Hi! What would you say truth is? Doesn't it presuppose truth to say what truth is? If this is so, is it bad?
I'll only comment on your last two questions. If what you seek to achieve is an explanation, or philosophical elucidation, of the concept of truth, then circularity isn't necessarily bad. You can start with the concept of truth as you understand it, and then proceed to analyse it by means of the examination of a variety of practical contexts where the concept is normally used. Circularity only is bad in deductive proofs, or demonstrations. In that case it is a fallacy. You can't assume what you intend to prove as a premise of your demonstration. In informal contexts of discussion, this is also called begging the question.
But where explanations are concerned, Wittgenstein has suggested that circularity only is bad when the circle is too small, and hence uninformative. So, the trouble with some circular explanations isn't the circularity itself but the excessive simplicity: such simplistic, quasi-tautological, explanations aren't sensitive enough to all the relevant aspects of the use of the concept one wishes to elucidate. The solution to this problem is to widen the circle of inter-related concepts one appeals to. Peter Strawson called this (wide) circular method of philosophical analysis "connective analysis" (which could be contrasted with reductive analysis). In epistemology, Clark Glymour has devised a convincing explanation of the somewhat circular nature of empirical evidence for scientific theories. It's called the bootstrapping theory of confirmation. It's a good way to account for the essential theory-ladenness of empirical concepts: your evidence always is couched in terms that presuppose some aspects of the theory you are attempting to confirm by means of scientific experiment or data gathering.
A Christian PhilosophyApril 08, 2017 at 16:38#649590 likes
Reply to mew Hello.
Aristotle tried this definition (I am paraphrasing): If one says it is that which objectively is, and isn't that which objectively isn't, then he speaks the truth; but if one says it is that which objectively isn't and isn't that which objectively is, then he does not speak the truth. In other words, if judgement reflects reality then truth, if not, then untruth. But this explanation seems circular to me, because to say "that which objectively is" is the same as saying "that which truly is".
Pascal says that some concepts are so fundamental that attempting to define them results more in confusion than clarity. I think truth is such a concept, as shown above. Maybe the best is to acknowledge that we all have the implicit knowledge of what truth is, even if we don't have the explicit definition. As such, we can still apply the concept correctly.
"Hi! What would you say truth is? Doesn't it presuppose truth to say what truth is? If this is so, is it bad?"
— mew
The closest thing we have to truth as human beings is something we call facts and/or data (ie. information about a physical thing) but such information is obviously transient and dependent on time, place, etc. in order for it to be useful. Also 'facts' in our mind seem to be not as transient as those applied to real world things (1+1 always equals 2, but the sky isn't always blue), but these things are either only true because we say they are true and or merely labels for real world things (ie. Main Street could be called Broad Street if we desire it and instead of 1+1= 2 we could have I + I = II).
This is not that hard to visualize until you have to deal with axioms; social/culture/ideological 'truth' most people have been ingrained with since they became aware of their surroundings. Such beliefs include human life is 'good', killing is 'evil' (unless it is done to defend oneself or country), famine/ war/ disease/etc is bad; I think you get the point.
In order to overcome your own indoctrinated axioms you have to realize there is an aspect of morality that is highly subjective, most ethical/moral beliefs are merely opinions/beliefs and not 'truths', and every action done by any human being requires a judgement call that is subject to own biases and prone to errors of one sort or another. While most people understand this to some degree, they don't like to admit how fallible our beliefs, knowledge, judgement, etc are and when we do screw up, we merely pass it off as IT IS THE BEST WE COULD DO WITH WHAT WE KNEW AT THE TIME, instead of realizing part of the problem is that we were too arrogant when taking certain actions.
I know this sounds like one has to be to politically correct or fret over one's actions too much, but that isn't a given. If fretting too much and being to PC IS counter productive then my arguments should be interpreted as to why someone SHOULDN'T care about fretting or trying to be PC if for them it creates more problems than it solves.
I guess my overall message is that the world, our choices of actions (as well as the lack of resources/time to always choose wisely), and other issues makes things more complicated than we often like to acknowledge them to be; and too often holding on to the idea we know some non-transient 'truth' just makes thing more FUBAR than they need to be.
So the answer to you OP is yes, presupposing something is 'truth' without doing the due diligence to prove something is actually truth (ie. which it is pretty much a given that it is impossible to due at this time) is "bad" because it can hinder one's judgement.
Pilate then went back inside the palace, summoned Jesus and asked him, "Are you the king of the Jews?"
"Is that your own idea," Jesus asked, "or did others talk to you about me?"
"Am I a Jew?" Pilate replied. "Your own people and chief priests handed you over to me. What is it you have done?"
Jesus said, "My kingdom is not of this world. If it were, my servants would fight to prevent my arrest by the Jewish leaders. But now my kingdom is from another place."
