Things interacting with each other is not observation, by any stretch of the imagination. If it is accepted in philosophy of science, that things inte...
It's not "a something", because he appears to be dismissing "something" for "process". Nevertheless, what he is discussing is in the mind, but as I sa...
He uses "picture" as an example, an illustration, it's more like a metaphor, we'd be better off with "picture-like". The point of your emphasized line...
If you ask whether the picture fits the use of the word, as Wittgenstein clearly does, ("In what sense can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of th...
Of course it's the same sense of "fit". He's asking if the word is fit as an appropriate descriptive term for the picture in mind. The only thing is t...
There is a distinction to be made between understanding the use of a word upon hearing it in a particular situation, and judging whether a word is "fi...
This is not true, and that's the problem which the op deals with. Science attempts to understand the world, as it appears to us, but it does not revea...
According to Wikipedia, "Canada is a country in the northern part of North America." It defines "country" in this way: And this is how Wikipedia defin...
I don't see how "what serves a purpose" tells us "what is". What if all the patterns which human beings come up with are imaginary, fabrications, and ...
You mean the real estate? I see how inhabitants would own the real estate, but I don't see how the inhabitants would own the country. Real estate is o...
What do you think is meant by "imitation" here? I have a hard time imagining "imitation" as we commonly use the word, being used to refer to the mediu...
It seems we are talking about completely different ontological points. You are talking about the reason why patterns make sense to us, and I am talkin...
Constraints do not necessarily cause patterns. The constraints must be designed, or systematic to cause patterns. So you are overlooking the real caus...
In your quotes from 2019, you missed the conclusion. The necessity of logic, logical necessity is not rule based, it is language based, and "Important...
I've read 2019's post twice fully, and some parts three or four times now, and I've looked very carefully at what Wittgenstein says about logic. I've ...
There are two distinct ways of "understanding" outlined in this section (138-142). If understanding a word is to associate something (like a picture) ...
My assumptions of what logic is, are derived from Wittgenstein's descriptions. So I see no point in dismissing these assumptions for your assumptions ...
Do you recognize the difference between something following rules, and rules being used to describe a thing? In the former case, the rules pre-exist t...
No, the issue is that if we assume that an animal must use logic, or reason, to do something like communicate, then we'll find that logic must pre-exi...
I don't think so. Evolution does not follow any rules. What are you saying, that evolutionary processes follow some sort of informal logic? Who would ...
This says nothing more than "if there is order in the universe, it must be a logical order". But this is the "classical account" that 2019 refers to, ...
Schopenhauer1 appears to be trying to draw some sort of ontological conclusions from this Wittgensteinian perspective. If natural languages are not ru...
This is otherwise known as the tinted glass analogy. If the glass through which I look at the world is tinted, it will affect the way the world appear...
Are you starting to see why you shouldn't have been so quick to trust me? And I've been subjected to many institutions of enforcement. I just don't se...
I don't see how you can say "use" does not fit scientific language games. The reality of the world is inherent within "use", as what is used. So "for ...
Right, but Wittgenstein does investigate what "how things are for us" means, because "us" implies a communion which is closely related to communicatio...
I still don't understand. You are willing to trust anyone, yet no one is entitled to that trust. On what basis do you give your trust? If trust is som...
Have you read "On Certainty"? We can say "it is certain" about some things, and I suppose that this is as close as Wittgenstein gets to saying what a ...
The issue is, as I described to Schop, how one gets from how things appear to me, to how things are "for us". This is a metaphysical issue, so being c...
You imply that Wittgenstein takes "for us" for granted. He does not, he recognizes a relationship between the existence of "for us" and the existence ...
Well, there is the bigger issue of how is the "for us" even a real perspective, when everything I apprehend is "for me". Language-games appear to me, ...
Many believe that wanton killing is not a good thing. Killing is a serious action which needs to be only carried out for a good reason, and this needs...
Why do you say that this is "not metaphysical"? To make a distinction between "things as they are", and "as they are for us", is to make a metaphysica...
I assume then, that "trust" is an attitude which you have toward me, and others as well. Would you say that you are born to be trusting, so it is inst...
Wittgenstein seems to be fascinated by mathematics and numbers. It appears like he sees that numbers work, but he doesn't understand how numbers work,...
But paranoia is a property of a thing (person)), it's not a name of the thing. How is Ralph's statement "my neighbour is a spy" evidence that he is pa...
I think I get it. "The drum is empty of liquid", and "the drum is full of vapour", are two distinct focal concepts, referring to the same thing. I thi...
As I explained, Ralph cannot validly conclude that his neighbour is a spy, whether he suffers delusions or not is irrelevant. Logic doesn't work that ...
I don't understand this attitude. Are you saying that if I was close to you for years, a good friend for many years, and I never did anything to incli...
Suppose Ralph believes there is a spy, but has not determined the person who is a spy, so he says "there is a spy", this is de dicto. If Ralph believe...
Trust is earned, it cannot be enforced. When it is lost, we suffer the consequences. But trust will not be regained through enforcement. That ship has...
The problem here being that, as I described in my other post, we have no principle whereby we can say that a language-game is a "real" object. Remembe...
Wittgenstein reduces logical necessity to a form of "needed for a particular purpose". This is the pragmatist standard, conception is based in purpose...
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