Banno

Here's my contention:That someone is following a rule is shown by what they do. You seem to be addressing something else - perhaps that one could not ...

Sure, all that can be agreed, and yet we still hold that Anellis has not carried his case. Does Anellis show explicitly that Peirce used a truth table...

Sure, and that is where it seems to stop. Wittgenstein does the same thing in 5.101. Again, the novelty in the Tractatus is set out here: Here Wittgen...

Yeah, I can see that last, but what is actually quoted in the literature from Pierce seems to be about listing permutations of Boolean operators rathe...

But again, I'll maintain that the cardinal step, to using truth tables as a device for determining tautology and contradiction, was taken by Witti. Ye...

Yep.

See for example Irvine Anellis. I don't see that Anellis carries the case that Pierce's approach was complete. From the little I've seen Pierce used t...

I'm not familiar with Peirce, so I'm not rejecting the notion that he used truth tables. I don't see anything that indicates Peirce used them such tha...

In any case, "truth tables don't adjudicate contradictions" is yet another error on the part of @"Leontiskos".

So after outlining the process, he says This is original.

Oh, yeah - I was just editing the post to acknowledge that. My understanding is that Pierce tabulated some bits of binary logic, but it appears that t...

Which is what Wittgenstein was working towards when he created truth tables.

An odd thing to say, since a contradiction will have "F" all the way down it's main operator

You posts do not come through on my mentions. That's somewhat discourteous. Learning the rules is not playing the game. And how does one demonstrate t...

I suspect is to be understood as "I don't get it!"

Writing "Assumption" to the right is a hangover from E. J. Lemmon.

Not so. What has been clearly demonstrated is that you do not have a grasp of propositional logic. That you do not understand validity, nor truth func...

Another inane misattribution. Nowhere have I said that, and certainly not in the post linked.

Hmm. So you are agreeing that we have a shared world?

SO are you saying you can have my "mental percepts"?

No, it isn't. You missed out a line.

And you would be wrong.

... if red is only a mental percept, then when you say “red” it refers to your mental percept, but when I say "red" it refers to my a mental percept. ...

Here it is again. And so, A -> (B & ~B) ? ~A. This is a valid argument. You made the claim that this was RAA: Which, as Tones pointed out, leaves out ...

Yep. So where are we now?

That was obvious. A mere typo. I didn't. This is inane. (4) cannot be invalid on its own. The argument is valid in classical prop logic.

For the - I think seventh or eighth time - the claim is not that being red or sour or smooth is in no part mental, but that it is not exclusively in y...

Oh, understood. I moved Universities between logic courses, and was first taught natural deduction and then axiomatic systems, without the difference ...

And being sour is a property of lemons... We don't generally have the "mental percept" of "sour" in the absence of lemons or some other such food. But...

And if I say "A sour taste is not only a 'mind-dependent' property of a lemon"?

This just shows a misunderstanding of "rule".

Well, no, you didn't. This is the bit where you claim to have made a point that you haven't carried through.

Sure.

...and?

And here we go again. The berry is red. The berry is rough. The berry is sour. These involve the berry. They are not purely mental. Again, if folk agr...

This in reply to my pointing out that what you claim is a reductio is not a reductio. It's not even a valid argument. I do not think the bad faith is ...

There's that verbal sleight of hand again. "Red" is not a mental property, whatever that might be. It's a colour. You are enabled by the choice of col...

That's obviously not the reductio.

Stubbing one's toe is not a "mental phenomena". I have to say something about that term. A phenomena is something observed. "Mental phenomena" is oxym...

Some folk seem to think that things are either mental or they are not mental, with no other option. But why should this be so? Minds are embedded in t...

So what. Can you pass me your pain? It appears that you have not understood the argument. Again, the claim is not that there is no mental component in...

Well, no. It's not about conditioning. You then go on to describe situations that differ yet to suppose that they are in some way the same. I don't se...

No. it doesn't. Well done. Ok. one can lead a donkey to water but not make them drink. I don't know what you must mean by "private', then, but you are...

Sure. In the world.

How could you know that? yet That overwhelmingly folk agree on some things being red and others being not-red shows that red is not a private phenomen...

If colours are only a type of "mental phenomena" (think about that term...), then since your "mental phenomena" are quite distinct from mine, your red...

Not "what", but "who", surely? The experience of your companion doesn't matter, so long as they hand you the red pen. That's why we know about colour ...

Nor does it make sene to say that red is mind- independent. But it also makes no sense, for the reasons given, to say that red is no more than my-perc...

Well, that's not right, either, it seems. The red of a sunset is very different to the red of a sports car, or the red of a sore eye. Indeed, the pres...