"You are a king, then!" said Pilate.
Jesus answered, "You say that I am a king. In fact, the reason I was born and came into the world is to testify to the truth. Everyone on the side of truth listens to me." "What is truth?" retorted Pilate. With this he went out again to the Jews gathered there and said, "I find no basis for a charge against him.
[/quote]
Pilot doesn't get an answer to his question. It seems like Jesus is dodging the question, "just who the hell are you and what did you do?"
The 'truth' to which Jesus is testifying about has been presumably been revealed to the reader of the Gospel, in the life and teachings of Jesus, and this Jesus can't, won't, or isn't able to summarize in a "25-words-or-less-definition".
"Truth in labeling" is straightforward. If the package says "1 dozen large brown eggs" then there should be 12, large, brown, eggs in the package. A lot of labels are very difficult to define clearly. "Climate warming is True" or "Climate warming is False" are not simple claims. I believe the claim that "climate warming is True" because it seems to align consistently enough with statements I find factual. For instance, "January in Minnesota is 60% warmer now than it was 50 years ago" is a fact, according to the historical record. In the historical past, Minnesota was damned cold in January, so 60% warmer doesn't mean that that one can pick roses in January.
Those who disbelieve the claim of climate warming can site similar facts, like "July in Minnesota is not hotter than the historical average." If January is 60% hotter, then July should be 60% hotter too, right? Apparently not -- more facts about climate warming or climate stability have to be brought in.
So, some facts seem to support the truth, and some facts don't. One has to decide which facts have the most weight, or are most numerous and consistent, and which facts aren't. As Pierre-Normand says,
In modern philosophy, truth is defined by formal logic on propositions (statements). There are three main basic kinds of it, which I hear attempt to express in way compatible with the thinking of the formal logicians Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, Kripke, Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson.
Tautological truths within formal systems, such as mathematical equations. These are established by syntactic consistency with core axioms. The core axioms themselves describe the formal systems, and so truths at this level are necessarily true, in accordance with first-order formal logic. These systems can be extended to create propositional logic, which defines rules of deduction and inference without introducing meaningfulness and causality.
Empirical truths, which are determined via ratification by observation of material states and events, as long as the propositions describing material states and events are logically coherent. If the observation verifies the proposition, then the RESULT of the observation is factually true, but the proposition itself without empirical ratification remains a proposition that is neither true nor false, and is simply a statement. The specific and exact nature of truth itself depends not on facts, but on the epistemological factors relating the proposition to the material world in different metaphysical systems, most predominantly in the theories that define the relation of subject and predicate to objects, states, and events in the physical world. These theories add semantics (the meanings of words) to the syntactic relationships described in first-order logic.
Causal truths, which again first must be consistent within first-order formal logic, and secondly must not contain any causal fallacies as defined in second-order formal logic. These are the most complicated forms of truth, and the basis of science. They are the most complicated because causal relationships cannot ever be proven necessarily true. They can only be proven not to be false. That distinction remains one of the least understood aspects of truth in the current world, because causality is so often claimed yet logical errors in statements of causal truth are so frequent. The metaphysical factors of causality are better understood if they are known to exist, but only a small number of people even know that there are metaphysical factors involved. Those who do know the metaphysical factors understand that the relation of the subject and predicate's in the cause, to the subject and predicate of the result, is an abstraction that can be very complex.
While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This 'axiom of probabilistic certainty' is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory.
Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are 'self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect proposition, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above.
"That is a very common error in the post information age, so you cant be criticized for believing it. Data are neither true nor false; they are simply data. And mathematics is not 'facts determined from real world things."
— ernestm
I disagree with your analysis and I will explain why...
"Tautological truths within formal systems, such as mathematical equations. These are established by syntactic consistency with core axioms. The core axioms themselves describe the formal systems, and so truths at this level are necessarily true, in accordance with first-order formal logic. These systems can be extended to create propositional logic, which defines rules of deduction and inference without introducing meaningfulness and causality."
— ernestm
Tautological truth are merely what I explained as mental constructs/models of the world around us and they are true only because we and/or our models say they are true. It has been well know since Ancient times that in our mind we can construct 'perfect models' (ie abstract models) of something in our own mind, yet these abstract models never translate into a real world thing. What your describing may be more accurate according to some philosophical text book, but my description is meant so that it can be understood by anyone while yet not being inaccurate. What we are talking about here is close enough to the same thing that I don't really feel the need to waste time splitting hairs about, even if our wording of things could be construed as that we each are talking about something else.
"{2} Empirical truths, which are determined via ratification by observation of material states and events, as long as the propositions describing material states and events are logically coherent. If the observation verifies the proposition, then the RESULT of the observation is factually true, but the proposition itself without empirical ratification remains a proposition that is neither true nor false, and is simply a statement. The specific and exact nature of truth itself depends not on facts, but on the epistemological factors relating the proposition to the material world in different metaphysical systems, most predominantly in the theories that define the relation of subject and predicate to objects, states, and events in the physical world. These theories add semantics (the meanings of words) to the syntactic relationships described in first-order logic."
