Are necessary and contingent truths necessary?
It is commonplace to distinguish between contingent truths - I am sat in a chair - and necessary truths - 2 + 1 = 3. A contingent truth is a proposition that is true, but is capable of being false. By contrast a necessary truth is a proposition that is true and is incapable of being anything but true.
For a while now I have been sceptical that there are any necessary truths (it is an unorthodox view, to be sure, but it is not without precedent - John Stuart Mill, for instance, held it as well). I admit that there do appear to be such truths - our reason does represent propositions such as 2 + 1 = 3 as being true not just here and now, but always and everywhere (that is, necessarily true). But I think, for reasons that do not need to be gone into here, that such appearances are deceptive and that necessity is not a real feature of the world. In everyday discourse we typically use the word 'necessary' expressively, not descriptively. To say that something is necessarily the case is to express one's confidence that it is, in fact, the case. Saying that a proposition is necessarily true is really no different to writing the word 'true' in capital letters. What I believe is that this is also how 'necessary' functions in the context of rational representations.
Just to be clear: I do not deny that it is true that the proposition 2 + 1 = 3 is true. I just deny that it is 'necessarily' true. Or rather, I deny that the word 'necessary' really adds anything to 'true' beyond expressing confidence, or some other attitude (either on our part, or on Reason's part).
It might be thought that if I deny that it is 'necessarily' true that 2 + 1 = 3 then I must think that all truths are contingent (that seems to have been Mill's view).
But I am suspicious that this may be a false dichotomy. For it seems to me that 'contingent' also plausibly functions expressively not descriptively. To say that something is 'contingently' true is to express either some kind of lack of confidence in its actual truth or a lack of confidence in its prospects of remaining true or to express the fact that one can conceive of its being false.
So, what I propose is that there are no such things as either necessary truths or contingent truths. There are just truths. There are not two categories of truth. There are just truths and that's that.
I am not at all confident that the position I have just described is coherent, but I am willing to try and defend it.
For a while now I have been sceptical that there are any necessary truths (it is an unorthodox view, to be sure, but it is not without precedent - John Stuart Mill, for instance, held it as well). I admit that there do appear to be such truths - our reason does represent propositions such as 2 + 1 = 3 as being true not just here and now, but always and everywhere (that is, necessarily true). But I think, for reasons that do not need to be gone into here, that such appearances are deceptive and that necessity is not a real feature of the world. In everyday discourse we typically use the word 'necessary' expressively, not descriptively. To say that something is necessarily the case is to express one's confidence that it is, in fact, the case. Saying that a proposition is necessarily true is really no different to writing the word 'true' in capital letters. What I believe is that this is also how 'necessary' functions in the context of rational representations.
Just to be clear: I do not deny that it is true that the proposition 2 + 1 = 3 is true. I just deny that it is 'necessarily' true. Or rather, I deny that the word 'necessary' really adds anything to 'true' beyond expressing confidence, or some other attitude (either on our part, or on Reason's part).
It might be thought that if I deny that it is 'necessarily' true that 2 + 1 = 3 then I must think that all truths are contingent (that seems to have been Mill's view).
But I am suspicious that this may be a false dichotomy. For it seems to me that 'contingent' also plausibly functions expressively not descriptively. To say that something is 'contingently' true is to express either some kind of lack of confidence in its actual truth or a lack of confidence in its prospects of remaining true or to express the fact that one can conceive of its being false.
So, what I propose is that there are no such things as either necessary truths or contingent truths. There are just truths. There are not two categories of truth. There are just truths and that's that.
I am not at all confident that the position I have just described is coherent, but I am willing to try and defend it.
Comments (120)
Even to make this argument there have to be necessary truths. If what you argue is only contingent, then it has no binding power, as it only happens to be true from time to time, if at all, and there's no reason anyone should accept it.
Necessary truths comprise the relationship between ideas. 2 is always greater than 1, in all possible worlds, as a matter of definition. Again if it were not so, how could logic itself gain any traction?
The reason you don't think that the descriptor 'necessary' adds anything of value, is because you're thinking of it tautologically - in effect, what about 'necessary' is 'necessary'? And the response is, necessary truths are true necessarily. If they were true on some other grounds, then they wouldn't be necessary.
I don't see why. I have not claimed that necessarily there are no necessary truths, only that there are not in fact any.
Quoting Wayfarer
None of that follows. First, I am not arguing that all truths are contingent, for I deny contingent truths too. Propositions are just true or false, they are neither necessarily true, nor contingently true - just true.
If a proposition is true, then there is (normally anyway) a reason to believe it (an 'epistemic reason'). But I fail to see why a truth has to be 'necessarily' true before we have reason to believe it - mere truth is sufficient. For example, I have reason to believe I exist, because it is true I exist. Yet clearly it is not necessarily true that I exist. So it is just plainly false that we lack reason to believe anything other than necessary truths.
Quoting Wayfarer
Well, take any law of logic you like, and call it 'necessarily true'. Well, I will just say that it is 'true'.
So this argument:
1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore P and Q
is valid. You will claim that if its premises are true, necessarily its conclusion is. But I will simply claim that if its premises are true, then its conclusion is. We can both reason just the same - we will both reach the same conclusions, it is just that you will think your conclusions are necessarily true given the premises, whereas I will simply think they are true.
Quoting Wayfarer
No, I just don't think necessity exists and I think the only evidence we have of its existence - namely rational intuitions representing there to be necessary truths - are more reasonably interpreted to be functioning expressively, rather than descriptively.
What I want to see is whether, by denying necessity and contingency, I am committed to affirming contradictions.
If you had six beers in the fridge, and I took some of them, then you would have less than what you put in. How many less, would be contingent on how many I had taken. But that there was less, is a necessary truth. If you knew I took two, then there would necessarily be four remaining (given that only you and I were involved.) I don't see anything else to say, but someone else might.
