MongrelDecember 09, 2016 at 15:5410275 views161 comments
Putting aside the various problems afflicting Correspondence, the topic of truthmakers is fascinating. What's the difference between a truthmaker and a justification?
Reply to Michael The asserter believes the asserted statement to be true and the justification is the grounding for that belief.
A truthmaker grounds the statement in a different way? How?
What is the statement? A representation? Are there unasserted statements in your view?
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 17:36#377440 likes
Truthmakers are usually said to be the "entity" in virtue of which a truthbearer (a proposition) is true. "Entity" is a misleading term in my opinion. I prefer to say (well, when I talk about this, which is pretty much only when someone else, such as yourself, brings it up, because I don't find it very useful in general) that a truthmaker is simply the conditions that make a claim true. (Per convention there are also falsemakers, by the way--conditions that make a claim false).
The easiest way to understand this is simply via the conventions of stating what correspondence theory is in a nutshell: that is, that "P" (is true) iff P. (Or in other words, that a proposition is true just in case the proposition corresponds to some fact.)
So the truthmaker for "The cat is on the mat" (for that truthbearer, that proposition) is the fact that the cat is on the mat (or rather the cat being on the mat as it's often put in truthmaker talk).
Justifications on the other hand are the set of reasons that one takes as (sufficient) grounds for belief that P. For some simple claims, it might seem that truthmakers and justifications would be the same, but arguably there is always more to justifications, including for example reasons for belief such as "I trust my phenomenal data," and for claims like "There is a God," justifications will typically be much different and more extensive than the truthmaker--since the truthmaker is simply there being a God.
Reply to Terrapin Station "P" is true IFF P is not an expression of Correspondence, is it? That's the t-sentence. It's trivially true and it's the banner of Redundancy, which is truth skepticism.
Who uses the t-sentence to describe Correspondence?
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 18:34#377520 likes
What the heck do you think that correspondence is then? That is correspondence. A proposition is true just in case it corresponds to the fact it putatively picks out. "P" in quotation marks is the convention for denoting a propostion as such. P without quotation marks is the convention for denoting the fact as such. (At least in this context, where it's important to make a distinction.) Also, the reason I put "is true" in parentheses was simply to allow it to count as either traditional correspondence or deflationism. You seem familiar enough with this (otherwise how would you know "t sentence" or redundancy?) that it's bizarre to have to explain this to you . . . and then you just focus on that and don't say anything about whether you understood the distinction between truthmakers and justifications, which you also shouldn't need explained to you given an apparent familiarity with relevant material.
Sure, an example is Matthew McGrath's Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory, although note that he uses "angle brackets"--< and > rather than quotation marks.
Could you answer the questions and address the points I brought up now please?
Then that's not the t-sentence. It's something else. Many have dreamed of replacing correspondence with the t-sentence. Hasn't been accomplished though.
What are the angle brackets supposed to mean?
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 19:31#377830 likes
Reply to Mongrel If that's not the t sentence to you, then how is what I wrote the t sentence, since the t sentence doesn't normally have "(is true)" in parentheses in the middle, does it?
The brackets are just an alternate symbol for setting off the proposition. You could use any symbol.
What, on your view, are we replacing with the t sentence if we replace correspondence with it? (Which is another way of asking you just what you take to be correspondence theory)
So "P" in the t sentence isn't a proposition in your opinion?
My understanding is that it is a sentence, not a proposition; which is presumably why this is called the semantic theory of truth, and is not simply (or non-controversially) categorized under either correspondence or deflationary theories.
Yet what else could make a statement justified if not that it is true in virtue of a truthmaker?
Given the standard definition of knowledge as justified true belief, there is evidently a distinction between justification and truth; otherwise, one or the other would be redundant. Justification is what warrants someone holding a belief, while truth is what makes that belief count as knowledge. We can be justified in holding a belief even when unaware of its truthmaker(s). We can also be justified (but mistaken) in holding a belief that is not true, and thus has no truthmaker.
Reply to aletheist So Correspondence says that truth is independent of knowledge, right? So how is the ontology of unstated statements handled? Or is it?
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 21:25#378020 likes
Reply to Mongrel I am not sure that it makes any sense to talk about "unstated statements." However, a declarative statement expresses a proposition, and a true proposition represents an objective fact, regardless of whether anyone ever expresses that proposition as a declarative statement. Is that what you have in mind?
Reply to aletheist I'm used to Scott Soames' terminology. Propositions are expressed by uttered sentences. "Proposition" and "statement" mean the same thing.
Reply to Mongrel A truthmaker is an entity which makes utterances true (or sentences, if you like).
A justification is a reason to believe.
Justification has precious little to do with truth, on my view. Sure, insofar that we want to know we want to believe what is true. But justification has to do with belief and persuasion more than truth.
EDIT: By 'entity' I mostly mean to denote individuated existence -- events, objects, persons would all qualify.
Reply to Mongrel I have in mind the idea that different statements--in different languages, even--can express the same proposition. I can even express a proposition without using words at all--e.g., holding out a gift-wrapped box is not a statement, but it can indicate (in a certain context) that I am giving you a present.
Justification has precious little to do with truth, on my view. Sure, insofar that we want to know we want to believe what is true. But justification has to do with belief and persuasion more than truth.
Yes. Looking at the question with Redundancy goggles on, the question: "By virtue of what is P true?" doesn't make a lot of sense. Redundancy says that there is no more to truth than a certain attitude on the part of a speaker... an attitude that makes the speaker an asserter.
What gives a speaker that little extra oomph such that we call him an asserter? Justification?
Eh.. anyway. The way you have framed the issue makes it sound like you accept Correspondence theory. Is this the case?
I have in mind the idea that different statements--in different languages, even--can express the same proposition. I can even express a proposition without using words at all--e.g., holding out a gift-wrapped box is not a statement, but it can indicate (in a certain context) that I am giving you a present.
You're sounding like Austin, but he didn't use "proposition." I don't hold that there's one way the words should be used. But no worthwhile discussion can be had where there is no agreement about how to use the words.
The SEP mentions several candidates for how we might understand truthmaker. This one is cool:
SEP article on truthmakers:
(Entailment-T)
a truth-maker is a thing the very existence of which entails that something is true.
So x is a truth-maker for a truth p iff x exists and another representation that says x exists entails the representation that p. It is an attraction of this principle that the key notion it deploys, namely entailment, is ubiquitous, unavoidable and enjoys a rich life outside philosophy—both in ordinary life and in scientific and mathematical practice.
The challenge to entailment is confusing and involves necessity. It might take me a while to get to the bottom of it. Anybody who already understands it... help would be appreciated.
Eh.. anyway. The way you have framed the issue makes it sound like you accept Correspondence theory. Is this the case?
It's more or less how I think about truth, yes.
But I think I've mentioned elsewhere I find most of the stuff I've read on truth confusing. So I just default to the theory that at least makes sense to me. It does, at least, seem to encapsulate what truth means, at least, if not what truth is.
Reply to Moliere Interestingly, the SEP article on truthmakers starts with an image of clapping hands to convey how truthmakers and truth-bearers relate... each one is a hand and it takes both of them to get the clapping. What I notice is that entering into the topic of Correspondence is like entering a self-contained world where every bit implies other bits. Once you take that first step into accepting representation, the skeleton of the whole theory is there as if innate. It's just waiting for the flesh to be stuck on in the form of specific truth-bearers being chosen and specific ideas about truthmakers.
That's why the alternate viewpoint has the character of a giant step out of the representational scheme.
Heh. I'm even anti-representaitonal in my thinking on knowledge, it's just that all the alternatives I've read on truth are either 1) obviously not what truth means (coherency, pragmatic), 2) flabbergasting (anything somewhat related to deflationary approaches)
Then there's this other side to me that wonders about other uses of "truth" which don't seem to be addressed by any of the theories. Not that these would be what truth is, per se, but then what is it people mean by "truth" if they are not meaning truth?
So I can see the motivation for wanting another theory of truth aside from correspondence. I just haven't found that bridge into the topic which makes it easy for me to make heads or tails of.
I have in mind the idea that different statements--in different languages, even--can express the same proposition. I can even express a proposition without using words at all--e.g., holding out a gift-wrapped box is not a statement, but it can indicate (in a certain context) that I am giving you a present.
The received view is that propositions are the meanings, not expressions, of declarative sentences (statements), hence the same proposition being expressible in different languages.
So I can see the motivation for wanting another theory of truth aside from correspondence. I just haven't found that bridge into the topic which makes it easy for me to make heads or tails of.
Deflation isn't so bad. You know what truth means in the sense that you know how to use the word. There probably isn't any definition that would be useful for teaching people what truth is. Since a definition is an assertion, the learner has to know what truth is in order to understand what a definition is. So the learner knows what truth is prior to hearing any particular definition.
And yet we still find Correspondence valuable (and in my case, fascinating.) Why? Somebody earlier in this thread (I think.. too lazy to look back) said that true propositions represent the actual world. So what do false propositions represent? Other possible worlds? Maybe the ultimate truthmaker is the actual.
Terrapin StationDecember 11, 2016 at 03:27#379910 likes
But the only assertions to be had when talking about this are limited to:
* Reports of conventional definitions of the term,
* Reports of particular persons' idiosyncratic usage.
* Reports of what I call "functional" usage of term, which can be different than how the people in question would define the term
Yes, which are all truth-apt assertions, not stipulations.
The definitions (or "meanings" if you like) themselves won't be true or false. They're always stipulations.
In context it should be clear that by "definition" Mongrel meant "a statement of the exact meaning of a word". She didn't mean in the sense of the meaning itself.
Terrapin StationDecember 11, 2016 at 12:01#380250 likes
Stipulative definitions are stipulative. But definitions in the dictionary, at least if we follow the Oxford model, are descriptive. So if one gave a descriptive definition of "tomato" as "to move with rapid jerky motions" that would be a false assertion.
There are also prescriptive definitions -- you may say "Irregardless" to mean "we can ignore that point because what's salient is...", but some may say that you should just say "regardless"
There's a cool article on definitions in the SEP: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/definitions/
Deflation isn't so bad. You know what truth means in the sense that you know how to use the word. There probably isn't any definition that would be useful for teaching people what truth is. Since a definition is an assertion, the learner has to know what truth is in order to understand what a definition is. So the learner knows what truth is prior to hearing any particular definition.
That argument makes sense to me. But it doesn't seem to answer the question, ya'know? It seems more like an argument for the possibility of answering the question, "What is truth?"
Terrapin StationDecember 12, 2016 at 12:19#381520 likes
Stipulative definitions are stipulative. But definitions in the dictionary, at least if we follow the Oxford model, are descriptive. So if one gave a descriptive definition of "tomato" as "to move with rapid jerky motions" that would be a false assertion.
But the only assertions to be had when talking about this are limited to:
* Reports of conventional definitions/usage of the term . . .
So it's not the definition that's true or false per se, but the (implicit) claim that a definition is an accurate report of how the term is conventionally used.
Re prescriptives/normatives, there's no such thing as a true/false prescriptive/normative on my view. Again, we could say that it's true or false that something is accepted as a normative, but that doesn't make the normative true or false.
Reply to Terrapin Station Sorry I missed that. Off to work atm, but your reliance on "the meanings themselves" looks suspect to me. Will post more later, but that's likely what I would respond to when I have time to think more.
Terrapin StationDecember 12, 2016 at 12:54#381560 likes
but your reliance on "the meanings themselves" looks suspect to me.
Are you referring to "it's not the definition that's true or false per se"? (I make a distinction between meanings and definitions, by the way. Meanings are the inherently mental/private/subjective relations in your head. Definitions are the expressions, for example in words--text or sounds--correlated to those meanings.)
Anyway, all I'm getting at is this:
Associating "Tomato" with "a glossy red, or occasionally yellow, pulpy edible fruit . . . " is not true or false (and likewise associating "tomato" with "to move with rapid, jerky motions" is not true or false).
What's true or false is this: "'Tomato' is conventionally used to refer to 'a glossy red, or occasionally yellow, pulpy edible fruit . . . '"
One could define "Tomato" as "to move with rapid, jerky motions" (that is, one could say something like "When I say 'Tomato,' what I'm referring to is 'to move with rapid, jerky motions") and that wouldn't be false or incorrect. It would just be unconventional. But it's not false or incorrect to be unconventional.
So the definition isn't true or false. The claim that a particular definition is the conventional one is what would be true or false.
That argument makes sense to me. But it doesn't seem to answer the question, ya'know? It seems more like an argument for the possibility of answering the question, "What is truth?"
Deflationists don't expect an answer to that question to be forthcoming, but they aren't truth anti-realists. Truth is a concept that's too basic to define.
numberjohnny5December 12, 2016 at 14:14#381630 likes
Are you referring to "it's not the definition that's true or false per se"? (I make a distinction between meanings and definitions, by the way. Meanings are the inherently mental/private/subjective relations in your head. Definitions are the expressions, for example in words--text or sounds--correlated to those meanings.)
Although I'm aware you're making that distinction there, would you also agree that definitions can be or are mental since they have to be constructed via minds? Definitions generally are, after all, just sentences, and sentences I think are also mentally constructed.
Terrapin StationDecember 12, 2016 at 14:23#381650 likes
Yeah, they're mentally devised (of course--after all, it's not like they just independently appear on paper or wherever), but unlike meanings, they're publicly shareable.
SEP truthmakers:(Entailment-T)
a truth-maker is a thing the very existence of which entails that something is true.
So x is a truth-maker for a truth p iff x exists and another representation that says x exists entails the representation that p.
"My dog just got her rabies vaccination." Let's call that utterance p.
My dog is a truth-maker for p IFF my dog exists, and if I say "My dog exists." this entails that my dog just got her rabies vaccination. Is p entailed by the existence of my dog?
Entailment:
https://systematicphilosophy.com/2011/05/27/what-is-entailment/:The concept of entailment depends on a more fundamental concept, the concept of immediate entailment. Once you grasp the concept , the concept is easy to understand.
In particular, to say that one or more propositions “entail” some proposition Q is to say that those propositions are related to proposition Q by a chain of immediate entailments. This means that like immediate entailment, entailment is a relation between propositions and relates one or more propositions to a given proposition.
Some examples
Consider the following list of propositions:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
Here, propositions A and B immediately entail proposition C. This is a chain of immediate entailment one link long, so propositions A and B entail proposition C. Similarly, propositions C and D immediately entail proposition E and propositions E and F immediately entail proposition G. It follows that propositions C and D entail proposition E and that propositions E and F entail proposition G. It also follows that propositions A, B, D and F are linked to proposition G by a chain of immediate entailments. So it follows that propositions A, B, D and F together entail proposition G.
It's not super clear to me that my dog's existence does entail that she recently got her vaccines. So per entailment, either:
1. My dog is not a truthmaker for p or
2. There's some chain of entailment from her existence to the vaccines.
Hmm.
Terrapin StationDecember 12, 2016 at 14:28#381670 likes
Truthmakers are usually said to be the "entity" in virtue of which a truthbearer (a proposition) is true. "Entity" is a misleading term in my opinion. I prefer to say (well, when I talk about this, which is pretty much only when someone else, such as yourself, brings it up, because I don't find it very useful in general) that a truthmaker is simply the conditions that make a claim true. (Per convention there are also falsemakers, by the way--conditions that make a claim false).
The way that's worded in the SEP, at least going by what you're quoting, isn't clear at all.
Reply to Terrapin Station The SEP article explores the pros and cons of a number of truthmaker candidates. Entailment is one that gets shot down. I was trying to understand what it says before I explain why it goes down in flames. :)
Terrapin StationDecember 12, 2016 at 14:38#381730 likes
Yeah, I'm reading through the SEP article now. . . it's not very well-written in my opinion, but I'm slogging through it.
Terrapin StationDecember 12, 2016 at 14:48#381740 likes
I'd have to read the Fox and Bigelow he references, but Fraser's comments following "a truth-maker is a thing the very existence of which entails that something is true" suggests that "something" amounts to "any arbitrary thing," but that strikes me as stupid beyond belief. Also, re "in virtue of," I have difficulty comprehending how any socialized, English-speaking adult sans serious mental/developmental disabilities would find "in virtue of" obscure or difficult to understand.
Reply to Terrapin Station My favorite Kierkegaard translator uses "virtue" that way. "There was one who was great by virtue of his power." and so on.
"By virtue of" is apt to mean "because of." Truthmakers do not have a causal relationship with truth-bearers. Maybe the motivation for avoiding "virtue" is in virtue of the causality issue.
Terrapin StationDecember 12, 2016 at 18:38#381990 likes
Truthmakers do not have a causal relationship with truth-bearers.
On my view, that's false, because on my view what it is for a proposition to be true is for someone to actively make a judgment about its relation (to whatever they consider the truthmaker we could say). On the standard view, I'm not sure I can make sense of why there wouldn't be a causal relationship. Folks would have to think that propositions correlate with facts in some happenstance way or something like that, which I don't think makes any sense.
On the standard view, I'm not sure I can make sense of why there wouldn't be a causal relationship.
Because presumably we can make true claims about things beyond any causal influence, e.g. the future or the distant, and about things that aren't causal things at all, e.g. counterfactuals.
Terrapin StationDecember 12, 2016 at 19:32#382120 likes
Because presumably we can make true claims about things beyond any causal influence, e.g. the future or the distant, and about things that aren't causal things at all, e.g. counterfactuals.
Wouldn't some set of facts cause one to make the claim though?
My dog is a truthmaker for P. The representation M entails P. Right?
Terrapin StationDecember 12, 2016 at 21:09#382360 likes
I'd say that your dog having two ears is a truthmaker for P. Your dog alone isn't enough to entail that P. After all, your dog might only have one ear.
Sorry @Mongrel for the divergence. If you think it's not quite applicable, we could move this to another thread. My thought was that "meanings" could actually serve as one half to the correspondence theory -- meanings could correspond to facts, whether those facts be about English or otherwise.
Reply to Terrapin Station "associating" differs in meaning from "defining". And, yes, we certainly disagree on word meaning.
Were you to define "tomato" as "used for emphasis", and by "define" I mean "descriptive definition", then that definition would be false. This is because the meaning of a word does not belong "in the head", as you say. We may take a sign and stipulate a meaning with that sign. But "tomato" still means "a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc." -- I can imagine other ways of phrasing this too that would be true -- regardless of your stipulation.
Now, if everyone began to use "tomato" as "used for emphasis", then the meaning of the word has changed. But that, in and of itself, is no reason to think that meanings on "in the head".
Consider, for instance, the following:
Heber brewed a of gone huber of a draken fitch-witch wherever why to run gone mad
I can tell you what I mean by this, but clearly it doesn't mean anything in English -- because there is a fact to the matter of English(just because we are "in L" does not mean there is no fact to the matter). Also, the word "mean" here has two different meanings -- my first usage means "intend" and my latter use means "extension of a word".
Hence why I'd say there is more to definitions than stipulations. There are stipulative definitions, but there's a reason one must stipulate -- because the meanings of words are often more diffuse than some given speaker might wish to express.
Now, intentions are mental and we can intend this or that meaning with a word. But meanings differ from intent.