— ernestm
These "Empirical truths" you talk about are merely best guess and opinions as opposed to actual truths. I'm not sure how much you read about the Enlightenment period of philosophy, as this passage seems to be one of the propositions made at the beginning of it which got torn apart as soon as some of the skeptics like Hume stepped in. I also hope you realize there is a difference between 'sort of the truth', 'sometimes the truth', what we guess is the truth', and actual 100% objective TRUTH which is the truth under any condition. The 'truths' devised from Empirical study/observation are merely thing derived from statistical analysis and/or human observation and are better describe as best guesses in order to not confuse them with actual objective truths.
Put it to you this way even nature laws, such as the Laws of Thermodynamics (which are about as close to something we know being true 100.000% of the time) are considered to be contingent on certain rules in our universe staying the same; however it is not a given that these rules have always been the same nor that they will ever change in the future. In other words every nature law, or any variation of "Empirical truths" is contingent on the things making them possible to never change, however it isn't a given that the thing that allow them to be will be as they are today.
While your argument may be more valid in a certain academic context, outside of that context it falls apart if one factors in the actual complexity of world
"{3} Causal truths, which again first must be consistent within first-order formal logic, and secondly must not contain any causal fallacies as defined in second-order formal logic. These are the most complicated forms of truth, and the basis of science. They are the most complicated because causal relationships cannot ever be proven necessarily true. They can only be proven not to be false. That distinction remains one of the least understood aspects of truth in the current world, because causality is so often claimed yet logical errors in statements of causal truth are so frequent. The metaphysical factors of causality are better understood if they are known to exist, but only a small number of people even know that there are metaphysical factors involved. Those who do know the metaphysical factors understand that the relation of the subject and predicate's in the cause, to the subject and predicate of the result, is an abstraction that can be very complex."
— ernestm
These "contingent truths" are even weaker than "Empirical truths" since the only thing different between is that causal truths almost wholly rely on human observation where as empirical truths have things like statistical analysis/studies, etc. in order to prove there validity. Needless to say because they are the same thing but weaker it is a given that they have the same problems (if not even more) as empirical truths.
"While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This 'axiom of probabilistic certainty' is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory."
— ernestm
In other words it our BEST GUESS that the sun will rise each morning that we are alive as long a wondering black hole, sun going supernova, or other similar event prematurely interrupts the stability of the star our planet orbits; but it isn't a given that nothing will interfere with a star during it's normal life cycle nor is it a given nothing will happen to our star in our lifetime. While we often like to talk about truths in an academic setting or working with something that is nothing more than a mental model; with dealing with real world issue
"Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are 'self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect proposition, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above."
— ernestm
Isn't it a given if these other 'truths' are always contingent on in order for them to be 'true' that something doesn't undermine them, that they are only 'sort of the truth' or 'truth unless some contingency/Act of God/etc changes it' truth, that they are a bit less than the 100% of the time objective kind of truth when we think of something being the TRUTH?
Of course, I might be just splitting hairs here if you already assume that these academic, contingent,
and/or empirical truths are obviously fallible under nearly an endless variety conditions and you are only using the word 'truth' as a means to describe a problem in a more.. palatable means; or perhaps the people that wrote the works you are referring from used such nomenclature and your just repeating it.
Reply to dclements It would be helpful to me if you could state what school teaches the views you state. Mine are from Oxford University, and thus follow the standard formal progression of thought in modern logic, from Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, through Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, and Kripke to Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson, I take it you are already familiar with those, as you speak with such authority. And obviously, the framework I propose has to be rather basic, in order to support all their varying opinions without inconsistency, but I believe it does so adequately, albeit without the exactitude I would really prefer, but more details would extend its length beyond that which people actually read these days, so really I cannot avoid the laxity. If you can please provide the authorities behind your own thought, I would be able to respond appropriately.
It's not the sort of thing that can be said - although it can be shown.
Reply to Samuel Lacrampe is on the right track; although placing the word objectively in the Aristotle quote is erroneous and misleading; but then including the word objectively in almost any philosophical discussion is erroneous and misleading...
It is tempting to treat the T-sentence as a definition of truth, like so:
T is true if and only if T
But this only shows that "...is true" is redundant. An example by way of explanation:
"It is snowing at Charlotte Pass" (that sentence) is true if and only if it is snowing at Charlotte Pass
That is, the sentence '"It is snowing at Charlotte Pass" is true' is truth functionally identical to the sentence 'it is snowing at Charlotte Pass'; "...is true" is redundant.
