What is truth?
It was Pontius Pilate's question to Jesus - a question he didn't let him answer (although I think we know the sort of thing he would have said; "I am the truth" or something similarly unhelpful).
Anyway. what's the actual answer? Over the years philosophers have given several different ones, none of them remotely plausible.
For instance, some say that truth is correspondence to the facts. That is, a proposition is true when its representative contents correspond to how things are in reality. But that's not really an answer to the question. It tells us when a propostion is true, but it does not tell us what truth itself is. Note, I am not denying that a propostion is true when it corresponds to the facts, I am just denying that this is an answer to Pontius Pilate's question.
Some say that a proposition is true when it coheres with a set of other propostions. But hat too does not seem to be a theory of truth, but about when a proposition is true. And it also seeems obviously false - 'true' and 'cohere's with some other set of propositions' seems about as clearly distinct as 'true' and 'tasty' do. For instance, we all recognise that two equally coherent worldviews cannot be true - at least one of them must be false. But if the coherence theory is true, then they are both true. Greanted, it is self-evident to reason that true propositions cohere with each other - for it is self-evident to reason that no contradictions are true. But it is equally self-evident, I would say, that truth and coherence are not the same.
Some say that a proposition is true when it is useful. But this kind of view - pragmatism - seems obviously false too. There seems nothing confused in the idea that it may sometimes be useful to believe false propositions. Yet that should seem confused if the above theory is true, for that would be an impossible combination.
Obviously my presentation of these theories - correspondence, coherence and pragmatic - has been crude for the sake of brevity, but I don't think making them more complex will save them from the fundamental problem with each. That being that they all seem on their face,to be false - as self-evidently false as the theory that truth is a tangerine. The problem with the tangerine theory is not that it is not refined enough, but that it is off on the wrong track right at the outset. Likewise, with the above theories.
So what is truth, then? Well, I think the best way to proceed is to ask a slightly different question - when would we (that is, highly reflective rational truth-seekers) be satisfied that a true theory of truth has been described to us? That is, what would it take for us all to be satisfied that our question - 'what is truth?' - has been answered?
I think we can answer that one decisively: all rational reflectors will be satisfied the question has been ansered when the answer is one that their faculties of reason represents to be true. That is, upon reflecting on it - upon applying their reason to it - they can see that if follows rationally from claims that are self-evident to reason. After all, it is precisley becasue the above theories do not seem to be like this that they are not universally accepted.
So, we will be happy we have the true theory of truth when our question "what is truth?" is answered with proposition whose representative contents seems to all rational reflectors to be something Reason is asserting to be the case.
If that's true - and I don't see how a reasonable person could deny it - then that itself should be what we consider truth to be. That is, truth is the property of being a proposition that Reason asserts to be the case. When Reason asserts that something is the case, it is the case. Her asserting it, and its being true are one and the same.
That's my theory, anyway.
Anyway. what's the actual answer? Over the years philosophers have given several different ones, none of them remotely plausible.
For instance, some say that truth is correspondence to the facts. That is, a proposition is true when its representative contents correspond to how things are in reality. But that's not really an answer to the question. It tells us when a propostion is true, but it does not tell us what truth itself is. Note, I am not denying that a propostion is true when it corresponds to the facts, I am just denying that this is an answer to Pontius Pilate's question.
Some say that a proposition is true when it coheres with a set of other propostions. But hat too does not seem to be a theory of truth, but about when a proposition is true. And it also seeems obviously false - 'true' and 'cohere's with some other set of propositions' seems about as clearly distinct as 'true' and 'tasty' do. For instance, we all recognise that two equally coherent worldviews cannot be true - at least one of them must be false. But if the coherence theory is true, then they are both true. Greanted, it is self-evident to reason that true propositions cohere with each other - for it is self-evident to reason that no contradictions are true. But it is equally self-evident, I would say, that truth and coherence are not the same.
Some say that a proposition is true when it is useful. But this kind of view - pragmatism - seems obviously false too. There seems nothing confused in the idea that it may sometimes be useful to believe false propositions. Yet that should seem confused if the above theory is true, for that would be an impossible combination.
Obviously my presentation of these theories - correspondence, coherence and pragmatic - has been crude for the sake of brevity, but I don't think making them more complex will save them from the fundamental problem with each. That being that they all seem on their face,to be false - as self-evidently false as the theory that truth is a tangerine. The problem with the tangerine theory is not that it is not refined enough, but that it is off on the wrong track right at the outset. Likewise, with the above theories.
So what is truth, then? Well, I think the best way to proceed is to ask a slightly different question - when would we (that is, highly reflective rational truth-seekers) be satisfied that a true theory of truth has been described to us? That is, what would it take for us all to be satisfied that our question - 'what is truth?' - has been answered?
I think we can answer that one decisively: all rational reflectors will be satisfied the question has been ansered when the answer is one that their faculties of reason represents to be true. That is, upon reflecting on it - upon applying their reason to it - they can see that if follows rationally from claims that are self-evident to reason. After all, it is precisley becasue the above theories do not seem to be like this that they are not universally accepted.
So, we will be happy we have the true theory of truth when our question "what is truth?" is answered with proposition whose representative contents seems to all rational reflectors to be something Reason is asserting to be the case.
If that's true - and I don't see how a reasonable person could deny it - then that itself should be what we consider truth to be. That is, truth is the property of being a proposition that Reason asserts to be the case. When Reason asserts that something is the case, it is the case. Her asserting it, and its being true are one and the same.
That's my theory, anyway.
Comments (410)
Quoting Bartricks
Sorry to answer with another question, but why do we want the truth, what do we want from it, what are we expecting?
Well, to give someone a reason to believe something is to set about showing that Reason wants you to believe it.
Thus, why do we have reason to search out the truth - including the true answer to the question "what is truth?"? Well, because Reason wants us to.
Maybe. But the quest for the truth suggests that we are not content with things, that there is something better, truer out there, or in here. Is it possible the quest for truth, the definition of it a hopeless quest?
I don't see the relevance. The question I am trying to answer is "what is truth?" Why truth is important is a distinct question. If you don't even know what truth is, how can you possibly hope to answer your question? My question is the more fundamental and so it must be answered first.
Quoting Brett
No. There is an answer to the question, and I see no reason to think we cannot acquire it - indeed, I have provided you with it above.
How would you ever know that someone has given you the answer until or unless you consider the evidence they have provided in support of it?
You mustn't make yourself deaf.
Quoting Bartricks
Okay.
But what (or who) is Reason? Aren’t you basing all your ‘truth’ on an assumption that everyone knows this particular ‘truth’?
That's the next question. It is the question it is appropriate to ask if my answer to the "what is truth?" question - namely that 'truth' is the property of being a proposition whose contents Reason asserts to be the case - is true.
But we can agree that my answer is true, even if we subsequently disagree about who or what Reason is. So I hesitate to say who or what Reason is for fear that many will think my answer to that question will discredit my answer to the "what is truth?" question (which it doesn't).
Quoting Possibility
Not sure I follow. I am assuming that upon reflection all reasonable people will agree about the form the answer to the question must take. That is, it must take the form of a proposition that the faculties of reason of most of us seems to endorse.
And then I am assuming that reasonable people will agree that if we'd all agree that "theory X" is the true theory of truth if our faculties of reason represent Reason to be asserting its contents to be the case, then by default we should assume that truth itself is synonymous with that property.
For an analogy: if we'd all agree we have some congealed milk on our hands if we have cheese on our hands, then it is reasonable to have as one's working hypothesis that cheese is congealed milk.
No, you’re making an assumption that anyone who disagrees with your definition is not ‘reasonable’, and are therefore excluded from the discussion. You’re limiting the parameters of the discussion to manipulate the ‘truth’ your claim.
Quoting Bartricks
No, I cannot agree that your answer is true if I disagree on the meaning of your answer. That’s like handing over a signed blank cheque on the proviso that we can ‘discuss’ the sum later. Or expecting me to agree to the statement ‘the Bible is true’ before we discuss any further. I commend your honesty in acknowledging fear as your main reason for trying to corral the discussion. But I would argue that the truth of your answer, as it is structured, is entirely dependent on a shared meaning of ‘Reason’.
I don’t value ‘reason’ quite as highly as you do, by my estimates. This is evident by your willingness to exclude any and all aspects of ‘truth’ that cannot be explained by reason alone. So let me offer my answer to your question, and we’ll see if we can find a shared meaning of ‘truth’:
Truth is a shared meaning achieved without ignorance, isolation or exclusion of any kind.
Yes, if you disagree - and are reasonable - you will make a case against my claim, rather than simply point out that I have made it. You can't make any case for anything without having to make assumptions. A reasonable person does not object, then, to the mere fact an assumption has been made, but rather subjects the assumptions in question to reasoned scrutiny. Clearly by presenting my case here I am inviting people to do precisely that. Unfortunately reasonableness is also in short supply here, as the internet is populated largely by fools and dogmatists.
Quoting Possibility
No, you can try and prove me wrong. I haven't just pulled this stuff out of my bottom. So, once again, if it is clear to the reason of reflective people that theory X is the true theory of truth, then isn't that the best possible evidence that theory X is true? If you think not, explain to me what could possibly be better evidence.
Quoting Possibility
Eh? My fear is fear of the stupidity of some people - the stupid inferences that some people make - and a fear of derailment.
The question is what is truth. I have argued - argued, mark you - that truth is the property of being a proposition the content of which Reason asserts to be the case.
Now, you have asked "who or what is Reason?". That is a distinct question - one that does not bear on the credibility of my answer.
For instance, let's say I say - and I wouldn't, because it is mad - that Reason is a Platonic Form. Well, a case would need to be made for that - but if such a case could be made, that would not affect my theory of truth.
Another analogy: let's say that the best theory about what cheese is, is that it is congealed milk. Okay, well asking "what's milk?" is a legitimate question to ask, but it does not affect the credibility of the 'cheese is congealed milk' theory. And two people could coherently agree that cheese is congealed milk, yet disagree about what milk is (one thinking it is a basic substance, the other that it is made of tiny molecules, for instance).
Quoting Bartricks
Truth is correspondence between thought and/or belief and what's happened, is happening, and/or will happen.
Then you are not as reasonable as I am. I think our reason is our only guide to what's true. You, I suspect, like to put yourself in the mix as well and will only listen to reason if she seems to be saying things you already agree with.
Quoting Possibility
I have no idea what that means or why I should endorse it given that you have provided no argument whatsoever in support of it, whereas I have provided an argument - an argument you have ignored because it had assumptions (like, you know, every argument ever) - in support of mine.
Quoting creativesoul
That's the correspondence theory of truth and I've already addressed it in the OP. It isn't a theory of truth, but a theory about when a proposition is true (which is different).
Truth is one such thing, as is true belief, meaning, and Mt. Everest.
Yes, that's my point - my point. So, you can't reject my argument on the grounds that I am appealing to reason, then, can you? Or that reason is unreliable - for any evidence that Reason is unreliable will itself have to involve an appeal to reason, and thus place some trust in Reason.
Again, then, the first step in my simple argument involves no more than acknowledging this - acknowledging that we (reasonable people, that is) will only be fully satisfied that we have a true theory of truth on our hands if we are all sure Reason asserts it to be the case.
You seem to be confirming, not denying this now.
Quoting creativesoul
Question begging in this context. You shouldn't, in the context of a debate over what truth itself is, assert what truth is. You need to argue, rather than just blankly state.
Don't hold me to a standard of argument/justification that you yourself have yet to have met. It will not end well for you...
Truth is correspondence.
Are you denying that true belief exists prior to language?
Quoting creativesoul
Until you provide some kind of an argument, that's like saying "truth is green" or "truth is blossom".
Argue, don't assert.
Er, what? I'm talking about 'truth'. I have said nothing whatsoever about beliefs and language. Nothing.
Perhaps you ought start to think about them...
Answer?
Whatever answer I give, it has no bearing on the credibility of my answer to the question "what is truth?".
Focus.
Quoting Bartricks
I wouldn't be a nuthin with mah head all full 'o stuffins...
It seems that you do not recognize the existential connection between truth and belief.
If true belief is prior to language, then either so too is truth or true belief can exist without truth, which is nonsense.
That's worth objecting to it.
I am sure that works wonders on drunks in bars, but I know what those words mean and it's nonsense. Something can be true and no-one believe it, and someone can believe something and it not be true.
Quoting creativesoul
I am talking about 'truth', not beliefs. They don't depend on each other, contrary to what you've asserted, as a moment's reflection reveals. Once again, the fact a proposition is true does not entail that it is believed. And the fact a proposition is believed does not entail it is true.
How?
I have argued that what it is for a proposition to be true is for Reason to be asserting that its contents are the case. How can that possibly be satisfied by falsehood, given that what it is for a proposition to be false is for it not to be true?
Note too, I am not offering a criterion for truth, but saying something about what truth consists of.
It is one thing to say when a proposition is true, it is another to say what the truth of it consists of.
For example, saying that the sky is blue is one thing, saying what blueness itself is is another.
Not necessarily true conclusion. Just because someone does not value a quality in himself, does not mean that he has no high amounts of that quality. Your conclusion, Bartricks, is false.
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Quoting Bartricks
Bartricks, Creative soul did not say "You've been denying the that true belief exists prior to language". He, instead, ASKS you, if you do deny it now. You did not answer the question. Which is your perogative, but then again, you have no reason to be surprised or act superior or indignant.
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Quoting Bartricks
Actually, there is a relevance. Do we have a definition for god? For life? For love? No, we do not have objective definitions for these that are completely accepted by all. Yet we search for god (some of us), we search for life, even on different planets, and we search for love.
NO, it is not necessary to have a previously accepted or internalized definition of it which applies to all in all situations and conditions, if you want to search for a thing or an ideal or a concept.
This makes truth a subjective thing... you are asking if we believe a thing is the truth, is it really the truth?
And you answer this:
Quoting Bartricks
Please forgive me if I am wrong, and do correct me then, but you seem to be saying that we will be satisfied that the question has been answered when the question has been answered. You connect no truth values to whether the answer is true, or truly describes the truth.
You instead say that reasonable fellers will take a reasonable statement as truth. If the reasonable statement of truth is given as true, then reasonable fellers will take that answer as the description of truth. That is not necessarily the real truth, though. And you know it too.
— Bartricks[/b]
There is one problem with this: Reason alone is not a determinant of facts. And truth depends on facts. Truth is actually the complete correspondence between events, facts, and things, and their descriptions and conceptualiziations in our minds.
You say reason is enough to establish this. No, reason is not enough. You need senses that properly translate reality to images of reality in our minds that can be further manipulated by our minds. But this translation is not proven, will never be proven, to be foolproof. All translations can all be false (except for "Cogito ergo sum" et al.)
Hence your definition of truth is not reliable. You did not account for perceptions being possibly false, and perceptions can't be proven to be either way (false or true).
Truth is an expression of 'what is'.
By 'what is', I don't mean facts. I mean reality in its absolute unchangeable perspective or identity. That's because no matter how much 'things' (within reality) change, reality as an identity remains the same.
So far, I think the best way to express truth is to express the principles through which it manifests (this is based on the perspective that we, humans, and everything else, are a manifestation of reality - therefore, truth is expressed by the principles which operate through everything, despite the relativity, and which also enfold everything).
I believe we can extrapolate a few of such principles, for example, the principle of cause and effect, the principle of vibration (or energy) - in that, all is vibration (or energy), etc, etc.
I believe facts are just reports of events or situations we observe. Facts can change but the truth can't be anything else or any other way.
