanding. This 'to and fro' is an important part of our discussion. I appreciate all thought provoking questions and responses.
Then be easy. If you get it I'll be interested, but let's stay with the main part of this. Your call.
'Be easy!' - a favourite quote of yours from the Three Musketeers.
Perhaps more pertinent here is their: 'The merit of all things lies in their difficulty.'
To achieve a deeper understanding of the difficult Preface requires several things. At the risk of repeating myself...
For some, this includes:
Careful reading with continual review.
A bit of a breather. To help get your head out of the single, successive paragraphs to gain perspective.
Seeking help from other resources.
You need to heed your own advice. Be easy. This swift copy and pasting of paragraphs might be what you need to do to reach the end. To keep control of the thread.
But at what cost to cohesive, clear comprehension ?
Deleted UserAugust 14, 2019 at 13:36#3155530 likes
This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.
I'm happy to slow down. Interested persons post here what they think a good rate is. My approach has been to "reload" when the discussion on the earlier post seemed done.
Given that I have made similar comments before to no great effect, I welcome this response.
In the main, the pace of posting paragraphs has been such that catching up has not been a huge problem. And I have enjoyed some fruitful sidetracks.
However, you have changed your initial approach. Contrary to what you have said, you do not in fact wait until the earlier post has been discussed or 'seemed done'. Indeed, para 28 was not even commented on, far less 'explicated'.
Para 26 proved more difficult to understand and so, has just finished being discussed by 2 of us.
I realise and totally understand that not everyone wants to spend so much time on a single paragraph or to tease out the meaning of a difficult concept. But 2 is approximately half the current group.
So, opinions as to what 'a good rate' might be will be as varied as motivations and reading pace.
The trouble is that there are non too many 'interested persons' around. Some have left or decided not to join, for various reasons.
I would welcome a return to your initial approach which meant taking the time to give an explication on each paragraph at the point of copy and paste. Then others can respond accordingly. But that's just me and no doubt you will have good reasons why that is not possible.
Perhaps Goethe shares Hegel's view of continuous development. It is not simply what was said or done at the beginning, but the continued active doing. From what you presented it also seems that Goethe shares Hegel's rejection of a transcendent God who acts upon the world.
"The need to represent the absolute as subject has helped itself to such propositions as “God is the eternal,” or “God is the moral order of the world,” or “God is love,” etc." - Hegel.
Does Hegel intend for us to draw a connection between “God is love”, “The life of God and divine cognition ... as a game love plays with itself” (19),and the goal of philosophy as moving “nearer to the goal where it can lay aside the title of love of knowing and be actual knowing (5)?
Thank you, Fooloso4, for helping me along the way. Your questions have stayed with me. @Fooloso4 - if you, or anyone else, are still interested and have the time, I would appreciate your thoughts on the PN article. Even if briefly.
Previously, I raised concerns about Hegel's apparent religiosity - the ascending staircase to the Absolute, a glorious path leading to Perfection.
Today I read this PN article which helped me better understand Hegel's position:
https://philosophynow.org/issues/86/Hegels_God
Putting these two points together, Hegel arrives at a substitute for the conventional conception of God that he criticized. If there is a higher degree of reality that goes with being self-determining (and thus real as oneself), and if we ourselves do in fact achieve greater self-determination at some times than we achieve at other times, then it seems that we’re familiar in our own experience with some of the higher degree of reality that we associate with God. Perhaps we aren’t often aware of the highest degree of this reality, or the sum of all of this reality, which would be God himself (herself, etc.). But we are aware of some of it – as the way in which we ourselves seem to be more fully present, more fully real, when instead of just letting ourselves be driven by whatever desires we currently feel, we ask ourselves what would be best overall. We’re more fully real, in such a case, because we ourselves are playing a more active role, through thought, than we play when we simply let ourselves be driven by our current desires...
...Hegel’s conception explains and preserves two other famous features of Abrahamic religions as well. The God that Hegel describes as emerging from the world of finite things, gives to them the greatest reality of which they’re capable. In this way, Hegel’s God performs something very similar to what’s traditionally called ‘creating’. However, because this Hegelian ‘creating’ takes place throughout time, rather than only ‘in the beginning’, it doesn’t conflict with what astrophysics and biology tell us about the history of the universe.
The other feature of the Abrahamic religions that Hegel preserves is that their God in some way takes care of or ‘saves’ his creatures. The God who is free love and boundless blessedness does exactly this, though in a perhaps unfamiliar way. Hegel’s God doesn’t ‘intervene’ in the world, or in something that comes ‘after’ it; rather, Hegel’s God is omnipresent in the world, giving each of us the full reality and thus the blessedness of which we’re capable.
It's OK whatever you decide to do. I will either continue in my own sweet way, or I won't :smile:
It will still involve clarifying or questioning the text and Hegel's thoughts - hopefully.
" If, namely, the True exists only in what, or better as what, is sometimes called intuition, sometimes immediate knowledge of the Absolute, religion or being - not at the centre of divine love but the being of the divine love itself - then what is required in the exposition of philosophy is, from this viewpoint, rather the opposite of the form of the Notion. For the Absolute is not supposed to be comprehended, it is to be felt and intuited; not the Notion of the Absolute, but the feeling and intuition of it, must govern what is said, and must be expressed by it" - Hegel.
The bolded sentence seems obviously mystical to me; it seems suggestive of Eckhardt.
@Wayfarer, your post intrigued me at the time and I think I did try to respond to it but inadequately.
I understand that you didn't have the time to participate in the reading or group discussion.
However, I would be interested to hear your views on Hegel and his position on God.
What he means by the Absolute. It seems to change from something mystical to the more concrete.
Perhaps from the real feel to the theoretical ?
ABSOLUTE adj.,n. (absolute, das Absolute). Complete, self-contained, all-encompassing. Per Inwood, the Absolute 'is not something underlying the phenomenal world, but the conceptual system embedded in it'.
Reply to Amity Did y’all get to the thesis-antithesis-synthesis part of Hegel yet? Because the way I see it, according to Hegel, historical reality is progressing to a type of perfection. Perhaps truth apprehended through intuition results in historical thesis, giving rise to historical antithesis, further resulting in synthesis. Collectively we who grasp this through intuition arrives at perfection ultimately at some future point in history? So, God grasped through intuition results in the ultimate truth of perfection at the end of history? Correct me if I’m confused.
If you are confused, then join the club. I am the last person to be correcting anyone.
Have you read the Preface ? Have you read the thread ? Have you perused any particular paragraph ?
It's easy to drop in by with some insight or opinion without any previous signs of commitment.
I think that is what Tim was guarding against at the beginning. There are rules !
I’m sorry. Will you forgive my transgression? I will either read from the beginning or I won’t. I probably won’t intrude again, but I really don’t care about angering Tim.
I would be interested to hear your views on Hegel and his position on God.
What he means by the Absolute. It seems to change from something mystical to the more concrete.
Perhaps from the real feel to the theoretical ?
There's a strong element of mysticism in German idealism, particularly Hegel, Schelling and Fichte, and to a lesser extent Kant and Schopenhauer. Now, the very word 'mysticism' is a pejorative to a lot of people, it's seen as the opposite of rigorous philosophy. But the true mystics are actually very rigorous in their own way. And that particular phrase of Hegel's is highly reminiscent of what is called 'Rhineland mysticism' of which the most illustrious exponent was the famous Meister Eckhardt. Then there's also a figure called Jacob Boehme (spelt various ways) nearer in time to Hegel, another mystical sage. I've read that he also had some affinity with hermeticism, which is a kind of underground current in a lot of Western philosophy and science.
In any case the origin of the mystical tradition in Western philosophy is (neo)Platonism and its successors, whose doctrines were fused into early Christianity by the Greek-speaking theologians, including Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and later Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus Eriugena. The intuition of 'the One' which is the ground/source of all being through the domain of the forms/ideas is central to that tradition. Although it should be said the marriage of Hebrew prophetic religion with Greek rationalism was often a rather fraught one, and that (in my view) the mystical elements became almost completely subordinated to the literalistic tendencies in Protestantism. But there's a huge amount of study involved in all of those issues, and I've only skimmed the surface. But I think it is possible to identify aspects the Hegelian 'absolute' with both the 'first mover' of Aristotle, and also with the One of neo-platonism (feasibly a kind of 'world soul').
Actually there's a passage that comes to mind from the SEP entry on Schopenhauer, to wit:
It is a perennial philosophical reflection that if one looks deeply enough into oneself, one will discover not only one’s own essence, but also the essence of the universe. For as one is a part of the universe as is everything else, the basic energies of the universe flow through oneself, as they flow through everything else. For that reason it is thought that one can come into contact with the nature of the universe if one comes into substantial contact with one’s ultimate inner being.
Among the most frequently-identified principles that are introspectively brought forth — and one that was the standard for German Idealist philosophers such as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel who were philosophizing within the Cartesian tradition — is the principle of self-consciousness. With the belief that acts of self-consciousness exemplify a self-creative process akin to divine creation, and developing a logic that reflects the structure of self-consciousness, namely, the dialectical logic of position, opposition and reconciliation (sometimes described as the logic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis), the German Idealists maintained that dialectical logic mirrors the structure not only of human productions, both individual and social, but the structure of reality as a whole, conceived of as a thinking substance or conceptually-structured-and-constituted entity.
Actually I want to comment on one phrase from the SEP quote I provide:
For as one is a part of the universe as is everything else, the basic energies of the universe flow through oneself, as they flow through everything else.
I think it would be rather better to paraphrase it like this: that as all originates from a common source, then every being reflects or is an aspect of that source. The analogy of ‘basic energies’ is rather materialist for my liking. I also think my paraphrase is nearer in meaning to Hegel.
But there's a huge amount of study involved in all of those issues, and I've only skimmed the surface. But I think it is possible to identify aspects the Hegelian 'absolute' with both the 'first mover' of Aristotle, and also with the One of neo-platonism (feasibly a kind of 'world soul').
Thanks for this. It is just what I was looking for. A way to understand Hegel and his spirit.
There's a strong element of mysticism in German idealism, particularly Hegel, Schelling and Fichte, and to a lesser extent Kant and Schopenhauer. Now, the very word 'mysticism' is a pejorative to a lot of people, it's seen as the opposite of rigorous philosophy. But the true mystics are actually very rigorous in their own way.
I am quite attracted to this way of looking at the world. I mentioned Goethe earlier. He is not a philosopher as such but a worthy nevertheless.
I will read the SEP entry later but this part seems to capture the process well:
With the belief that acts of self-consciousness exemplify a self-creative process akin to divine creation, and developing a logic that reflects the structure of self-consciousness, namely, the dialectical logic of position, opposition and reconciliation (sometimes described as the logic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis), Quoting Wayfarer
Also have a glance at this article
https://philosophynow.org/issues/86/Hegels_God
Have done :smile: See earlier post. I found it helpful.
Didn’t notice you’d already referenced Wallace! Only responded to the post above my reply.
No worries.
My turn to confess :yikes:
I only found the article by following your previous link to it elsewhere. I should have acknowledged that.
From: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2384/page/p1
"There's an article by Robert M. Wallace, Hegel's God, although some of it is pretty murky, in my opinion. But it is introduced with the statement that ' 'Large numbers of people both within traditional religions and outside them are looking for non-dogmatic ways of thinking about transcendent reality', of which Hegel's philosophy of religion is given as an example".— Wayfarer
Actually I want to comment on one phrase from the SEP quote I provide:
"For as one is a part of the universe as is everything else, the basic energies of the universe flow through oneself, as they flow through everything else."
I think it would be rather better to paraphrase it like this: that as all originates from a common source, then every being reflects or is an aspect of that source. The analogy of ‘basic energies’ is rather materialist for my liking. I also think my paraphrase is nearer in meaning to Hegel.
I think this fascinating. Yet again, I am tempted beyond the Preface. I won't pursue this in great detail here...but important to bear in mind as I progress my understanding of Hegel. Thanks.
Before returning to the Preface mountainside...
Just one question - why do you think your paraphrase is nearer in meaning to Hegel ?
I don't understand your objection to 'basic energies'.
Have you read this ?
Another parallel between Hermeticism and Hegel is the doctrine of internal relations. For the Hermeticists, the cosmos is not a loosely connected, or to use Hegelian language, externally related set of particulars. Rather, everything in the cosmos is internally related, bound up with everything else. Even though the cosmos may be hierarchically arranged, there are forces that cut across and unify all the levels. Divine powers understood variously as “energy” or “light” pervade the whole.
Hegel's Preface :
Magee starts off with this astonishing claim:
Glenn Magee:Hegel is not a philosopher. He is no lover or seeker of wisdom — he believes he has found it. Hegel writes in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, “To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title of ‘love of knowing’ and be actual knowledge — that is what I have set before me” (Miller, 3; PC, 3). By the end of the Phenomenology, Hegel claims to have arrived at Absolute Knowledge, which he identifies with wisdom.
Rather, everything in the cosmos is internally related, bound up with everything else. Even though the cosmos may be hierarchically arranged, there are forces that cut across and unify all the levels. Divine powers understood variously as “energy” or “light” pervade the whole.
This is close to the idea of the perennial philosophy. (It's also highly reminiscent of Hua Yen Buddhism.) They are marvellous ideas, but how characteristic they really are of Hegel, I can't tell, having not read Magee's book - perhaps I should give it a look.
As to whether Hegel was a sage - I think I would have to demur. I think his work is in many respects very much a product of its time and place, particularly in its emphasis on nationalism. He did touch on universal themes but I don't know if I agree with that glowing assessment of him overall. I do sometimes feel as though Hegel and his ilk were the last representatives of the 'grand tradition' of Western philosophy. But they're so verbose! To much going on in the word processing department. I prefer the directness of Zen.
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 16, 2019 at 10:51#3163140 likes
But I think it is possible to identify aspects the Hegelian 'absolute' with both the 'first mover' of Aristotle, and also with the One of neo-platonism (feasibly a kind of 'world soul').
In my experience Hegelians generally dismiss this enterprise of relating Hegel's thought to that of the ancients, insisting on Hegel's originality. I find that this enforces the representation of Hegel as mystic, because mysticism focuses in on the originality of the individual. We approach the meaning of One (in the sense of the unity of all), through understanding "one" in the sense of one individual, oneself.
This classes all phenomenology as mysticism. This mystical method takes the approach that the only true access we have to the unity of being, which is the source of the particular, the object, is internally. Presupposing the existence of things, as objects, is rejected, because there is no principle of unity to justify that assumption. The subject, oneself, can be the only true object, because only by looking at oneself can one come into contact with the source of unity, which is necessary for the existence of an object.
I would appreciate your thoughts on the PN article.
The problem I have with Wallace's article is the lack of reference. How much of what he claims can be found in the texts? I am reminded of Nietzsche's inversion of a famous saying: "Seek and you will find". Is Wallace finding all this in Hegel because it is there to be found or does he find it because that is what he wants to find?
As to the question of whether Hegel was a mystic, we must first ask what a mystic is. Is it someone who has experiences or someone who has been initiated formally or informally into secret teachings or someone who yearns for immediacy or someone who attempts to attain altered states of consciousness via particular practices or ...?
How much of what he claims can be found in the texts?
Indeed. And that is a timely reminder to return to the Preface.
The alternative perspectives and interpretations are fascinating.
To be followed up outwith this thread, I think.
Thanks to all.
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 17, 2019 at 01:22#3166170 likes
As to the question of whether Hegel was a mystic, we must first ask what a mystic is. Is it someone who has experiences or someone who has been initiated formally or informally into secret teachings or someone who yearns for immediacy or someone who attempts to attain altered states of consciousness via particular practices or ...?
Mysticism is philosophy centred around the mystical experience. I believe that in it's most simple form, the mystical experience is the experience which makes one aware of one's own spirituality. Recognizing your spirituality, and acknowledging this as experience, makes you a mystic.
Reply to Metaphysician UndercoverReply to Fooloso4Reply to Wayfarer
Trying to avoid a total sidetrack here, I had thought to start a new thread entitled ' Hegel is not a philosopher !' ( using Magee's quote ) *
However, I note this has been discussed before:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/517/mysticism/p1
Janus :This is a passage from Hegel which I think is particularly relevant, quoted in the book I am reading, Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition. Magee thinks Hegel uses mytho-poetic language to "encircle" or "circle around" his subjects with concrete images to gain speculative knowledge of them, rather than trying to think them in the determinate language of abstract conceptualization. So we get a picture, but no definitive propositional-type claims are made about the subject and there always remains mystery.
I hope this can be opened; I didn't have time to type it out; I'm pretty pressed at the moment.
Well, the logic of both the stuff in time combined with the idea of a dialectic as producing results through a process suggests that "exclusion" is a very important activity in what Hegel has in mind.
The inclusion part only gets recognition after the conflict is over.
Or put another way, there is factor in play that Kant was not able to locate. And Hegel tried to.
Any chance of adding light here in not too many sentences?
1) Taking the process as a black box that produces a result (or like a recipe that produces a cake), I'm thinking that in the result are all the components that were input to the black box. For this present purpose I'm not looking inside the black box, wherein indeed there may be a sorting process as part of the process.
2) What factor?
I will try to answer in reverse order. The factor Kant is leaving out of his analysis is a motive to go forward. The briefest account I can find comes from Hegel's Logic, translated by William Wallace:
This thought, which is proposed as the instrument of philosophic knowledge, itself calls for further explanation. We must understand in what way it possesses necessity or cogency: and when it claims to be equal to the task of apprehending the absolute objects (God, Spirit, Freedom), that claim must be substantiated. Such an explanation, however, is itself a lesson in philosophy, and properly falls within the scope of the science itself. A preliminary attempt to make matters plain would only be unphilosophical, and consist of a tissue of assumptions, assertions, and inferential pros and cons, i.e. of dogmatism without cogency, as against which there would be an equal right of counter-dogmatism.
A main line of argument in the Critical Philosophy bids us pause before proceeding to inquire into God or into the true being of things, and tells us first of all to examine the faculty of cognition and see whether it is equal to such an effort. We ought, says Kant, to become acquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work for which it is to be employed; for if the instrument be insufficient, all our trouble will be spent in vain. The plausibility of this suggestion has won for it general assent and admiration; the result of which has been to withdraw cognition from an interest in its objects and absorption in the study of them, and to direct it back upon itself; and so turn it to a question of form. Unless we wish to be deceived by words, it is easy to see what this amounts to. In the case of other instruments, we can try and criticize them in other ways than by setting about the special work for which they are destined. But the examination of knowledge can only be carried out by an act of knowledge. To examine this so-called instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim. Reinhold saw the confusion with which this style of commencement is chargeable, and tried to get out of the difficulty by starting with a hypothetical and problematical stage of philosophizing. In this way he supposed that it would be possible, nobody can tell how, to get along, until we found ourselves, further on, arrived at the primary truth of truths. His method, when closely looked into, will be seen to be identical with a very common practice. It starts from a substratum of experiential fact, or from a provisional assumption which has been brought into a definition; and then proceeds to analyse this starting-point.
We can detect in Reinhold’s argument a perception of the truth, that the usual course which proceeds by assumptions and anticipations is no better than a hypothetical and problematical mode of procedure. But his perceiving this does not alter the character of this method; it only makes clear its imperfections.
So, negation is important because there is no motion forward without it. The Notion is not an explanation but an activity. It is not "automatic" as a process. If it was, then it would already be appropriated like a Category of Reason. The previous discussion of necessity in Logic is focused upon this point. If we knew what we know, why bother with any further discussion?
So, negation is important because there is no motion forward without it. The Notion is not an explanation but an activity. It is not "automatic" as a process. If it was, then it would already be appropriated like a Category of Reason.
I think that is correct and is a consistent feature throughout.The latest in para 32 and 33:
32:
Hegel:However, the life of spirit is not a life that is fearing death and austerely saving itself from ruin; rather, it bears death calmly, and in death, it sustains itself. Spirit only wins its truth by finding its feet in its absolute disruption. Spirit is not this power which, as the positive, avoids looking at the negative, as is the case when we say of something that it is nothing, or that it is false, and then, being done with it, go off on our own way on to something else. No, spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face and lingering with it. This lingering is the magical power that converts it into being.
33:
Hegel:Nowadays the task before us consists not so much in purifying the individual of the sensuously immediate and in making him into a thinking substance which has itself been subjected to thought; it consists instead in doing the very opposite. It consists in actualizing and spiritually animating the universal through the sublation of fixed and determinate thoughts.
Further notes from Rockmore:
https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft7d5nb4r8;brand=ucpress
Tom Rockmore:Analysis (Analysieren) of an idea into its constituent elements, through the understanding (Verstand ), as distinguished from reason, will not yield knowledge. Kant's critical philosophy features categories, or pure concepts of the understanding, that "produce," or "construct," the objects of experience by unifying the contents of sensory experience. For Hegel, on the contrary, the understanding does not unify but rather separates. He refers to "the activity of separation of theUnderstanding, the most astonishing and mightiest of powers, or rather the absolute power" (§32, 18). The understanding's capacity to introduce distinctions, to separate what was whole, or the power of the negative that causes death, is a phase of the cognitive process. In a further phase, mere individuality is transformed into universality. In this way, thoughts, or pure essences, are brought together in an "organic whole" (§34, 20).
Deleted UserAugust 19, 2019 at 17:15#3176530 likes
This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.
Reply to tim wood
Very well said.
I consider your question of dinosaur versus current player the one that is most interesting to me and shapes the tenor of many reactions to Hegel's text.
But I will respond more thoughtfully after a little bit.
I am being chased by a Velociraptor.
At this point a decision to be made. Hegel is either a dinosaur, interesting but in-himself a quaint piece of history of no direct interest, or, even today the bearer of truths timeless in-themselves, that ought to be known
Why 'at this point'?
Why an either/or decision ?
Why the extreme positions ?
You might need to make that decision. I don't.
However, you raise an interesting question which I have taken the liberty of including in a parallel thread:
I consider your question of dinosaur versus current player the one that is most interesting to me and shapes the tenor of many reactions to Hegel's text.
But I will respond more thoughtfully after a little bit.
'Dinosaur v current player'.
I look forward to further clarification.
Clearly, there are many different views and interpretations.
All of them potentially relevant to one's own developing understanding.That is one of the reasons I started a new thread; to give room for that exploration and to prevent straying too far off the Preface.
I understood Tim's aim was to focus on the text alone and explicate each paragraph *
I find this continual comparative analysis of Hegel v Kant useful up to a point. However, it seems to be taking over the objective analysis of the Preface.
I miss @Fooloso4 comments on each paragraph. Perhaps he has lost interest...
To understand any book or text requires first that it be read - and understood. That's the task of this thread, and that is the only task of this thread! Opinions and arguments are not welcome! Exception: given a reading, if someone can add light or improve on - or correct - the explication given, then they're very welcome. Or if anyone wants to add their own parallel "reading," also welcome.
With luck, 50-odd pages, maybe the thing can be done in under 50 - 100 posts!
This is a difficult read. I intend to proceed through it paragraph-by-paragraph,
Copying and pasting.
Soon the whole Preface will be covered.
The mountain top reached.
Out of breath and without oxygen.
Dead bodies are left on the mountain.
Where is the joy ?