All that being said, you are of course free to postulate and even stick to a strictly stipulative theory of meaning. But it is at the very least idiosyncratic. What reason would you have for believing it, given that we have to learn a language, after all, and that there are at least purported facts about language. How would you deal with, say, the existence of an English class? What is it they are learning? The mathematical average of the contents of a culture's mind?
Reply to Mongrel As in, the whole process of definition relies on truth, so trying to define truth will necessarily result in circularity? Or just a general skepticism, given the results so far?
Terrapin StationDecember 12, 2016 at 22:26#382500 likes
When someone says, "I will define 'tomato' as 'to move with rapid, jerky motions,'" do you simply say that the person is making no sense, or can you understand that when that person says "tomato" from that point (at least in the context at hand), he's going to be referring to "moving with rapid, jerky motions"?
Terrapin StationDecember 12, 2016 at 22:40#382530 likes
Okay, but if you can understand that, how would it make sense to say that "definition" necessarily amounts to a report of what most people (at least of a given population) are doing? That's not what our hypothetical person is doing above when he defines "tomato" as "to move with rapid, jerky motions."
Reply to Terrapin Station It seems to follow from your theory of stipulation -- at least, that's the best interpretation I can come up with, given that meanings are mental/private/subjective. When a class learns the meaning of the word, and the meanings of words are mental/private/subjective, then it would seem that the meanings we learn are some conglomeration of mental meanings.
Obviously the hypothetical person is stipulating another definition. But not many people are using said definition, no?
But you seem to be saying I have it wrong. So, what would you say we learn when we learn the meanings to English words, given that meanings are mental/private/subjective?
As in, the whole process of definition relies on truth, so trying to define truth will necessarily result in circularity? Or just a general skepticism, given the results so far?
In Frege's argument an infinite regress appears with any attempt to define truth. It's not just Correspondence. It's any definition. I wrote out Frege's argument on the old forum and went through it. I guess that's all in the bit bucket, huh?
Sorry Mongrel for the divergence. If you think it's not quite applicable, we could move this to another thread. My thought was that "meanings" could actually serve as one half to the correspondence theory -- meanings could correspond to facts, whether those facts be about English or otherwise.
You mean use meaning as truth-bearers? How would that differ from using propositions? And it's cool if you want to continue the conversation here. I recently discovered that I'm not too clear on what entailment is. I think I'll start a thread on that shortly. :)
Reply to Mongrel Yeah, as truth-bearers. And it would differ, at least from my understanding of Propositions, because the meaning is attached to utterances -- the extension of usage. Propositions, from what I understand, are semi-Platonic entities.
Terrapin StationDecember 12, 2016 at 23:24#382680 likes
Obviously the hypothetical person is stipulating another definition. But not many people are using said definition, no?
I'll get to the other stuff, but I want to just sort this one little thing out first. If "definition" on your account refers to some consensus usage, then one can't stipulate a definition that only one is using. That you can understand that one can stipulate a definition that only one is using implies that definition, unqualified, does not denote consensus usage. You'd need to qualify it as a "descriptive (of the consensus usage) definition" rather than a "stipulated, idiosyncratic definition," for example. A "stipulated, idiosyncratic definition" would make no sense if "definition" refers to consensus usage, because then we're saying that it's a "stipulated, idiosyncratic consensus usage," and in this case, used by only one person. That would be incoherent.
Yeah, as truth-bearers. And it would differ, at least from my understanding of Propositions, because the meaning is attached to utterances -- the extension of usage. Propositions, from what I understand, are semi-Platonic entities.
What do you mean by "attached" there?
Terrapin StationDecember 12, 2016 at 23:49#382710 likes
The conventional definition of propositions in contemporary analytic philosophy is that they are the meanings of declarative sentences.
Reply to Mongrel Well, I don't want to boil semantics down to pragmatics, more than anything. So "attached" just means it's not merely the usage of an utterance which is the meaning, but that the meaning of some utterance can be determined by the extension of usage.
Wait, so "definition" on your account doesn't refer to consensus usage, and/or you're now saying that ("on your account") you can't make sense of someone saying "I will define 'tomato' as 'to move with rapid, jerky motions'"?
Now, if everyone began to use "tomato" as "used for emphasis", then the meaning of the word has changed.
But there is a difference between saying that we can tell what "tomato" means by what everyone uses "tomato" as, and that a descriptive definition refers to consensus usage. A descriptive definition describes the meaning of a term. We can tell what the meaning of that term is by the extension of usage of said term. There's not exactly a Committee for Consensus on the Sign which holds conventions to ensure consensus is reached, at least with most natural languages.
A stipulative definition is understood because I know what "to stipulate" means. "Tomato" has meaning regardless of what a person might stipulate it as because "stipulate" means. So, no, just because someone can use a sign idiosyncratically that doesn't sink the notion that "tomato" means something regardless of said stipulation.
Also, I think you're focusing on my former part -- admittedly larger -- of the post in this dialogue, whereas I'm focusing on my questions, such as:
How would you deal with, say, the existence of an English class? What is it they are learning? The mathematical average of the contents of a culture's mind?
Which seems to me to be the results of your theory -- that what you learn in English class, when you learn word meaning, is the average of mental contents -- which sounds a lot like consensus to me, but maybe not to you.
But if I could just have one question answered, because you seem to be indicating that I have it wrong, this would be the one:
But there is a difference between saying that we can tell what "tomato" means by what everyone uses "tomato" as, and that a descriptive definition refers to consensus usage. A descriptive definition describes the meaning of a term. We can tell what the meaning of that term is by the extension of usage of said term. There's not exactly a Committee for Consensus on the Sign which holds conventions to ensure consensus is reached, at least with most natural languages.
This paragraph isn't at all clear to me, unless for some reason--though Lord knows what reason--you'd be reading "consensus" as necessarily referring to some sort of formal agreement a la your comment about a committee.
A stipulative definition is understood because I know what "to stipulate" means.
Right, but if you took "definition" to necessarily refer to a consensus or conventional usage, then an idiosyncratic stipulative definition shouldn't make sense to you. That it makes sense to you would suggest that you're not using "definition" to refer to consensus/conventional usage (which you've already agreed to, so no need to go over this again).
So, no, just because someone can use a sign idiosyncratically that doesn't sink the notion that "tomato" means something regardless of said stipulation.
The only idea was to separate "definition" from "consensus (or conventional) usage." "Definition" doesn't necessarily refer to consensus (or conventional) usage. Other than that, definitions only obtain via stipulation (per usage at least). But then it's just a matter of whether other people will agree with that stipulation or not. If lots of folks agree and follow suit, then it becomes a conventional usage, and dictionary authors note it when they're doing their work.
How would you deal with, say, the existence of an English class? What is it they are learning?
Nowhere am I denying that there is conventional or consensus usage of a language. What I've said is that (a) conventions or consensuses do not make something true or false (beyond it being true or false that such and such is a convention), (b) "Definition" does not conventionally refer to conventional or consensus definitions, and (c) Definitions are stipulations, not truth claims. That's not to say that what dictionary authors are doing is stipulating whatever definitions they'd like. But that doesn't imply that what "definition" conventionally refers to is a conventional or consensus usage. (c) is saying that definitions arise, historically, via stipulation.
Anyway, so you mostly learn the conventions of the language in English class. You could separate prescriptions from that, but really, prescriptions are the conventions of a particular population (such as English professors and other people considered language experts).
that what you learn in English class, when you learn word meaning,
On my view, one can not learn, or share, etc., meaning. Meanings are mental-only, and can't be made non-mental. You learn definitions and observe (behavioral) usage. Meanings are something that happen inside an individual's head, from a first-person perspective. (This is a response to your final question as well.)
Well, I don't want to boil semantics down to pragmatics, more than anything. So "attached" just means it's not merely the usage of an utterance which is the meaning, but that the meaning of some utterance can be determined by the extension of usage.
I'm having trouble following this... sorry. Consider agreement. Two people are willing to assert the same truth-bearer. It can't be that they're willing to make the same utterance. I can't make your utterance and vice versa.
I'll get to the other stuff, but I want to just sort this one little thing out first. If "definition" on your account refers to some consensus usage, then one can't stipulate a definition that only one is using.
You can stipulate any arbitrary eccentric meaning you like for any word you want to, as in your example; but your stipulation, if it is to be understood, will always rely on conventional shared meanings for the terms your stipulation employs. It will necessarily be reliant, in other words, on other meanings which you have not stipulated, meanings which have been established by usage.
So, the fact that arbitrary meanings can be stipulated of words and phrases really shows nothing of any significance about meaning or definition.
Metaphysician UndercoverDecember 13, 2016 at 21:38#383890 likes
So, the fact that arbitrary meanings can be stipulated of words and phrases really shows nothing of any significance about meaning or definition.
This isn't entirely true. A person can stipulate a definition as a premise, for the purpose of deductive argument. The logical argument, and others which follow, using conclusions as further premises, will produce a structure of meaning built upon that stipulated meaning. So we can have significant meaning which is built upon stipulated definition. This is fundamental to scientific theory.
The issue which we have to be very wary of, is when a stipulated definition is close to but varying slightly from the meaning of conventional usage. Then, if in the process of logical argument, one slips from the stipulated definition to the conventional meaning, we have a case of equivocation. These are generally sloppily produced arguments found in places like tpf, and pop philosophy, they are not the arguments of good philosophy or good scientific theory.
Yes, but the stipulated meanings in those kinds of cases are not arbitrary.
Metaphysician UndercoverDecember 13, 2016 at 22:31#384040 likes
Reply to John Yes, they can be arbitrary. That's the point, we can build a structure of meaning on an arbitrary definition. Whether or not the stipulated meaning is arbitrary is irrelevant. There is a relationship between symbol and what is symbolized, and this could very well be arbitrary, but that doesn't affect the fact that there is meaning there. That's algebra "let X represent ...".
This paragraph isn't at all clear to me, unless for some reason--though Lord knows what reason--you'd be reading "consensus" as necessarily referring to some sort of formal agreement a la your comment about a committee.
More just that language isn't something which is institutional, as "consensus" seems to imply to me -- though there are other ways to institute, of course, than by consensus. I do not hold that meanings are made by consensus. There are even uses of similar phonemes which are unrelated to one another, and there are more or less popular uses of certain words, as well as archaic usage too.
There are institutions dedicated to language, but language came prior to said institutions.
Institutions are where we get conventions from. So, therefore, language is not purely conventional. I would say that there is a fact to the matter.
That sentence doesn't make sense to me, either (including grammatically).
"Tomato" means. "means" is a verb, indicating that the word is an active participant in language, regardless of intent. In the same way one might say "The rock is", I was stating ""Tomato" means" to indicate there is a fact to the matter.
Other than that, definitions only obtain via stipulation (per usage at least).
:D -- I am trying to draw a distinction between what you are smashing together. Definitions obtain via usage, not stipulation. So, it is either by use or by stipulation, at least if we happen to be just that smart and are debating the only two theories that are possible. ;)
But then it's just a matter of whether other people will agree with that stipulation or not. If lots of folks agree and follow suit, then it becomes a conventional usage, and dictionary authors note it when they're doing their work.
Agreement is a kind of institutional action -- a way of creating institutions. But it is not agreement which gives meanings to words. We are able to stipulate, of course, because anything can serve as a sign. But this does not then mean that agreement creates meaning -- even if we agree to use "The crow flies from coast to coast" to mean "I'm a member of the Communist Party", and even if the entire communist party began using it in this manner, that would not change the meaning of "the crow flies from coast to coast".
There is a certain history to words which agreement is unable to overcome. People don't follow suit and decide to create language. Rather, we are born into a world with language, and it already means something, regardless of my intent.
I'd say that this is what your theory is unable to explain -- it explains how it is we can take a sign to mean something, but it doesn't explain the factual side of language.
Anyway, so you mostly learn the conventions of the language in English class. You could separate prescriptions from that, but really, prescriptions are the conventions of a particular population (such as English professors and other people considered language experts)
On my view, one can not learn, or share, etc., meaning. Meanings are mental-only, and can't be made non-mental. You learn definitions and observe (behavioral) usage. Meanings are something that happen inside an individual's head, from a first-person perspective. (This is a response to your final question as well.)
Cool.
Then I'd submit to you that I know "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc.
If I know that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc., then it is true that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc.
If an utterance is true, then there is a fact to the matter.
If there is a fact to the matter with respect to language, then not all language is stipulated.
An utterance is a matter of language. And so I'd conclude that there is something missing in the belief that "all English definitions are stipulated"
This is just a bit more formal way of presenting what I already stated above.
No worries at all. Please question away -- I'm far from an expert on this subject. I probably know just enough to hurt myself, really ;).
Consider agreement. Two people are willing to assert the same truth-bearer. It can't be that they're willing to make the same utterance. I can't make your utterance and vice versa.
True. But then suppose while I was in California I were to say, "It is 5:00 PM". And my cousin, who lives on the East coast, were to also say "It is 5:00 PM" at the same time in a telephone conversation. Only one of these utterances is true, even though they express the same semantic content. (well, OK, they could both be false as well -- but they can't both be true :D)
One of the reasons I like the focus on utterances is that it seems, at least, to be a nice and neat way to accept all the messiness of context without getting lost in the mud of possible contexts.
Metaphysician UndercoverDecember 13, 2016 at 22:59#384130 likes
If I know that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc., then it is true that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc.
Here's a slight problem. When I say I know what "tomato" means, does this mean that I can ring off an acceptable definition as you have, or does this mean that I can identify a tomato? It is possible that one is capable of the latter, without being capable of the former, or even vise versa. So for instance, if a child learns the word "tomato", and is able to point to a tomato when the word is spoken, but is not able to state what the word "tomato" means, would you say that the chid knows the meaning of "tomato" or not? If not, why is being able to relate the symbol to the object not a case of knowing meaning?
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover How about both? I'd call the former a descriptive definition, and the latter an ostensive definition. So they are two different definitions of the meaning, but we can both fairly say we know the meaning of the word, I think.
Terrapin StationDecember 14, 2016 at 00:31#384320 likes
More just that language isn't something which is institutional,
I'm not saying anything about institutions.
Here are some common definitions of "consensus":
* "general or widespread agreement"
* "majority of opinion"
* "agreement of the people"
And "convention"
* "a way in which something is usually done"
* "a rule, method, or practice established by usage; custom""
* "general agreement or consent; accepted usage"
Maybe you're using "institution" in some looser manner than referring to "formal" institutions however.
Agreement is a kind of institutional action . . . There is a certain history to words which agreement is unable to overcome. People don't follow suit and decide to create language. Rather, we are born into a world with language, and it already means something, regardless of my intent.
I couldn't disagree with these two paragraphs more strongly than I do. In my opinion, it's rather clear that you have this stuff factually wrong.
I'd say that this is what your theory is unable to explain -- it explains how it is we can take a sign to mean something, but it doesn't explain the factual side of language.
The factual side of language certainly isn't that words have definitions (which you'd call "meanings") that can be different than usage. That goes against the factual evidence. Words are defined however people choose to define them. They can do something highly idiosyncratic there, or they can follow suit with how the vast majority of people are defining the term, or they can do anything in between. None of that is right or wrong, by the way. And typically, those definitions, that usage (of the vast majority that is) shifts over time.
If I know that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc., then it is true that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc.
Haha--no, that isn't true. It's only true that that's the conventional definition.
This is similar to saying, for example, (a) "Vanilla ice cream tastes good" versus (b) "80% of the people in Des Moines feel that vanilla ice cream tastes good." (a) isn't true (or false). (b) is true or false. In other words, it's only true or false in the context of some particular persons feeling that vanilla ice cream tastes good or not. It's not (that particular) context-free true or false that vanilla ice cream tastes good.
So likewise, "The definition of tomato is such and such" isn't true or false. But "Most people define tomato as such and such" is true or false. It's only true in the context of some particular persons defining tomato in the way in question.
Metaphysician UndercoverDecember 14, 2016 at 00:48#384340 likes
How about both? I'd call the former a descriptive definition, and the latter an ostensive definition. So they are two different definitions of the meaning, but we can both fairly say we know the meaning of the word, I think.
So isn't it necessary to distinguish between meaning in sense #1, and meaning in sense #2 then? If we don't maintain this distinction there could be ambiguity or even equivocation. Meaning in the one sense lends itself to truth as correspondence, and in the other sense, coherence.
But then suppose while I was in California I were to say, "It is 5:00 PM". And my cousin, who lives on the East coast, were to also say "It is 5:00 PM" at the same time in a telephone conversation. Only one of these utterances is true,
Two different propositions were expressed. An utterance is sounds or marks, generally... not really a good candidate for truth-bearer.
One of the reasons I like the focus on utterances is that it seems, at least, to be a nice and neat way to accept all the messiness of context without getting lost in the mud of possible contexts
Propositions don't operate on "possible contexts." A sentence is uttered to express a proposition. Listeners either understand what proposition was expressed or they don't. No malarky about computer generated poetry here.
And whatever the ontology of propositions might be (and it is quite the poser), Scott Soames lays out a pretty good argument which concludes that the price of denying propositions is giving up the possibility of agreement. And those who are fine with that probably don't bother to be understood, I would imagine.
The factual side of language certainly isn't that words have definitions (which you'd call "meanings") that can be different than usage. That goes against the factual evidence. Words are defined however people choose to define them. They can do something highly idiosyncratic there, or they can follow suit with how the vast majority of people are defining the term, or they can do anything in between. None of that is right or wrong, by the way. And typically, those definitions, that usage (of the vast majority that is) shifts over time.
Hold on there. A definition is not a meaning. A definition describes the meaning. When someone uses a word, they are not defining it. They're using it.
Haha--no, that isn't true. It's only true that that's the conventional definition
I understand that you disagree. But the best reason I seem to get for you is that your idea about meaning accounts for being able to use words idiosyncratically.
But if we can figure out what words mean by their usage, then I don't see an issue with new uses of words, and it seems that we have a way of understanding shared meanings, rather than having them be private.
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover I don't think so. Meaning isn't the same thing as definition, so there's no need to say there are different kinds of meanings just because we define a word in different ways.
Metaphysician UndercoverDecember 14, 2016 at 01:57#384470 likes
I don't think so. Meaning isn't the same thing as definition, so there's no need to say there are different kinds of meanings just because we define a word in different ways.
But these aren't two types of definition, one is a definition, the other a direct relating the word to an object. The latter is knowing what "apple" means by being able to point to an apple, it is not in any way defining "apple".
Two different propositions were expressed. An utterance is sounds or marks, generally... not really a good candidate for truth-bearer.
What were the two different propositions? To my understanding, propositions are generally taken as the content of certain expressions. No? Does the location in which we speak change the semantic content of an expression?
I may just misunderstand propositions. Because I would say that "It is 5:00 PM" is expresses the same proposition regardless of the speaker -- so your assertion that there are two different one's runs counter to my understanding. (which, as I've noted, isn't in any way professional. I'm certainly open to reading more. I'm just interested in the topic, so I'm talking)
Propositions don't operate on "possible contexts." A sentence is uttered to express a proposition. Listeners either understand what proposition was expressed or they don't. No malarky about computer generated poetry here.