SO suppose we are presented with a definition of truth. There would indeed be a circularity in asking if that theory is true. But it is not a vicious circularity. All that is required is that the theory be true in its own terms.
I was always struck by the existential weight of that question within it's historical context, especially because he then says he sees no basis for a charge against Jesus.
Hi! What would you say truth is? Doesn't it presuppose truth to say what truth is? If this is so, is it bad?
No, it's not bad. I've always liked the simplicity of the argument you bring up: asking whether truth exists or not doesn't beg the question, but rather answers itself in an utterly pure manner. Indeed, it's circular in the best possible way. This is because truth is one of the very building blocks of consciousness. We live in an age where this is beginning to get fleshed out. Keep asking those deceptively simple questions.
"It would be helpful to me if you could state what school teaches the views you state. Mine are from Oxford University, and thus follow the standard formal progression of thought in modern logic, from Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, through Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, and Kripke to Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson, I take it you are already familiar with those, as you speak with such authority.
And obviously, the framework I propose has to be rather basic, in order to support all their varying opinions without inconsistency, but I believe it does so adequately, albeit without the exactitude I would really prefer, but more details would extend its length beyond that which people actually read these days, so really I cannot avoid the laxity. If you can please provide the authorities behind your own thought, I would be able to respond appropriately."
— ernestm
Thank you for noticing the authority (perhaps even arrogance?) I try to speak with. It doesn't come studying but from the time I have devoted to the subject and effort I make in trying to get others to want to knock me off my soapbox; as well as the hope that I can find someone that can do this.
To be honest, I was just guessing that your arguments/parts of your posts came from a formal education and not just something you where pulling out of your..hat (or just cutting and pasting) like some people arguing philosophy do. The only formal education I have in philosophy is about three courses at a community college (Intro to Philosophy,Intro to Religions,and intro to ethics) but I have over a decade of studying and debating philosophy which in some ways can trump an actual education in the subject. However there have been countless debates and several books I have read that have influenced my opinions; and yes I am aware that my arguments are only my opinions. Also I have read the following books which have helped influence some of my thinking:
Philosophy For Beginners
Eastern Philosophy For Beginners
Postmodernism For Beginners
Kierkegaard For Beginners
(I even have a pdf copy of Kierkegaard For Beginners which I can give you a copy of, and point out the parts where he talks about morality being subjective; or at least the author of the book commenting on the subject.)
I will have to admit that since I have ADHD, I have trouble reading some of the more wordy text books and have to rely on sources, such as the 'for beginners' books, that cut to the chase. While you may look down on me now for admitting I don't have a real education on philosophy, the irony is that I have something better than an education which is ten years of having to deal with the subject without being hindered by a formal education in the subject where I have been forced to think for myself and come up with my own stuff without support from the philosophers that came before me. I don't know if you are aware of the quote from the teacher who commented on the full verses empty glass, but I think it sort of applies here.
If time is short and/or you are unable to access the books I noted you can even look up the following links which more or less same similar things as passages to the books I noted:
Is–ought problem
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem
"The is–ought problem, as articulated by Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume (1711–76), states that many writers make claims about what ought to be on the basis of statements about what is. Hume found that there seems to be a significant difference between positive statements (about what is) and prescriptive or normative statements (about what ought to be), and that it is not obvious how one can coherently move from descriptive statements to prescriptive ones. The is–ought problem is also known as Hume's law, or Hume's guillotine."
— Wiki
Turtles all the way down
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down
Münchhausen trilemma
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%BCnchhausen_trilemma
"In epistemology, the Münchhausen trilemma is a thought experiment used to demonstrate the impossibility of proving any truth, even in the fields of logic and mathematics. If it is asked how any knowledge is known to be true, proof may be provided. Yet that same question can be asked of the proof, and any subsequent proof. The Münchhausen trilemma is that there are only three options when providing proof in this situation:
The circular argument, in which theory and proof support each other
The regressive argument, in which each proof requires a further proof, ad infinitum
The axiomatic argument, which rests on accepted precepts
The trilemma, then, is the decision among the three equally unsatisfying options."
— Wiki
There are a couple more sources but I think this should do for now. I will have to admit the whole fact/data vs opinion/judgement call is just something I created to simplify the problem (as it can be worded in may other ways) so trying to find an EXACT source for it would be kind of futile except other than perhaps finding my previous posts.
Reply to Banno Absolutely I am sure. In modern philosophy, truth is very clearly defined in formal terms. As I stated, I attempted to define it in a way compatible with the theories of Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, through Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, and Kripke to Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson.
Reply to dclements Well, without any education in formal logic, you clearly have ability in the subject, I hope you find time in your life to further your studies, and I look forward to seeing your posts.
Reply to Banno That is a good observation to an extent. However it is not entirely circular, as to provide answers to material propositions, it also requires an epistemological basis on semantics, which actually is far more complicated than the simplicities of propositional calculus by itself.