I think these principles need to be more inclusive than cause and effect or vibration in order to operate through and enfold ALL of reality despite relativity to space, time, value or meaning...
Some statements can be true; but they don't need empirical verification. They don't reflect the truth; they are merely true, such as 1=1.
Anything that is claimed to be the truth needs empirical verification; but that, in its metaphysical sense, is not available to man. Man does have perceptions, but they are not verified to reflect the actual reality.
Information of what the truth is can be gained only via the physical senses, but these senses are unreliable... or reliable. We can't tell the difference. We have no amount of certainty on how reliable our senses reflect reality.
In other words, humans are not in a position to tell whether their senses are giving them a reliable account of reality, or not.
Therefore truth exists, but man's ability to tell it is hindered by our senses which can't be verified to be reliable.
What if, as you say, someone asserts this proposition:
1. This statement is false.
Using your words, our Reason enables us to assert such proposition. ' When reason asserts that something is the case, it is the case.' In that case, is the proposition true or false?
I expect to be shredded for this
More inclusive... ? In what way? And, how are the principles of cause and effect, and vibration (energy) limited?
How about blending all of these various positions and look for truths that correspond to reality, are useful and cohere with whatever that needs cohering, IF that's possible.
Personally I prefer correspondence theory of truth because it's the most basic requirement for truths - that truths be about reality. This is probably reducing the philosophy of truth to a mere game of survival played out in jungles and savannahs but the hard fact is reality can be ignored only at great risk to oneself.
What about pragmatism and truth? There's merit in valuing utility. After all one side of the entire enterprise of truth-seeking is how to use truths for our benefit. It makes sense then to say truth is about utility, especially if other theories of truth can be faulted which is probably the case. However one sticking point I see is that truths no matter how useful can't stray too far away from reality i.e. correspondence theory of truth is a limiting factor to pragmatic truths. I don't know what notion of utility is being used in pragmatism but it seems that truths, seen as corresponding to reality, are the most useful. This makes pragmatic truth superfluous.
Similarly, coherence theory of truth lacks meaning by itself. It only states that a truth must fit another truth and so on until we've built a structure of beliefs that have no inconsistencies. Ok but what about the component truths themselves - atomic truths if you will. These building block truths seem to be, again, a matter of corresponding to reality.
Ultimately, in my humble opinion, all other theories of truth are founded on the correspondence theory of truth.
:joke:
Usefulness. The truth is useful. Falsehoods aren't.
What makes something useful? Isn't is a correspondence between what is and how the knowledge of what is is being applied? If your knowledge of what is is inaccurate, then you probably won't achieve what it is you meant to achieve.
Quoting creativesoul
Reason results in false conclusions when you don't have all the relevant information (reasons) to support some conclusion. With the right input, the process of reasoning produces the right output.
Quoting tim wood
I am typing and submitting a post. Does this sentence correspond to what has happened? Is it the truth?
Quoting 3017amen
Is it true that the statement is false?
This search for 'truth' as an abstract concept is illogical. Truth is only logical in relation to a question/problem. Truth is whatever 'solves' this problem or 'answers' that question.
Truth is only true when certain set rules are in play, whatever those rules may be. The overarching set of rules would be the rules of observation and the laws the universe operates by.
If the statement is true, then it is false; and if it is false, then it is true.
Quoting Bartricks
We're not too far apart here actually. I completely agree that something can be true and no-one believe it, and that someone can believe something and it not be true. I also agree that a proposition's being true does not entail that it is believed, and a proposition's being believed does not entail that it's true.
Our disagreement is the bit about interdependence between belief and truth.
In order for a proposition to be true, there must first be a proposition. Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Language... belief. Therefore... true propositions are existentially dependent upon belief.
True belief exists prior to language. So too does truth. Thus, truth cannot be what you say it is. Besides that, Reason - and following the rules of entailment in particular - can lead to falsehood. See Gettier or any of the historical examples of conventional false belief.
Reason is thinking about thought and belief. It's not an entity in and of itself capable of doing stuff. So, it would be helpful if you stopped personifying reason.
What would constitute being proof of that?
I could point to Tarski's T sentence. I could implore your agreement about cats and mats. I could tell you that something or other is the case, and you could go look for yourself. I could point you towards verification/falsification methodology.
It depends on what the quality is. For example, take the quality of self-approval. Well, clearly if someone does not value a quality in themselves that does entail that they do not have as much self-approval as someone who values everything about themselves.
To be reasonable essentially involves caring what Reason says and believing things precisely because she says to believe them (so, it matters not just what you believe, but how you believe it). As such someone who does not care that much about what Reason has to say on a given matter - someone who, for instance, will not believe something Reason says if it conflicts with something they care about more - is not as reasonable as someone who cares more about what Reason says. So it does follow and you're wrong.
But in the OP I provided an argument that appears to refute your view. For I provided an argument in support of the view that a proposition is true when Reason asserts its content to be the case. In order to defend your view, then, you need to show that what I said in support of my view either does not support my view, or that your view enjoys even stronger support.
The OP was started by me and you're free to ignore it. You are not experiencing oppression. And try to keep in check the oh so common desire to ban that which you cannot understand. And try - try - to stick to addressing the arguments. And when that goes badly - when you're refuted at every turn - don't take it personally. Here endeth the lesson.
What do you mean?
The conclusion of my case is not that truth is constituted by some assertion of ours, but rather of Reason. So, it is when Reason - not you or I - asserts the content of a proposition that the proposition in question has the property of truth.
As for that specific proposition - well, it'd be true if Reason asserted it. Needless to say, the possibility of such propositions generates apparent counterexamples to the law of non-contradiction.
But if my view is true then they don't, as Reason clearly asserts the law of non-contradiction to be true and does not assert "this statement is false". (Plus were she to assert "this statement is false" then the law of non-contradiction is false, which is now consistent with it also being true).
So are you saying that it is logically impossible for there to exist no true propositions?
I like it.
I would worry about equivocating between “true” and “the truth”. One is a description; the other is the nominalization of that description. One describes things (propositions), and the other is a thing.
I agree that in order for a proposition to be true, there has to be a proposition (for that is self-evident to my reason and to the reason of virtually everyone).
Then you claim that propositions depend on language. Well, I doubt that, but even if we grant it for the sake of argument the rest of what you say does not follow. How do you get from that to "truth exists prior to language"? If - if - propositions cannot exist without there being a language (not a claim I accept, I stress), then truth - as it is a property of propositions - cannot exist prior to language. So I do not see how you're arriving at these conclusions or what, about my position, you are challenging with them.
No, I don't see how anything I have said implies that. I think it is possible for there to be no true propositions.
If that's inconsistent with my view that truth is constituted by Reason's asssertions, then I'll change my view - but it seems entirely consistent with that view that it would be possible for there to be no true propositions, as it seems entirely possible for Reason to assert nothing.
Well the obvious question has to be, if there are no true propositions, then how does this forum exist?
Yes, I too worry about that and so made avoiding such equivocation a priority.
However, it seems to me that such equivocation is what proponents of other views engage in - especially those who defend correspondence theories.
I did not say there are no true propositions. Clearly there are. I said I think it is possible for there to be no true propositions. There's a world of difference between the claim that it is possible for there to be no true propositions and the claim that it is true that there are no true propositions.
Why would that be helpful? If my view about truth is true - that is, if truth is constituted by Reason's asssertions - then Reason must be a person, for only persons can assert things.
It seems to me that you've decided in advance - in advance of listening to what Reason has to say about the matter - that Reason is not a person.
Again, Reason must be a person if truth is constituted by Reason's assertions, for only persons can assert things.
But first you're talking about when someone believes a proposition is true, rather than about what the property of truth itself consists of. Second, to believe something is to believe it is true - so now we have truth, the concept we want elucidated, turning up in the analysis - that makes it circular and thus unhelpful. For an analogy, let's say the question is "what is water?' (as in, what does water consist of, rather than 'please identify some water for me'). Well, no good saying "people believe they have water when they believe that every source verifies it is water", for first that's not an answer to the question (which is about water itself, not about beliefs) and second it is circular as you've said "people believe they have water when they believe they have water" (true, but unhelpful).
Quoting khaled
Why? The question has been asked - not just by Pontius Pilate, but by many others including many contemporary philosophers, so the question is a prima facie coherent one. That doesn't mean it is coherent, but it does mean a case is owed for thinking it is not.
Plus I've addressed the question and proposed an answer - if the question makes no sense then you'd need to show that my answer to it makes no sense.
Ok got it. Are you saying then if there exists at least one true proposition, then, they must be logically necessary/ logical necessity?
Not sure I understand the question.
My analysis of truth, if correct, permits there to be no true propositions, for it is possible for Reason not to assert anything.
Clearly there are true propositions, which just shows that Reason does assert some things.
As it seems clear enough to my reason that whatever a person asserts, they are able not to assert - and as Reason must be a person in order to be able to assert anything - then I do not think any of Reason's assertions are asserted of necessity. That is, I do not believe any proposition has its truth of necessity. All true propositions are true contingently, not of necessity (including, of course, that one).
I do not yet see how inspecting it more closely throws any doubt on it. If truth is a performative of Reason, as I have argued, then it is easy to answer the question "how does Reason know", for knowledge involves having a true belief that has been acquired in a manner that Reason approves of - and so Reason knows what she knows because truth is in her gift as is justification. So, "how does Reason know" is akin to asking how I think what I think (answer: I think what I think by thinking it).
You're the one invoking proof. What does "prove, please" politely demand if not proof of something or other?
What are you asking me to prove and what does your criterion for proof demand of me? What standard must I meet?
"True" is what we call sentence tokens that bear repeating on their own terms, which is to say, without contextualising in the manner of "... is untrue because..." or "... would be the case if not for..." etc.
Such contexts are potential predators, and must be fought off and dominated.
So... you're compelled to hold that propositions do not depend upon language for their very existence. I'm compelled to hold that they are.
What's the argument and/or reasoning in support of your objection here?
I've one for how/why they are.
All propositions are existentially dependent upon language.
Language is existentially dependent upon belief.
Propositions are existentially dependent upon belief.
True propositions are kinds of propositions.
True propositions are existentially dependent upon belief.
Is the above a true statement? It seems like more of a meaningless contradiction, and is therefore false.
I can know facts without having asked a question or trying to solve problems.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Of course the truth is useful. But the truth being sought here seems to be eternally elusive, as if it’s not so much a search for truth as some sort of psychological drama that we indulge in. Having found this “truth” what then? Is it to decide if we’re right in what we think, or to know “all”, or to build the perfect world. What do we want from this “truth”?
How is this any different than saying that the universe is filled with information/facts that is the answer to some question?
Some bit of information in the universe is only relevant in specific contexts or to specific questions, but that doesnt mean that the information only exists when we ask those questions. We have to find the answers, not make them up.
On the basis of what would reason assert anything to be the case? Is it not possible that the bases could differ in different contexts?
A proposition is true when it is able to solve a problem or answer a question.
1.3 Pragmatist theories
A different perspective on truth was offered by the American pragmatists. As with the neo-classical correspondence and coherence theories, the pragmatist theories go with some typical slogans. For example, Peirce is usually understood as holding the view that:
Truth is the end of inquiry.
Yes, 'true' is an adjective, attribute or property; while 'truth' is a noun. But is there a salient difference between what is true and truth, or the truth?
I still do not follow or see on what basis you are rejecting my analysis. I have argued for the truth of a view that seems quite different to yours, and as such my arguments - if they go through - refute your position. Truth is not the name for some practice of ours - our practice of calling some sentences 'true', for clearly we could have that practice and some of the sentences we call true could be false. Truth is, as I have argued, the assertive activity of Reason: a proposition is true when Reason asserts it.
I am not sure what you're talking about - this thread is about truth and I have offered an argument in support of a distinctive analysis. But you're talking about propositions. And I do not see how anything you have said about propositions casts any doubt on what I have said about truth.
Quoting creativesoul
I'm not 'compelled' at all. I did not express a position on propositions, I simply showed how nothing you had said about them (dubious though I think it was) casts doubt on my view about truth.
To believe something is to think it true. Now it is that property - the property of truth - that I am trying to understand. So what beliefs do or do not depend on seems entirely beside the point.
So... I've misunderstood then.
What is truth a property of?
You did doubt a claim about the existential dependency of propositions. If it doesn't matter, so be it. I'm good with hearing the answer to the last question and taking it from there.
Quoting tim wood
I didnt ask a question about whether or not all facts are historical, yet you still provided that "fact". So is this evidence that facts exist independent of questions? Questions are a result of ignorance. If we weren't ignorant we wouldnt ask questions because we'd already have all the facts.
I haven't defined truth, rather I've provided an analysis of it. That is, I am trying to understand what truth is, in and of itself. Literally, what is it made of?
I have also argued for my view, not simply announced it. So yes, one can say what one wants about truth - one can say truth is the number 10, or truth is a giraffe. That is easy. But I have not done that, rather I have presented a case - a reasoned argument - for thinking that truth is a performative of Reason.
My view changes in your quote - my view is that truth is a performative of Reason, but in your quote it suddenly becomes a performative of 'my' reason. But 'my' reason (and 'your' reason) are faculties, not Reason itself. Just as there is what is seen and sight and the two are not the same.
You ask "how does it [Reason] know?" - but if this presents you with a puzzle it is only because you have rejected the analysis. There is no puzzle if the analysis is correct, for to know something is to have a justified true belief. What does that involve? Well, we know from the analysis - and note, you'd be begging the question if you reject it without argument - that truth is a performative of Reason. And we know too that to be justified in a belief is to have acquired it in a manner Reason approves of (for that is just what a justification is). Thus, again, there is no puzzle understanding how Reason knows this. Perhaps you could explain why you think there's a puzzle here, for I do not see one.
Again, I stress again that in your quote above you conflate my view with a quite different one. My view is that truth is a performative of Reason - so, when Reason says something is true, her saying it makes it so, for 'being true' just is to be asserted by Reason - not 'our faculties of reason'. When I talk about our reason I am referring not to Reason, but the faculty by means of which we are aware of Reason.
You didn't answer my question.
Statements are about facts. You making a statement is another fact for a different context.
Propositions.
But what I am interested in - what we are being asked when we are asked "what is truth?' is not what a proposition is, but what this property of truth is.
A proposition - whatever one of those is - is true when it is asserted by Reason. That is, the property of 'truth' and the property of 'being asserted by Reason' are one and the same. As long as we agree that propositions can be asserted, it does not really matter - for the sake of my analysis of truth - exactly what a proposition is.
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting Bartricks
:death:
If truth is a property of a proposition, and all propositions are existentially dependent upon language, then so too is all truth. That is what you obligate yourself to hold... on pains of incoherence, self-contradiction.
The problem is that that is not true.
Furthermore, if you cannot set out what a proposition is, then it does not belong in the lexicon.
Truth is a property of propositions.
That is not an analysis of truth. Nor is it an analysis of propositions.
For an analogy, "water is wet". That's not an analysis of water. Not is it an analysis of wetness.
Now, my view about truth - truth and not another thing - is that it is made of Reason's assertions. That is, for a proposition to be true, is for it to be being asserted by Reason.
That's not a theory about propositions. It is a theory about truth.
So, again, my theory is about truth, not propositions. In saying that truth is a property of propositions I am not thereby taking a stand on what propositions are, anymore than in saying that apples are spherical I am taking a stand on what shape is.
Do you believe that that statement is true?
Yes, if those dubious theses are true, then truth could not exist independently of a language.
So? How does that contradict my analysis of truth?
