Are de re counterfactuals rigid?
Two questions:
Do you think that Kripke would argue that the impossibility of de re counterfactuals only obtains for rigid designators?
And a following question as to one might reasonably speculate that de re statements are a fortiori rigid?
Do you think that Kripke would argue that the impossibility of de re counterfactuals only obtains for rigid designators?
And a following question as to one might reasonably speculate that de re statements are a fortiori rigid?
Comments (51)
I'll try and provide you with everything that seems pertinent to the issue; but, am apprehensive of trying to rationalize this due to my own lack of knowledge on the issue:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_dicto_and_de_re#Context_of_modality
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vivid_designator
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operator_(linguistics)#Quantifier_raising
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prop-attitude-reports/dere.html
Hope that provides some background context we can work on here.
Thanks.
OK, so let me elaborate at risk of spewing babble. De re counterfactuals seem to imply that quantification is limited to the scope of the singular individual expressing a "belief" such as:
Ralph believes that someone is a spy, instead of the de dicto assertion that,
Someone is such that Ralph believes s/he is a spy.
The limitation of the scope of quantification is the point here because, in a counterfactual world, it could be that case that de dicto there is no-one that is a spy or that nobody is out to get Ralph. De re, the assertion still obtains (perhaps because Raph is schizophrenic or is such that he is paranoid for some reason.), thus the rigidity of the de dicto assertion does not necessarily obtain because it encompasses the scope of the domain of individuals in the sum total of the "world", whereas the de re assertion is endowed with a sense of rigidity, due to the characteristics or quality of the person that is Ralph.
Now, this all seems to imply in my mind, that it boils down to essentialism, such that de re: "Because Ralph is a schizophrenic because he believes his neighbor is a spy." Whereas de dicto: "Nobody is a spy because Ralph falsely believes his neighbor is a spy due to his (essentialist?) quality of being a schizophrenic."
Hope that elucidates the difference I am trying to outline here.
Some more reading on the epistemic validity of de re/de dicto assertions:
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ergo/12405314.0002.019/--epistemic-modality-de-re?rgn=main;view=fulltext
De re (rigid counterfactual): Ralph believes someone is a spy. (True in possible worlds where Ralph is not treating his paranoid schizophrenia.)
De dicto (non-rigid counterfactual): Nobody is out to get Ralph because he is not treating his paranoid schizophrenia.
Not what you’re saying btw, just the whole necessity versus probability stuff.
See my latest response in regards to the Barcan formula. Actualism vs. possibilism.
This might help a little:
So re Kripke's views, my first thought is, "Wait--I don't recall Kripke saying anything like 'de re counterfactuals are impossible.'" Can we review where he said this, or why we believe that he'd say it?
(Maybe you meant de dicto counterfactuals? Remember that "The shortest spy might not have been a spy," on the conventional view, isn't possible de dicto, that is, in the reading where we're talking about whatever person--we don't know exactly which person--who would be the shortest spy. It's not person for that person to not be a spy.)
Available:
http://ge.tt/6y5U3Ow2
It looks like you are trying to aim Quine at Kripke to see if you can score a hit. Is that right?
I asked for a reiteration of the OP in PLAIN ENGLISH. I didn’t ask for an elaboration of something I really didn’t grasp in the first place.
Note: this is not to say I will be satisfied with a dumbed down version, just that I may need a dumbed down version in order to enter more fully and offer you an attempt at a response. Communicating difficult ideas to idiots like me is useful because it highlights points that you that for granted.
Suppose Ralph believes there is a spy, but has not determined the person who is a spy, so he says "there is a spy", this is de dicto. If Ralph believes his neighbour is a spy, and says "John is a spy", this is de re. The two are not incompatible, the neighbour may be a spy, and the de dcito instance may be true even if Ralph suffers from paranoid schizophrenia.
Quoting Wallows
I think you misunderstand the nature of de dicto. Ralph thinks there is an object which fulfills the conditions of being " a spy", and therefore is a spy. Perhaps what is confusing you is the fact that you cannot proceed logically from the de dicto to confirm the de re. The "therefore is a spy" does not follow. In other words, Ralph may produce an endless list of the properties of "a spy", and the object (the neighbour) may match every property, but this cannot produce the logical conclusion that the neighbour is a spy, because Ralph needs a further premise which says that every object with such and such properties is a spy. But Ralph's list of properties of a spy does not necessitate that any object with those properties is a spy. So despite the de dicto (Ralph believes there is a spy), and the fact that the neighbour fulfills all Ralph's criteria of "a spy", Ralph cannot validly produce the de re conclusion that the neighbour is a spy. That's the nature of human judgement, it's fallible.