There were six beers in the fridge. You took two. Now there are four (which is fewer than there used to be).
This is a major fault of the website. I blame the website for our inability to increase the understanding of reason in your otherwise head. After all, I can't blame you, me, or any other user for this; so it must be a problem with the website.
Prove to me that the reason we can't teach you how to become a reasonable person is the fault of you, of me, or of any one or more of the other users including you or me or neither of us, and I shalt rescind the claim that it's the website's fault.
But the vast bulk would accept that some truths are necessary and those that are not necessary are contingent. And they mean by this (well, 'precisely' what's meant is a matter of dispute) that some truths must be true - they are true 'in all possible worlds' - whereas others are not, they just happen to be true but it is possible for them to be false.
I think that every truth is just true. I think no truth is necessarily true, but at the same time I do not think that it is true that a true proposition 'could be false'.
Not necessary as some world feature, but necessary by definition. Therefore such truths can be found only in logic, mathematics and similar axiom based derivation of truth statements. The question then is really about choice of axioms, but they are considered 'self-evident' rather than 'necessary'.
On the other hand, knowledge of the world features is empirical and ultimately only statistical, so no absolute or necessary truths there. Except, perhaps, this one: “I think, therefore I know I exist”.
Let's say I define 'bachelor' as 'never married man'. Well, as Roger is a never married man, then Roger is a bachelor. That's what I'd say. But presumably you'd say that as Roger is a never married man, then 'necessarily' he is a bachelor. That's what I'd deny.
There is nothing to follow, only to understand what "necessary by definition" means. Do you not see it's self-contradiction and pointles to deny what you defined, why would you want to do that?
So, once more, I accept this definition of a bachelor: a bachelor is a never married man. I accept that Roger is a never married man. And I conclude that Roger is therefore a bachelor.
No contradiction there. I have not said anything about Roger that contradicts what I have said about the meaning of the word 'bachelor'
But again, I take it that you would insist that as Bachelors are, by definition, never married men, and Roger is a never married man, then it follows 'of necessity' that Roger is a bachelor.
That's precisely what I deny.
You haven't, then, explained necessity by explaining how necessary truths are truths of definition, for your explanation presupposes that necessity exists, rather than explaining its existence.
Again, I accept that it is true by definition that Roger is a bachelor, yet I deny that there are any necessary truths. I have not, so far as I can tell, contradicted myself.
It is like the concept of thought experiment. So if I say let us imagine that A=B, you either play along or you don't. But instead you want to accept a premise just to deny it, and if you do not see the contradiction, at least you should realize how pointless it is.
Ok, let us hear your reasoning then.
I am arguing that we do not need necessity - that we can dispense with it and still be able to reason about reality just fine, find out stuff, and not commit ourselves to affirming contradictions. And I am saying the same about contingency.
That's what I'm arguing here. So to challenge me you'd need to show that I am wrong about that. But what you're now doing is questioning the point of this. Well, the point is a) it would solve a lot of problems elsewhere, such as how to account for the truth of conditional statements, and b) I think there's a good case for thinking that necessity and contingency are not real. But that case would be undermined if dispensing with them would commit us to affirming contradictions.
Quoting Zelebg
I am not arguing here that necessity and contingency do not exist - although that is what I think - I am arguing that we do not need to affirm their existence. That is, we can, as I say, get along just fine without them. It is that claim - that we can do without them - that I am defending, and I am defending it by showing how those who claim otherwise cannot show me that I must commit myself to contradictions when I deny the reality of necessity (maybe they can - but they haven't yet).
So you, for example, said that necessary truths are truths of definition. But I did not see how the existence of truths of definition would commit me to accepting the existence of necessary truths. For, again, though I accept that it is true by definition that bachelors are never married man, and accept as well that Roger is a never married man, I just conclude from this that therefore Roger is a bachelor.
Roger is a never married man. Never married men are bachelors. Therefore Roger is a bachelor. What would adding "must be" do apart from serving to emphasise the obviousness of it all?
If A is B and B is C, then A is necessarily C.
You are talking about semantics and you want to say “necessarily” is superfluous? It means the conclusion “logically follows” or is “implied by proposition”, that better?
So your interpretation of logical necessity is simply too rigid, unless you want to question the logic of why it “logically follows” A should equal C in the above example?
That's what you say. I say "if A is B, and B is C, then A is C".
Quoting Zelebg
I don't think those don't mean the same as 'necessarily'. For instance, most would hold that the laws of logic are necessary truths, but they do not mean by that that they somehow 'follow' from something.
Plus even if they are synonymous, my position would then be that we can do without them and rather than saying 'logically follows' can simply say 'consequently is the case' or some such.
Consequently is good too, but maybe not exactly hitting the point, which is to illustrate conclusion is exclusively defined by the proposition.
It adds constancy, assures predictability, determinism. It says “no magic allowed”, no god or other some such potential devil could sneak up from outside of the equation and change the result or conclusion. It simply reiterates or underlines ‘rules of the game’ set by axioms, in the service of education for example.
What does the 'it' refer to?
Quoting Zelebg
I don't follow you. I'm not arguing for magic. I mean, it is necessity and contingency that seem to require magic, not their absence.
Anyway, whatever desires of yours the reality of necessity would or would not satisfy, I am arguing that we can dispense with the notion and not be committed to affirming contradictions. You have yet to show me that I am wrong about that.
Well, in a way what you've said just underlines my point - which is that words like 'necessary' 'always' and so forth, function to express convictions, desires, that kind of thing, rather than to describe some feature of reality.
Some propositions are true and some are not. And there are methods we can employ to distinguish the true from the false. But we do not need to invoke the concepts either of necessity or contingency in order to be able to do this, I think.