Again - I don't sign up to those claims (not until I see powerful evidence in support of them - which there may be, of course). I am just pointing out that none of them are inconsistent with my analysis of truth.
Yes, clearly. I am being sincere.
From the Pontius Pilate question, it is presented in the accepted Gospels as an observation upon the process of judgement Pilate is carrying out. Something like:
I make decisions all the time so how would this be different?
So, if one was to present an argument to a question that is largely rhetorical, how would one proceed?
I'm calling bullshit here.
I've shown how your criterion for what counts as "truth" can be satisfied by falsehood. Truth cannot be false. Therefore, your criterion is rejected.
I thought you were going to argue for true propositions having the property of truth. But, if you do not know what propositions are, then that's a bit too much to expect and/or ask of you...
Well, bullshit isn't a performative of creativesoul. It isn't bullshit, it is an analysis of truth that you simply do not understand. Not my fault.
Quoting creativesoul
I have already replied to this unargued for claim, and you have just blithely ignored what I said.
Tell you what, you tell me what the status of "this proposition is false" is (is it true, or false, or both?) and then we'll see if your answer - your answer - is consistent with my analysis of truth (pssst, it will be).
Quoting creativesoul
Er, yes, true propositions have the property of truth. Duh.
I do know what propositions are, but this thread is not about them. This thread is also not about sparrows, which is why I am not talking about sparrows. I know what a sparrow is, but this thread is not about them.
Bartricks: Truth is a performative of Reason
Creativesoul: Sparrows depend on worms, therefore truth depends on worms
Bartricks: eh? This thread is about truth, not sparrows
Creativesoul: Do you agree that the proposition "Sparrows depend on worms" is true?
Bartricks: Well, no - I don't think sparrows depend on worms. But even if they did, how would the truth of that proposition show that truth depends on worms?
Creativesoul: Because if the proposition "Sparrows depend on worms" is true, then truth depends on worms, because it is only if sparrows really do depend on worms that the proposition is true.
Bartricks: That doesn't follow at all. I am talking about what the property of truth is. The fact that the proposition "Sparrows depend on worms" is true - not a claim I have made, incidentally - does not show that truth itself depends on worms.
Creativesoul: do you agree that worms?
Bartricks: eh? that doesn't make sense.
Creativesoul: well, I'm calling bullshit on this - you clearly don't even know what a worm is.
If you believe that that's a true report of our exchange, then I've nothing further, it says all that need said about how well your notion of truth actually works in practice...
The Universe is not filled with facts. Facts are constructs of the mind. And they can only be considered 'Facts" if they contain 'truths. And 'truths' solve problems or answer questions.
Face value. What is that?
I think Pontius was trying to ask that question along with the others.
I mean taking it as a sincere question.
Quoting Valentinus
Doubt it, as he didn't stay to hear the answer.
But anyway, I am asking the question sincerely and I am offering an answer to it.
If she thinks something is the case, then it is the case. On what basis does she think things? Well, I am not sure. Surely some thoughts are just basic - they are not 'based' on anything else, they are just thought.
Well, because some of those theories are false and some are not competitors (because they're different kinds of theory).
For example, the correspondence theory of truth does not seem to be a theory of truth at all, but a theory about when a proposition is true. So it is not a rival view. It is a vacuous view about something else.
Everyone agrees that a proposition is true when it corresponds to reality. But what does it mean - are we any the wiser about what truth itself is? No, for it is really to say no more than that a proposition is true when it is true. It can't be denied, but it says nothing substantial.
As well as being uninformative, it doesn't even address the question. For the question is not "when is a proposition true?" but "what is truth?" My answer to that question is that truth is made of Reason's assertions. That is, what it is for a proposition to be true is for its content to be being asserted by Reason.
Why try and blend a theory with others when the theory in question appears to be true and rival views appear false or vacuous or to be theories about something else?
Quoting TheMadFool
This was addressed in the OP. A useful proposition can still be false, as is manifest to the reason of virtually everyone. So pragmatism is false.
I do not mean to question your sincerity. I was trying to take the Pilate reference seriously.
Now that you abandon it, I am not sure what it has to do with something.
He did ask that question, or did if the bible is accurate. And no doubt Jesus would have taken him seriously. But, as Francis Bacon put it "what is truth? asked jesting Pilate, but would not stay for an answer".
Anyway, as this is a philosophy forum and the question "what is truth?", like the questions "what is morality?" and "what is time?" is squarely philosophical, I am attempting to answer it.
The answer, it seems to me, is that truth is a performative of Reason. An answer likely to please Jesus, of course, as this would make Reason into God.
I have argued that truth is a performative of Reason. That is, when Reason asserts a proposition, that proposition is true. It is not that she confers truth on it, it is that being true and being asserted by Reason are one and the same.
My reason is a faculty. We can distinguish between sight and what is seen. Sight is a faculty. but we do not see sight. We see sensible objects. We see sensible objects with our sight.
My reason is a faculty just as my sight is. But my reason does not acquaint me with sensible objects - not directly, anyway - but with what Reason commands, values, and asserts. Not infallibly, of course - no more than my sight infallibly acquaints me with the sensible. The important point, however, is that though my reason acquaints me with what Reason asserts, my reason does not assert anything.
Another analogy: I give you a note on which is written "shut the window!" I am clearly telling you to shut the window. But the note isn't telling you to do anything. I am, via the note. Likewise, my reason tells me what Reason wants me to do, and to believe, and what Reason herself asserts. But my reason itself doesn't want me to do or believe anything, nor does it assert anything.
So, there is Reason - the asserter, the commander, the valuer - and then there is our faculty of reason (the means by which we gain some acquaintance with what Reason asserts, commands, values).
there's a world of difference between the two and it is a category error to confuse Reason with our reason.
Anyway, truth is what Reason - that which my reason gives me fallible insight into - asserts.
My faculty, being a faculty, does not 'assert' anything. That's like thinking my sight sees. My faculty of reason asserts nothing. Nor does yours.
Reason does assert things.
Reason, being assertive, must be a person, for only persons can make assertions.
Note, this is something that can be validly concluded from this analysis of truth.
Now you have said that my argument is build on sand. I see no justification for that claim. My argument appears to me to be very strong.
For surely it is a good idea to ask the question "when would we be satisfied that we have the true theory of truth on our hands?"?
And what is the answer to that question? Well, that we - we who are using reason to find out what's true - will be satisfied when it is clear to us all that Reason asserts the theory in question to be true.
Well, if that's what it would take for us to be satisfied that we have the true theory of truth on our hands, then it stands to Reason that this should be our working hypothesis about what truth itself is.
So, absent some good reason to think otherwise, our working hypothesis should be that truth is a performative of Reason. What it is for a proposition to be true, is for Reason to be asserting it.
Now, that's not a weak argument. If you think it is, highlight the weak step and show me the firmer ground to step on.
What makes you think I haven't?
I was careful to say that knowledge involves - involves - having a justified true belief. That's not the same as saying that those elements are sufficient for knowledge.
If you don't know why "she" thinks things are the case, then how do you know that "her" thinking them to be the case makes them true? Also, if reason alone can determine truth, and we are reasonable beings, then we should be able to know what is true and what not; otherwise what use is reason to us on your understanding?
Dialetheism is the position that some statements are both true and false, i.e. that some contradictory propositions express what is termed “true contradictions”. I hold disregard for dialetheism, but the point is that it uses reason to make and substantiate this assertion. Dialetheism stands in contradiction to the law of noncontradiction (the LNC), which also uses reason to make and substantiate its assertion.
If truth is that which Reason asserts, given that reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC, would both dialetheism and LNC be true?
If they’re not both true, wouldn’t this evidence that truth is not a product of what reasoning asserts? Reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC but, here, they’re not both true – hence one given which reason asserts is here necessarily false.
Alternatively, if they are both true, then how does this not negate the LNC in favor of dialetheism and, in the process, evidence that truth is not a product of what reasoning asserts? Reason can assert the LNC but, if both dialetheism and the LNC are true, the LNC would necessarily be false as entailed by the true contradiction of both being true – thereby again making something which reason asserts false.
You say that truths are different to truth. The former I interpret as facts of the world while the latter is a property of propositions and you claim that the correspondence theory of truth fails because you think it's about propositions rather than the world.
Well, consider what we mean by truths. If there is an actual difference between truths and true propositions we should be able to get our hands on a truth that isn't a proposition. Can we do that? No. This implies that truths are nothing more than true propositions and the truth of a proposition is best evaluated by assessing how a given proposition corresponds in meaning with the real world.
The correspondence theory of truth of propositions lets us know truths
The principles of cause and effect and vibration refer to a reality that is four-dimensional: relative to time and space. But what is real or true is not necessarily bound by time, or by cause and effect. Potential energy, for instance, is not an ‘effect’ and has no ‘cause’ - and yet we understand it to be real/true. It is a truth that exists in relation to value and meaning, but has no defined temporal or spatial aspect. The principle of cause and effect does not apply to potential energy, and neither does the principle of vibration.
Well, you’d suspect wrong.
Reasoning is the act of structuring and restructuring the mind for the purpose of integrating new information to minimise instances of prediction error.
Reason, on the other hand, is a limited structuring of that mind based on a system of logical significance and language. As such, it is reason who only listens to things she already agrees with. Reason has her perspective of what is true - it’s a limited perspective, but she’s not aware of this - and she ignores and excludes new information that cannot be reduced to logical argument.
So for Reason, truth is subject to logic. If you put all your faith in Reason, then you could very well be as narrow-minded and ignorant of reality and truth as someone who puts all their faith in God - just in a different way.
Quoting Bartricks
This is because everything has to be reduced to logic and the language of argument before Reason (and therefore you) will recognise it. If I reduce it to logical argument, then it can only be argued as a truth subject to logic. And my argument is that we cannot be certain that it’s true under these conditions.
I’ll try to clarify and extend:
Truth is a shared meaning achieved without ignorance, isolation or exclusion of any information (perhaps that’s a little clearer?). It exists regardless of relativity to logic or value, and regardless of time or space.
A lie can be useful, too.
Truth can be reduced to an object, in much the same way as a table can be reduced to three lines on a page. But are they the same thing?
Not without contradicting other sentences we call true.
Firstly, as you have already accepted, "potential *energy*" is energy. Secondly, it is only potential with respect to the work it is directed towards. And, in that work, cause and effect cannot and will not be avoided. So, to me, the principles of cause and effect and energy/vibration are all-inclusive no matter the perspective or paradigm of reality one takes into consideration.
True. Do it all the time.
He won't see it though.
I'll waste time elsewhere. The rest of you have fun.
As should be apparent, I fully agree. A tricky philosophical question that ensues: To what does reasoning’s premises (first principles at least) correspond to?
As for me, since I have idealistic leanings, these correspond to universally applicable aspects of awareness – regardless of its type or degree – such that awareness per se is presumed a metaphysically real given (rather than a physically real given). Quite the mouthful, I know, but here truth as correspondence to that which is real is maintained.
I’m curious to discover alternative understandings regarding what reality the first principles of reasoning would correlate to.
As an example, one could make the case that Aristotle's laws of thought pertain to the physical wold and we gain knowledge of them via empirical observation - such that their truth is a correspondence to physical reality. The problem I find in this is that it places the cart before the horse: we as aware beings require the laws of thought aprioristically in order to engage in empirical observations - at the very least, the law of identity - and, moreover, aprioristically require these same laws of thought so as to hold the capacity of obtaining generalities (in this case, reasoning's premises) from observed particulars.
Edit: Just realized I might have misinterpreted what you meant by "reasoning's premises". You many have been strictly addressing formal reasoning which, as such, requires premises from which to infer things. If so, please interpret my usage of "reasoning's premises" as strictly specifying the laws of thought which we premise to be required for correct reasoning to obtain.
Because of the argument I gave in the OP. You don't have to know why the burglar burgled your home in order to be able reliably to know 'that' the burglar burgled your home, or be able to explain why the serial killer did that to his victims before we are justified in believing that he did that to his victims, and so on.
The argument given in the OP allows us reasonably to conclude that our working hypothesis should be that truth is constituted by Reason's assertions. We do not need to know why she asserts what she asserts for that to be correct.
Quoting Janus
You are equivocating between 'reason' (lower case r), which refers to our faculty of reason, and 'Reason' (upper case r) which refers to the being whose attitudes our reason gives us insight into. That's akin to confusing your sight with that which is seen.
It is Reason who determines what is true - constitutively determines it, because 'to be true' just is to be being asserted by Reason - and our faculties of reason give us insight into what Reason asserts.
This analogy fails because you know why the burglar burgled your home: it was in order to steal things. We don't have access to "capital 'R' Reason", we only have access to our own reasoning.
No, absolutely not. If the argument of the OP goes through - and so far no one has challenged either its validity of the truth of its assumptions - then truth is constituted by Reason's assertions.
How could a set of tools assert anything? Again, it seems to me that you are continuing to conflate a faculty with 'that which the faculty gives us an awareness of'. Sight allows us to see things. But sight and the things seen with sight are distinct.
Likewise, our reason - lower case r - is a faculty. It gives us an awareness of aspects of Reason, upper case r. Now, that isn't in dispute - these are conceptual truths. Our reason is a faculty, but Reason is the asserter, bidder, commander. Reason and 'reason' are distinct, just as sight and 'the things seen' are distinct.
Reason, as we know from the argument in the OP, asserts things. For it is her assertions that constitute truth, and some things are true.
A faculty cannot assert anything. Our reason itself gives us insight into this - our reason (the faculty) let's us know that Reason says that faculties do not assert things. To put it another way, it appears to be a self-evident truth that only persons - minds - can assert things. That's not something one sees, or smells, or tastes, or hears. It is something we know via our reason, and so it appears, then, to be something Reason herself tells us is the case.
Now, it follows from this that Reason is a mind, a person. For Reason asserts things - and those assertions constitute truth - and among the things that Reason asserts, it would seem, is that minds and minds alone assert things.
So no, faculties do not assert things. And Reason is not a set of faculties, not a set of tools, but a mind.
Quoting tim wood
No, before setting it aside describe it - what circularity?
No it doesn't, you're just not getting the point. I don't have to know why someone did something before I can know that they did it.
That's so obviously true it hurts. Do you know how the internet works? I don't. I haven't the faintest idea how the words I am typing on my keyboard are getting to you. But I know - or can reasonably believe - that they are.
Again: you don't have to know why something is happening before you can know that it is happening.
Do you know why you're here, for instance? I mean, do you know the meaning of your life? I bet you don't. Yet you know that you're living a life, yes?
Gibberish.
You agree with gibberish? What do you agree with?
The correspondence theory of truth is not a substantial theory of truth. It is true - no one disputes that it is true - but it is true because it is trivial. It says "a proposition is true when it corresponds to the facts", yes?
Now, no one disputes that. But first, that tells us 'when' a proposition is true, which is distinct from telling us what truth itself is.
If I ask "what is water?" and you say "the stuff that comes out of water pipes" then what you've said is true, but not a substantial answer to my question, which was not a request to locate some water or tell me something about where it comes from, but a question about what it is made of.
Likewise then, to ask "what is truth?" is to ask about what truth is made of. To say that proposition have this property of truth when they correspond to the facts is not an answer to that question, anymore than 'water comes from water pipes' is an answer to 'what is water?'
So, first point - the correspondence theory of truth is not, despite its name, a theory of truth. It is a theory about when propositions are true, it is not a theory about truth itself.
Second, what's a fact if not something that's true? It's a misguided and empty theory. But it does allow those who lack insight to talk a lot of gibberish, which given that's all they're capable of it, they're not going to give it up.