"Well, without any education in formal logic, you clearly have ability in the subject, I hope you find time in your life to further your studies, and I look forward to seeing your posts."
— ernestm
So because your degree is bigger (or something else for that matter) than mine, you think you automatically know more than me?
I have taken courses and studied enough in digital logic/philosophical logic to not have to bother taking them over again. However the 'truth' when used by the nomenclature of such things is not the same thing as 'truth' when used in ethics/religions/morality. If you don't know that and/or the basics of identifying fallacies or differences between facts and opinions then you really don't know anything about philosophy itself and instead you are merely to regurgitating some of what you heard in your classes while not even bothering to think for yourself.
"Absolutely I am sure. In modern philosophy, truth is very clearly defined in formal terms. As I stated, I attempted to define it in a way compatible with the theories of Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, through Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, and Kripke to Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson."
—ernestm
One's ideas/beliefs may be considered the 'truth' or more accurately 'true' in the context of their own work, but when critiqued by others it usually loses such meaning and especially so when critiqued by those who have different opinions. In Post Modern philosophy the search or hope for 'Truth' has all but been completely abandoned in the face of diametrically opposing viewpoints and the understanding/ acknowledgement of how complex the world really is.
"We do what we do because that is the way that we do it", and that is both the way it is and the way it is going to be for the foreseeable future. But seriously your type of arguments/viewpoints where abandoned back in the age of enlightenment when most philosophers had to grow up and realize 'perfection" and "truth" were merely an illusion and they had to adjust their perspective to account for such things.
Pierre-NormandApril 10, 2017 at 17:57#652010 likes
So because your degree is bigger (or something else for that matter) than mine, you think you automatically know more than me?
No. However, I do believe people who have devoted their lives to furthering this subject, and who have studied the prior thought for centuries, and who discuss their resulting thoughts with each other in formal ways, have together built a far better explanation than any one person can ever obtain via intuition.
Truth is that thought which accords to reality whether we recognise it or not. Subjective opinion is only truth insofar as it is truly our opinion...sometimes it also accords with reality, that we call knowledge. Sometimes people claim knowledge , when in fact, it is merely their false opinion.
"I think Ernestm was merely paying you a compliment."
— Pierre-Normand
Actually you are right, I misread the post and didn't see the part that he actually complimented me. :D
Sorry about that, my ADHD sometimes hinders me from seeing part of a post when another part kind of set me off but at least I'm not to arrogant to admit that it happens.
"No. However, I do believe people who have devoted their lives to furthering this subject, and who have studied the prior thought for centuries, and who discuss their resulting thoughts with each other in formal ways, have together built a far better explanation than any one person can ever obtain via intuition."
—ernestm
You are committing an argumentum ad populum fallacy, argument from authority fallacy, and likely a few others as well. Just because someone wrote down something in a book somewhere and other people sometimes agreed with them doesn't necessarily make such ideas better than those you can come up with from the top of your head. And besides there are just as many existentialist/ deconstructionist/ nihilistic philosophers that have dedicated their lives to writing books and making similar arguments to mine. Because of that it really isn't accurate to say I'm just pulling it all out of my hat even if I more often than not came to my conclusions before reading their work.
Also subjectivity isn't really about undermining math, scientific ideas, concepts (ie. pure science supposedly assumes hypothetically ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE even if from a technical standpoint we don't always have to be aware of that issue) it is about dealing with hard core ideological dogma that tries to paint the world in 'Good'/'Evil', Black/white, True/False as well as other binary/false dilemmas that are too common is Western ideology. If you don't understand WHY people need and use subjectivity as a tool, perhaps it is just something you are not ready for.
"Truth" can remain 'ok' when used to reference mental constructs, but human beings are too fallible for us to know whether these mental constructs really are one for one in regard to the real life counter parts. However once one gets over oneself and the fallibility of the human race as a whole is isn't that big of a deal, unless one encounters someone who is unaware of human fallibility.
"Truth is that thought which accords to reality whether we recognise it or not. Subjective opinion is only truth insofar as it is truly our opinion...sometimes it also accords with reality, that we call knowledge. Sometimes people claim knowledge , when in fact, it is merely their false opinion."
—Chester
Or in other words human beings are to fallible for us to safely assume that any axioms or 'truths' through either mental construct and/or opinion really applies in the real world. And to quote Socrates again "I'm the wisest man in Greece, since I know that I know nothing". Actually I don't think it is noted that Socrates said that but since we only know him from what Plato wrote of him, it is plausible that he actually said something like that either at during his trail or perhaps some other time.
What I have done is extend my above definition very slightly, in response to comments received here and elsewhere, and shared it on the thread "true and truth"
However once one gets over oneself and the fallibility of the human race as a whole is isn't that big of a deal, unless one encounters someone who is unaware of human fallibility.
