Critique of Camus' 'truly serious philosophical problem'

The question is not well-defined. In the first sentence he says it is 'suicide', by which I presume he means the question 'Shall I commit suicide?'. In the second sentence he says the question is 'Is life worth living?', which is a correlated but different question.

It is possible for somebody to decide (not) to commit suicide despite their finding life (not) worth living.

Also, the audience to whom the question is posed is biased. Since they can read the question they are alive and hence must have already decided the answer to the question is 'No, I shall not commit suicide, for the present at least'.

Why?

I mean, it's just an introduction to the essay. If you disagree then maybe you can still find insight in the essay, or perhaps you could just put it down and read something else. If you agree, then you'll read it.

It seems to me that one would just support this as the one truly philosophical problem by saying: "If you answer in the affirmative, then all the other problems of philosophy are never addressed, and in the negative, then you may take up the other problems knowing that life is worth living"

Quoting andrewk

The question is not well-defined. In the first sentence he says it is 'suicide', by which I presume he means the question 'Shall I commit suicide?'. In the second sentence he says the question is 'Is life worth living?', which is a correlated but different question.

Later on in the essay, Camus remarks that life does not need a meaning in order to be lived, and can, in fact, be 'better' without a meaning. That is not my point, however.

My question is, whether the question of living or ending the life is the first question that one should ask before going into the other philosophical questions. Although, I admit, by taking up the other problems, one must have already agreed to live the life. Still, I assume, this idea and essay in general has a lot to add to the question of the meaning of life.

Quoting Moliere

It seems to me that one would just support this as the one truly philosophical problem by saying: "If you answer in the affirmative, then all the other problems of philosophy are never addressed, and in the negative, then you may take up the other problems knowing that life is worth living"

I do agree. But why couldn't the very first question be like this? What would be the reason to disagree with this to be the first question?

It could be, sure. But that's why I'm saying that it's just the introduction to the essay. He even remarks that times may change and that his essay may not be relevant in other times, but that it seems relevant in his time. It's not so much an essay about "This must be the first question in philosophy", as it is an essay about confronting a world seemingly without meaning, as well as wondering if, logically speaking, that would indicate that death is preferable to continuing to live.

So the first problem of philosophy is a moral question, one that Shakespeare addressed "To be, or not to be?" Levinas also thought that Practical Philosophy is 1st Philosophy. It is a question that has to do with the will's contest against itself. Why the will to power stops me from doing what I want to do?

The question of suicide masks the real issue, which is our own temporality. It's true we want to be happy, be at peace, but it this is not always possible, and living a temperate life might alleviate some pain, but in the end it is all the same, death sooner or latter. It's not meaning which counts, it is the ability to accept what is, to will what is, inspite of what is. I think that is only possible by finding something transcendent, beyond one's self.

We all tend to have a bias towards the future, don't we. Not the person in 4th stage cancer, not the 90 year old solitary man that can barely get out of bed. Not the convicted felon looking at 30 years imprisonment. Why shouldn't these people seek early release from their misery? There is no answer that applies to all, each must make their own decision.

Why did Socrates commit suicide? He could have escaped, his friends had already made the arrangements. His act of will was in accordance with the rest of his life, his love of Athens, and its laws, and his willingness to abide by them. He found something higher than himself, yet immanent in the world.

Reply to Kazuma My interpretation of Camus' philosophical project is that he was coming to terms with Nietszche's proclamation of the Death of God. Camus had been quite spiritually inclined, his PhD was on Plotinus. So I think the whole question is, is life meaningful without any transcendent aim, goal or purpose? If we are simply acting out the imperatives of survival - then what's the point? Should we even ask that question? Because if it is true that we are no more than matter, then death ends the problem altogether; we can simply exit the painful predicament of existence into the nothingness from which we came. That's what I think he's wrestling with.

Reply to Kazuma

Quoting Camus

Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy.

This is the important sentence. Elsewhere Kant argues that all philosophy ultimately aims at answering these three questions: “What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope?” I have no idea whether Camus was familiar with Kant's "ultimate question" formulation.

Quoting Kazuma

These are games; one must first answer.

I agree with Camus: A great deal of philosophy is kind of a game, and will not lead to a confrontation with ultimate questions about life or anything else. "Is life worth living or not?" and phrased another way, “What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope?”

Men must decide how to live their lives; we are specially burdened by that requirement. Most people do not opt for suicide, but that does not mean that most have made their life worth living by examining it, or by pursuing the most meaningful course they could take for themselves. We generally don't ask "What should I do?" We ask "What's next on the list?"

Camus' and Kant's questions are a pain to answer, because there is always the risk that we will find reasons to stop living the way we do, and instead live some other way; and then there will probably be hell to pay. Others in our lives may not appreciate our discovery that our lives are kind of empty meaningless affairs. What does that say about their lives?

Quoting Kazuma

There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide.

@Bitter Crank
This question is most pertinent on a Monday before work. This is sort of a joke but it is also a metaphor for the instrumentality of things. You do your little work week, consumption, cultural upkeep thing and then the weekend comes and goes and it seems like a sort of vapid affair as you start all over. Those moments where you got caught up in the "flow" of your hobbies, past times, and friends cannot be maintained for longer than certain span. The routines of life give you a bit of angst as you wonder what it is for. However, if you were given unlimited freedom, and no routine, you would still ask what it is for. Thus, there is no way out of the situation.

There is a pendulum swing between survival through cultural upkeep (all the routines needed to survive and be well-adjusted in your culture) on one side and boredom on the other. Ennui is kind understanding the vanity of existence, and an acute awareness of one's own need to need and want because you will need to sustain and entertain day after day. Throw in the idea that you may be harmed in various contingent (unwanted/unexpected/circumstantial) ways and Camus' question becomes pertinent.

Camus may have meant it to be a question one asks continually to see if one is really just going through the motion or gaining as much as he/she can out of their time. The problem with Camus' is its a mirage of freedom. Cultural upkeep is just part of surviving as a human and is part of our situatedness and throwness into the world. Human needs are also not simply willed, but are an integral a part of or psyche (things like the need to be with others, etc).

Also, the notion of instrumentality may overcome any feelings of intense freedom as one's options are played out and one becomes aware that first, we have to have an image of what makes one free, and then we realize that this image itself is simply grounded in cultural expectations (i.e. traveling must be good because that is how books and movies and media portrays what freedom is).. These images are really no more free than the cultural milieu that one finds oneself in.. So "freedom" actually becomes a cliched version of itself by living out exactly what the culture wants you to live out as your sense of freedom..

Camus then goes on to give his own cliches which feed back into what an acceptable version of freedom is.. live like an actor he says..because if you are a different person you can live a bunch of lives in one.. (forget the fact that this creates havoc for any relationships and is quite selfish at best)

Or have many lovers like Don Juan.. (again a lot of selfishness here)..

Camus seems to have a theme of freedom in the selfish ME culture that we see playing out today. At the same time, the ME culture is no more than just a socially accepted way to relieve ones daily routine. Group oriented cultural cliches (on the opposite side of things.. family, tribe, religion, etc.) really won't do much either.