When it comes to "Reason" valuing certain things, if you knew that "Reason" valued those things, then you would know why it values them. This is because you could have no way of knowing (if indeed you could know) that "Reason" values certain things, other than by using your own reason, and since reason operates in terms of reasons, you would have to know the reasons that "Reason" values those things in order that it does indeed value them. If you think there could be an alternative way to know what Reason values then by all means...
Eh? Let's just recap - in the OP I provided an argument in support of a particular analysis of truth. An argument is an appeal to reason - what I am doing in arguing something is trying to show that Reason endorses the conclusion. That's just what arguing is. Someone who doesn't try to show that a given view is supported by Reason is not arguing - they're just asserting. They may disguise this in various ways, but if they're not appealing to Reason, they're not arguing.
So, I made an argument. I didn't say "this is true because I say so" I said "these claims appear self-evident to our reason, and they imply this theory of truth".
What you said is that you don't care as much as I do about what Reason says. In effect, then, what you are doing is giving yourself an out - you want to be permitted to just ignore Reason when it is convenient to do so.
And yes, be my guest - do that. But know that you're not doing philosophy when you do that. You're just indulging yourself. And apart from by pure fluke, you are not going to get closer to understanding anything about the world to the extent that you do that. You're just going to be listening to yourself, rather than looking for evidence.
Again, then, I have made an argument - I have tried to listen to Reason and report what she appears to say. You, though, have said simply that you do not care as much as I do what Reason may or may not be saying. Okay, that's your prerogative, But that's no different to a detective saying "look, here's some evidence that Jack did the crime" and you responding "well, I don't care as much as you do about what the evidence indicates". Fine - but then you're not a detective, or at least you're not a very good one.
That simply doesn't follow. I can know that Sarah values X without knowing why she values X. And I can know that Sarah values X on the basis of Sarah's testimony (she told me she values X) without thereby knowing why she values X (she didn't tell me why).
So, you know, you're wrong.
Another poor analogy! Sarah is a person who can tell you or show you through her actions what she values. How do know what this fictitious "Reason" of yours values, and how do you know it?
Via my faculty of reason and by comparing what my faculty says to what the faculty of reason of others reports Reason as valuing.
For example, I seem to remember Sarah saying that she values X. Others who also know Sarah confirm that they too seem to remember Sarah saying that she values X. On that basis I conclude that Sarah values X. But none of us have a clue why she values X, because none of us can remember if or what she said about that.
Again, then, we have a 'faculty' of reason which acquaints us - more or less reliably - with what Reason asserts.
We do not have to be able to know why Reason asserts what she asserts before we can know that she asserts what she asserts.
All you know there is what others value, whether reasonably or not. People usually have reasons for valuing what they do, and if you ask them they will tell you. If they can't tell why they value something then you might conclude that they don't really value it at all, but are merely paying lip service; just blindly following along without thinking about it.
In any case even assuming that most people value certain things doesn't tell you that there is a being "Reason" that values those things; it just tells you that most people have reason to value them, and those reasons may not even be the same. That said, I think it is likely that there are reasons in common for valuing certain things, reasons we all share just by virtue of being the kinds of beings we are.
Quoting javra
I do not know what you mean by LNC. But if - if - Reason asserts that a proposition such as "this proposition is false" is true, then dialetheism will be true.
There is debate over whether it is true, and so we can take from the fact of such a debate that it is not entirely clear what Reason asserts in this respect. I do not see a problem, then, as whichever view turns out to be true, the truth of it will consist of its being asserted by Reason.
the way I see it, dialetheism is a first order theory, not a second order theory. That is, it is not a theory about what truth itself is, but about what the property of truth can attach itself to. As such it is not a rival view to mine, but a theory about something different. That is, it is a theory about how truth behaves, rather than about what truth is.
Of course, a theory about what truth is has to be consistent with how truth behaves. But note that my theory is consistent with dialetheism and consistent with its negation - and so the credibility of my view is not held hostage to how the debate over the credibility of dialetheism pans out.
You're just not getting the point. The point, once more, is that we can know 'that' something is the case without having to know 'why' it is the case.
We can know that truth is what Reason asserts, without knowing why she asserts what she asserts.
You're conflating the empirical context in which we can of course know that something is the case without knowing why with the rational context in which we cannot. In other words it isn't possible in the context of logical thought which is the basis of reason to know what is the case without knowing why it is the case, even if that merely means knowing that something is self-evident. In order to know that something follows logically or rationally you have to know why.
Gibberish
Just carefully go through Bartramp's comments and pick out from a slew of self-contradiction. Stop wasting your time my friend.
Unless I misunderstood creativesoul's remark, I agree that reasoning is subject to laws of thought and that these are presupposed true in the very use of reasoning - such that their truth can only be a priori to any use of reasoning, including any assertion thereby obtained. Hence, that truth and reasoning are two different things. This in a way touches upon my first post on this thread which you've not yet replied to.
Quoting Bartricks
This is only a particular instantiation of, "a proposition's correspondence to that which is real", and I take the latter to sum up the correspondence theory of truth. I in my own way agree that the correspondence theory of truth is insufficient, but I do take it to be a necessary aspect of any theory of truth that addresses propositions. (When I say it's insufficient, it for example does not easily explain "the arrows aim was true" or "a true friend" and like semantics of the same term, so to me there's something more general involved.)
But you disagree that it is a theory of truth at all. True is an adjective whereas truth is a noun form of this same adjective. To me truth is not a sharply different semantics from true but, instead, addresses what all instantiations of true hold in common as their property.
I get we don't agree on what truth is. But I'd ask you to reply to my previous post as pertains to the validity of your own theory. For ease, I'll re-post it here:
Quoting javra
(As to its last paragraph, I get the incomprehensibility of the LNC being false if it were to be true in conjunction with dialetheims - but this is what contradictions are, incomprehensible. Nevertheless, since the LNC stipulates that no contradictions can occur, were any contradictions to be deemed correct, the LNC would be false - and dialetheism contradicts with the LNC.)
Flagrantly question begging. Reason constitutively determines what's true - that's what my argument appeared to demonstrate. Now, if you think otherwise engage with that argument - challenge either its validity or one of its assumptions. Don't just state a different view, as if evidence counts for nothing.
Sadly, "Reason" seems not to be shining her light on you, despite your pitiful obsequy. But--you know--call me "Hugh" again--it might make you feel better to think that I have a huge anus, because then you can imagine rendering me butt hurt with tricks you can perform with your (even huger) bar . :joke:
There are many things that we know are the case without knowing why it's the case. We know for example that quantum entanglement is a fact (it is the case that quantum entanglement occurs), but we don't know the whys of quantum entanglement. I can also know that so-and-so murdered Mary, but not know why so-and-so murdered Mary. In some cases we know why, but in other cases we don't. Just because we have good evidence or good reasons (logic) to support a conclusion that doesn't mean we know for example the causes behind the conclusion, or even all the reasons behind the conclusion.
Well at least it provides some sardonic amusement on those lonely mornings of little intellectual stimulation.
You need to read more carefully and see that I have already acknowledged that we can empirically know that something is the case without knowing why it is the case.
I don't think it's helpful to talk about "causes behind conclusions". Conclusions are accepted on account of reasons, not causes, and we may not "know all the reasons" for a conclusion (whatever that might mean) but we need to know at least one if it is to be counted as a reasoned conclusion.
Reason doesn't assert. Such talk is nonsense.
There is also no such thing as "the property of being a proposition"...
More nonsense.
That's the gist of this thread.
Read the OP for yourself, my old friend... it's impossible to be taken seriously. The abuse of language is self-evident.
Dialetheism is the theory that there can be true contradictions.
That's not a theory about truth, but a theory about what can be true.
It is consistent with my theory.
For an analogy: utilitarianism is a first-order theory of ethics. It is a theory about what kinds of acts possess the property of rightness (namely, acts that maximise happiness).
Divine command theory, by contrast, is a second-order theory of ethics. It is a theory about what rightness is (namely, that rightness is one and the same as being an act that is commanded by a god).
The two are not rivals, though if the first theory is true then the second would need to be consistent with its truth (as it is).
If one asks "what is right?" one could be asking either the first order question "which acts possess rightness?" or the second order question "what does rightness consist of?"
These are not at all the same question.
Likewise, if one asks "what is true?" one could be asking either the first order question "which propositions are the true ones?" or one could be asking "what is truth itself?".
These are not at all the same question.
Dialetheism is a first-order theory - it is the theory that among the propositions that are true, are contradictions.
My theory - that truth is made of Reason's assertions - is a second order theory.
They're not competitor theories - they're not answering the same question.
As for the correspondence theory - like I say, it is either not a second order theory (and so not a rival view), or it is a second order theory but one that lacks any content and so is vacuously true (and also entirely consistent with my substantial second order theory).
Um, OK. I was hoping you'd provide something I could reply to, though.
Argument? Oh, I forgot, you're one of those - you know, virtually everyone here - who thinks that if they say something, it is so. No need to argue. No need to engage with any argument another has presented. Just say it - just express yourself. It's all about self-expression - just be yourself, you can't possibly be wrong.
Now, Reason does assert things because some propositions are true and as the argument in the OP shows, for a proposition to be true is for Reason to be asserting it. Q.E.D.
You're out of your depth. Not my fault you can't think of anything to say. Go down the shallow end.
No, there's an argument in the OP. Read it. Not my fault you don't know an argument from your elbow. You just need more edumacation, that's all. Get some, come back. Read the OP. Then address the argument rather than just saying things.
Quoting Bartricks
Your typical response to almost everyone.
What exquisite irony! You are either lying to yourself or you know that you are not at all interested in reasoned argument and are lying to everyone else.
Yes, because this:
Quoting Bartricks
is true. So it is an appropriate response to almost everyone.
I don't respond that way to those who actually engage with the argument. Only those who don't bother and just blurt things out of their face fronts.
Fact is, I've read a few of your threads and I can recall no exchanges where you didn't at least end up responding to your interlocutor in this typical way. And it always seems to happen when you apparently can't think of any counterargument.
I think you need to get some self-knowledge happening, little man.
That’s a lot of IFs. Personally, I don’t define the universe as everything humans are capable of comprehending, so I won’t follow you down that rabbit hole.
You, guy, are more than correct in this. When someone does not know what is meant by the law of noncontradiction but considers dialetheism to be consistent with his theory ... I at that point am out of my depth.
Shallow sounds about right right now.
What you’re doing here is reducing potential energy to energy and energy to vibration, by stating that it is “only potential with respect to the work it is directed towards”. This is a common move for physicists/physicalists (not assuming either), where the ‘potential’ or ‘potentiality’ is only considered relative to the actual, rather than the other way around. This error of correlation (in my opinion) is why quantum mechanics is so difficult for many to understand outside of the calculations.
You need for me to give you good reason for believing that Reason is not the sort of thing that is capable of making assertions? Really?
Imagination doesn't make assertions either. Thought and belief do not make assertions either.
Language users are the kind of things capable of making assertions.
Assertions are assertions of thought and belief. Reason is not the sort of thing that has thought and belief or asserts it. Rather, it is always the case that some thought and belief is considered reasonable and some thought and belief is not.
Quoting Bartricks
Allow me to hold the mirror....
Er, yeah - this is a philosophy thread. I made an argument. Either locate a fallacy, or dispute a premise. Now, we both know you can't do that. But yes, that is what I want you to do - and it is what you need to do if you're to qualify as addressing the OP.
Quoting creativesoul
Argument? Where is your argument for this claim - it contradicts the conclusion of my argument, so I've refuted your position until or unless you show there to be something faulty in my argument. Refute my argument without assuming you already know what kind of a thing Reason is - you know, refute me without begging the question.
I. Think. You. Can't. Do. That.
No. You have not. Such evidence could be easily produced and/or reproduced here and now. Show it.
That is precisely the belief that you're working from.
There are true contradictions.
Thus, you shrug off the LNC, on pains of coherence.
According to your definition of philosophy, which is necessarily limited by your unshakeable faith in Reason.
You're granting too much... even here. The 'ole chap is not even using the term "Reason" in accordance with it's original usage.
You're not very good with the spatiotemporal aspects of your own worldview are you?
Both of those endeavors are existentially dependent upon having an argument with premisses clearly demarcated. Otherwise, I'm shooting blind-folded.
Gotta argument?
Let's go though it, shall we - baby steps.
The question is "what is truth?"
Because no-one currently seems to know - there are several theories, but none enjoys universal support among those who are clever enough to be paid to think about such matters - it is worthwhile stepping back a mo and asking a slightly different question: when would all of those clever enough to be paid to think about such things be happy with an answer? They're not currently, but when would they be?
Well, surely they would all be happy with an answer when it is clear to the reason of all of them that the answer is endorsed by Reason - that is, when their reason represents the answer to be true.
Now, that's one of my 'assumptions'. Challenge it if you like. I think you won't succeed, but by all means try.
If - if - that assumption is correct (and I cannot conceive how it could not be, for it is true for any answer to any philosophical question) - then it is reasonable to have as one's working hypothesis that truth itself just is the property of being a proposition that Reason asserts.
Gibberish.
You think worldviews are located in space and time? So, er, they have shapes do they? Does my worldview have a shape? Is that what you think? Are you literally in a straightjacket typing with your nose?
Gibberish.
Yes.
What are the sorts of things that we say are capable of making an assertion?
Reason does assert things! "If a proposition is true, do not also believe it is false" - that's an assertion.
It isn't true because I assert it, or you, or because it is written by someone in a book. It is true because Reason asserts it.
So, premise 1: Reason makes assertions
Premise 2: Minds and only minds make assertions
Conclusion: therefore Reason is a mind
Which premise is false? And provide evidence, don't just blurt.
Wow, you can talk. ‘Truth is an appeal to Reason because I reject anything that is not an appeal to Reason. Therefore, truth can ONLY be an appeal to Reason.’
Is it reasonable for you to consider, just for a moment, the possibility that there might be more to reality than what appeals to Reason - the possibility that your perspective of reality might be limited in some way? That is, before you summarily dismiss that thought on account of it failing to appeal to Reason, of course...
There are a plurality of assumptions within the above quote. Despite that, you assert the following...
Quoting Bartricks
That is gibberish.
What non-humans experience and observe.
You made the assertion. You are not Reason.
I’m a generous person...
Both the primary and the secondary premiss is false. The conclusion is rendered irrelevant.
Address the argument I gave. You're not humble if, when confronted with overwhelming evidence that a proposition is true, you continue to take seriously that it is false.
That's what religious people are like. You show them that the evidence indicates their god does not exist. They then pretend they're the reasonable ones if they continue to take seriously that the god does exist.
No, they're not being reasonable - they're just ignoring evidence.
Now, perhaps their god does exist - perhaps there's excellent evidence their god exists.
the point, though, is that a reasonable person does not ignore evidence and keep playing the 'but let's be reasonable and accept the possibility the view is false" card. That ain't being reasonable, sonny boy, not when evidence has been given that it is true. It's just a pathetic attempt to avoid having to accept a belief you may not like.
Now, engage with that evidence - that is, try and refute my argument.
I've not.
Thus...
Let me explain how that works. Clearly one cannot win a game of chess by whizzing on the board. That's not a legitimate move. It's not a bad move, it isn't a move at all - that's how bad it is.
What I am suggesting is that your response to my argument is analogous to whizzing on a chess board. That is, your response to my careful opening gambit has been to shower the board with urine.
Any and all arguments appeal to apparent assertions of Reason. So it cannot coherently be denied that Reason makes assertions.