Propositions don't, but language does. An understanding of meaning without somehow incorporating context doesn't strike me as terribly helpful because meaning changes so much with context.
Why not computer generated poetry? Isn't computer generated poetry just as much a part of language as declarative sentences?
That's the crazy part about language. It has meaning regardless of intent. If a computer generates a sentence, then we know what it means even though there wasn't even a speaker.
What's wrong with sounds or marks, vs. propositions? To me it seems that I know the former exist because I see them. But the latter strike me as convenient inventions that don't even account for language meaning, but only the meaning of very particular types of sentences which some philosophers have an interest in. Granted, these are the sorts of sentences we're usually interested in when talking about truth-apt sentences, and therefore truth, but still -- it seems to me that meaning is wider than truth, and truth is just one goal a sentence can accomplish.
While Saussure certainly believes meanings are in the head, I don't think that is necessary to take on board if we talk about language in terms of signs. A sign is composed of both a signifier and a signified. The marks can be the signifier. And truth is the property which a signifier has to some fact. The signified is the meaning which "comes along with", but given that semantic meanings of words are resilient to change -- whereas the marks in a given context aren't (whether "mark" be understood as phonic or visual), and in fact vary considerably with context -- it makes sense to assign truth to the mark rather than the meaning to account for the variety in contextual use.
It may be counter-intuitive to say that the marks we see bear truth -- but that doesn't mean it shouldn't be the case, no? I can see that because a mark can have different meanings that maybe it's a bit of a bait-and-switch move... but it seems to me that just because a mark can look different and mean the same, or vice-versa, that there's still good reason for attributing truth to the mark because it's the very thing which is in context.
But these aren't two types of definition, one is a definition, the other a direct relating the word to an object. The latter is knowing what "apple" means by being able to point to an apple, it is not in any way defining "apple".
If someone uses the word "apple", then they are not defining it. They are demonstrating competence of the language, but they are putting the language to use.
If someone is teaching another the meaning of "apple", then they may choose, rather than speak the meaning, to demonstrate the meaning by showing the pupil an apple.
So being able to point to an apple, and pointing to an apple, is using "apple". Demonstrating to someone how to use "apple" is a way of defining apple. Telling someone what an apple is is another way of defining "apple". So if we are asking a clerk for an apple then we are using the word "apple", and if we are telling someone about "apple" then we are mentioning the word "apple".
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover The relationship between X and what it represents (some unknown quantity or other) in algebra is anything but arbitrary. If it was arbitrary we would never be able to determine what the unknown quantity is. Of course it doesn't matter whether it is 'X' or 'A', or whatever symbol you like, used to represent the unknown quantity, but that is not the point at issue.
Also this is not a case of arbitrary semantic meaning; where a conventionally determinate meaning is substituted by an arbitrary stipulated meaning. Any stipulated meaning is still determinate, insofar as it is stipulated. In the algebra case the meaning of 'X' is only determinable by a process of calculation; and this is not analogous to conventional semantic meaning; which is either already known or has to be looked up. There is no process whereby semantic meanings can be calculated.
Metaphysician UndercoverDecember 14, 2016 at 02:22#384580 likes
If someone uses the word "apple", then they are not defining it. They are demonstrating competence of the language, but they are putting the language to use.
OK, so back to my original question then. When a child learning language knows how to point to the proper object when the word "apple" is spoken, does that child know what "apple" means? If so, then that child knows what "apple" means without knowing any definition of apple.
At first, you said that this person does know what "apple" means, and that's why I said we need to distinguish between two senses of meaning. One being associated with the capacity to define the word, the other being associated with the capacity to relate the word to an object.
But maybe they don't know how to define a word, yet. They haven't reached the ability to begin thinking about their words in the same way that they think about their apples. So they know what "apple" means, but they may not know what "The word "apple"" means.
What's wrong with sounds or marks, vs. propositions? To me it seems that I know the former exist because I see them. But the latter strike me as convenient inventions that don't even account for language meaning, but only the meaning of very particular types of sentences which some philosophers have an interest in. Granted, these are the sorts of sentences we're usually interested in when talking about truth-apt sentences, and therefore truth, but still -- it seems to me that meaning is wider than truth, and truth is just one goal a sentence can accomplish.
Sounds and marks won't work as primary truth-bearers in spite of their ready visibility. If you and I are in agreement, it's not sounds or marks we're agreeing to.
I get the objection to propositions based on ontological considerations, but as photographer would often say: reality is what we can't do without. Before you ditch propositions, recognize what you're saying you can do without. As I mentioned, it's communication itself that's undermined by that rejection.
Metaphysician UndercoverDecember 14, 2016 at 02:33#384620 likes
The relationship between X and what it represents ( an unknown quantity) in algebra is anything but arbitrary.
But X does not represent an unknown quantity, it represents a defined object "Let X = ..." The task of the mathematician is to assign a numerical value to that defined object. The definition of X is completely arbitrary because we can fill the space with whatever random definition which we want to figure the numerical value for.
So do you agree that we need to respect two distinct senses of "meaning"? One is associated with the capacity to relate words to objects, and the other is associated with the capacity to relate words to other words, form a definition.
But X does not represent an unknown quantity, it represents a defined object "Let X = ..." The task of the mathematician is to assign a numerical value to that defined object. The definition of X is completely arbitrary because we can fill the space with whatever random definition which we want to figure the numerical value for.
Give me an example of the kind of "defined" object you think 'X' represents in algebra.
Metaphysician UndercoverDecember 14, 2016 at 02:51#384670 likes
Reply to John Let X = the number of times that I drove to the store last week. "The number of times that I drove to the store last week" is the defined object.
The whole point of defining something like that as 'X' is to facilitate calculating it in cases where you don't know what it is, but you do know other things relating to what you are defining which will enable you to calculate it, which is pointless if you already know what X equals. So the number of times you went to the store is an unknown quantity, plus you have some other information that can be formulated in terms of X such as to enable that unknown quantity to be calculated, or if you do know the number of times you went to the store, then there is no point defining it as 'X".
Think of this example of an algebraic formula: 2X +15= 25, you are not defining X, but '2X +15' and you are defining the latter as being equal to 25. This enables you to calculate the value of X, which prior to calculation is an unknown quantity.
Sure, it doesn't matter whether X is the number of times you drove to the store or the number of times you deceived your wife (and the latter may well be incalculable ;) ) but that arbitrariness is a separate (non) issue.
In any case all of this is a red herring for the reason that algebraic definitions are not equivalent to semantic definitions as i already pointed out.
Sounds and marks won't work as primary truth-bearers in spite of their ready visibility. If you and I are in agreement, it's not sounds or marks we're agreeing to.
That's fair. I agree.
I get the objection to propositions based on ontological considerations, but as photographer would often say: reality is what we can't do without. Before you ditch propositions, recognize what you're saying you can do without.
There's the ontological consideration, but also it seems an odd way to talk about meaning too. Propositions focus on such a very specific use of language, and it seems to me that if one were to base a belief about meaning on them that they'd just be over-generalizing and getting it wrong. Some meaningful sentences are true, but then if we just understood meaning then that would give a means to truth (at least, truth understood in this way -- the kind of truth which telling the truth relies upon)
As I mentioned, it's communication itself that's undermined by that rejection.
Cool. I'd have to read the dude you referenced, I think.
My immediate thought is that we could just take meaning for granted. It seems more plausible, to me at least, to believe that our expressions are meaningful rather than to rely upon a belief in propositions to say what it is that makes them meaningful. We don't have to know what it is that makes a sentence meaningful to know that it is meaningful, after all.
Metaphysician UndercoverDecember 14, 2016 at 03:26#384750 likes
Reply to John X represents a known and defined object, "the number of times that I went to the store last week". Clearly you're wrong to say that we don't know what it is. We know, according to that definition. It is the value of this defined object which is unknown. It is determined by placing it in relations to other things with known values.
In any case all of this is a red herring for the reason that algebraic definitions are not equivalent to semantic definitions as i already pointed out.
You are simply denying the semantic part, where the symbol X is given meaning, and focusing on the mathematical part, to maintain your assertion that we cannot give symbols arbitrary meaning.
Sure, it doesn't matter whether X is the number of times you drove to the store or the number of times you deceived your wife (and the latter may well be incalculable ;) ) but that arbitrariness is a separate (non) issue.
No it is not a separate issue, it is a clear indication, that contrary to what you claim, we can, and do, by definition, give a symbol an arbitrary meaning.
My immediate thought is that we could just take meaning for granted. It seems more plausible, to me at least, to believe that our expressions are meaningful rather than to rely upon a belief in propositions to say what it is that makes them meaningful. We don't have to know what it is that makes a sentence meaningful to know that it is meaningful, after all.
Again, you're sort of acting like propositions are objects of superstition... as if they're fairies magically making meaning where there was none. They're just content. You can deny that there really is any content to speech and writing. You can go behaviorist.. we're all just quacking ducks. Meaning is quacking.
I don't have the alternative figured out. I just know Hamlet's to be or not to be soliloquy is not the same as duck noises. :)
So do you agree that we need to respect two distinct senses of "meaning"? One is associated with the capacity to relate words to objects, and the other is associated with the capacity to relate words to other words, form a definition.
If that's the conclusion I should draw from what I said, I don't see it as of yet. Meanings aren't related to our capacities, so just because we have different capacities -- are able to do different things with words -- that does not then mean that words have two different senses of meaning. We can use "apple" and we can mention "apple", but that's just us using the same word in a different way.
In fact I'd be rather suspicion of a theory of meaning that treats words like tags that we can put on objects, to be honest. We do things with words, and one of the things we do with words is refer -- but that's no different than if I were to point at something.
"meaning" has many meanings, and if that's all you mean by sense then I don't see it as controversial. Maybe I don't get what you mean by sense.
Reply to Mongrel No, that's not exactly what I'm going after either. Or, at least, if it is true, I don't believe that language is a series of barks chained to our reproductive worth to the species.
(EDIT: though, by the same token, I don't think language makes us special in comparison to other animals either.)
Mostly because words have meaning (or sentences, at least, do).
Maybe it's just the sound of proposing "propositions" that makes me think of them as magical fairies -- that's the connotation that I hear when hearing someone propose propositions.
Reply to Moliere "Proposition" sounds math-like and logical to me. And it's probably as close to philosophy of math as I ever really need to get. But you're right.. meaning and truth are different animals. Meaning is probably more of a social issue (holism, atomism, molecularism) with some logical and metaphysical stuff in the wings.
Logic is upfront when we're talking about truth. A truth realist will deny that the mechanics of meaning are ultimately significant with truth because a proposition can be true though it's never been expressed and no one knows it. This must be so. Otherwise there would be no detectives.
No. you are simply conflating mathematical and semantic meanings. Whether X represents the number of times you went to the shop, cleaned your teeth, fed your dog or whatever (your so-called "defined object") is absolutely irrelevant to the mathematical meaning of 'X', which is a variable; and a variable is just a symbol for a number we don't yet know.
Logic is upfront when we're talking about truth. A truth realist will deny that the mechanics of meaning are ultimately significant with truth because a proposition can be true though it's never been expressed and no one knows it. This must be so. Otherwise there would be no detectives.
See. . . that definitely strikes me as a semi-platonic entity then (it may not be strictly platonic, so that's why I say semi- in that it relates to some features of platonic philosophy). If a proposition can be true even though it's never expressed and no one knows it, then the proposition has a reality all of its own -- and propositions are even thought to be the vehicle through which we can translate to different languages, so whatever language we might be speaking would be inconsequential to the existence of propositions. Language wouldn't even need to exist for propositions to exist, in that case, as I see it.
That's just something that I'm incapable of believing in.
Truth I could at least see as semi-plausible as a platonic entity. Not saying I believe in it, but it's at least believable and something I could consider seriously.
But some kind of language-invariant meaning that's also true above and beyond usage just seems like a convenient just-so story to me.
Language, I can see, exists all on its own. It has an independent reality, of a sorts. It's pseudo-real, and exists in the same way as anything else we might posit exists. But then I would also say that "it is raining" means something different from "Es regnet".
Surely there's some other way of thinking about truth, and believing in detectives, than believing in the existence of propositions which are never expressed and never known.
Surely there's some other way of thinking about truth, and believing in detectives, than believing in the existence of propositions which are never expressed and never known.
Sure. You can be deflationist.
Terrapin StationDecember 14, 2016 at 09:43#385190 likes
Hold on there. A definition is not a meaning. A definition describes the meaning. When someone uses a word, they are not defining it. They're using it.
Definitions are correlated to meanings. I wouldn't say they "describe" meanings. For one, in order for something to count as a description, one has to assign meaning to it, because descriptions are representations. In my view, usage does indeed determine definition. This includes everything from simply stating a definition to contextual usage, both re the context of other language and re behavioral contexts.
But if we can figure out what words mean by their usage
You don't figure out what words mean. You observe usage and assign meaning.
Re the reason I'm saying that it's not true or false that tomato is defined as x context-independently, that is outside of how someone(s) happens to be defining/using x, and getting back to the thread topic, is that context-independently, there is no truthmaker for "tomato is defined as x." The reason that I'm not reading "defined as" as necessarily referring to the context of consensus or conventional usage I've already explained in detail, and you've already agreed with this; you've already agreed that "defined as" needs to be contextually qualified, that it can't necessarily be read as implying (non-institutional) consensus or conventional usage.
You don't figure out what words mean. You observe usage and assign meaning.
I think we're chasing our tail on this one. :D
Re the reason I'm saying that it's not true or false that tomato is defined as x context-independently, that is outside of how someone(s) happens to be defining/using x, and getting back to the thread topic, is that context-independently, there is no truthmaker for "tomato is defined as x." The reason that I'm not reading "defined as" as necessarily referring to the context of consensus or conventional usage I've already explained in detail, and you've already agreed with this; you've already agreed that "defined as" needs to be contextually qualified, that it can't necessarily be read as implying (non-institutional) consensus or conventional usage.
I'd say that anything that is true is not true context-independently. "context-independently" is an imaginary scenario by which we may be able to judge certain things as more or less subjective, but since it is imaginary it's the sort of standard which we can draw wherever our heart desires. It's more a way of creating a point of contrast for comparison than it is a reality.
"All Bachelors are Unmarried" is true only in the context of English. "War is War" is not a necessary truth, but is true in our world. "(A + B) + C = A + (B + C)" is true in basic arithmetic
For what is there a truthmaker, in your view? What is context-independent?
Terrapin StationDecember 14, 2016 at 11:20#385350 likes
You're not forgetting that I'm talking about a specific context here, right? Namely, how particular persons are defining/using the term(s) in question. I specified this a number of times.
And in conjunction with this, you've agreed that "definition," unqualified, does not refer to a non-institutional consensus or conventional usage.
You're not forgetting that I'm talking about a specific context here, right? Namely, how particular persons are defining/using the term(s) in question. I specified this a number of times.
No. I figured what you were saying, though, was that because " there is no truthmaker for "tomato is defined as x."" that it follows that meaning is mental/private/subjective. (Hence why you were saying that we do not figure out what words mean, but rather assign meaning)
No. I figured what you were saying, though, was that because " there is no truthmaker for "tomato is defined as x."" that it follows that meaning is mental/private/subjective.
That wasn't the idea there, although yeah, I'd say that the two facts are related. The idea is more that if you want to claim that there is a context-independent (per this specific context) truthmaker for "tomato is defined as x," then you should specify what the truthmaker is.
The idea is more that if you want to claim that there is a context-independent (per this specific context) truthmaker for "tomato is defined as x," then you should specify what the truthmaker is.
I'd hazard that the truthmaker is no different in this context than any other context for which truthmaker is applicable -- it's just the facts.
Facts are never context independent. But I don't think context-independence is necessary for truth.
Terrapin StationDecember 14, 2016 at 11:44#385400 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station No sarcasm on my part. The point is too rarified for me to be able to lodge sarcasm very effectively -- it's kind of one of those things where it's so simple that you already sound dumb for even talking about it, so sarcasm isn't going to exactly work.
In this case, where I say "tomato" means X, we're talking about truth and meaning in a somewhat general way, and I'm trying to make use of an example to give something more concrete to talk about. So, to give an "in the flesh" example:
There is a language which we share, English, and within that language there is a sign "tomato" which means X. The author of that page knows English just as I know English, and they know the sign "tomato" just as I know the sign "tomato". The fact of the matter, in the flesh, is that the author is using the sign "tomato". (interesting to note that the usage of the sign, in this case, doesn't occur within a sentence, but still has meaning) There is a shared Background, and shared meanings, which we were both born into which allows us to discuss how to garden.
Metaphysician UndercoverDecember 14, 2016 at 12:06#385430 likes
If that's the conclusion I should draw from what I said, I don't see it as of yet. Meanings aren't related to our capacities, so just because we have different capacities -- are able to do different things with words -- that does not then mean that words have two different senses of meaning. We can use "apple" and we can mention "apple", but that's just us using the same word in a different way.
Well you've totally lost me. If meaning is what a word means, and I can know what "apple" means, and knowing is a capacity, then how can you say "meanings aren't related to our capacities"? Isn't it clear to you that if we can know the meaning of something, and knowing is a capacity then necessarily meaning is related to our capacities. Is knowing not a capacity of human beings?
Now, you're not paying attention to the example. The example does not demonstrate that we can do different things with words. it demonstrates that we can know the meaning of a word in two very distinct ways. I am not talking about doing anything with a word, you keep interpreting in this way, and now I have to keep on correcting you. I am talking about interpreting, and that is doing something with the mind, not the word. In the example, we are doing something with our minds, knowing the meaning of a word. And, we do this in two distinct ways, by either relating the word to an object, or by relating the word to a definition.
One person knows the word "apple" as meaning that particular object on the table, and another person knows the word "apple" as meaning "a round red fruit", and both are correct. Do you not recognize a fundamental difference between relating the word to a particular object, and relating the word to a bunch of other words?
Terrapin StationDecember 14, 2016 at 12:10#385450 likes
The sarcasm was on my part. I was indicating that asking for more specificity than "the truthmaker is the facts" was sarcastic understatement from me.
In the rest of your post, you're saying that the truthmaker for "The definition of 'tomato'," in a context-independent way (re that specific context) is how people use the word "tomato."
The problem with this is that that IS the specific context I was referring to. So that's not a context-dependent "true definition" (re that specific context).
The problem is this.
(A) You're agreeing that definition doesn't refer to anything like consensus or conventional usage unless we qualify that that's what we're referring to. (And the reason you agreed to this, as you should have, was that you can comprehend the usage of "definition" in a case like "I will define 'tomato' as 'a lint ball.'")
(B) You're claiming that "The definition of 'tomato' is x," unqualified, can be true or false. (And you've also made claims that this is true regardless of usage, although it's fine if we don't bother with that part here. That you claimed the definition, unqualified, can be true or false is enough.)
(C) When pressed on how the definition, unqualified, and independent of the specific context of usage, which isn't implied by the word "definition," can be true or false, you explain that it's true or false by virtue of how the term has been used. Well, this contradicts both (A) and (B).
