Luke

"Unfortunate" is one way of putting it. Contrary to your view is another, since "illusion" indicates that time doesn't actually pass or flow: Can you ...

How do you know? News article on block universe

Except that time doesn't pass in a block universe, yet time appears to pass.

Maybe the same brain state can correspond to more than one thought.

Great, then I only need you to concede on the two remaining properties. The title suggests that the purpose of the article is to "deny resolutely the ...

You weren't aware of the experience? I never claimed anything of the sort. It's implied by your own example. You get touched on your shoulder (externa...

Don't overlook the end of §308: Yes, it would. But I don't think it's very clear from the paper (and, perhaps more so, from his defenders here) what D...

Go ahead and explain your reading of it, then. Meanwhile: Yet these inner mental processes are just what Wittgenstein claims do not give our words the...

Something exists only if it can make a difference to a conversation? Or what do you mean by "make a difference"? Wittgenstein seems to acknowledge a d...

Do you agree with Dennett or not? Isn't this to be expected if qualia are ineffable? - Qualists claim that qualia are ineffable and your complaint is ...

But I thought you were advocating what Dennett says in the article. Doesn’t he deny that qualia are ineffable? Do you believe that we have inner priva...

I'm surprised by this response. Do you also agree that we have inner private experiences? "There is a way of talking about qualia that is...all quite ...

You agree that qualia are ineffable?

Given the discussion's recent linguistic turn (assuming the discussion is still about qualia), I thought I'd try and revive my earlier point: If we ta...

I'm still unclear on the distinction. You said that the phrase "practical contact" might be used for both humans and robots, so why couldn't the term ...

I'm still not clear on the distinction between the different senses of "physical contact" and "practical contact" or how the robot example helps to di...

I was probably unclear. You said that an experience "describes your practical contact with things in the environment". Could you clarify whether "prac...

What are you on about? If you disagree with the Wikipedia definition of "mind" that I quoted, feel free to spell out where you disagree. If you don't ...

Doesn't empirical verification require direct observation? Otherwise, it's indirect observation and inference. I had assumed that when you said "The p...

I was responding to your statement that “The physical...is that which is empirically verifiable in principle by definition.” I’m asking how do you ver...

What about the distinction between mind/matter or mental/physical? Is there such a distinction, or do minds/mental states not exist?

Perhaps, but that doesn't explain (away) the duality of the experience.

1. Isn't the "practical" (physical?) contact between you and your environment a "concrete thing"? 2. Isn't there more to an "experience" than this phy...

The feeling. "I'm in pain" is not a causal explanation (a causal explanation for what, the pain?). Saying that you feel a stabbing pain in the thigh i...

It depends what you mean by "happening". Qualia proponents might insist that however it seems or feels is no more than how it seems or feels, regardle...

The way the world seems is not a theory, is it? To try and put it another way, the biological machinery produces some end-product of consciousness, an...

Do I need your permission?

I never said that my "position" was obvious. I said that qualia are obvious. The definition of obvious is "apparent", "perceptible", "self-evident". Q...

On your reading, he's using the impossibility as a fact. Okay. How can it be otherwise? Lions can't talk. I don't think it's clear, but I'm not sold o...

If you don't know how (an instance of seeing) the colour red looks to you or how (an instance of having) pain feels to you, then there's little to dis...

I'm not sure what you mean by an impossibility. Is it impossible that lions can talk? Yes, but Wittgenstein is getting us to imagine that a lion could...

I think you need to provide more support for this reading. Why couldn't it be another example of "the convincing expression of a conviction"? Or somet...

Are you saying that it is a person's (ethical?) choice not to understand a lion? Or are you saying that it is impossible to understand a lion (as "a f...

Learning any concept consists in no more than being able to use the word suitably. However, it does not follow that pain consists in no more than bein...

You said earlier that taste was a concept: Now you're saying instead that (a bitter) taste is "associating the concept with it". What is "it"?

I'm sure you're right; taste is only a concept and has nothing to do with eating or drinking. According to what you've said, whether something is 'bit...

Being "party to" is one thing. You've suggested that a taste experience is "a unique set of memories, emotions, desires, sematic associations etc" tha...

What is the difference between practical privacy and philosophical privacy? I await your distinction between practical privacy and philosophical priva...

How colours appear to each of us, for starters, e.g. what a colour in the chart above "looks like" to you.

But you claimed that you do know. You've claimed, and are continuing to claim - without any argument - that red objects must appear the same to everyo...

“Since we both learned color words by being shown public colored objects, our verbal behavior will match even if we experience entirely different subj...

You’re not certain? You said that “we do sometimes know what others are experiencing when seeing a red cup”. How do you know that what I experience (c...

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You might know how red objects appear to you (or what red objects “look like” to you), but how do you know how red objects appear to other people? How...

I find the argument that we should eliminate synonyms to be an unusual one. The term qualia seems to be useful in philosophy of mind discussions to pi...

Qualia emphasises the subjective, phenomenal, felt aspects of experience.

What you meant by “extra layer” was “potentially confusing synonym”?

Why does it need to be an “extra layer” though?

Pretty much. This seems to be what divides existing things into the physical and mental categories. That's a good question. I'm not sure if it's a sat...