The picture maintains what I consider to be the false assumption of indirect realism: that we require a second-order cognition/awareness/perception in...
Again: I take it that the position of indirect realism is that perception never provides us with direct knowledge of distal objects. And the position ...
Which scientific understanding of the world and perception are you referring to? I might agree that perception does not always provide us with direct ...
Yes, but not all experiences of distal objects are hallucinations. Perhaps I should have said "you could not have a non-hallucinatory experience of a ...
I also believe that distal objects are constituents of experience in the sense that you could not have an experience of a distal object without them. ...
Is the dispute between naive realists and indirect realists also "an irrelevant argument about grammar"? Non-naive realists and indirect realists have...
How is the dispute between indirect realists and naive realists any different? As you describe it: Naive realists and non-naive realists both claim th...
Therefore, Big Ben is not a constituent of a photograph of Big Ben? Surely Big Ben is a component of the photograph. It's the subject of the photograp...
I would say that illusions and hallucinations are phenomenal experiences, instead of saying that they are the consequences of phenomenal experiences. ...
This is the distinction between non-naive realism and indirect realism. Indirect realists holds that we perceive perceptions or mental representations...
You said: You said that indirect realists believe it is false. Since you are an indirect realist, then you believe it is false. So, what meaning do yo...
What do you mean by "our perceptions are of distal objects" when you say it is false? How does that follow? It is not a dispute over different meaning...
I've already answered this: Do you deny that indirect realists believe that our perceptions are only of mental representations or sense data? Or do yo...
Sorry, you've lost me. You were arguing that indirect realism was the same as non-naive direct realism. You seem to have abandoned that to ask me what...
Okay, but you asked me: If the indirect realist agrees that some distal object has interacted with one's sense to cause the experience, then I'm not s...
Are we no longer discussing whether indirect realism and non-naive realism are the same view? What it means to say that an experience is of some dista...
Do you have an argument to support this assertion? Non-naive realists believe that our perceptions can be of distal objects, whereas indirect realists...
In my earlier post, I stated: According to the non-naive direct realist's meaning of "direct", we cannot directly perceive distal objects as they are ...
Unless indirect realists also hold the belief that we can directly perceive distal objects without needing to perceive an intermediary, then I don't b...
The naive realist defines direct perception in terms of perceiving the world as it is in itself (the WAIIII), and they say we do perceive the WAIIII. ...
According to grammatical convention, we would normally say that we see a screen, not a "visual sensation". The "visual sensation" is the "seeing". The...
And yet you argue that we can never know if the smell of smoke indicates that there is smoke (or that one perceives smoke), due to the possibility of ...
The argument that there is no "correct" orientation or "correct' way of perceiving the world seems to me help make the case for direct realism rather ...
Because my comment, to which you replied, was made in the context of the GPT response posted by @"hypericin", which specifically referred to "mental r...
And yet: Are you saying that even telepathy would be indirect, despite it having "no interloping/interceding/mediating stage or medium"? Without any "...
That's not how I would read the response. The response states that: "Some mental representations might be unconscious or lack a subjective quality, an...
Why "certainly not"? It's what I have been calling perceptual experiences, aka qualia. Did you note that the GPT definition differs from yours? The GP...
Fair enough. I concede this point. However, I still have doubts about your version of indirect realism, in which awareness of external objects is medi...
I asked ChatGPT whether the argument is valid: User Is this argument valid: P1. If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation; and P2. If ...
You are taking this out of context. The context of our exchanges followed from what you said earlier in the discussion, namely: You referred to "a rep...
But “a perceptual experience is a representation” does mean that “a perceptual experience” equals “a representation”. Therefore, if a representation i...
The logical move that lets me snip out “a representation” is substitution. A perceptual experience is a representation and a representation is of real...
It seems to follow that it is. If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation and if the representation is of real objects, then the “direc...
I should have said this earlier: I don’t see what makes you an indirect realist, because I don’t understand what is your perceptual intermediary. Awar...
I find it hard to accept that we can never know that there is smoke in your room. If the smell isn't enough, you could move closer to the source of th...
You continue to equivocate on the meaning of “perceptual experience”. In what sense is vision mediated? It is only mediated in the production of the p...
The issue is not whether our “perceptual system” is direct, as you seem to assume. The issue is whether our perceptual experiences are direct. Percept...
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