So we simply go back again the idea of that life is really just the pendulum swing between cultural upkeep and finding various ways to overcome boredom through goal-seeking. To go beyond that and say you have the magic elixir of life which is some sort of hip manic living as various characters in some tragic-comedy, questing for quantity of experiences, lovers, etc.. is not really going to solve anything. It's trying to make a satire of life.. like a laughing Sisyphus.. But sometimes one cannot laugh through everything.. One still wants and needs and cannot escape certain things with ones own sense of revelry.

However, what does seem useful from Camus is his idea of revolt. By living, you are in a sense living a revolt because you realize your situatedness, and this pendulum swing, but you decide to live it out. However, this is not to romanticize it. The revolt though can also be about constantly being aware of the situation and not letting yourself pretend it's not there.

I think it's a little (a lot) disengenious. The vast majority of suicides are by the severely mentally ill, the terminally ill, people who have experienced some great bereavement or another, unbearable shame, and those suffocating under crippling debt.

I really highly doubt it was a serious issue for Camus himself. Are we really supposed to believe that this man would have lethally inflicted harm upon himself for some vague, ephermal reason like the world having no objective meaning? I don't buy it.

What method was he going to use? When was he going to do it? How was he planning on mitigating the effects his death would have on his loved ones? Note or no note? Is it a mistake? Is there no other option? How will he find the courage to do it? For people whom suicide really is a serious issue, these are the kind of issues they grapple with. I don't get the impression Camus seriously considered any of them.

I mean even if his response to 'the absurd' was to think suicide IS the best option, it's still a gigantic leap from there to actually DOING the act. He was never going to actually kill himself - at least not as a response to 'the absurd'. His solution to this supposed issue was already a foregone conclusion before it was raised. There's no serious issue of suicide if you were never going to do it in the first place. It doesn't need to be argued against or even thought about at all.

"Should I kill myself because the world is absurd?" There's no point even asking this question because I'm not going to actually lethally harm myself even if the answer is yes. I suspect Camus was never going to either. It's a non-issue.

Reply to dukkha The vast majority of suicides are by the severely mentally ill, the terminally ill, people who have experienced some great bereavement or another, unbearable shame, and those suffocating under crippling debt.

Citations for that?

Quoting dukkha

I mean even if his response to 'the absurd' was to think suicide IS the best option, it's still a gigantic leap from there to actually DOING the act. He was never going to actually kill himself - at least not as a response to 'the absurd'. His solution to this supposed issue was already a foregone conclusion before it was raised. There's no serious issue of suicide if you were never going to do it in the first place. It doesn't need to be argued against or even thought about at all.

"Should I kill myself because the world is absurd?" There's no point even asking this question because I'm not going to actually lethally harm myself even if the answer is yes. I suspect Camus was never going to either. It's a non-issue.

I agree..but I think most people reading the essay also know he wasn't meditating on suicide as a way to explore the "real" sociological reasons for why people actually commit suicide. Rather, he was using as a device to explain how to live a "meaningful" life. It was a rhetorical device and a signal that the book was about the worth of what we do. However, for all the reasons I explained in my previous post, his solutions are not very convincing and he overlooks a lot of baked-in things about the human condition. Remember, he broadly falls into the existentialist camp (though he tried to renounce this label). One reason he does fit in this camp is the idea of authenticity and radical freedom. The problem is that humans simply aren't as radically free as we think. There are psychological mechanisms that keep us more conservative than willing whatever we think we are free to do. Also, the structural conditions of life essentially make it the same kind of life for everyone- survival through cultural upkeep/routines and entertainment-seeking through cultural means. Schopenhauer, in this regard was a much more astute existentialist than the 20th century versions of it.

Reply to Kazuma I would personally argue that the most serious philosophical problem isn't whether or not we should cease our own consciousness, but whether or not we ought to create another consciousness. For the former question inherently depends on the the latter question.

Reply to dukkha

This looks to me like you haven't read the essay, or at least missed the part near the beginning where he makes a distinction between people who kill themselves due to distress, and suicide as the result of a process of thought.

Furthermore, he's arguing against suicide -- arguing that it is possible to find joy even in a world without meaning. So it wouldn't matter that "he's not really going to kill himself!" -- he's arguing the extreme circumstance that it is not logical to do so.

Quoting schopenhauer1

Remember, he broadly falls into the existentialist camp (though he tried to renounce this label).

While I agree that he falls broadly into the existentialist camp, it's also fair to say he's writing in response or as critical of existential philosophies (as he defines the term, of course). So it's also fair to say he is not an existentialist. On one hand you have the broad historical category where we group some authors together because they have similar themes or moods, but on the other you have a crisper definition offered by Camus which he is critical of.

Quoting Kazuma

Also, any opinions on why this is or is not the most serious philosophical problem?

It probably seems to be one of the most important problems for people with severe depression. I'd actually say that the most important problem for them is getting psychiatric help though.

For me, it's never been any more of an issue than the following question would be to most people: "Should I construct and always wear a hat that looks like a giant beach ball and that has five tiger gongs hanging off of it that I regularly strike?"

Quoting Kazuma

But why couldn't the very first question be like this? What would be the reason to disagree with this to be the first question?

Really, the first question that the vast majority of people (and maybe everyone) deals with re philosophy is one of these two:

(1) Just what is "philosophy"?

or

(2) Hmm--wait a minute. This doesn't resemble the stuff that I've known as "philosophy" to this point. What is the relation of this stuff to what I was calling "philosophy"?

Often the answer to (1), and to an extent the answer to (2), is "Oh, it was 'that stuff' that I was doing." But still, they must figure out (1) or (2) before moving on where they know that they're doing philosophy.

Quoting Wayfarer

Citations for that?

If you look at the low side of the estimate it's not a "vast majority" for this single reason, but it's not all the reasons he listed:

http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/suicide:
The most common underlying disorder is depression, 30% to 70% of suicide victims suffer from major depression or bipolar (manic-depressive) disorder.

That site also says:

Substance abuse is another great instigator of suicide; it may be involved in half of all cases. About 20% of suicides involve people with alcohol problems, and the lifetime rate of suicide among people with alcohol-use problems is at least three or four times the average. Completed suicides are more likely to be men over 45 who are depressed or alcoholic.

And here is some info from Psychology Today, re an article written by Alex Lickerman, M.D., on "The Six Reasons People Attempt Suicide":

1. They're depressed. This is without question the most common reason people commit suicide. Severe depression is always accompanied by a pervasive sense of suffering as well as the belief that escape from it is hopeless. The pain of existence often becomes too much for severely depressed people to bear . . .

2. They're psychotic. Malevolent inner voices often command self-destruction for unintelligible reasons. Psychosis is much harder to mask than depression, and is arguably even more tragic. The worldwide incidence of schizophrenia is 1% and often strikes otherwise healthy, high-performing individuals, whose lives, though manageable with medication, never fulfill their original promise . . .

3. They're impulsive. Often related to drugs and alcohol, some people become maudlin and impulsively attempt to end their own lives . . .

4. They're crying out for help, and don't know how else to get it. These people don't usually want to die but do want to alert those around them that something is seriously wrong . . .