Of reading...
Deleted UserAugust 20, 2019 at 16:58#3179200 likes
This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.
In any case the origin of the mystical tradition in Western philosophy is (neo)Platonism and its successors, whose doctrines were fused into early Christianity by the Greek-speaking theologians, including Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and later Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus Eriugena. The intuition of 'the One' which is the ground/source of all being through the domain of the forms/ideas is central to that tradition. Although it should be said the marriage of Hebrew prophetic religion with Greek rationalism was often a rather fraught one, and that (in my view) the mystical elements became almost completely subordinated to the literalistic tendencies in Protestantism. But there's a huge amount of study involved in all of those issues, and I've only skimmed the surface. But I think it is possible to identify aspects the Hegelian 'absolute' with both the 'first mover' of Aristotle, and also with the One of neo-platonism (feasibly a kind of 'world soul').
Your description is helpful. I would only throw a few curve balls into the mix.
The emphasis in Lutheran thought that what is happening for each individual is the Incarnation is mystical in itself.
As a matter of struggling with the idea of the "unconditioned" as a means of orientation to establish a starting place, Leibniz and Spinoza did that sort of thing while Kant declined to provide that in his Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics because he said we could never prove it.
I find the paragraphs taken severally difficult to get through. Often in trying to follow the path I find no path. I.e., where I look for meaning I have to provide it - and remember that as mine it's provisional
Of course, the paragraphs are difficult to get through to find the meaning. As a group, we all struggle with this to varying degrees. Some spend more time than others, some fall away; it's all a learning process.
Fascinating to be a part of.The dynamics and dialogue intriguing in themselves.
As a leader of a discussion, it is wise and important to acknowledge a lack of understanding and not to plough on regardless, without even commenting on a particular paragraph *.
Silence can mean so many things. It can give the impression of not caring and that is far from the truth.
It is good to know where we stand, even if the ground is shaky, especially when the ground is shaky.
All our understanding is provisional. Our thoughts are not written in stone. They are active and adapting.
Communication is all. Thanks for listening and sharing.
If something in a view you're examining is unclear to you, don't gloss it over. Call attention to the unclarity. Suggest several different ways of understanding the view. Explain why it's not clear which of these interpretations is correct.
I am guilty of glossing over that which I don't understand or dismissing fancy gobbledegook.
However, sometimes I try to gain clarification by asking questions of other posters. Sometimes I am fortunate enough to get an understandable reply. Other times, the reply is that ambiguous silence.
Deleted UserAugust 21, 2019 at 15:51#3183070 likes
This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.
A modern phrase (first used before Hegel!) suffices here: "hermeneutic circle." More accurately, spiral. in simplest terms, as you go 'round and 'round with a thing, or idea, it makes the more sense. "Circle" referring variously to a "circle" of texts that inform (by successive recourse to) on the text in question. Or because the Greek root means translate/interpret, which in itself evokes a "taking counsel with," implying an other even it the other needed be found only in one's own critical awareness.
Given that I have started a parallel thread to further explore issues, I will be discussing the question of the 'Hermeneutic Circle' there.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6430/hegel-is-not-a-philosopher-thoughts-
I hope thereby not to intrude on the focus and engagement required for the Preface text discussion.
I hope that using parts of quotes from this thread will not be objected to.
I will give due reference, acknowledgement and show context.
Have sent a PM to tim wood.
But I do observe that there is in your posts almost zero reference to any reading you're doing of Hegel's text. Anyone, everyone, else, but not Hegel. Why would that be? I assume you do read the paragraphs.
You are right. I have never referenced any paragraphs, discussed any analysis with any other participants or raised any questions about the text. And I never, ever read the paragraphs.
As to the question of whether Hegel was a mystic, we must first ask what a mystic is. Is it someone who has experiences or someone who has been initiated formally or informally into secret teachings or someone who yearns for immediacy or someone who attempts to attain altered states of consciousness via particular practices or ...?
A mystic is someone who knows or thinks to know something but refrains from uttering it, for various reasons. Mysticism's main tenet can be summed up in the proposition: "'Whereof one dare not speak thereof one must be silent". But Hegel was pretty much verbose, unless he kept silent about a lot of stuff.
A modern phrase (first used before Hegel!) suffices here: "hermeneutic circle." More accurately, spiral. in simplest terms, as you go 'round and 'round with a thing, or idea, it makes the more sense. "Circle" referring variously to a "circle" of texts that inform (by successive recourse to) on the text in question. Or because the Greek root means translate/interpret, which in itself evokes a "taking counsel with," implying an other even it the other needed be found only in one's own critical awareness.
The hermeneutic circle is a good idea to bring into this topic. It is an element in the experiences Hegel describes and also reflects how he is in the circle himself as the origin of many discussions and disputes about ontology and epistemology. In spite of those conditions, I read the Phenomenology as an attempt at escaping the circle of "avoiding learning how to swim before getting in the water." When I read that section of the Logic, I wonder whether Hegel avoided the situation he said Kant was stuck in. Does he escape the problem of being "outside" of his method?
Some of that wondering goes in the direction being explored by Fooloso4:Quoting Fooloso4
Another thing might be that each thing must be other than all other things. Is the whole other than itself? In one sense since there is nothing other than the whole of what is then there would be nothing other than the whole. But self-knowing requires the self to treat itself as is object of knowledge.
A greater part of my wondering goes toward how "Self-Awareness" comes into being through its experiences and the role harsh necessity and "un-freedom" play in that. The negativity of the conscious individual meets the negation of the other individuals. The logic of how these events unfold leads to freedom and self-awareness. I accept that something like the structure of a Preface is needed to talk about experience this way. To see conflict as part of a process requires the use of synthesis for it to become past. From that point of view, Hegel is keenly aware of his "absorption" in his time and history. He is a major part of why we talk that way now.
On the other hand, the idea that the process has reached a kind of completion is at odds with the instruction to stay in the water. The ever expanding generations of Hegel's critics dig into the negativity he did not explore. By the turn of his own method, that points to elements and processes he was not aware of.
In my mind, it is that relationship between the dialectic and understanding that is still alive and kicking.
By your description Hegel would not be a mystic, but those who, like Wallace, claim that Hegel was a mystic hold to some other idea of what mysticism means.
Given the importance of the development of spirit in time, it seems clear that Hegel's thinking goes further than that of the mystics. But, one might argue that the mystic is able to transcend time. For Hegel, however, science is discursive. It is necessary to articulate or give a rational account of what one claims to know. I think he would say that the mystic fails to do this, but not because the mystic chooses to remain silent.
Deleted UserAugust 27, 2019 at 13:54#3208560 likes
This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.
Deleted UserAugust 27, 2019 at 15:58#3209090 likes
This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.
Reply to Fooloso4 I am talking about this sort of thing, as it was laid out by Plato (or his followers) in "The Seventh Letter":
plato 7th:Therefore every man of worth, when dealing with matters of worth, will be far from exposing them to ill feeling and misunderstanding among men by committing them to writing. In one word, then, it may be known from this that, if one sees written treatises composed by anyone, either the laws of a lawgiver, or in any other form whatever, these are not for that man the things of most worth, if he is a man of worth, but that his treasures are laid up in the fairest spot that he possesses. But if these things were worked at by him as things of real worth, and committed to writing, then surely, not gods, but men "have themselves bereft him of his wits."
Anyone who has followed this discourse and digression will know well that, if Dionysios or anyone else, great or small, has written a treatise on the highest matters and the first principles of things, he has, so I say, neither heard nor learnt any sound teaching about the subject of his treatise; otherwise, he would have had the same reverence for it, which I have, and would have shrunk from putting it forth into a world of discord and uncomeliness. For he wrote it, not as an aid to memory-since there is no risk of forgetting it, if a man's soul has once laid hold of it; for it is expressed in the shortest of statements-but if he wrote it at all, it was from a mean craving for honour, either putting it forth as his own invention, or to figure as a man possessed of culture, of which he was not worthy, if his heart was set on the credit of possessing it.
Perhaps men have themselves bereft Hegel of his wits, or maybe he too is a man of worth. In that case he would be like Plato in that both have a lot to say but both leave the things of the most worth unsaid. I am certain that this is the case for Plato but do not know if it is for Hegel.
Deleted UserAugust 28, 2019 at 16:06#3213890 likes
This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.
Perhaps men have themselves bereft Hegel of his wits, or maybe he too is a man of worth. In that case he would be like Plato in that both have a lot to say but both leave the things of the most worth unsaid. I am certain that this is the case for Plato but do not know if it is for Hegel.
Exactly! Which is why I said "but Hegel was pretty much verbose, unless he kept silent about a lot of stuff". No matter whether Plato or Hegel were really mystics, it's another question what they took themselves to be. In that respect, Plato certainly took himself as one, but I doubt that the same can be said of Hegel. In fact, I believe that Hegel wanted to do away with mysticism, most probably seeing the "young spirit" as mystical and secretive, but in its progression breaking free from this secrecy, like you say "it seems clear that Hegel's thinking goes further than that of the mystics".
When I first read Plato I thought he was a mystic. I no longer read him this way.
I think he was a Socratic or zetetic skeptic, knowing that he does not know. What he says about the Forms seems to be a direct contradiction of this point, but a careful reading of the Republic makes clear that Socrates is telling stories. He admits he cannot confirm that things are as he says. In other words, he has not had the transcendent experience of direct apprehension of the Forms. The Forms, of which the visible world is said to be an image, are actually themselves images of the truth, a truth he does not know.
I think what Plato presents is a public teachings that takes on the guise of mystical revelation. It is a salutary teaching about the Good. It is Plato's response to the poets who shaped the minds and souls of man. It is poetry (poeisis, to make), intended to inspire and lead to the desire to aspire, to seek the truth itself.
Reply to Fooloso4 So, to make things clear, you say that a mystic is like the one being portrayed in the following music video, one that "saw the whole of the moon"?
I saw the crescent
You saw the whole of the moon
I spoke about wings
You just flew
I wondered, I guessed and I tried
You just knew
I sighed
But you swooned, I saw the crescent
You saw the whole of the moon
The whole of the moon
How would Hegel call this, the distinction between loving to know and actual knowledge, or I dunno?
So, to make things clear, you say that a mystic is like the one being portrayed in the following music video, one that "saw the whole of the moon"?
I am not saying what the mystic is. What I am saying is that there is no single definition of the mystic. I am not sure if the label is important or helpful. So, when someone asks whether Hegel was a mystic I must ask what he or she means by that.
I don't think either of them were. I do see some similarities between Hegel and Lurianic Kabbalah, but I am not prepared to make more of it. I simply do not know his work well enough to speak with more confidence on the matter.
One way I look at the limit of reason stuff in Hegel is that he was a horse who got out of his corral when a gate was left open.
He galloped for a while and then stopped because he expected there to be another fence after the one he got past.
Reply to Fooloso4
For sure, there is no single definition of the mystic, or for anything. But we can focus our attention on different meanings for the same word. Which means that there is no point in us, or anyone for that matter, arguing what a mystic really is, really pointless, but to give an account, a description, for what we, individually, mean by that, like you ask. So I am saying that Hegel believed, mystic or not, purported himself to be the one to see the whole, "see the whole of the moon", would you agree?
I mean, like timmy :) above referred from the marxists:
"Hegel is not a philosopher. He is no lover or seeker of wisdom — he believes he has found it. Hegel writes in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, “To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title of ‘love of knowing’ and be actual knowledge — that is what I have set before me”. By the end of the Phenomenology, Hegel claims to have arrived at Absolute Knowledge, which he identifies with wisdom."
In order to know with what we are dealing with here. Are we dealing with this? With a method to attain absolute knowledge, everything that there is to know?? But I think that Hegel did not identify himself with absolute knowledge, like he did not say that he knew everything that there is to know, but that his method, the hegelian method, will lead someone to absolute knowledge.
Has Hegel lost his mind, or does he know what is he talking about?
He may be right, of course, I don't know. But it is crucial to know beforehand what we are delving into here.
Has Hegel lost his mind, or does he know what is he talking about?
Knowledge of the whole for Hegel does not mean knowledge of every particular. It is not a claim of omniscience. The Phenomenology describes the movement of thought from consciousness to self-consciousness - knower and known.
Reply to Fooloso4 Yes, so his philosophy, method or theory has the explanatory power to give an account for all philosophical thoughts throughout history. Meaning for example when Aristotle thought something, Hegel can come up and say why he thought so and what he meant by it, the same for everyone else. Also, it explains itself.
Yes, so his philosophy, method or theory has the explanatory power to give an account for all philosophical thoughts throughout history. Meaning for example when Aristotle thought something, Hegel can come up and say why he thought so and what he meant by it, the same for everyone else. Also, it explains itself.
I don't think it is a matter of Hegel being able to explain why Aristotle thought as he did but that since Hegel denies that there can be partial knowledge, Aristotle's philosophy, as well as the philosophy of all others before Hegel, is deficient, incomplete.
I don't think this means that Hegel was able to definitively explain everything that Aristotle said.
Reply to Fooloso4 Perhaps I wasn't clear, I will post an example. In the Science of Logic, Hegel writes (21.13):
[quote=Hegel]“In so many respects,” says Aristotle in the same context, “is human nature in bondage; but this science, which is not pursued for any utility, is alone free in and for itself, and for this reason it appears not to be a human possession.”[/quote]
In the above, Hegel quotes Aristotle, where the latter tries to find and define the "first science", metaphysics or theology as he calls it, what its subject matter is etc.
And so, the first science appears to Aristotle to be of divine nature, giving his reasons for it. Hegel gives his own reasons as well for this appearance, but in terms of his own philosophical system, and thus goes further than Aristotle. In the process, he would have to explain why Aristotle didn't think of what he himself did.
And elsewhere, where for example he examines Plato's Ideas, Hegel does so within his philosophical system, he doesn't just say that Plato was wrong and disposes of his thoughts, but tries to give an account of what Plato thought in hegelian terms. I have no idea how he does this, but I am certain that every thought, no matter what, is put under the microscope in his own system.
And elsewhere, where for example he examines Plato's Ideas, Hegel does so within his philosophical system, he doesn't just say that Plato was wrong and disposes of his thoughts, but tries to give an account of what Plato thought in hegelian terms.
I do not know the details of this but in general this is how Hegel regards all prior philosophers. There is something correct in their view but it is aufheben, sublated. Each proposition followed to its logical end contains its own contradiction.
Reply to Fooloso4 Yes, sublation, if this is how all things are evolving, then it must also be at the core of the Theory of Evolution, speciation I mean, the way new species are being generated. Thus giving birth to man, the most contradictory being that man knows. But I am mostly interested in Hegel from a physics point of view, as it is reflected in bohmian mechanics, the peculiar interpretation of quantum mechanics that David Bohm developed along with mathematician Basil Hiley.
Hegel is talking about the movement of thought or spirit. I don't think this extends to physics or evolution, but I could be wrong.
But Hegel's philosophy is about the whole, so how could it leave these things behind?? After all, Hegel provides the scientific foundations, and physics and evolutionary biology are sciences.
Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/natindex.htm
It was taking too much time and energy. I was spending many hours working through a single paragraph in some cases.
Indeed, these things have leisure as a prerequisite.
science of logic:'It was only', says Aristotle, 'after almost everything necessary and everything requisite for human comfort and intercourse was available, that man began to concern himself with philosophical knowledge' 'In Egypt', he had previously remarked, 'there was an early development of the mathematical sciences because there the priestly caste at an early stage were in a position to have leisure'.
But Hegel's philosophy is about the whole, so how could it leave these things behind?? After all, Hegel provides the scientific foundations, and physics and evolutionary biology are sciences.
The question is not whether he leaves these things behind but whether the process of nature is the same as the process of the development of spirit, specifically, whether the development is a process of aufheben. For example, in the link to Hegel's philosophy of nature he says:
§ 210. Gravitation is the true and determinate concept of material corporeality ...
This would indicate that the processes are not the same, but I have not read the text, although one leads to the other.
ValentinusSeptember 03, 2019 at 23:02#3238790 likes
I have no idea how he does this, but I am certain that every thought, no matter what, is put under the microscope in his own system.
Hegel does not consider a lot of things. His "system" is built upon certain principles. The method makes some things more important than others. The selection relates to what he considers the issue in his idea of development. To say that means he could have an opinion about anything that anybody said is to abandon his project and just treat the work as another opinion among others.
Whether he succeeded or not in reaching the goals he set out for himself is one thing. Referring to those goals as a given is another.
The question is not whether he leaves these things behind but whether the process of nature is the same as the process of the development of spirit, specifically, whether the development is a process of aufheben. For example, in the link to Hegel's philosophy of nature he says:
The link I posted is only a brief description/outline. For more details, you should see Hegel's philosophy of nature, the long version. There he starts with the concept of Space, showing how it negates into Time:
hegel:Negativity, as point, relates itself to space, in which it develops its determinations as line and plane; but in the sphere of self-externality, negativity is equally for itself and so are its determinations; but, at the same time, these are posited in the sphere of self-externality, and negativity, in so doing, appears as indifferent to the inert side-by-sideness of space. Negativity, thus posited for itself, is Time.
From there he goes on to speak of bodies and matter, and eventually gravity.
hegel:The truth of space is time, and thus space becomes time; the transition to time is not made subjectively by us, but made by space itself. In pictorial thought, space and time are taken to be quite separate: we have space and also time; philosophy fights against this 'also'.
Well, philosophy fought against the separation of space and time, combining them into spacetime. But this is nevertheless a mathematical construct, what it means philosophically, I think it still escapes the scientists.
§ 210. Gravitation is the true and determinate concept of material corporeality ...
This would indicate that the processes are not the same, but I have not read the text, although one leads to the other.
Regarding gravity, at the time of Hegel, gravity was thought as an external force acting upon the bodies. Hegel says this is not correct reasoning, but that gravity is a manifestation of the bodies themselves. He therefore criticizes Newton for speaking of a dubious "force" of gravity, acting at a distance, and praises Kepler for showing the same "law of gravity" only geometrically, relating motion with time and space:
hegel:Dimensionless time achieves therefore only a formal identity with itself; space, on the other hand, as positive being outside of itself achieves the dimension of the concept. The Keplerian law is thus the relation of the cubes of the distances to the squares of the times;-a law which is so great because it simply and directly depicts the reason of the thing. The Newtonian formula, however, which transforms it into a law for the force of gravity, exhibits only the perversion and inversion of reflection which has stopped halfway.
And of course, this is how general relativity treats the concept of gravity, any force is fictitious and superfluous. Spacetime is not some container where matter happens to exist and move, but it is indistinguishable from matter:
wiki:Einstein believed that the hole argument implies that the only meaningful definition of location and time is through matter. A point in spacetime is meaningless in itself, because the label which one gives to such a point is undetermined. Spacetime points only acquire their physical significance because matter is moving through them. In his words:
"All our space-time verifications invariably amount to a determination of space-time coincidences. If, for example, events consisted merely in the motion of material points, then ultimately nothing would be observable but the meeting of two or more of these points."[7]
He considered this the deepest insight of general relativity.
Supposedly, one could understand all of the above and most possibly discover or rather re-discover the whole of Hegel's philosophy and maybe even more, if one could understand the "Phenomenology of Spirit", which makes this book the starting point of the investigation into the matter.
Supposedly, one could understand all of the above and most possibly discover or rather re-discover the whole of Hegel's philosophy and maybe even more, if one could understand the "Phenomenology of Spirit", which makes this book the starting point of the investigation into the matter.
So, what are your thoughts on the preface to the Phenomenology as it has been discussed so far in this topic?
So, what are your thoughts on the preface to the Phenomenology as it has been discussed so far in this topic?
I haven't really meticulously gone through everything that you discussed, but, from what I read, I think that you came to a standstill with the Phenomenology, as have I of course, which happens every time I occupy myself with Hegel. :groan: So I don't have a lot to say. Just two things.
1. When Hegel compares his own work with a work on anatomy, what he means to say is that in the latter, this work separates itself from the subject, as it is something external to it, like force is assumed, or at least was, to be something external to a body. In that, there is a very clear separation between the subject matter in hand - the anatomical body - and the theory that attempts to explain it - anatomy. Anatomy could never and in fact never participates in its subject, the body, how could it anyway? But in the case of philosophy that deals with the whole, a philosophical work must also include itself, even if at the beginning of the exposé it seems that the subject-matter is something external to it, or some particular, like anatomy is to the body. Eventually, and if it is successful, it should be found out and be evident that the work was speaking about itself all along, or the universal, so the relation that a philosophical work has with its subject-matter is internal, and not external. This is very difficult to do of course, and I think only philosophy does this, I can't think of any other. I mean, if there is such a science, like philosophy, that examines everything there is and the reason why these every-things exist, then sooner or later the philosopher and examiner will start wondering about philosophy herself and her own reason, making it so to fall back on herself, and then what would we have to say if philosophy's subject-matter turns out to be herself? Well, it seems that we would have to say things like Hegel did. I guess that this shouldn't come up as a surprise, but it does.
I think this is what you meant when you wrote:
Fooloso4:The whole of the subject matter includes not just the result of what has been worked out but the working out itself, which is to say, the working itself out.
The thing at stake, the subject matter, die Sache selbst, is not a thing-in-itself, Ding an sich. In other words, it is not something to be treated as a subject does an object that stands apart.
That is, instead of standing apart one must stand within. The term ‘subject matter’ rather than ‘object matter’ is suggestive.
2. Hegel admits somewhere, either in the Phenomenology or in the Science of Logic, or you all might have said it yourselves, that the order of how true philosophy is exposed does not matter, the parts. I am guessing that he was at odds with himself with how he would present his findings. Eventually he settled with something, since anyway he couldn't have done otherwise. But we should bear in mind that from the point of view of someone that has seen the whole, it is not easy to bring this into the minds of people that have seen only parts, if any. After all, we are all different, and what appeared to Hegel as the correct method - if there is such - to present his system, might not agree with everyone. So what I said earlier:
Supposedly, one could understand all of the above and most possibly discover or rather re-discover the whole of Hegel's philosophy and maybe even more, if one could understand the "Phenomenology of Spirit", which makes this book the starting point of the investigation into the matter.
is plain wrong. I don't think there is a "right" method or order, which means that we can be at liberty to tackle the problem anyway we feel like, bringing things out of order, or seeking help elsewhere, it is not a linear development I mean, but nevertheless not to lose track of the end result, which is to understand Hegel's philosophy.
It's gonna be a long road, for sure, but maybe we can come back with a story to say.
I think that you came to a standstill with the Phenomenology
My original intention was to put the question of absolute otherness aside for the time being. It is often the case that what I cannot understand at one moment becomes clearer later. I decided not to go further with reading the text now not because of a standstill but because of other demands, including the demand to not spend whole days with one text or with sitting, reading, and writing.
Eventually, and if it is successful, it should be found out and be evident that the work was speaking about itself all along, or the universal, so the relation that a philosophical work has with its subject-matter is internal, and not external.
While I do think that the subject must be taken into consideration with regard to the object, I don't think that the subject-matter of knowledge can be reduced to the internal, that is, the subject. Perhaps here we must confront absolute otherness. The object of knowledge in general is not the subject, although with regard to knowledge of it there are the poles of knower and known.
