I had a look at the interesting blog you cited previously. I gather you want to differentiate between, on the one hand, things that selectively reflec...
Sure. The relevance of that distinction here, however, escapes me. In both cases we would most simply parse "red" as a predicate: "There is a red ball...
Qualities are a queer notion. The idea is something like that there is a something had by, say, all balls, such that being a ball involves having the ...
I don't know. You asserted that there was a difference, first insisting that the "...account that works for the redness of red has to work just as wel...
I'm not evading. I'm attempting to have you articulate whatever is troubling you in a way that is clear to me. "Quality" is a somewhat archaic word in...
Why isn't "ballness" (?) a quality? What's a quality, here, anyway? A thing in the world? A concept? It's hard to address a term that has so much bagg...
They do? I'm not at all sure what that could mean. I, and I think most folks, do not attach numbers to roundness in any intrinsic way. But sure, as Au...
If you wish to talk about something else, go right ahead. But don't presume to be talking for everybody. This question is at least in part about the u...
Sure, and in the context of the paper that's fine. But the farther claim that what "red" refers to is a mental percept is fraught with issues. I've me...
A pretty clear explanation, showing the underpinning assumption that there must be a "something" to which "red' refers. Why should this be so? Look to...
Who, me? But I have been at pains to point out that colour is not mind-independent; nor is it all in the mind. The error here is in thinking things mu...
Thanks for the long response, which I will take as you thinking out loud. So many good questions, I'm not going to approach them all. There's a bunch ...
Yep. Folk assume that colour words must refer, and that there must be a thing to which they refer, then get themselves all befuddled inventing things ...
Yep. Hence forms of life are lived and shown, and cannot be incommensurable because they must all occur embedded in our activities in the world we sha...
Hoffman makes the same mistake as Kant, supposing that there is a really, truly world out there that is different to and inaccessible from the world w...
I dunno. I tried to give you an opportunity to regroup and perhaps present a case that might make sense. Instead you doubled down. Trouble is, so many...
I don't think there is any disagreement here concerning the neurobiology of perception. The issue is: That's a question about the way the word "red" i...
Perhaps. If you want a word for both experiences and hallucinations you might try "sensation" or "impression". That way we can usefully distinguish be...
What you say here is blatantly erroneous. There is nothing "putative" about the use of MP, and the resulting schema is an instance of RAA. Such deriva...
My bad, I shouldn't have uncritically adopted your nomenclature. Laws of deduction are not usually derived from one another. But deriving equivalent s...
None of what you have claimed is novel, nor hopeful. RAA is certainly a valid inference in classical logic. I'll invite you to set out an example. It ...
IEP gives this as the form of the reductio: If p ? ~p, then ? ~p And then @"Leontiskos", is there anything in the article that corresponds to what you...
See ( ) how what you are suggesting doesn't square with what is the case in prop logic? Deriving RAA from MT, and MT from RAA are common introductory ...
There may be something in what you are attempting to articulate. Perhaps a difference between Aristotelian logic and prop calculus could be shown in s...
As a rule of thumb, if you are using physics to explain what red is, you've missed the point. Children learn how to use the word long before they lear...
When one has an experience, it is an experience of something. When there is no "something", it's an hallucination. But also, that "brains can generate...
But why? In addition to what? An individuals percept and and what? A pen, perhaps? The naive view that denies colour to objects is mistaken. Why shoul...
How come "pen" picks out a mind-independent object, and not just whatever has the causal role in eliciting a particular type of mental percept. Doesn'...
No, because on your account we are talking not about the red pen but each of our own solipsistic percept-of-red-pens. One your account there is no red...
Just to sum up, here's the truth table: https://i.ibb.co/gdJnj3B/image.png If they did contradict each other, the third column would all be F's. So as...
Brilliant stuff. Seems we are done here, unless you have something substantive to say? Edit: Nice to see you have taken to quite radical edits of prev...
Quoting only yourself might indicate a failure to address one's interlocutors. But I could make no sense of that last post anyway. Pointing out your e...
So on your account, when we agree that the pen is red, we are talking about quite different things - the percept-in-my-mind and the percept-in-your-mi...
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