Well you've totally lost me. If meaning is what a word means, and I can know what "apple" means, and knowing is a capacity, then how can you say "meanings aren't related to our capacities"? Isn't it clear to you that if we can know the meaning of something, and knowing is a capacity then necessarily meaning is related to our capacities. Is knowing not a capacity of human beings?
That's fair. I should be more specific. What I mean is that what a meaning is is not related to our capacities. Yes, we can see some kind of relation between our abilities and our words (and the relationship may just be one of knowing or believing), but I just meant to indicate that our capacities do not create meanings.
One person knows the word "apple" as meaning that particular object on the table, and another person knows the word "apple" as meaning "a round red fruit", and both are correct. Do you not recognize a fundamental difference between relating the word to a particular object, and relating the word to a bunch of other words?
I don't. Objects and words, insofar that either exists, are existential equals.
In the rest of your post, you're saying that the truthmaker for "The definition of 'tomato'," in a context-independent way (re that specific context) is how people use the word "tomato."
The problem with this is that that IS the specific context I was referring to. So that's not a context-dependent "true definition" (re that specific context).
Context-independence is your term. Insofar that you're using that qualifier I am too, but it was not I who introduced this notion. Hence why I asked what would count for the qualifier in any case at all, since the way I would put things would be to say there is no such case with regards to anything.
You're agreeing that definition doesn't refer to anything like consensus or conventional usage unless we qualify that that's what we're referring to.
"Meaning", but yeah. Definitions describe meanings, by my reasoning. I understand that you don't agree with the distinction, but I'm just making it explicit that this is what I'm saying.
You're claiming that "The definition of 'tomato' is x," unqualified, can be true or false. (And you've also made claims that this is true regardless of usage, although it's fine if we don't bother with that part here. That you claimed the definition, unqualified, can be true or false is enough.)
I'm claiming that a definition can be true or false. I'm not sure where I said "unqualified".
When pressed on how the definition, unqualified, and independent of the specific context of usage, which isn't implied by the word "definition," can be true or false, you explain that it's true or false by virtue of how the term has been used. Well, this contradicts both (A) and (B).
To me this just seems like a strange set-up. Perhaps it derives from your notions on truth, actually -- since many people seem to believe that truth is somehow a property which pertains outside of context. But that's just a guess on my part, I don't know.
What I can say without reservation is that definitions can be true or false, and they are true or false by virtue of usage. That isn't to say that usage is the same as meaning, but that usage is how we determine meaning. But since I've been relying on usage as my methodology, it would certainly be shooting myself in the foot to then say that meanings exist in an unqualified and independent of specific context way. But, this is an idea I think you introduced which I'm willing to engage, but it's not what I've been saying I believe.
I just don't think you need an unqualified and independent of context way for meanings to be in order for them to serve as facts. Since all facts are neither unqualified nor independent of context it strikes me that this is just an odd criteria, too, since even with non-controversial facts (such as "the capital of the United States in the year of our Lord 2016 is Washington DC") neither quality applies.
Metaphysician UndercoverDecember 14, 2016 at 12:33#385480 likes
No. you are simply conflating mathematical and semantic meanings. Whether X represents the number of times you went to the shop, cleaned your teeth, fed your dog or whatever (your so-called "defined object") is absolutely irrelevant to the mathematical meaning of 'X', which is a variable; and a variable is just a symbol for a number we don't yet know.
I am not conflating, I am separating. You have been attempting to deny the existence of the semantic meaning of X, claiming that it only has a mathematical meaning. Now that you've found this to be untenable, you claim that the semantic meaning is irrelevant. That too is untenable. If someone is doing algebra to solve for "the number of times that I went to the store last week", then "the number of times that I went to the store last week" is of the utmost importance. Your claim that it is "absolutely irrelevant" whether X represents this, or something else, is absolutely nonsense.
That's fair. I should be more specific. What I mean is that what a meaning is is not related to our capacities. Yes, we can see some kind of relation between our abilities and our words (and the relationship may just be one of knowing or believing), but I just meant to indicate that our capacities do not create meanings.
I'm not sure I agree with "our capacities do not create meanings", but consider this. Suppose that instead of "the meaning" of something, we are talking about "the colour" of something. If I demonstrated to you, that we could determine the colour of something by seeing it, and we could determine the colour of something by hearing it, wouldn't you agree with me that we were using "the colour" in two distinct ways? "The colour" refers to two distinct things, the visual impression, and the aural impression. Common usage is such that "the colour" refers to the visual impression and also to the aural impression. Wouldn't you agree that we should separate these two distinct things, such that when we talk about "colour" we can distinguish whether we are talking about the visual impression of the thing, or an aural impression.
This is what I am doing with "meaning". We have two distinct ways of determining "the meaning", one, by relating the word directly to an object, as we commonly do in day to day communication, and a second, by relating the word to other words (defining the word) as we do in more sophisticated situations. Do you not agree that we should identify and separate these two, so that when we talk about "the meaning", we can avoid ambiguity, and have a better understanding of what we are talking about.
Terrapin StationDecember 14, 2016 at 12:33#385490 likes
I am not conflating, I am separating. You have been attempting to deny the existence of the semantic meaning of X, claiming that it only has a mathematical meaning. Now that you've found this to be untenable, you claim that the semantic meaning is irrelevant. That too is untenable. If someone is doing algebra to solve for "the number of times that I went to the store last week", then "the number of times that I went to the store last week" is of the utmost importance. Your claim that it is "absolutely irrelevant" whether X represents this, or something else, is absolutely nonsense.
This is a wicked distortion. I have never denied, but on the contrary have explicitly acknowledged, that arbitrary semantic meanings can be assigned to X. What I have denied is that, in the context of algebraic equations, the semantic meaning one may have assigned to X (the number of times you went to the shop, the number of hairs on your head, the number of times you farted in a twenty four hour period, and so on) has any mathematical relevance whatsoever. You are not "separating" these irrelevant semantic meaning from mathematical meaning (in this case the meanings of the algebraic operations involving variables) you are conflating them; it is I who have been doing the separating.
The other point you have conveniently glossed over is that I have been arguing that the fact that such arbitrarily assigned semantic meanings are possible doesn't tell us anything significant about language, because such assignations are only possible at all within, and are thus dependent upon, the non-arbitrary context of conventionally established semantic meanings.
Reply to Terrapin Station I say that definitions can be true or false. Obviously a stipulative definition is neither true or false. A descriptive definition, on the other hand, is true or false. It is true in the case where the description describes the meaning of a term, and false when it fails to do so.
I think our disagreement follows more from my assertion that there are more definitions than stipulative definitions. I don't deny stipulation, only that there's more to definition than stipulation.
Suppose that instead of "the meaning" of something, we are talking about "the colour" of something. If I demonstrated to you, that we could determine the colour of something by seeing it, and we could determine the colour of something by hearing it, wouldn't you agree with me that we were using "the colour" in two distinct ways?
I suppose it depends, actually. If you could reliably hear green, then I'd just say you're using a different method that I'm not actually familiar with, but that there's no difference in the green property. If you're using "green", on the other hand, to describe something which is not green then you'd be using "green" differently.
Common usage is such that "the colour" refers to the visual impression and also to the aural impression.
I'd say that common usage refers to the color green, and not an impression of the color green.
Wouldn't you agree that we should separate these two distinct things, such that when we talk about "colour" we can distinguish whether we are talking about the visual impression of the thing, or an aural impression.
I'd say it just depends on if that's important or not. Consider a submarine. A submarine can detect, at a distance, objects by way of echo-location. But there's no need to constantly specify that the submarine is using echolocation when we, as humans, would typically use sight in determining spatial distrubtion of objects. We could just say "There is an object so many meters away from us", regardless. We might even say "I see an object so many meters away from us", even if what I see is a radar.
This is what I am doing with "meaning". We have two distinct ways of determining "the meaning", one, by relating the word directly to an object, as we commonly do in day to day communication, and a second, by relating the word to other words (defining the word) as we do in more sophisticated situations. Do you not agree that we should identify and separate these two, so that when we talk about "the meaning", we can avoid ambiguity, and have a better understanding of what we are talking about.
I think the use/mention distinction handles this well enough, personally, and that there's no need to divide meaning up because we can use a word or we can mention a word.
I think this is right. And it follows that definitions, may be considered to be kinds of assertions. Although stipulations cannot be true or false, and they are thus not assertions in that sense, I think they are assertions of a kind wherever they are proposed non-arbitrarily. The implicit assertion is that the stipulation will be useful or relevant in some way.
Terrapin StationDecember 14, 2016 at 23:15#386460 likes
I think the use/mention distinction handles this well enough, personally, and that there's no need to divide meaning up because we can use a word or we can mention a word.
So if you don't recognize these two distinct types of meaning, then how do you account for the difference between truth by correspondence and truth by coherence?
Reply to Terrapin Station I'm afraid I'm not following what you're asking after here. What is "per what"? Like, by what authority? Or, by what feature of the world? or. . what?
A description of, say, the watch is true if it describes the watch. Likewise, a description of "watch" is true if it describes "watch". In the case of a descriptive definition we're asking after the meaning of "watch". So, a descriptive definition is true if it describes the meaning of "watch".
So what makes a descriptive definition true, as with any assertion, is the facts. The facts in this case is the meaning. The meaning is determined by usage.
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover The only answer I can think of is to state a basic version of both theories of truth, thereby making it clear how they differ. Or to say that we can account for differences by pointing out or describing differences -- by contrasting different ideas. But that all just seems kind of flippant on my part, and so doesn't seem to answer the question.
What are you asking for?
Terrapin StationDecember 15, 2016 at 11:53#387660 likes
So what makes a descriptive definition true, as with any assertion, is the facts. The facts in this case is the meaning. The meaning is determined by usage.
You're not claiming that what "definition" (or "meaning" in your usage) refers to, though, is "report of usage" are you?
A descriptive definition is true if it accurately describes the meaning of a term.
We know the meaning of a term by its usage -- more specifically, as I stated earlier, the extension of usage.
The first states under what conditions a descriptive definition is true, and the latter states how one might go about evaluating whether a descriptive definition is true.
EDIT: At least if by "report of usage" you mean statements like --
"Robert said, "Please pass the salt""
Or --
"It has been observed that "salt", by and large, is often used to refer to salt"
The latter is closer to what I am on about, but I am claiming that meaning exists too, and that a definition is true as long as it accurately describes the meaning of a term. (or perhaps even "a" meaning -- a definition does not need to be exhaustive in order for it to be true).
Terrapin StationDecember 15, 2016 at 12:54#387720 likes
"It has been observed that "salt", by and large, is often used to refer to salt"
That's a report of usage.
At any rate, the reason I asked for clarification on this is that if you're NOT saying that definitions (or meanings) necessarily refer to reports of usage, then saying that meaning is determined by usage doesn't answer the question about what facts make a meaning true.
Saying that a definition is true if it describes the meaning of the term is just putting what you're claiming in different words, and it's not answering the question I'm asking. I'm asking what makes it true that something is a meaning of a word. Usage can't be the answer if you're agreeing that definitions do not necessarily report usage.
Metaphysician UndercoverDecember 15, 2016 at 13:39#387790 likes
Well, consider "the apple is red". This phrase might be referring to a particular object on the table which appears to be red, and we might therefore say it is a true statement, by means of correspondence. On the other hand, it might be a defining statement, referring to a type of object titled "the apple", and describing this type of object as red. What I've argued, is that these are two very distinct types of meaning which that phrase could have (you haven't yet seen the need for discerning these two distinct types of meaning). The need for two distinct types of meaning comes about from the two very distinct ways that truth or falsity is judged of the phrase.
The example phrase is very simple with respect to correspondence, as I described. "The apple" is agreed to refer to a particular object, and "red" is agreed as the term for the way it appears to the human eye. But when we take "the apple" to refer to a class of objects, rather than a particular, we are making a generalization. "The apple is red" is a defining phrase, saying that all tings in this class, called "apple", are necessarily red. Then, in order that there is truth here, it must be the case that all objects which will be called "apple" are necessarily red. Otherwise, our defining phrase, "the apple is red" is false.
Now here's the difficult part, and this appears to be the substance of your discussion with Terrapin. What allows either of these meanings of the phrase to be judged as true? In the case of the correspondence, there is an agreement that the particular object is called "apple", then we agree on a judgement of truth, regardless of what anyone might say an apple "really" is. That is the apple, we've designated it as such, and therefore the phrase is true regardless of whether that object is really an apple or not. So let's move to the defining statement. Now we cannot go on a simple arbitrary designation, (that object we will call apple), we need structure, consistency. And we cannot say that all things we call apple are necessarily red, because we define "apple" by other criteria. And we must maintain consistency within this conceptual structure of criteria. No longer are we looking at a thing called "apple", but we are looking at all the things called "apple", and deriving our truth from that. Here, the agreement is not between you and I, that this object on the table will be called "apple", which makes the truth. The correspondence, or agreement, if there is any, is between all the objects called "apple", and the definition of "apple".
My question is, do you see this fundamental difference? In one case, truth is dependent on a agreement between individual human beings, we agree that the object is called "the apple", therefore it is true that this object is the apple. In the other case, there are things which we are calling apples, and truth is dependent on an agreement between the properties of these things, and our definition of "apple".
Saying that a definition is true if it describes the meaning of the term is just putting what you're claiming in different words, and it's not answering the question I'm asking. I'm asking what makes it true that something is a meaning of a word. Usage can't be the answer if you're agreeing that definitions do not necessarily report usage.
Usage is the method. If you want to know the meaning, then you look to usage -- or reports, sure. That is what one would look at. But whether a report is true is still different from whether or not a definition is true, since a report is describing events and a descriptive definition is describing word (sentences, phrases, etc.) meaning.
A meaning is different from a description. For you this is a restatement because you're saying definitions are meanings. But I would say that the meaning of some term isn't the same as its description.
"What makes it true that something is. . . "
"What makes it true that something is a chair?"
This question is clearer to me than the previous one. But I don't have an answer for you, which is bound to disappoint. But I also don't have an answer for the latter -- at least not one that I believe is true. You're asking after, from what I'm able to parse, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions by which we can pick out, out of all the entities, which entities are meanings.
I'd put it to you that to ask the question "What makes it true that something is a chair?" is to at least have a notion of "chair" and chairs. It is possible for us to know that this is a chair without knowing the necessary and sufficient conditions by which we can definitively state what, of all entities, which entities are chairs.
Likewise, we can know whether something is or is not true without also knowing what it is that makes this true. (I know true statements, but I may not know what truth is)
But I do know what a chair is, in spite of not knowing "what makes it true that something is a chair" (or, perhaps more clearly stated, I'm able to pick chairs out of the entities I am familiar with). I could even offer a definition of "chair", though that's different from what you're asking.
I'm not offering a theory of meaning, as you have. So that may be a source of some miscommunication on our parts. But I also don't need one for my assertion that descriptive definitions are true, insofar that you likewise believe that words have meanings which differ from definitions as my argument didn't rely upon a theory of meaning but rather just on whether or not language is meaningful, or that meaning exists. This, I believe, is mostly the crux of our disagreement. You believe there is no distinction to be had because you believe that meanings are definitions, in particular, stipulated definitions. My strategy has been to demonstrate, by way of example, words which have meaning in spite of stipulation to show that there are meanings aside from stipulation. I understand that the perils of such a strategy is that any counter-example can be re-interpreted under a new theory, hence why I noted I know you can sustain belief in a stipulative theory of definition and meaning. My recourse from there was to note that beliefs in meaning account for more about how language is, whereas your account doesn't account for the factual and historical element of language -- that it, taken to extremes, would lead to a bunch of people barking but never communicating. Meaning really must be shared, at least, in order for us to communicate (insofar that we believe there is such a thing as 1st person experience, at least -- as I do, and I suspect, given your comments about meaning, that you do to).
There are very good reasons to believe that language has meaning. Aside from communication, which is only one part of what language does, we can read a letter, a play, a poem, a book, an article and they all are rich in meaning. This is something of a brute fact, from my perspective -- just as objects are. There is not an existential or ontological difference between objects and words. It's possible that neither exist, but I don't think you can deny one without also denying the other. (perception, after all, doesn't individuate on its own -- objects are named, and names are a part of language) So in some sense I'd say to deny language meaning is very similar to denying objects -- I understand that it can be done, but I don't have a good reason to do so.
My understanding of our disagreement isn't as much about the existence of meaning, however, as much as whether or not meaning is purely a stipulative, and thereby private/mental/subjective, affair.
So onto that:
I found Wittgenstein's treatment in P.I. fairly convincing in arguing that language is public. That we are able to communicate on a regular basis with one another, just as we are able to sit in the same chairs and share food, indicates we share meaning, and that notion of private language are only expressable because of this shared meaning -- since, if language were strictly private, then it would not express. It wouldn't mean anything, at least not to me. And you would say that I can look to your behavior when saying some private word and infer from behavior what you have in your head. But I would say that said inference is impossible without a language. Inference is built on our ability to use language. "if", "then", "possibly", are all words taught to us -- not discovered or invented by us.
Private languages don't account for this, which brings me to:
The phenomenological consideration that I was born into a world where the meanings of language pre-existed me. Language was always-already there. So it's simply true that I didn't define the words which I use. English is older than me, and has a history. I have a Background, of which language is a part.
So, I have good reason to reject that meanings are private, at least. I suspect they are not mental, but perhaps there is some way of parsing a public mental sphere which could make sense of the matter. However, I likewise suspect that any such parsing will make objects just as mental as words -- idealism of a stripe, even if it be a more reserved transcendental idealism.
Terrapin StationDecember 15, 2016 at 16:17#387910 likes
Usage is the method. If you want to know the meaning, then you look to usage -- or reports, sure. That is what one would look at. But whether a report is true is still different from whether or not a definition is true, since a report is describing events and a descriptive definition is describing word (sentences, phrases, etc.) meaning.
This makes no sense, though. If usage is what makes meanings true, and a definition gives the meaning, then a definition isn't true independent of meaning. That's a simple contradiction.
you believe that meanings are definitions, in particular, stipulated definitions
That's not at all true. I don't believe that meanings are stipulated definitions. I explained this earlier. In my view, meanings are mental associations that we make, where they're inherently mental and can't be made into or translated into something else. The words we express via speaking, writing, etc. (so, for example, definitions) are correlated with meanings, but they're not the same as meanings.
It's probably not very important to get into that, though, for a discussion where you're claiming that definitions (or meanings, or whatever you'd like to call it) can be true where that can be independent of usage.
Likewise, we can know whether something is or is not true without also knowing what it is that makes this true.
The importance of being able to say what makes it true is when someone--that's me--comes along and challenges the claim that definitions can be true (or false). If you're going to claim that they are indeed capable of having truth values, then you'd better be able to support that claim beyond "I just know that it's the case" which is essentially all that you're saying here. To me, it just looks like a combination of not wanting to analyze this very much (because you like the view you hold) and perhaps being too lazy to analyze it very much.