Whoever would be unaware of human fallibility? That would never happen, would it? The streets must be teeming with people who reflect on their fallibility and the unreliability of their grasp of truth. Just read the news.
Reply to ernestm Interesting dissertation on the types of truth, but ultimately non-responsive to the OP. The question was what is truth, not what are the types of truth. Should I ask what pasta is, I wouldn't be requesting an itemization of the types with an explanation of the distinctions between penne and linguine, but I'd like to hear about flour and water.
Reply to Banno well across these thinkers, a better distinction is tautological, EMPRICAL, and causal. And yes, they all do not believe propositional logic by itself can cross a semantic turnstile, so causal truth requires epistemological additions beyond those in syntactic languages.
The OP asked for a definition of truth. You provided three ways in which one might justify claiming that a statement was true. I'm pointing out that this doesn't answer the question.
Reply to Banno It is the formal definition of philosophical truth in modern metaphysics. There is no 'justification' involved.
That is to say, if you ask a professor with a PhD in modern philosophy, who has read several thousand books with different opinions on the subject, that is as good an approximation to a short answer they the professor would state that I can currently write.
Reply to Banno There's not, but were you able to decipher the meaning of truth by the presentation of the sub categories of truth? I wasn't. At best, I was provided an encyclopedic statement of truth subtypes where I could then begin drawing my own conclusions as to what they had in common that made them all truth.
At any rate, your interpretation of his post as ostensive is generous. I took his post as a statement that there were 3 seperate truths, without a necessary overlap that distinguished them all as truth. That interpretation wasn't suggested in his post anywhere.
Reply to Banno Nothing is wrong with an ostensive definition. If you are not interested in modern philosophical theory, talk about whatever you like. But I did revise the definition in response to constructive comments, and as people frequently use wor4s like 'right and wrong' interchangeably with 'true and false,' and the issue of truth and 'wrongness' in is in the last paragraph.
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In modern philosophy, truth is defined by formal logic on propositions (statements). There are three basic kinds of truth evaluation, which I here attempt to express in way compatible with the thinking of the modern philosophers Russell, Whitehead, Moore, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, Kripke, Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson. According to all these various thinkers, truth is the result of evaluating a proposition, but the relation between truth and the proposition itself can be different depending on epistemological considerations.
Tautological truths within formal systems, such as mathematical equations. These are established by syntactic consistency with core axioms. The core axioms themselves describe the formal systems, and so truths at this level are necessarily true, in accordance with syntactic rules which are themselves defined in formally as logical propositions. These propositional systems can also define rules of deduction and inference without introducing meaningfulness and causality.
Empirical truths, which are determined via ratification by observation of material objects, states and events, as long as the propositions describing material states and events are logically coherent. If the observation verifies the proposition, then the RESULT of the observation is factually true, but the proposition itself without empirical ratification remains a proposition that is neither true nor false, and is simply an assertion. The specific and exact nature of truth itself depends not on facts or data, but on the epistemological factors relating the proposition to the material world in different metaphysical systems, most predominantly in the theories that define the relation of subject and predicate to objects, states, and events in the physical world. These theories add semantics (the meanings of words) to the syntactic relationships described in first-order logic. 'Internal' states, resulting from consciousness, are also evaluated empirically. The nature of consciousness itself is part of the epistemology.
Causal truths, which again first must be generally consistent within the rules of propositional calculus, and additionally, they must not contain any syntactic fallacies of deduction or inference. These are the most complicated forms of truth, and the basis of science. They are the most complicated because causal relationships cannot ever be proven necessarily true. They can only be proven not to be false. That distinction remains one of the least understood aspects of truth in the current world, because causality is so often claimed, yet errors in statements of causal truth are so frequent. The metaphysical factors of causality are more frequently better understood if they are known to exist, but only a small number of people even know that there are metaphysical factors involved. Those who do know the metaphysical factors understand that the relation of the subject and predicate's in the cause, to the subject and predicate of the result, is an abstraction that can be very complex.
While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This 'axiom of probabilistic certainty' is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory. The extrapolation of this axiom is the creation of the scientific method, which is designed to define the minimum number of observations necessary to corroborate a theory. As per the rules for causal truth, theories can only be corroborated and not be proven true; but modern science theory might still call a theory true based on the axiom of probabilistic certainty.
Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are 'self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect proposition, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above.
Truth in theology, morality, ethics, law, and metaphysics
Much confusion about truth has arisen in these fields, but by the above schema, the nature of truth itself is relatively simple. Theological systems make assertions about that which cannot ultimately be proven; morality strives to define that which is good or bad for an individual; ethics defines that which is good or bad for a society; law strives to define that which is right or wrong; and metaphysics strives to define that which is real. In all these cases the absolute truth of the assertions they make is undefinable. However within each of these disciplines, it is possible to evaluate the propositional consistency of statements within formal systems that they define; and from that, to evaluate the truth of their propositions empirically, within the formal systems themselves. so again, when different propositions within, or across, these disciplines contradict each other, it is not possible to evaluate which are true or false in absolute terms. It is only possible to demonstrate whether the claims by each system are coherent.