I have argued that truth itself is constituted by Reason's assertions, for any thesis that there is more, or something different to truth than this will itself have to appeal to Reason's assertions. And so there is really nothing more that can be said in favour of a view about truth, than that it appears to be being asserted by Reason - in which case it is reasonable to suppose that truth itself is one and the same as that property.
Your response? "Whizzzzz"
I’m not ignoring the evidence - you only think I’m ignoring it, because I’m not giving it the same weight as you are. My subjective experience (which you reject as well as your own because it fails to appeal to your perspective of Reason) gives me sufficient reason to doubt that either of us have enough information to confidently assert the truth about ‘truth’ itself. My response to this awareness is to propose that we consider what is beyond reason in our understanding of truth. Your response is to exclude it or isolate it from any consideration of what truth is - thereby reducing truth to your limited perspective of Reason.
Looks like an accounting malpractice to me... from what propositions are... through what an argument is... through what sorts of things are capable of making assertions... and all the way into the quality of my objections and/or your purported 'arguments'.
Quoting creativesoul
They're not purported arguments. They 'are' arguments. The truth of that claim doesn't depend on your comprehension skills (thankfully).
Again, if the most we can ever say in support of any view about anything - including any view about what truth is - is that it appears to be being asserted by Reason, then truth itself is reasonably considered to be that property (the property of 'being asserted by Reason').
You have said precisely nothing in objection to that view. Note: objecting to a view, or to the holder of it, does not an objection make.
Not very good at that are you?
Assertions are made with language use. Reason is not the sort of thing capable of using language. Reason cannot make assertions.
Then we better find a better way to talk...
Reason is thinking about thought and belief.
You're not even addressing it. Have I committed a fallacy? No. But by all means correct me on that and point one out.
Have I made a false assumption? No. I have assumed this: I have assumed that all reasonable people will agree that they have acquired the true theory of truth when it is clear to the reason of all of them that the theory in question is asserted by Reason. Is that assumption false? Well, you've said precisely nothing - nothing - to challenge it. You don't seem even to be aware of it. But it is true, is it not? I mean, what more could a reasonable person want before they will be assured of the truth of a thesis?
I have also assumed this: that if all reasonable people will be satisfied that they have acquired the true theory of truth when and only when it seems clear to them all that Reason asserts it to be true, then - other things being equal - it is reasonable to suppose that this is what truth itself consists of. That is, that truth itself is composed of Reason's assertions, given that this and this alone is what assures us we have it.
Have you said anything at all to challenge that assumption? No.
Now, if you consider that an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises does not constitute good - I mean, the best - evidence that a thesis is true, then what else do you consider relevant? I'm intrigued. Does it, perhaps, also have to be a theory that your gran approves of? Does it also have to be a theory that, when described to your cat, produces a meow? I mean, what the hell else carries weight, in your view?!
Another accounting malpractice...
You're attributing the capability of making assertions to that which does not have what it takes. You're assuming that Reason makes assertions. That is false, by definition. We make assertions. Language users make assertions. All assertions are made in language.
Reason is not the sort of thing that uses language as a means to make assertions.
We are.
More of the same meaningless incoherent nonsense.
Zip.
Quoting creativesoul
Whiz.
Cakes are made with ovens. Cakes are not ovens, though.
I use language to make assertions. But language asserts nothing. I make the assertion, not the language.
Again, for the point is subtle and you're not a subtle thinker. I use language to make an assertion. But I - I - am the maker of the assertion, language asserts nothing.
I use my sight to see things. But my sight sees nothing. I see by using my sight. But my sight sees nothing.
I learn by reading books. But books learn nothing. And on and on.
Now, do up your flies, put the pieces back on the board and start recognising these things.
Whiz
Not at all.
Quoting Bartricks
Self-approval is not a quality. It is a noun. Adjectives describe quality.
Quoting Bartricks
You realize that this second quote by you is bad fantasy, gibberish, nonsense.
Aside from your non-sequitur nonsense, you should know that Reason is not a female person. It is not a person. The reason you use female gender for reason is that in German the word "Vernunft", which is the German word for reason, is of feminine gender. It is also capitalized in German, as all nouns are capitalized in German. You simply copied and pasted some passages from the English translation of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" too many times, and it mesmerized you to believe that the proper use of reason in English is to capitalize it and use it as a feminine-gender noun.
You are precisely as ridiculous as the translators of the works of Immanuel Kant, who translate by the letter, literally. If you read the instructions in the immanual for translators of Immanuel, then you must realize that the text of Immanuel is gibberish etc etc etc
Assertions require a language user, something to talk about, and assertions about that something.
Reason is not a language user. Reason does not have what it takes to make assertions.
Well, if you really need me to reduce my level of reasoning to yours...how about we start with the ‘no true Scotsman’ fallacy? There are a number of reasonable posters here who object (and have made reasonable objections) to your assumptions. Appealing to Reason as you see it is not the same as being reasonable. So are you the only one here who is being ‘truly’ reasonable?
Yes. It. Does. See earlier example.
Quoting god must be atheist
Irrelevant, but glad English course well going
Quoting god must be atheist
Hmm. I spoke too soon.
Quoting god must be atheist
Ah, well, you got me bang to rights there. Reason ist not eine lady, but ist eine pig-dog.
I validly concluded that Reason, being an asserter of things, must be a person, a person I refer to as 'she' because that's how she's been traditionally referred to (not just by Germans) and because calling her 'him' might make people identify her with the god of an extant religion.
But meh.
What is the 'no true Scotsman fallacy' and how have I committed it. Remember, I'm a dumbo so I not be understanding this stuff.
Explain.
Quoting Possibility
No, that's false. Name one. There hasn't been a single good objection yet. Not one. And I haven't encountered anyone reasonable who's objected to my view.
But do correct me. Identify a reasonable objector and then explain to me how their objection is reasonable - that is, how it either identifies a fallacy in my reasoning or raises a reasonable doubt about the truth of one of my assumptions.
All asserters of things are Reason... it would follow... not a person. All people who assert.
Eh? What are you on about?
Pointing out the problem in that argument.
Reason, being an asserter of things, must be everyone who asserts.
It makes no sense to pick out an individual, which is what you've done on multiple occasions. Reason, being an asserter of things, need not be a single asserter. Rather Reason must be all that assert(everyone who asserts).
Here is the relevant argument:
premise 1: Reason makes assertions
premise 2. Persons and only persons make assertions
Conclusion: therefore Reason is a person.
Now, which premise are you taking issue with?
Now we've gotten somewhere. The conclusion does not follow.
Therefore Reason is persons and only persons...
...that's what follows.
:brow:
Groups of persons - not being persons themselves - cannot assert anything.
It is persons - individual persons - and those alone who can assert things.
The conclusion does follow. Reason has to be a person - not a group of persons.
Again, persons - not groups of persons, but persons - and persons alone assert things.
Reason, then, must be a person.
A group of persons is not itself a person, anymore than a group of sharks is a shark.
I've already adequately refuted the primary premiss.
I'm now granting it and focusing upon the invalid inference. After you grant that mistake, I'll continue along the path of showing you how a valid inference results in being a problem with your analysis of truth.
Rubbish. If groups cannot assert things there could be no groups asserting things. But there are, and they are everywhere asserting all sorts of things.
No, premise 2 is true, you just don't understand what it means. It doesn't mean that groups of persons can assert things, only that persons - minds - and minds alone can assert things.
Now, that's true, not false.
And it entails that Reason is a person. Not 'a persons' - that's just bad grammar.
Irrelevant.
The argument is valid, the problem is that English is not your first language and so you have not realized that "persons and only persons" refers not to groups, but individual persons.
The first one is not. You're talking about something other than the first one. Thus...
Irrelevant.
I've refuted the first. Whether or not the second is true is irrelevant. The argument is refuted.
Lay it out. A valid argument with the negation of premise 1 as its conclusion please.
Isn't that like saying that the solution to world peace is what Reason asserts it is?
Also capitalized Reason is poetic, but what does it refer to? Our everyday reasoning? A God's-eye view?
The rules of entailment allow the truth conditions of a belief to change. That's just bad logic.
The conclusion does not follow.
Therefore Reason is persons and only persons...
...that's what follows.
No, Reason would have to be a person - a mind - because Reason asserts things (and values things, and prescribes things) and minds and only minds can assert things (and value things, and prescribe things). So Reason, capital R, is a person (and we learn this by reasoning - that is, by consulting our reason - the faculty that gives us insight into what Reason prescribes, asserts, values and so on).
Quoting Andrew M
What could the solution to world peace be if not whatever Reason asserts it to be? I mean, when we try and figure out what the solution to world violence is, what are we doing? Consulting our reason, surely? We are consulting our reason and trying to discern the answer, because at some level we recognise that we will only be satisfied we have the true answer to any question when we are sure that Reason asserts it to be true.
Note too that an analysis of truth is not going to give you the answer to substantial questions about what's true. For an analogy, figuring out what water is - that is, what it is made of - does not amount to knowing where there is water. If there are two people in a desert, one of whom is aware that water is made of tiny molecules whereas the other believes (incorrectly, of course) that water is a basic substance that is made of nothing more basic than itself, the one with the correct view is not necessarily in any better position to know where there is any. Likewise, someone who realizes that truth is made of Reason's assertions is not necessarily in any better position to know the solution to world violence than someone who believes (incorrectly) that truth and the property of 'being useful to believe' are one and the same.
Again, provide a valid argument that has the negation of one of my premises as its conclusion so that I can inspect your premises and see if they have any probative force at all.
We're getting somewhere...
There are several different criticisms being leveled here at the same time. It would serve us best to focus upon them one at a time. Right now, I'm granting your premisses, and objecting to the change in the terminology between them and the conclusion. That is an invalid move.
There’s no need to get passive-aggressive, I made no assumption about your intelligence, only your capacity to see reasoning as more inclusive than simply appeals to Reason.
Excuse my appeal to Wikipedia:
“No true Scotsman, or appeal to purity, is an informal fallacy in which one attempts to protect a universal generalization from counterexamples by changing the definition in an ad hoc fashion to exclude the counterexample. Rather than denying the counterexample or rejecting the original claim, this fallacy modifies the subject of the assertion to exclude the specific case or others like it by rhetoric, without reference to any specific objective rule ("no true Scotsman would do such a thing"; i.e., those who perform that action are not part of our group and thus criticism of that action is not criticism of the group).”
You attempt to protect the generalisation ‘truth is an appeal only to Reason’ from counterexamples (such as that truth extends beyond reason) by changing it to ‘all reasonable people would agree that truth is an appeal only to Reason’, which excludes claims by anyone who (by your definition of ‘reasonable person’) fails to appeal only to Reason, or to make a formal argument. This is the circular reasoning that everyone else is trying to point out to you. You have modified the subject of your assertion (what truth is) to exclude any and all reasonable claims of truth that extend beyond your definition of Reason, without reference to a specific objective rule; ie. those who appeal to anything beyond Reason are not part of the group known as ‘reasonable persons’, and thus disagreeing with the assertion that ‘truth is an appeal only to reason’ is not disagreeing with the assertion that ‘all reasonable people would agree that truth is an appeal only to Reason’ - and so, in your mind, your argument is flawless.
My counter argument (and I may not have made this clear enough for you) has been to point out that if my subjective experience of truth extends beyond appeals to Reason, and includes empirical evidence that other subjective experiences of truth do the same, then it is reasonable to at least consider the possibility that an appeal to Reason is insufficient for an inclusive and objective understanding of what truth is.
Your response has been to exclude me from the group known as ‘reasonable persons’, because I didn’t use the formal language of argument - which necessarily reduces any meaning of truth to an appeal only to Reason - in order to make my case.
1. Reason makes assertions
2. A person and only a person can make an assertion
3. Therefore Reason is a person
Same argument, and it is valid and sound.
No, "persons" refers to more than one person. That's what the term followed by the letter "s" is doing there. Denoting a plurality...
Different argument. Both premisses are false.
It's also an invalid conclusion. Again you've changed the terms between the premisses and the conclusion. A valid conclusion would read...
Therefore Reason is a person and only a person.
Quoting ovdtogt
I don't have facts in my mind. I have knowledge in my mind - knowledge of the facts.
I recall the facts I know. I ask questions to get at facts that I don't know.
A fact is a state-of-affairs. Truth is accurate knowledge of the facts - like knowing the fact, or state-of-affairs, that Donald Trump is president of the United States.
Many people make assertions.
Reason is not a language user.
Reason does not make assertions.
Sound. Refutation of the primary premiss.
So, once more, it is the same argument.
It is valid.
A conclusion can't be valid or invalid. Arguments are valid or invalid.
the conclusion follows.
the premises are true.
The argument is sound.
Therefore the conclusion is 'true'.
Now let's go through the looking glass and take a peer at your bizzaro argument, shall we -
Quoting creativesoul
Your second premise is just an assertion rather than a self-evident truth of reason.
Compare it to:
"Reason makes assertions".
That's self-evidently true. If you think it isn't, then tell me what this is, if not an assertion of Reason:
"If an argument is sound, believe its conclusion".
Here's another: "if a proposition is true, do not believe it is also false"
Here's another: "be kind"
Here's another: "if an act is in your interests, do it - unless doing it would be unkind"
And so on.
there's plenty of disagreement about what, exactly, Reason asserts about this or that matter. But that we are dealing with assertions is beyond doubt. If you think otherwise, tell me what they are?
Just to reiterate: you are denying that Reason prescribes, asserts, values, commands (for my same argument can be run for all of those).
Your denial is not based on any evidence, it is just based on your desire to refute me.
Can you provide an example of this, for at the moment what you have just said seems conceptually confused.
How on earth can one reason without appealing to reason?
And can you then point out where I have done this?
I mean, for starters, locate for me the putative counterexample - that is, provide me with the example of someone who reasons without appealing to reason. You haven't done that above.
It seems to me that you are committing a fallacy known as 'the idiot's veto'. I will let the philosopher Michael Huemer, who coined that term for it, explain:
"The Idiot's Veto is the principle that one can bar any (would be) fact from the realm of objectivity merely by failing to apprehend it. In effect, the premise grans individuals with limited cognitive abilities or stubbornly sceptical dispositions a veto power over any would-be objective truth. Thus, suppose a physics teacher encounters a student who refuses to accept the Second Law of Thermodynamics (such individuals are the source of the perennial efforts to design 'perpectual motion machines'). According to the Idiots Veto, this wold rule out the objectivity of the Second Law of Thermodynamics"
Now, it seems to me that you are thinking that if some people of limited cognitive abilities and/or a stubborn conviction that I am wrong about anything and everything, object to some argument I have made, then that shows that the argument is not sound, or not valid, or that I am not reasonable in rejecting or ignoring what they have said.
Can you also explain to me what you mean by 'evidence'. For example, how can any sensation constitute evidence without an appeal being made to Reason?
It is by reason that I infer from the fact I am subject to certain sensations, that there are external objects responsible for those sensations.
So, explain to me on what grounds you think you know something, if it is not by appeal to reason. (Even 'justified basic beliefs' - beliefs that have not been acquired via some reasoning process - are still beliefs for which there are reasons, and thus are still beliefs that are endorsed by Reason)
It seems to me that you are not remotely reasonable. But of course, that's not a vice, is it, by your book?
You just know that some things are true, and furthermore if the reason of you and others seems to contradict you, that - for you - is not evidence that you are wrong.
There's a name for that: it is called 'dogmatism' and it is the precise opposite of philosophy.