A related problem is the identification of the subject. The subject should not be thought of as the solitary individual. The individual is culturally and historically situated in time. There is a sense in which the subject is 'we' rather than 'I'.
I am guessing that he was at odds with himself with how he would present his findings.
Part of the problem is that the whole cannot be presented as a whole all at once. Quoting Pussycat
So what I said earlier:
Supposedly, one could understand all of the above and most possibly discover or rather re-discover the whole of Hegel's philosophy and maybe even more, if one could understand the "Phenomenology of Spirit", which makes this book the starting point of the investigation into the matter.
is plain wrong.
Well, one must start somewhere. A phenomenological account is a good place to start since it addresses both subject and object, but one might get to the same place starting elsewhere.
...we can be at liberty to tackle the problem anyway we feel like...
If one's goal is to understand Hegel, and by this I mean regard him as a teacher of philosophy with something to teach us, then I think it best to follow his lead.
My original intention was to put the question of absolute otherness aside for the time being. It is often the case that what I cannot understand at one moment becomes clearer later. I decided not to go further with reading the text now not because of a standstill but because of other demands, including the demand to not spend whole days with one text or with sitting, reading, and writing.
Yes, I got what you said the first time, "taking too much time and energy", as it happens to be the case for me too. But when I asked "why did you stop your reading?", I was not referring to you, or at least not just you personally, but to the reading group, huh, as a whole. The same for the "you" in the "standstill".
While I do think that the subject must be taken into consideration with regard to the object, I don't think that the subject-matter of knowledge can be reduced to the internal, that is, the subject. Perhaps here we must confront absolute otherness. The object of knowledge in general is not the subject, although with regard to knowledge of it there are the poles of knower and known.
I am not sure I understand what you mean by "I don't think that the subject-matter of knowledge can be reduced to the internal, that is, the subject". In any case, I was referring to the relation that philosophy has to its subject-matter. I will rephrase it in another way. If we say that philosophy is a collection of thoughts, then, if we are talking about the totality of thoughts, philosophy should also include itself in this collection, because the collection of all thoughts is also a thought. This differs from anatomy, or other sciences, since the anatomical thoughts or propositions regarding the animal or human body do not refer to or include the science - anatomy - that examines them. In the same way as with philosophy, a work on logic that attempts to find the laws of logic, must include itself, since it is through logic that the logical laws are to be found. So it is evident that it must be something circular, like for example a feedback loop, positive or negative or both, the loop being stressed in time.
Does Hegel address the question of why things exist, why there is something rather than nothing?
From what I know, no, he does not address this question, do you think he had his reasons for not doing so, or the thought didn't just cross his mind? Heidegger, I believe, following in Hegel's footsteps, attempted to answer this question, but I don't know what he presented as answer. But when I wrote "the reason why these every-things exist", I wasn't thinking of this question in terms of existence, but as to their purpose, what do they serve?
If one's goal is to understand Hegel, and by this I mean regard him as a teacher of philosophy with something to teach us, then I think it best to follow his lead.
But what lead is that? Never satisfied with himself, as can be seen from his re-workings and the renewed prefaces, he kept changing it. At some point he asked for patience and indulgence. Well no more!! haha Anyway, we will see.
But when I asked "why did you stop your reading?", I was not referring to you, or at least not just you personally, but to the reading group, huh, as a whole.
Having given my reasons I will leave it to others to say.
I am not sure I understand what you mean by "I don't think that the subject-matter of knowledge can be reduced to the internal, that is, the subject".
The subject matter of knowledge includes things in the world - objects, events, processes, and so on. Knowledge of anatomy has to do with the structure of bodies that are other than the subject who desires to know.
do you think he had his reasons for not doing so, or the thought didn't just cross his mind?
Although I don't know if he ever addressed the question either directly or indirectly, given his familiarity with the history of philosophy I think he was aware of the question. Nothing is fundamental to Hegel's logic. That there is something has something to do with nothing.
But when I wrote "the reason why these every-things exist", I wasn't thinking of this question in terms of existence, but as to their purpose, what do they serve?
I touched on the question of purpose, or more precisely purposive doing in my response to paragraph 22 (page 9 of this discussion). Purposive doing is not for some external purpose, that is, it is not about serving a purpose.
While I agree with you that we are at liberty to tackle the problem anyway we feel like, in my opinion, with any philosopher we hope to learn from, we must attempt to think along with them, follow their thoughts where they lead us. This is, of course, not the end of the matter. We might also learn from them by challenging them, but to challenge need not be to reject. We may, however, decide to reject them, but this may be a rejection of our own misunderstanding of them.
Knowing, as it is at first, or, as immediate spirit, is devoid of spirit, is sensuous consciousness. In order to become genuine knowing, or, in order to beget the element of science which is its pure concept, immediate spirit must laboriously travel down a long path.
Immediate spirit is devoid of spirit because it is consciousness of something other, that is, it is not self-consciousness. The path from consciousness of what is other to self-consciousness is the development of genuine knowing.
28:
However, the task of leading the individual from his culturally immature standpoint up to and into science had to be taken in its universal sense, and the universal individual, the world spirit, had to be examined in the development of its cultural education.
The universal individual, the world spirit, is not any particular individual:
... the particular individual is an incomplete spirit, a concrete shape whose entire existence falls into one determinateness and in which the other features are only present as intermingled traits.
The universal individual is one formed by the development of Western culture. Although genuine knowing involves both subject and object and is in that sense subjective, it is not a matter of whatever any particular individual declares or thinks or believes. It is universal subjectivity. But it is not simply a matter of consensus, that is, what is true is not so because most or all at any given time take it to be true.
In any spirit that stands higher than another, the lower concrete existence has descended to the status of an insignificant moment; what was formerly at stake is now only a trace; its shape has been
covered over and has become a simple shading of itself. The individual whose substance is spirit standing at the higher level runs through these past forms in the way that a person who takes up a higher science goes through those preparatory studies which he has long ago internalized in order to make their content current before him; he calls them to mind without having his interest linger upon them.
Each stage of development is secondary to the completion of the movement of spirit. By way of analogy, one's first steps are of momentous importance but cease to be important as one learns to walk and run. Hegel is not minimizing the importance of what those before him have accomplished. Their accomplishments, however, have become internalized, part of one's cultural education. However great the accomplishments of Plato or Kant or Newton or anyone else, they are only moments in the development of knowledge and the world spirit. Although we may never accomplish what they did we are able to see further than they by standing on their shoulders.
In that way, each individual spirit also runs through the culturally formative stages of the universal
spirit, but it runs through them as shapes which spirit has already laid aside, as stages on a path that has been worked out and leveled out in the same way that we see fragments of knowing, which in earlier ages occupied men of mature minds, now sink to the level of exercises, and even to that of games for children. In this pedagogical progression, we recognize the history of the cultural formation of the world sketched in silhouette. This past existence has already become an acquired possession of the universal spirit; it constitutes the substance of the individual, or, his inorganic nature. – In this respect, the cultural formation of the individual regarded from his own point of view consists in his acquiring all of this which is available, in his living off that inorganic nature and in his taking possession of it for himself.
Our inorganic nature is our spiritual nature. We are as we are not because of some timeless and invariant human nature or individual particularity. It is as it is because our spiritual nature is cultural and historical. The " cultural formation of the individual regarded from his own point of view" appears to be a matter of what he or she acquires on his own, but:
... this is nothing but the universal spirit itself, or, substance giving itself its self-consciousness, or, its coming-to-be and its reflective turn into itself.
It is not the individual person but the instantiation or indwelling of spirit manifest in the individual.
Standard disclaimer: Everything here is tentative and subject to correction.
Comments (385)
Get lost with that. That's not philosophy.
Yeah, a philosophy text.
I will join in.
The German title is "Phänomenologie des Geistes". Geistes is translated as either Spirit or Mind. Same book. The link I provided is not the Kaufmann translation. It is Baille's.
Could you tell me the first few words of the translation you are using?
Here is another online translation, by Miller: http://www.faculty.umb.edu/gary_zabel/Courses/Marxist_Philosophy/Hegel_and_Feuerbach_files/Hegel-Phenomenology-of-Spirit.pdf
And another by Pickard: https://libcom.org/files/Georg%20Wilhelm%20Friedrich%20Hegel%20-%20The%20Phenomenology%20of%20Spirit%20(Terry%20Pinkard%20Translation).pdf
Couldn't find an online copy of Kaufmann.
Same work by Hegel. Pinkard:
Miller:
I deleted the Baille link. The Pinkard copies and pastes cleanly, the Miller misreads some letters.
But not Hegel's philosophy! According to him of course.
Is that remark purely about the link?
Or do you object to using Miller's translation?
It was about the Baille translation. I deleted the link.
I think the Miller is still widely used. It was what we used in the last class I took, but that was 20 years ago. The problem is not with the translation but with what happens when you copy and paste from it. Some letters do not copy correctly and have to be fixed.
I am going to start by using both Miller and Pinkard to see if there is much of a difference.
Thanks.
I have the printed Miller version and if I quote from it, I will type it in as such.
This reading project is interesting.
Thanks for the links, Fooloso4. This morning, I downloaded both. Ater a quick look decided to go with Pinkard. It seems easier to read.
The Preface itself starts on p50 of the 539 page download.
Quoting Banno
Yes. That is a beautiful quote. Still trying to work out its meaning and better understand it in philosophical context. In Pinkard, it is found in the numbered paragraph 2. Will spend some time on this.
Quoting tim wood
Quoting tim wood
I appreciate your aims here and taking on a difficult job. However, the reading group is just starting to assemble. Why the rush through ? It seems such a beautiful and worthwhile piece of writing to be savoured as a read.
Never thought I could be attracted to Hegel, but there ya' go.
Anyway, carry on as you decide. It will still be here, if and when, I catch up.
Best wishes.
I was struck by this phrase in #6:
The bolded sentence seems obviously mystical to me; it seems suggestive of Eckhardt.
It probably would be better if forums like this supported nested comments. Then people could interact with your crits freely without letting it interrupt the reading. That's one of the big reasons why reddit has succeeded in replacing the classic forum because nested discussions are almost impossible to hijack.
Anyway, I would be interested in a reading group for the complete Hegel book provided we can decide on a free pdf/html translation online. This doesn't seem to be the case with OP.
Yeah, although I wouldn't say that regularly asking oneself, "Is this correct? Why is the author claiming this? Is it well-supported? Is the author clearly communicating their ideas?" etc. is "hijacking" any sort of philosophy interaction--it's what we should be doing.
https://hegelreadinggroup.wordpress.com/phenomenology-of-spirit-2014/
https://hegelreadinggroup.wordpress.com/calendar-2014/
As Tim said above:
'The goal here is both to understand and contribute to understanding - a team effort.'
So,Tim and team, any thoughts on separating paras along these lines ?
And time frame ? Too long ?
Tim, could you take a look at one of the translations I linked to and see if you can find some common numbering? The two I linked use the same numbering system.
Added: What you have as the beginning of #6 is the beginning of #3:
3. Those who demand both such explanations and their satisfactions may well look as if they are really in pursuit of what is essential. (Pinkard)
3. Demanding and Supplying these [superficial] explanations passes readily enough as a concern with what is essential. (Miller)
Thanks for the direct comparison. Confirmed my choice of Pinkard as a more natural read. For me.
I don't think it matters which online book is used. The great thing is that they are free and readily accessible to all.
It is:
What is essential to the question of how to present philosophical truth is not how presentation is carried out, but the final result. The particular must be understood within the universal. The goal is the articulation of the whole. Short of that goal we have not reached what is essential.
#2
One must:
rather than seeing:
It is as it is with the plant and its bud, blossom, and fruit:
Consciousness must know:
and:
It must:
Thanks. I think the meaning of para 2. is clearer to me.
So, philosophical systems have grown organically. The organic development of thought, if tended well and each part given its due consideration, should lead to a more complete and comprehensive understanding?
Is that about right ?
In a double sense. It is not just that they have grown individually and separately but that they have grown one from the other to form the whole.
Traditionally, they have been treated only in opposition to each other and arguments made as to which one is right and wrong.
The whole of the subject matter includes not just the result of what has been worked out but the working out itself, which is to say, the working itself out.
The thing at stake, the subject matter, die Sache selbst, is not a thing-in-itself, Ding an sich. In other words, it is not something to be treated as a subject does an object that stands apart.
That is, instead of standing apart one must stand within. The term ‘subject matter’ rather than ‘object matter’ is suggestive.
The truth exists only in the system of knowledge of the truth.
Hegel sees himself as a participant in a collaborative effort with those who are lovers of knowledge, that is, the philosophers who preceded him, of whom it can be said that they are not actual knowers. To the extent he succeeds he will be the first to actually know.
Hegel’s task is the exposition of the inner necessity of knowing, that knowing is the system of science.
The exposition of the inner necessity is externally realized in time, and Hegel will demonstrate that now is with his philosophy the time for philosophy to become actual knowing.
Hegel is opposing his claim that:
with the claim that it is not the concept but the feeling and intuition or immediate knowing of the absolute which are supposed to govern what is said of it.
Yes, but this needs to be understood within the whole, that is, it is comprehensive in the double sense of comprehend and inclusive of the subject matter as both subject and object together. See my comments about on #3.
So what is your take on this? Just quoting the whole of paragraph does not seem productive since the text is readily available.
To avoid the risk of doing the same I will hold off.
Fooloso4 asks a reasonable and relevant question given your approach as stated in OP.
Quoting Fooloso4
It seemed clear that you hoped to give an explication of the Preface, paragraph by paragraph.
Then others were welcome to join in. This included anyone who wished to add a parallel 'reading'.
Just putting a paragraph out there, as a full quote, is not what was expected. A simple reference is enough so that people can follow your explication.
Explication:
'The idea and practice of explicate or explication is rooted in the verb to explicate, which concerns the process of "unfolding" and of "making clear" the meaning of things, so as to make the implicit explicit. The expression of "explication" is used in both analytic philosophy and literary theory'. Wikipedia
What is a philosophical explication ? Why is It carried out ?
(I'm interested in this reading group and look forward to participating. Atm I'm in the French alps though and cannot keep pace until my vacance finishes).
It would perhaps be wise to slow down. Take the time, as group leader, to read and think carefully before using the para as the basis for a group discussion,
This is not about 'hogging the commentary'.
I hope you will continue to give your understanding of selected text.
I don't expect that a full explication is what is required for a forum discussion ?
I appreciated our discussion re para 2.
Thank you.
Quoting Wayfarer
Good question but, as yet, unanswered. I wonder why that would be the case? I think it important that we ask that kind of question. This text warrants such attention. So...
Are there particular questions we should have in mind as we read the Preface? What process, if any, do you use in an attempt to understand ?
I am wondering about noting key words or phrases which might hold the key to the sense of the paragraph.
What difference would it make if a translation uses 'general' as opposed to 'universal' ?
And is the word being used in a technical v ordinary language sense ?
Which words or phrases are important to Hegel's whole philosophy ?
Does he give any explicit definitions of key terms and their relationship to each other ?
Part of the reading process is about such identification.
https://sites.ualberta.ca/~rburch/PhilosphicalText.html#long
Wayfarer, are you still reading the Preface ?
There are only 4 pages which I have printed off.
Also, a free downloadable dictionary: by Glenn Alexander Magee
www.scribd.com/doc/69965769/Hegel-Dictionary
Edit to add:
Pinkard has a Glossary of Translated Terms
German to English
English to German
In book - p475
In pdf - p522
Actually I am going to bow out.
Any particular reason?
I felt the same way yesterday.
Yes. If done well, it is time consuming and other things take priority. I think some will have read the Preface before and so have a major head start. I will see how things go...
Good Luck with the new job :smile:
27. It is this coming-to-be of science as such or of knowledge, that is described in this Phenomenology of Spirit. Knowledge in its first phase, or immediate Spirit, is the non-spiritual, i.e. sense-consciousness.
- from Miller trans.
The above is important to stave of the prying noses of the religious zealots whom prefer to take “Spirit” as something akin to philosophical justification for an ‘immortal soul’. Note: “non-spiritual”.
Next the only paragraph I’ve marked ‘nice’ :
31. Quite generally, the familiar, just because it is familiar, is not cognitively understood. The commonest way in which we deceive either ourselves or others about understanding is by assuming something as familiar, and accepting it on that account; with all it’s pros and cons, such knowing never gets anywhere, and it knows not why. Subject and object, God, Nature, Understanding, sensibility, and so on, are uncritically taken for granted as familiar, established as valid, and made into fixed points for starting and stopping. While these remain unmoved, the knowing activity goes back and forth between them, thus moving only on their surface. Apprehending and testing likewise consist in seeing whether everybody’s impression of the matter coincides with what is asserted about these fixed points, whether it seems that way to him or not.
Also, the term Notion is worth addressing next:
33. (at the end of section) ... Through this movement the pure thoughts become Notions, and are only now what they are in truth, self-movements, circles, spiritual essences, which is what their substance is.
Next a brief look at Hegel’s approach to ‘negation’ and such:
36. The immediate existence of Spirit, consciousness, contains the two moments of knowing and the objectivity negative to knowing. Since it is in this element [of consciousness] that Spirit develops itself and explicates its moments, these moments contain antithesis, and they appear as shapes of consciousness.
... But Spirit becomes object because it is just this movement of becoming an other to itself, i.e. becoming an object to itself, and of suspending this otherness.
Note: You don’t want ‘opinion” here, but I would feel a little disingenuous if I didn’t remark that this comment is trying to unknot “knowing” as we commonly hold the term in colloquial use and frame “knowing” more or less as the common term ‘notion’. Also, the very next section calls back to attention the meaning of ‘knowing’ and how to reconcile such a take on ‘knowing’ with ‘truth’ ...
37. ... When it has shown this completely, Spirit has made its existence identical with its essence; it has itself for its object just as it is, and the abstract element of immediacy, and of the separation of knowing and truth, is overcome. ...
Context of the above is necessary, but I’m typing this by hand so look for yourself! :) In brief, negation is brought into play to explicate. I’ve also neglected to address the use of the term ‘essence’ which sprung up much earlier in the preface!
Forgive the backtracking ...
20. The True is the while. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development. ...
Note: a favourite term of mine may be useful here in place of ‘development’ (Nascent). I’m justified by stating this given the following lines of the text (go look).
Hegel then brings into focus, in the same section, the nebulous nature of some terms and how - harking back to section 31 - they are familiar, and thus paid dubious attention. This section being the set up for the later section (31).
Actually, I don't think this unusual in any reading.
I am thinking of starting at the end :wink:
The Hegel Glossary from Sebastian Gardner is useful here. Gives different translations and thoughts from Miller, Inwood, Solomon, Geraets et al, Kainz.
Excerpt from CONCEPT ( Begriff)
...
Is it okay if I post regardless? I’ll probably be done with this sometime before you lot unless I take a large break.
The preface is about one tenth of the book so if you go at that pace you’ll be done by late 2020. If you were at university you’d be expected to sum it up the main points AND have a depth of understanding (usually parroting what others have said).
Reading from the end makes more sense with these kinds of texts. I’m assuming you weren’t joking? Once I’m done with the introduction I’m going straight to the last page.
The thread is only about the Preface.
So, we are following Tim as leader of a group discussion.
As usual, readers are at various stages, levels of ability, and go at a pace which suits them.
Tim has set the general pace. It is his thread. So, people can either catch up, keep up, or keep ahead and comment at appropriate point.
As such, it isn't really helpful 'to cut to the meaning' by starting in the middle.
But hey, setting rules or guidelines, means some like to revolt and break 'em...
It makes for haphazard and incomplete understanding. Not usually the aim of a university course.
Apologies to Tim if my entries are seen as just the kind of 'noise' you were hoping to avoid.
Back to the Preface, armed with Glossary.
He's having a bad day, @Amity.
Cheers.
Who you gonna call ? Hanover ? :kiss:
Cheers Wallows, are you reading the Preface?
Hanny only believes in himself.
Quoting Amity
I'm wallowing through it slowly.
That is, the requirement that the absolute be felt and intuited. Then:
The result is the opposite of what it intended. From this stage it:
But rather than:
it proceeds:
In its desire for oneness or unity it ignores or destroys the multiplicity or distinct elements that are essential to knowledge of unity.
Reading all this I am constantly reminded of Plato who is perhaps a primary target here.
It may be helpful to consider the Lutheran tradition where the democracy of conscience is opposed by "explanations" to contain it. Hegel and Kierkegaard held contempt for many of the same kinds of self righteousness that hid itself in "mysteries."
That is not to say Hegel did not describe Plato's work as part of keeping "substance" apart. But Hegel tends to describe that element in a kind of "ontogeny recapitulates ontology" fashion. He leveled more specific criticisms toward the Neo-Platonists. I think Hegel did not view Plato as making a system. In any case, Hegel just went through great pains to say he was not talking about setting various ideas against each other directly. In terms of his exposition of how these ideas appeared, everything has a place.
Whoops. That was opinion and speculation. I will return to my desk.
Given that the movement of history is central to Hegel's system, Plato is not to be understood as a static moment in the past of that history but as part of its ongoing development, which means not just the dialogues but all that follows, that is, his influence on the tradition. And, of course, when, for example, he talks about "the convictions of the present age" in #6 it is clear that he is addressing more than Plato and the influence of Plato. Having said that, such things as Plato's depiction of the love of wisdom as an erotic pursuit of something one does not posses, and knowledge of the Forms as ekstasis and noesis (intuition), are things worth pursuing. But since this is not a thread on Plato I thought it worth mentioning without pursuing it here.
I mention this because reading the quotes given above by others the distinction between the use of Begriff seems to have been entirely ignored in the translation (“Notion” and “concept”, not simply “concept”)
[ Interesting and inspiring to hear different takes on the text; the interaction between readers who offer
the subjective ( opinion and comment) as well as objective matters, such as text and background. Making connections. It encourages active reading, keeping certain questions in mind ( as discussed earlier).
The latest on para 7 in particular - speaks to me: 'The beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion, and love itself are all the bait required to awaken the craving to bite. What is supposed to sustain and extend the wealth of that substance is not the concept, but ecstasy, not the cold forward march of the necessity of the subject matter, but instead a kind of inflamed inspiration.'
I asked earlier : What difference would it make if a translation uses 'general' as opposed to 'universal' ?
This might have been motivated by 'inflamed passion' and less of a 'cold forward march' but it can help progress an understanding. Most questions do.
What difference does it make if a translation uses 'Notion' instead of 'Concept' ?
The Hegel Glossary has both. It directs to Miller's translation as Notion.
We need to consider both, I think. As part of the dialectic which Hegel celebrates.
I think it helps to shape or firm up own thoughts, even as it might shake up and confuse. As we read this, it will no doubt inspire different directions of thought. Are we to dismiss this as 'opinion' ? I think not.
Sometimes, in posts, it is not easy to separate out readings from individual speculation.
When taking notes, I find it helpful to distinguish own thoughts or questions by use of [ ].
I will do this here.
Finally, I am taking time out to return to the Translator's Notes to understand the reasons for word choices. In Pinkard pdf this is on p38. And yes, I might even look at 'The Conclusion of the Book'.
What is it all about, Alfie? ]
'What's it all about, Alfie?
