Missing the point of the thread, which I take to be: what clarification of that vague and ambiguous assertion (the one you are pleased that I find vag...
Well yeah, vaguely, but that's exactly where the thread started. My formula (with modal inflection if required, but it's implied, so 6 words, and I th...
Yes, but not to qualify it as falsifiable. It takes heat to melt a piece of butter, but not to qualify it as "melts at less than 100°C", even though I...
How could it be when it ignores my formula and the clarification? I dunno... any universal claim that currently looks like it could be true. F = (with...
I agree, but I wouldn't stop there. I would say: saying that a proposition is true (or TRUE) is really no different to expressing (asserting) the sent...
Same confusion here. Corrected: Take rumours of the death of induction with a pinch of salt. (A good habit.) I.e. the embarrassment isn't fatal. Try t...
Which is a potential embarrassment for confirmation theory (induction), but not for falsification theory (hypothetico-deduction), which doesn't preten...
Yay A pre neural-network (pre 80's) computational picture of the brain? Wherein you doubt neural colours but assume correlative neural symbols? Like p...
Wherever it makes sense to parse them as objects, e.g. objects of a semantic verb like denotes/describes/points-at/refers-to/applies-to. Wherever it m...
Funny how even behaviourism doesn't resist the "idea" idea. That is, if it ever did (as so often charged) espouse an initial blankness of slate. A sla...
1) As a word's (or other symbol's) happening not to point at an object 2) As some corresponding negative's (or antonym's) happening to point at the ob...
... and Aristotle, apparently. Hence the etymology of "idea" involving "image", as in a photographic trace. (Natural as opposed to conventional.) And ...
So, on waking that morning (OP), we might all seize and catch fire like confused robots. But we might do that anyway if we took any logic too religiou...
I don't see how you are addressing anything like the same claim, e.g., Any symbol system that can prove all arithmetic proves at least one liar senten...
Trying to square this with the wikipedia version, I'm struggling with, Shouldn't it be more like, ... and then, continuing, state the existence of som...
Or, to simplify matters, alternating assertion and denial of a sentence. Or, to simplify further, production or selection of sentence tokens (utteranc...
But that is what he sees as offending our sense of proportionality: It might not have seemed to you to be the same kind of problem as proportionality....
"True" is what we call sentence tokens that bear repeating on their own terms, which is to say, without contextualising in the manner of "... is untru...
Fine, so you get how it is... And you get how Sider thinks that this consequence of a sharp border conflicts with most people's intuition of "proporti...
True is what we call sentences which prevail: those whose tokens replicate successfully as free-standing (e.g. un-negated) assertions within the langu...
Possibly a misunderstanding. Were sin and virtue simply your labels for the separate islands? (And not some distinct species of moral variation as I a...
I disagree that sin and virtue aren't just as continuous as any other conception of moral variation. And your rumination at the end, about redemption,...
Similar as in approximately equal but not necessarily actually equal. E.g. not-noticeably-different. Two such people will go to different places if th...
Holding my nose at the god-bothering, I will say... People who say, miss the point, and end up ignoring the evidence (in natural as well as human mess...
I don't have a problem with the critical attitude. I'm just trying to understand what you and @"Janus" have against scaling up from analysis at the re...
Ok, this thread is to question that? Question Davidson's assertion that the problem scales up? You see the "non-trivials" as a different problem? Not ...
@"Banno" But this (as the implied alternative to polytheism) leaves out ecumenism/pluralism, which I think characterises most of the philosophical "pe...
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