Reply to Banno I said there are three BASIC forms of truth evaluation across the thinkers Russell, Whitehead, Moore, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, Kripke, Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson.
My apologies for appearing to be ridiculing you. I'm of the opinion that truth is redundant; not an uncommon view. So my reaction to your presentation of a definition is that it's not a definition of truth, but of justification.
Tautologies do not need justification. Empirical statements are justified by observation.
Reply to Banno Well, there are other perspectives on truth by other people. But they would not agree that their definition, is 'redundant,' because, for example, it is the basis of the philosophy of science, and the merit of a metaphysical system, in the modern view, is that it is no longer a case of how 'true' it might be, but rather how useful it is in improving understanding of the world. As science has greatly improved understanding of the material world, and somewhat helped in other aspects of reality, they believe their system of truth evaluation is of great merit. That's basically what they would say of it.
I don't see that redundancy undermines science. Indeed, it says nothing about science. 'F=ma' and 'It is true that: F=ma' say exactly the same thing.
What I am having a go at is the notion that the truth of a tautology might be a different truth to that of an empirical statement. If it was your intention to show that they are different, then I think you have not succeed.
Reply to Banno Well it seems then, what I refer to as 'tautological truth,' as different from other forms of truth, is something with which we are in a agreement, but you simply think that it is 'wrong' to call 'tautological truth' a form of truth at all?
Tautologies are not true in a way that is different to other sorts of statements. That is, the "It is true that:" in "It is true that:A implies A" and in "It is true that: this sentence is in English" and in "It is true that: F=ma" mean exactly the same thing.
Reply to Banno the thinking is, if you state that a is logically equivalent to b, then the statement is considered true. However, the 'truth' which one considers is a semantic evaluation, not a property of the syntactic system itself, and so 'truth' is not redundant, but somehow associated with the statement. Different epistemologists consider the relation in different ways, and the exact statement of each of their beliefs here could only be superficial. But in summary, there are 'naturalists; who hold that truth is an instrinsic property of the abstractions that create it. There are association theories, which hold that truth is one of the properties of a proposition. Kuhn believes that we attach truth by an act of wilful 'dubbing.' And there is Davidson, whose description is far too complex for me to even begin trying to state it in one phrase.
Now you may believe such distinctions rather arbitrary, so I will make one statement about why different views exist. It depends whether you think truth of a proposition exists before a person evaluates its truth value. That immediately starts to get into issues of monism versus dualism, or even in Wittgenstein's theory of logical positivism, whether language is the only thing that is actually real. So that is a deeper explanation of why the specific nature of truth is dependent on metaphysics, and it remains a hotly debated issue in modern philosophy.
Reply to mew It would be interesting to hear from Mew again.
My answer to the OP is that Mew, as a competent speaker of English, already knows what truth is, and that this would be demonstrated by their use of the word. Further, any proposed definition of truth would face the circularity Mew describes, but that circularity is not vicious if the definition of truth can be consistently ascribed to itself.
Reply to Banno I'm very sorry, but the rate at which you are posting broke the page in my browser. I edited the statement in my last post to answer you properly.
Reply to Banno Now I am remembering, it was a very long time ago, and I did hear the question asked why a truth value should be related to a syntactic proposition at all, and so why there should be any debate on the epistemology at all. The answer is that the purpose of modern logic is to make statements meaningful.
If you remove truth values from propositional logic, then you can create a simpler reductionist system in which statements about the truth of propositions are meaningless. But then the explanation of meaningfulness is also incomplete, and so such methods are of less merit.
if you state that a is logically equivalent to b, then the statement is considered true. However, the 'truth' which one considers is a semantic evaluation, not a property of the syntactic system itself, and so 'truth' is not redundant, but somehow associated with the statement.
Hmm. That 'A implies A' is true just on the syntax, surely?
Reply to Banno Well that is the naturalistic view, which is that truth exists inherently as an intrinsic part of the proposition. if you believe that, then a proposition has a truth value regardless whether anyone thinks of it, and you end up having to postulate the existence of 'a priori' truth in the Kantian sense, and some people object to that.
Reply to Banno I don't understand the relevance of that. Davidson does say that truth is undefined, but only because he is an anomalous absolute monist, and therefore, in his view, it is not possible to know, absolutely, whether truth exists a priori or not. But then he goes on to say some very complicated things about meaning as the consequence of which, truth can be known, but from an absolute perspectiive, only in an indefinite manner.