Is it just for the moment we live?
What's it all about when you sort it out, Alfie?
Are we meant to take more than we give
Or are we meant to be kind?'
- Burt Bacharach
Quoting Wallows
'Slow and steady wins the race'
But, as usual, there is an opposite:
'Time & tide waits for none'
We have plenty of time to navigate our way through this text, with a little help from our friends.
I quite like Tim's favourite quote: 'Be easy!' ]
Yes, I agree. My earlier comment on #6:
Quoting Fooloso4
To edify is to instruct, to lift up or improve in a moral or spiritual sense. Etymologically, to build up. From #8:
More on #8 to follow but note the movement from a time when people gazed upward followed by a turning back to the earth and now a need for elevation.
That is, for ecstasy, elevation, "insight as edification".
As if people :
Their eyes must be directed to the stars, to what is higher, to the divine.
But:
In other words, the felt need for what is higher is not simply reactionary, the result of man's lowliness. There was a time when meaning was found in the thread of light binding all existence to the divine.
Hegel's image can be likened to an inversion of Plato's image of the cave. Instead of being forced to leave the cave under duress:
And as with being compelling to return to the cave:
It is not, however, to a cave with the artificial light of the fire and shadows on the cave wall that the spirit's eyes (German Geist - spirit/mind, as in phenomenology of) were now turned:
But:
It is not a simple back and forth movement from the heavens to the earth and back to the heavens:
The spirit has undergone a change. The felt need for elevation is too easily satisfied. Note the change from the "spirit’s eyes" that looked back to the earth from above to "people’s eyes" that must now be directed to the stars.
Why were the spirit's eyes compelled to turn to the earthly? Perhaps it has something to do with the tension between "this present" and "an other-worldly present". Does this turn mark the advent of modern science?
From a review of Yovel's translation of the Preface:
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/hegel-s-preface-to-the-phenomenology-of-spirit/
Another element in rejecting Romanticism is that one of the main goals of the book is to show how individual experience is interwoven with developments of ideas that unfold over time.
At the same time, the developments are changes in what is possible for the individual to experience.
For "edify" and "edification" the original text uses "Erbauung".
This word ist usually used to describe a spiritual or moral type of experience. One might find Erbauung in church, in nature, or in art.
Erbauung has positive connotations ( unless you use it in an ironic fashion), as in: it strengstens your personality. But it's usually more intuitive and spiritual, not rational and intellectual.
I believe that Hegel thus connects the word to the romantic "Schwärmereien" he mocks. And when her states that philosophy may not be "erbaulich", he is trying to say that it is a strictly rational enterprise, not a vague spiritual feel-good Type of experience.
... Interesting Reading project! Thank you for bringing this Text to my attention!
I'll be following along with the German original. I'm a German native, so the original text is actually easier for me to read... Let me know whenever you need any further explanation on German words and phrases
Hegel is not entirely unsympathetic to the impulse of those he is criticizing. The impulse is to seek the infinite and divine and stems from spirit's loss (#8) The problem is that it sees science as the very thing that limits rather than frees the spirit. They
What it fails to see is that:
But they:
11:
This kind of intellectual passivity or receptivity:
For:
As with gestation and birth there is:
In the same way:
The activity of those Hegel is critical of in #10 is seen as:
But with Hegel the process:
Quoting Fooloso4
Well, yeah, he gets where they're coming from. But isn't he accusing them of choosing the easy path, which they claim leads to deep understanding but is really just a superficial dream?
In §11, when he chooses the metaphor of the child:
However, just as with a child, who after a long silent period of nourishment draws his first breath and shatters the gradualness of only quantitative growth – it makes a qualitative leap and is born – so too, in bringing itself to cultural maturity, spirit ripens slowly and quietly into its new shape
Do you think that he's picking up the bud and flower metaphor from earlier?
I think he is. Again, it's about development. Things are changing, that's his message. But the new is not refuting or replacing the old, the old is merely developing into the new. As in, the old state of things is a necessary precursor to the new.
And while we're looking at metaphors: note that §10 ends in a sentence about sleeping and dreaming, i.e. Romanticism, while §11 ends with the "break of day" of Enlightenment.
But I'm not sure yet what this "qualitative leap" is supposed to be exactly?
Yes. But one point I was trying to make is that from a historical perspective, and this means the working out of self-consciousness, we should not just dismiss what they say as wrong - even though they are, it is part of the development.
Quoting WerMaat
I think his own development went through a similar stage but he was able to see beyond it and why it is self-defeating.
Quoting WerMaat
It's another metaphor for development, but here there is a shattering of the gradualness, a qualitative leap - birth, a new world. In addition, and more importantly, here we are dealing with development but birth of self-consciousness.
Quoting WerMaat
Good point. I think there might also be a religious note - revealed truth coming in dreams, that is, from above as opposed to the spirit's working itself out and realization.
Quoting WerMaat
Birth is not just gradual development it is disruption, a new beginning.
I can't put it into such poetic words as my predecessor in this thread, but I'm guessing that Hegel is not aiming for any eternal spirals or cycles of life and death.
Instead, he might simply be defending himself against the criticism of being too simplistic or too elitist:
"The wealth of its bygone existence" - He says that the old concept(s) of science where broad and diverse in scope and well founded in a wealth of particulars.
And this broad scope is still what people expect from science: "consciousness misses both the dispersal and the particularization of content,"
Right now, however, he's at a bottle neck or turning point. His concept of the new science is currently "enshrouded in its simplicity" and "the esoteric possession of only a few individuals"
But he hastens to assure us that this simplicity is not the goal or core of his project, but merely an initial stage. From here on, the "new" science will unfold and realize its potential.
Right now his theory may be a small acorn, and only few can work with it and understand it. But it's supposed to grow into a large tree and be accessible to a broad audience: "Only what is completely determinate is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and possessed by everybody."
What do you think?
I NEVER read commentaries until I’ve drawn my own vague ‘conclusions’ purely from what the text says.
Anyway, have at it if you want. I’m outta here!
Consider it noted with appreciation for clarity, drawing out the distinction.
From Gardner's Glossary:
----------
Quoting Valentinus
Helpful. The unfolding of developing ideas and the effect on individuals.
Good to know one of the main goals of the book.
Quoting WerMaat
How excellent is this. Das ist fantastisch :cool:
I haven't reached this point yet. However, your clear thoughts and writing make me want to try and catch up.
Quoting Fooloso4
I'm glad about that. It seems to me that his writing style reflects that positive spirit of Erbauung of which WerMaat spoke. The spirit lying in the artful use of metaphors.
The discussion between you and WerMaat is instructive and enjoyable to read.
Reciprocal exchanges and informative interaction.
It is exactly what I appreciate in a book discussion. Especially when I am behind and need a bit of motivation. Thanks :smile:
I am not there yet. I guess you are one of the few :wink:
I appreciate your enthusiasm but I see more distracting poetry than useful clarity in this explication:
Quoting tim wood
Some selective pruning required ?
When being and not being are subsumed within becoming, in the manner of Hegelian dialectics, the "qualitative leap" is difficult to make sense of. Such a leap, under its own definitive terms is an end, a not-being of the past existence, and a beginning of the being of the future existence. Such a leap must be understood in terms of process, a coming-to-be, to be made sense of in Hegelian terms, but then the term "leap" is misleading. Hegel's challenge is to describe these occurrences which appear as qualitative leaps, in terms of processes or comings-to-be, "slowly and quietly" ... "reshaping itself", because the leap for him is an illusion. You might call this "qualitative leap" a faulty description.
As the oak is in the acorn, the man is in the child, but it its immediacy, that is, at this moment it has not actualized itself.
Just as each stage of gestation is necessary, each moment leading to the new birth of spirit is necessary. And just as each stage in the development of the fetus is itself a revolution (Miller has upheaval) that brings about something that was not present before this stage and adds to the whole of what is developing, each stage of cultural development adds to the diversity of forms that comprise:
Returning into itself is to become what from the beginning it is to be. Each stage of this new whole no matter how different it is from earlier stages is not a move away from but within itself, adding to to the completion of itself.
The moments in the development of spirit do not understand themselves and are not understood by subsequent moment until this moment when it has come to the simple concept of itself. It is in this new element that each of those moments is understood anew as part in the development of the whole.
13:
Hegel is not talking just about the development of some intellectual pursuit, philosophy, or even a science of the whole, but of a new world in its incipience. It is not the study of or reflection on the whole but the whole itself. In its simplicity it is not yet revealed itself as what it is to be. At the same time its existence as it was is still present or active in its recollection of itself, that is, its history in the sense of bringing it back to itself in its consciousness of itself.
Its new shape, the whole enshrouded in simplicity, as the universal ground is no longer what it was in its earlier stages of differentiation and particularization, of fixed relationships. Here we see that Hegel is not completely at odds with those he criticizes.
Science appears to be esoteric, that is, shrouded, hidden from view of all but a few who are, so to speak, initiated into its secrets, its specialized language and practices. But it appears this way because it has not yet fully unfurled. It is not something wholly singular but a part of the development of the whole. It is from within this development that science has its general intelligibility.
Up until this point science has not been completely determinate, that is to say, it has not yet completed itself and so cannot be understood. With the completion of its movement it has become comprehensible. Perhaps @WerMaat can comment on whether there is in German this double sense of comprehensive as complete and understandable.
What does Hegel mean by "our own intellect"? Is it something uniquely mine or ours? The "pure I" is the thinking I. As such it is the I of thinking. What is intelligible is so to any consciousness whether scientific or unscientific, because the intelligible is what is already familiar to consciousness.
German:
Erst was vollkommen bestimmt ist, ist zugleich exoterisch, begreiflich, und fähig, gelernt und das Eigentum aller zu sein.
Forget about the double sense, we're talking "understandable" only, "completeness" is not implied in the German Text.( At least not in this sentence.)
Hegel uses "begreiflich", from the root greifen: the action of grasping an object with your hand.
With the prefix be- you get begreifen, literally: the action of touching an object repeatedly in order to explore its shape - but usually used in the more abstract sense of understanding or grasping something in your mind
This makes sense to me. There are distinct stages of development of an individual, the core spirit of whom remains intact. It is a becoming.
Quoting Fooloso4
Each individual experience, and reflection thereof, adds new ideas to the old.
The effects, more evolutionary than revolutionary ? Leading to an exciting new world.
Is that about right ?
Okay, thanks. I think it may be more accurate to say that completeness is not implied in the German term begreiflich, but completeness is certainly central to the text and paragraph: "Only what is completely determinate ...", and this is why prior to this moment it has not been understood or, as both Miller and Pinkard have it "comprehended". Whether they made a connection between comprehend and comprehensive I cannot say. With regard to the root meaning of the term in German you provided I am reminded of the parable of the blind men and the elephant. Each can touch a part but since none can grasp the whole, and so none of them understand or comprehend the object.
This clarity helps my understanding. Much better than the glossary explanation . Thanks.
Readers each explore the form, shape, substance and nature of the text from their unique perspective.
So, a group affair is more likely to fare well.
Feedback loop leads to improved comprehension. Hopefully.
In #11 he says that the process is interrupted. And in #12 that the beginning of a new spirit is the outcome of a widespread revolution.
Hegel died before the publication of The Origin of Species and so we should not attribute Darwin's vocabulary of evolutionary change to Hegel.
Yes definitely, a good point!
Still, in this context I think that Hegel is mainly trying to contrast the "esoteric" and the "exoteric", stating that only the latter is easily and immediately "graspable": begreiflich.
He may still be arguing against Romanticism, which believes in the opposite: that the true core of a thing can best be comprehended and grasped by immediate intuition, circumventing reason and intellect.
By the way, scrolling back to the earlier paragraphs, please note that you have already encountered the noun form of "begreiflich".
The word "Begriff", translated as "concept" in #6, stems from the exactly same root...
Right, but what is it that makes it graspable? How is it that what was once esoteric has become exoteric?
Quoting WerMaat
See also the following exchanges:
Quoting Amity
Yes, I read that. However, I am wondering how long this took in real life.
How long was 'the winding path' ?
12. The beginning of a new spirit is the outcome of a widespread revolution in the diversity of forms of cultural formation; it is both the prize at the end of a winding path just as it is the prize won through much struggle and effort.
Quoting Fooloso4
The word 'evolution' was in use before Darwin. From the 1660s it meant a growth to maturity and development of an individual living thing. A process. Unfolding over time.
This would tie in with Hegel's biological analogies.
I think talk of a revolution and leaps is confusing. I think MU makes a similar point:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Also:
Quoting WerMaat
Thank you, Tim.
Although initially critical of need to cut and copy whole paragraphs, thinking a reference sufficient, I now appreciate this very much.
It means I can easily find and copy relevant pieces of text in response to others.
My own pdf is Read Only.
From the Greeks to Hegel.
Quoting Amity
It is not always clear what one means when they use the term. For Darwin the process is not predetermined, but for Hegel it is. It is teleological.
Quoting Amity
I do not think the leap is an illusion:
It is the difference between process and product. The product is not simply the continuation of the linear process that led up to it. It is birth of something new, something revolutionary.
That is, the prize is the product that one comes at the end of the process and, equally as much, what comes through the through the process of struggle and effort. We do not simply follow along the path we bring about the prize. It is not simply there to be found but brought out through our struggle and effort.
Quoting Fooloso4
Ah yes. The movement of history. I had been thinking about the duration of Hegel's own journey.
His time of revolution within the overall evolutionary process, meaning changes over successive generations.Ideas changing individuals.
Quoting Fooloso4
Understood. The product can be both an end and a beginning. Just like the conclusion of an argument can become a premise of another in an inference chain.
Still, I wouldn't describe it as revolutionary. The term 'revolution' is debatable.
Struggle and effort are involved in both evolution and revolution.
But don't wish to bog the discussion down.
Hegel has not given us any examples. The rise of modern science was revolutionary and among other things established the authority of the individual based on reason. The American Revolution, French Revolution.
I think this is important and speaks to my earlier point:
Quoting Fooloso4
I'm tired so will ask only one question - perhaps a follow up tomorrow, or if someone else wants to contribute their thoughts...
Examples of what and where ?
Of revolution ?
Yes. [Added. Examples of revolutions. I suggested the scientific revolution and the French and American Revolutions.]
It is not a question of a new science of teleology, but of the movement of spirit from consciousness to self-consciousness, which is the movement of the whole to self-realization. I am not going to defend that argument now, but I think it will become clearer as we move forward.
The book, beyond the Preface, builds on how other people take things away from us when they appear before us. The new thing being proposed is to live without doing that. And it is an empty idea unless a different sort of life happens. To that extent, the esoteric relies upon what is determined by the "exoteric." It has to work for everybody or at least enough of us to not be stuck in a previous level of development.
Having taken the time to read more, I now understand the term 'qualitative leap' and the revolutionary aspect.
So, I agree with you and the important point you were making.
Thanks.
This paragraph ends with a rather surprising statement given what was said above in paragraph 11 about:
Here he speaks of:
How are these to be reconciled? The answer comes at the beginning of paragraph 14:
To return to an earlier analogy it is as if one were to look at a baby or toddler or child or youth or teen and on that basis alone judge what it is to be a human being. The potential is there but at each of these stages it has not been actualized and thus cannot even be realized or known.
We must identify the demands on science that he says:
They are the demands of those who are critical of science who:
It might help to think of this in relation to the analogy in 12 of the prize at the end of the path, won through struggle and effort.
That prize is:
In each of its moments it has not yet completed itself via its return to itself. With its return to itself there is no longer any mediacy. This is the satisfaction of the demand for immediate rationality and divinity, where science has been brought to completeness of detail and to perfection of form.
The beauty of having a pdf is its search function. Type in 'Napoleon' to read of Hegel's claim.
For context and understanding, I think it helpful to read Pinkard's Introduction which tells of 'Hegel's Path to the Phenomenology'. Hegel calls it his 'voyage of discovery' (p10).
The Intellectual, Political and Social Ferment of the Time (p12).
2 major upheavals:
1. When Hegel was 19yrs old - the French Revolution upended all conventional thought.
2. Intellectual upheaval - brought in by Kant's writings with his insistence on freedom of thought revolutionised philosophy (p13).
Then 3. Goethe changed the outmoded Jena University from stuffy, conventional orthodox to a place where a professor could be a hero following Kant's injunction to 'think for oneself', laying the blueprint for the emerging modern world itself (p14).
This ties in with Fooloso4's important point re para 13:
Quoting Fooloso4
The emergence of a new Spirit.
p18 continues with 'What is a Phenomenology?'.
And so on.
Hegel envisaged his audience to be the people of modern Europe (p10).
Yes. It is right to point out the problem of over-thinking.
For sure, the Preface won't be completely understood after a first read through.
Individual appetites and capacity for close reading and analysis vary.
While the thread and the 'we' of a reading group might need or wish to proceed quickly, it is about finding the right balance.To take time to discuss. To share thoughts.
The thread appears steady and on course to reach its aim of understanding the Preface.
As well as possible.
I think I get most of that. I'd summarize like this:
Hegel has just presented and defended his idea, saying that the new concept of science is still at an initial starting point, and now needs to grow, to unfurl, to develop. So in the end we'll have a well-ordered universal system.
Now in #15 he describes a false way of growing.
He complains that the "others" take two unrelated elements: the available content and material gathered by the older stages of science, and their own idea.
And then they pretend that this existing material is all nicely explained by their one idea, like they were the ones who invented and gathered it all. Which is not the case, and neither is the material explained better nor their own idea improved or developed by this artificial joining.
Like: they're just piling up stuff that was already there, and spray-paint it pink, and then expound how this perfectly shows the superiority of the theory of pinkness.
Or like some guy with a conspiracy theory, who will copy and paste all kind of unrelated stuff from all over the internet then then go on how this is all proof for his pet theory.
Unfortunate detail: I'm not totally sure who exactly those "others" are he's complaining about, and what exactly that "absolute idea" is which they are trying to pass off as the pinnacle of all science.
Thoughts?
Is he still complaining about Romanticism?
Yes. That is a helpful way of looking at and understanding para 14. As is :
Quoting Fooloso4
Good questions.
I don't know. However, I think it might refer to Hegel's critique of Kantian idealism.
Perhaps the contemporary 'Empty Formalism Objection' as googled after reading:
'this other view instead consists in only a monochrome formalism' (para 15 ).
[my bolds]
Others will know better and in greater detail. I look forward to hearing from them.
Note: I am reading outwith the text. I find the SEP article on Hegel useful:
Quoting Paul Redding
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel/
This is a continuation of 14, of the:
... opposition [that] seems to be the principal knot which scientific culture is currently struggling to loosen and which it does not yet properly understand.
The other side refers to those who reproach science. But in doing so they make use of what science has accomplished.
It treats knowledge as a collection of things known, as a collection of items, and in doing so it does not see the order that science has not yet brought to order, that is, the order of the whole.
The absolute is the unconditioned, that is, what is determined in and of itself. It not to be recognized in everything at this point because there is not yet a science of the whole, which is not wide-ranging but self-contained.
It is as if it (he is still talking about the reproach to science) lays out the items of knowledge before itself and applies the idea of the absolute to them. It fails to see that it is one and the same thing, namely the absolute idea, giving itself diverse shapes, and instead it repeats one and the same thing, giving to them the idea of the absolute. Rather than finding the absolute idea in them it imposes the idea on them.
A word about the 'idea'. In paragraph 12 Hegel says:
In the history of philosophy the 'idea' at one stage is the 'eidos' of Plato's Forms, that is, the things themselves as they are known in direct immediate intuition. Even as it develops and becomes in Descartes and others something that exists in the mind as an image, it is to be taken up again in its new element in each of its moments. An idea for Hegel is not an image in the mind, something which gives rise to the problem of the relationship between idea and those real things they are ideas of.
[Edited to add the close quote in the second to last paragraph. The next paragraph should not have been enclosed.]
' ...this other view instead consists in only a 'monochrome formalism' (para 15 ).
I referred to this earlier, thinking it might have to do with the formalism of Kant.
I would be grateful for some clarity on this, thanks.
Thanks for that. All opinions welcome :smile:
It sounds good.
Kaufmann as an authority on the subject is more than likely to be right :cool:
You are correct in that the idea is not static, it does not follow, however, that anyone or anything, any system, that claims to "have" it, is wrong. Hegel's claim is that he has it.
Your assumption seems to be that since the idea is not static that it does not complete itself. But Hegel claims that it has completed itself, at least to the extent that it understands itself within the whole of itself.
Quoting tim wood
What is to be known is itself, that is, it is not simply a matter of knowledge of things but knowledge of knowledge, knowledge of the knower.
Quoting tim wood
That too is correct, but you seem to have missed the point.
When Hegel says:
that does not mean a return to Plato but a dialectical rethinking of not only Plato but of the whole history of philosophy. Although he has not used the term, it is aufheben, both to cancel or negate and preserve. You referred to "aufheben and sublation" on page 4. Sublation is the English translation of aufheben. It is the preserve part that you seem to have overlooked. It is not a matter of leaving the past behind. If we are to understand the ontological status of 'idea' for Hegel we must see that he does not mean what we ordinarily mean when we talk about ideas. On the other hand, he does not mean some transcendent realm of unchanging beings either.*
On the relationship of Hegel to Plato by a quick search I found this: https://www.academia.edu/20121186/Platos_Positive_Dialectic_Hegel_Reads_Platos_Parmenides_Sophist_and_Philebus
I only skimmed parts but it might give you a better sense of what is at issue.
*Of course, it should not be overlooked that Plato himself rejected this. In the dialogue Parmenides, the Forms, as presented by a young Socrates, are shown to be incoherent by Parmenides. The Forms are Plato's poetry, designed to replace the theology of the poets. I have written about this elsewhere on the forum. Plato was, after all, both a master dialectician and rhetorician.
The wiki article on Naturphilosophie might be helpful, particularly the following:
Thank you for that.
It seems that Schelling is indeed a target of Hegel. And vice versa.
Bearing in mind the need to focus on the text, I only add this as a matter of interest.
Quoting Andrew Bowie
plato.stanford.edu/entries/schelling/#5
The next few paragraphs further develop this. 16 begins:
Thank you Tim. That was most gracious. Perhaps one of these days I will be obliged to return the favor.
I agree that Parmenides, the Dialogue, is important to this discussion of what is an "absolute" and what not so absolute elements might have to do with it.
But, while the dialogue brings up many problems to the notion of "participating in the eidos", I don't read it as kicking it to the curb. Parmenides and Zeno, in so far as they spoke for themselves (in pre-Socractic texts) presented a unity that did not permit a way to understand change. This view has often been contrasted to Heraclitus who made it difficult to understand what continues to exist after accepting the complex world of change as the primary state. The introduction of the idea of forms was, in some part, to bridge the gap between the two.
So, in one way, this dialogue, written later in Plato's life, was not a disavowal of an idea but the gift of a problem to future generations.
A most generous gift! (and I love how you phrased that)
Thank you all for your helpful comments! I currently feel that I have nothing useful to add, but I'm following this discussion with great enjoyment.
One comment, perhaps: I find the translation to be very good. I, at least, found no clues or meanings in the German text of #15 and #16 that weren't adequately represented in the English translation also. In #16, the English was even easier to read than the rather convoluted German sentences...
