creativesoul

I agree. What follows below is a bit off topic, my own take on a few things, and disagrees sharply with the convention grounding Kripke's thoughts in ...

Unsure how this addresses my last post. Nonetheless, it makes no sense to me. If all known properties of an object are necessary, it would mean that a...

Yup. That must be the case...

He argues in favor of the first quote. He argues in favor of the second quote. The result is obvious self-contradiction unless there is a distinction ...

If the paper arrives at self-contradiction, how far does the consequence of incoherency travel? If it doesn't matter to some of the points he makes, t...

Hmmm... I'm not so sure.

I'm concluding based upon the above that - according to Kripke's scheme - a necessary existent is equivalent to an essential property... The above see...

Some have said that modal talk has an inherent issue. Namely(pun intended), that identity cannot transcend from our world to a hypothetical one(all po...

That was put poorly by me... He repeatedly talks of the consequences for a theory of meaning and a theory of reference as they apply to his offering. ...

I'm not sure that every name is a rigid designator for Kripke. Proper names are what he's dealing with... I think. Assume he is talking about every na...

Indeed he does, or so it may seem... That is the bit that I'm currently attempting to summarize. I think it amounts to the difference between the mean...

I think that prior to getting into the second lecture, we ought offer a summary of the first. This summary ought set out the important distinctions th...

This topic is about Kripke's paper/lectures. It is not about the archaic and utterly useless notion of subjective that you've invoked here... You're e...

Yes. Banno just elaborated nicely upon my response to you...

This is not the place for it ...

I don't think that that's quite right. I'm thinking that his use of "stipulate" is very specific here. It's being used as a means to isolate the diffe...

:wink: Maybe.

What's confusing to you?

I'm not sure he says that. Objects, as far as I understand, according to Kripke are picked out of this world - by virtue of naming them - and posited ...

Kripke mentions early on that some problems of trans-world identity come from conflating epistemological issues with ontological ones. There are stark...

Possible worlds are stipulated. All possible world scenarios pick out something in this world and stipulate that something in a different set of circu...

"Resembling"... Why ought an apple pie resemble all of it's parts as a pre-requisite to insisting that there are no sensible possible world scenarios ...

My side issue with this concerns certain situations where the object in question is existentially dependent upon it's parts(emergent things/objects). ...

Yes. I agree with that. It seems that if we do not do that, then possible world semantics lose coherency...

I need a quote of me from you to me. Then, I may answer...

This seems pivotal as well...

I think that this bit above underwrites quite a bit of these lectures. I do not concur. However, it is important to understand what Kripke is getting ...

There are still some problems with transworld identifications, but I do not think that Kripke's language use grasps them. He has addressed some though...

Yes.

Hmmm... "So wrong" "again" Puzzlin' indeed.

Nah. Possible worlds are a metacognitive endeavor. There are no possible worlds without extremely complex language. All you'll find is language use.

Yeah, I think Kripke takes care of Heraclitus' 'same river' pseudo-problem. It's untenable... utterly untenable.

Emphasis mine Yup. That's what I'm talking about Banno. What if they are??? Those are unaddressed issues. In support of Kripke... his point - if I rea...

What have I written here that is incommensurate with anything you've quoted? :brow:

Where yat Banno? :cool:

So this notion Kripke invokes on page48... ...is quite intriguing by my lights. It not only allows the discussion of basic, foundational, and/or other...

I do find it interesting that he allows for 'essential properties' in several ways but asks to set them aside...

Kripke, it seems to me, strongly believes that possible world semantics are intuitively useful. His strong assertion...

Yeah, I dunno about this take... Seems to me that the very use of "actual" eliminates coherent use of possible world semantics.

I suggest that you back up and re-read the bit about the meaning of a name and the meaning of a reference(pg. 32, 33, 34). Kripke draws a distinction ...

I agree that the rigid designator in this example is Nixon. I didn't mean to imply otherwise. Designators can be contingent. Kripke makes a point to d...

This piques my interest. I agree to some extent. However, this assessment is already theory laden with notions that I reject for various reasons. Krip...

Honestly Banno, I am struggling to set aside my own position. It must be done in order to grasp what Kripke is getting at. One must also have a good g...

So while being president of the U.S. in 1970 designates Nixon, it is a nonrigid or accidental designator.

He wants to say that we only need the name to maintain identity across possible worlds, and that there is no problem with trivially stipulating differ...

Interesting take that Kripke has... By virtue of talking about Moses in another possible world, all we've done is posit the exact same thing(Moses) in...

So... the idea itself comes from thinking about one's own thought/belief?

No, you're not.

How is a better question. It's already been answered.

What sort of question is that Posty? Ask a better question.