If that's the conclusion I should draw from what I said, I don't see it as of yet. Meanings aren't related to our capacities, so just because we have ...
OK. Then yeah, I certainly misunderstood them. That's fair. I agree. There's the ontological consideration, but also it seems an odd way to talk about...
They know what apple means. But maybe they don't know how to define a word, yet. They haven't reached the ability to begin thinking about their words ...
If someone uses the word "apple", then they are not defining it. They are demonstrating competence of the language, but they are putting the language ...
What were the two different propositions? To my understanding, propositions are generally taken as the content of certain expressions. No? Does the lo...
I don't think so. Meaning isn't the same thing as definition, so there's no need to say there are different kinds of meanings just because we define a...
Cool. Hold on there. A definition is not a meaning. A definition describes the meaning. When someone uses a word, they are not defining it. They're us...
How about both? I'd call the former a descriptive definition, and the latter an ostensive definition. So they are two different definitions of the mea...
No worries at all. Please question away -- I'm far from an expert on this subject. I probably know just enough to hurt myself, really ;). True. But th...
More just that language isn't something which is institutional, as "consensus" seems to imply to me -- though there are other ways to institute, of co...
"Definition" does not refer to consensus usage. The latter I've already assented to. I imagine what's throwing us off is this: But there is a differen...
Well, I don't want to boil semantics down to pragmatics, more than anything. So "attached" just means it's not merely the usage of an utterance which ...
Yeah, as truth-bearers. And it would differ, at least from my understanding of Propositions, because the meaning is attached to utterances -- the exte...
It seems to follow from your theory of stipulation -- at least, that's the best interpretation I can come up with, given that meanings are mental/priv...
As in, the whole process of definition relies on truth, so trying to define truth will necessarily result in circularity? Or just a general skepticism...
Sorry @"Mongrel" for the divergence. If you think it's not quite applicable, we could move this to another thread. My thought was that "meanings" coul...
Sorry I missed that. Off to work atm, but your reliance on "the meanings themselves" looks suspect to me. Will post more later, but that's likely what...
Why would you say say that? I mean, if people were rational, then perhaps that'd be the case. But there are people who desire harm, and not just as a ...
That argument makes sense to me. But it doesn't seem to answer the question, ya'know? It seems more like an argument for the possibility of answering ...
That depends on your definition. :D Stipulative definitions are stipulative. But definitions in the dictionary, at least if we follow the Oxford model...
http://hinterlandgames.com/ That's been the game I've played most recently. I have a thing for trying out survival games -- some of them aren't that g...
I suppose this is what I'm trying to get at -- your account seems to focus on what we would term are pleasures derived by satisfying needs and wants. ...
That makes a good deal of sense to me. Heh. I'm even anti-representaitonal in my thinking on knowledge, it's just that all the alternatives I've read ...
It's more or less how I think about truth, yes. But I think I've mentioned elsewhere I find most of the stuff I've read on truth confusing. So I just ...
I'd hazard to say that desire is more complicated than needs/wants, especially when needs and wants are imagined along a scale of intensity more than ...
A truthmaker is an entity which makes utterances true (or sentences, if you like). A justification is a reason to believe. Justification has precious ...
Well, one paper seems to lead to another: http://tedsider.org/papers/temporal_parts.pdf I suppose my initial guess is that I am not my body, but my bo...
But what if you thought neither? I think that's where the disconnect is. The skeptic doesn't believe either that we are in a dream or that there are i...
Granted Aaron R's rendition does say "if I were now dreaming" I've been making a weaker claim, though. A genuine ground for doubting comes about merel...
But then I would say you haven't responded to the skeptical argument. The skeptic isn't saying "for all I know I am the only existing entity", even --...
I don't think the argument from the OP leads to solipsism. Looking at it again: Support for P2 being that a dream is not distinguishable from existenc...
I suppose that would depend on how we cash out the terms "grounds for doubt" -- it would seem strange, I think, if a skeptic claimed to know, and on t...
I used to argue exactly this, but I think it's a mistake in reasoning. We can distinguish between dream and reality, but what this does not do is prov...
I wonder if this is something the dream argument needs to work. On the surface I would say no. Supposing there is no ontological dichotomy between min...
Not only is it ok, it's what I'd expect of a rational person. :D Indeed, wouldn't it actually be kind of irrational (just in the common use of the wor...
I think it depends on whether said meta-physician admits to having argued this or that based on, in some way, taste. There is nothing wrong with utili...
I suppose I would question your "considering that raw experience" line, first and foremost. But under the presumption -- I would say that epistemology...
Yes, that makes sense to me. From the brief description I don't find myself able to really grasp what he means by love-anger, myself -- but the other ...
I hate work. It's something I must do. And I've had a lot of jobs of various degrees of cool and suck, but at the end of the day it doesn't matter wha...
I tend towards the view that desire is primary and is productive, and lack is secondary. Lack comes about because the object of desire has been produc...
I would put it like this -- the view of materialism is one view which is compatible with absurdism, given certain perimeters to that materialism (such...
I tend to think of Nietzsche as a pragmatist on truth (if we had to place him in a category, at least). That which is true is that which is useful, mo...
Not necessarily, of course. There are things one let's go. But belittling someone or some condition strikes me as the sort of thing which people shoul...
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