I don't want to derail the topic, so I will only make a few quick comments. I would be glad to discuss the issue elsewhere. While I agree that the Forms can be seen as situated between Parmenides and Heraclitus (there is interestingly enough no dialogue Heraclitus), the setting of the dialogue at the time when Socrates was young suggests that it was not simply in his later years that Plato came to question the Forms as some claim. The Forms are not things known, they are images and despite all the talk of them being what things are the image of, they are themselves images. Further, since Plato makes clear that, contrary to what Neo-Platonists, mystics, and some religious believes hold to be true, anamnesis or recollection is a myth, and as such does not support the Forms but makes their existence even more problematic. They are, in my opinion, and in no way only my own, a gift of philosophical poetry, which does not to diminish their importance and value.
Quoting WerMaat
On the contrary, your take of how German text sounds to a German reader is very helpful. It is the sort of information that is typically added in footnotes to translation as a back up argument for why a phrase appears as it does. Responding as a reader is a different thing.
Keep going, please.
You are right. The topic requires its own discussion.
I am not sure how Hegel understood what happened in regards to the topic.
I really like the observation that there is no Platonic dialogue called Heraclitus.
Yes. I noticed that when Tim posted it earlier.
Quoting tim wood
Indeed. It is helpful so to do.
I have also used the search function. 'Formalism' comes up 13 times.
Of interest to me relates to WerMaat's thoughts:
Quoting WerMaat
Hegel speaks of monotonous formalism being not that difficult to handle. It is like the limited palette of red and green. The painter using red for a historical piece, green for landscapes ( para 51, p79 ).
I am now wondering just how much of that is a true depiction of Schelling's view ( if he is the target ).
But that would be another book, another time - I guess...
Without your curiosity, questions, imagery and ideas, I might well have carried on in ignorance.
Now out of a sleepy stupor and fully engaged.
I agree this group discussion is stimulating. Look forward to hearing more...
It is reassuring to know you find the translation to be good. I think having German as a first language will come in very useful when it comes to deciding meaning. For example:
Quoting Fooloso4
Pinkard discusses 'aufheben' and 'sublate' in his Translation Notes.
He leaves it up to the reader to judge whether it is being used simply as 1.negate 2.preserve or 3.both.
Another suggested meaning: to raise up.
He gives an example of 3. both.
A move in a philosophical conversation where an interlocutor might deny an opponent's point but there is still something worthy in it. So it is kept in a changed format in the ongoing discussion.
I just looked into this a bit. Hegel says that Kant's Categorical Imperative, his moral formula of universal law, is "empty formalism". It is empty because it has no content just the form. Although we find here the absolute and the universal, I don't think that it is Kant's formalism that is at issue.
So, what is the formalism that Hegel rejects? That "in the absolute everything is one ... in the absolute everything is the same" or, as he mocks it in #7: " to stir it all together into a smooth mélange".
In its formulaic universality it abstracts from every difference, every particularity, and thus renders everything the same. It is not the universal Idea that he objects to but:
It calls itself speculative knowledge but:
As opposed to this:
that is, in the absolute as it is properly understood:
At first glance it may seem as if the two views are the same, that there is no difference between them, but in unity there is difference, otherwise there is nothing to be unified.
What does it mean for A=A? Traditionally it means identity, but to say that this equals that is to assert some difference. In identity there is difference. Is it then that A=A means this equals this? What then is the function of the equal sign, what does it mean for something to equal itself?
The opposition here is not between the affirmation and denial that in the absolute everything is the same. Both sides agree on this. The difference is between the knowing which has only this one bit of knowledge and the knowledge which makes distinctions and either has or seeks to fulfilled itself in knowing the same in difference, the one out of many.
Thanks.
I appreciate the time, patience, knowledge and experience you bring.
Will be taking some time out now but will follow with interest.
Now, I'm not an expert, but this part reminds me of Plotin a little. It sounds like substance is To Hen, the platonic oneness which is totally abstract, and according to Hegel it requires a notion of being a subject, an awareness, a reflection on itself - as the platonic "nous", intellect.
Quoting tim wood
"inert simplicity" - I think this is what Hegel tries to avoid at all cost. He likes the idea of there being a universal principle, but an unchanging, abstract oneness is useless in his eyes. He wants this highest notion to be aware, dynamic, "begreiflich" (graspable...)
Or am I getting that wrong? I feel that I may be over-simplifying matters.
Quoting tim wood
And here we have another notion of change, of constant movement and reflection, right? The living substance.
Would it be too speculative to go back to our child and acorn metaphor?
As in: a newborn child is a fully realized human in itself. But at the same time, it is in some ways only a potential, it is in constant change. A human being is can be grasped only in their current state, in their current age and development. And in the next moment, they will already have changed.
But in a way, a human is also the sum of all his moments, past and present: Quoting tim wood
.
I trust that everything I have said in this discussion is taken as tentative, but here it may be necessary to state it. I have worked and re-worked this, each time seeing it somewhat differently. But since, as Hegel says, we cannot see clearly what has not yet completed its development, there may be errors here that will become evident to me as we move forward.
It is instructive to compare this to what Spinoza says about substance.
Hegel continues:
The universal is unity of the immediacy, direct and unmediated, of knowing and being, of knowing and for knowing.
In what sense is this the opposite of the view Hegel presents above as his view? In Hegel’s view the universal is within substance, here thinking is itself undifferentiated, unmoved substantiality, the universal.
Intellectual intuition is given in its immediacy to thought by thought. It is inert simplicity because as given it does no work.
In the middle of these distinctions there is what seems to be a non-sequitur:
I take this is a direct reference to Spinoza’s God. Hegel thinks it shocked the age not because, as is commonly assumed, threatening the status of God as distinct and separate, but because it threatens the status of man as distinct in his self-consciousness. It is not a non-sequitur because this is precisely what is at issue - the relationship between God, man, thinking, and the whole.
I am not sure how this works out in the Preface but Hegel discusses the immediacy of knowing in the early chapters of the book itself. He takes away the platform Kant gave himself. Or one gives oneself.
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/glossary.htm
It is not a question of accepting Spinoza for an explanation of what Hegel means by substance. I introduced Spinoza because of what Hegel goes on to say about God as the one substance. Why does he introduce this here, at this point?
Quoting tim wood
One thing we can do is go through it again and again and again ourselves.
Quoting tim wood
I do not want to get into a discussion of Spinoza but it means that there is only one substance and that it is not derived from or dependent on anything else.
Quoting tim wood
Hence my comment about the tentativeness of what I said. One disadvantage of the way we are proceeding is that we have not read the whole of the preface or the whole of the book.
Quoting tim wood
One assumption that guides my reading of the philosophers is that when things do not make sense to me the problem is probably with me and not the text. Hegel is certainly not floating. If anything, the density and compactness of what he is saying is likely to sink us. But the sense of not having your feet on the ground is apt. He is talking about the whole from within the whole, there is no ground on which to stand.
Yes. This glossary is more in-depth and explanatory than the previous Gardner one.
It links concepts and shows how Hegel uses them.
A glossary is an essential piece of kit when trying to understand or explicate the meaning.
Care needs to be taken that it is a reliable source. I think this one is.
However, I agree, even the definitions can be difficult to understand !
Some will already have acquired and are adept at using this specialised language.
It might be helpful to build own glossary along the way.
And edit it as understanding progresses.
Just a thought...
Yes. We shouldn't expect to understand everything on a first read.
Read, reread and reread again.This requires time and focus.
Quoting Fooloso4
Likewise.
Quoting Fooloso4
Agreed. I was taught to scan or skim through the first time, not stopping at obstacles or confusing parts. Then return to take notes, look up specialised key terms and issues. But each to their own. I like to note and understand key words first...
This group discussion is a bit of a mix. Apparently taking place during a first read, hence the advice to carry on and not get bogged down. It seems we carry on - in various stages of ignorance - and return later, having gained an overall picture. Or in the perhaps vain hope of Quoting tim wood
Now I need to return to time out...
Need to sort out the quotes. Tim should not be confused with Hegel.
I don't know but it might be an idea to use the quote function, stating Hegel as source.
Otherwise, when your post is used as reference, it looks like Hegel's words are yours.
Confusing enough already.
.
Wise words.
I guess that Hegel wrote this text with his peers and contemporaries in mind. It was probably much easier for them to get his allusions and references. And without that whole background, it's indeed a challenge for us to find any stable ground at all.
For that reason we should probably rely on our more knowledgeable participants as well as secondary literature to point us in the right direction (thank you for linking all those useful resources!)
Quoting Amity
Good idea. If we can at least keep track of some key words, that's a big step already, and the glossary is a huge help there.
I myself like to use a kind of falsification method... not sure how to describe that in English, an "Ausschlussverfahren"? As in, I see what ideas, associations and hypotheses I can come up with myself, and then check if they hold up under scrutiny: Test them against the text itself, and with external sources, shave them with Occams razor and see what remains.
For example, my association with Plotin is probably nonsense if we have much closer, more contemporary candidates in Spinoza and Kant.
(I take this from the way I tackle Latin translations... I go with my first vague understanding of a sentence, and then check the grammar in detail to see if it matches my thesis. A lot of times I have to discard my first idea, or at least revise it significantly, but it gives me a starting point)
Kein Problem !
The quote function can be a bit of a pain :roll:
Is it just me, or was that one rather more easy?
Until here, we continue from before, right? Abstract universality is nice, but useless, because it's somehow incomplete (not sure I get the "otherness" and the overcoming of that alienation, though).
Now, this is actually rather clear, isn't it?
The key words are "form" and "essence" I guess. Thankfully no trouble with the translation, the German "Form" and "Wesen" have pretty much the same range of meanings.
Well, "Form" has the additional meaning of "mold", and "Wesen" can also be a "creature" (as anyone who watches the series "Grimm" would know...) - but Hegel's context is clear enough to avoid those ambiguities.
Yes, that makes sense to me. Try an initial understanding before grabbing the dictionary.
That is kinda what I do. Have to say though, Latin, German and Italian are easier for me to understand than Hegelese.
Quoting WerMaat
I like that. I would like it even better if I could do it in German. Consider me in awe !
My favourite German word: Ausgezeichnet :cool:
Quoting WerMaat
I am still not sure about any of this. You seem well ahead on the path of understanding.
Quoting WerMaat
Yes. I think that is the point of a group discussion. To benefit from others sharing their views and insights. And also to keep questioning...as you do so well.
Thanks.
I agree! :grin: :lol:
You know quite a bit of German, don't you? Du kannst mir gerne schreiben, wenn du deutsche Konversation üben möchtest..
I do something similar. I start with what I think he is saying and then go back to the text to see how well that squares with what it says. It may seem as though I am on the right track but then I ask myself how this or that statement fits in. Without forcing it I see if I can make it fit and whether this helps make sense of the larger context or if I need to change how I initially understood it. This process continues as I read. Sometimes what I thought fit together must be torn apart and rebuilt if I cannot get what I am now reading to fit. Maybe what I had put together is not right and maybe what I am now trying to put together is not right and sometimes neither is right and the whole thing needs to be revised. But it may be that there are pieces that come later, and so, everything remains tentative.
Each part must be understood in its details and taken together all the parts should form a whole with those parts serving their function within the whole. The parts themselves can form wholes in the same way that a hand is a whole but a part of a larger whole. The process of reading is both analytic and synthetic, breaking things down and putting them together.
Nicht wirklich. I knew it fairly well a long time ago.
Thanks for your very kind offer. But that would be too much for my fried brain right now.
In #17 he said:
How are we to reconcile these statements? Is it immediacy or mediation?
#17 begins as a view from the end or completion, a view which Hegel says:
Hegel identified two modes of this exposition. Both are the consequence of thinking identity without difference. These should not be thought of as simply abstract logical consequences but as having occurred within the history of philosophy, the logic of the development of spirit.
In the first it is the identity of thinking with itself - universality, simplicity, undifferentiated, unmoved substantiality.
In the second the identify of thinking and being as immediacy - inert simplicity, actuality itself in a fully non-actual mode.
In #18 he shifts from lifeless categories to living substance, the being that is in truth subject. In its immediacy it is both the knower and what is known (#17). But in is in truth only insofar as it
is the movement of self-positing. The term comes from Fichte:
Hegel adds that it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself. As self-determining it is other than itself in that it is not yet what it determines itself to be.
Self-positing is negative in that it is a rejection of what it is in order to become what it will be.
The movement is within the subject, a turning from within itself away from and back to itself. In its otherness it is still its sameness. That is, it is never wholly other.
The subject here is not the individual or only the individual but mankind.
(just kidding. :grin: Thank you for your insightful words! It's just that, when I read them the first time, I'm swept away by the elegance of your sentences, It's like watching somebody dance. And then I tend to loose sight of the actual content and need to start over.)
Aw shucks.
Fooloso4 works hard at this; note his reading process above. His practice means an ever-increasing fluency in Hegelese. If anyone doesn't understand, he is accessible and amenable to answering questions like: 'Eh? You what ?!'
Fooloso4 is a teacher in the best sense, having patience and a desire to help others understand.
However, right now, I am a bit like the 3yr old girl in:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6244/i-simply-cant-function-without-my-blanket
Only with me, it's 'I Simply Can't Function Without My Glossary!' ( and Friends ).
And even then, I struggle.
I realise that I am not ready to climb Everest, being more of a rambler.
That is why I have downloaded a free pdf from scribd.com:
Peter Singer's 'HEGEL: A very short introduction'.
I'll continue to follow this fascinating discussion, from the foothills.
Happy climbing!
So, an easy 5 minute walk in the park :wink:
Thanks. This SEP article is very helpful. It describes various interpretations of Hegel's Dialectics.
[ It also provides a link to another resource. Hegel on Dialectic, Philosophy Bites podcast interview with Robert Stern (https://philosophybites.com/2010/04/robert-stern-on-hegel-on-dialectic.html). ]
Quoting tim wood
Yes. Here, it spells out that Hegel rejects the technique of using a triadic form:
So how would this process be reconciled with an organic growth - thinking back to the analogy of bud, blossom, fruit (para 2 )? Distinct from the more formalised pattern of: positive >negative > aufheben.
Perhaps, a more important, overarching question should be kept in mind:
How does this process lead to what is important to Hegel - The Absolute Spirit or Idea ?
Quoting Julie Maybee
[ I'm kinda back in the game after reading Peter Singer's Introduction to Hegel.
A short but clear overview - well explained.]
I don't understand this. Would it be possible to give a practical example of how this operates ?
From Gardner's glossary:
NEGATIVE, NEGATION, NEGATIVITY, NEGATE
.
Note that the meaning of negation changes according to how or where it is applied.
As someone else advised: 'a glossary can be helpful but it can also be misleading. The general meaning of a term or even the way an author uses the term in general might not be the way he is using it in a specific instance.'
This is why I think it might be useful to compile one's own glossary along the way. Referencing context.
As mentioned earlier, this would be part of the active reading process - 'making the text 'properly one's own' by investigating its meaning and truth'.
Quoting tim wood
Yes, but we need not discard our immediacy of perception, right? We need to find the synthesis of both world and mind, Wesen(essence) and Form
I don't see fundamentally new happening in this paragraph. Actually, Hegel is being quite patient with us, isn't he?
I think he's carefully and repeatedly explaining the fallacy that lies in immediate perception of the absolute: You end up with "big" words that are empty: In their universality they become vague and indeterminate.
They are not totally useless, however, they are still the right starting point for the following mediation.
Now, this sounds like he faced some lively opposition to his ideas already, doesn't it?
Would it be too forward to translate into modern vernacular:
"Calm down, folks! I'm NOT abandoning the absolute"
I agree. We can't discard this. It is part of a 3 stage process. Leading to knowing ? Truth ?
1. Immediacy comes first. If it means intuitive and simple perception of the world. A vagueness.
Non conceptual. Universal.
2. Mediation is opposed to immediacy. If it means conceptualization. Cognition. Particular.
3. The process of reasoning ( ? involving 1. and 2. ) > Self development > Individuality
Or something like that ?
What a strange phrase. How can Hegel cast loose from the world when he is in it ?
Quoting tim wood
* How can a chair self-posit ? There is no consciousness.
Some of the difference between Kant and Hegel is that the individual is not the only theater in town. Hegel relates the negation of person-hood as happens between Master and Slave as part of the process of becoming aware of the "other." Reason, with a capital R, is not possible without lots of awful experience.
Quoting tim wood
Hegel deals with the world and consciousness at different levels. Thinking is part of being in the world. It includes and leads to all kinds of knowledge.
As far as I can tell, Hegel's intent to explicate the whole as a practical and human concern. The world and society are basic to individuals self-development or self-realisation.
Quoting Tom Rockmore
https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft7d5nb4r8;brand=ucpress
Thanks. I would be grateful if you could provide a reference for this.
The paragraphs 179 to 181 specifically involve "sublating" the other.
'The process of becoming aware of the other' seems central to Hegel's theory.
We only become self-aware or self-conscious via our relationships to others.
Quoting Valentinus
Thanks. I have taken note of the pdf page - starts p155, para 178. Jotted down p160 para 190 where I think the discussion starts in earnest. ( but I could be wrong ! )
I'm currently reading Tom Rockmore's 'Concept - An Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit' - (again, the search function is proving useful ).
Didn't realise that this passage was so famous, particularly from the Marxist perspective.
Conscious individuals in their conflicting interrelationships the basis for the master-slave relationship.
Quoting Tom Rockmore
https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft7d5nb4r8;brand=ucpress
I think Rockmore speaks too generally when he says: "The relation of inequality remains, although its terms reverse themselves". The master's dependency on the servant develops over time and when the relationship is superseded by a new one. The ground is not the same as at the beginning.
This touches on what Tim Wood is saying about the process of understanding being prior to the description of a knowing agent and what is known. Reading backwards from paragraph 190 to the initial discussion of perception, the process is not separated into different agents with different objects.
Perhaps you are right.
However, I read it that the inequality remains when the roles are reversed.
Yes, the relationship develops over time. Rockmore says the relationship evolves.
In any case, I think it probably time I backtracked to para18 of the Preface !
Thanks for your thoughts.
Well, what is the reverse of a condition made only possible through development?
The term or idea of 'development' usually has positive connotations but not always.
What do you mean by it ?
What 'condition' are you talking about ?
What is the point of the question?
I didn't quite catch the importance of this on my first skim through.
Appreciate Fooloso4's thought here:
Quoting Fooloso4
Thanks for spelling out what is at issue.: 'The relationship between God, man, thinking, and the whole' Although still not sure what kind of God Hegel is speaking of. Nor what the 'whole' is in practical terms *. Are we supposed to be at One with each other ?
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Fooloso4
So, God is a substance ? Is Hegel a pantheist ? Rockford seems to suggest so:
Quoting Tom Rockmore
What does this mean ? Is God the Subject, the living Substance - and we are the object (or small subject ) endeavouring to become at one with the Subject ? Do we reject our self so as to move on, to process and progress?
Quoting Fooloso4
Could you expand on this, please. I am still not entirely sure what 'self-positing' means?
Quoting Fooloso4
Do you mean the subject or the object which changes, developing through increased awareness ?
The relationship between our particular selves > the world > reaching some whole Truth via the process of reason or thought ?
Are we meant to get tied in knots ?
* from Rockford on 'the whole':
Well, there is nothing new here in the sense that I still don't get it no matter how often he may repeat himself. This:
I have read this and similar phrases over and over. It seems to be the nub of the matter.
I am tempted to throw my arms in the air and shout 'So what !?' :meh:
Yes, pretty much. I agree!
I feel that the Immediacy is more focused on the moment, timeless and floating, while the mediation is more temporal, looking at the whole process.
Or another thought I had, a more modern metaphor:
The immediacy of the absolute could be compared to the DNA of an animal. If you know the DNA, then apparently you have the ultimate knowledge about this creature, its innermost structure, the core, the absolute.
Then Hegel might say that the DNA alone is just a mirage, a potential. You need to see the animal born, observe while it grows and develops, if you want to understand it fully.
DNA, the genotype, may be the essence, but the particular body, the phenotype: that is the form.
You know, I get the feeling that you have grasped all that pretty well already. Perhaps you are at that point when you have trained and practiced a lot, and learned something well, and suddenly it's pretty easy to do... And then you get the feeling that you're missing something or doing it wrong, just because you think "it can't be that easy".
That sentence you quote - doesn't it describe the same 1-2-3 process that you yourself summarized above?
"The whole": point 3, the completed understanding
"The essence": point 1, immediacy
"completing itself through its own development": point 2, the mediation. negation, questioning, and in the end sublation to a new understanding.
Otherwise the both of us are missing the point, 'cause I'm no further than you are (I've not even read all of the articles you've linked.)
I totally need to memorize this sentence, that's a brilliant way of describing it!
Quoting tim wood
Agreed! The only thing we need to guard against is a too strong fixation on our ideas and decisions. We need to keep checking if they work and adjust as necessary, or we run the risk to become
Quoting tim wood
Quoting tim wood Yeah. The style is typical for the time, but it could be wielded with more elegance and clarity. Take Goethe - his reputation as a master of language is sometimes a bit blown up, but not undeserved. Texts by Goethe are far easier to read. On that note: Kant's style is even worse, in my opinion
Quoting tim wood
Very good summary!
I also like your suggestion that "negation" is in understanding what's missing, in grasping the inadequacies of the "universal" view.
.
Now this captured my attention. I am very fond of Goethe.
Having read one or two pieces of his literary work, I hadn't thought of Goethe in terms of German Idealism. Wanting to know where his theoretical texts fitted in...I googled.
So, up they pop, here:
1790 - Metamorphosis of plants
1810 - Theory of colours.
1801 - Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_German_idealism
Quoting Wiki
So, there we have it, Goethe developed a phenomenological approach to natural history or natural philosophy. This gave me an increased understanding and appreciation of historical progress. The changing ideas...
The timeline picks up on the 'Pantheism Controversy' ( see para 17 discussion ).
This a major event in German cultural history (1785 - 1789 )
Goethe is linked to this via his poem 'Prometheus' published in 1789.
So, it seems that Hegel and Goethe were kindred spirits, even dying within a year of each other.
If we wanted to attach a label to their cold, white big toes, then perhaps 'humanist' would fit the bill...as well as any other...
Would you go to the Restaurant at the End of the Universe ?
Quoting tim wood
Yes. That is what drew me in. The first mouthwatering bite...and then look what happened...
A great discussion. Thanks to you and all.
Thank you. Appearance can be deceptive !
Quoting WerMaat
Tsk, tsk ! :wink:
I think you are entirely right. It would be helpful to circle back. After all, the circle is the best and most powerful image of the self-movement of spirit. Since it is so easy to get lost in the details and opacity of Hegel's writing, before moving forward I want to collect a few things together that he has said.
Returning to itself from out of itself the whole comes to know itself. This is the fundamental movement of spirit in its self-realization. It is articulated by Hegel in various ways. It is important to see that this is a self-enclosed movement whose progress is not linear. There is nothing outside of it.
