How isn't this as confused as saying "the computer would need to simulate the weather event down to the level of water droplets. The weather event wou...
Do you mean that some part of the computer running the game would need the detail? Then you're talking about an AI, a simulation in the unproblematic ...
Oh good. So, a simulation as a description or theoretical model, distinct from any real or imaginary structure satisfying the description. A map, dist...
Surely the problem is the one frequently pointed out, with the word "simulate" being ambiguous between "describe or theoretically model" and "physical...
To identify the phenomena as being a perfectly attainable goal of science is hardly to debunk the noumena as being a necessarily unattainable goal of ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14873/what-could-solve-the-hard-problem-of-consciousness/p1 With or without neuroscience we have the Chinese...
So, physically identical except in respect of its lacking consciousness, possibly physical? Or, physically identical but different non-physically, in ...
It's what they mean by "sub-vocalisation", at least. Why not, if it resembles speech in respect of its graph of intensity against time? I think they a...
Don't you have brain shivers that appear to rehearse likely conversations with other speakers? I mean, don't you find your brain rehearsing the kinds ...
As those cats would no doubt advise: the best possible method of learning is play, but at the same time it's crucial that newly acquired knowledge be ...
In the more mundane of the two senses which you are right to separate, yes. (The sense of "undergo".) Balls and players both. Are you sure that sense ...
Experience is undeniable, yes. But unconscious billiard balls can experience impacts, and unconscious computers can experience changes in state or con...
Well neither of these pages, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem?wprov=sfla1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological_nativism?w...
Then again, it's conceivable that simulated humans could be real AI's, immersed in a virtual digital world. Conceivably, they might be fooled. (Though...
I get a different shape? More like, axiom 1 is about saying a thing (e.g. "Romeo!")... which, if you do it again, is only to reinforce that first stat...
A semantic grammar is a semantic syntax. So not necessarily a true semantics. Not necessarily joining in the elaborate social game of relating maps to...
So it's a crucial issue of semantics. Should the psychology admit internal representations, as well as external representations and internal brain shi...
Ok. The broken leg is trauma. The brain activity (the recognising the broken leg as an instance of trauma) is the feeling pain. Sure. The associations...
I'm suggesting the pain is the recognition of the trauma as an instance of a kind of thing, e.g. of trauma. It is the association. Sure it's separate ...
They suffered the trauma. My car suffers trauma. And pain, but only metaphorically. They, though, probably also had enough symbolic ability to associa...
But then, applying that to the snooker balls, you're averse to saying that seeing the ball as red has something to do with associating it with red sur...
There's mystical and there's mystical. There's an invisible pull between two bodies proportional to their masses, and there's a picture show in the he...
But perhaps you need to have brain activity that succeeds in associating the red ball with red surfaces generally, and the blue ball with blue surface...
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