Re "What makes it true that something is a chair?" my answer to that is simple (well, rephrasing it because it's not true (or false) that something is a chair--it needs to be rephrased to something like "What makes me say that that is a chair?") The simple answer to that is that it fits the concept that person holds of a chair. It meets their necessary and sufficient criteria to call the object in question a chair. This has the upshot that it's a chair to them, and it might not be a chair to someone else. And that's indeed the case with ALL name-bestowal. Not everyone calls the same things by the same identification names. Not everyone has the same concepts.
Re "I'd put it to you that to ask the question 'What makes it true that something is a chair?' is to at least have a notion of 'chair' and chairs." I don't at all agree with that. You could say, "Hey, that's a reetswahtter!" I haven't the faintest idea what a reetswahtter might be. So I'd ask you "What makes you say that's a reetswahtter?" and hope that your answer would give me some clues as to what the heck a reetswahtter is in your usage.
Anyway, this is all going way far afield from what I was asking you. We're going off on a bunch of tangents, which I hate doing, and that's why I hate that people type such friggin long posts, especially in response to a simple, direct question. I want to focus on one simple thing at a time.
But I also don't need one for my assertion that descriptive definitions are true, insofar that you likewise believe that words have meanings which differ from definitions as my argument didn't rely upon a theory of meaning but rather just on whether or not language is meaningful, or that meaning exists. This, I believe, is mostly the crux of our disagreement. You believe there is no distinction to be had because you believe that meanings are definitions, in particular, stipulated definitions.
Just really quickly -- putting your contradictory quotes into context above
"insofar" means "if" in the above, not "Since".
Terrapin StationDecember 15, 2016 at 16:21#387930 likes
This makes no sense, though. If usage is what makes meanings true, and a definition gives the meaning, then a definition isn't true independent of meaning. That's a simple contradiction.
Usage is not what makes meanings true. Usage is how one determines what a meaning is. Meanings themselves, I suspect, are not true or false. It would be like saying a chair is true or false to say that meanings are true or false.
A definition describes the meaning. Is that the same as gives? I don't think so.
In my view, meanings are meantal associations that we make, where they're inherently mental and can't be made into or translated into something else. The words we express via speaking, writing, etc. (so, for example, definitions) are correlated with meanings, but they're not the same as meanings.
Gotcha.
Then we're not so different, I think, except insofar that I don't believe that meanings are mental. They are, however, associated with words/phrases/sentences. (do we associate the meanings? We can, but we also don't always do so
The importance of being able to say what makes it true is when someone--that's me--comes along and challenges the claim that definitions can be true (or false). If you're going to claim that they are indeed capable of having truth values, then you'd better be able to support that claim beyond "I just know that it's the case" which is essentially all that you're saying here
I certainly didn't have a proof written up. I'm just being honest about that. I'm working through ideas with you. It helps to have someone who disagrees to do exactly that. Sorry if it frustrates. After all:
To me, it just looks like a combinatino of not wanting to analyze this very much (because you like the view you hold) and perhaps being too lazy to analyze it very much
It would be an odd way of being lazy, considering the length of the discussion so far. :D
Re "What makes it true that something is a chair?" my answer to that is simple (well, rephrasing it because it's not true (or false) that something is a chair--it needs to be rephrased to something like "What makes me say that that is a chair?" The simple answer to that is that it fits the concept that person holds of a chair. It meets their necessary and sufficient criteria to call the object in question a chair. This has the upshot that it's a chair to them, and it might not be a chair to someone else. And that's indeed the case with ALL name-bestowal. Not everyone calls the same things by the same identification names. Not everyone has the same concepts.
The problem I have with that is we just don't operate on necessary and sufficient criteria. People don't gaze about looking at objects and evaluating them on this basis. Philosophers wonder about answers to these questions, but this does not reflect how people identify chairs.
To rephrase your question in terms of meaning, then -- "What makes me say that that is a meaning of a word?"
Again, I would say an answer to the question "What makes me say that that is a chair of Walmart?" is to ask the exact same question. It's not ideas, from my view, as per what I stated above. Notions maybe, in the sense that people have rough ideas, but not necessary and sufficient conditions. At least, from the way I believe we actually use words and think about these things.
There's an ambiguity in the word "makes", too -- I mean, I could say that what makes me say that that is a chair of Walmart is someone asked me whether or not Walmart has chairs, and reply in a jocular fashion, "That is a chair of Walmart". So someone else's question made me say exactly that.
What makes me say that words are correlated with meanings -- signifiers with signifieds -- is that there are signs in the world, and they mean things regardless of what beliefs I might hold about those signs. "tomato" refers to a tomato even if I use "tomato" to insult someone. What makes me say that this is a meaning is that meanings of words are as public as chairs of walmart. To go back to an older example:
So I'd ask you "What makes you say that's a reetswahtter?" and hope that your answer would give me some clues as to what the heck a reetswahtter is in your usage.
I only understand you because I know the meanings of your words. Were they private, then the whole thing has about as much meaning as reetswahtter does in English.
Anyway, this is all going way far afield from what I was asking you. We're going off on a bunch of tangents, which I hate doing, and that's why I hate that people type such friggin long posts, especially in response to a simple, direct question. I want to focus on one simple thing at a time.
And I was just getting to how this all leads to World Peace. Darn.
Terrapin StationDecember 15, 2016 at 16:45#387950 likes
I don't want to talk about 50 different things in each reply, so I'm just going to cover one thing at a tinme.
The simple answer to that is that it fits the concept that person holds of a chair. It meets their necessary and sufficient criteria to call the object in question a chair.
That is what I hear.
Terrapin StationDecember 15, 2016 at 16:52#387980 likes
You read it as if I'm saying that they're explicitly saying "What are my necessary and sufficient criteria"??? Why in the world would you read it that way? It in no way SAYS that they explicitly say "What are my necessary and sufficient criteria"
My question is, do you see this fundamental difference? In one case, truth is dependent on a agreement between individual human beings, we agree that the object is called "the apple", therefore it is true that this object is the apple. In the other case, there are things which we are calling apples, and truth is dependent on an agreement between the properties of these things, and our definition of "apple".
Yes, that makes a good deal more sense to me now. In one case we're offering a standard by which to judge whether something fits a category, and in the other we are referring to some entity.
Reply to Terrapin Station I suppose because it's not the "explicit" part that gives me pause, but whether it happens at all -- I don't think people implicitly hold necessary and sufficient conditions for being able to pick out entities for words.
Terrapin StationDecember 15, 2016 at 17:05#388010 likes
I don't know why you'd think that, though, because it happens all the time. For example, someone might see this:
And say, "That's not a chair!"
When you ask them why they say that, they might respond with, "It ain't got no seat!" or "It ain't got no legs!" or both. In other words, it doesn't meet a necessary condition (or two) for them to call it/consider it a chair. (If you object that it does in fact have a seat, they'd say it doesn't, because it doesn't meet their necessary criteria for what counts as a "seat.")
But someone else might say, "That is a chair!"
When you ask them why they say that, they might respond with, "You can sit on it and it even has a backrest; plus it was intended as a chair." Or in other words, it meets that person's sufficient conditions to be a chair. (By the way, that was in fact intended as a chair--it's an example of an "art chair.")
People do this all the time when they're assigning or refraining from assigning a term to an object.
Look at how often this sort of thing happens with, say, film and music discussions regarding whether a particular film or piece of music belongs to a particular genre or not.
Reply to Terrapin Station People have discussions about categories, no doubt, and whether something does or does not fit a category.
But when someone sees a chair as a chair, they did not do so by necessary or sufficient conditions. The conditions are post-hoc explanations of word usage. Explanations which can even modify how we use a word in the future or elucidate something about the object, no doubt. But when someone asks for a chair, and the shopkeeper brings them a chair, the shopkeeper did not buy chairs on the basis of some sort of rational conditions. He just knew what counts as a chair, as the buyer knew what they were asking for.
If the shopkeeper brought the above image to the buyer, then a discussion about the proper use of chair, or the necessary and sufficient conditions of chair-hood, might take place. Prior to that, though? We have to be able to pick out chairs in order for us to even begin laying out the necessary and sufficient conditions of chair-hood -- hence, have some kind of notion of chairs prior to assigning conditions.
Terrapin StationDecember 15, 2016 at 17:18#388030 likes
Unfortunately, you have absolutely no explanation for that aside from "he just knows."
Again, I'm not saying that this process is necessarily explicit, but it's the process that's going on with respect to concept application. We formuate concepts because that's necessary for us to be able to deal with the plethora of information we encounter--we have to formulate conceptual abstractions so that we can quickly assess our perceptual data and take actions that allow us to survive--our brains evolved that way because it's the only way we can survive, and when we perceive something, our brains quickly register it as fitting or not fitting particular conceptual abstractions we've formulated via what are essentially necessary and sufficient criteria. That's how you know what you count (not some general "what counts," as there is no such thing) as a chair. And it's the only way it makes sense that we can observe something and go "chair."
But you have absolutely no theory of that besides "you just know."
With particular types of brain damage, by the way, people can no longer look at certain things and register whether they match a concept--they can no longer recognize certain things. That's because that brain damage affects some concept-formulation and storage structures in their brain.
Again, I'm not saying that this process is necessarily explicit, but it's the process that's going on with respect to concept application. We formuate concepts because that's necessary for us to be able to deal with the plethora of information we encounter--we have to formulate conceptual abstractions so that we can quickly assess our perceptual data and take actions that allow us to survive--our brains evolved that way because it's the only way we can survive, and when we perceive something, our brains quickly register it as fitting or not fitting particular conceptual abstractions we've formulated via what are essentially necessary and sufficient criteria. That's how you know what you count (not some general "what counts," as there is no such thing) as a chair. And it's the only way it makes sense that we can observe something and go "chair."
Your brain does all this?
Where?
:D
There's a lot of entities you're introducing in this paragraph. A very large story on how we "essentially" comes to necessary and sufficient criteria (are concepts or are concepts not necessary and sufficient criteria? I'm saying they are not, but are just rough notions -- but here you're introducing "essentially". What does that mean?)
I don't think it's the only story that makes sense of the fact that we can observe something and go "chair". First, I would say we do not observe something and then go chair. We don't have perceptual data. We have chairs. "perceptual data" is an abstraction built on abstractions arrived at after much contemplation, which itself relies upon language.
If our brain and evolution does things for us, then just as the brain and evolution make us sit in the chair, then also the brain and evolution make us refer with signs ("chair" to chair) which already mean something.
It is not the brain and evolution which creates meaning, but the brain and evolution which uses meaning -- just as it uses chairs.
But you have absolutely no theory of that besides "you just know."
No theory, of course. Only an argument about the necessity of having to "just know" in order to be able to formulate necessary and sufficient conditions.
Your story about concepts and sense data and brains and evolution driving perception of chairs all relies upon this -- our -- ability to "just know" the meanings of words without necessary and sufficient conditions. (EDIT: It's worth noting here, too, that we are really focusing a lot on nouns, but that language meaning is much more diverse than necessary and sufficient conditions for categories. I'm not saying you deny this, but it's worth noting because right now we are focusing very much on this one example, when meaning isn't just this one example)
Terrapin StationDecember 15, 2016 at 17:30#388060 likes
You're asking me where one's brain is? Or where in the brain? If where in the brain, one study suggested that it starts in the hippocampus, though other evidence suggests that at least once concepts are formulated, they can occur throughout the brain. It's not highly localized.
Unfortunately, you have absolutely no explanation for that aside from "he just knows."
What I've been discussing with Moliere, is that there is no need for him to know that the item is a chair, nor is there a need for him to know what a chair is, in general. When someone is talking about a particular object, and calling it a chair, all that matters is that the people hearing know which object is referred to as the chair. So knowing what a chair is, or that the object referred to with "chair" is really a chair, or not, is completely unnecessary for us to be capable of making true statements about the chair. All that is necessary is that we agree on which item is referred to as the chair. It is highly likely that the context of the word "chair" within the speech and actions of the speaker is what determines the object that "chair" refers to, not some sort of conditions as to what constitutes a chair, within the hearer's mind.
I think it is very important to understand this, before we move on toward analyzing any sort of standards by which we say that the object is or is not a chair. At the basic fundamental level, all that is necessary is the agreement, that this object will be identified as the chair. Then we have a basic truth, that particular object is "the chair", and this is a fundamental truth. It doesn't require any standards or criteria. But if we want to establish a class of items to be called chairs, then we need some criteria for classification, and this is where definition comes into play. Now we have a completely different type of truth, we are not agreeing that this object goes by the name "chair", we are agreeing on the criteria by which any object may be correctly called a chair.
In one case we're offering a standard by which to judge whether something fits a category, and in the other we are referring to some entity.
Suppose we have a category now, the category of chair, and we want to judge an object as to whether its a chair. We have two distinct judgements to make. First we have to judge the standards. Are these the proper standards for defining "chair"? And, we have to judge the object to see if it fulfills those conditions.
So back to the first case now, when we are just referring to some entity with some name. There is no double judgement. One person says "chair", and the other person judges what the particular item is that is being referred to, as the chair, without referring to any set of standards. The item referred to is the chair, and that is the truth. In the other case, we want to determine whether the item referred to is really a chair. Then we need to make this double judgement, which will lead us toward the truth of whether the item really is a chair or not
The first problem with the entailment angle on truthmaking is that any object which exists will end up being a truthmaker for a necessary truth. My dog is a truthmaker for the proposition that 2+2=4. And there are other problems.
So we'll attempt to remedy this by adding relevance to entailment. Is it possible to become systematic about the concept of relevance?
Comments (161)
A truthmaker grounds the statement in a different way? How?
What is the statement? A representation? Are there unasserted statements in your view?
The easiest way to understand this is simply via the conventions of stating what correspondence theory is in a nutshell: that is, that "P" (is true) iff P. (Or in other words, that a proposition is true just in case the proposition corresponds to some fact.)
So the truthmaker for "The cat is on the mat" (for that truthbearer, that proposition) is the fact that the cat is on the mat (or rather the cat being on the mat as it's often put in truthmaker talk).
Justifications on the other hand are the set of reasons that one takes as (sufficient) grounds for belief that P. For some simple claims, it might seem that truthmakers and justifications would be the same, but arguably there is always more to justifications, including for example reasons for belief such as "I trust my phenomenal data," and for claims like "There is a God," justifications will typically be much different and more extensive than the truthmaker--since the truthmaker is simply there being a God.
Yet what else could make a statement justified if not that it is true in virtue of a truthmaker?
Who uses the t-sentence to describe Correspondence?
What the heck do you think that correspondence is then? That is correspondence. A proposition is true just in case it corresponds to the fact it putatively picks out. "P" in quotation marks is the convention for denoting a propostion as such. P without quotation marks is the convention for denoting the fact as such. (At least in this context, where it's important to make a distinction.) Also, the reason I put "is true" in parentheses was simply to allow it to count as either traditional correspondence or deflationism. You seem familiar enough with this (otherwise how would you know "t sentence" or redundancy?) that it's bizarre to have to explain this to you . . . and then you just focus on that and don't say anything about whether you understood the distinction between truthmakers and justifications, which you also shouldn't need explained to you given an apparent familiarity with relevant material.
Sure, an example is Matthew McGrath's Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory, although note that he uses "angle brackets"--< and > rather than quotation marks.
Could you answer the questions and address the points I brought up now please?
What are the angle brackets supposed to mean?
The brackets are just an alternate symbol for setting off the proposition. You could use any symbol.
What, on your view, are we replacing with the t sentence if we replace correspondence with it? (Which is another way of asking you just what you take to be correspondence theory)
Wow. So "P" in the t sentence isn't a proposition in your opinion?
My understanding is that it is a sentence, not a proposition; which is presumably why this is called the semantic theory of truth, and is not simply (or non-controversially) categorized under either correspondence or deflationary theories.
Given the standard definition of knowledge as justified true belief, there is evidently a distinction between justification and truth; otherwise, one or the other would be redundant. Justification is what warrants someone holding a belief, while truth is what makes that belief count as knowledge. We can be justified in holding a belief even when unaware of its truthmaker(s). We can also be justified (but mistaken) in holding a belief that is not true, and thus has no truthmaker.
Right. So propositions don't have anything to do with sentences in your view?
Is the t-sentence about questions and commands and so on, would you say?
Haha--okay, and what would you say the received view is on what propositions are?
Oy vey. Are you guys learning philosophy off the back of cereal boxes or what?
A justification is a reason to believe.
Justification has precious little to do with truth, on my view. Sure, insofar that we want to know we want to believe what is true. But justification has to do with belief and persuasion more than truth.
EDIT: By 'entity' I mostly mean to denote individuated existence -- events, objects, persons would all qualify.
Yes. Looking at the question with Redundancy goggles on, the question: "By virtue of what is P true?" doesn't make a lot of sense. Redundancy says that there is no more to truth than a certain attitude on the part of a speaker... an attitude that makes the speaker an asserter.
What gives a speaker that little extra oomph such that we call him an asserter? Justification?
Eh.. anyway. The way you have framed the issue makes it sound like you accept Correspondence theory. Is this the case?
You're sounding like Austin, but he didn't use "proposition." I don't hold that there's one way the words should be used. But no worthwhile discussion can be had where there is no agreement about how to use the words.
The challenge to entailment is confusing and involves necessity. It might take me a while to get to the bottom of it. Anybody who already understands it... help would be appreciated.
It's more or less how I think about truth, yes.
But I think I've mentioned elsewhere I find most of the stuff I've read on truth confusing. So I just default to the theory that at least makes sense to me. It does, at least, seem to encapsulate what truth means, at least, if not what truth is.
That's why the alternate viewpoint has the character of a giant step out of the representational scheme.
Heh. I'm even anti-representaitonal in my thinking on knowledge, it's just that all the alternatives I've read on truth are either 1) obviously not what truth means (coherency, pragmatic), 2) flabbergasting (anything somewhat related to deflationary approaches)
Then there's this other side to me that wonders about other uses of "truth" which don't seem to be addressed by any of the theories. Not that these would be what truth is, per se, but then what is it people mean by "truth" if they are not meaning truth?
So I can see the motivation for wanting another theory of truth aside from correspondence. I just haven't found that bridge into the topic which makes it easy for me to make heads or tails of.
The received view is that propositions are the meanings, not expressions, of declarative sentences (statements), hence the same proposition being expressible in different languages.
Deflation isn't so bad. You know what truth means in the sense that you know how to use the word. There probably isn't any definition that would be useful for teaching people what truth is. Since a definition is an assertion, the learner has to know what truth is in order to understand what a definition is. So the learner knows what truth is prior to hearing any particular definition.
And yet we still find Correspondence valuable (and in my case, fascinating.) Why? Somebody earlier in this thread (I think.. too lazy to look back) said that true propositions represent the actual world. So what do false propositions represent? Other possible worlds? Maybe the ultimate truthmaker is the actual.
Definitions are stipulations, not assertions.
Can't see how a stipulation is not a kind of assertion.
An assertion is a(n endorsement of a) truth claim.
Stipulations on the other hand simply forward associations--X will refer to y, or let x = y.
But if someone asks me what a word (like "truth") means my response isn't simply "let 'truth' mean [whatever I want]".
