By NOW, do you mean something like 'ever' or 'while I exist?' So do you mean to ask me, 'do you ever have those sorts of experiences?' or 'Do you have...
But I do find that – at different times of course. I mean that in the perfectly ordinary sense. Forget about the A and B theories – we're not assuming...
OK, I've been pulling your leg a little bit. I actually am familiar with all of these theories, and have been playing dumb because I don't want to get...
Great! So let's talk about P3 independent of metaphysical theories of time. Let's suppose (as is true) that I have no stake in the game of which theor...
Don't you think that any theory that forces us to say that sensical things don't make sense should prima facie be disregarded, unless there is good re...
I think there is some misunderstanding here. The issue is not over which metaphysical theory of time anyone does or doesn't understand – it's about th...
Alright – I still don't really get it. I don't know what the difference between a past time 'existing' versus not. It seems to me to be a confusion ab...
This is not what I was asking. I was asking what this word, NOW, you've made up, means. This does not help. You need to use it in sentences. The terms...
I don't know what this means. How many senses of existing are there? I know I exist. I know that sitting here etc. is all I experience right now. But ...
There is no 'ontological' sense of 'now,' if by 'now' you mean the English word. If you do not mean this word, then why not make up a new one so as to...
No, since you'll exist tomorrow and existed yesterday and had experiences then as well. I'm being polite. What you quoted is more lucid than what you ...
If I can intuit from my introspective experience "The only thing I experience during the time in which I exist is sitting at my computer, etc.," and t...
If you clarify what you mean, then the sentence may lose its intuitive plausibility: that is the gamble one takes when moving from an intuitively plau...
It is relevant because you are appealing to intuition for the truth of an English sentence and presenting your argument in English. P3 and whatever va...
I think the reason we are talking past each other is because I am taking the sentences you say at face value as English sentences, and interpreting th...
Something like, 'in general, the only thing I experience is sitting at my computer' or 'the only thing I ever experience is sitting at my computer.' I...
The simple present in English typically has a habitual reading. This is a fact about English, and has nothing to do with any metaphysical position. Fo...
I'm asking about your position. Do you not see why it is a contradiction to claim that you have only one sort of experience, and that you tend to have...
This is not possible since you only exist for an instant. You cannot both have only one sort of experience, and tend to have different sorts of experi...
OK. 1) and 2) seem to contradict each other. Surely you are not committing to a contradiction. So why do you believe they don't contradict? If you are...
I'm sorry, but I literally do not understand your position. Can you please just give me a straightforward answer, as to whether you accept both 1) and...
Do you assent to the following two sentences: 1) I only experience sitting in front of my computer 2) I tend to have other sorts of experiences ? I as...
So what are you saying? You're not saying that the only sort of thing you experience is being on a computer. You're not saying that all you're experie...
I did not insist on anything. You used the present tense yourself in making the claims. I was pointing that out to you. I have adopted no theoretical ...
Not at all. I believe it's false because they don't seem to be true, independent of theoretical position. If someone asked me what sorts of things I e...
It doesn't matter what you 'mean.' What I am saying is that the sentence you uttered, a sentence of English, cannot mean what you are saying it does. ...
To be on the nose about it, this: Is obviously a description of what your experiences were at the time of typing, not what they are in general or at d...
So I'm trying to understand how to interpret your claim. If I say this: My first inclination is that this is simply false. I experience all sorts of t...
But this is just false, right? Read that back to yourself and ask whether it's true. The only thing you experience is being at your computer? No: you ...
That depends on the semantics of your language. You can of course construct a language in which 'A implies A' is contingent or even a contradiction. S...
I don't think this is an assumption – it's a plain fact. That is written in the present progressive, and means that you are not experiencing any other...
Tautology is a semantic notion – the semantics are presumably set up in a way where their interpretation of the syntactic form is always going to yiel...
I'm not sure that's right, but in any case it doesn't matter – as long as there's a notion of having an experience at a time, the same holds, since th...
Not that you are experiencing all of them, but that you have or will experience(d) (or are experiencing) all of them. But it does, via the present ten...
Hi, I'm not going to read the thread, but – P3 seems easily deniable by the worm-theorist, who can claim that we experience all times in which we exis...
Williamson and Soames are unusually parochial, but yeah, their point can't be denied. The formalization of arguments is less interested than the forma...
The formalization, more than just explicitness, gives a sense that there are actual stakes to what's being done – because if you need your models to p...
Lewis himself was a modal realist, which is a bizarre metaphysics, but his formal treatment of counterfactuals probably could be adapted into any meta...
Counterfactuals aren't a problem for any theory of truth so far as I can tell. Modal truths are in a sense 'about' non-actual world states, but they a...
The classical view is that you can order possible world-states along some contextually determined relation of metaphysical similarity, and that any co...
If you're interested in classic semantic accounts of counterfactuals using possible worlds, Stalnaker's 1968 Theory of Conditionals and Lewis' 1973 Co...
The idea that things cause each other is grounded in everyday experience. The idea that they do infallibly according to necessary principles isn't. An...
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