Just read “necessary” as “always”, and may god help you find less trivial thoughts to think about.
'Has' to be the case would be more accurate. And that's what I'm denying - I'm denying the reality of has-ness. There are true propositions. But adding to the claim that a proposition is true that it 'has' to be true describes nothing real about it, it just expresses conviction, I think.
It's hardly trivial.
Anyway, once more you've yet to show me how denying the reality of necessity commits me to affirming contradictions.
Hi Bartricks!
Both truths still exist, much like objective truths and subjective truths.
Here's an appetite whetter for necessary truths:
1. There is at least one true proposition.
Is that true or false?
Well, I'm sceptical about precisely that - but happy to be corrected. (By that, of course, I mean that I am sceptical that 'necessary' and 'contingent' truths exist, but I do accept that those truths that have been said to be necessary or contingent are true - so I agree that the truths exist, I just do not think a 'necessary' or 'contingent' describes anything real about the truths.)
Quoting 3017amen
Yes, I agree that that is true.
If you believe it's true then it's true by logical necessity. Here's why:
There is at least one true proposition. Call this proposition A. Is A necessarily true? Suppose I contend that is false. Call this proposition B "A is false."
But if A is false so is B because B is a proposition. And if A is false, there are no true propositions. So A must be true.
It is therefore logically impossible for there to exist no true propositions.
It is trivially non-issue unless you are questioning starting axioms.
If A is B and B is C, then A is necessarily C.
That is not a statement about metaphysical or any kind of world or reality, or anything in particular, but about constraints that are set by axioms which you must follow throughout your argument or otherwise it will end up being incoherent, contradicting, or otherwise deemed to be logically false.
It’s just rules of the game. You may question starting axioms, but to accept them and start playing the game just to immediately say “I quit, I don’t like the rules anymore”, that’s more than just crazy, it’s also funny because it’s beautifully pointless.
So, I think proposition A is true.
What about the proposition "A is necessarily true"? No, I think that proposition - proposition B - is false.
I think A is true, and B is false. So far so good.
But now you say this - "But if A is false so is B because B is a proposition. And if A is false, there are no true propositions. So A must be true"
That's clearly confused. I think proposition A is true. Proposition A says "there is at least one true proposition". I think that's true, not false!
But this proposition "Proposition A is necessarily true" I think is false. That proposition says not that there is a true proposition (which I think is true), but that it is necessarily true that there is a true proposition - which I deny.
So you absolutely haven't demonstrated that I am committed to contradicting myself. Not yet, anyway.
Quoting 3017amen
And that is false. That's just to state that it is necessarily true that there are some true propositions. I deny precisely that. There are some true propositions, but it is not necessarily true that there are some true propositions.
I am playing by the rules, I am denying that playing by the rules requires affirming the existence of necessity.
Quoting Zelebg
No, I think "if A is B and B is C, then A is C".
You will have shown that I am not playing by the rules when you show me that I am committed to affirming contradictions.
Okay, do you realize you just agreed to a necessary truth? By agreeing that there exists at least one true proposition, that is considered a necessary truth.
You do realize I absolutely didn't? This: "There is at least one true proposition" does not mean the same as "There is necessarily at least one true proposition".
I think the former is true, the latter false.
Now get me to contradict myself.
Yes it is. Go back and read my first response.
Don't overthink it. It's easier than you think.
"There is at least one total dumbo on this thread" does not mean the same as "There is necessarily at least one total dumbo on this thread". And if I deny the latter - which I do - I am not thereby committed to denying the former - which I most certainly don't.
Read your own sentences more carefully.
Quoting 3017amen
Don't underthink it.
You can not say "no" when you repeated the same thing, just more vaguely. When speaking about any rules it is wise to be overly specific to avoid any potential confusion. And when educating someone about how logic works you might want to use the word "necessary" in order to underline the conclusion should be obvious from the premises. This is trivial semantic non-issue, waste of time.
I realize you prefer ad hominem when pushed in a corner, but that's ok. (Unfortunately, many people resort to that behavior as a deflection mechanism when denying facts.) It's a cognitive science thing too expansive to unpack here.
Maybe, 'contingent truth' will be easier for you to grasp.
First answer this question:
1. all events must have a cause
Is that proposition true or false?
In what fantasy world did you push me into a corner? You tried to show that I was committed to a contradiction, and I showed you in no uncertain terms that you were wrong. I believe it is true that there is at least one true proposition and I believe it is false that it is necessarily true that there is at least one true proposition. Those are not contradictory beliefs!
You are also misusing 'ad hominem'.
Quoting 3017amen
Er, you realize you lost the last skirmish, yes? I rolled over you like a tank over a kitten. It's you, matey, who's having trouble grasping things, namely reality.
Quoting 3017amen
Bossy.
Quoting 3017amen
False.
Please share how you think it is false?
If p states that " all propositions are false "
Then p is also false which implies all propositions are true. Hence, p is also true.
We started with p being false and ended with p being true. Contradiction.
I think this example is more than clear enough, classic liar paradox that tells us that all propositions can't be false if they are of the same order type.
If you are saying that you think all events have 'cause-s', you are saying that it is both a necessary and contingent truth. ( At first you said 'False', so I'm just trying to understand you.)
That's not an example of liars paradox, but this is:
1. this statement is false.
Liar's paradox is usually from the paradox of self-reference. My example is not referring to self-reference. It's an example of a necessary truth.
I think the proposition "all propositions are false" is false. For I believe that some propositions are true.
As for a proposition like this "this proposition is false" - well, I think that proposition is either true or false, but I am not sure which. (Perhaps it is both - in which case it is a counter example to the law of non-contradiction. I think that law is true, but as I do not think it is a necessary truth, I do not see why a counter-example to it would be a problem for me).