But the only assertions to be had when talking about this are limited to:
* Reports of conventional definitions/usage of the term,
* Reports of particular persons' idiosyncratic defintions/usage.
* Reports of what I call "functional" usage of term, which can be different than how the people in question would define the term,
The definitions (or "meanings" if you like) themselves won't be (and can't be) true or false. They're always stipulations.
Yes, which are all truth-apt assertions, not stipulations.
In context it should be clear that by "definition" Mongrel meant "a statement of the exact meaning of a word". She didn't mean in the sense of the meaning itself.
Right, and since I called them assertions, that's what I was saying, too.
Quoting Michael
Which refers to which of the three bulleted points of mine in your view?
Stipulative definitions are stipulative. But definitions in the dictionary, at least if we follow the Oxford model, are descriptive. So if one gave a descriptive definition of "tomato" as "to move with rapid jerky motions" that would be a false assertion.
There are also prescriptive definitions -- you may say "Irregardless" to mean "we can ignore that point because what's salient is...", but some may say that you should just say "regardless"
There's a cool article on definitions in the SEP: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/definitions/
That argument makes sense to me. But it doesn't seem to answer the question, ya'know? It seems more like an argument for the possibility of answering the question, "What is truth?"
Again, I noted above:
Quoting Terrapin Station
So it's not the definition that's true or false per se, but the (implicit) claim that a definition is an accurate report of how the term is conventionally used.
Re prescriptives/normatives, there's no such thing as a true/false prescriptive/normative on my view. Again, we could say that it's true or false that something is accepted as a normative, but that doesn't make the normative true or false.
Are you referring to "it's not the definition that's true or false per se"? (I make a distinction between meanings and definitions, by the way. Meanings are the inherently mental/private/subjective relations in your head. Definitions are the expressions, for example in words--text or sounds--correlated to those meanings.)
Anyway, all I'm getting at is this:
Associating "Tomato" with "a glossy red, or occasionally yellow, pulpy edible fruit . . . " is not true or false (and likewise associating "tomato" with "to move with rapid, jerky motions" is not true or false).
What's true or false is this: "'Tomato' is conventionally used to refer to 'a glossy red, or occasionally yellow, pulpy edible fruit . . . '"
One could define "Tomato" as "to move with rapid, jerky motions" (that is, one could say something like "When I say 'Tomato,' what I'm referring to is 'to move with rapid, jerky motions") and that wouldn't be false or incorrect. It would just be unconventional. But it's not false or incorrect to be unconventional.
So the definition isn't true or false. The claim that a particular definition is the conventional one is what would be true or false.
Deflationists don't expect an answer to that question to be forthcoming, but they aren't truth anti-realists. Truth is a concept that's too basic to define.
Although I'm aware you're making that distinction there, would you also agree that definitions can be or are mental since they have to be constructed via minds? Definitions generally are, after all, just sentences, and sentences I think are also mentally constructed.
Yeah, they're mentally devised (of course--after all, it's not like they just independently appear on paper or wherever), but unlike meanings, they're publicly shareable.
"My dog just got her rabies vaccination." Let's call that utterance p.
My dog is a truth-maker for p IFF my dog exists, and if I say "My dog exists." this entails that my dog just got her rabies vaccination. Is p entailed by the existence of my dog?
Entailment:
It's not super clear to me that my dog's existence does entail that she recently got her vaccines. So per entailment, either:
1. My dog is not a truthmaker for p or
2. There's some chain of entailment from her existence to the vaccines.
Hmm.
That's related to what I said in my initial post of this thread:
Quoting Terrapin Station
The way that's worded in the SEP, at least going by what you're quoting, isn't clear at all.
Yeah, I'm reading through the SEP article now. . . it's not very well-written in my opinion, but I'm slogging through it.
"By virtue of" is apt to mean "because of." Truthmakers do not have a causal relationship with truth-bearers. Maybe the motivation for avoiding "virtue" is in virtue of the causality issue.
On my view, that's false, because on my view what it is for a proposition to be true is for someone to actively make a judgment about its relation (to whatever they consider the truthmaker we could say). On the standard view, I'm not sure I can make sense of why there wouldn't be a causal relationship. Folks would have to think that propositions correlate with facts in some happenstance way or something like that, which I don't think makes any sense.
Because presumably we can make true claims about things beyond any causal influence, e.g. the future or the distant, and about things that aren't causal things at all, e.g. counterfactuals.
Correct. That's the case on my view.
Wouldn't some set of facts cause one to make the claim though?
My assertion was causally influenced, yes. But, under the standard view (and not your view), the assertion's truth maker is something else.
I'm not sure I'm following your comment. Something else other than what caused you to make the claim you mean?
D: Dogs have two ears.
P: My dog has two ears.
My dog is a truthmaker for P. The representation M entails P. Right?
"associating" differs in meaning from "defining". And, yes, we certainly disagree on word meaning.
Were you to define "tomato" as "used for emphasis", and by "define" I mean "descriptive definition", then that definition would be false. This is because the meaning of a word does not belong "in the head", as you say. We may take a sign and stipulate a meaning with that sign. But "tomato" still means "a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc." -- I can imagine other ways of phrasing this too that would be true -- regardless of your stipulation.
Now, if everyone began to use "tomato" as "used for emphasis", then the meaning of the word has changed. But that, in and of itself, is no reason to think that meanings on "in the head".
Consider, for instance, the following:
Heber brewed a of gone huber of a draken fitch-witch wherever why to run gone mad
I can tell you what I mean by this, but clearly it doesn't mean anything in English -- because there is a fact to the matter of English(just because we are "in L" does not mean there is no fact to the matter). Also, the word "mean" here has two different meanings -- my first usage means "intend" and my latter use means "extension of a word".
Hence why I'd say there is more to definitions than stipulations. There are stipulative definitions, but there's a reason one must stipulate -- because the meanings of words are often more diffuse than some given speaker might wish to express.
Now, intentions are mental and we can intend this or that meaning with a word. But meanings differ from intent.
All that being said, you are of course free to postulate and even stick to a strictly stipulative theory of meaning. But it is at the very least idiosyncratic. What reason would you have for believing it, given that we have to learn a language, after all, and that there are at least purported facts about language. How would you deal with, say, the existence of an English class? What is it they are learning? The mathematical average of the contents of a culture's mind?
What would motivate such a belief?
When someone says, "I will define 'tomato' as 'to move with rapid, jerky motions,'" do you simply say that the person is making no sense, or can you understand that when that person says "tomato" from that point (at least in the context at hand), he's going to be referring to "moving with rapid, jerky motions"?
Obviously the hypothetical person is stipulating another definition. But not many people are using said definition, no?
But you seem to be saying I have it wrong. So, what would you say we learn when we learn the meanings to English words, given that meanings are mental/private/subjective?
In Frege's argument an infinite regress appears with any attempt to define truth. It's not just Correspondence. It's any definition. I wrote out Frege's argument on the old forum and went through it. I guess that's all in the bit bucket, huh?
You mean use meaning as truth-bearers? How would that differ from using propositions? And it's cool if you want to continue the conversation here. I recently discovered that I'm not too clear on what entailment is. I think I'll start a thread on that shortly. :)
I'll get to the other stuff, but I want to just sort this one little thing out first. If "definition" on your account refers to some consensus usage, then one can't stipulate a definition that only one is using. That you can understand that one can stipulate a definition that only one is using implies that definition, unqualified, does not denote consensus usage. You'd need to qualify it as a "descriptive (of the consensus usage) definition" rather than a "stipulated, idiosyncratic definition," for example. A "stipulated, idiosyncratic definition" would make no sense if "definition" refers to consensus usage, because then we're saying that it's a "stipulated, idiosyncratic consensus usage," and in this case, used by only one person. That would be incoherent.
What do you mean by "attached" there?
Wait, so "definition" on your account doesn't refer to consensus usage, and/or you're now saying that ("on your account") you can't make sense of someone saying "I will define 'tomato' as 'to move with rapid, jerky motions'"?
I imagine what's throwing us off is this:
Quoting Moliere
But there is a difference between saying that we can tell what "tomato" means by what everyone uses "tomato" as, and that a descriptive definition refers to consensus usage. A descriptive definition describes the meaning of a term. We can tell what the meaning of that term is by the extension of usage of said term. There's not exactly a Committee for Consensus on the Sign which holds conventions to ensure consensus is reached, at least with most natural languages.
A stipulative definition is understood because I know what "to stipulate" means. "Tomato" has meaning regardless of what a person might stipulate it as because "stipulate" means. So, no, just because someone can use a sign idiosyncratically that doesn't sink the notion that "tomato" means something regardless of said stipulation.
Also, I think you're focusing on my former part -- admittedly larger -- of the post in this dialogue, whereas I'm focusing on my questions, such as:
Quoting Moliere
Which seems to me to be the results of your theory -- that what you learn in English class, when you learn word meaning, is the average of mental contents -- which sounds a lot like consensus to me, but maybe not to you.
But if I could just have one question answered, because you seem to be indicating that I have it wrong, this would be the one:
Quoting Moliere
This paragraph isn't at all clear to me, unless for some reason--though Lord knows what reason--you'd be reading "consensus" as necessarily referring to some sort of formal agreement a la your comment about a committee.
Quoting Moliere
Right, but if you took "definition" to necessarily refer to a consensus or conventional usage, then an idiosyncratic stipulative definition shouldn't make sense to you. That it makes sense to you would suggest that you're not using "definition" to refer to consensus/conventional usage (which you've already agreed to, so no need to go over this again).
Quoting Moliere
That sentence doesn't make sense to me, either (including grammatically).
Quoting Moliere
The only idea was to separate "definition" from "consensus (or conventional) usage." "Definition" doesn't necessarily refer to consensus (or conventional) usage. Other than that, definitions only obtain via stipulation (per usage at least). But then it's just a matter of whether other people will agree with that stipulation or not. If lots of folks agree and follow suit, then it becomes a conventional usage, and dictionary authors note it when they're doing their work.
Quoting Moliere
Nowhere am I denying that there is conventional or consensus usage of a language. What I've said is that (a) conventions or consensuses do not make something true or false (beyond it being true or false that such and such is a convention), (b) "Definition" does not conventionally refer to conventional or consensus definitions, and (c) Definitions are stipulations, not truth claims. That's not to say that what dictionary authors are doing is stipulating whatever definitions they'd like. But that doesn't imply that what "definition" conventionally refers to is a conventional or consensus usage. (c) is saying that definitions arise, historically, via stipulation.
Anyway, so you mostly learn the conventions of the language in English class. You could separate prescriptions from that, but really, prescriptions are the conventions of a particular population (such as English professors and other people considered language experts).
Quoting Moliere
On my view, one can not learn, or share, etc., meaning. Meanings are mental-only, and can't be made non-mental. You learn definitions and observe (behavioral) usage. Meanings are something that happen inside an individual's head, from a first-person perspective. (This is a response to your final question as well.)
I'm having trouble following this... sorry. Consider agreement. Two people are willing to assert the same truth-bearer. It can't be that they're willing to make the same utterance. I can't make your utterance and vice versa.
You can stipulate any arbitrary eccentric meaning you like for any word you want to, as in your example; but your stipulation, if it is to be understood, will always rely on conventional shared meanings for the terms your stipulation employs. It will necessarily be reliant, in other words, on other meanings which you have not stipulated, meanings which have been established by usage.
So, the fact that arbitrary meanings can be stipulated of words and phrases really shows nothing of any significance about meaning or definition.
This isn't entirely true. A person can stipulate a definition as a premise, for the purpose of deductive argument. The logical argument, and others which follow, using conclusions as further premises, will produce a structure of meaning built upon that stipulated meaning. So we can have significant meaning which is built upon stipulated definition. This is fundamental to scientific theory.
The issue which we have to be very wary of, is when a stipulated definition is close to but varying slightly from the meaning of conventional usage. Then, if in the process of logical argument, one slips from the stipulated definition to the conventional meaning, we have a case of equivocation. These are generally sloppily produced arguments found in places like tpf, and pop philosophy, they are not the arguments of good philosophy or good scientific theory.
Yes, but the stipulated meanings in those kinds of cases are not arbitrary.
More just that language isn't something which is institutional, as "consensus" seems to imply to me -- though there are other ways to institute, of course, than by consensus. I do not hold that meanings are made by consensus. There are even uses of similar phonemes which are unrelated to one another, and there are more or less popular uses of certain words, as well as archaic usage too.
There are institutions dedicated to language, but language came prior to said institutions.
Institutions are where we get conventions from. So, therefore, language is not purely conventional. I would say that there is a fact to the matter.
Quoting Terrapin Station
"Tomato" means. "means" is a verb, indicating that the word is an active participant in language, regardless of intent. In the same way one might say "The rock is", I was stating ""Tomato" means" to indicate there is a fact to the matter.
Quoting Terrapin Station
:D -- I am trying to draw a distinction between what you are smashing together. Definitions obtain via usage, not stipulation. So, it is either by use or by stipulation, at least if we happen to be just that smart and are debating the only two theories that are possible. ;)
To highlight the difference:
Quoting Terrapin Station
Agreement is a kind of institutional action -- a way of creating institutions. But it is not agreement which gives meanings to words. We are able to stipulate, of course, because anything can serve as a sign. But this does not then mean that agreement creates meaning -- even if we agree to use "The crow flies from coast to coast" to mean "I'm a member of the Communist Party", and even if the entire communist party began using it in this manner, that would not change the meaning of "the crow flies from coast to coast".
There is a certain history to words which agreement is unable to overcome. People don't follow suit and decide to create language. Rather, we are born into a world with language, and it already means something, regardless of my intent.
I'd say that this is what your theory is unable to explain -- it explains how it is we can take a sign to mean something, but it doesn't explain the factual side of language.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I think this is our only point of contention, really.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Cool.
Then I'd submit to you that I know "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc.
If I know that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc., then it is true that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc.
If an utterance is true, then there is a fact to the matter.
If there is a fact to the matter with respect to language, then not all language is stipulated.
An utterance is a matter of language. And so I'd conclude that there is something missing in the belief that "all English definitions are stipulated"
This is just a bit more formal way of presenting what I already stated above.
No worries at all. Please question away -- I'm far from an expert on this subject. I probably know just enough to hurt myself, really ;).
True. But then suppose while I was in California I were to say, "It is 5:00 PM". And my cousin, who lives on the East coast, were to also say "It is 5:00 PM" at the same time in a telephone conversation. Only one of these utterances is true, even though they express the same semantic content. (well, OK, they could both be false as well -- but they can't both be true :D)
One of the reasons I like the focus on utterances is that it seems, at least, to be a nice and neat way to accept all the messiness of context without getting lost in the mud of possible contexts.
Here's a slight problem. When I say I know what "tomato" means, does this mean that I can ring off an acceptable definition as you have, or does this mean that I can identify a tomato? It is possible that one is capable of the latter, without being capable of the former, or even vise versa. So for instance, if a child learns the word "tomato", and is able to point to a tomato when the word is spoken, but is not able to state what the word "tomato" means, would you say that the chid knows the meaning of "tomato" or not? If not, why is being able to relate the symbol to the object not a case of knowing meaning?
I'm not saying anything about institutions.
Here are some common definitions of "consensus":
* "general or widespread agreement"
* "majority of opinion"
* "agreement of the people"
And "convention"
* "a way in which something is usually done"
* "a rule, method, or practice established by usage; custom""
* "general agreement or consent; accepted usage"
Maybe you're using "institution" in some looser manner than referring to "formal" institutions however.
Quoting Moliere
I couldn't disagree with these two paragraphs more strongly than I do. In my opinion, it's rather clear that you have this stuff factually wrong.
Quoting Moliere
The factual side of language certainly isn't that words have definitions (which you'd call "meanings") that can be different than usage. That goes against the factual evidence. Words are defined however people choose to define them. They can do something highly idiosyncratic there, or they can follow suit with how the vast majority of people are defining the term, or they can do anything in between. None of that is right or wrong, by the way. And typically, those definitions, that usage (of the vast majority that is) shifts over time.
Quoting Moliere
Haha--no, that isn't true. It's only true that that's the conventional definition.
This is similar to saying, for example, (a) "Vanilla ice cream tastes good" versus (b) "80% of the people in Des Moines feel that vanilla ice cream tastes good." (a) isn't true (or false). (b) is true or false. In other words, it's only true or false in the context of some particular persons feeling that vanilla ice cream tastes good or not. It's not (that particular) context-free true or false that vanilla ice cream tastes good.
So likewise, "The definition of tomato is such and such" isn't true or false. But "Most people define tomato as such and such" is true or false. It's only true in the context of some particular persons defining tomato in the way in question.
So isn't it necessary to distinguish between meaning in sense #1, and meaning in sense #2 then? If we don't maintain this distinction there could be ambiguity or even equivocation. Meaning in the one sense lends itself to truth as correspondence, and in the other sense, coherence.
Two different propositions were expressed. An utterance is sounds or marks, generally... not really a good candidate for truth-bearer.
Quoting Moliere
Propositions don't operate on "possible contexts." A sentence is uttered to express a proposition. Listeners either understand what proposition was expressed or they don't. No malarky about computer generated poetry here.
And whatever the ontology of propositions might be (and it is quite the poser), Scott Soames lays out a pretty good argument which concludes that the price of denying propositions is giving up the possibility of agreement. And those who are fine with that probably don't bother to be understood, I would imagine.
Cool.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Hold on there. A definition is not a meaning. A definition describes the meaning. When someone uses a word, they are not defining it. They're using it.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I understand that you disagree. But the best reason I seem to get for you is that your idea about meaning accounts for being able to use words idiosyncratically.
But if we can figure out what words mean by their usage, then I don't see an issue with new uses of words, and it seems that we have a way of understanding shared meanings, rather than having them be private.
But these aren't two types of definition, one is a definition, the other a direct relating the word to an object. The latter is knowing what "apple" means by being able to point to an apple, it is not in any way defining "apple".
What were the two different propositions? To my understanding, propositions are generally taken as the content of certain expressions. No? Does the location in which we speak change the semantic content of an expression?
I may just misunderstand propositions. Because I would say that "It is 5:00 PM" is expresses the same proposition regardless of the speaker -- so your assertion that there are two different one's runs counter to my understanding. (which, as I've noted, isn't in any way professional. I'm certainly open to reading more. I'm just interested in the topic, so I'm talking)
Quoting Mongrel
Propositions don't, but language does. An understanding of meaning without somehow incorporating context doesn't strike me as terribly helpful because meaning changes so much with context.
Why not computer generated poetry? Isn't computer generated poetry just as much a part of language as declarative sentences?
That's the crazy part about language. It has meaning regardless of intent. If a computer generates a sentence, then we know what it means even though there wasn't even a speaker.
What's wrong with sounds or marks, vs. propositions? To me it seems that I know the former exist because I see them. But the latter strike me as convenient inventions that don't even account for language meaning, but only the meaning of very particular types of sentences which some philosophers have an interest in. Granted, these are the sorts of sentences we're usually interested in when talking about truth-apt sentences, and therefore truth, but still -- it seems to me that meaning is wider than truth, and truth is just one goal a sentence can accomplish.
