Luke

But you appear to speak the same way. At least, you don't speak with certainty that colours do appear the same way to both of us. The way colours appe...

Wow - all that results from a public concept? You said: "I can't possibly think one thing is 'sweet' whilst other people think a different thing is 's...

I would surmise that it is because the taste exists as an experience, and it does not exist unless it is experienced by someone. Therefore, it's the w...

Why must it be? I don't disagree, but that's not showing me your perceptions or sensations. Maybe you're colour-blind and you perceive it differently ...

I don’t know; how does an apple taste to you (or to anyone else)? Can you show me how it tastes to you? What reason is there to assume that how it tas...

If experiences are qualitative, then what’s the problem in speaking of their qualities? I don’t see why it’s necessary to phrase it like that.

Here you go again conflating qualia with language use. It is not the language use which is private, but the sensations.

See my latest response to @"Janus". If an apple has a taste, then there is a way it tastes. Am I Englishing wrong? If apples have a taste then you can...

You think that the word “qualia” has an intentionally nonsensical meaning?

What’s the difference? I guess it depends on whether you take an “experience” to be something inner or something outer. Qualia is what eliminative mat...

Nonsense verse is not complete nonsense, but the nonsensical aspects are due to the use of words which intentionally lack meaning/sense. Maybe a word ...

I’d really prefer to return to my argument that we can talk about qualia even though qualia are not the basis for the meanings of sensation terms. Ban...

Good. Then you should accept that it’s not senseless to talk about qualia or inverted spectra.

If you’re only going to respond to the first line of each of my posts then why should I bother? It is you who has missed what was said. Being the topi...

Try again. There are no language games about “Prefflings”, but there are plenty about qualia, Moreover, if Prefflings and qualia “cannot have a role i...

You said that qualia "cannot have a role in the language game", so how can it be that there are language games about qualia? You are not merely saying...

What cannot have a role in the language game? Qualia? I thought it was the subject of this discussion. With regards to intuition pump #3, you know wha...

It is still a possibility that our qualia may be different. Besides, if you can’t “ever determine that” our qualia may be different despite us using t...

I don't see why making natural distinctions and observing things could not be a logical precondition for having a perspective (or a point-of-view). Bu...

Sorry for not responding sooner. I had intended to, but life intervened. It seems that Dennett finds our talk about tasting food and experiencing spic...

What challenge? A random quote from the Tractatus which you have failed to demonstrate was a view Wittgenstein still held in his later years? I met yo...

Can you show that he didn't? Wittgenstein himself - not one of his interpreters - states the Tractatus contained "grave mistakes". I've provided relev...

"For since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I could not but recognize grave mistakes in what I set out in that first...

I'm happy for you to provide an argument. All I see in those sections is W repeatedly stating that he does not want to deny that any "inner process" o...

We can talk about pain, just as we can talk about colour. But we can't say much about the nature of our pains or the way we see colours - the sensatio...

Because the pain is the qualia; what it feels like. Acknowledging that there is pain (qualia) associated with pain-behaviour is not putting it "out of...

If that were the case then Wittgenstein would admit that there is no difference between between pain-behaviour with pain and pain-behaviour without pa...

Dennett seems to think it means something: You said that "Colours ain't coming from in here, either, since we overwhelmingly agree on them". The point...

You don't understand what it means?

Isn't that a bit like saying you believe we have qualia, but we just can't discuss them; which is to say that they are ineffable? Rather than "hedg hi...

If everything is physical (physicalism), then how do we account for (i.e. categorise) the mental/experiential? Experience could emerge from brute matt...

How do you account for Intuition Pump #3?

A logical condition of what? Or, what do you mean by a "logical condition"? I wouldn't say that being conscious is the end of a process. I consider it...

Fair enough, although you did ask about reference frames, not perspectives.

I was following Andrew's lead here, since he said:

Wouldn't you say that having a perspective (or being conscious) is a bodily process or function like any other? I think you and I might have different...

Apologies, I was quite unclear. I was trying to connect it back to your earlier post, where you said: More recently, you stated that a human perspecti...

Thanks, Andrew. Allow me to try and press the analogy to see whether it holds. In the same way that e.g. breathing, perspiration and digestion are not...

Thanks, @"Wayfarer". I was responding to Andrew's use of 'substantial', and was thinking in terms of Descartes' res extensa: extended thing(s), given ...

It's an interesting take that the Tractatus may be viewed as an attack on Cartesian dualism or subject/object dualism - not that I think you meant to ...

Does that include the existence of the observing mind itself? Yes, it’s a conundrum. Focusing on “knowing” misses the point, I feel. I agree it’s not ...

To echo @"Marchesk"’s post, if we have perspectives - if our perspectives exist - yet they do not have substantial (physical?) existence, then what ty...

Perhaps, but not for lack of trying. I have asked for clarification.

Apart from your repeated assertions, I still don't see much justification for "metacognition" or much distinction of it from linguistic competence. Wh...

Why not? I'm trying to understand the distinction between "talk of redness" requires metacognition and "talk of redness" requires language. Why does "...

How is that different to saying that it requires language to identify the colour as "red"?

Your point is that humans and animals can both perceive or consciously experience red, but it requires language to identify the colour as “red”?

You’re saying that conscious experience involving red objects is not necessarily conscious experience of red objects (or of the redness of those objec...

Is this not contradictory?