So anyway, I fail to see how it poses a difficulty for the view I am putting forward here specifically.
I don't think we should use the word is as a relation between two propositions. Unless you meant to represent numbers.
If we say p=p, we don't add anything to the discussion and if we say p=q, we are saying two things are identical, which is nonsense. Here p,q represent proposition.
You example is correct but l don't see any problem with mine as it also refers to itself in a paradoxical manner.
Maybe l responded to an earlier post.
By necessary truth, do you mean proposition that are true by definition. For example "All bachelors are unmarried " is true by definition. It is necessarily true.
I think all the events have causes. That's not the same as saying that all events must have causes.
I'm trying to understand you - I don't understand why you think the claim that all events have causes is equivalent to saying that all events must have causes.
How does the fact a proposition is true by definition make it necessarily true? Why not just 'true'?
What do you take the word neccessary to mean ?
In other words, if you said 'all events have a cause', then you would be suggesting a necessary truth.
On the other hand, if you said 'all events have causes' you would be suggesting a contingent truth.
I take the word to be expressive. So, when I use it it functions a bit like 'hooray' - that is, it expresses an attitude, rather than describes a feature. That's why I don't think there is any necessity in the world - for saying that a proposition is 'necessarily true' is really no different to saying it is TRUE!! That is, 'necessarily' does what caps lock does.
But when philosophers use it they mean, well, I am not really sure 'exactly' what they mean, which is why I think I can get by without the notion. But they say they mean things such as 'true in all possible worlds' or 'can't be false'.
Why? I don't see that at all.
But if l say a certain proposition is sometimes true , l also say that it is sometimes false. But if l say a proposition is always true, then it is never false. The word neccessary, always adds clarity to what we are stating. It is a good distinction.
If you say something is true, we don't know if you mean for this instance or for all cases.
Let's say I have existed since the beginning of time. It is now true to say that I have always existed. Yet that does not mean that I exist of necessity.
Those who believe in necessity would, I think, happily accept this. For they would accept that a proposition that has always been true is not thereby incapable of being false.
I think of necessary and contingency when I think of Cosmology. And when you say 'all bachelors are unmarried men' I think of that being an analytical truth. But I suppose you could call it a logically necessary truth, since it is true by definition or because it is 'necessarily true' by definition.
But I'm not sure that's proper. Or at least I haven't thought of it that way. Instead, I just call it an analytical truth or an a priori truth.
And so, I tend to categorize it in this way and define the a Priori-a Posteriori Distinction, the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction, the Necessary-Contingent Distinction as follows:
•The analytic – synthetic distinction: Analytic statements can be proven true by analyzing their terms (they are tautological), meanwhile synthetic statements cannot be proven true by analyzing their terms.
•The necessary – contingent distinction: Necessary statements are necessarily true in all cases, meanwhile contingent statements depend on more information (they are conditional).
•The a priori – a posteriori distinction: A priori statements do not rely upon direct experience (they are rationalized), meanwhile a posteriori statements do rely on direct experience (they are empirical).
In my studies, necessary/contingent statements usually are in the context of theoretical physics. But there are all sorts of combinations thereto. For example, in Metaphysics, the infamous Kantian statement 'all events must have a cause' is of course a synthetic-a priori judgement or statement.
And that's because that statement makes a general claim on everything without having experienced everything, yet would require experience to explore/determine its truth value. And the Metaphysical part is our sense of wonderment about it, and why we even have the capacity which causes us to make the statement in the first place (or as Schopenhauer might posit, our metaphysical will to wonder).
In a cosmological context, this would be an example of 'why':
1.Every contingent fact has an explanation.
2.There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts.
3.Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact.
4.This explanation must involve a necessary being.
5.This necessary being is God.
That's not what I asked though. I don't think it is obvious that the vast bulk would say that this distinction is necessary to make. Saying that sounds to me as ridiculous as saying "You must solve this problem using the conservation of energy. You cannot solve it using Newton's laws even though it is possible to do so" to give a physics example.
Quoting Bartricks
Care to elaborate? I think: "I am eating right now" is an example of a proposition that is true at the moment but could very well be false.
I think belief in God comes from being aware of the despair we have in our life without God. Only God can cure us from that despair. Those who do not believe in God are not even aware of being in despair and hence it is still a form of despair. Logical arguments will only convince those who already believe in God. I regard using logic in theology akin to taking away the beauty. Only a religious man can get closer to God and know of him. Rhetoric leaves one behind. We need to have faith just as we live every day hopefully thinking that we won't die today. We don't need to use reasoning to be assured.
I certainly said all this due to kierkegaard being your avatar.
I think your categorization in the Kantian fashion is very clear and useful. But, one of the category is usually subject to scrutiny, the category of synthetic a priori .
If l am not wrong, euclidean geometry was a part of the synthetic a priori but it turned out that it wasn't necessarily true as mathematicians developed non euclidean geometry. Since it was argued that synthetic a priori statement are necessarily true. It turned out that this category may not exist but it is still an open topic.
Sure. Kant studied/taught math and thought the act of computing mathematics itself was a synthetic a priori exercise in cognition. I tend to agree with him on that.
And I agree with you that propositions, or as you say arguments, relative to EOG are usually for those who already have experienced God or otherwise infer God as a causal agent to their own existence. But the distinction there is a priori v. a posteriori.
In other words, not to detour off topic; deductive reasoning v inductive reasoning. The ontological argument only fails because it's primarily deductive (or analytical as it were).
I think it was Einstein who said basically if human's weren't sentient creatures, Religion would have no meaning. There would not be a need to posit God.