5. They have a philosophical desire to die. The decision to commit suicide for some is based on a reasoned decision, often motivated by the presence of a painful terminal illness from which little to no hope of reprieve exists . . .

6. They've made a mistake. This is a recent, tragic phenomenon in which typically young people flirt with oxygen deprivation for the high it brings and simply go too far. The only defense against this, it seems to me, is education.

And on the other hand, I'd say that the most important set of philosophical questions, at least for philosophy majors, would be this:

"Why am I majoring in philosophy? What do I expect to do with my degree? What do I want to do for a career?"

It's important to have good answers for onself to those questions. Some answers will suggest continuing on, and some will suggest making some changes.

For folks simply pursuing philosophy as an extracurricular/as a hobby/on their "own time" so to speak, the most important questions are simply those that interest them the most. And that could be anything.

1. If life is not worth living, then philosophy is not worth doing.
Therefore, the worth of every other philosophical question is dependent on the question of whether life is worth living.

2. The question of whether life is worth living is worth answering.
Therefore philosophy is worth doing.
Therefore life is worth living.

Premise 1 seems like a necessary truth, give or take.
Premise 2 is controversial, and only needs to be accepted by those thread participants who wish to avoid the performative contradiction of posting worthlessly.

Quoting Moliere

While I agree that he falls broadly into the existentialist camp, it's also fair to say he's writing in response or as critical of existential philosophies (as he defines the term, of course). So it's also fair to say he is not an existentialist. On one hand you have the broad historical category where we group some authors together because they have similar themes or moods, but on the other you have a crisper definition offered by Camus which he is critical of.

Yes, I agree that he emphasizes the "absurd" while Sartre emphasizes freedom. There are some differences like Sartre's freedom seems to be intrinsic while Camus seems to be contingent upon only confronting the "absurd". I am still critical of Camus ideas in regards to his "solutions" which amount to a sort of quantity of experience (the actor, the seducer, etc.). Though probably not to be taken literally, to me, it is very much (along with Nietzsche's ideas) provided the ethos of the "hip" manic lust for voracious experience seeking.. which actually just amounts to the cliched ideas of the traveling gypsy lifestyle, the party-goer, adrenaline junky, etc. etc. It seems very self-absorbed.. You know just "Do the Dew" as Mountain Dew would say...

Existentialist themes in media have been quite extensive since the end of the end of the 20th century..You have themes from movies like Office Space and the Big Lebowski... which kind of sees the Dude and Peter Gibbons as your everday man that faces realities in stride.. and then you have movies like Fight Club and such which were more of the Camus variety that you should live extreme experiences, and be happy that you made your own decisions while living in the absurd.. These kind of solutions, though presenting themselves as just entertainment, convey the general ethos of the middling existentialist idea that one can be content in the absurd.. That is not revolt but complacency.. Really looking at the situation head-on would be more of the Schopenhauer variety and seeing the structural situation we find ourselves in.

Quoting unenlightened

Premise 1 seems like a necessary truth, give or take.

I don't agree with that. Let's say that you've never at all considered whether life was worth living, but you engage in/with philosophy and you value it a lot. In that case, the value of philosophical questions has nothing to do with considering whether life is worth living.

Quoting Cavacava

The question of suicide masks the real issue, which is our own temporality. It's true we want to be happy, be at peace, but it this is not always possible, and living a temperate life might alleviate some pain, but in the end it is all the same, death sooner or latter. It's not meaning which counts, it is the ability to accept what is, to will what is, inspite of what is. I think that is only possible by finding something transcendent, beyond one's self.

'Ability to accept what is' - That's what Camus described as 'philosophical suicide'. By finding something transcendent, one can get too complacent. Camus argues that we don't know and that we can't possibly know. That's why accepting means creating an illusion and then accepting the illusion in order to feel more comfortable.

Reply to Bitter Crank

Quoting Bitter Crank

This is the important sentence. Elsewhere Kant argues that all philosophy ultimately aims at answering these three questions: “What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope?” I have no idea whether Camus was familiar with Kant's "ultimate question" formulation.

I agree with ''What can I know?'' But I don't see much sense in the following questions.

What if I can only know that I don't know what I should do, and therefore I can't be sure whether I should hope at all?

How could he impart the concept of hope in the ultimate questions if the questions haven't been answered yet?

Quoting Terrapin Station

Premise 1 seems like a necessary truth, give or take.
— unenlightened

I don't agree with that. Let's say that you've never at all considered whether life was worth living, but you engage in/with philosophy and you value it a lot. In that case, the value of philosophical questions has nothing to do with considering whether life is worth living.

That is certainly possible. However, if, as a matter of fact, and unknown to you since you haven't considered it, life has no value, then it surely turns out that your philosophising has no value, and you have mis-valued it.

Reply to unenlightened

It has no objective value, but "objective value" is a category error anyway.

It has subjective value to me, and that's the nature of value. It's a subjective phenomenon.

Reply to Terrapin Station

In that case you have already answered the question implicitly without having thought about it. If philosophy has value of whatever jectivity, then life has value of that jectivity, since life is necessary to philosophy.

Reply to unenlightened

But I don't buy implicit valuations. Valuing something is explicit. If you've never considered the question of "whether life is worth living," you don't have an "implicit answer" about it.

Your purchases are not really my concern. However, if you look both ways before crossing the street, you are implicitly valuing not getting run down, and you don't need to explicitly articulate this value to yourself.

Existentialist angst can be interpreted as merely a dark school of comedy and what Camus is actually asking is what is the value of our emotions. If the universe were merely logical and ruled by causality then suicide would seem to defy causality and logic with the question becoming why to do we even have emotions. Studies of generosity and altruism indicate that they support the ongoing evolution of the species and often promote reciprocity. Hence, by philosophy examining how supposedly irrational emotions promote rationality and evolution it can answer more of the Big Questions.

Quoting wuliheron

it can answer more of the Big Questions

Somehow knowing "how" something developed and living with the manifestation of that development seem like two very different questions or at least approaches to the question. Existential philosophizing is the DaSein, the person as being lived- the ready-to-hand of phenomenology. The present-at-hand of how and discursive reflection of how my own emotions came about is not equivalent to the actual experiencing of emotions.

It may put the emotions into perspective, but gives me no real direction of what to do, or how to think of the situation. In this case, the ready-at-hand experience is that of the human animal with his immense self-reflective abilities confronting a world that has no direction. That is the absurd according to Camus. Of course my difference with Camus is how he interprets our ability to be free within the absurd.. We are constantly impinged by the set-up of the world and our own psyche.. The need for needs and wants, the harms of the environment, the harms of every contingent unwanted pain, etc. etc.. The suffering of the world is sort of not addressed very well. This is where Schopenhauer's understanding fits much better.. His pendulum swing of survival through cultural upkeep and boredom and the subsequent entertainment-seeking that ensues.. The revolt then isn't being the "absurd" Nietzschean superman who climbs mountains, lives a bunch of lives at once, and conquers nations (the man of action without dithering thought)..these are all manic thought-experiments that have little bearing to the life lived of the human animal. Rather, the revolt comes from the ability to see the situation for what it is without flinching or distracting oneself from this idea.

