As independent things is the simple way of looking at the world. And there is much empirical support for this. We see things as distinct from each oth...
This is the problem then. That is not the law of identity. The law of identity does not allow that there is more than one X. When you say "for all X.....
You know there's a difference between information and knowledge, don't you? That there is information all over the universe does not mean that there i...
I don't see how "having information scattered all over the environment", which appears to me to be an accurate description, (imagine if you could see ...
I agree, the distinction between description and reality is relevant here. The law of identity attempts to get right to reality, independent of what w...
No, it's not really what I'm driving at at all. To think that the law of identity states that an object has a static fixed identity is a misunderstand...
Really, I'm afraid that the Trump phenomenon is just a symptom of the social disease which has infected us. Check the man's approval ratings. As it ap...
Yes, but my point is that the law of identity transcends formal logic as well as the notion of 'existence", and that is why it is an ontological princ...
I'm not familiar with your use of symbols, but there is an object assumed, or else there is nothing identified. The object need not be a physical obje...
That's basically what I was trying to tell Kornelius. It's an ontological principle because it produces the logical necessity that there is such a thi...
No, I mean Aristotle's law of identity, which is an ontological principle. It states that a thing is the same as itself. It is ontological because it ...
145: The imaginary pupil is supposed to have learned to write the series 0 to 9 in the way which we call correct, consistently, numerous times. Wittge...
I think the law of identity is itself a metaphysical claim. So it's not a matter of me importing metaphysical claims into the law of identity, it alre...
OK, so let's assume it's as you say, it's only the reader being referred to with "he" here at 144. The reader says "I can imagine that too", and this ...
The problem here is that Wittgenstein has given us an example which cannot be related to anything real, therefore we cannot make sense of the example....
It's not a matter of what I'm reading into "he", it's a matter of determining the proper referent of "he". If "he" refers to the pupil in Wittgenstein...
There is a dichotomy between we and he at 144. We have a normal way of looking at things, and do not make systematic mistakes in counting numbers. He,...
Oh, then what is it? He distinguishes random from systematic mistakes in a theoretical way, and says that there is no sharp distinction between the tw...
Right, he asks that question and answers it with this: : Notice, he begins by speaking to "you", "you can imagine that too". Then he proceeds in this ...
We have two distinct sets of circumstances in which the pupil's capacity to learn the formation rule comes to an end. One is when he is making random ...
I don't agree with that at all. He's talking in the third person, referring to "him", "he is capable of imagining that?", "put the picture before him"...
That's a load of crap. Plato is pointing our minds toward the Forms, he is not claiming to reveal them to us. We cannot see them, we can only apprehen...
I was just trying to explain Wittgenstein's point: The point being that we are inclined to think that the person making the systematic mistake can be ...
I think what he is driving at is the ability to learn. Notice that a systematic mistake demonstrates the possibility of being corrected, and the rando...
Wittgenstein will proceed now to apply the distinction made at 142, between normal use and abnormal use, to the process of learning what he calls a "f...
I don't see your point. Are you arguing that using words is not an act, or are you arguing against Wittgenstein's principle that meaning is use. Eithe...
Oh dear, what are you thinking? Using words is a type of act, is it not? There are many meaningful acts which human beings engage in, using words is o...
You might say "I intended to make an unintentional act", and speak the truth in saying this, if you truly believed that you could do this. And I could...
Well no, just because you claim it, doesn't make it so. That's the difficult aspect of "intention". What you intend does not necessarily come from wha...
The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself, or identical to itself. This does not deny the possibility of change, because despite t...
That's a good question. I'd say yes. If I swing the hammer, and miss the nail, is the action still meaningful? I think it is, despite the failure. To ...
I didn't say that. I said that people can use a word despite having misunderstood how it is used by others. Having understood the use of a word by ano...
If the appropriate picture is not associated when hearing the word, this is not understanding, we call it misunderstanding. But speaking the word is c...
Just to clarify my last point Luke, hearing a word and speaking a word are not the same thing, they are distinct processes. Wittgenstein's argument ag...
I don't see why not. It's not that you use the word to mean something, because meaning and use are one and the same. If you use a word, the word has m...
Suppose you hear a spoken word, and understanding that word consists of associating it with a picture like thing (I will call it an "idea", perhaps). ...
Call it conflation if you like, but when a person speaks words, if the array of words which one speaks is not "forced" upon that person by a mental im...
Let me just see if I can understand your distorted opinion. Wittgenstein is talking about choosing words at 139. Then at 140, where he states the conc...
Well, he introduces the topic of what it is to "understand a word" at 138, and proceeds to discuss the meaning of words, the use of words, and the cho...
So when you describe something, like Wittgenstein describes choosing words at 139 and 140, this is not a case of expressing an understanding of the th...
There is not such distinction and that's what I said. So obviously I am not introducing the distinction, you are. Because you do not want to face the ...
Don't be silly, there's no such distinction. Meaning is use. Using a word is speaking. Understanding the meaning of a word is understanding speaking. ...
More evidence of the confusion I am talking about. The section ends just as confused as it starts, and this is because of the ambiguity in his use of ...
This is what he said: As I said, I am concerned with how he uses "grasp it in a flash". To speak in a comprehensible way requires a skill of choosing ...
Each, the micro system and the macro system are constructed so as to interact. So the human involvement in the interaction is not restricted to whethe...
Right, if a robot picks up a gun a shoots someone, it's not the robot who committed the murder, but the person who programmed it to do that. Likewise,...
Observation is a noting of information. Interaction is a reciprocal action. It may be the case that all observations are interactions, but not all int...
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