So, using a Star Trek metaphor; we are either Spock or Captain Kirk. Or maybe a combination of both :wink:
I think most would consider it incoherent to deny the reality of either or both. They may be right, of course. I am just exploring whether we can do without them, given that I do not really understand how either could be a reality.
Quoting khaled
I do not know what 'could very well be false' means here. That is, I do not understand metaphysical possibility. I understand epistemic possibility - that is, not being certain whether something is the case. And I think that often when we say "but it could be false" it is our uncertainty about its actual truth that we are expressing (which is fine). And I understand what it means to say that one can think it false - that is, that it is conceivably false - and I think we sometimes say 'could be false' to express this idea (that is, that though we believe it to be true, we have or are imagining it to be false too). But if one is using the 'could' to express metaphysical possibility, then I do not really know what it means. Which is why I am trying to dispense with the notion.
Er, how on earth does that demonstrate that "always is the case" means the same as "necessarily is the case"??
It just doesn't. For one thing, you're helping yourself to the very notions whose need is in question, and for another you're just not addressing my question, you've just said some things.
Not sure what you're referring to, or are getting at... I'm simply showing you that necessary and contingent truth have their relevance per your OP.
Be well
I realize you prefer ad hominem when pushed in a corner, but that's ok. (Unfortunately, many people resort to that behavior as a deflection mechanism when denying facts.) It's a cognitive science thing too expansive to unpack here. LOL
Quoting Bartricks
Well, perhaps a slight teaching-moment detour is in order. How has pride enhanced your cognitive abilities in understanding the distinctions between necessary and contingent truth's?
I hate to call you out on this minor detail but you just contradicted yourself by asking for help when apparently your suggesting that you don't need it. That's the second time that happened... .
At any rate, I have demonstrated by that simple syllogism (including of course my other responses) where contingent/necessity is appropriate in (cosmological/metaphysical) discourse, without going into any extraneous explanation that could confuse you.
But to answer your concern, you denying those so-called logical tools of discourse would not present any contradictions. However, with all due respect, by denying them you would also be denying yourself of a higher level of understanding. At the risk of redundancy, theoretical physics uses those tools to help advance various theories about same.
Does that help any?
I agree, but I wouldn't stop there. I would say: saying that a proposition is true (or TRUE) is really no different to expressing (asserting) the sentence.
And so doing (asserting a sentence) is really no different to pointing the predicate (e.g. adjective) of the sentence at the object denoted by the subject of the sentence.
And so doing is really no different to producing (writing and uttering) tokens of the sentence. It's all hot air.
I don't expect you will approve of any of these steps. From such madness I do get to explain (away?) both truth and necessity. But since you seem to believe in truth on some abstract level, you won't (I expect) like the way I dispose of both. Here goes, anyway.
Truth is unanimity, or consistency of all tokens produced. We've been here before:
Quoting bongo fury
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting bongo fury
IOW, I admit that truth is relative to a system: any more or less expansive and enduring but non-ultimate lake or culture of sentence-propagation (and predation). Of which there will many.
Whereas, you envision a singular system overseen by "Reason".
Quoting Bartricks
And I like the image (by which I might assimilate your vision to mine) of Reason throwing new fish in the water and overseeing a perfect ecology. (Perfectly consistent or at least stable.)
Anyway, necessity then is (potentially, if we have the time and inclination to argue logically or hypothetically) just the claim or observation of some reliable pattern of population growth in some class of systems grown (in petri dish or sandbox) from scratch, from small families of premises, and with clear rules of reproduction and predation.
Although, more usually, we just join the fray of reproduction and predation in a larger and less civilised sea of sentence tokens. But we join it armed (in aid of rhetorical fitness) with more or less clearly formed ecological predictions which we call "truth" and "necessity".
I haven't asked for help, I am testing a thesis. I am seeing if I can do without the notions of necessity and contingency and not thereby commit myself to affirming any contradictions. I am waiting for someone to show me - not just declare - that I will be bound to affirm a contradiction.
Quoting 3017amen
No, like I say, you put terms like 'necessary' into the premises, thus presupposing what needed to be demonstrated.
Quoting 3017amen
Stop talking - it isn't making sense. When I was at school I didn't learn any French because I just cheated by copying my friend's work. When it came to the French oral exam I had no clue what the teacher was asking me, and so I just made some noises in the hope that somehow they might be French sentences. You're doing something equivalent here methinks.
Quoting bongo fury
I partially approve of them, it is just that I identify 'truth' with an activity of Reason, rather than an activity of ourselves. Our judgements about a proposition's truth or lack of it are then judgements about whether or not Reason is asserting it. In this way I will be able to do everything you can do, yet at the same time respect appearances - for when we judge a proposition to be true we do not appear to be just asserting something (that gets things the wrong way around, for in general asserting something does not make it so; we assert that something is the case because we take it to be the case - that is, we think it is true that it is the case).
So my problem with your view is not that it is fundamentally wrong - for I hold a version of it - but that there is no evidence it (your version, that is) is true.
Of course, one might well say the same about my view that necessity and contingency are not features of reality. For after all, they do appear to be features of reality given that our guide to reality -the representations of our reason - represent many propositions to be true of necessity.
But I have a case for thinking that such representations are likely to be being misinterpreted by us (I haven't made it here, for I am just exploring the coherence of the possibility, rather than the case for its actuality). I think there is no parallel case for thinking that truth is unreal.
I don't think so but this doesn't matter
Quoting Bartricks
I don't either. I don't know what that is supposed to mean. Care to elaborate?
In what of your phantasies did he (he being 3017Amen) say he pushed you in a corner? He said "I realize you prefer ad hominem when pushed in a corner".
He did not say when HE pushed you in a corner. He said when you get pushed into a corner. Get with the program, man.
So, he did not say that he pushed me into a corner, and I did not say that he did either. All is well.