Quoting schopenhauer1

Rather, the revolt comes from the ability to see the situation for what it is without flinching or distracting oneself from this idea.

The revolt comes as a result of our inability to occupy the lowest possible energy state. When human behavior is examined within the context of known physical laws, rather than idealism, it makes a great deal more sense. Hippies like to say, "When harmony is lost, balance will be restored" which leads to harmony eventually being restored. It is where physical laws and our emotions meet that the most interesting observations can be made, when the only thing we might know is nothing, but that's how we can sometimes learn the most interesting things because it provides the necessary analog perspective. The ultimate analog perspective being that it is the greater context of the Truth which determines the identity of everything else.

Quoting Kazuma

What if I can only know that I don't know what I should do, and therefore I can't be sure whether I should hope at all?

We are not born knowing the answers to the Kant's three questions, or Camus' challenge, and therefore we have to labor over these questions if we are going to find any answers. That is what life is about, is it not?

We answer these questions through study and thoughtful living. Maybe the answers come from the way we live.

The "know" question is about the certainty you can place in your knowledge. The "do" question is about ethics. You have to decide what it is right and proper for you to do. If we live our lives deliberately, study and learn, think about the kind of people we think we ought to be, we may answer the first two questions reasonably well.

What you can hope for perhaps derives from what you can know and what you should do.

Quoting Kazuma

How could he impart the concept of hope in the ultimate questions if the questions haven't been answered yet?

Did Kant intend to impart hope in his three questions?

Good parenting sets children on the path of learning, proper behavior, and hope. Later in life the child-become-adult has to decide whether what he learned, what was proper, and what could be hoped for is now adequate. Maybe the parents taught that the child should hope for eternal life in heaven or a fortunate reincarnation. The adult may decide that he can not know about heaven or reincarnation, and toss that hope out the window. Maybe the adult concludes that there is no hope for human progress, or conversely, that there is much hope. What people think they can know, what they should do, what they may hope often changes over time. The child may have been taught that he should make a lot of money. The adult may decide that he should not do that.

I hope pursuing these questions makes like meaningful.

It's a problem that can be a most serious one in particular cases. Treating it as a general, abstract--"philosophical"--problem renders it a mere intellectual exercise, which is to belittle it.

Quoting Bitter Crank

Good parenting sets children on the path of learning, proper behavior, and hope. Later in life the child-become-adult has to decide whether what he learned, what was proper, and what could be hoped for is now adequate. Maybe the parents taught that the child should hope for eternal life in heaven or a fortunate reincarnation. The adult may decide that he can not know about heaven or reincarnation, and toss that hope out the window. Maybe the adult concludes that there is no hope for human progress, or conversely, that there is much hope. What people think they can know, what they should do, what they may hope often changes over time. The child may have been taught that he should make a lot of money. The adult may decide that he should not do that.

Hope sounds very desperate to me. It seems to be a comfortable approach to problems that would eventually end up without any solution. Hoping and believing is what Camus classified as ''philosophical suicide''.

I'm not sure if Kant meant it this way, but it seems it would make more sense if it was: ''Before abandoning hope, one must first start hoping.''

Quoting Bitter Crank

I hope pursuing these questions makes like meaningful.

Assuming we need a meaning in life.

Quoting Kazuma

Hope sounds very desperate to me.

“Hope” is the thing with feathers -
That perches in the soul -
And sings the tune without the words -
And never stops - at all -

And sweetest - in the Gale - is heard -
And sore must be the storm -
That could abash the little Bird
That kept so many warm -

I’ve heard it in the chillest land -
And on the strangest Sea -
Yet - never - in Extremity,
It asked a crumb - of me.

Emily Dickinson 1830-1886

Quoting Kazuma

Hope sounds very desperate to me. It seems to be a comfortable approach to problems that would eventually end up without any solution.

I hope you won't always view life negatively.

Sure, sometimes life presents us with desperate situations and we can only hope for the best while fully expecting the worst. But not all of life is miserable and not all hope is desperate. We hope for everything from the trivial to the sublime.

We can hope that the bakery has not sold all the cinnamon rolls. We can hope to find someone to love and marry. We can hope to do well in life. We can hope for the resurrection. We can hope to get through the day without going crazy. We can hope that death will come quickly. We can hope the person calling us is not our super-annoying sister-in-law. We can hope that even one out of 100 publishers will accept our manuscript. We can hope that that it snows on Christmas Eve.

Quoting Kazuma

Assuming we need a meaning in life.

Trust me: we need meaning in life.

Quoting unenlightened

Your purchases are not really my concern.

"I don't buy," in other words equals, "That's wrong"

Quoting unenlightened

However, if you look both ways before crossing the street, you are implicitly valuing not getting run down, and you don't need to explicitly articulate this value to yourself.

People do not want to explicitly want to not be hit by a car when they look both ways before crossing a street?? lol

Quoting Moliere

While I agree that he falls broadly into the existentialist camp, it's also fair to say he's writing in response or as critical of existential philosophies (as he defines the term, of course). So it's also fair to say he is not an existentialist. On one hand you have the broad historical category where we group some authors together because they have similar themes or moods, but on the other you have a crisper definition offered by Camus which he is critical of.

Camus criticizes existentialists such as Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Jaspers for recognizing the absurd situation and then, as he sees it, betraying their realization. From the perspective of the rational intellect, life has no inherent meaning. Camus recommends that we should live passionately in the light of this rationalist vision of the meaninglessness of existence, that we should not deny it but rather rebel against it, in the sense of live in despite of it, in a kind of paroxysm of human pride.

Personalty, I find Camus to be, as a philosopher, both callow and shallow. He has capitulated to the objectified, scientistic vision of nature, and to the limitations of a carping rationalism that would set the limits, not only of itself, but of the spiritual. What he fails to see in Kierkegaard's vision of the absurd is the role of faith; he does not see that his valorization of the nihilistic vision of meaninglessness is itself both as much an imputation of meaning and a question of faith as is any spiritual vision of meaning and transcendence.

"Existentialist" has tended to be like "hipster."

Everyone denies that they are one, whether that's the case or not.

Reply to schopenhauer1 I'm mostly just focusing in on the text, in this case, rather than cultural affect of Camus' writing.

I sometimes wonder about the particular lives he uses to elucidate the absurd man. My take on it was that he's using extreme cases which are counter to the general attitudes of moral living in order to demonstrate that the absurd man, while it is a kind of ethic, is not the sort of ethic which many are concerned with. He does, though I grant that it's curious that all of his examples are rather romantic, say:

Do I need to develop the idea that an example is not necessarily an example to be followed (even less so, if possible, in the absurd world) and that these illustrations are not therefore models?...A sub-clerk in the post office is the equal of a conqueror if consciousness is common to them. All experiences are indifferent in this regard

So, just at his word, at least, he's speaking against the notion that one must follow the examples he uses. In addition, he states explicitly that complacency is exactly what the absurd man does not allow -- this is his criticism, in a way, of both suicide and existentialism. They are ways of escape from the absurd, ways towards complacency with the absurd world -- whether that be through the church, the knife, or plunging into the irrational.

