Luke

In music, there are microtones: notes between the named notes (e.g. between C and C#). I'm not sure whether these "extra" notes also have names, but I...

In that case, I think you and I each mean something different by "conscious experience". If conscious experience is no more than a "pattern of signals...

It would not surprise me. Not in any great detail. Sorry for any misinterpretation.

Maybe it was both? I really don't know much about it, but it seems like a fine distinction to draw between killing Jews because he wanted to, and kill...

Can you give an example of one (or more) of these properties. I assume redness is out. Bitterness?

Do you disagree with Dennett that there are properties of conscious experience?

Dennett seems to allow for qualia, insofar as they do not have the four special qualities he cites of being: (1) intrinsic (2) ineffable (3) private (...

Seems like you mean to say that the word "qualia" has no referent, rather than no meaning. Thanks, I'll take a look. I take all this to mean that it t...

The idea of "objective properties" may be something I erroneously inferred from your earlier comments (e.g. here) regarding 'extrinsic relational prop...

If the word "qualia" has no use, then what are we talking about? What is Dennett talking about? Perhaps our conscious minds "don't work in real time",...

Thanks for clarifying. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I take the "perceptual relationship" to be the perception itself, and I further assume that the pe...

Can you explain the difference between seeing red and experiencing a red quale? If we eliminate the supposed Cartesian Theatre, does it imply that we ...

If the nature of conscious experience is not amenable to philosophical discussion, then so be it. Since you're invoking Wittgenstein, what do you make...

You've already defined it: "how this coffee tastes to me, here, now", at one point in time. I'm saying that the taste of a cup of coffee can change fr...

No, the point is that, even in one cup of coffee, the taste can change from start to finish. But it still tastes like coffee, overall. Just like I can...

A cup of coffee usually tastes pretty much the same throughout for me, unless I forget to stir it, then it tastes sweeter at the end of the cup than a...

The relational, dispositional and functional aspects you describe appear to be reflexive and automatic; in other words: unconscious. You withdrew your...

Why is it only possible under the second model of experience (sensory input->qualia.....then....b)qualia->(via some judgement/assessment)->response)? ...

I thought qualia were a property of perception, rather than a product of perception. If I perceive a blue door, the blue isn't something that follows ...

I'm going to restrict my comments to privacy, as I think most qualia advocates would agree with Dennett that this is one of the properties of qualia. ...

Depends what you mean by "same scope". It seem obvious that the relationship is "inside the subject" if only in the sense that it is the agent's perce...

No, I asked why you add sugar. Yours. What if we remain unconvinced by (or just want to question) the article and its implications? For example, does ...

I'm not saying that either. I'm just trying to get people to admit that they do, in fact, taste tea when they drink it. Non-qualists seem very relucta...

You appear to have changed your opinion between these two quotes. Otherwise, I don't understand the distinction. You can taste tea but it has no taste...

You mean to tell me you didn't notice that adding sugar changed your internal states in a desirable way until you learned about neural networks and pr...

What internal states? How do you sense that it is desirable? How do you know that it will be again? I don't want to call your entire mental state the ...

Okay, so our perceptions get coloured by stuff. I'm just trying to get at whether or not you can smell smoke at all, or whether you've ever smelled sm...

If someone asks you "how's the tea?", you respond in neurological terms and/or strategic terms? The flavour never enters into any of your responses? W...

Then what informs your response, or your "range of words" you reach for if asked to describe it (to describe what?)

You are again pretending as if those qualia don't exist, yet that is what you are trying to account for by means other than introspection. I saw a rea...

Why does the person report that it tastes bitter? I mean, I get that qualia might not be necessary for scientific purposes, but this is philosophy. Do...

What (else) is chemosensation supposed to account for if not taste?

At the very least, I believe that things can be shown.

I wasn't referring to (and I thought you weren't referring to) a way tea tastes to you that is stored in your brain, but to a way tea tastes to you wh...

Someone once observed that "what can be shown cannot be said", such as the colour red, or the Guernica painting. Others think that seeing a painting a...

Aren't you trying to explain something when you say, for example: What are you trying to account for here?

Then what are you trying to explain? The mistaken belief that we taste tea? Or that people make reports about the taste of tea (even though there’s no...

Why not just work backwards from the fact that there is some way the first sip of tea tasted, as described or reported by a subject? It’s as though no...

I wonder if there is really any difference. Being a relation still involves a combination of, or an interaction between, a subject and an object(s). O...

An excellent post, which I'm sure I'll still need to read a few more times. On first impressions: If this characterisation is incorrect, does it imply...

With regard to the intuition pump of inverted spectra: Assuming it is possible for two people to have different experiences of “subjective colour”, wo...

How could you know whether anyone else has been “so effected”? One thing I had trouble with in the article was the inverted spectrum intuition pumps f...

I think the former is typically epistemic: one knows (or doesn't know) what it is like, whereas the latter is (having) the experience. I would say tha...

I should probably also add this: Why do we need to get at truth here? How things seem to me is just that, irrespective of what any supposed truth of t...

I tend to agree with @"Kenosha Kid"'s exegesis generally. This is how I read the article (in part): (1) Ineffable Dennett does not specify which quali...

It’s the opening paragraph of the article - Dennett’s words, not mine. But go off.

How does the first-order property (the creamy cauliflower taste) differ from the sense datum (taste)? You previously stated that the denial of qualia ...

What are the first order properties?

Where does he say that they are additional properties? In addition to what? And yet, you stated earlier: Your position is that you don't need to deny ...

What distinction are you drawing between sense data properties and qualia? You say that there are "additional properties associated with qualia", so w...