Aw, shucks. I was again foiled by your superior argumenting skills. (S.)
Well, it is hard because I don't think it makes sense - so I am explaining something I think is ultimately nonsensical.
Take the proposition that you exist - that is, the proposition "Khaled exists". That is true.
But most philosophers are going to say that though it is true, it is a contingent truth.
And what does that mean? Well, I am not sure. I do not think it is up to me to clarify what it means, given that I do not say that any proposition is contingent. Surely the person who says of a proposition that it is contingent is the one who owes us an explanation of what exactly they mean by the term?
Nevertheless, I'll run through a few candidates.
If someone says of a proposition that it is 'capable' of being false, they might just be expressing their lack of certainty about its actual truth.
But that's not what the philosopher means by 'contingent'. After all, you can be certain that the proposition "Khaled exists" is true, yet they would insist that it remains a contingent truth.
Similarly, someone might say that a proposition is 'capable' of being being and mean by this that they can conceive of its being so. That is, they find they are able to imagine its falsity.
But that isn't what a philosopher means when they say that a proposition is contingent, for there are many propositions that we can imagine being false that (the philosopher would say anyway) are not contingent. For instance, if we are not very good at mental arithmetic we - many of us - might believe that 3 x 18 = 54 yet at the same time be able to imagine that it equals 58 (due to us not being entirely sure what it equals). Nevertheless, the philosopher would insist that 3 x 18 = 54 is not a contingent truth, but a necessary truth.
So what do they mean? Well, again, I stress that it is not up to me to say. But many would say that what they mean is that there is a possible world in which the proposition is false. So, though "Khaled exists" is true in this world - the actual world - there are possible worlds in which it is false (for there are possible worlds in which you don't exist).
Glad you've finally taken your meds and some of the scales have fallen from your eyes.
I don't think anyone can imagine it being 58. We can believe it is 58 momentarily but that doesn't make it true. Once someone has discovered it is 54 he can't imagine a situation in which it is 58. A contingent truth means that even when you are convinced it is true right now you can imagine a situation where it isn't
This is just clearly false. We can easily imagine sums equalling numbers distinct from those they actually equal - that's what's happening when people get sums wrong. And when we're unsure - as we often are - what a sum equals, we can imagine it equalling 54 or 55 or whatever.
Quoting khaled
Again, clearly false. That's just not what philosophers use the term to mean. Take your own existence. Can you imagine not existing? No. Yet the fact you exist would be described by virtually all philosophers as a contingent truth, not a necessary one (yet by your definition above, it would be a necessary truth).
There is a big debate about the connection between conceivability and metaphysical possibility, with some arguing that if you can conceive of something being the case, then it is metaphysically possible for it to be the case, and others disputing this. The very existence of this debate shows that metaphysical possibility is not considered to be one and the same as conceivability. I mean, even those who think that conceivability is a reliable guide to metaphysical possibility do not think the two are one and the same notion.
What we can imagine is someone making a calculation mistake. That's not the same as imagining that 3x18 = 58. Let's make it a bit simpler. 1 + 1 = 2. 1 + 1 = 2 is true no matter what because it's a definition. In the same way that "Married bachelors don't exist" is always true by definition.
You're saying something akin to: "One can forget the definition of bachelor for a moment and thus married bachelors can exist". In this case and the 3x18 case, it's not that someone can conceive of 3x18 =58 or of a married bachelor, it's that someone made a mistake. That's all you can imagine: someone making a mistake and forgetting the definitions.
In other words:
"1 + 1 = 2" is a necessary truth
"When I calculate 1 + 1 I get the sum of 2" is a contingent truth
Quoting Bartricks
I can easily imagine a world in which I don't exist which makes me existing in this world a contingent truth. I cannot imagine the "experience of not existing" if that's what you're asking but that is not even a coherent concept.
Quoting Bartricks
When did I say that?
Here:
Quoting khaled
True by definitional fiat.
Definitions of that which existed in it's entirety prior to our awareness of it can be wrong. If we do not allow for that, if we do not consider that, we find ourselves claiming that falsehoods are necessary truths.
Er, yes. I am saying they don't exist and we don't need them to exist.
My explanation is better.
Oh really? Explain.
Thus your entire argument falls apart. Sorry :cry:
:roll:
Quoting khaled
Can be interpreted to mean whatever is conceivable is metaphysically possible not that they are one and the same.
Yes, but we were talking about what metaphysically possibility might be, and you offered that. So now you're just being disingenuous.
Quoting khaled
I didn't detect any.
Are you saying that what it means to say that a proposition is necessarily true is that it is true 'by definition'?
Quoting khaled
I am arguing we cannot imagine 3x18 being 58 and that I CAN easily imagine a world in which I don't exist. You claimed the opposite in both cases.
Quoting Bartricks
Yes. Example: There cannot be married bachelors.
Well, I just think both claims are false. People would not make mistakes in mental arithmetic if they were incapable of imagining the sum equally something it did not, in fact equal.
And I cannot imagine a world without me in it. All I can do is imagine my body not existing.
Anyway, it does seem from the above that you are now identifying 'necessarily true' with 'true by definition'. Is that right?
Isn't that exactly what a "world without you in it" means? You either just lack imagination or you're being disingenuous
Quoting Bartricks
When people make a mistake in arithmetic they are forgetting a definition or a rule somewhere. The fact that someone forgot a definition and got a wrong answer doesn't make that answer the truth. For example, one can forget the definition of bachelor for a moment but that doesn't mean married bachelors can exist
Quoting Bartricks
I literally just answered this. Yes. Though I don't think there is much point in moving on when we disagree on something as basic as "can you imagine 3x18 equalling 58"
I wish life was that simple.