Mind isn't a person. Mind is an abstraction that refers to a person's ability to think and reason. Only a person can assert things.
Quoting Bartricks
You seem to be treating reason as a homunculus. But consulting your reason is not like consulting your lawyer. It is instead a metaphor for thinking intelligently about something.
Quoting Bartricks
Agreed. But in this case, an analysis of truth has yet to be made. Positing Reason as a person who asserts truth just pushes that analysis back a step (like the homunculus) while creating the illusion of having provided it.
An abstraction is an abstraction. Minds think. Abstractions don't think. So I don't know why you're confidently asserting such things, given they're neither self-evident truths of reason or follow from any.
Minds - or persons, or 'subjects of experiences' the terms can be used interchangeably (I certainly use them interchangeably) - are the only kinds of thing that can make assertions, or value anything, or command anything, or hope, or desire, or prescribe.
I am a mind, and I can do all of those things. You are a mind and you can. Some minds can't, but nothing that isn't a mind can. And we literally consider insane those who think otherwise and lock them in padded cells.
Reason too, does all of those things. And thus Reason is a mind - something she herself tells us, via asserting that minds and minds alone assert things.
Quoting Andrew M
I have argued that Reason is a person, a mind, a subject of experiences and I am talking about her accordingly. You can't refute a view by simply describing it in disparaging terms.
Quoting Andrew M
Yes it has. All rational disputants will agree that a theory X is the true theory of truth if and only if they are agreed that Reason asserts it to be true. After all, what more could any rational searcher after truth want? Now, I have then argued that as that's what will satisfy everyone that they have the true theory of truth on their hands, our working hypothesis should be that truth itself is constituted by that property - that is, the property of being asserted by Reason.
That's an analysis. What is truth? Truth is the assertions of Reason. Water is H2o. That's an analysis of water. Truth is the assertions of Reason.
Quoting Andrew M
How? First, we know what assertive activity is, for we ourselves assert things all the time. We also know - for it is self-evident to our reason that this is the case - that what we assert to be the case and what is true are not necessarily the same.
Now, if you assert something to be the case, you are claiming it is true. That is, you are representing it to be true. But no matter how sincerely one does that, it remains the case that what is actually true, and what we represent to be true, are not necessarily the same. There's a gap. So, truth is not plausibly constituted by my assertions - and my evidence that it is not, is that Reason asserts it not to be.
But now apply that to Reason herself. Is there a gap between what she asserts to be the case and what is true?
I do not think so, for we can never have better evidence that something is true than that Reason asserts it to be the case. Hence why truth itself can plausibly be identified with that property. I do not say that it has to be that property, only that it is the best working hypothesis given that we can never be more satisfied that we have truth on our hands than when Reason seems to be asserting that something is the case.
Perhaps your point is that to be asserting something is, in effect, to be saying that it is 'true'. And thus I am saying that a proposition is true when Reason asserts it to be true. And this, one might then say, leaves 'truth' itself unanalysed.
But that too is false, I think. I have said in various places above that truth can be considered a 'performative' of Reason.
Normally, saying something does not make it so. If I say "I am 9ft tall" that will not make it the case that I am 9ft tall. But there are well known exceptions.
For example: "I promise to be there". Now, if I say that, then I have promised to be there. My saying it - so long as I have said it sincerely - makes it the case.
Sometimes, then, saying something can make it so.
Another example, that is perhaps better for my purposes: "meeting adjourned".
If I am the chair of a meeting and I say "meeting adjourned" then my saying it adjourns the meeting. My saying it makes it the case that the meeting has been adjourned. Meeting adjournments are created by meeting chairs saying "meeting adjourned".
That's a performative. Meeting adjournments are performatives of meeting chairs.
If you are not the chair of a meeting and you say "meeting adjourned" then although what you say could be true - the meeting might be adjourned - your saying it does not make it so.
But if I am the chair and I say it, then the meeting is adjourned.
My view is that 'truth' is to Reason what meeting adjournments are to meeting chairs. When I say "X is true" that does not make it true. But when Reason does, her saying it makes it so.
Now, that does not push anything back anymore than pointing out that meeting adjournments are created by meeting chairs saying "meeting adjourned" pushes anything back.
No, you seem to misunderstand me. I'm not saying that potential energy is not actual energy; it is. Potential energy is actual energy. However, its potentiality is relative. For example, both kinetic and potential energy are energies; but the difference is with respect to the state in which they are manifest. 'Potential' and 'kinetic' are expressions of the conditioning of the energy, and thus potential energy can translate to kinetic and vice-versa. In both cases, it is impossible to negate the aspect of them as being 'energy' even when the conditioning changes. My point is, the perspective of reality as energy is all-inclusive, because it can be applied to all components of reality.
I’m glad you asked. There is a common presumption that thinking and making sense of reality (ie. reasoning) necessarily requires a purely rational or logical structuring of that reality, but in my experience I find this to be neither true nor entirely helpful. Human behaviour, for instance, cannot be effectively structured according to logic, because not everyone reasons - thinks and makes sense of reality - in precisely the same way. To structure our social reality in a purely logical way would ensure prediction error with almost every human interaction. I imagine this is what autism might feel like.
While it’s possible to formulate a logically structured reality (from the perspective you refer to as Reason herself), one cannot be certain that this structure is entirely objective - that is, inclusive of all possible perspectives of reality. It is reasonable to assume that not everyone’s perspective of reality is identical to this logical structure of reality we refer to as Reason. The only way to assert the truth of Reason’s perspective with any confidence, then, is to exclude or ignore any perspective that doesn’t conform to it.
So it’s reasonable to suggest that perhaps Reason may not be as certain as to the inclusive truth of her logically structured reality as you are. How would you know without appealing to Reason herself? And how could she inform you either way?
How is potential energy manifest?
The ‘evidence’ I was referring to is the written testimony of others who express a subjective experience of truth that extends beyond appeals to Reason. I’m not sure what ‘sensations’ you’re referring to...
Quoting Bartricks
I have made no assertions here - I haven’t claimed to know anything. You can cast dispersions on how ‘reasonable’ you think I am, but it only verifies the limitations of your argument.
Don’t get me wrong - your argument appears to make sense from a logical perspective. But that alone does not make it true. Truth is not bound by logic, and any description of truth from a logical perspective is necessarily limited. You may be willing to assert that Reason knows exactly what truth is, but I’m not convinced. I have reason to suspect that truth extends beyond appeals to Reason. That doesn’t mean I know what truth is better than Reason does, or that I think Reason has no clue at all - only that she cannot possibly have the full picture. Nobody does, that’s the point.
You've reached incoherence my friend. You're equivocating the terms "Reason" and "truth". You've also changed the terms between the premisses and the conclusion on multiple occasions. Not to mention all the other problems you've shrugged off.
Not much more I can do here. The astute reader will be served.
Evidence?
Quoting creativesoul
er, evidence?
Quoting creativesoul
Evidence?
Quoting creativesoul
Oh, they've been served by you, don't you worry, but not for the reasons you think.
That's the only one that matters. Everything else is ego and posturing.
Well then, I’ll leave you to your delusions...
Based on this definition, we can tell the truth conditions for all statements that involve existential quantifier, universal quantifier and all other logical operators including negation. We can extend this system to natural languages too.
The controversial matter is whether the definition involves truth correspondence theory or not.
I guess some people can’t be helped...
That would count me out - I’m rarely brief.
Well I’m not sure I claimed it did.
Quoting ep3265
That’s a little defeatist, isn’t it? How do you think we developed a way to comprehend what other humans experience and observe? Do you think that’s conclusive?
Even comprehending how a dog views 'reality' will just remain an educated guess.
As will you comprehending how I experience reality.
The arrogance of thinking I need your help. I don't need your help matey. You need mine - you need to understand that you can't reason without attempting to listen to Reason, just as you can't be a bachelor and have a wife. Reasoning is attempting to listen to Reason.
Now, you think that Reason is not the ultimate guide to what's what. So, that makes you - not me - deluded, okay? You. Not me.
There's listening to Reason, and then there's what's called 'making stuff up'. If you can't show that your beliefs answer to Reason - and worse, if you don't even care - then you are living in a fantasy world. And you're locked in too - for only someone who listens to Reason is capable of recognising the problem they're in.
How are you addressing the argument of the OP?
This - This statement is true if and only if it is true - is not a theory about what truth is. It is a theory - a vacuous theory - about when a statement is true.
There's when a proposition is true, and then there's what the truth of it consists in. It is the latter - not the former - that is at issue here.
Society is built on an assumption that you and I ‘operate’ the same way. On a basic level, that may be fairly accurate. On a more basic level, we also ‘operate’ the same way as dogs do in many respects. That’s not a bad place to start in comprehending how a dog views reality.
But at the higher level of subjective experience, value and meaning, you cannot just presume to comprehend how I operate simply because we’re both human. You would need to speculate, predict and test. And you would need to care about the differences you find.
Many people have taken the trouble to care about the differences between how a dog views reality and how a human does. The more we interact with them, the more refined our comprehension becomes.
We do share similarities with dogs. It is just that because their sense of smell and hearing is so vastly more acute than ours we will never understand it's 'world view' apart that it wants to eat, shit, sleep and fuck like we do. I am more concerned with the difference in it's perception of 'reality'. Our 'truths' are more or less 'predetermined by the ability and dis-ability of our senses.
Seeing in ultra-violet or infrared or hearing beyond 22,000 hertz does change your perception of 'reality'.
That's the point. The question about the content of a statement is irrelevant with regards to the logic of truth conditions.
Other than that, we have statements that are self evidently true.The rest can be compared to the world and if the state of affairs are identical then the statement are true, that's correspondence theory.
Hmm, do you spend ANY time with dogs at all? I’m only asking because that is a particularly limited understanding of what a dog wants, and the distinction between dogs and humans.
Quoting ovdtogt
Well, if that were the case, then I have NO idea how we cure or prevent diseases or infection...
Dogs have a keen sense of smell which has them living in a world far more dominated by smell than vision. How a dog 'sees' the world with his nose is beyond our comprehension.
No it isn’t. It’s only beyond yours at this moment.
Clever...
That's an unusual usage. As defined here, "mind" ordinarily refers to a faculty or ability of a person, not that it is a person. Anyway since they're interchangeable for you, I can just read your use of "mind" as "person".
Quoting Bartricks
My argument is that you're reifying an abstract term (reason) as something substantial. And your motivation, it seems, is that you want to model assertions as a kind of performative utterance. So Reason is posited as a mistake-proof assertor, analogous to the meeting chair who adjourns the meeting. But that outcome should be an indicator that the model doesn't fit.
Quoting Bartricks
Agreed.
Quoting Bartricks
The evidence that it is not is that we can recall assertions that were later shown to be mistaken. Or point to two people making contrary assertions, only one of which can be correct.
Truth is simply a function of a meaningful assertion in some context. For example, this is an apple (points to apple), this is a table (points to table). If the apple is on the table (the context) and Alice asserts that the apple is on the table then her assertion is true.
If it is false, then it's true. So you are incorrect.
Just sayin'.
:rofl:
Yeah... whatever dude.. Wie auch immer...
If we assume and act as though truth is found outside of our feeling, we actually get pretty far. We can specify where our minds originate from, how we came to be, what happens if we do a certain action etc. And because operating on the assumption that existence exists and is outside of us, we can obtain logic without even trying. It's already there. At this point, we're still on an assumption, but at least its coherent. What about science? The scientific method is perhaps the best source for why this assumption has merit. Under science, assumptions are only met with the most stringent tests, and when those assumptions are concluded with coherent results, we assume its truth, i.e. evolution, gravity, cell theory, etc.
Okay fine, but how do we define what this reality is and where does it stop if it is "everything," what even is "everything." Hmmm, now we have a real problem. Well first we need to find if existence is a dichotomy or a spectrum. We really have no way of answering it per se, other than what we experience. We only experience a dichotomy of reality right? We might have to conclude that. Doesn't mean there isn't anything outside of it, only that it's outside of our comprehension, making it non existent in our terms. What we can comprehend is something telling us that something's outside of our comprehension, so the thought exists, but not the actuality of the statement. What we're not saying is that humans are the only way the universe can exist, but merely that we abstract and define the terms of it.
But that point - the point in question - shows that that answer is no answer to the question.
And again, nobody disputes the correspondence theory of truth - it is just that it is not a theory of truth.
It's as if I've said 'morality is subjective' and you've said 'if an act is right, we ought to do it'. The latter is true, but does not contradict the first.
Likewise, my theory - one I've argued for, not just stated - is that the property of truth is one and the same as the property of being asserted by Reason. You haven't said anything to challenge that.
No good talking about correspondence to facts, or reality, or what is the case - for again a) not a theory of truth and b) facts, reality and what is the case are just other ways of talking about the same property, namely being true, or else are less basic than the truth in that any analysis of what they are will have to appeal to our analysis of what truth is.
No, not unusual - for time immemorial 'the mind' has been used to refer to the thing, whatever it may be, that is the seat of our consciousness. Mental states, for instance, are 'states of mind'. 'I' - this thinking thing - and 'my mind' are, and always have been, used interchangeably. Using the term 'mind' - a word that denotes an object - to refer to a 'faculty' is confused. Philosophy of mind is that area of philosophy that dedicates itself to figuring what kind of an object the mind might be.
Quoting Andrew M
That's not an 'argument', it is a question begging assertion. Note, to 'reify' something is to 'mistakenly' think of it as an object. Now, I have argued that Reason is a person - a mind, a thing - not just stated it. So, you need to defeat this argument before you're entitled to use the term 'reify'.
1. Reason makes assertions
2. Minds and only minds can make assertions
3. Therefore Reason is a mind
Otherwise all you're doing is describing my view and using a term to describe it that implies it is mistaken. But you're not showing it to be mistaken at all. So, do you dispute 1 or 2?
Quoting Andrew M
No, why analyse my motives? They're irrelevant. And no, wrong way around. I want to know what truth is, I have concluded that truth is the assertions of Reason, and from that - from the fact Reason makes assertions, I have concluded that Reason is a mind and thus truth is constituted by the assertions of that mind. These are 'conclusions' validly derived from premises that appear to be true. I haven't started out with a bunch of claims and then gone hunting for arguments to support them - someone who does that is a crook, not a philosopher.
Quoting Andrew M
Well, first that's wrong because we can know that our assertions do not make things true just by reflection. But anyway, even if your process is the correct description, it too involves appeals to Reason. First, to recognise that an assertion is mistaken you have to note that it does not match some representation of Reason. And second, to then 'infer' that from the fact they are sometimes mistaken that truth therefore cannot be constituted by one's own assertions is, once more, to appeal to Reason. It is Reason who tells us - asserts - that if one thing is constituted by another thing, then if you have the first you have the other, yes?
There's no way of arguing for anything - including no way of recognising one thing on the basis of another - without having to make recourse to assertions or prescriptions of Reason.
Quoting Andrew M
Question begging. And confused. I don't know what you mean by 'a function of a meaningful assertion'. Either you're using 'meaningful' as a synonym for 'true' - in which case you're not giving an analysis, just repeating yourself - or being meaningful and being true are not synonymous, in which case your analysis is false because by hypothesis a statement could be meaningful and not true. Perhaps by 'in some context' you mean 'a context in which the statement would be true'. Okay, but now once more you've gone in a circle and told us nothing.
Once more, then, I have provided a substantial analysis of truth - I have argued that truth is constituted by the assertive activity of Reason, for we can never have any better evidence that a proposition is true than that it is asserted by Reason. That thesis refutes any other view, and so rather than stating a rival view - which is instantly to beg the question - one must overturn my case first.