Reply to John

Perhaps he does. But, even so, it's worth noting that he's speaking about Kierkegaard from the perspective of the absurd man. They are legitimate to themselves, but -- according to Camus -- they negate the absurd, which the premise of the essay (Can we, and if so how, do we live with an absurd world?)

Mystical thought has familiarized us with such devices. They
are just as legitimate as any attitude of mind. But for the moment I
am acting as if I took a certain problem seriously. Without judging
beforehand the general value of this attitude or its educative power,
I mean simply to consider whether it answers the conditions I set
myself, whether it is worthy of the conflict that concerns me

...

What is perceptible in Leo Chestov will be perhaps even more
so in Kierkegaard. To be sure, it is hard to outline clear
propositions in so elusive a writer. But, despite apparently opposed
writings, beyond the pseudonyms, the tricks, and the smiles, can be
felt throughout that work, as it were, the presentiment (at the same
time as the apprehension) of a truth which eventually bursts forth
in the last works: Kierkegaard likewise takes the leap. His
childhood having been so frightened by Christianity, he ultimately
returns to its harshest aspect. For him, too, antinomy and paradox
become criteria of the religious. Thus, the very thing that led to
despair of the meaning and depth of this life now gives it its truth
and its clarity

...

It is not for me to wonder to what stirring preaching this
attitude is linked. I merely have to wonder if the spectacle of the
absurd and its own character justifies it

Also, while Camus is certainly a rationalist, I don't find any good reason to attribute scientism to his philosophy. One can conclude that the world is absurd without attributing metaphysical status to scientific propositions, and Camus doesn't rely upon science to sketch absurdity in the beginning or to define it directly thereafter.

What makes you say otherwise?

Reply to Ciceronianus the White I don't know. I realize that suicide is very serious. But I'd say that it helps to have ways of thinking about serious problems.

I mean, what's the way of thinking about suicide now? Isn't it actually pretty complex? And it's mostly placed within a medical context, too -- thereby depriving the victim of much say in the cure. That isn't to say that it shouldn't be done, but I wouldn't exclude it from the realm of philosophy either tout court.

Quoting Moliere

I don't know. I realize that suicide is very serious. But I'd say that it helps to have ways of thinking about serious problems.

I mean, what's the way of thinking about suicide now? Isn't it actually pretty complex? And it's mostly placed within a medical context, too -- thereby depriving the victim of much say in the cure. That isn't to say that it shouldn't be done, but I wouldn't exclude it from the realm of philosophy either tout court.

There are sick people, people in trouble because of "real life" problems, desperate people who contemplate suicide. They're not putting the back of their hands to their foreheads and moaning about ennui. Their dilemmas merit study, yes, but I doubt that what they grapple with is the kind of philosophical problem Camus refers to, and is best addressed in context.

Reply to Ciceronianus the White Certainly addressing a particular case of suicide requires context, and generalizing to understand the motives for suicide requires one to reference the context (since the reasons are many, after all).

But I don't see how that's a reason to exclude suicide from philosophical contemplation. I don't see how you could argue Camus' essay belittles suicide, even if we could imagine that there are ways of belittling suicide by way of philosophical reflection.

Quoting Moliere

In addition, he states explicitly that complacency is exactly what the absurd man does not allow -- this is his criticism, in a way, of both suicide and existentialism.

Well indeed, it is this equivalency of the sub-clerk and the conqueror that allows The Dude and Peter Gibbons to be the middling existential hero... Both the extreme absurdist model (the actor, seducer, and conqueror), and the subdued version of it (the sub-clerk who knows the absurd situation but still roles with it because he is free in his mind).. Are both bad version of the revolt of existence.

The three examples of the extreme version are clearly destructive to others, despite its irony in its own pursuit of quantity of experience (oh so hip)..

The examples of the subdued "everyday" man, living the absurd life but in the everydayness of things...because well, it is just complacency..despite if one is self-aware of the absurdity..

A revolt comes not when one sees the absurd and decides to live life in this full good faith view. But rather, the revolt comes when one sees the many harms one is exposed to, and the ever-present pendulum of one's own psyche- moving from survival as cultural upkeep and boredom turned into entertainment seeking.. The fact that we must rely on hope and "flow" experiences to try to sustain us or give us "justifications" for why every day is not so bad.. It is realizing that hope and flow are just ways to isolate the fact that life can be quite harmful, causes much stress, and forces us to constantly deal with our homeostatic/cultural thing. It is a burden or series of burdens that most constantly be confronted. If we can see this aspect, and not flinch, and not try to run away from it with more flow activities and distraction, that is the revolt.. If one can actually bitch about it without resigning to thinking that they are a smiling Sisyphus.. Then they are actually revolting.. Sisyphus smiling is simply the status quo. Accepting fate, Nietzschean and Camus style may be hip and in vogue amongst those who care about that, but it's not revolt.

Reply to schopenhauer1

I don't see a problem with being hip or in vogue. Even if something is hip or in vogue, that doesn't stop it from being what it is. Lady Gaga is a musician, whether she is hip today or not so tomorrow. What does it matter if someone is self-aware that they are revolting against the absurd, that they are smiling, that they reference Nietzsche, that they think of themselves in a Sisyphean manner? How does that take away from the Absurdists revolt?

I don't think there's some kind of real revolt to uphold people to. I think that this is the solution to the problem, the result of the absurd reasoning. It seems to me that you're saying a person has to hide that they feel a certain way from themselves, and purposefully go against the "status quo" in order to revolt. For one, I'm rather uncertain that absurdism is the status quo. But just granting the premise, if it were -- the revolt isn't predicated against numbers or others. It's a revolt against the absurd. So insofar that you follow the absurd reasoning, then the act of revolt is a way to be joyful.

On a side note -- hope is one of those terms frequently spoken against in The Myth of Sisyphus. Hope is a form of nostalgia which one gives into to nullify one of the two terms which results in the absurd, at least as it is used in the essay. I mean, you're free to posit what you want obviously, but it struck me as odd to say that Camus hopes and feels very hip and cool about hoping when he speaks explicitly against hope, at least.

Now, I gather that your revolt may not be Camus' revolt. But from what I can tell you're not an absurdist, either -- you're not following the absurd reasoning, or at least not believing in it. So, insofar that you're not the absurd man, that you don't feel that your desires can not be met by the world and you continue to desire anyways, that the world has meaning (if a pessimistic one) -- the result of all of this would amount to saying: "I don't just disagree with your reasoning, but the premise upon which your reasoning starts". Which, of course, I don't see a problem with that, but I don't see it as a strike against Camus either. After all -- the absurdist can say the same to you, since they started their premise with the absurd.





The concept of "quantity of experience" is one of those that I'm rather uncertain on in the essay. He uses the example of 40 vs 60 years. But I am rather prone to think there is a depth of life, myself. So it's a part of his argument that I find hard to either follow or buy into, and actually wonder what he's getting at (after all, how does one measure quantity of life? Just in years? But then why the number of women being emphasized, the number of characters you play, the number of foes you vanquish? Not quite sure what to make of it. Though the same sort of questions could apply to depth, too)

Reply to Kazuma

'Ability to accept what is' - That's what Camus described as 'philosophical suicide'. By finding something transcendent, one can get too complacent. Camus argues that we don't know and that we can't possibly know. That's why accepting means creating an illusion and then accepting the illusion in order to feel more comfortable.