While Saussure certainly believes meanings are in the head, I don't think that is necessary to take on board if we talk about language in terms of signs. A sign is composed of both a signifier and a signified. The marks can be the signifier. And truth is the property which a signifier has to some fact. The signified is the meaning which "comes along with", but given that semantic meanings of words are resilient to change -- whereas the marks in a given context aren't (whether "mark" be understood as phonic or visual), and in fact vary considerably with context -- it makes sense to assign truth to the mark rather than the meaning to account for the variety in contextual use.
It may be counter-intuitive to say that the marks we see bear truth -- but that doesn't mean it shouldn't be the case, no? I can see that because a mark can have different meanings that maybe it's a bit of a bait-and-switch move... but it seems to me that just because a mark can look different and mean the same, or vice-versa, that there's still good reason for attributing truth to the mark because it's the very thing which is in context.
If someone uses the word "apple", then they are not defining it. They are demonstrating competence of the language, but they are putting the language to use.
If someone is teaching another the meaning of "apple", then they may choose, rather than speak the meaning, to demonstrate the meaning by showing the pupil an apple.
So being able to point to an apple, and pointing to an apple, is using "apple". Demonstrating to someone how to use "apple" is a way of defining apple. Telling someone what an apple is is another way of defining "apple". So if we are asking a clerk for an apple then we are using the word "apple", and if we are telling someone about "apple" then we are mentioning the word "apple".
Also this is not a case of arbitrary semantic meaning; where a conventionally determinate meaning is substituted by an arbitrary stipulated meaning. Any stipulated meaning is still determinate, insofar as it is stipulated. In the algebra case the meaning of 'X' is only determinable by a process of calculation; and this is not analogous to conventional semantic meaning; which is either already known or has to be looked up. There is no process whereby semantic meanings can be calculated.
OK, so back to my original question then. When a child learning language knows how to point to the proper object when the word "apple" is spoken, does that child know what "apple" means? If so, then that child knows what "apple" means without knowing any definition of apple.
At first, you said that this person does know what "apple" means, and that's why I said we need to distinguish between two senses of meaning. One being associated with the capacity to define the word, the other being associated with the capacity to relate the word to an object.
But maybe they don't know how to define a word, yet. They haven't reached the ability to begin thinking about their words in the same way that they think about their apples. So they know what "apple" means, but they may not know what "The word "apple"" means.
One doesn't even know what proposition is being expressed unless the context of utterance is known.
John said "2 is a prime number."
Bill said, pointing to the number 2 written on the blackboard "That is a prime number."
Different sentences, different utterances, same proposition.
Quoting Moliere
Yep. As I said.. you identify the proposition expressed by an utterance by attending to context of utterance.
Quoting Moliere
Sounds and marks won't work as primary truth-bearers in spite of their ready visibility. If you and I are in agreement, it's not sounds or marks we're agreeing to.
I get the objection to propositions based on ontological considerations, but as photographer would often say: reality is what we can't do without. Before you ditch propositions, recognize what you're saying you can do without. As I mentioned, it's communication itself that's undermined by that rejection.
But X does not represent an unknown quantity, it represents a defined object "Let X = ..." The task of the mathematician is to assign a numerical value to that defined object. The definition of X is completely arbitrary because we can fill the space with whatever random definition which we want to figure the numerical value for.
Quoting Moliere
So do you agree that we need to respect two distinct senses of "meaning"? One is associated with the capacity to relate words to objects, and the other is associated with the capacity to relate words to other words, form a definition.
Give me an example of the kind of "defined" object you think 'X' represents in algebra.
The whole point of defining something like that as 'X' is to facilitate calculating it in cases where you don't know what it is, but you do know other things relating to what you are defining which will enable you to calculate it, which is pointless if you already know what X equals. So the number of times you went to the store is an unknown quantity, plus you have some other information that can be formulated in terms of X such as to enable that unknown quantity to be calculated, or if you do know the number of times you went to the store, then there is no point defining it as 'X".
Think of this example of an algebraic formula: 2X +15= 25, you are not defining X, but '2X +15' and you are defining the latter as being equal to 25. This enables you to calculate the value of X, which prior to calculation is an unknown quantity.
Sure, it doesn't matter whether X is the number of times you drove to the store or the number of times you deceived your wife (and the latter may well be incalculable ;) ) but that arbitrariness is a separate (non) issue.
In any case all of this is a red herring for the reason that algebraic definitions are not equivalent to semantic definitions as i already pointed out.
OK. Then yeah, I certainly misunderstood them.
Quoting Mongrel
That's fair. I agree.
There's the ontological consideration, but also it seems an odd way to talk about meaning too. Propositions focus on such a very specific use of language, and it seems to me that if one were to base a belief about meaning on them that they'd just be over-generalizing and getting it wrong. Some meaningful sentences are true, but then if we just understood meaning then that would give a means to truth (at least, truth understood in this way -- the kind of truth which telling the truth relies upon)
Quoting Mongrel
Cool. I'd have to read the dude you referenced, I think.
My immediate thought is that we could just take meaning for granted. It seems more plausible, to me at least, to believe that our expressions are meaningful rather than to rely upon a belief in propositions to say what it is that makes them meaningful. We don't have to know what it is that makes a sentence meaningful to know that it is meaningful, after all.
Quoting John
You are simply denying the semantic part, where the symbol X is given meaning, and focusing on the mathematical part, to maintain your assertion that we cannot give symbols arbitrary meaning.
Quoting John
No it is not a separate issue, it is a clear indication, that contrary to what you claim, we can, and do, by definition, give a symbol an arbitrary meaning.
Again, you're sort of acting like propositions are objects of superstition... as if they're fairies magically making meaning where there was none. They're just content. You can deny that there really is any content to speech and writing. You can go behaviorist.. we're all just quacking ducks. Meaning is quacking.
I don't have the alternative figured out. I just know Hamlet's to be or not to be soliloquy is not the same as duck noises. :)
If that's the conclusion I should draw from what I said, I don't see it as of yet. Meanings aren't related to our capacities, so just because we have different capacities -- are able to do different things with words -- that does not then mean that words have two different senses of meaning. We can use "apple" and we can mention "apple", but that's just us using the same word in a different way.
In fact I'd be rather suspicion of a theory of meaning that treats words like tags that we can put on objects, to be honest. We do things with words, and one of the things we do with words is refer -- but that's no different than if I were to point at something.
"meaning" has many meanings, and if that's all you mean by sense then I don't see it as controversial. Maybe I don't get what you mean by sense.
(EDIT: though, by the same token, I don't think language makes us special in comparison to other animals either.)
Mostly because words have meaning (or sentences, at least, do).
Maybe it's just the sound of proposing "propositions" that makes me think of them as magical fairies -- that's the connotation that I hear when hearing someone propose propositions.
Logic is upfront when we're talking about truth. A truth realist will deny that the mechanics of meaning are ultimately significant with truth because a proposition can be true though it's never been expressed and no one knows it. This must be so. Otherwise there would be no detectives.
No. you are simply conflating mathematical and semantic meanings. Whether X represents the number of times you went to the shop, cleaned your teeth, fed your dog or whatever (your so-called "defined object") is absolutely irrelevant to the mathematical meaning of 'X', which is a variable; and a variable is just a symbol for a number we don't yet know.
See. . . that definitely strikes me as a semi-platonic entity then (it may not be strictly platonic, so that's why I say semi- in that it relates to some features of platonic philosophy). If a proposition can be true even though it's never expressed and no one knows it, then the proposition has a reality all of its own -- and propositions are even thought to be the vehicle through which we can translate to different languages, so whatever language we might be speaking would be inconsequential to the existence of propositions. Language wouldn't even need to exist for propositions to exist, in that case, as I see it.
That's just something that I'm incapable of believing in.
Truth I could at least see as semi-plausible as a platonic entity. Not saying I believe in it, but it's at least believable and something I could consider seriously.
But some kind of language-invariant meaning that's also true above and beyond usage just seems like a convenient just-so story to me.
Language, I can see, exists all on its own. It has an independent reality, of a sorts. It's pseudo-real, and exists in the same way as anything else we might posit exists. But then I would also say that "it is raining" means something different from "Es regnet".
Surely there's some other way of thinking about truth, and believing in detectives, than believing in the existence of propositions which are never expressed and never known.
Sure. You can be deflationist.
Definitions are correlated to meanings. I wouldn't say they "describe" meanings. For one, in order for something to count as a description, one has to assign meaning to it, because descriptions are representations. In my view, usage does indeed determine definition. This includes everything from simply stating a definition to contextual usage, both re the context of other language and re behavioral contexts.
Quoting Moliere
You don't figure out what words mean. You observe usage and assign meaning.
Re the reason I'm saying that it's not true or false that tomato is defined as x context-independently, that is outside of how someone(s) happens to be defining/using x, and getting back to the thread topic, is that context-independently, there is no truthmaker for "tomato is defined as x." The reason that I'm not reading "defined as" as necessarily referring to the context of consensus or conventional usage I've already explained in detail, and you've already agreed with this; you've already agreed that "defined as" needs to be contextually qualified, that it can't necessarily be read as implying (non-institutional) consensus or conventional usage.
I think we're chasing our tail on this one. :D
I'd say that anything that is true is not true context-independently. "context-independently" is an imaginary scenario by which we may be able to judge certain things as more or less subjective, but since it is imaginary it's the sort of standard which we can draw wherever our heart desires. It's more a way of creating a point of contrast for comparison than it is a reality.
"All Bachelors are Unmarried" is true only in the context of English. "War is War" is not a necessary truth, but is true in our world. "(A + B) + C = A + (B + C)" is true in basic arithmetic
For what is there a truthmaker, in your view? What is context-independent?
You're not forgetting that I'm talking about a specific context here, right? Namely, how particular persons are defining/using the term(s) in question. I specified this a number of times.
And in conjunction with this, you've agreed that "definition," unqualified, does not refer to a non-institutional consensus or conventional usage.
No. I figured what you were saying, though, was that because " there is no truthmaker for "tomato is defined as x."" that it follows that meaning is mental/private/subjective. (Hence why you were saying that we do not figure out what words mean, but rather assign meaning)
Quoting Terrapin Station
Yup.
But I don't think that implies that meaning is mental/private/subjective.
That wasn't the idea there, although yeah, I'd say that the two facts are related. The idea is more that if you want to claim that there is a context-independent (per this specific context) truthmaker for "tomato is defined as x," then you should specify what the truthmaker is.
I'd hazard that the truthmaker is no different in this context than any other context for which truthmaker is applicable -- it's just the facts.
Facts are never context independent. But I don't think context-independence is necessary for truth.
Haha--yeah, but what facts. Be a little more specific. (Sarcastic understatement again.)
Again, this has nothing to do with general context-independence. It has to do with a very specific context-independence.
In this case, where I say "tomato" means X, we're talking about truth and meaning in a somewhat general way, and I'm trying to make use of an example to give something more concrete to talk about. So, to give an "in the flesh" example:
https://www.planetnatural.com/tomato-gardening-guru/
There is a language which we share, English, and within that language there is a sign "tomato" which means X. The author of that page knows English just as I know English, and they know the sign "tomato" just as I know the sign "tomato". The fact of the matter, in the flesh, is that the author is using the sign "tomato". (interesting to note that the usage of the sign, in this case, doesn't occur within a sentence, but still has meaning) There is a shared Background, and shared meanings, which we were both born into which allows us to discuss how to garden.
Well you've totally lost me. If meaning is what a word means, and I can know what "apple" means, and knowing is a capacity, then how can you say "meanings aren't related to our capacities"? Isn't it clear to you that if we can know the meaning of something, and knowing is a capacity then necessarily meaning is related to our capacities. Is knowing not a capacity of human beings?
Now, you're not paying attention to the example. The example does not demonstrate that we can do different things with words. it demonstrates that we can know the meaning of a word in two very distinct ways. I am not talking about doing anything with a word, you keep interpreting in this way, and now I have to keep on correcting you. I am talking about interpreting, and that is doing something with the mind, not the word. In the example, we are doing something with our minds, knowing the meaning of a word. And, we do this in two distinct ways, by either relating the word to an object, or by relating the word to a definition.
One person knows the word "apple" as meaning that particular object on the table, and another person knows the word "apple" as meaning "a round red fruit", and both are correct. Do you not recognize a fundamental difference between relating the word to a particular object, and relating the word to a bunch of other words?
The sarcasm was on my part. I was indicating that asking for more specificity than "the truthmaker is the facts" was sarcastic understatement from me.
In the rest of your post, you're saying that the truthmaker for "The definition of 'tomato'," in a context-independent way (re that specific context) is how people use the word "tomato."
The problem with this is that that IS the specific context I was referring to. So that's not a context-dependent "true definition" (re that specific context).
The problem is this.
(A) You're agreeing that definition doesn't refer to anything like consensus or conventional usage unless we qualify that that's what we're referring to. (And the reason you agreed to this, as you should have, was that you can comprehend the usage of "definition" in a case like "I will define 'tomato' as 'a lint ball.'")
(B) You're claiming that "The definition of 'tomato' is x," unqualified, can be true or false. (And you've also made claims that this is true regardless of usage, although it's fine if we don't bother with that part here. That you claimed the definition, unqualified, can be true or false is enough.)
(C) When pressed on how the definition, unqualified, and independent of the specific context of usage, which isn't implied by the word "definition," can be true or false, you explain that it's true or false by virtue of how the term has been used. Well, this contradicts both (A) and (B).
That's fair. I should be more specific. What I mean is that what a meaning is is not related to our capacities. Yes, we can see some kind of relation between our abilities and our words (and the relationship may just be one of knowing or believing), but I just meant to indicate that our capacities do not create meanings.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't. Objects and words, insofar that either exists, are existential equals.
Context-independence is your term. Insofar that you're using that qualifier I am too, but it was not I who introduced this notion. Hence why I asked what would count for the qualifier in any case at all, since the way I would put things would be to say there is no such case with regards to anything.
Quoting Terrapin Station
"Meaning", but yeah. Definitions describe meanings, by my reasoning. I understand that you don't agree with the distinction, but I'm just making it explicit that this is what I'm saying.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I'm claiming that a definition can be true or false. I'm not sure where I said "unqualified".
Quoting Terrapin Station
To me this just seems like a strange set-up. Perhaps it derives from your notions on truth, actually -- since many people seem to believe that truth is somehow a property which pertains outside of context. But that's just a guess on my part, I don't know.
What I can say without reservation is that definitions can be true or false, and they are true or false by virtue of usage. That isn't to say that usage is the same as meaning, but that usage is how we determine meaning. But since I've been relying on usage as my methodology, it would certainly be shooting myself in the foot to then say that meanings exist in an unqualified and independent of specific context way. But, this is an idea I think you introduced which I'm willing to engage, but it's not what I've been saying I believe.
I just don't think you need an unqualified and independent of context way for meanings to be in order for them to serve as facts. Since all facts are neither unqualified nor independent of context it strikes me that this is just an odd criteria, too, since even with non-controversial facts (such as "the capital of the United States in the year of our Lord 2016 is Washington DC") neither quality applies.
I am not conflating, I am separating. You have been attempting to deny the existence of the semantic meaning of X, claiming that it only has a mathematical meaning. Now that you've found this to be untenable, you claim that the semantic meaning is irrelevant. That too is untenable. If someone is doing algebra to solve for "the number of times that I went to the store last week", then "the number of times that I went to the store last week" is of the utmost importance. Your claim that it is "absolutely irrelevant" whether X represents this, or something else, is absolutely nonsense.
Quoting Moliere
I'm not sure I agree with "our capacities do not create meanings", but consider this. Suppose that instead of "the meaning" of something, we are talking about "the colour" of something. If I demonstrated to you, that we could determine the colour of something by seeing it, and we could determine the colour of something by hearing it, wouldn't you agree with me that we were using "the colour" in two distinct ways? "The colour" refers to two distinct things, the visual impression, and the aural impression. Common usage is such that "the colour" refers to the visual impression and also to the aural impression. Wouldn't you agree that we should separate these two distinct things, such that when we talk about "colour" we can distinguish whether we are talking about the visual impression of the thing, or an aural impression.
This is what I am doing with "meaning". We have two distinct ways of determining "the meaning", one, by relating the word directly to an object, as we commonly do in day to day communication, and a second, by relating the word to other words (defining the word) as we do in more sophisticated situations. Do you not agree that we should identify and separate these two, so that when we talk about "the meaning", we can avoid ambiguity, and have a better understanding of what we are talking about.
Where you say "unqualified" is by saying "Definitions are true or false." "Definitions" there is unqualified.
Again, what's true or false is that so and so(s) is (are) using a term a particular way.
But that's not what "definition" (necessarily) refers to. You agreed to this.
This is a wicked distortion. I have never denied, but on the contrary have explicitly acknowledged, that arbitrary semantic meanings can be assigned to X. What I have denied is that, in the context of algebraic equations, the semantic meaning one may have assigned to X (the number of times you went to the shop, the number of hairs on your head, the number of times you farted in a twenty four hour period, and so on) has any mathematical relevance whatsoever. You are not "separating" these irrelevant semantic meaning from mathematical meaning (in this case the meanings of the algebraic operations involving variables) you are conflating them; it is I who have been doing the separating.
The other point you have conveniently glossed over is that I have been arguing that the fact that such arbitrarily assigned semantic meanings are possible doesn't tell us anything significant about language, because such assignations are only possible at all within, and are thus dependent upon, the non-arbitrary context of conventionally established semantic meanings.
I think our disagreement follows more from my assertion that there are more definitions than stipulative definitions. I don't deny stipulation, only that there's more to definition than stipulation.
I suppose it depends, actually. If you could reliably hear green, then I'd just say you're using a different method that I'm not actually familiar with, but that there's no difference in the green property. If you're using "green", on the other hand, to describe something which is not green then you'd be using "green" differently.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'd say that common usage refers to the color green, and not an impression of the color green.
I'd say it just depends on if that's important or not. Consider a submarine. A submarine can detect, at a distance, objects by way of echo-location. But there's no need to constantly specify that the submarine is using echolocation when we, as humans, would typically use sight in determining spatial distrubtion of objects. We could just say "There is an object so many meters away from us", regardless. We might even say "I see an object so many meters away from us", even if what I see is a radar.
I think the use/mention distinction handles this well enough, personally, and that there's no need to divide meaning up because we can use a word or we can mention a word.
I think this is right. And it follows that definitions, may be considered to be kinds of assertions. Although stipulations cannot be true or false, and they are thus not assertions in that sense, I think they are assertions of a kind wherever they are proposed non-arbitrarily. The implicit assertion is that the stipulation will be useful or relevant in some way.
So if you don't recognize these two distinct types of meaning, then how do you account for the difference between truth by correspondence and truth by coherence?
A description of, say, the watch is true if it describes the watch. Likewise, a description of "watch" is true if it describes "watch". In the case of a descriptive definition we're asking after the meaning of "watch". So, a descriptive definition is true if it describes the meaning of "watch".
So what makes a descriptive definition true, as with any assertion, is the facts. The facts in this case is the meaning. The meaning is determined by usage.
What are you asking for?