To deny or negate a proposition that's a necessary truth will lead to a contradiction in all possible worlds. A contingent truth may be false and thus amenable to negation in some possible worlds.
Propositions like "I exist" inferred from "I think" are necessary truths because their negation is an impossibility i.e. leads to a contradiction in all possible worlds.
Propositions like "dogs have wet noses" are contingent since it's possible that there's a world where dogs' noses aren't wet. In other words, negating such propositions don't lead to a contradiction only in those worlds where the proposition is true and not in all possible worlds.
That there is such a distinction in philisophy suggests either a necessity or utility. Isn't it enough to know about this world alone? Knowledge of this world alone implies we would be walking around with a mixed bag of truths: there would be true propositions in our knowledge bank that are either necessarily true or contingently true. However, if our knowledge is to transcend this world, its odd peculiarities, we would need to gain knowledge of necessary truths.
Is it then necessary (your question) to know the difference between these two kinds of truths? I guess in a purely epistemological sense it would be quite unsatisfactory for a person to know a proposition that can be false in some other world; he would be limited to his world and its particular construction. Would it count as knowledge? I mean our "knowledge" that all intelligent beings have two legs, being a contingent truth, would probably fail us if ever we visited another planet where, say, mollusc-like creatures evolved intelligence.
This brings us to the issue of utility. Is knowing that there are two kinds of truths, contingent and necessary, useful? Indeed it would serve very well in sorting our knowledge on that basis for it would inform us which propositions are temporary and revisable and which propositions are permanent and fixed.
No, that isn't what it means at all. Again: I can imagine my body not existing, but I seem unable to imagine that 'I' - the one doing the imagining - does not exist.
Yet I do not exist of necessity.
So inconceivability is neither constitutive of, or a reliable guide to necessity's presence.
Quoting khaled
Give any explanation you like, the simple fact is they often imagine that 18 x 3 = 58. It's why maths exists as a discipline. And it is why rules are formulated - for relying on our imagination is not a reliable way of doing anything other than the most basic of sums.
But even if everything I have just said is wrong - and it really isn't - it is absurd to think that your imagination either constitutively determines what is or is not possible (that somehow your imagination is in charge of reality), or that reality somehow has control over your imagination such that it has managed to forbid it from imagining that which reality cannot provide. The idea is simply farcical.
So, again, conceivability and necessity are not the same notion (nor is one a reliable guide to the other).
Quoting khaled
No, because you keep pressing the conceivability point, thus leaving me unclear what view you hold.
'Inconceivably false' and 'true by definition' are not the same. So you go on about conceivability, and then - out of nowhere - you claim that a necessary truth is 'true by definition'. Hence my confusion.
Anyway, you now think that what it is for a proposition to be 'necessarily' true (as opposed to just 'true') is that it is 'true by definition'.
Well, I don't think that captures the notion of necessity, for no word has its definition of necessity. I mean, you'd agree to that, presumably?
Bachelor 'does' mean 'unmarried man'. But it doesn't 'have' to mean that. It just does, yes?
That's true of all words. So if 'necessarily true' just means 'true by definition' then 'necessarily true' doesn't tell us anything more about the nature of reality than just 'true' would.
I do not know what that means. To be clear, I accept that it is true that a true proposition is not also false (the law of non-contradiction). But I do not think that it is 'necessarily' true that a true proposition is not also false. Or at least, I do not yet know what 'necessarily' true means beyond just 'true'.
Talk of possible worlds is really no help here at all, for the notion of 'possible' is precisely what's at issue.
Talk of possible worlds is just a colourful way of saying 'metaphysically possible'.
For example, say I want to know what 'cheese' is, and you say 'cheese is fromage'. Well, ok, but I'm non the wiser for all you've done is given me another word to refer to the same thing.
It seems to me that this, at best, is what talk of 'possible worlds' does, if that.
I mean, what is a possible world? An actual place? Or just an imaginary one?
It's impossible for a necessary truth to be false but it's possible for contingent truths to be false. What do you think "possible/impossible" means?
So you’re trying to imagine the experience of not existing? That’s an incoherent concept. Of course you would not be able to imagine that, that’s like trying to imagine a square circle. If your body doesn’t exist the “I” (probably) won’t exist but it pointless to try to imagine what that would “feel like”.
Quoting Bartricks
We have very different definitions of “imagine” then. If someone can imagine 3x18=58 then I would take it that person can have a crystal clear mental image of himself putting 18 sets of 3 things each next to each other and getting 58 things. I don’t think people can do that.
Quoting Bartricks
I can’t think of an example of something that is inconceivably false that is not true by definition or vice versa. Though that could just be a lack of imagination. Care to provide an example?
Quoting Bartricks
Yes it does, because you can substitute the meanings of the words in. For example: a married bachelor cannot exist can be translated to: A married unmarried man cannot exist. Which is obviously true and will remain true regardless of whatever word you use to encapsulate “unmarried man”.
Yes, er, that's MY point - I cannot conceive of not existing. I cannot imagine it. But clearly that does not mean that I exist of necessity. So 'inconceivable' does not capture what philosophers mean when they say that a proposition is true of necessity. For the proposition "Bartricks exists" is one that I cannot conceive of being false, yet it is not a proposition that any philosopher I know of would say is of a kind that is 'necessarily' true (as opposed to just 'true').
So, I give you an example of something I - and anyone else who is clear about what is involved - cannot conceive of being the case, and you first say that you can conceive of it, and now you say that it is impossible to conceive of it. Okay, so again, "Bartricks exists" is a proposition whose falsity I cannot conceive of, yet that is not necessarily true. Thus, when we wonder what necessity is, conceivability is not a good guide.