His mythical man accepts the conditions of his existence in almost stark rebellion as he trudges up and down his hill. How does he do this, how does he maintain his rebellious attitude, in spite of his eternal condemnation to this absurd task. He can do it because he is his own man, he is not sorry about anything. Man can scorn anything.

In Camus's Plague there is a scene where the doctor (Rieux) and a priest (Paneloux) spend a whole night with a child dying from the plague. The child dies a horrifically painful death while neither of these men can't do anything but watch. The child was an innocent the doctor screams at the priest, who says that we cannot understand the ways of God's love and the doctor says he wants no part of that kind of love.

What drives the doctor? He says his concern is with health. He says:

"What does it matter? What I hate is death and disease, as you well know. And whether you wish it or not, we're allies, facing them and fighting them together... Rieux was still holding Paneloux's hand."

The absurd death of the child cannot be justified, just as there is no justification for luck, the contingencies of life. How does one react to life's contingencies? Camus doctor in The Plague has no choice, there is no meaningful answer, he works to help the sick because they are sick and he is a doctor...and that is what he does.

Reply to Moliere

The indifference which Camus imputes to the universe is based on a view which sees it as brutely material and not at all as spiritual, both in essence and origin. I think this is fundamentally a rational empiricist view. This kind of presuppositional perspective is the metaphysical essence of scientism.

Reply to John But where does Camus state that the universe is brutely material in essence and origin?

I would say that the context in which the essay is written explains more how the universe appears indifferent. 1940 France is when Paris was taken by the Fascists. In 1955 Camus states:

For me "The Myth of Sisyphus" marks the beginning of an idea which I was to pursue in The Rebel. It attempts to resolve the problem of suicide, as The Rebel attempts to resolve that of murder, in both cases without the aid of eternal values which, temporarily perhaps, are absent or distorted in contemporary Europe. The fundamental subject of "The Myth of Sisyphus" is this: it is legitimate and necessary to wonder whether life has a meaning; therefore it is legitimate to meet the problem of suicide face teo face. The answer, underlying and appearing through the paradoxes which cover it, is this: even if one does not believe in God, suicide is not legitimate. Written fifteen years ago, in 1940, amid the French and European disaster, this book declares that even within the limits of nihilism it is possible to find the means to proceed beyond nihilism

In the opening paragraph to the essay, so written around 1940 he writes:

But it is useful to note at the same time that the absurd, hitherto taken as a conclusion, is considered in this essay as a starting-point. In this sense it may be said that there is something provisional in my commentary: one cannot prejudge the position it entails. There will be found here merely the description, in the pure state, of an intellectual malady. No metaphysic, no belief is involved in it for the moment. These are the limits and the only bias of this book.

So I would say there's even reason to believe that the indifference of the universe is posited not on the basis of a metaphysical outlook, since he eschews metaphysics in the opening -- and that, given the events in which the essay was written in, there's also reason to believe that the indifference of the universe is acutely felt due to said events. (And it is even admitted that eternal values may only be temporarily absent or distorted).

The above is also why I don't think ennui is exactly an appropriate description of the emotion from which the essay is written, either. Camus was a part of the resistance. The unsatisfied desire is the desire for justice, and the realization that what we might consider evil, what we would consider unjust was winning the day.

In our own day we have a war fought on an invented casus belli, and we know that the perpetrators of said lies will never be brought to justice, as well as a financial crisis for whom the same can be said, and a right-wing populist who -- even if his campaign was all bluster -- certainly helped to organize hate-groups.

I wouldn't say that the topic of suicide is exactly the result of listlesness, but the genuine wondering at whether all the pain of life is worth going through when you know what you consider to be evil will dominate and win.

Quoting Moliere

I don't see a problem with being hip or in vogue. Even if something is hip or in vogue, that doesn't stop it from being what it is. Lady Gaga is a musician, whether she is hip today or not so tomorrow. What does it matter if someone is self-aware that they are revolting against the absurd, that they are smiling, that they reference Nietzsche, that they think of themselves in a Sisyphean manner? How does that take away from the Absurdists revolt?

I didn't mean it's wrong because it is in vogue.. If Schopenhauer was in vogue, he wouldn't be wrong.. People would just be more right :D. But what I was really saying is that these themes seem to be the Zeitgeist for a long time and THOUGH it is popular, that doesn't necessarily mean it is right. That's all.. However, being popular does not negate something's truthfulness either.

Quoting Moliere

I don't think there's some kind of real revolt to uphold people to. I think that this is the solution to the problem, the result of the absurd reasoning. It seems to me that you're saying a person has to hide that they feel a certain way from themselves, and purposefully go against the "status quo" in order to revolt.

No not really.. What I am saying is that "revolt" in the context of how Nietzsche and Camus explained it, is simply acceptance of the situation said in a different way. This "joy" is actually not the life lived..which is as I explained the pendulum swing and contingent harms. It is another false escape hatch...The Zen absurdist hero- more artistic than realistic.

Quoting Moliere

On a side note -- hope is one of those terms frequently spoken against in The Myth of Sisyphus. Hope is a form of nostalgia which one gives into to nullify one of the two terms which results in the absurd, at least as it is used in the essay. I mean, you're free to posit what you want obviously, but it struck me as odd to say that Camus hopes and feels very hip and cool about hoping when he speaks explicitly against hope, at least.

I wasn't speaking there about Camus' notion of hope per se, but about a common notions people have to find a reason to keep going. Like relationships, flow, aesthetics, the onward march of science and technology..it's just one of those human reasons for continuing themselves and procreating future people so they can too can continue themselves for those reasons. Hope, in particular is the carrot and the stick.

Quoting Moliere

So, insofar that you're not the absurd man, that you don't feel that your desires can not be met by the world and you continue to desire anyways, that the world has meaning (if a pessimistic one) -- the result of all of this would amount to saying: "I don't just disagree with your reasoning, but the premise upon which your reasoning starts". Which, of course, I don't see a problem with that, but I don't see it as a strike against Camus either. After all -- the absurdist can say the same to you, since they started their premise with the absurd.

At the end of the day, you still must deal with survival and entertainment, in other words, the structure of one's very willing nature. The instrumentality of existence.. and how we are forced everyday to deal with our wants, needs, and contingent harms. I have sympathies with Camus' idea of the absurd, as indeed the idea of instrumentality, the absurd feeling we get when we realize our constant need to put forth the energy to pursue goals and actions in waking life. This feeling can make us question the whole human enterprise itself of maintaining upkeep, maintaining institutions, and pursuing any actions that takes up our free time simply because we are alive have no other choice. My disagreement is with his conclusion that all is well in the joyful Zen-like Sisyphus accepting his fate.

Quoting Moliere

But where does Camus state that the universe is brutely material in essence and origin?

Granted he may not state it, but I think the presumption is implicit in his view.