So, here's the question again:
Quoting Wallows
And here is the reasoning:
If Ralphs believes his neighbor is a spy, then this can only obtain for stipulated worlds where Ralph is paranoid or has some essentialist feature of being a paranoid schizophrenic. Therefore, the rigid designator becomes the fact that Ralph will believe in any possible world where he is not treating his disorder (such as paranoid schizophrenia) and continues to believe in those worlds that the government is out to get him or his neighbor is a spy.
I don't think that this is an incredulous assumption and one that makes some sense in an essentialist manner?
As I explained, Ralph cannot validly conclude that his neighbour is a spy, whether he suffers delusions or not is irrelevant. Logic doesn't work that way, it's backward. He must start with the designation, the neighbour is a spy, and proceed logically from there. But that proposition is supported by evidence, not a logical conclusion, and Ralph's mental state is relevant in his judgement of evidence.
Yes, but, doesn't that make it a de facto a de re attitude?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, that would be a de dicto assertion, based on epistemic validity under my understanding of the issue. This is the difference between de dicto and de re, as much as I understand.
Now how do you make it into a counterfactual de re attitude?
That makes little sense to me. Seems you were answering @Metaphysician Undercover.
There is a lack of perspicuity in your question. The distinction between de ditto and de re is a mark of natural languages, there being no equivalent ambiguity in formal logic. Further, in Kripke's account all proper names are rigid designators, while descriptions are non-rigid.
Kripke's semantics bypasses Quine's objection to modal logic, to my eye, and I think this is a common belief. IF you think otherwise you will need to set it out in some detail and clarity.
That's perhaps what I'm trying to address here as this was the most prominent feature of the N&N thread that stuck in my mind. Let me elaborate once more. In every possible world where Ralph is a paranoid guy, he will think that his neighbor works for the government and is a spy. Therefore, how does one call his paranoia as a form of rigidity? Does that make it at least a vivid designator in terms of de re statements?
Well, how do you make an abstract descriptor as "paranoia" into a, in a sense, a vivid designator for all Ralphs that posses the attribute of being "paranoid" manifest in his de re statement that his neighbor is a spy?
? When do you get to the "impossibility of de re counterfactuals" part or why we'd think that Kripke would say that there's any sort of de re counterfactuals that are impossible?
What makes something de re is that it's positing a property (or lack of a property) to some (particular) thing(s) in the world, and it's not about the language per se. At least so the normal distinction goes, where we're at least pretending the distinction holds water/doesn't wind up falling apart.
An easy way to think of it and remember it is to think of English words related to the Latin words in question, such as "real"/"reality" versus "diction," "dictionary" etc. And then in short, are we saying something about a (particular/specific) real thing or set of specific things ("the dogs at the Main St. Shelter" for example) or are we saying "something about the dictionary" or about language qua language.
So if we suppose that someone is saying that some sort of de re counterfactual is impossible, we're saying that the person is saying that it's not possible to posit a real thing having or lacking different properties in possible worlds. But that's not what people say unless they're simply denying possible world talk altogether.
What about the possible worlds in which he is paranoid and thinks his neighbour is one of the alien lizards?
Your question still needs work.
Well, there you have it. The counterfactual still obtains due to the attribute of Ralph being a paranoid guy? Call this a definite description or vivid designator for the (essential?) trait of Ralph being one of the paranoid types?
What?
No, forget that. I'm done here.
Never heard of the Barcan formula?
But paranoia is a property of a thing (person)), it's not a name of the thing. How is Ralph's statement "my neighbour is a spy" evidence that he is paranoid?
It appears like you are trying to make the attribute "paranoia" necessary, as if it were the thing's name, and then treat it as if it were a non-essential attribute of the thing, in your counterfactuals. You can't have both. Either the thing is designated as "paranoid" and we seek the properties of "paranoid", or the thing is designated as "Ralph", and we seek the properties of Ralph (one might be paranoia).
That's kind of the point here. De dicto, the scope of the epistemic quantifier is non-bound by a singular individual's beliefs.
So, Ralph might be right that his neighbor is a spy in his own mind; but, de dicto that simply isn't the case, or might not be. Hence, de dicto we can conclude that Ralph is paranoid. De re, Ralph might still profess his paranoid belief irrespective of the fact that he may or may not be paranoid. Or, no. De re, Ralph will keep on professing his belief as long as he posses' the quality or trait of being paranoid.