I have stated that we can never have better evidence that a thesis is true than that it is asserted by Reason, for the entire enterprise of philosophical investigation is precisely the search for what Reason asserts. Anyone who thinks a proposition is true despite it not appearing to be asserted by Reason is a dogmatist, for they are defying the evidence (evidence itself being that which indicates what Reason asserts).
I have then argued that given that 'being asserted by Reason' is the most we can ever conceive of having in terms of evidence that a proposition is true, it is reasonable to assume that truth itself is that property.
No, I'm sure you listen to Reason when it is convenient for you to do so - that is, you listen to Reason on your terms (if you didn't listen to Reason at all you wouldn't survive long in the world). But when confronted by reasoning that leads to a conclusion you dislike, or that would be inconvenience for you to acknowledge, you're going suddenly to decide that Reason lacks authority in this area and listen to yourself instead.
I take it you mean by that, "yes, I see that to construct an argument that has the negation of one of your premises as a conclusion I need to incorporate a premise that has nothing to be said for it" or "I no understandy - something went wrong but I no clear what".
It makes no sense to say that reason makes assertions; reason is the basis upon which reasonable assertions are made by persons (or minds, if you want to speak in that quirky way).
So, your argument, although valid, is unsound.
I dispute 1 and 2.
Per premise 1, I can point to people making assertions. But you can't point to reason making assertions since it is an abstract term. Premise 1 depends on personifying (anthropomorphising) an abstraction.
So we should recognise that our limited information renders the structure of our knowledge inconclusive. When we are aware of the prediction error this causes, we are called to make an effort (find energy) to revise the information we do have, accepting new information and discarding structures that are no longer relevant. We need to interact and relate more with what we cannot comprehend, rather than defining the terms of existence and then striving to avoid the prediction error. The first step to doing science is recognising the gaps and inconsistencies in our knowledge. Sometimes we need to be prepared to take structures apart and rebuild them to accommodate new information. For me, gaps are less painful than inconsistencies - but then, I’m not a scientist.
The way I see it, there is no conclusive ‘everything’. The amount of relevant information about a system is finite, yet there is always more information to be gained about the system.
It is manifest in the way we perceive and/or understand it. Why would energy be potential? Because it is assigned a certain degree of probable capacity for work. Therefore, the potential of any energy is manifest with respect to activities and the conditions they take place in.
I see absolutely no justification for this claim.
What's this: "if an argument is valid and has true premises, then the conclusion is true"?
Well, it is an assertion I have made, certainly. I just made it. But that's not all. It is also asserted by Reason.
What do you think it is if not an assertion?
Reason directs, prescribes, asserts, values. Deal with it. Pick up any book on philosophy and see how far you get before you encounter talk of Reason's directives, biddings, demands, requirements, and so on.
Reason does those kinds of thing. Logic is the attempt by us to describe some of those assertions. Reasoning is our best attempts to listen and follow them.
Only a mind can assert, describe, prescribe, demand, bid, value.
Hence, Reason is a mind.
Don't just cough up an inchoate view about Reason and declare it to be true and my view nonsense.
Nonsense doesn't make sense. My view, even if false, makes sense. SO it isn't nonsense if you're using that word correctly.
My view also answers to the facts. If you think not, then answer my question - what is this: "if an argument is valid and has true premises, then the conclusion is true" if not an assertion?
Obviously that would depend.
Do you think it is true? If you think it is true, does that entail that it is true? If not, why not?
Quoting Bartricks
Why not start simpler?
Something like: true and false are properties of propositions.
Relating propositions and ontology may then be a whole other thing, but for starters at least.
Surely, whatever is the case does not depend on her?
Her reasoning about something may then become good justification for her beliefs.
Looks like conflating ontology and epistemics, truth and justification/beliefs, which has a few odd implications.
Ordinary logic is common to reasoning.
Quoting jorndoe
How do you know I didn't? You admit you have not read the whole thread, but then you talk as if you have. Confusing.
This thread is about what truth is - and in the OP I explain what I think it is and why.
It is uncontroversial that truth is a property of propositions. But that is not, however, an answer to the question "what is truth", as I have explained to others. It leaves the question of what the property is, entirely open.
This thread is not about propositions, but about what truth is.
Now, I have argued that truth is constituted by the assertions of Reason. That is, for a proposition to be true, is for Reason to be asserting its contents.
Why? Because that's the ultimate test for whether a proposition possesses the property of truth. And thus, as a working hypothesis, it is reasonable to assume that truth itself is that property.
Quoting jorndoe
Looks like you've strung some big words together in the hope that the resulting sentence expresses something coherent. It doesn't.
Of course it's your assertion I just don't agree with you that reason itself universally "asserts" anything. Even the principles of reason are asserted by us on account of their intuitive self-evidence, not on the basis of any more fundamental reason. You're really just arguing over ways of speaking. If I make a claim it is me making the claim, not reason, even is it is a reasonable claim.
The point is that there is no ambiguity involved in the statement that persons make claims, because persons are understood to possess the requisite agency to do so; whereas there is an ambiguity in the statement that reason makes claims; you can word it that quirky way, sure,
provided you are careful not to impute agency to reason; which is precisely the pitfall you are failing to avoid.
Quoting Bartricks
Why should I accept a statement which issues from a misunderstanding due to a reification of an ambiguous way of thinking about reason? I do not accept it because reason tells me it is completely unfounded. So my reason, to use your ambiguous locution, does not "assert"' the same as your reason apparently, and I would say mistakenly, asserts. So how do you justify appealing to some overarching "Reason" if different persons' reason tells them different things?
Evidence? Again, you have no justification for these claims. I am justifying mine.
You have agreed that my example was an example of an assertion.
Now, it is also a 'true' assertion. But it is not true because 'I' assert it, is it?
So, why is it true, then?
Because Joe Bloggs asserts it?
No.
Becasue Reason asserts it?
yes.
There's no other plausible answer.
Now, don't just nay say. That's not arguing.
Again, you have agreed that this - "if an argument is valid and has true premises, then the conclusion is true" - is an assertion.
You should also agree that it is 'true'.
Is. It. True. Because. I. Assert. It?
No.
Why is that assertion true, then?
Don't explain why we 'think' it is true. Explain why it is actually true. In virtue of what is it true?
Question begging. I am not misunderstanding anything. I am just saying things you - you - disagree with. That is not equivalent to being mistaken.
Reason does all of the following, as a cursory read of any philosophical text on the matter will show: command, direct, require, bid, favour, prescribe, assert, value.
Now, don't just say "no she doesn't". That's just silly. She does. And she has to be a 'She' (or He - whatever) becaues only shes and hes do that kind of thing. Q.E.D.
Argue something and stop just farting out assertions, Hugh.
Well, it doesn’t matter what I think, does it? It only matters what appeals to Reason. You’ve already made it clear that I’m unable to determine this.
So what does Reason tell you about the truth of this statement? And what does its truth depend on (apart from an appeal to Reason, of course)?
Like ‘God’ is manifest in the way we perceive and understand it? Or with respect to the activities and conditions of the universe? I’m trying to understand what evidence you have of actual energy that isn’t doing any work.
I recognise that my perspective is unconventional, and I don’t expect it to be intuitively understood in this way. But the more I apply this conceptualisation to experience, the more sense it makes.
Don’t get me wrong - I realise that potential energy is real. We perceive it and understand it as a prediction in relation to a capacity for work. Manifest as energy, however, as an event, it is a reduction - a collapsed wave, if you will. There is more to what we refer to as ‘potential energy’ than what it manifests as, more than its relation to any specific activity or conditions. It’s real because it has a value aspect and a meaning aspect, but its temporal and spatial aspects are undefined. It cannot exist as actual energy except in the past: the energy in an activity was potential energy. But it’s not anymore.
The way I see it, the existence of potential energy points to an aspect of reality with which we interact that is beyond time, enabling us to accurately structure predictions in relation to the manifestation of energy. I can see that activities and conditions are caused, but how is energy caused? The language around energy and ‘doing work’ disguises the reality that energy is not exactly caused, but rather manifests from its own potential in relation to the potential of interacting events.
for us.
Since it is we who will test these ideas.
Or find that they do not work.
Or find exceptions and need to refine.
Maybe we 'shouldn't' have a pragmatic idea of truth.
But in reality, here we are. What option do we have? we don't have direct access. The truth doesn't shine in a way so we can recognize those true propositions from false ones. So we are always seeing they work, finding out they don't, regardless of how we define them.
Here in our fallible in situ groping.
I suppose another way of putting this is: I think it is pragmatic to act as if the conclusions we make that work are true, until they do not work. We have no direct access to final knowledge, we learn over time, we are fallible. And further, as far as I can tell, pretty much everyone does this, though some fail to notice that some of their truths are not working, even for them.
We should have a pragmatic idea of truth.
Anything that makes you feel you are 'better off' today than yesterday is truth. And once you believe things can't get any better you have arrived at you destination.
The obvious question is, what is Reason? and why the capital letter? Just to reifying it?
The followup question is, how is it that Reason never errs? How is it that Reason never arives at falsehood?
And the conclusion, using the open question argument, is that since we can ask if Reason can arrive at falsehood, Reason is not the very same as truth.
Quoting Possibility
I don't even know what the question is - it's like asking "is it true that blue?"
"And what does its truth depend on (apart from an appeal to Reason, of course)?"
Truth is not an appeal to Reason. Appealing to Reason is how we find out about what's true. But truth itself is the property of "being (sincerely) asserted by Reason".
If you now ask "what does truth depend on (apart from the assertions of Reason)?" the answer is "nothing" - for that's like asking "what does water depend on, apart from hydrogen and oxygen?" It expresses a refusal either to understand or accept the analysis just provided. Which is your prerogative, of course, but the fact is that I've argued for it and the argument has yet to be challenged.
Reason is a person. That's not reification. Reification involves making a mistake - the concept incorporates the idea of error. But Reason 'is' a person - there can be no reasonable doubt about it, for Reason asserts things and only persons - minds - can do that (as is itself manifest to the reason of all of those apart from the insane).
Why the capital letter? Because the word 'reason' is multiply ambiguous and historically a capital letter has been used to denote the source of reasons.
That's obviously false. It's as obviously false as saying "truth is a table. Anything that is a table is true". It's just confused.
"Useful" and 'true' clearly denote different properties, otherwise the idea of a false but useful belief would make no sense (and it clearly does make sense).
Are you saying that water depends on nothing apart from hydrogen and oxygen?
Is there a universal consensus among those who use their reason to figure out what truth is (philosophers) about what truth is?
No. There are just several theses, theses that most of those who are trying to figure out what truth is agree are not very plausible.
Given that there is, at present, no consensus on what truth is, it is worth asking "what would it take for there to be?"
That is, when would philosophers agree that they have found the true theory of truth?
That answer is unquestionably this: they would all agree that theory X is the true theory of truth when the reason of all of them represents theory X to be the true theory of X. For what more could anyone want than this?
Well, then it makes sense to suppose that 'that' is what truth is. That is, that truth itself is none other than the property of being a proposition that Reason is representing to be the case.
That's my reasoning.
So what does truth depend on?
Reason.
It depends on Reason asserting something. Why? Because if and only if she asserts something will anything be true. Why? Because that's what truth is.
Thank you for laying it out. I agree with you up to this point. But the rest does not follow, by my reasoning (for what it’s worth).
Quoting Bartricks
‘Reason’ is a concept that you’ve constructed, like ‘God’, to represent a supposedly ‘objective’ position that is inclusive of a ‘consensus’ (ie. of reasoning) - which so far has changed from what one would assume was ‘all people’ to only ‘reasonable people’, and is now only ‘philosophers’. Just as ‘God’ cannot be an objective or ‘omni’ position if you exclude contributing perspectives from the consensus (such as ‘Evil’), so ‘Reason’ as you’ve constructed here can only be a subjective position of reasoning.
Truth depends on more than the property of being a proposition that your ill-defined consensus is representing to be the case, because a comprehensive understanding of truth must be an objective consensus. That doesn’t mean everyone has to agree - but it does mean that what is deemed unreasonable, unethical, inhuman, impossible, improbable, contradictory, unheard of and unknown ALL must contribute to an understanding of what truth is. Otherwise you only have a limited perspective of truth, and so you cannot claim to have fared any better than all those philosophers whose efforts you disparage.
Therefore your argument rests entirely on who or what is ‘Reason’ (hence my initial question), which by all accounts renders any understanding of truth from your theory limited, and therefore subjective.
But hey, if it’s only the truth of your relationship with ‘Reason’ as you (and people like you) understand her, or if you’re arguing that truth as an objective position doesn’t exist, or that we cannot reach a universal consensus on what truth is, then we can explore that. But I don’t think you are.
A comprehensive answer to ‘what is truth?’ must be inclusive of understanding the relationship between truth and supposedly ‘unreasonable’ perspectives like mine. You can’t just exclude us - that’s not what truth is.
If you want to look for some esoteric 'mumbo jumbo' definition of truth, that is your prerogative. I think that is just about as useful as digging a hole and filling it in again. If you want to cleverly rearranging words, why not do a crossword puzzle?
That does not make sense.
We know it is false because it does not work.
Beliefs that are believed to be false have no usefulness. False beliefs that are believed to be true can be useful.
Our belief in an anthropomorphic God may be false but that belief may still be useful. The truth in this case is that the ' unverifiable belief' can be useful. The truth again lies in the usefulness of the belief even though the belief itself may be false. The fact that this belief (in God) remains useful, is because it can not be verified.
Beliefs that are believed to be false have no usefulness. False beliefs that are believed to be true can be useful.
Our belief in an anthropomorphic God may be false but that belief may still be useful. The truth in this case is that the ' unverifiable belief' can be useful. The truth again lies in the usefulness of the belief even though the belief itself may be false. The fact that this belief (in God) remains useful, is because it can not be verified.
You're just thoroughly confused. First, you have suggested that if a belief is 'useful' then it is true.
Now, that's obviously false, as false as saying "if something is a biscuit, it is true".
And it's incoherent, because to truly be useful it has to be 'true' that believing the proposition is useful. Which is now going to set you off on a regress.
But anyway, it's false on its face.
But you've decided to double-down. That's a mistake. First, grossly implausible views require considerable ingenuity to defend well. You're not qualified.
Second, you keep stating things that are obviously false in the hope that confidence about them will somehow make them true. For instance. "beliefs that are believed to be false" - what do you mean? If you believe a proposition, then you believe its contents obtain. That's just what it is to believe something. I can't believe it is raining and at the same time believe that my belief that it is raining is false. If I believe it is raining, I believe that raining is the case.
Er, what? So you now agree that a belief can be useful yet false? Yes, I know.
So, this thread is about what truth is. It's not about whatever pseudo profound utterance occurs to you. It is about 'truth'.
Now, if a belief can be useful yet not true, then we know - or those of us who have powers of reason can know - that truth and usefulness denote different properties. Which is something we already knew, because it is directly self-evident. Deal.
I'm not defining truth, as I've already said. And you're begging the question.
Sometimes it is useful to dig a hole and fill it in again (for instance, let's say a crazy rich person pays people to do it - well, now there's some use in me doing it). Presumably by your lights that makes the hole, er, true?
Exactly. Your belief in a God that is aiding and abetting you in your moments of struggle might give you the psychological strength to persevere where you otherwise might have given up. I consider (the belief in) God to be a kind of psychological placebo effect.
Clever. Did you think that one up all by yourself?