I would say that the context in which the essay is written explains more how the universe appears indifferent. 1940 France is when Paris was taken by the Fascists. In 1955 Camus states:

"The fundamental subject of "The Myth of Sisyphus" is this: it is legitimate and necessary to wonder whether life has a meaning; therefore it is legitimate to meet the problem of suicide face to face. The answer, underlying and appearing through the paradoxes which cover it, is this: even if one does not believe in God, suicide is not legitimate. Written fifteen years ago, in 1940, amid the French and European disaster, this book declares that even within the limits of nihilism it is possible to find the means to proceed beyond nihilism".

The declaration that it is legitimate to wonder whether life has a meaning is precisely the declaration that the question should be asked and answered by the discursive rational intellect, rather than by intuition and the leap of faith. The contradictory implication in Camus is that the question both can and cannot be answered by the rational intellect. He sees this as the "absurd" situation. But what is the point of asking and attempting to answer a question using a faculty that cannot answer (and hence arguably deceives itself in even thinking it can ask) the question?

This is why Kierkegaard's 'absurd' is so very different from Camus'. It is not because K has capitulated to settle for an illegitimate answer as C would have it. It is rather that K's 'absurd' was never the characterization of the situation of the inability of the material universe to answer our intellectual questions about its meaning, but rather about our radical freedom to believe and the anxiety that freedom produces. K's 'absurd' is essentially that of the subjective condition of absolute freedom, and C's is essentially that of the absolute subjection (that is, really, the elimination or denial) of freedom to the objective condition. The two 'absurds' are actually polemical opposites.

So I would say there's even reason to believe that the indifference of the universe is posited not on the basis of a metaphysical outlook, since he eschews metaphysics in the opening -- and that, given the events in which the essay was written in, there's also reason to believe that the indifference of the universe is acutely felt due to said events. (And it is even admitted that eternal values may only be temporarily absent or distorted).

I don't find this convincing. I think there is a metaphysical presumption of the indifference of the universe or the Real, that is based on the demand that if it were not indifferent that it then should be obvious to the rational intellect that it is not indifferent, and that since such a situation is not obvious at all, that it must be concluded that the Real is indifferent and that we should henceforth live our lives in a kind of radical rebellion against this absurdity, in the light (or darkness) of the nihilism produced by that purported 'insight', rather than capitulating to believing what we are understood to have no evidence for; a capitulation that is seen as 'giving in to wishful thinking'.

For me it is ultimately an adolescent and facile conclusion, and an utterly artificial 'solution' to a pseudo-problem that has come about due the modern obsessive embrace of objectified rational conceptualization and the abnegation of our intuitive and mytho-poetic faculties.

Quoting Moliere

Certainly addressing a particular case of suicide requires context, and generalizing to understand the motives for suicide requires one to reference the context (since the reasons are many, after all).

But I don't see how that's a reason to exclude suicide from philosophical contemplation. I don't see how you could argue Camus' essay belittles suicide, even if we could imagine that there are ways of belittling suicide by way of philosophical reflection.

There is nothing called "suicide" which can be subjected to philosophical contemplation (whatever that may be). There are suicides, each of them different as they involve different individuals and circumstances. Perhaps a scientific investigation into suicides may provide some insight. But I personally feel that very few of them result from philosophical contemplation, as it seems Camus himself realized, so I wonder just how philosophical contemplation would be useful in that case.

I doubt those who seriously consider suicide would benefit at all from the philosophical contemplation of suicide. They would more likely benefit from medical/psychological contemplation and action than being told by some philosopher that they want to kill themselves because life is absurd.

There are suicides, each of them different as they involve different individuals and circumstances. Perhaps a scientific investigation into suicides may provide some insight. But I personally feel that very few of them result from philosophical contemplation, as it seems Camus himself realized, so I wonder just how philosophical contemplation would be useful in that case.

I would say that your wondering how is still not an argument against. There are clearly things we all don't understand -- but that's not a reason to exclude someone from a topic using a particular style of writing.

Quoting Ciceronianus the White

I doubt those who seriously consider suicide would benefit at all from the philosophical contemplation of suicide.

How would you measure such benefit or lack thereof, considering that you propose science as the path to possible usefulness, and that each suicide is actually terribly specific?

You doubt -- but what is your reason for doubt?

They would more likely benefit from medical/psychological contemplation and action than being told by some philosopher that they want to kill themselves because life is absurd.

I don't think you'd find anyone here who would disagree with that.

Quoting Moliere

I would say that your wondering how is still not an argument against. There are clearly things we all don't understand -- but that's not a reason to exclude someone from a topic using a particular style of writing.

But I'm not contending Camus and others shouldn't philosophically contemplate suicide. They may do so to their hearts' content (though Camus may have hesitated to assert he was content with anything). Similarly, they may contemplate the question "What is the meaning of life?" which Camus called the most important philosophical question in the same essay. I simply think suicide is a medical/psychological problem, not a philosophical one, and think philosophical contemplation of it would be no more useful than the philosophical contemplation of any mental or physical disease or condition.

Reply to Ciceronianus the White

You were, however, contending that to do so is to belittle suicide, no?

Without some shared agreement on what is useful I don't know if we could actually productively argue over whether this or that is useful. What, after all, would you say philosophy is useful for at all?

Reply to Cavacava

In the first comment you stated:
Quoting Cavacava

It's not meaning which counts, it is the ability to accept what is, to will what is, inspite of what is. I think that is only possible by finding something transcendent, beyond one's self.

However, in your excerpt of Camus' Plague there is no acceptance of anything ''beyond one's self''. There is a mere realisation that at that moment he is a doctor. Because there is no such thing as he is a doctor, or any other profession for that matter.

Reply to Kazuma

The doctor accepts his role as a doctor in spite of his inability to escape the absurdity of this role in the face of the irrational force of the Plague. He does not despair, he does not seek the safety of a transcendental god, he is not an existentialist, he is the ultimate realist who embraces the absurd for what it is, and he keeps on trudging up and down his own hill.

Quoting Moliere

You were, however, contending that to do so is to belittle suicide, no?

Without some shared agreement on what is useful I don't know if we could actually productively argue over whether this or that is useful. What, after all, would you say philosophy is useful for at all?

I do contend that, yes--in the same way that "philosophical contemplation" of bipolar disorder or cancer would belittle them. It would be contemplation for the personal satisfaction of the contemplator, quite unassociated with treatment of the disease and those afflicted by it. Treatment of the disease is useful; whether someone who doesn't have the disease thinks it has implications for his/her thoughts on the meaning of life (Camus' most important philosophical question) is not.

Reply to Ciceronianus the White

How does that square away with this:

Quoting Ciceronianus the White

But I'm not contending Camus and others shouldn't philosophically contemplate suicide.

Reply to Moliere I don't think the fact I disapprove of something or believe it's futile necessarily means that it shouldn't be done or that I should be disturbed by it.

Reply to Ciceronianus the White Not necessarily, of course. There are things one let's go. But belittling someone or some condition strikes me as the sort of thing which people shouldn't do. Especially if it is a serious condition.

Quoting Moliere

Not necessarily, of course. There are things one let's go. But belittling someone or some condition strikes me as the sort of thing which people shouldn't do. Especially if it is a serious condition.