Quoting khaled
To quote you, "I literally just did!" This proposition "Khaled exists" is, for you, a proposition you cannot conceive to be false, yes? But it is not true by definition. And it is not necessarily true.
Quoting khaled
But you said that 'necessarily' true should be understood to mean 'true by definition'. But the definition of a term - and thus what you can substitute one word for - are not necessary truths. So, although it is true that bachelors are unmarried men, it is not necessarily true because the definitions of those terms are not necessary truths. It is not 'necessarily' true that 'bachelor' means 'unmarried man'. It just does.
So I don't see how what you've said addresses the point. In effect all you've said is that so long as bachelor means unmarried man, a bachelor will be an unmarried man and vice versa. Well, yes. But that's no different to saying that so long as there is some cheese in my fridge it will be true that there is some cheese in my fridge. Yet clearly it is just 'true' that there is some cheese in my fridge - it is not necessarily true.
So 'true by definition' doesn't capture what 'necessarily true' means either.
We can still say a proposition is 'necessarily' true, but now the term will be functioning expressively - it will express our conviction that it is actually true, rather than saying something special about the proposition itself. That is how the word typically functions in everyday life.
But the idea that necessity and contingency are real features of the world, as opposed to expressions of conviction or doubt (and such like) is, I think, false.
Under what conditions do propositions deserve our convictions or our doubts?
You CAN imagine a world in which the collection of molecules known as your body doesn’t exist correct? Therefore your body existing is a contingent truth. You’re trying to imagine the “experience of not existing” which is not a coherent concept so of course you’d fail.
Quoting Bartricks
Really? You cannot imagine a world in which your parents never met?
Quoting Bartricks
Maybe actually read what I’m saying. One can easily conceive of a world without themselves. That’s not what you’re trying to do. You’re trying to conceive of the experience of not existing, which is an incoherent concept like “square circle” and I don’t know why you’re trying to do that
Quoting Bartricks
No. And I never said that. I can easily imagine a world where the homo sapien referred to on this forum as “Khaled” doesn’t exist. What I cannot imagine is the “experience of non existence” which is, again, an incoherent concept. Because if said homo sapien didn’t exist there wouldn’t be an experience to imagine
Quoting Bartricks
I understand your point. I just think it’s trivial. However you swap around the terms and definitions “a married unmarried man cannot exist” will remain true. When someone says “true by definition” It usually means “if you substitute the definition in it will be clear that the statement is true” which is exactly what I mean.
When Reason herself seems either to express a conviction that they are true, or a doubt about the matter, or seems to favour 'us' being doubtful about the truth of the proposition in question (given how we have acquired it).
So, it seems clear and distinct to our reason that 2 + 2 = 4 - indeed, our reason represents 2 + 2 necessarily to = 4, which is our reason's way of conveying Reason's conviction that this is so.
Thus, we are justified in believing very firmly that 2 + 2 = 4.
No, that's question begging. Yes, of course I can imagine my body not existing. And most would agree that my body's existence is contingent. But that isn't what the notion of 'contingency' means (it does not mean 'is conceivably false'. For I find myself unable to imagine myself not existing, yet clearly my self's existence, no less than my body's existence, is considered by most to be contingent too.
So you're persisting with the idea that necessity and contingency has something to do with conceivability, despite the fact there is damning evidence that this is not the case, plus just taken at face value it seems absurd to think that our imaginations place limits on reality and vice versa.
Quoting khaled
Er, we're going in tedious circles here - my parents created my body, not my self. So yes, I can obviously imagine that, but it's beside the point.
Quoting khaled
Maybe YOU should do that - you don't seem to understand your own view, or why it seems to be two quite different views that you vacillate between.
Quoting khaled
No, first "a married unmarried man cannot exist" is not true if the 'cannot' means 'necessarily cannot', for it is by convention - and thus not necessary - that 'unmarried' means 'not married'.
And if you agree that 'necessarily true' adds nothing to 'true' (and that this is also true of contingently true') then you agree with me.
Quoting Bartricks
:wink:
I would argue on many levels you are right. I believe in absolute truth for example but I believe it is very hard to approach the threshold of attaining absolute truth depending on what field of study you are into. Forensics and Crime investigation are fields of study where absolute truth is debated depending on the crime or "crime".
Another thing to note is that there are those who like to remain ignorant at all costs on one end of the spectrum and on the other end there are those like perhaps you who want the truth at all costs. "be as wise as a serpent and as gentle as a dove for he sends us out among wolves"
Wrong. 2+2=1
Figure it out.
You just don't learn, do you? :roll:
How does that make the necessary-contingent distinction undesirable?
Quoting Bartricks
That’s what it means for you not to exist.... What you’re trying to imagine is the experience of not existing and your inability to do so doesn’t prove anything. If your body didn’t exist there wouldn’t be an experience because there wouldn’t be a self.
Quoting Bartricks
But surely without your body your self wouldn’t exist? That’s the assumption here. Your self is contingent on your body existing. Unless you’re suggesting that selves can exist without bodies in which case it becomes unclear whether their existence is contingent or necessary.
Quoting Bartricks
Ok how about “a married not married man cannot exist”. Mr nitpick
Quoting Bartricks
Now when did I say that? I wouldn’t be responding to you if I agreed would I.
Quoting Bartricks
But our logic/reason does? Both are just human faculties. Also categorizing truths into necessary and contingent doesn’t place limits on reality any more than Newton’s theory of gravitation forced the universe to behave according to his theory. Because our categorization can simply be flawed
Quoting Bartricks
I asked you to provide an example of something that is “true by definition” that is not “inconceivably false” or vice verse and you provided “khaled exists”. However it is conceivable that khaled doesn’t exist and nothing in khaled’s definition says he must exist. Therefore that example fails. I think both views are the same though I’m not sure on this point. As I said, could just be lack of imagination