@"Banno" @"Hanover" I tried to read a paper recently that discussed the difference Wittgenstein makes between sensations (toothache) and “dispositions...
@"Banno" @"Hanover" I take it McCormick wants to find a way out of the categorization of belief as only rational, without part of it being cast out as...
I have yet to read the article, but, as just an initial response, I would think we need to consider the topic in relation (say apart from) the classic...
I think the point of understanding the earlier discussion of feelings in comparing it to the toothache case, is to show that the words we use are not ...
@"Paine" @"Ludwig V" @"Joshs" @"Shawn" @"Srap Tasmaner" @"Luke" I think I have to go back over his investigation of knowledge and the situation betwee...
@"Paine" @"Ludwig V" @"Joshs" @"Shawn" @"Srap Tasmaner" @"Luke" Section 5 (pp. 21-23) Russell and Undiscovered Feelings Maybe someone can help fill in...
I think this is a confusion of Witt’s making. When he says the “method of science”, he might seem to be talking about comparing methods, but, based on...
In our discussion, this illustrates Witt’s insight that reasons get mixed up by the skeptic/metaphysician with causes (p. 14). People will do things t...
It’s fine, but you and @"Joshs" maybe should take a look at pages 14-15 as it is a discussion of reasons (vs causes), and it also may help straighten ...
I think it is important to revisit page 17 when he discusses language games. “These are ways of using signs simpler than those in which we use the sig...
True, “dismiss” was strong. It’s not like we don’t learn something along the way. And, in a very real sense, we would not have that knowledge without ...
@"Paine" @"Ludwig V" @"Joshs" @"Shawn" @"Srap Tasmaner" Section 4C (pp. 18-20] Philosophical “Attitude” To step back just to page 18, he is I believe ...
It’s not a matter of another general answer he gives as much as the “answer” he claims that the solipsist wants to satisfy that desire for their pure,...
In a sense, but I’m making a finer distinction between kinds of “problems”. In my discussion of Sec 2 above I claimed he was pointing out how philosop...
I’ve always thought they both start in the same place: asking what we say in a given situation, but Witt listens in a way where Socrates seems to alre...
@"Joshs" Cavell will point out that the teacher is only “inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do.’” (PI #217] so of course we can shut the door to ...
Aren’t justifications just a subset of reasons, like an excuse is a reason, as is acting on principal? Preparing them in advance to decide to act a ce...
Yes. You pick out the banjo. The picking results in a particular interpretation, or use, as: ‘This is pencil’ can distinguish the material, or the num...
Yes. Same statement (“This is pencil”), different “uses” (usages, made explicit), or as he also calls them: interpretations. Not that the use is given...
I think the comparison of motives with reasons is logical (grammatically similar) both compared to causes, which we may not know. But I can know my mo...
Yes, but we don’t manipulate language to build what we want; we communicate along “well established usage”(p.3) which we share, demonstrated by any of...
@"Banno" @"Paine" @"Ludwig V" @"Jamal" @"Astrophel" @"Joshs" @"Shawn" @"Srap Tasmaner" (If anyone else does not want to be “notified” when I read anot...
His form of proof is logical, but it takes the acknowledgement of his premises, which are the expressions we have about a practice in a situation, and...
Yes, but his derogatory ideas of “psychology” (“mental processes”, compulsion, etc.) doesn’t eclipse his discussion of our human responses to philosop...
The confusions so far appear to be motivated by the desire for a “crystalline purity of logic” (PI #107) like that misapplies the framework of objects...
I meant to refer generally to the discussion of both, not to just the mathematical section (though, as the text here points out, even mathematically t...
The irresistible temptation is not “to use a certain form of expression”. The temptation is for mathematical certainty. That desire forces the express...
Well, to the extent it has done its work, the method of science is based on ensuring repeatable, predictability, and removing our (individual) part in...
I only point it out as the placeholder for the alternative to our ordinary criteria that we uncover by self-reflection rather than impose. By “certain...
Well I’m not sure it’s going too far to say being contextual, not forcing conclusions, etc., are virtues. Calling it best practices, or a code of cond...
@"Ludwig V" I haven’t gotten as far as your quote from the end of the book, but I think I’ve shown sufficient evidence in the text that the vehicle of...
@"Banno" @"Paine" @"Ludwig V" @"Jamal" @"Manuel" @"Astrophel" @"Joshs" @"Shawn" Section 2B: 8-10 Analogy Some of these sections are a little bumpy so ...
The two mistakes are: 1. What the mind does (thought) is strange; so 2. How the mind works must be a mystery. Thus, we create the “problem” that we ju...
@"Ludwig V" @"Joshs" @"Manuel" “We are most strongly tempted to think that here are things hidden, something we can see from the outside but which we ...
I am trying to get at his separation between what are the general activities of the brain, and what would enlighten us as to what is essential about t...
I agree but he is taking his time drawing out this side here first. And my recollection of TLP is shoddy but I was trying to draw the parallel of his,...
Well, yes, there can be a lot going on, but most of the time we get along fine, which is only to say that the odd example is not evidence of the need ...
Well I think wanting necessity is different than just going along with what you’re accustomed to (the “ordinary”) without reflecting. But yes the most...
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