The description of being paranoid wouldn't be a rigid designator then. In another possible world, Ralph might not be paranoid. The name Ralph is rigidly designated though.
The simplest Barcan formula is just to have the mailman come. Your dog will go crazy.
But maybe tackle one small thing at a time until we've solved (or at least resolved) it, and then move on?
True, though it might be a vivid designator for any Ralph believing his neighbor is a spy?
I don't think "paranoid" is a designator at all, because it refers to a property rather than an object.
It seems as if you're trying on terms of art like they're hats that you might incorporate into a Halloween costume.
How unusual, a contributor to TPF who hides behind terms as if they were a costume.
Yeah, hence essentialism? Think about it this way. If I stipulate a de re counterfactual, then I am bound to quantify wrt. to a subject de re. If this subject professes a de re belief that his or her neighbor is a spy, then isn't that bound to the abstract property of de dicto epistemic concerns about the subject?
This might help:
When I worked in a psychiatric hospital, we had one person diagnosed as schizophrenic who would cite a list of all the spies he had seen during the night every morning. Of course at first I thought he was totally insane, but after a while, I realized he was actually telling me about the other other patients secretly watching each other and judging each other's behaviors, leading to him calling them nazi or communist spies.
That is, while what he was stating about them was obviously delusional on the surface, it was derived from factual observation that one could interpret properly, given sufficient experience with his way of describing events. I dont know how that fits in with your 'de dicto' concerns.
Very interesting...
Quoting ernestm
The point I'm trying to say is that the de re/de dicto distinction is epistemically in a loop. De dicto, Ralph is a paranoid schizophrenic. De re, Ralph continues to believe his neighbor is a spy as long as, de dicto, his schizophrenia isn't addressed.
That should be pretty straightforward.
Now, quantifying into a possible world where Ralph, still believes that his neighbor is a spy, then his de dicto "trait/qualities/property/attribute" of being schizophrenic (perhaps untreated) will dictate his de re beliefs about his neighbor being a spy. Hence, there is some element of rigidity for all possible worlds where Ralph professes these delusional beliefs, which in my mind boils down to essentialism. If you want to go a step further, then transworld identity is dictated by these very "trait/qualities/property/attribute" that Ralph has. Therefore, essentialism?
Russell's criticism still applies. Just because he says his neighbor is a spy does not mean he actually believes his neighbor is a spy, even if he is schizophrenic. Ralph could be asserting that because he knows his listener thinks he is schizophrenic, so he states it to satisfy the audience.
Yes; but, even given the opacity of determining intent, the conclusion still obtains.
One could go in that direction, but it would be more fruitful to consider the diagnosed schizophrenic as being in the ideal position to play language games with his listeners. After all, they don't have much else to do.
One maintence shot of Abilify or Zyprexa, first I assume. Hehe.
It's important to be familiar with it if you want to be familiar with analytic philosophy, and especially the developmental history of analytic philosophy, but in my opinion, the whole project that Naming and Necessity is a "symptom" of is a big mess, with Naming and Necessity doing nothing to make it less of a mess.
So unless there's a good reason that you want to be well-versed in analytic philosophy, there's probably no reason for you to slog through the rest of the book, especially if it's not doing anything for you yet, especially if you're not retaining much of it--which you're probably not since it's seeming like a complete waste of time to you. Reading through the rest at this point would probably have the impact of reading a long string of arbitrary words.
Naming and Necessity is really best approached with a robust familiarity with the project it's stemming from, going back to at least Frege's philosophy of language work, then Russell's theory of descriptions, a bit of the mountain of commentary on both in the wake of the theory of descriptions (Russell played a big part in sparking later interest in Frege), etc.
It seems like pointless reiteration to lay out the grounds for some position - which hasn’t yet been hinted at. If it has been hinted at then I don’t expect to get much more from this. I may as well slog through it either way as it’s quite short.
Compared to Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” and Husserl’s “Logical Investigations” is almost completely empty. Only 28 pages in to Hegel’s preface and there is more content, Husserl, as usual takes his time to get anywhere, but once it gets going it really gets going. With Kripke I find myself saying “so?” and “that is meant to be new to me?”
It’s not like I don’t appreciate the difference between temporally held names and abstractions. The deal with Nixon is like watching someone flog a dead horse ... get on with man! Haha! I guess because it was a lecture we can understand it as laying out the most obvious points for the audience? Am I being impatient?
Of haven't read his Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures... Coming up in due time (6 months tops) on my rare reading group sessions.