Until the whole completes itself, that is, comes to know itself, knowledge is still indeterminate, incomplete and the possession of the few. Who are these few? The philosophers who have moved knowledge forward. Knowledge is self-knowledge is a double sense - the movement from the Delphic "know thyself" to knowledge of the spirit's knowledge of itself. With the completion of this movement the individual, the subject knows itself in the truth of the whole. It is not available for all in the sense that information is, but rather as self-realization.
The understanding is thinking, thinking is the pure I, the pure I is the understanding. Knowledge and understanding are in this way distinguished. How is it that what is intelligible is what is already familiar and common? What is intelligible is what is or can be understood, that is, made intelligible through the understanding, through the I that thinks, and is thus found not in the object but in thinking the object. What is made intelligible in thinking is then available to all. It is through the thinking of the few that knowledge is made possible to all who think. Thinking is carried forward by the few and becomes the available possession of all.
Hegel is not just expressing an opinion. It is his view that will become what everyone will be able to see. In this moment of the movement substance and subject are distinct. But the true is as much one as it is the other.
Substance is the whole, knower and known. Substance is not in or a name for the universal. The universal is within substance. It should be noted that Hegel is not rejecting immediacy. We know the immediacy of being in that we are. The immediacy for knowing is 'der Sache selbst', the thing itself that is to be known. I intentionally translated it in this way to draw the connection with Kant.
If substance is the whole, and as such there can only be one substance, then God is in truth subject. It is not just that God was taken or regarded to be subject. It is something now understood if not yet known. And because it is not fully realized, self-consciousness perishes, but this is only half of it. It is also preserved, taken up anew.
The movement of self-positing is the movement described in paragraph 12, the movement in which the subject returns to itself from out of itself. It is a mediated process, but not, as for example with Kant, the mediation of the object given in experience by the subject's understanding, but rather the mediation of the subject with itself. This is not to exclude the object. The object is taken up in the understanding, the I thinks it. In taking up the understanding itself, the understanding is mediated, that is, becomes an object for knowledge for the subject.
[Edited to add:
Well, we are roughly a quarter of the way up the mountain. And sidetracks have been explored.
Good to have a picnic break to survey the scenery. I will digest later.
Summaries are always useful, thanks.
“Thus” indicates that the life of God and divine cognition follow from what has been said. God and the divine are not separate from but within the circle. A game love plays with itself, the game of uniting two as one, but to play the game one must first become two, dividing and uniting itself with itself. Divine life and divine cognition are being and knowing.
Hegel immediately adds that this idea must be thought with due seriousness, that it was won through the suffering, the patience, and the labor of the negative. The reference is to the life and death of Christ and the themes of suffering and sacrifice, death of the body and life of the spirit. Whatever Hegel’s own beliefs were on such matters, they are an important part of the history of spirit, if not in terms of actual events then in terms of the shaping of consciousness.
What does the pure self-intuition of the divine mean? First, this intuition is the subject’s intuition. As immediate substance it takes the divine to be other than itself. To be grasped and expressed as form requires that it be articulated both as self-forming and formed, as both the development of form and the entire richness of the developed form. It is only from this stage of its development, when it has become actual, that it can know itself.
This is summed up in #20:
He goes on to express this:
Zoology is not adequately expressed by the universal “all animals”, for in the universal the particular is negated or not expressed. All animals tells us nothing about any particular animal. In the same way, “absolute,” “divine,” “eternal,” tell us nothing about the particulars within the universal.
Hegel goes on to explain mediation:
The transition from a word to a proposition is mediation for it must be thought and expressed. So too the absolute, the divine, eternal, must be mediated, that is, thought and expressed, given shape and content. But they are mediated by, the I. Existing-for-itself, the I is other than the subject or object of thought. At the same time it negates this otherness by making it one’s own by the understanding. What is thought, the universal, comes to be the subject matter, which is to say, the subject’s matter.
Reason is not unmediated intuition. It is not the understanding. It is positive in that it reflects on what is taken up in the understanding as immediacy without reflection on the process of unity. It is, in other words, reflection on a central problem of philosophy at least since it was first expressed by Parmenides: thinking and being are the same.
The movement in consciousness is from the immediacy of objects in consciousness, to their difference or negativity as objects of rather than from consciousness, to the immediacy of objects of consciousness, their sameness or positivity as objects from consciousness.
Hegel expresses the same idea in yet another way, this time making explicit that it is not just something that occurs in the consciousness of the individual:
It is not the capacity for rationality but the culturally formed and educated rationality that allows the person to become for herself what she is in herself. While the importance of culture was recognized by the Greeks, it was to a large degree atemporal. The importance of history as self-moving and self-development was not a factor. The truth was regarded as unchanging. Today both views are represented and defended.
I don't know what this means. Did Spinoza "go theological"?
The first question should not be whether he believed in God but what he means by God. Once that question is answered the answer to whether he believed in God would be, for those who hold traditional beliefs, no. But that is not the end of the matter. Like talking about man when he is but an embryo, we should wait to see how things develop.
He does not reject:
When he talks about:
this reads to me like an affirmation. But it seems clear from what he has said that his concept of God is not the God of the Bible or the God the traditional theologians.
Quoting tim wood
There is some truth in this and I am sure that Hegel, like his predecessors, was well aware of the practice of philosophical esotericism - hiding your meaning from those who are not ready for it. I think that what he says would be regarded as anti-religious by many both in his time and ours, who consider themselves religious. His comment about:
Quoting tim wood
speaks to this.
As a contrasting parallel to Foolso4's remarks involving Spinoza, it is interesting how Spinoza complained how certain thinkers were sure what was possible for the "Absolute" without being in a favorable spot to observe such things. That sort of thing reminds me of:
Quoting tim wood
The limits of observation sounds like a good place to start a Phenomenology.
I asked about the reversibility of terms because the logic that seems to be operating here does not seem to be focused on corresponding necessity to event in the way other ideas of causality are often discussed.
OK. It would be helpful if you could expand on this objection.
If this is about the Master/Slave dialectic, then there are many views and interpretations.
If it is about the particular Rockmore quote I linked to, then he probably had more to say on the subject.
For me, this is only an awakening which will hopefully lead to a deeper understanding, given time and application. Clearly you have read more and have developed opinions which you are sharing. Thanks.
So, to return to your objection. It requires more detail from you. What is it that concerns you ?
Where is the weakness ?
How does it affect the overall drive of the argument, the acceptance of Hegel's theory - or its importance in the progress of philosophy ?
I need to read more about this. To this end, I place the following links:
( any other help would be appreciated)
http://culturalstudiesnow.blogspot.com/2017/03/hegel-on-master-slave-dialectic-summary.html
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Master–slave_dialectic
http://www.cambridgeblog.org/2014/05/hegel-on-the-master-slave-relation/
Indeed.
Quoting Fooloso4
Perhaps. However, the Preface is by its very nature limited.
For a more expansive, possibly clearer view, we would need to read the chapter on Religion.
A foray into Rockmore...
Quoting Tom Rockmore
https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft7d5nb4r8;brand=ucpress
At first glance the quote looks to be the words of tim wood. As suggested before, to avoid any confusion on requotes, it is good to give Hegel his due by either naming him and/or paragraph.
WerMaat agreed with this and changed accordingly.
I know that clicking on the link returns you to the post where you can see it relates to para 23.
However not everyone clicks, it is simply read as is, especially in requotes. As can be seen when I quoted you just now.
Unfortunately, Tim continues the practice of posting Hegel paragraphs without using the quote function.
Why ?
[ I only recently mastered the art of the quote function from external sources (different from internal quoting other posters) due to similar concerns.
In my case, I didn't wish to take credit for words not my own.]
[ On requoting this, I noted the original Hegel quote marks were not transferred. I needed to use the quote function again :roll: ]
Re: para 21:
So, becoming all that you can be depends not only on capacity for reason but being part of a society of others with whom you can relate and depend on for nourishment and enrichment. Combined with reflection it leads the way to an improved understanding of particulars and the universal. Is that about right ?
Quoting Fooloso4
I am surprised that the importance of history in or as self-development wasn't recognised by the Greeks.
What did they see as the truth ?
How does this compare with the Romans ?
That will probably come later...
I think one thing is clear, God is not known by revelation or by intuition or by feeling. Since truth has the element of its existence solely in concepts (6), what is necessary is the expression of the concept of God.
In paragraph 4 we find the following statement:
What is a fulfilled life? Given the themes of wholeness and completion, a fulfilled life is only realized within the movement of or perhaps with the completion of the whole. In any case, it must be a life guided by reason. If is the life that is self-positing. The life in which the thinking I, the subject, is its own authority.
Hah. Talk about circling back...
We kinda skipped over that right at the beginning.
(Amidst the confusion of Kaufmann v Pinkard and their different paragraph numbering )
Glad you rectified that and added your understanding. Most helpful.
Yes, the development of the individual is through the development of the culture. But also, it is "the few" the philosophers who are responsible for the development of the culture.
Quoting Amity
Human nature, according to the Greeks, is unchanging. Self-development is toward this end. The realization or actualization or completion of one's nature is not dependent on history. We are no more or less capable of this than the Greeks.
The importance of history, the ability to think change, was one of if not the most important contributions of Hegel's philosophy. It has been said (I don't know by who) that Hegel is Spinoza plus time.
Quoting Amity
The truth is what they sought. Whatever it is, they thought, or perhaps more accurately publicly professed, it must be unchanging. If the truth can become false then the truth has no meaning.
Quoting Amity
It became the standard, the eternal verities, veritates aeternae. One might think of it as the victory of Parmenides over Heraclitus, but with Hegel Heraclitus lives to fight another day.
So, we should thank our lucky stars ? For the 'few' - who knew what to do?
And the opposing view ?
Quoting Fooloso4
:smile:
I am beginning to enjoy Hegel. Worth the effort.
Thanks again.
Since we are reading Hegel it would only be appropriate to that him.
Quoting Amity
Of the many? Hegel thinks he and the gang have taken care of that as well. What was once the possession of the few has now become available to all.
Quoting Fooloso4
Fooloso4, don't put to much weight on this sentence... Upon rereading this passage I stumbled across a mismatch in the translation.(It stood out - the translation is usually excellent!) I believe that the translator as inserted a clear interpretation, while the passage in the original is ambiguous.
The German sentence reads:
The English goes:
"gebildet" means nothing but "formed". It has the second meaning of "educated", true, but Hegel's context leaves it open whether the rationality has simply "formed" and developed itself, or whether it was "educated" from an outside source. And the word "cultural" does not show up at all.
I feel that Hegel is leaning more towards the self-formed. A reference to culture and education - the social environment forming the individual - is entirely missing from the whole passage. Instead, it's all about self-reflection:
Not from an outside source. As I said in an earlier post, there is no outside, all is within the whole.
Quoting WerMaat
Yes, I think that this is right, but self-formation is a cultural formation. We are shaped by and within our culture. As individuals we are not wholly separate or other. To use the agricultural root from which we get culture, it is the soil in which we grow and are nourished.
From the Wiki article on Bildung:
More specifically:
But in this precise passage of the Vorrede, in this specific context? I don't see a reference to culture, to society or education in its literal sense. (Latin e, ex: out, out of & ducere: lead - the "leading s.o. out" implying the involvement of an outside party)
The self-development of the individual takes places within the self-development of the whole, which in turn is led by the philosophers from within the whole. We do not each of us come to think as we do on our own. The development of the thinking I is a historical development not something that develops on its own in each individual.
I'm not disagreeing. But I still posit that this is not in the specific passage I quoted - Hegel is using the Embryo-to-aware-self as a metaphor, he's not expounding a theory of education.
:up:
Thank you !
I agree. What I am stressing is the importance of culture in the development of the thinking I. In terms of the context and history of the term it seems to me to not be an interpretation rather than translation, although the line between them is not always clear.
This statement is clearly false, and does not make sense. There is an illusion of sense, which you have created with ambiguity of verb tense. When you properly distinguish between what you've gotten from the restaurant in the past, from what you expect to receive in the future, then you will see that the reason you are going to the restaurant is your expectation to get what you want, not because of what you've gotten in the past.
The fact that you like what you've received there, in the past, does not motivate you to go there, in the future. What motivates you to go is the expectation of getting what you like, in the future. And this is the very opposite of what you say. This is the very difficult aspect of consciousness to understand, the conversion of past experiences into an expectation for the future. And understanding this conversion is very necessary because it is the expectation for the future which motivates one to act, not the experiences of the past. You cannot avoid this difficult aspect of consciousness, hiding it behind smoke and mirrors, by creating the illusion that it is past experiences which motivates one to act.
Hegel notes that this claim has fallen into disrepute, because nature is regarded to be above thinking and without external purpose. He says that this misconstrues thinking and that purpose does not entail external purpose. He appeals to Aristotle’s determination of nature as
This is important in several ways. It shows that the development of knowledge is not simply a linear progression in which those who come later see more clearly and accurately than the ancients did. Aristotle is taken up again anew, which is not to say ahistorically. In addition, nature as purposive means that nature is not the action of blind forces, there is purpose in its doings. Nature as subject means that thinking is not below or above nature. Aristotle’s unmoved mover is the movement of the subject, the thinking I.
The beginning is purpose, the result the actualization of purpose. From beginning to end, in moving away from itself the move is back to itself, it is the actuality of purpose, being for itself.
But what is the self? Is it the same or different from myself or yourself?
23:
Does Hegel intend for us to draw a connection between “God is love”, “The life of God and divine cognition ... as a game love plays with itself” (19),and the goal of philosophy as moving “nearer to the goal where it can lay aside the title of love of knowing and be actual knowing (5)?
That is, such propositions only reflect the negative movement, the movement away from itself, its otherness, which has not yet reached the moment of the movement when reflection turns back to itself. So, what’s love got to do with it? Love is the desire for unity. In religious terms it is the unity of man and God. In philosophical terms the unity of man and knowledge. In knowledge the desire for unity with God is overcome, for the movement has returned back to the self from the otherness of God.
Instead of saying: “God is the eternal” or “God is the moral order”, etc., why can’t we just say the eternal or the moral order without appending the meaningless sound God? The answer is provided in the next sentence:
We should keep in mind that Hegel says the subject is self-positing (18).In other words, the positing of God is the self-positing of the subject. But:
The positing of God is at that moment the positing of something fixed and unchanging, something wholly and completely other. But:
The problem is that the subject, God, is thought of as being at rest and unchanging. As the theologians have argued, God is perfect and thus unchanging, for change implies imperfection.
Interesting to read of this translation. However, as you say it is ambiguous.
Within a specific passage it could and probably does take on the particular meaning, as suggested.
Quoting Fooloso4
Agreed. Self-formation is related to recognition and relationships.
Quoting WerMaat
Would it have been necessary to include such a reference. Isn't it fundamental ?
Aren't we dependent on the
Quoting Fooloso4
Yes, I think we all agree on that, don't we ? Perhaps not.
I have been reading an article by Andy Blunden - ' Hegel, Recognition and Intersubjectivity'.
Number 19 - its download title is 'Mediation and Intersubjectivist Interpretations of Hegel', 2007.
From:
https://ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/works/on-hegel.htm
It is a broad, pragmatic interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of Spirit.
Blunden distinguishes this from the narrow pragmatism which ignores the meaning already invested in cultural inheritance.
So, are you saying you don't know about - or recognise - the importance of culture ?
What particular notion of 'culture' do you have difficulty with ?
But you are 'pretty sure that...Hegel is is going to argue that history/culture is shaped by impersonal movement'.
Why would you think that ?
How could it be 'impersonal' ?
Quoting Amity
Quoting tim wood
Please clarify.
OK. Good examples of individuals getting caught up in events outwith their control.
Within which there is still that search - desire - for freedom, progress - where hope might prevail as fear encompasses them. Desire and Fear being basic driving forces in human activity.
Reason appears to fly out the window when political rhetoric is used to stir up communal emotion.
Where there was progress, regress steps in.
So far, so human.
To return to the initial metaphor cleverly employed to draw us in; the natural, organic growth of bud, blossom, fruit. This can only take us so far in understanding.
It is not sufficient. It takes no account of all of the above.It is 'impersonal' in the sense of not having human qualities, emotions or reason. We are more than physical, passive growth. We are active, interacting, to grow spiritually, academically, socially, whateverly - interdisciplinary.
So, this 'impersonal movement' you talked of above - which you appeared to specifically relate to the metaphor - why would you think that this is how Hegel will progress his argument or theory ? Or is it a different kind of 'impersonal movement' you have in mind ?
And what is meant by your question: 'is there some more elemental force at work' ?
What do you mean by 'elemental' ? Your 'clarification' needs clarifying.
Take your pick. From:
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/elemental
Elemental biological needs.
Essential constituent of something.
Forming an integral part. Inherent.
Resembling a great force of nature. Violent rains or passion.
A supernatural being. Spirit.
An elementary part or principle.Two different epistemologies:
1. Science > strives to understand the elementals of material existence ( empiricism)
2. Theology > our universality, existence described through faith.
Or perhaps none or all of the above...I look forward to your explication.
-----------
And so we return to Hegel and questions arise as to his meaning. Quoting Fooloso4
How do we understand him ?
I think for him the game is over, unity has been realized.
There is no first principle of philosophy upon which everything else rests and is supported. Both the truth of a proposition and its negation are moments within the movement of the system of knowledge.
Contrary to the assumption that the ground or principles of reason must be firm and unchanging, the movement of reason has no fixed ground. A principle is a starting point. The positive movement is via the negative, the negation of what is taken as true. It is not the truth but in the movement, the development, the working out of truth.
If he is with us in spirit :halo: then he is also in purgatory :groan:
Then again, he could be :rofl:
I think the matter of scale you describe is important to what Hegel is presenting. The "unconditioned" is present in all the instances of determination. But how that is so is not some kind of phenomena without conditions. Self-awareness has to happen in many ways for it to happen in one.
Quoting Valentinus
As already discussed, the movement of history is central to Hegel's system.
Of course, there are matters of 'scale' within this.
Paraphrasing some previous references and thoughts:
We develop from individual consciousness to self consciousness - seeking knowledge from an individual perspective to the universal. Via the development of the culture.
A kind of global humanism dealing with problems of humanity.
We have intrinsic purpose. We follow both intuition, insights and reason on the path to self-realisation.
The scale concerns relative degrees; measuring both the quantitative gradations and the qualitative leaps.
The subject matter of the text is both the Concept of Geist (Spirit) and its working out in real life.
Theory and Practice.
Philosophical theories are neither true or false. They offer different perspectives on progressive development.
Philosophy is viewed and understood from a historical perspective.
Philosophical concepts made by humans who relate to each other in action and reaction.
The practical role is to formulate ideas which might lead to new ways of thinking about the world and our place in it.
Yes. It is about the testing of ideas or concepts. The dance of the dialectic.
https://www.marxist.com/science-old/dialecticalmaterialism.html
Quoting Fooloso4
I think this is a good summary. It relates to my last post regarding the subject matter of the text.
Geist - the concept of and its working out in real life.
The spirit of philosophy.
What is the religion of modernity? Without venturing an answer it can be noted that “the most sublime concept” belongs to it, the expression of the absolute as spirit.
The spiritual is what exists-in-itself and comports itself to itself. But this means it must be to itself other than itself for itself.
Spirit comes to know itself through us, by becoming an object to itself, an other whose otherness is immediately negated so that it is taken back into itself
It is not us who engender the spiritual content, it is engendered for us. It is as it is for us.
I take this to mean that the object, that is, spirit becoming an object to itself, is self-engendering, it conceives itself. It is pure concept, reason, logos.
Man does not engender the concept but thinks it, develops it dialectically, actualizes it.
When I think of spirit, beginnings and qualitative leaps, Goethe comes to mind. With his:
In the beginning was the act. Im Anfang war die Tat - Faust.
As opposed to the Word of the Bible.
His qualitative leap ? Perhaps this:
Quoting Adam Kirsch
Quoting Adam Kirsch
The Greek word used by John in the New Testament is logos. It seems likely Hegel in using the term is mindful of both the Greek and Christian tradition, and since both are historically important his use reflects the full range of meaning.
As used by John it connotes the tradition of revelation, what God speaks to man. It is primarily what man is told by and about God. For the Greeks logos is an ordering of words intended to give an account or explanation, literally to gather together and lay out. One who is wise is able to give a logos that reflects the intelligible order of the cosmos, why and how all things are as they are. But the logos is not simply ordered speech, it is the ordering of what speech is
Perhaps what Goethe was getting at is the impotence of mere words. Actions not words are primary. Hegel's use of terms such as 'logos', 'reason', and 'concept' are self-generative, that is, not passive descriptions of something separate and other.
No, I don't think that's it. Goethe was a poet and thinker. Faust was the character trying to translate the New Testament into German. From what I remember, he was seeking inspiration having dried up in more ways than one. Then came the Spirit...
@WerMaat will probably know more than I do.
What I can share is one of Goethe's short poems which speaks to his understanding of natural process.
Paraphrased from 'Goethe - poet and thinker' by Wilkinson and Willoughby, pp21-25.
Depends what you mean by 'the concept'.
If Man does not engender the concept, then who ?
God ?
Or what ?
Cosmic Consciousness ?
I am not sure I follow. I am at a disadvantage not having read Goethe (and have been scolded by you for this omission). Isn't it the translation of logos that Goethe's Faust is grappling with, the term translated as wort in German and word in English, as in: "In the beginning was the ..."?
Inspiration is, literally, the indwelling of spirit. If I understand you, Faust is moved the the spirit. If that is the case then doesn't this point to the insufficiency of words, that words alone are not what provides the movement both for him and in the beginning? I take it as being for this reason that he translates logos as deed or act, something done rather than something said.
This may be off though, since what God does to begin is to speak, to say: "Let there be ...". [Added: Perhaps Goethe shares Hegel's view of continuous development. It is not simply what was said or done at the beginning, but the continued active doing. From what you presented it also seems that Goethe shares Hegel's rejection of a transcendent God who acts upon the world.
There is much in what you quote that is consonant with Hegel. I think Hegel's response might be that Goethe represents it but does not raise it to the level of science, he does not:
Of course one might claim that this reflects the superiority of poetry. With Hegel we are still within what Socrates calls the ancient battle between philosophy and poetry.
Quoting Amity
Self-engendering spirit. Man's role is in the articulation and working out of the absolute. As a teleological movement, what comes to be, what develops is the potentiality that is realized or actualized in what is there from the beginning.
Yes. That is word for word translation. So, no difficulties there. I guess there was more to it.
Anti-religion ? What comes first...not words. Nor a Bible.
Quoting Fooloso4
I am no Goethe scholar. I would need to read it again. The pact with the devil spirit I think came after that point. And it wasn't the literary spirit they engaged in. In the words of Elvis:
'A little less conversation, a little more action, please
All this aggravation ain't satisfactioning me
A little more bite and a little less bark
A little less fight and a little more spark...'
I hope the sparkling spirit of @WerMaat is visited upon us, soon.
I think you have a better handle on this than I have, even if you haven't read Goethe.
You are right. It takes more than words alone.
Quoting Fooloso4
Goethe does that elsewhere. Possibly even at the same time. One can write poetry even as one studies rocks. He was multi-talented that guy. I mentioned his theories earlier.
Quoting Fooloso4
Yeah, I got that. I just don't get it. What is there at the beginning...