"a belief can be useful yet not true"
A belief may be false, but can not been known to be false. Only a belief not known to be false can be useful. A belief has to be considered true to be useful. So truth and usefulness do not denote different properties.
Holes can't be true
Digging can't be true
Sorry you'll have to explain that to me.
Survival is necessary to reason.
Every single thing you've just said is false. That's quite impressive.
A false belief can certainly be known to be false. A lot of people believe things that we can know to be false.
"Only a belief not known to be false can be useful." No, false again. It is common for people to believe they are far more popular than they really are. That belief is false in many cases. But it is useful as it makes those who have it happier than they would otherwise be (which is generally useful).
Are you thinking at all before you write these things?
Quoting ovdtogt
No they do denote different properties - clearly they do - and furthermore that claim does not follow from anything you said before. Fail.
Yes, that doesn't surprise me.
Propositions can be true (or false). That's because they have 'representative contents' - that is, they represent something to be the case. Hence they can be true if what they represent to be the case is the case, and false otherwise.
Why can't a hole be true? Because it is a hole, not a proposition. "There is a hole to your left" can be true. But holes themselves can't be.
Likewise for digging. Digging is an activity. Activities can be done or not done. They can't be 'true' or 'false'. It can be true that you are digging something - but in that case what's true is the proposition "A very confused person is digging" rather than digging itself.
And trees upend numbers in the dark.
I never stated a belief can not known to be false.
Quoting ovdtogt
A belief must be useful to considered true.
A belief is considered true because it is useful.
No I mean what makes you think I am interested in holes and digging. If you want to dig a hole for yourself be my guest. You don't have to explain that to me.
What is truth?
What is useful is tru(th).
What is tru(th) is useful.
There you go. In a nutshell.
yes you have:
Quoting ovdtogt
You clearly don't have a stable view.
You should learn to read and see that those 2 sentences have a completely different meaning.
You said "A belief may be false, but can not been known to be false". The grammar is bad and the statement is false. A belief that may be false can be known to be false.
Quoting Bartricks
Wrong. A belief that may be false, may be known to be false.
Doesn't matter, of course. But it does underline that you possess the standard toxic combo of confidence and ignorance.
Okay. I think in that case. 'Can not be known to be false' would have sounded better.
You've said that beliefs that are false cannot be known to be false.
Yes they can.
You've said that if a belief is useful, it is true.
No, for false beliefs can be useful.
And so on.
Dyslexia is a problem many people suffer from. Nothing to be ashamed of.
Yes, and arrogance and ignorance are also problems many people suffer from too. But they are something to be ashamed of so, you know, be ashamed.
Now back to the topic of this thread: what is truth? I have provided an analysis and all you've done is pronounce. Stop pronouncing and try arguing something
I have given it in a nutshell. Go back and read it (if you can).
Which explains why it was nuts. Again, you haven't engaged with the argument of the OP, or argued anything at all. Just pronouncements.
Yes I just make pronouncements. And if people disagree I engage with them and try to clarify my position to the best of my ability.
Yes, well stop that. That's not philosophy. Positions are ten a penny. And clarifying a position is not the same as justifying it.
If you don't have a opinion on a subject how are you to philosophize about it? And a clarification serves the same purpose as a justification.
No it doesn't. Clarifying what Buddhists believe, for instance, does not serve to justify those beliefs. There is no inconsistency in understanding that Tim believes P and at the same time believing that there is no reason to believe P.
Anyway, you are confident about matters before you've thought about them. I mean, this whole style of yours - pronouncing first and then trying to think of something to say about the pronouncement later - betokens that.
That's true, if one holds that truth and usefulness count as properties then the terms "truth" and "usefulness" are used as a means to denote different properties.
Not all powers of reason lead to that...
Just saying, it seems you're overstating the case you have.
Not all belief can be falsified. So, not all belief that may be false can be known to be.
No, it is just true. You can 'hold' whatever you want, that isn't going to make usefulness and truth denote the same property.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, some people can't reason very well. They can reason well enough to locate sandwiches and push them into their face every so often, but not well enough to gain insight into trickier questions, such as "what is truth". There's a technical word for them that rhymes with poo squid.
I think we have the same idea but are expressing it differently. I claimed that the principle of cause and effect and the principle of energy (vibration) are all-inclusive to all components of reality. That meant that they were fundamental to reality. In short, reality is energy. And, reality is cause and effect.
Energy is cause and effect - That which causes is energy. That which is effected is energy. The only difference is perspective. Fundamentally, all absolutes are identical. Cause and effect is primarily a perspective with regard to activity. Energy is primarily a perspective with regard to force. Both force and activity are integral to reality.
Also, NOTHING IS BEYOND SPACE AND TIME. If anything exists then it must have form (a configuration), force (influence) and activity. Where there's form, space is inevitable; where there's activity, time (relativity) is inevitable. And because form and activity are fundamental to reality, space and time are inescapable.
Nothing (implying no thing or lack of anything) is a misnomer with respect to identity (existence). We can't deny the existence of something which we constantly affirm. Words like nothing are mental constructs we use for comparative thinking. They are mental mirror-images of what we reflect upon. Nothing (or no thing) is mental slang for inverted/reversed thing-ness.
Bartricks has problems with the English language. I suggest he take up knitting as a hobby.
And a clarification [can] serve[s] the same purpose as a justification.
You can clarify what you believe in and what you disbelieve. You can use clarification as a justification for your beliefs.
I have no idea why I am getting a line through my text.
Yes 'usefulness' is a property of truth.If the 'truth' does not contain 'usefulness'(i.e information) it can not be considered 'truth'.
Usefulness is a property of information.
Unless a statement contains information, it is totally meaningless and does not contain truth.
Truth without information has no value and therefor can not be truth.
Truth without information is not truth.
I’m not sure that we do, though. While I agree that energy and cause and effect constitute a four-dimensional aspect of reality, I would argue that there is more to reality than this, and that there is more to these principles than the concepts of ‘energy’ or ‘cause and effect’ describe.
Quoting BrianW
I would say that if anything exists then it has form, activity and/OR influence. Energy, for instance, has activity without form. Potential energy has influence with neither activity nor form. Likewise, cause and effect have activity without form, but will has influence with neither activity nor form. And both potential energy and will exist and have influence outside time, enabling us to predict, imagine and initiate activity.
Energy, cause and effect, will, etc are not identities (or existences). Rather, they are aspects (or perspectives) of existences/identities. All forces/influences are contained within (or interact through) forms, just as all forms are configurations/structures of forces, and both forms and forces are in constant expression and interrelation hence perpetual activity.
*will is just the human analogy to cause.
Quoting Possibility
What more is there? Please share.
Quoting Possibility
What does 'outside time' mean?
I would think that anything within the human realm of perception and participation is within the bounds of time. So, how have you arrived at outside time?
That might be true, but if we are brains in a vat we will never find out.
They’re concepts, and they refer to the different aspects of reality or existence - which are also concepts. The structures of our conceptualisation differ markedly, you and I, but I think we have some areas of agreement here.
I agree that influence interacts with and through ‘forms’ (although they are not contained within these ‘forms’, but rather transcend them). I agree that ‘forms’ (which, for me, refers to three aspects of reality: length, shape and form) and ‘forces’ (which refers to three additional aspects: activity/time, influence/value and expression/meaning) interrelate to constitute all of existence as we are aware of it. But it is how these aspects interrelate - what the structure of reality looks like - where we differ most.
Much of what you describe refers to a Newtonian perspective, which derives from Aristotle. What relativity and quantum mechanics has done recently is force us to reassess how we structure reality in order to avoid the prediction error that comes from trying to integrate all of this information into our conceptualisation of reality.
The biggest problem with the Newtonian perspective is that it removes all reference to the ‘self’ as a position within that reality. The problem this creates is similar to the problem solved by acquiring a heliocentric structure to the solar system: by positioning our perspective at a point within rather than central to the structure, we get a more accurately objective view. That’s all I’m attempting to do, really.
Quoting BrianW
Everything is a human analogy, really. But I disagree with this. The human mind interacts between cause and effect, to predict, imagine, determine and initiate actions.
Quoting BrianW
By outside, I mean regardless of one’s position within it. This is how we’ve determined our relative position on a spherical Earth, in the Solar System, the galaxy and the spatial structure of the universe. It’s how we’ve determined our relative position in human civilisation, the evolution of life and the unfolding of the temporal structure of the universe. It’s how we determine our position within our social groups and a global humanity, and why we struggle to acquire an accurate view of our position within both the ecosystem and the value structure of the universe.
I think the line going through your text was the best thing about it.
Clarifying a belief is not the same as justifying it. Deal with it.
Note, I justified my analysis of truth. I didn't start with the analysis and then look for a justification. I started by trying to figure out what truth itself is.
So, what is it for the umpteenth time? Well, if all rational deliberators would agree that theory X - whatever it may be - is the true theory of truth if Reason represents it to be, then on grounds of simplicity it is reasonable to assume that 'that' is what the property of truth consists of. A proposition is true when Reason asserts its contents, and not otherwise.
How does that change anything you do, though?
In my moments of heightened awareness I believe that everything we experience is a hallucination and that we possess a everlasting soul that is our consciousness. We merely have to deny our body in order to travel down the path to Nirvana. As our temporal body dies, our soul will be released like a butterfly from a cocoon to join the eternal cosmic consciousness that lies at the root of all life.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sokushinbutsu?fbclid=IwAR3itT5SD3DNlyY8rYX1F-eGNx7DGeRMy1pgOfEB1DJQyKib8wtP1gVXfvw
Sokushinbutsu (???) are a kind of Buddhist mummy. The term refers to the practice of Buddhist monks observing asceticism to the point of death and entering mummification while alive.[1] They are seen in a number of Buddhist countries, but the Japanese term "sokushinbutsu" is generally used.
It is believed that many hundreds of monks tried, but only 24 such mummifications have been discovered to date. There is a common suggestion that Shingon school founder Kukai brought this practice from Tang China as part of secret tantric practices he learned, and that were later lost in China.[2]
Yes, well my cat can't distinguish between a Rembrandt and a child's scrawl and seems to think its own bottom is the most beautiful thing in the world.
This, I think, is an extremist version of Buddhism - one based on a misunderstanding of Buddha’s teachings and how they relate to practise. The way I see it, Buddha’s own asceticism was simply a demonstration of awareness - not a practical path to be followed for its own sake. It achieves nothing in itself - its purpose is to demonstrate the structure of existence for our benefit, by documenting the journey towards and beyond its limitations.
It’s a bit like ascetic monks in Christianity who practise self-flagellation. Withdrawing from existence is not a life lived with purpose if it doesn’t connect in some way with those of us who continue to exist. Buddha still manages to connect with existence. The rest of those monks are at best a re-confirmation of what Buddha/Jesus has already quite effectively demonstrated. So why go over the same ground? If Buddha burnt his hand on the stove and said to you ‘that’s hot, it burns’, do you need to then do the same thing?
Quoting Bartricks
You certainly believe that it's true, Who said anything about making usefulness and truth denote the same property?
Arguing with your own imagination.
Some hold that truth is a property. Others do not. There are other frameworks following Reason that truth is a sort of agreement between thought and belief about what's happened and/or is happening and what's happened and/or is happening.
We find the same agreement between thought and belief about the way things are and the way things are; between thought and belief about the case at hand, and the case at hand; thought and belief about the world and/or ourselves, and the world and/or ourselves, etc.
So your ultimate aim is to achieve non-existence?
From eternity I came into madness and to eternity I shall return.
This is just what I said. Whatever the process of human causation (initiating of actions), we (humans) reference it as willing.
Quoting Possibility
How is any of the above without regard for time when time is one of the fundamental references for all those relations you've pointed out?
As to my perspective, it is neither heliocentric nor specific relative to any other reference point. I would describe my perspective as comprehensive or, at least, an attempt at it. To be able to extrapolate anything about reality as a whole, I must attempt to embody everything within me and see everything as parts of me as well as see myself as the unity of everything - in imitation of the reality I wish to understand.
Quoting Possibility
Whether the perspective is heliocentric or at a point within the structure, it would still be relative (to some other points). The only way to reference the whole of reality is to have a perspective that embodies all perspectives. To that end, our conception and examination of reality as a whole is such an attempt. Within reality, all its components (humans included) are subject to relativity. Time is inescapable for all those components because it is an emergent property of that relativity. The only way to be outside of time is to be beyond relativity (as the absolute whole). Therefore, only reality in its absolute sense is outside of time because there is nothing beyond it or which causes it to be relative. For us (humans), and every other 'thing' within reality, time is inevitable.
Here we all are 'brains in a vat' devising ever more sophisticated language in a desperate attempt to get grip on reality.
We see only as far as we can look. Even now a large part of the universe is too far away to be seen. We can only see 13.8 billion light years into the past. The universe is a lot larger than that.
Far cleverer people than me have figured that out. The proper distance—the distance as would be measured at a specific time, including the present—between Earth and the edge of the observable universe is 46 billion light-years (14 billion parsecs), making the diameter of the observable universe about 93 billion light-years (28 billion parsecs).
This is in fact incorrect. We can only look back 13.8 billion years because that is the age of the universe.
'Reality' might be too complex for human comprehension. We might have to be satisfied that we even got this far in our understanding.
Things we comprehend
Possibilities:
Things we cannot comprehend
Possibilities:
At this point we have identified reality into two parts, each of which have not split existence at all really, only our reason. Since we can identify it into two groups, those are two ways of viewing it to come to some conclusion. Since incomprehension has no bearing on our reality in any sense, practically the admittance is that we shouldn't be concerned with it. But practicality does not always coincide with reality, so, since we cannot comprehend it, then it must be out of our own existence. The view is then that human comprehension limits our view of the universe, as we have already established. However, in order to define the terms, since rules govern life, we must say that everything that does not exist is everything we have disproved and everything that we cannot comprehend.
And falsehood... so usefulness is of no help here when setting out truth(as distinct from falsehood).
Yeah, I didn’t explain that well. Scratch that. I’ll need to think about it some more.
I think that human comprehension relies, more than we’re often willing to admit, on a collaborative relationship with other human as well as non-human comprehension. We must trust in the comprehension of others, if we are to increase knowledge beyond our own empirical experience. It’s not the human who can comprehend the most, then, but the human who can maximise awareness, connection and collaboration.
Yes. Usefulness can be the property of a falsehood not known to be false.
But unuseful can never be the property of truth.
Truth must always contain the property of usefulness.
And falsehood known to be false... so usefulness is of no help here when setting out truth(as distinct from falsehood).
This is self-contradictory and/or incoherent.
Let A = usefulness
Let B = truth
Let C = information
Let D = a statement
:brow:
And what do you find so useful in falsehoods?
And this is a totally useless statement.
Sigh....
It's not about what I find... it's about everyday events where people intentionally use falsehoods to mislead others.
The point is that usefulness is of no use in discriminating between truth and falsehood. Discriminating between truth and falsehood is required for taking proper account of truth. Thus... usefulness is useless here...
Again I ask you. You said it. Now defend it and stop being intellectually dishonest.
What do you find useful in a falsehood known to be false?
Read my last post.
intellectually dishonest.
Falsehoods are often of value from an artistic or comedic aspect. They can also generate other ideas that are not false and turn out to be useful.
There are many more ways to do something wrong than right (=optimal) so the world would be a pretty bare place without falsehoods.
Mirror mirror...
Give me 1 example.
Or impressionist / modern art is strictly speaking a wrong portrayal of reality but still has artistic merit.
Or perhaps in science a theory maybe wrong, but it may lead to a better theory being developed through intellectual insights taken from the wrong theory.