The significance of the conduct has to be considered. "Philosophical contemplation" of suicide doesn't strike me as particularly significant; it's unusual that people would even read of it or hear of it. And it's not as if Camus or anyone else would be ridiculing those with suicidal tendencies or who commit suicide or harming them. No malice or ill-will would be involved. They would merely be engaging in a misguided exercise of sorts.

Quoting Cavacava

The question of suicide masks the real issue, which is our own temporality. It's true we want to be happy, be at peace, but it this is not always possible, and living a temperate life might alleviate some pain, but in the end it is all the same, death sooner or latter. It's not meaning which counts, it is the ability to accept what is, to will what is, inspite of what is. I think that is only possible by finding something transcendent, beyond one's self.

So the doctor managed to accept what is even without finding anything transcendent? Why do you think that it could be possible only by finding it then? Seems contradictory.

Reply to Kazuma

I'm not sure Kazuma.

The Doctor had displayed an unbendable will in a way I doubt I could measure up to, but his circumstances were unique and he did not have many options. In the back of my mind I think he saw his role to help others as his transcendent goal*, he embraced the absurd as his raison d'ê·tre (his god).

*Transcendent means to go beyond, which is not necessarily transcendental. Levinas used the term transcendent to mean going across over to the other. The desire is for the other to be absorbed as part of my own reality, while this desire can't be actualized (there will always be a gap), it can be deepened.

Quoting Kazuma

Can anyone suggest any critique on Camus':

“There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. All the rest — whether or not the world has three dimensions, whether the mind has nine or twelve categories — comes afterwards. These are games; one must first answer.”

Also, any opinions on why this is or is not the most serious philosophical problem?

I would ask why are there only two alternatives (life and death). I would also want to know why life is worth living for some and not for others. Why does death often come with the experience of pain that precedes death to the point that we have created a whole industry (hospice) to avoid that pain? Why would a bad experience precede something that some claim to be peaceful? Does the pain before death mean something about where you are headed?

Suicide is one of those choices that you can't change. You can often change your choices in life. Maybe it's the fear of making the wrong choice that keeps us from committing suicide. Many people refuse to make choices for fear of the outcome and then the decision is eventually taken out of their hands.

Quoting John

Granted he may not state it, but I think the presumption is implicit in his view.

I would put it like this -- the view of materialism is one view which is compatible with absurdism, given certain perimeters to that materialism (such as being a non-realist on moral truths, for instance, which isn't a necessary given), but I wouldn't assent to say that it is the only metaphysical view consistent with absurdism.

Anti-realism, as a whole, seems to fit. Really any metaphysical picture which does not believe eternal values can give aid to humanity would probably fit (so, perhaps they could exist, but be beyond knowing, for instance).

Quoting John

The declaration that it is legitimate to wonder whether life has a meaning is precisely the declaration that the question should be asked and answered by the discursive rational intellect, rather than by intuition and the leap of faith.

Heh. This is responded to as well. The leap of faith, from Camus' perspective, is no better or worse off than hoping or having a nostalgia -- it's guaranteed to kill the absurd by simply accepting it. It eliminates one of the terms which grants the absurd. The absurd man clings to reason because he has no such intuitive faculty, that you mention later. Just to make that clear, that isn't to say that there is no such faculty. Perhaps others are different. After all, people get by in there own ways. But this is what the absurd man does.

Quoting John

I don't find this convincing. I think there is a metaphysical presumption of the indifference of the universe or the Real, that is based on the demand that if it were not indifferent that it then should be obvious to the rational intellect that it is not indifferent, and that since such a situation is not obvious at all, that it must be concluded that the Real is indifferent and that we should henceforth live our lives in a kind of radical rebellion against this absurdity, in the light (or darkness) of the nihilism produced by that purported 'insight', rather than capitulating to believing what we are understood to have no evidence for; a capitulation that is seen as 'giving in to wishful thinking'.

I would say that the absurd man uses rational intellect not on the basis that this is some kind of criteria of reality, but because it is all the absurd man has. Further, I would caution against attributing nihilism. The whole book is against nihilism, or overcoming nihilism even in the face of nihilism. You may believe that this preconditions the conclusion that reality has no meaning for people. But the absurd man has no other means for grasping the problem.

The absurd man just sees no solution to the absurd in faith. All it does is eliminate the absurd rather than confront the absurd -- and the absurd man is convinced of this alone, that there is an absurd reality born from human desire and the knowledge that reality will never fulfill that desire.

For me it is ultimately an adolescent and facile conclusion, and an utterly artificial 'solution' to a pseudo-problem that has come about due the modern obsessive embrace of objectified rational conceptualization and the abnegation of our intuitive and mytho-poetic faculties.

I think you're holding back. Come on. this is a friendly space. Tell us how you really feel. ;)

Quoting Harry Hindu

I would ask why are there only two alternatives (life and death).

What other alternatives could there be? We are either alive or dead, there is no other alternative.

Quoting Harry Hindu

I would also want to know why life is worth living for some and not for others.

I don't see why life would be worth living for some and not for others. How did you come to that conclusion?

Quoting Harry Hindu

Why does death often come with the experience of pain that precedes death to the point that we have created a whole industry (hospice) to avoid that pain? Why would a bad experience precede something that some claim to be peaceful? Does the pain before death mean something about where you are headed?

Pain makes us feel mortal, while without pain we don't have to think about our own mortality. What happens after death, I don't know. The idea of a peaceful realm might be constructed just to make us feel better about something we know nothing about.

Quoting Harry Hindu

Suicide is one of those choices that you can't change. You can often change your choices in life. Maybe it's the fear of making the wrong choice that keeps us from committing suicide. Many people refuse to make choices for fear of the outcome and then the decision is eventually taken out of their hands.

Does that mean that suicide is just the matter of choice? Isn't it the matter of whether life is or is not worth living? Because you seem to state that we live because we are afraid to make a change, to die.

Quoting Kazuma

I don't see why life would be worth living for some and not for others. How did you come to that conclusion?

Because I see life as worth living and others commit suicide.Quoting Kazuma

Pain makes us feel mortal, while without pain we don't have to think about our own mortality. What happens after death, I don't know. The idea of a peaceful realm might be constructed just to make us feel better about something we know nothing about.

We can be in pain and not dying. So pain isn't something that informs us of our mortality. Seeing others die informs us of our mortality. Pain informs us of damage to our body which could be life-threatening or it might not.Quoting Kazuma

Does that mean that suicide is just the matter of choice? Isn't it the matter of whether life is or is not worth living? Because you seem to state that we live because we are afraid to make a change, to die.

I said that we are afraid of making an irreversible change that we might not like.

Quoting Harry Hindu

Because I see life as worth living and others commit suicide.

That is only your perception and perception of others. It does not mean life is worth living for some and not for others.

Quoting Harry Hindu

We can be in pain and not dying. So pain isn't something that informs us of our mortality. Seeing others die informs us of our mortality. Pain informs us of damage to our body which could be life-threatening or it might not.

Pain can be perceived as a potential danger to our health and can be, as you said, life threatening. Therefore there is a reason to avoid it.