This observation strikes in many directions. I will throw out two.
It recasts the argument between Hume and Kant regarding causality. If Hume's skepticism is a "natural" development in the advance of "science", Kant's rejection of that argument is another one.
Arguments about free will versus various expressions of necessity tend to misrepresent why the proposal of a system that ties them together would be rejected out of hand. At the very least, Hegel is asking for the problem to be approached from a different direction.
If I had the opportunity to cross the river and pour some of my blood into Kierkegaard's bowl in Hades, I would ask him about this passage.
Quoting Valentinus
Oh no, not your blood - that is a sacrifice too far !
Perhaps we could all chip in...and pray for a positive outcome.
Why Kierkegaard and not Hegel himself ? ( assuming that wasn't an error )
What position did Kierkegaard take - for or against Hegel. Or a little of both?
Curious about this, and philosophical, historical developments.
Also how sure can we be that what is reported or criticised is the correct version. Bring on the blood.
I think it helpful to look at objections to Hegel as a way to understand him.
Some thoughts here:
Quoting Matthew Edgar review
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/kierkegaard-s-relation-to-hegel-reconsidered/
Review of:
Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel Reconsidered, Cambridge University Press, 2003
I cannot say what more there is for Goethe but for Hegel it is the sublation of both the Greek logos and John's logos. Some read Hegel as anti-religious and others as religious. At this point perhaps it is prudent to just suggest that Hegel sublates religion.
Quoting Amity
Is it science in Hegel's sense of the term, that is, knowledge of the whole?
Quoting Amity
If I remember correctly and understood it correctly (it has been a very long time since I last read Hegel) it begins with the eternal negating itself and giving rise to time. In its embryonic stage it contains all that it will come to be, but must work itself out over time, eventually there is the development of consciousness and finally self-consciousness and knowledge of itself as the whole.
I don't know. I doubt it is exactly Hegel's approach. Goethe wasn't such a brilliant, mad philosopher.
It would be interesting to see how they compare.
A few bits and bobs:
Quoting Jeff Carreira
https://philosophyisnotaluxury.com/2013/06/14/goethes-method-of-doing-science/
Quoting Nicholas Boyle [my bolds]
https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/biographical/goethe-johann-wolfgang-von-1749-1832/v-1
Goethe's Faust and Hegel's Phenomenology: A Comparison
http://journal.telospress.com/content/1968/1/34.abstract
On Goethe's vision, a science of wholeness:
https://blog.usejournal.com/goethes-science-of-wholeness-55282a462bbe
Eh ? :chin:
Huh ? :confused:
OK... :nerd:
I agree with Stewart that Hegel and Kierkegaard collide in many places but that the differences are not a simple matter of thesis versus antithesis.
I brought up Kierkegaard since he emphasized the centrality of the Single Individual. In the passage I quoted by Hegel, I wonder if the statement can be be seen as a shared point of departure, a moment of agreement before struggling with each other.
Stewart depicts faith as something like the Romantic's criticism of reason as insufficient. Kierkegaard is better understood as a follower of Pascal who recognized that Christianity was absurd in a fundamental way but who also argued that it is a better model of the human condition than others.
So, in addition to the specific arguments made in regards to what must exist, there has been introduced a psychological register where some models fit better than others. The "long path" reference in Hegel's text is an acknowledgment that experience is not a simple thing given to anybody.
Thanks for explanation and point to ponder on our path. It's good to linger a while.
Quoting Valentinus
The idea of the 'path', I think was first introduced in para 12. I look back at the discussion about the prize at the end of a 'winding path' being won through struggle and effort. The prize of the 'beginning of a new spirit' being the final outcome. It seems clearer now. As is 'this path to science is itself already science'.
I think it perfectly understandable that it is life's journey itself, with all its experiences, that can help move us. In different ways at different times. There is no single appropriate fit or model.
I don't know where the image of the spiral staircase to the Absolute is referenced. Anyone ?
I don't think it helpful. Again, it smacks of religiosity. A glorious path ascending to Perfection.
This idea of reaching, or grasping at, a perfect ideal might be fine for a few philosophers.
It might be the case that philosophy is an essential part of the whole but it isn't everything.
Our knowledge/understanding of the human condition is gained via many sources.
Not so much a ghost but a host of many coloured disciplines.
It is this almost religious sense of the importance of Western, European or German philosophy in our historical development or culture that I take exception to. So very narrow...and it is not available to all, even if it were so desired.
But perhaps I have it all wrong...
Quoting Amity
Your statement has been articulated in many ways. Hegel, himself, said many things that compared his "culture" in a better light than others.
But, as a matter of intellectual inheritance, his work paved the way for you to express your objection.
Irony abounds.
Yes. Such criticism ( and more ) is supported by others more articulate than whot I am.
For example, 'In the Spirt of Hegel' by Robert Solomon.
https://www.scribd.com/document/321486406/SOLOMON-Robert-In-the-Spirit-of-Hegel-pdf
Also, Bertrand Russell offers a critical analysis of Hegel in his 'History of Western Philosophy'.
https://archive.org/details/RUSSELLHEGEL1946
This is counterbalanced by John Cottingham's 'Western Philosophy - an Anthology'.
And so it goes.
Quoting Valentinus
'Intellectual inheritance' - sounds good but what does it mean ?
If it is about the history of philosophy then I agree Hegel played his part.
However, it is a strong claim to make that his work paved the way for me to express my objection.
This is not about intellectual inheritance but intellectual or cognitive development.
I don't need to read a 'Who's Who' in Western Philosophy to reach an understanding of individual progress to self-realisation or wellbeingness, holistically.
Quoting Valentinus
Yes it does. Sarcasm too. Especially when there are difficulties in communicating ideas from one brain to another in writing. And through the lens of bias.
Quoting Valentinus
What kind of experience are you referring to ?
Exchange of letters between Hegel and Goethe. Did Hegel appropriate Goethe's idea ?
https://ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/works/on-hegel.htm
No 43 Goethe, Hegel and Marx
( 19 page downloadable pdf )
I meant no offense. The irony applies to my own efforts to criticize Hegel.
I had a teacher who once asked me how I could separate using tools made by others from one's I forged myself. I used to think the question was about authenticity versus imitation. An Hegelian point of view says to me that the new is both.
If I use something made before for my purposes, that is a new "determination." If I organize elements in a way that gets other people to start talking in a new way, that too, is a kind of new "determination."
The "Concept" beyond the boundaries of an individual are developed by both kinds of change. It introduces a Z axis where previously there was only X and Y.
Interesting story. If I understand correctly, then I agree.
The tools you forged yourself could be a direct copy, an imitation of the original product - X.
However, I think there would be differences even if same materials were used. Humans are not robots who churn out identikits.
If handmade then differences in skills, experience and ability would result in something unique to you; even if not original. That reproduction would be new but not significantly different - Y.
If you then use some imagination ( ? a movement of spirit - inspiration ) to create or invent a new product by tweaking the old and adding a new element, then - Z.
You are a design genius.
Same with concepts.
I am not sure what you mean by 'beyond the boundaries of the individual'.
As individuals, don't we in the main have an inherent drive - an inner necessity- to progress either to benefit self or with others.
Are you talking about the consciousness which moves us to a heightened awareness of the possible ?
All knowing takes place in unconditioned otherness, that is, in what is other than self. As its ground and soil, the otherness to self cannot be separate from self-knowing. Pure self-knowing is purity from otherness.
Both Plato and Aristotle say that philosophy begins in wonder (‘thaumazein’) (Theaetetus 155c-d; Metaphysics 982b). There can be no wonder without a sense of the otherness of what engenders wonder. It is what lies beyond or outside of what can be understood or taken within consciousness, what remains a mystery.
The coming to be of otherness is not the coming to be of the object in and for itself but of its coming to be for us, that is, as an object of consciousness. It is pure spirituality in that it is for us in its immediacy, in its otherness, its mystery, understood universally rather than as a particular object of consciousness.
The substance of spirit is the union of consciousness and what is for consciousness. Otherness is transfigured from what is other than or independent of consciousness to what is for consciousness in its immediacy. Being becomes conscious of itself.
Science requires that self-consciousness be situated in the ether of absolute otherness. It must become other in and for itself, its own object.
The individual in his conscious awareness is not aware of his awareness but of what is given immediately in awareness. His absolute self-sufficiency, his being unconditioned, his immediate self-certainty of being, requires for its self-sufficiency self-knowledge. He must be both knower and known.
The standpoint of consciousness is its awareness of things as other than itself. This standpoint, the opposition of subject and object, is the other of science. Science is self-consciousness, the unity of consciousness with itself, is the loss of spirit because it is the loss of consciousness of the world.
The one part is consciousness as knowing objective things, the other consciousness knowing itself. Each taken by itself is an inversion of the truth because each by itself leads away from the truth, that is, away from the concept of the whole in which both parts are united, identity in difference.
The natural consciousness is consciousness of objects and is thus not sufficient to move immediately to science. It is one sided, undeveloped, not yet prepared to be knowledge of the whole, that is, of the identity in difference between subject and substance, knower and known.
Self-consciousness is immediacy. Science is mediated, the conception of or thinking about rather than the immediacy of self-consciousness.
Science is the in-itself but must become for itself, that is, it must move from self-consciousness as being something inner, by which substance is other or object to self-consciousness, to self-consciousness being for itself, the whole as the union of substance and subject. Here spirit is no longer substance, that is, object of consciousness but the actualization of spirit, as in itself and for itself; not something that is mine or particular, or even as universal, but as absolute, the identity of difference, one with itself.
Response:
Quoting Fooloso4
Discussion:
That makes sense to me.
In that the claim is that it is philosophy alone which is supposed to lead to increased understanding of self via others.
If this is the case, then it should provide the means, the ladder - the structure of reason - to facilitate this process. The path to knowledge or science.
The starting point is the individual, the subject who is aware of his limitations and is curious to know more about the awesome world out there. As you point out:
Quoting Fooloso4
The image of the ladder reminds me of the Wittgenstein thread you participated in.
In that case, wasn't the ladder kicked away ? Do you think that it might be a different kind of ladder ?
I can't remember the details.
Anyway, as always, Fooloso4, thanks for the in--depth analysis, requiring time and effort.
Most helpful.
Standard disclaimer: in trying to work out what Hegel says I am forced to frequently revise what I think he is saying. What follows is no exception.
I think that absolute otherness as discussed here does not refer to others but to pure self-knowing, that is, knowing that has itself as its object, which is to say, that treats itself as other. What is absolute is not relative to or conditioned by anything else. The otherness of objects in the world as well as other people are other relative to me, and so, cannot be absolute otherness. The otherness of myself is not relative to anything other than myself. But absolute otherness cannot be the otherness of myself to myself either, because that would make it dependent on me. Knowing in its universality means what is common to all knowing, the unification of subject and object, identity in difference. All knowledge is self-knowledge. Absolute otherness must be the otherness of the whole within itself as the condition for the whole's self-knowledge. The circle of self-knowledge plays out on the levels of the individual, the culture, and the whole. The first two are limited wholes, the last the whole of wholes.
Quoting Amity
Others do come into play but here we are led to the same question as in the ascent from Plato's cave. If one is led up and out, then who led out those who can lead us out? Is there first one individual who did not require others? In line with the metaphor of the ladder, the rungs may have been put in place by the work of those who came before, but each new step requires going further than what culture and education provided. There must still be someone whose step goes beyond what was already provided. But now with Hegel all the rungs are in place.
Hegel goes on to claim that the individual has immediate self-certainty, an unconditioned being. I think that what he is getting at here is the certainly of our being. Descartes' self-certainty was his Archimedean point, from which he could move the Earth. Perhaps Hegel is suggesting that Descartes science was incomplete because he failed to otherness into account.
Quoting Amity
I think it is more than curiosity. It is desire, eros, love. And here again we are reminded of Hegel's claim that the title of love of knowing can be set aside and replaced by actual knowing (5).
Quoting Amity
There are some similarities but the image of the ladder is an old one. There is, for example, Jacob's ladder (Genesis 28:10-17). Hegel's ladder is to reach the standpoint of absolute otherness, the ground and soil of science. Wittgenstein's ladder is leads to what is beyond the limits of science.
I think you are right about the importance of others for self-consciousness, but what I am still struggling with the concept of absolute otherness. It seems to be a contradiction in terms. What is other is so relative to something, but if relative then it is not absolute.
[Added: I might put this question aside for now.]
Yes, you and me both.
Ciao :cool:
With these paragraphs, Hegel draws in sharp relief the comparison of individual experience to what makes that possible. This "universal self" is central to what is being presented but is very hard for me to understand.
Then the difference between Kant and Hegel is about how this stuff is happening in time or not.
Kant describes time as a component of individual experience.
If this "Spirit" is the shape of history, then Kant is wrong.
Quoting tim wood
Good observation.
I am not sure how to read that against the background of negation and exclusion being the default position and something other than that being an advance or at least something different.
Well, the logic of both the stuff in time combined with the idea of a dialectic as producing results through a process suggests that "exclusion" is a very important activity in what Hegel has in mind.
The inclusion part only gets recognition after the conflict is over.
Or put another way, there is factor in play that Kant was not able to locate. And Hegel tried to.
Quoting Valentinus
Quoting Valentinus
I find this excerpt from para 28 helpful:
So, knowledge for the particular individual is internalised as he progresses through life and learning via study and experience. All of this happens within a universal culture.
We proceed by laying aside ( a kind of exclusion ) previous baby steps in learning, but they are necessarily incorporated into our whole (inclusion).
The spirit grows. Rung by rung.
Rockmore has this to say:
Quoting Tom Rockmore
https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft7d5nb4r8;brand=ucpress
How so ?
Quoting Valentinus
I don't fully understand it either. I think I remember discussing it earlier - but it never quite sinks even with all the repetition. It is linked to mediation and sublation.
We need others to become more. To connect. To be global. Universal.
We keep our sense of self as we progress and are lifted up into a higher Self.
Or something along these lines...
I don't know if this will help.
From an Outline of Hegel's Phenomenology:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ol/ol_phen.htm
To even try 'to re-say Hegel' we need to know what he is saying in the first place. To focus on the text. This means careful reading - not a swift, superficial skipping over of paragraphs 'to see what comes'. And yes, even then, approximations are the most we can hope to achieve.
I think, as a group, we are doing quite well. Getting there...
All of this, requires understanding important philosophical terminology, related to Hegel.
From Sebastian Gardner's glossary:
Returning to our previous question about 'absolute otherness'...
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Fooloso4
I am going to refer to Gardner's glossary in an effort to understand the above.
So, what can be meant by 'absolute otherness', as per para 26.
"Pure self-knowing in absolute otherness, this ether as such, is the very ground and soil of science, or, knowing in its universality" - Hegel.
Taking absolute as an adjective: all-encompassing. There is a sense of a complete or whole otherness wherein we as individuals find ourselves.
We move from our separate, individual potential ( in itself) to actual, full self-realisation in a personal and global sense ( in-and-for-itself) via socio-cultural relationships and being actively reflective ( for itself).
That is, we are relative within an absolute whole.
That's my current understanding. Open to review.
Just noticed this part I bolded. I think you answered your own question. Where is your struggle ? There is no contradiction in terms, is there ?
If we were to draw the circles of wholes where would absolute otherness be? If it is complete otherness it would be a circle that is not encompassed in some larger whole, otherwise it would not be absolute otherness.
Perhaps what Hegel is getting at is the movement from absolute otherness to its sublation, its negation.
Agree. If we take it 'absolute' as 'all encompassing', it would be the outer circle.
I think, according to Hegel, it is the universality of philosophical science or knowing ?
It would seem like the end point of his conceptual system.
Quoting Fooloso4
Perhaps indeed.
Isn't this what he says in para 26 ? It is the ground. The beginning of the circle or spiral upwards.
"Pure self-knowing in absolute otherness, this ether as such, is the very ground and soil of science, or, knowing in its universality" - Hegel.
Given the eternal thinking process, and the dialectic, it is the beginning of new concepts and ideas.
Perhaps some other philosopher, post-Hegel, takes one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind.
Quantitative evolutionary steps up a ladder.
Followed by qualitative revolutionary leaps in thought ?
We blow thought bubbles, then burst them or they are burst, sometimes they join up...
And so it goes...
Another thing might be that each thing must be other than all other things. Is the whole other than itself? In one sense since there is nothing other than the whole of what is then there would be nothing other than the whole. But self-knowing requires the self to treat itself as is object of knowledge.
OK. Yes, in one sense, each thing or person is other than the rest, but there are similarities as well as differences. As we all know.
If we take the 'whole' as meaning the whole of 'what is', we cannot know that that is all there is. There could easily be more than the whole of what we currently know. But that pertains to scientific knowledge, doesn't it, not philosophical knowledge such as it is. Given that both take place within a changing world, neither can be complete or whole.
'Self knowing' if that is the same as self consciousness requires a self-regarding as an object. To be able to detach and be objective. And that can never be complete either. It is an ongoing process.
However, a union can obtain between individual knowledge of the self/subject, that is 'subjective' and philosophical knowledge - the knowing of reason (objective). They are not distinct entities. It takes two to tango. Ain't that the tangled truth ?
I linked to 'the Outlines of Hegel's Phenomenology' earlier. I find it helpful as an aid in understanding.
In particular this part seemed relevant.
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ol/ol_phen.htm
I will try but I will be slow in responding. I need to review some other parts of Hegel that is influencing my perspective.
I think it is wise to take time to review difficult aspects of Hegel. All the better to clarify and hopefully reach a better understanding. This 'to and fro' is an important part of our discussion. I appreciate all thought provoking questions and responses.
Quoting tim wood
'Be easy!' - a favourite quote of yours from the Three Musketeers.
Perhaps more pertinent here is their: 'The merit of all things lies in their difficulty.'
To achieve a deeper understanding of the difficult Preface requires several things. At the risk of repeating myself...
For some, this includes:
Careful reading with continual review.
A bit of a breather. To help get your head out of the single, successive paragraphs to gain perspective.
Seeking help from other resources.
You need to heed your own advice. Be easy. This swift copy and pasting of paragraphs might be what you need to do to reach the end. To keep control of the thread.
But at what cost to cohesive, clear comprehension ?
Given that I have made similar comments before to no great effect, I welcome this response.
In the main, the pace of posting paragraphs has been such that catching up has not been a huge problem. And I have enjoyed some fruitful sidetracks.
However, you have changed your initial approach. Contrary to what you have said, you do not in fact wait until the earlier post has been discussed or 'seemed done'. Indeed, para 28 was not even commented on, far less 'explicated'.
Para 26 proved more difficult to understand and so, has just finished being discussed by 2 of us.
I realise and totally understand that not everyone wants to spend so much time on a single paragraph or to tease out the meaning of a difficult concept. But 2 is approximately half the current group.
So, opinions as to what 'a good rate' might be will be as varied as motivations and reading pace.
The trouble is that there are non too many 'interested persons' around. Some have left or decided not to join, for various reasons.
I would welcome a return to your initial approach which meant taking the time to give an explication on each paragraph at the point of copy and paste. Then others can respond accordingly. But that's just me and no doubt you will have good reasons why that is not possible.
Thanks.
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Fooloso4
Thank you, Fooloso4, for helping me along the way. Your questions have stayed with me.
@Fooloso4 - if you, or anyone else, are still interested and have the time, I would appreciate your thoughts on the PN article. Even if briefly.
Previously, I raised concerns about Hegel's apparent religiosity - the ascending staircase to the Absolute, a glorious path leading to Perfection.
Today I read this PN article which helped me better understand Hegel's position:
https://philosophynow.org/issues/86/Hegels_God
Quoting Robert Wallace
It's OK whatever you decide to do. I will either continue in my own sweet way, or I won't :smile:
It will still involve clarifying or questioning the text and Hegel's thoughts - hopefully.
Quoting Wayfarer
@Wayfarer, your post intrigued me at the time and I think I did try to respond to it but inadequately.
I understand that you didn't have the time to participate in the reading or group discussion.
However, I would be interested to hear your views on Hegel and his position on God.
What he means by the Absolute. It seems to change from something mystical to the more concrete.
Perhaps from the real feel to the theoretical ?
Quoting Amity
If you are confused, then join the club. I am the last person to be correcting anyone.
Have you read the Preface ? Have you read the thread ? Have you perused any particular paragraph ?
It's easy to drop in by with some insight or opinion without any previous signs of commitment.
I think that is what Tim was guarding against at the beginning. There are rules !
I’m sorry. Will you forgive my transgression? I will either read from the beginning or I won’t. I probably won’t intrude again, but I really don’t care about angering Tim.
There's a strong element of mysticism in German idealism, particularly Hegel, Schelling and Fichte, and to a lesser extent Kant and Schopenhauer. Now, the very word 'mysticism' is a pejorative to a lot of people, it's seen as the opposite of rigorous philosophy. But the true mystics are actually very rigorous in their own way. And that particular phrase of Hegel's is highly reminiscent of what is called 'Rhineland mysticism' of which the most illustrious exponent was the famous Meister Eckhardt. Then there's also a figure called Jacob Boehme (spelt various ways) nearer in time to Hegel, another mystical sage. I've read that he also had some affinity with hermeticism, which is a kind of underground current in a lot of Western philosophy and science.
In any case the origin of the mystical tradition in Western philosophy is (neo)Platonism and its successors, whose doctrines were fused into early Christianity by the Greek-speaking theologians, including Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and later Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus Eriugena. The intuition of 'the One' which is the ground/source of all being through the domain of the forms/ideas is central to that tradition. Although it should be said the marriage of Hebrew prophetic religion with Greek rationalism was often a rather fraught one, and that (in my view) the mystical elements became almost completely subordinated to the literalistic tendencies in Protestantism. But there's a huge amount of study involved in all of those issues, and I've only skimmed the surface. But I think it is possible to identify aspects the Hegelian 'absolute' with both the 'first mover' of Aristotle, and also with the One of neo-platonism (feasibly a kind of 'world soul').
Actually there's a passage that comes to mind from the SEP entry on Schopenhauer, to wit:
Also have a glance at this article
https://philosophynow.org/issues/86/Hegels_God
Also been meaning to dig into Dermot Moran on Eiriugena and German philosophy.
Fine.
I think it would be rather better to paraphrase it like this: that as all originates from a common source, then every being reflects or is an aspect of that source. The analogy of ‘basic energies’ is rather materialist for my liking. I also think my paraphrase is nearer in meaning to Hegel.
Thanks for this. It is just what I was looking for. A way to understand Hegel and his spirit.
Quoting Wayfarer
I am quite attracted to this way of looking at the world. I mentioned Goethe earlier. He is not a philosopher as such but a worthy nevertheless.
I will read the SEP entry later but this part seems to capture the process well:
Have done :smile: See earlier post. I found it helpful.
No worries.
My turn to confess :yikes:
I only found the article by following your previous link to it elsewhere. I should have acknowledged that.
From: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2384/page/p1
"There's an article by Robert M. Wallace, Hegel's God, although some of it is pretty murky, in my opinion. But it is introduced with the statement that ' 'Large numbers of people both within traditional religions and outside them are looking for non-dogmatic ways of thinking about transcendent reality', of which Hegel's philosophy of religion is given as an example".— Wayfarer
I think this fascinating. Yet again, I am tempted beyond the Preface. I won't pursue this in great detail here...but important to bear in mind as I progress my understanding of Hegel. Thanks.