You're not claiming that what "definition" (or "meaning" in your usage) refers to, though, is "report of usage" are you?
A descriptive definition is true if it accurately describes the meaning of a term.
We know the meaning of a term by its usage -- more specifically, as I stated earlier, the extension of usage.
The first states under what conditions a descriptive definition is true, and the latter states how one might go about evaluating whether a descriptive definition is true.
EDIT: At least if by "report of usage" you mean statements like --
"Robert said, "Please pass the salt""
Or --
"It has been observed that "salt", by and large, is often used to refer to salt"
The latter is closer to what I am on about, but I am claiming that meaning exists too, and that a definition is true as long as it accurately describes the meaning of a term. (or perhaps even "a" meaning -- a definition does not need to be exhaustive in order for it to be true).
That's a report of usage.
At any rate, the reason I asked for clarification on this is that if you're NOT saying that definitions (or meanings) necessarily refer to reports of usage, then saying that meaning is determined by usage doesn't answer the question about what facts make a meaning true.
Saying that a definition is true if it describes the meaning of the term is just putting what you're claiming in different words, and it's not answering the question I'm asking. I'm asking what makes it true that something is a meaning of a word. Usage can't be the answer if you're agreeing that definitions do not necessarily report usage.
Well, consider "the apple is red". This phrase might be referring to a particular object on the table which appears to be red, and we might therefore say it is a true statement, by means of correspondence. On the other hand, it might be a defining statement, referring to a type of object titled "the apple", and describing this type of object as red. What I've argued, is that these are two very distinct types of meaning which that phrase could have (you haven't yet seen the need for discerning these two distinct types of meaning). The need for two distinct types of meaning comes about from the two very distinct ways that truth or falsity is judged of the phrase.
The example phrase is very simple with respect to correspondence, as I described. "The apple" is agreed to refer to a particular object, and "red" is agreed as the term for the way it appears to the human eye. But when we take "the apple" to refer to a class of objects, rather than a particular, we are making a generalization. "The apple is red" is a defining phrase, saying that all tings in this class, called "apple", are necessarily red. Then, in order that there is truth here, it must be the case that all objects which will be called "apple" are necessarily red. Otherwise, our defining phrase, "the apple is red" is false.
Now here's the difficult part, and this appears to be the substance of your discussion with Terrapin. What allows either of these meanings of the phrase to be judged as true? In the case of the correspondence, there is an agreement that the particular object is called "apple", then we agree on a judgement of truth, regardless of what anyone might say an apple "really" is. That is the apple, we've designated it as such, and therefore the phrase is true regardless of whether that object is really an apple or not. So let's move to the defining statement. Now we cannot go on a simple arbitrary designation, (that object we will call apple), we need structure, consistency. And we cannot say that all things we call apple are necessarily red, because we define "apple" by other criteria. And we must maintain consistency within this conceptual structure of criteria. No longer are we looking at a thing called "apple", but we are looking at all the things called "apple", and deriving our truth from that. Here, the agreement is not between you and I, that this object on the table will be called "apple", which makes the truth. The correspondence, or agreement, if there is any, is between all the objects called "apple", and the definition of "apple".
My question is, do you see this fundamental difference? In one case, truth is dependent on a agreement between individual human beings, we agree that the object is called "the apple", therefore it is true that this object is the apple. In the other case, there are things which we are calling apples, and truth is dependent on an agreement between the properties of these things, and our definition of "apple".
Usage is the method. If you want to know the meaning, then you look to usage -- or reports, sure. That is what one would look at. But whether a report is true is still different from whether or not a definition is true, since a report is describing events and a descriptive definition is describing word (sentences, phrases, etc.) meaning.
A meaning is different from a description. For you this is a restatement because you're saying definitions are meanings. But I would say that the meaning of some term isn't the same as its description.
"What makes it true that something is. . . "
"What makes it true that something is a chair?"
This question is clearer to me than the previous one. But I don't have an answer for you, which is bound to disappoint. But I also don't have an answer for the latter -- at least not one that I believe is true. You're asking after, from what I'm able to parse, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions by which we can pick out, out of all the entities, which entities are meanings.
I'd put it to you that to ask the question "What makes it true that something is a chair?" is to at least have a notion of "chair" and chairs. It is possible for us to know that this is a chair without knowing the necessary and sufficient conditions by which we can definitively state what, of all entities, which entities are chairs.
Likewise, we can know whether something is or is not true without also knowing what it is that makes this true. (I know true statements, but I may not know what truth is)
But I do know what a chair is, in spite of not knowing "what makes it true that something is a chair" (or, perhaps more clearly stated, I'm able to pick chairs out of the entities I am familiar with). I could even offer a definition of "chair", though that's different from what you're asking.
I'm not offering a theory of meaning, as you have. So that may be a source of some miscommunication on our parts. But I also don't need one for my assertion that descriptive definitions are true, insofar that you likewise believe that words have meanings which differ from definitions as my argument didn't rely upon a theory of meaning but rather just on whether or not language is meaningful, or that meaning exists. This, I believe, is mostly the crux of our disagreement. You believe there is no distinction to be had because you believe that meanings are definitions, in particular, stipulated definitions. My strategy has been to demonstrate, by way of example, words which have meaning in spite of stipulation to show that there are meanings aside from stipulation. I understand that the perils of such a strategy is that any counter-example can be re-interpreted under a new theory, hence why I noted I know you can sustain belief in a stipulative theory of definition and meaning. My recourse from there was to note that beliefs in meaning account for more about how language is, whereas your account doesn't account for the factual and historical element of language -- that it, taken to extremes, would lead to a bunch of people barking but never communicating. Meaning really must be shared, at least, in order for us to communicate (insofar that we believe there is such a thing as 1st person experience, at least -- as I do, and I suspect, given your comments about meaning, that you do to).
There are very good reasons to believe that language has meaning. Aside from communication, which is only one part of what language does, we can read a letter, a play, a poem, a book, an article and they all are rich in meaning. This is something of a brute fact, from my perspective -- just as objects are. There is not an existential or ontological difference between objects and words. It's possible that neither exist, but I don't think you can deny one without also denying the other. (perception, after all, doesn't individuate on its own -- objects are named, and names are a part of language) So in some sense I'd say to deny language meaning is very similar to denying objects -- I understand that it can be done, but I don't have a good reason to do so.
My understanding of our disagreement isn't as much about the existence of meaning, however, as much as whether or not meaning is purely a stipulative, and thereby private/mental/subjective, affair.
So onto that:
I found Wittgenstein's treatment in P.I. fairly convincing in arguing that language is public. That we are able to communicate on a regular basis with one another, just as we are able to sit in the same chairs and share food, indicates we share meaning, and that notion of private language are only expressable because of this shared meaning -- since, if language were strictly private, then it would not express. It wouldn't mean anything, at least not to me. And you would say that I can look to your behavior when saying some private word and infer from behavior what you have in your head. But I would say that said inference is impossible without a language. Inference is built on our ability to use language. "if", "then", "possibly", are all words taught to us -- not discovered or invented by us.
Private languages don't account for this, which brings me to:
The phenomenological consideration that I was born into a world where the meanings of language pre-existed me. Language was always-already there. So it's simply true that I didn't define the words which I use. English is older than me, and has a history. I have a Background, of which language is a part.
So, I have good reason to reject that meanings are private, at least. I suspect they are not mental, but perhaps there is some way of parsing a public mental sphere which could make sense of the matter. However, I likewise suspect that any such parsing will make objects just as mental as words -- idealism of a stripe, even if it be a more reserved transcendental idealism.
This makes no sense, though. If usage is what makes meanings true, and a definition gives the meaning, then a definition isn't true independent of meaning. That's a simple contradiction.
Quoting Moliere
?? I'm not saying that at all. I said that they're two different things on my view.
However, the more you're writing the less sure I am of what the relationship is in your view between definitions, descriptions and meanings.
You go on to say both:
Quoting Moliere
and
Quoting Moliere
Which is again a simple contradiction.
That last part went on to say:
Quoting Moliere
That's not at all true. I don't believe that meanings are stipulated definitions. I explained this earlier. In my view, meanings are mental associations that we make, where they're inherently mental and can't be made into or translated into something else. The words we express via speaking, writing, etc. (so, for example, definitions) are correlated with meanings, but they're not the same as meanings.
It's probably not very important to get into that, though, for a discussion where you're claiming that definitions (or meanings, or whatever you'd like to call it) can be true where that can be independent of usage.
Quoting Moliere
The importance of being able to say what makes it true is when someone--that's me--comes along and challenges the claim that definitions can be true (or false). If you're going to claim that they are indeed capable of having truth values, then you'd better be able to support that claim beyond "I just know that it's the case" which is essentially all that you're saying here. To me, it just looks like a combination of not wanting to analyze this very much (because you like the view you hold) and perhaps being too lazy to analyze it very much.
Re "What makes it true that something is a chair?" my answer to that is simple (well, rephrasing it because it's not true (or false) that something is a chair--it needs to be rephrased to something like "What makes me say that that is a chair?") The simple answer to that is that it fits the concept that person holds of a chair. It meets their necessary and sufficient criteria to call the object in question a chair. This has the upshot that it's a chair to them, and it might not be a chair to someone else. And that's indeed the case with ALL name-bestowal. Not everyone calls the same things by the same identification names. Not everyone has the same concepts.
Re "I'd put it to you that to ask the question 'What makes it true that something is a chair?' is to at least have a notion of 'chair' and chairs." I don't at all agree with that. You could say, "Hey, that's a reetswahtter!" I haven't the faintest idea what a reetswahtter might be. So I'd ask you "What makes you say that's a reetswahtter?" and hope that your answer would give me some clues as to what the heck a reetswahtter is in your usage.
Anyway, this is all going way far afield from what I was asking you. We're going off on a bunch of tangents, which I hate doing, and that's why I hate that people type such friggin long posts, especially in response to a simple, direct question. I want to focus on one simple thing at a time.
Just really quickly -- putting your contradictory quotes into context above
"insofar" means "if" in the above, not "Since".
If I believe that they're the same thing, I can't have an "insofar as I believe there can be a difference."
That's a contradiction.
If there can be differences, they're not the same thing.
(Of course, I don't believe they're the same thing. I rather believe that definitions are correlated with meanings.)
Quoting Terrapin Station
Usage is not what makes meanings true. Usage is how one determines what a meaning is. Meanings themselves, I suspect, are not true or false. It would be like saying a chair is true or false to say that meanings are true or false.
A definition describes the meaning. Is that the same as gives? I don't think so.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Gotcha.
Then we're not so different, I think, except insofar that I don't believe that meanings are mental. They are, however, associated with words/phrases/sentences. (do we associate the meanings? We can, but we also don't always do so
Quoting Terrapin Station
I certainly didn't have a proof written up. I'm just being honest about that. I'm working through ideas with you. It helps to have someone who disagrees to do exactly that. Sorry if it frustrates. After all:
Quoting Terrapin Station
It would be an odd way of being lazy, considering the length of the discussion so far. :D
Quoting Terrapin Station
The problem I have with that is we just don't operate on necessary and sufficient criteria. People don't gaze about looking at objects and evaluating them on this basis. Philosophers wonder about answers to these questions, but this does not reflect how people identify chairs.
To rephrase your question in terms of meaning, then -- "What makes me say that that is a meaning of a word?"
Again, I would say an answer to the question "What makes me say that that is a chair of Walmart?" is to ask the exact same question. It's not ideas, from my view, as per what I stated above. Notions maybe, in the sense that people have rough ideas, but not necessary and sufficient conditions. At least, from the way I believe we actually use words and think about these things.
There's an ambiguity in the word "makes", too -- I mean, I could say that what makes me say that that is a chair of Walmart is someone asked me whether or not Walmart has chairs, and reply in a jocular fashion, "That is a chair of Walmart". So someone else's question made me say exactly that.
What makes me say that words are correlated with meanings -- signifiers with signifieds -- is that there are signs in the world, and they mean things regardless of what beliefs I might hold about those signs. "tomato" refers to a tomato even if I use "tomato" to insult someone. What makes me say that this is a meaning is that meanings of words are as public as chairs of walmart. To go back to an older example:
Quoting Moliere
If you were to reply, "Now what does that mean?", and meanings are private, then I would reply:
Quoting Moliere
And "Now what does that mean?" would have about as much meaning as the above example does.
So when you state:
Quoting Terrapin Station
I only understand you because I know the meanings of your words. Were they private, then the whole thing has about as much meaning as reetswahtter does in English.
Quoting Terrapin Station
And I was just getting to how this all leads to World Peace. Darn.
Quoting Moliere
You weren't reading me to say that people explicitly think, "What are my necessary and sufficient criteria for this," were you?
Quoting Terrapin Station
That is what I hear.
You read it as if I'm saying that they're explicitly saying "What are my necessary and sufficient criteria"??? Why in the world would you read it that way? It in no way SAYS that they explicitly say "What are my necessary and sufficient criteria"
Yes, that makes a good deal more sense to me now. In one case we're offering a standard by which to judge whether something fits a category, and in the other we are referring to some entity.
I don't know why you'd think that, though, because it happens all the time. For example, someone might see this:
And say, "That's not a chair!"
When you ask them why they say that, they might respond with, "It ain't got no seat!" or "It ain't got no legs!" or both. In other words, it doesn't meet a necessary condition (or two) for them to call it/consider it a chair. (If you object that it does in fact have a seat, they'd say it doesn't, because it doesn't meet their necessary criteria for what counts as a "seat.")
But someone else might say, "That is a chair!"
When you ask them why they say that, they might respond with, "You can sit on it and it even has a backrest; plus it was intended as a chair." Or in other words, it meets that person's sufficient conditions to be a chair. (By the way, that was in fact intended as a chair--it's an example of an "art chair.")
People do this all the time when they're assigning or refraining from assigning a term to an object.
Look at how often this sort of thing happens with, say, film and music discussions regarding whether a particular film or piece of music belongs to a particular genre or not.
But when someone sees a chair as a chair, they did not do so by necessary or sufficient conditions. The conditions are post-hoc explanations of word usage. Explanations which can even modify how we use a word in the future or elucidate something about the object, no doubt. But when someone asks for a chair, and the shopkeeper brings them a chair, the shopkeeper did not buy chairs on the basis of some sort of rational conditions. He just knew what counts as a chair, as the buyer knew what they were asking for.
If the shopkeeper brought the above image to the buyer, then a discussion about the proper use of chair, or the necessary and sufficient conditions of chair-hood, might take place. Prior to that, though? We have to be able to pick out chairs in order for us to even begin laying out the necessary and sufficient conditions of chair-hood -- hence, have some kind of notion of chairs prior to assigning conditions.
Unfortunately, you have absolutely no explanation for that aside from "he just knows."
Again, I'm not saying that this process is necessarily explicit, but it's the process that's going on with respect to concept application. We formuate concepts because that's necessary for us to be able to deal with the plethora of information we encounter--we have to formulate conceptual abstractions so that we can quickly assess our perceptual data and take actions that allow us to survive--our brains evolved that way because it's the only way we can survive, and when we perceive something, our brains quickly register it as fitting or not fitting particular conceptual abstractions we've formulated via what are essentially necessary and sufficient criteria. That's how you know what you count (not some general "what counts," as there is no such thing) as a chair. And it's the only way it makes sense that we can observe something and go "chair."
But you have absolutely no theory of that besides "you just know."
With particular types of brain damage, by the way, people can no longer look at certain things and register whether they match a concept--they can no longer recognize certain things. That's because that brain damage affects some concept-formulation and storage structures in their brain.
Your brain does all this?
Where?
:D
There's a lot of entities you're introducing in this paragraph. A very large story on how we "essentially" comes to necessary and sufficient criteria (are concepts or are concepts not necessary and sufficient criteria? I'm saying they are not, but are just rough notions -- but here you're introducing "essentially". What does that mean?)
I don't think it's the only story that makes sense of the fact that we can observe something and go "chair". First, I would say we do not observe something and then go chair. We don't have perceptual data. We have chairs. "perceptual data" is an abstraction built on abstractions arrived at after much contemplation, which itself relies upon language.
If our brain and evolution does things for us, then just as the brain and evolution make us sit in the chair, then also the brain and evolution make us refer with signs ("chair" to chair) which already mean something.
It is not the brain and evolution which creates meaning, but the brain and evolution which uses meaning -- just as it uses chairs.
No theory, of course. Only an argument about the necessity of having to "just know" in order to be able to formulate necessary and sufficient conditions.
Your story about concepts and sense data and brains and evolution driving perception of chairs all relies upon this -- our -- ability to "just know" the meanings of words without necessary and sufficient conditions. (EDIT: It's worth noting here, too, that we are really focusing a lot on nouns, but that language meaning is much more diverse than necessary and sufficient conditions for categories. I'm not saying you deny this, but it's worth noting because right now we are focusing very much on this one example, when meaning isn't just this one example)
You're asking me where one's brain is? Or where in the brain? If where in the brain, one study suggested that it starts in the hippocampus, though other evidence suggests that at least once concepts are formulated, they can occur throughout the brain. It's not highly localized.
Quoting Moliere
You're not something separate from your brain/body. It's not doing something for you. It is you.
(Although oops, I'm meaning to stick with one thing at a time.)
What I've been discussing with Moliere, is that there is no need for him to know that the item is a chair, nor is there a need for him to know what a chair is, in general. When someone is talking about a particular object, and calling it a chair, all that matters is that the people hearing know which object is referred to as the chair. So knowing what a chair is, or that the object referred to with "chair" is really a chair, or not, is completely unnecessary for us to be capable of making true statements about the chair. All that is necessary is that we agree on which item is referred to as the chair. It is highly likely that the context of the word "chair" within the speech and actions of the speaker is what determines the object that "chair" refers to, not some sort of conditions as to what constitutes a chair, within the hearer's mind.
I think it is very important to understand this, before we move on toward analyzing any sort of standards by which we say that the object is or is not a chair. At the basic fundamental level, all that is necessary is the agreement, that this object will be identified as the chair. Then we have a basic truth, that particular object is "the chair", and this is a fundamental truth. It doesn't require any standards or criteria. But if we want to establish a class of items to be called chairs, then we need some criteria for classification, and this is where definition comes into play. Now we have a completely different type of truth, we are not agreeing that this object goes by the name "chair", we are agreeing on the criteria by which any object may be correctly called a chair.
Quoting Moliere
Suppose we have a category now, the category of chair, and we want to judge an object as to whether its a chair. We have two distinct judgements to make. First we have to judge the standards. Are these the proper standards for defining "chair"? And, we have to judge the object to see if it fulfills those conditions.
So back to the first case now, when we are just referring to some entity with some name. There is no double judgement. One person says "chair", and the other person judges what the particular item is that is being referred to, as the chair, without referring to any set of standards. The item referred to is the chair, and that is the truth. In the other case, we want to determine whether the item referred to is really a chair. Then we need to make this double judgement, which will lead us toward the truth of whether the item really is a chair or not
So we'll attempt to remedy this by adding relevance to entailment. Is it possible to become systematic about the concept of relevance?
Since 2+2 = 4 is true either a priori or analytically, does it then require a truthmaker?