Before returning to the Preface mountainside...
Just one question - why do you think your paraphrase is nearer in meaning to Hegel ?
I don't understand your objection to 'basic energies'.
Have you read this ?
Quoting Glenn Magee
Hegel's Preface :
Magee starts off with this astonishing claim:
This is close to the idea of the perennial philosophy. (It's also highly reminiscent of Hua Yen Buddhism.) They are marvellous ideas, but how characteristic they really are of Hegel, I can't tell, having not read Magee's book - perhaps I should give it a look.
As to whether Hegel was a sage - I think I would have to demur. I think his work is in many respects very much a product of its time and place, particularly in its emphasis on nationalism. He did touch on universal themes but I don't know if I agree with that glowing assessment of him overall. I do sometimes feel as though Hegel and his ilk were the last representatives of the 'grand tradition' of Western philosophy. But they're so verbose! To much going on in the word processing department. I prefer the directness of Zen.
In my experience Hegelians generally dismiss this enterprise of relating Hegel's thought to that of the ancients, insisting on Hegel's originality. I find that this enforces the representation of Hegel as mystic, because mysticism focuses in on the originality of the individual. We approach the meaning of One (in the sense of the unity of all), through understanding "one" in the sense of one individual, oneself.
This classes all phenomenology as mysticism. This mystical method takes the approach that the only true access we have to the unity of being, which is the source of the particular, the object, is internally. Presupposing the existence of things, as objects, is rejected, because there is no principle of unity to justify that assumption. The subject, oneself, can be the only true object, because only by looking at oneself can one come into contact with the source of unity, which is necessary for the existence of an object.
The problem I have with Wallace's article is the lack of reference. How much of what he claims can be found in the texts? I am reminded of Nietzsche's inversion of a famous saying: "Seek and you will find". Is Wallace finding all this in Hegel because it is there to be found or does he find it because that is what he wants to find?
As to the question of whether Hegel was a mystic, we must first ask what a mystic is. Is it someone who has experiences or someone who has been initiated formally or informally into secret teachings or someone who yearns for immediacy or someone who attempts to attain altered states of consciousness via particular practices or ...?
Indeed. And that is a timely reminder to return to the Preface.
The alternative perspectives and interpretations are fascinating.
To be followed up outwith this thread, I think.
Thanks to all.
Mysticism is philosophy centred around the mystical experience. I believe that in it's most simple form, the mystical experience is the experience which makes one aware of one's own spirituality. Recognizing your spirituality, and acknowledging this as experience, makes you a mystic.
Trying to avoid a total sidetrack here, I had thought to start a new thread entitled ' Hegel is not a philosopher !' ( using Magee's quote ) *
However, I note this has been discussed before:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/517/mysticism/p1
* Done.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6430/hegel-is-not-a-philosopher-thoughts-
Quoting Valentinus
tim wood said this:
Quoting tim wood
I will try to answer in reverse order. The factor Kant is leaving out of his analysis is a motive to go forward. The briefest account I can find comes from Hegel's Logic, translated by William Wallace:
Quoting Hegel, Logic, paragragh 10
So, negation is important because there is no motion forward without it. The Notion is not an explanation but an activity. It is not "automatic" as a process. If it was, then it would already be appropriated like a Category of Reason. The previous discussion of necessity in Logic is focused upon this point. If we knew what we know, why bother with any further discussion?
Quoting Valentinus
I think that is correct and is a consistent feature throughout.The latest in para 32 and 33:
32:
33:
https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft7d5nb4r8;brand=ucpress
Very well said.
I consider your question of dinosaur versus current player the one that is most interesting to me and shapes the tenor of many reactions to Hegel's text.
But I will respond more thoughtfully after a little bit.
I am being chased by a Velociraptor.
Why 'at this point'?
Why an either/or decision ?
Why the extreme positions ?
You might need to make that decision. I don't.
However, you raise an interesting question which I have taken the liberty of including in a parallel thread:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6430/hegel-is-not-a-philosopher-thoughts-
'Dinosaur v current player'.
I look forward to further clarification.
Clearly, there are many different views and interpretations.
All of them potentially relevant to one's own developing understanding.That is one of the reasons I started a new thread; to give room for that exploration and to prevent straying too far off the Preface.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6430/hegel-is-not-a-philosopher-thoughts-
I understood Tim's aim was to focus on the text alone and explicate each paragraph *
I find this continual comparative analysis of Hegel v Kant useful up to a point. However, it seems to be taking over the objective analysis of the Preface.
I miss @Fooloso4 comments on each paragraph. Perhaps he has lost interest...
*
Quoting tim wood
Quoting tim wood
Copying and pasting.
Soon the whole Preface will be covered.
The mountain top reached.
Out of breath and without oxygen.
Dead bodies are left on the mountain.
Where is the joy ?
Of reading...
Your description is helpful. I would only throw a few curve balls into the mix.
The emphasis in Lutheran thought that what is happening for each individual is the Incarnation is mystical in itself.
As a matter of struggling with the idea of the "unconditioned" as a means of orientation to establish a starting place, Leibniz and Spinoza did that sort of thing while Kant declined to provide that in his Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics because he said we could never prove it.
Of course, the paragraphs are difficult to get through to find the meaning. As a group, we all struggle with this to varying degrees. Some spend more time than others, some fall away; it's all a learning process.
Fascinating to be a part of.The dynamics and dialogue intriguing in themselves.
As a leader of a discussion, it is wise and important to acknowledge a lack of understanding and not to plough on regardless, without even commenting on a particular paragraph *.
Silence can mean so many things. It can give the impression of not caring and that is far from the truth.
It is good to know where we stand, even if the ground is shaky, especially when the ground is shaky.
All our understanding is provisional. Our thoughts are not written in stone. They are active and adapting.
Communication is all. Thanks for listening and sharing.
*
Quoting Jim Pryor
I am guilty of glossing over that which I don't understand or dismissing fancy gobbledegook.
However, sometimes I try to gain clarification by asking questions of other posters. Sometimes I am fortunate enough to get an understandable reply. Other times, the reply is that ambiguous silence.
Given that I have started a parallel thread to further explore issues, I will be discussing the question of the 'Hermeneutic Circle' there.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6430/hegel-is-not-a-philosopher-thoughts-
I hope thereby not to intrude on the focus and engagement required for the Preface text discussion.
@tim wood
@Fooloso4
@Wayfarer
@Valentinus
And any other interested parties...
I hope that using parts of quotes from this thread will not be objected to.
I will give due reference, acknowledgement and show context.
Have sent a PM to tim wood.
A lot of waffle.
For anyone interested in a more objective and substantive account, this is recommended:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel/
You are right. You didn't get what you asked for. Tough. Perhaps someone else can be bothered.
'Waffling':
The first part of your post. Verbose padding.
Quoting tim wood
You are right. I have never referenced any paragraphs, discussed any analysis with any other participants or raised any questions about the text. And I never, ever read the paragraphs.
[ Edit: to remove comments I regret making ]
A mystic is someone who knows or thinks to know something but refrains from uttering it, for various reasons. Mysticism's main tenet can be summed up in the proposition: "'Whereof one dare not speak thereof one must be silent". But Hegel was pretty much verbose, unless he kept silent about a lot of stuff.
The hermeneutic circle is a good idea to bring into this topic. It is an element in the experiences Hegel describes and also reflects how he is in the circle himself as the origin of many discussions and disputes about ontology and epistemology. In spite of those conditions, I read the Phenomenology as an attempt at escaping the circle of "avoiding learning how to swim before getting in the water." When I read that section of the Logic, I wonder whether Hegel avoided the situation he said Kant was stuck in. Does he escape the problem of being "outside" of his method?
Some of that wondering goes in the direction being explored by Fooloso4:Quoting Fooloso4
A greater part of my wondering goes toward how "Self-Awareness" comes into being through its experiences and the role harsh necessity and "un-freedom" play in that. The negativity of the conscious individual meets the negation of the other individuals. The logic of how these events unfold leads to freedom and self-awareness. I accept that something like the structure of a Preface is needed to talk about experience this way. To see conflict as part of a process requires the use of synthesis for it to become past. From that point of view, Hegel is keenly aware of his "absorption" in his time and history. He is a major part of why we talk that way now.
On the other hand, the idea that the process has reached a kind of completion is at odds with the instruction to stay in the water. The ever expanding generations of Hegel's critics dig into the negativity he did not explore. By the turn of his own method, that points to elements and processes he was not aware of.
In my mind, it is that relationship between the dialectic and understanding that is still alive and kicking.
By your description Hegel would not be a mystic, but those who, like Wallace, claim that Hegel was a mystic hold to some other idea of what mysticism means.
Given the importance of the development of spirit in time, it seems clear that Hegel's thinking goes further than that of the mystics. But, one might argue that the mystic is able to transcend time. For Hegel, however, science is discursive. It is necessary to articulate or give a rational account of what one claims to know. I think he would say that the mystic fails to do this, but not because the mystic chooses to remain silent.
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/seventh_letter.html
Exactly! Which is why I said "but Hegel was pretty much verbose, unless he kept silent about a lot of stuff". No matter whether Plato or Hegel were really mystics, it's another question what they took themselves to be. In that respect, Plato certainly took himself as one, but I doubt that the same can be said of Hegel. In fact, I believe that Hegel wanted to do away with mysticism, most probably seeing the "young spirit" as mystical and secretive, but in its progression breaking free from this secrecy, like you say "it seems clear that Hegel's thinking goes further than that of the mystics".
I think he was a Socratic or zetetic skeptic, knowing that he does not know. What he says about the Forms seems to be a direct contradiction of this point, but a careful reading of the Republic makes clear that Socrates is telling stories. He admits he cannot confirm that things are as he says. In other words, he has not had the transcendent experience of direct apprehension of the Forms. The Forms, of which the visible world is said to be an image, are actually themselves images of the truth, a truth he does not know.
I think what Plato presents is a public teachings that takes on the guise of mystical revelation. It is a salutary teaching about the Good. It is Plato's response to the poets who shaped the minds and souls of man. It is poetry (poeisis, to make), intended to inspire and lead to the desire to aspire, to seek the truth itself.
And that Plato was not one, but Hegel was?
I saw the crescent
You saw the whole of the moon
I spoke about wings
You just flew
I wondered, I guessed and I tried
You just knew
I sighed
But you swooned, I saw the crescent
You saw the whole of the moon
The whole of the moon
How would Hegel call this, the distinction between loving to know and actual knowledge, or I dunno?
I am not saying what the mystic is. What I am saying is that there is no single definition of the mystic. I am not sure if the label is important or helpful. So, when someone asks whether Hegel was a mystic I must ask what he or she means by that.
Quoting Pussycat
I don't think either of them were. I do see some similarities between Hegel and Lurianic Kabbalah, but I am not prepared to make more of it. I simply do not know his work well enough to speak with more confidence on the matter.
He galloped for a while and then stopped because he expected there to be another fence after the one he got past.
For sure, there is no single definition of the mystic, or for anything. But we can focus our attention on different meanings for the same word. Which means that there is no point in us, or anyone for that matter, arguing what a mystic really is, really pointless, but to give an account, a description, for what we, individually, mean by that, like you ask. So I am saying that Hegel believed, mystic or not, purported himself to be the one to see the whole, "see the whole of the moon", would you agree?
I mean, like timmy :) above referred from the marxists:
"Hegel is not a philosopher. He is no lover or seeker of wisdom — he believes he has found it. Hegel writes in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, “To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title of ‘love of knowing’ and be actual knowledge — that is what I have set before me”. By the end of the Phenomenology, Hegel claims to have arrived at Absolute Knowledge, which he identifies with wisdom."
In order to know with what we are dealing with here. Are we dealing with this? With a method to attain absolute knowledge, everything that there is to know?? But I think that Hegel did not identify himself with absolute knowledge, like he did not say that he knew everything that there is to know, but that his method, the hegelian method, will lead someone to absolute knowledge.
Has Hegel lost his mind, or does he know what is he talking about?
He may be right, of course, I don't know. But it is crucial to know beforehand what we are delving into here.
Yes, he does claim to know the whole. He also claims that it is now possible for others to do so as well.
Quoting Pussycat
Knowledge of the whole for Hegel does not mean knowledge of every particular. It is not a claim of omniscience. The Phenomenology describes the movement of thought from consciousness to self-consciousness - knower and known.
Yes, I do. I think Hegel is important because he makes time and change essential to thinking.
I don't think it is a matter of Hegel being able to explain why Aristotle thought as he did but that since Hegel denies that there can be partial knowledge, Aristotle's philosophy, as well as the philosophy of all others before Hegel, is deficient, incomplete.
I don't think this means that Hegel was able to definitively explain everything that Aristotle said.
[quote=Hegel]“In so many respects,” says Aristotle in the same context, “is human nature in bondage; but this science, which is not pursued for any utility, is alone free in and for itself, and for this reason it appears not to be a human possession.”[/quote]
In the above, Hegel quotes Aristotle, where the latter tries to find and define the "first science", metaphysics or theology as he calls it, what its subject matter is etc.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0052%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D982b
And so, the first science appears to Aristotle to be of divine nature, giving his reasons for it. Hegel gives his own reasons as well for this appearance, but in terms of his own philosophical system, and thus goes further than Aristotle. In the process, he would have to explain why Aristotle didn't think of what he himself did.
And elsewhere, where for example he examines Plato's Ideas, Hegel does so within his philosophical system, he doesn't just say that Plato was wrong and disposes of his thoughts, but tries to give an account of what Plato thought in hegelian terms. I have no idea how he does this, but I am certain that every thought, no matter what, is put under the microscope in his own system.
The explanation has to do with the development of thought in time through history, the dialectical movement from the objective to the subjective.
Quoting Pussycat
I do not know the details of this but in general this is how Hegel regards all prior philosophers. There is something correct in their view but it is aufheben, sublated. Each proposition followed to its logical end contains its own contradiction.
Anyway, why did you stop your reading?
Hegel is talking about the movement of thought or spirit. I don't think this extends to physics or evolution, but I could be wrong.
It was taking too much time and energy. I was spending many hours working through a single paragraph in some cases.
But Hegel's philosophy is about the whole, so how could it leave these things behind?? After all, Hegel provides the scientific foundations, and physics and evolutionary biology are sciences.
Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/natindex.htm
Quoting Fooloso4
Indeed, these things have leisure as a prerequisite.
The question is not whether he leaves these things behind but whether the process of nature is the same as the process of the development of spirit, specifically, whether the development is a process of aufheben. For example, in the link to Hegel's philosophy of nature he says:
This would indicate that the processes are not the same, but I have not read the text, although one leads to the other.
Hegel does not consider a lot of things. His "system" is built upon certain principles. The method makes some things more important than others. The selection relates to what he considers the issue in his idea of development. To say that means he could have an opinion about anything that anybody said is to abandon his project and just treat the work as another opinion among others.
Whether he succeeded or not in reaching the goals he set out for himself is one thing. Referring to those goals as a given is another.
The link I posted is only a brief description/outline. For more details, you should see Hegel's philosophy of nature, the long version. There he starts with the concept of Space, showing how it negates into Time:
From there he goes on to speak of bodies and matter, and eventually gravity.
Well, philosophy fought against the separation of space and time, combining them into spacetime. But this is nevertheless a mathematical construct, what it means philosophically, I think it still escapes the scientists.
Speaking for my part, I take these goals as a given in order to understand what on earth he was on about. We shall see.
Regarding gravity, at the time of Hegel, gravity was thought as an external force acting upon the bodies. Hegel says this is not correct reasoning, but that gravity is a manifestation of the bodies themselves. He therefore criticizes Newton for speaking of a dubious "force" of gravity, acting at a distance, and praises Kepler for showing the same "law of gravity" only geometrically, relating motion with time and space:
And of course, this is how general relativity treats the concept of gravity, any force is fictitious and superfluous. Spacetime is not some container where matter happens to exist and move, but it is indistinguishable from matter:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hole_argument
So, what are your thoughts on the preface to the Phenomenology as it has been discussed so far in this topic?
I haven't really meticulously gone through everything that you discussed, but, from what I read, I think that you came to a standstill with the Phenomenology, as have I of course, which happens every time I occupy myself with Hegel. :groan: So I don't have a lot to say. Just two things.
1. When Hegel compares his own work with a work on anatomy, what he means to say is that in the latter, this work separates itself from the subject, as it is something external to it, like force is assumed, or at least was, to be something external to a body. In that, there is a very clear separation between the subject matter in hand - the anatomical body - and the theory that attempts to explain it - anatomy. Anatomy could never and in fact never participates in its subject, the body, how could it anyway? But in the case of philosophy that deals with the whole, a philosophical work must also include itself, even if at the beginning of the exposé it seems that the subject-matter is something external to it, or some particular, like anatomy is to the body. Eventually, and if it is successful, it should be found out and be evident that the work was speaking about itself all along, or the universal, so the relation that a philosophical work has with its subject-matter is internal, and not external. This is very difficult to do of course, and I think only philosophy does this, I can't think of any other. I mean, if there is such a science, like philosophy, that examines everything there is and the reason why these every-things exist, then sooner or later the philosopher and examiner will start wondering about philosophy herself and her own reason, making it so to fall back on herself, and then what would we have to say if philosophy's subject-matter turns out to be herself? Well, it seems that we would have to say things like Hegel did. I guess that this shouldn't come up as a surprise, but it does.
I think this is what you meant when you wrote:
is plain wrong. I don't think there is a "right" method or order, which means that we can be at liberty to tackle the problem anyway we feel like, bringing things out of order, or seeking help elsewhere, it is not a linear development I mean, but nevertheless not to lose track of the end result, which is to understand Hegel's philosophy.
It's gonna be a long road, for sure, but maybe we can come back with a story to say.
My original intention was to put the question of absolute otherness aside for the time being. It is often the case that what I cannot understand at one moment becomes clearer later. I decided not to go further with reading the text now not because of a standstill but because of other demands, including the demand to not spend whole days with one text or with sitting, reading, and writing.
Quoting Pussycat
While I do think that the subject must be taken into consideration with regard to the object, I don't think that the subject-matter of knowledge can be reduced to the internal, that is, the subject. Perhaps here we must confront absolute otherness. The object of knowledge in general is not the subject, although with regard to knowledge of it there are the poles of knower and known.
A related problem is the identification of the subject. The subject should not be thought of as the solitary individual. The individual is culturally and historically situated in time. There is a sense in which the subject is 'we' rather than 'I'.
Quoting Pussycat
Does Hegel address the question of why things exist, why there is something rather than nothing?
Quoting Pussycat
Part of the problem is that the whole cannot be presented as a whole all at once. Quoting Pussycat
Well, one must start somewhere. A phenomenological account is a good place to start since it addresses both subject and object, but one might get to the same place starting elsewhere.
Quoting Pussycat
If one's goal is to understand Hegel, and by this I mean regard him as a teacher of philosophy with something to teach us, then I think it best to follow his lead.
Yes, I got what you said the first time, "taking too much time and energy", as it happens to be the case for me too. But when I asked "why did you stop your reading?", I was not referring to you, or at least not just you personally, but to the reading group, huh, as a whole. The same for the "you" in the "standstill".
Quoting Fooloso4
I am not sure I understand what you mean by "I don't think that the subject-matter of knowledge can be reduced to the internal, that is, the subject". In any case, I was referring to the relation that philosophy has to its subject-matter. I will rephrase it in another way. If we say that philosophy is a collection of thoughts, then, if we are talking about the totality of thoughts, philosophy should also include itself in this collection, because the collection of all thoughts is also a thought. This differs from anatomy, or other sciences, since the anatomical thoughts or propositions regarding the animal or human body do not refer to or include the science - anatomy - that examines them. In the same way as with philosophy, a work on logic that attempts to find the laws of logic, must include itself, since it is through logic that the logical laws are to be found. So it is evident that it must be something circular, like for example a feedback loop, positive or negative or both, the loop being stressed in time.
Quoting Fooloso4
From what I know, no, he does not address this question, do you think he had his reasons for not doing so, or the thought didn't just cross his mind? Heidegger, I believe, following in Hegel's footsteps, attempted to answer this question, but I don't know what he presented as answer. But when I wrote "the reason why these every-things exist", I wasn't thinking of this question in terms of existence, but as to their purpose, what do they serve?
Quoting Fooloso4
But what lead is that? Never satisfied with himself, as can be seen from his re-workings and the renewed prefaces, he kept changing it. At some point he asked for patience and indulgence. Well no more!! haha Anyway, we will see.
Having given my reasons I will leave it to others to say.
Quoting Pussycat
The subject matter of knowledge includes things in the world - objects, events, processes, and so on. Knowledge of anatomy has to do with the structure of bodies that are other than the subject who desires to know.
Quoting Pussycat
Philosophy is self-reflexive. Its subject matter is the whole.
Quoting Pussycat
Yes, it is circular. But not in the sense of closing off, rather it is all inclusive.
Quoting Pussycat
Although I don't know if he ever addressed the question either directly or indirectly, given his familiarity with the history of philosophy I think he was aware of the question. Nothing is fundamental to Hegel's logic. That there is something has something to do with nothing.
Quoting Pussycat
I touched on the question of purpose, or more precisely purposive doing in my response to paragraph 22 (page 9 of this discussion). Purposive doing is not for some external purpose, that is, it is not about serving a purpose.
Quoting Pussycat
While I agree with you that we are at liberty to tackle the problem anyway we feel like, in my opinion, with any philosopher we hope to learn from, we must attempt to think along with them, follow their thoughts where they lead us. This is, of course, not the end of the matter. We might also learn from them by challenging them, but to challenge need not be to reject. We may, however, decide to reject them, but this may be a rejection of our own misunderstanding of them.
Immediate spirit is devoid of spirit because it is consciousness of something other, that is, it is not self-consciousness. The path from consciousness of what is other to self-consciousness is the development of genuine knowing.
28:
The universal individual, the world spirit, is not any particular individual:
The universal individual is one formed by the development of Western culture. Although genuine knowing involves both subject and object and is in that sense subjective, it is not a matter of whatever any particular individual declares or thinks or believes. It is universal subjectivity. But it is not simply a matter of consensus, that is, what is true is not so because most or all at any given time take it to be true.
Each stage of development is secondary to the completion of the movement of spirit. By way of analogy, one's first steps are of momentous importance but cease to be important as one learns to walk and run. Hegel is not minimizing the importance of what those before him have accomplished. Their accomplishments, however, have become internalized, part of one's cultural education. However great the accomplishments of Plato or Kant or Newton or anyone else, they are only moments in the development of knowledge and the world spirit. Although we may never accomplish what they did we are able to see further than they by standing on their shoulders.
Our inorganic nature is our spiritual nature. We are as we are not because of some timeless and invariant human nature or individual particularity. It is as it is because our spiritual nature is cultural and historical. The " cultural formation of the individual regarded from his own point of view" appears to be a matter of what he or she acquires on his own, but:
It is not the individual person but the instantiation or indwelling of spirit manifest in the individual.
Standard disclaimer: Everything here is tentative and subject to correction.