Reply to Banno the thinking is, if you state that a is logically equivalent to b, then the statement is considered true. However, the 'truth' which one considers is a semantic evaluation, not a property of the syntactic system itself, and so 'truth' is not redundant, but somehow associated with the statement.
Reply to Banno Those assertions are not an example of logical equivalence, as per my first and second basic definitions. That is an example of two empirical statements, because they require testing against the material world in order to determine their truth. An example of logical equivalence would be "10 in base two is equivalent to 2 in base 10.".
Reply to Banno Also I should explain about knowledge of truth in an indefinite manner, as per Davidson. Davidson's view on the statement 'I know the sun will rise tomorrow" is that it is true. However, you can only know that you knew it after the sun rises the following day. That is, Davidson believes you can know the truth, but not necessarily know that you know it, if empirical verification is not immediately available.
I'm sorry, you are right, I was trying to say something too quickly. But I am having a problem that this forum does not support logical symbols, and frankly, I am not really sure what your real problem is, and so I am not sure that I can provide an answer. What I tried to do was explain the definition of truth in modern logic. It appears to me you have some motivation not to accept the reasoning, and ultimately, you will not be satisfied with any explanation I try to provide.
Reply to Banno What I suggest is that you look at the description of logical equivalence on the Wikipedia, and what you will find is that I restated the last sentence of the first paragraph in response to your question.
The closest thing we have to truth as human beings is something we call facts and/or data (ie. information about a physical thing) but such information is obviously transient and dependent on time, place, etc. in order for it to be useful.
This supposed problem is trivially resolved.
The transience of a statement can be resolved with a few indexicals - "it is raining" becomes "it is raining here, now".
Usually context makes such indexicals redundant. Certainly there are useful statements of fact without dependence on time, place, etc.
The Great WhateverApril 11, 2017 at 04:12#653110 likes
That is, are you claiming that one needs a semantic interpretation in order to identify basic tautologies?
Tautology is a semantic notion – the semantics are presumably set up in a way where their interpretation of the syntactic form is always going to yield true. But it makes no sense to say something is tautologous from syntax alone. Syntactically, the sentence is just a structure of symbols, and so doesn't mean anything, let alone something always true.
Reply to Banno I think you are confused about my shorthand use of 'truth' for 'truth evaluation.' It is fairly common shorthand, and I did consider writing it out more fully, but it makes it more difficult to read, and people who are not trying to say it is wrong have no problem with it, so I am not changing it. However, you may find it useful to consider how propositions EVALUATE to truth, and that there is no other way to state a truth than with a proposition.
If you want to understand the different approaches to truth evaluation, and why I state them separately, then you will also find that the need for semantics in the first kind of truth is summarized here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth#Formal_theories
for the first category, the formal description on the Wikipedia starts here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-order_logic
For the second kind, which as I say is based on the first kind, but which introduces the need for empirical verification, starts here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_descriptions
And for the third kind, which adds the idea of causality, the formal description starts here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality#Causal_calculus
For the basis of defining promises: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/promises/#ScaExpThe
And for the acceptance of scientific theories as truths: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_science
This is not that hard to visualize until you have to deal with axioms; social/culture/ideological 'truth' most people have been ingrained with since they became aware of their surroundings. Such beliefs include human life is 'good', killing is 'evil' (unless it is done to defend oneself or country), famine/ war/ disease/etc is bad; I think you get the point.
Not sure about this. For example, it's clear that disease is bad; that's not something that is only accepted as a result of cultural indoctrination.... rather, it's the result of getting sick and finding it unpleasant.
Reply to Banno And of course, for not being able to define truth in morality, there is
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._E._Moore#Good_as_indefinable
and for the formal statement of ethical truth within an ethical system:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_ethics
The Great WhateverApril 11, 2017 at 04:27#653190 likes
Reply to Banno That depends on the semantics of your language. You can of course construct a language in which 'A implies A' is contingent or even a contradiction. So the syntax alone is uninteresting except w.r.t. a semantic framework.
Reply to Banno And thank you for the conversation. I can't find anything further from what you say that requires any alteration of my summation, so it appears we would be at cross purposes to continue the dialog, and I hope you find out whatever it is you are trying to learn.
That doesn't answer the OP though anymore than did Ernest when he itemized the different types of truth. As Ernest begged the question of "what is truth" by simply telling us different sorts of truths, you beg the question by simply telling us that "truth" adds nothing to the meaning of a proposition. You are not arguing obviously that "truth" adds nothing because it has no meaning, but that it is redundant to what already has been said. So, accepting fully that "it is true that the snow is white" is equivalent to "the snow is white," what does "true" mean?
And don't avoid the question by saying that "it is true" means "the snow is white," because I'm not speaking in the particular, but in the general as to how "true" is to be defined.
And this is significant it seems because it you can't offer the same meaning for "true" in the examples of:
1. It is true it is snowing,
2. It is true the sun will rise tomorrow, and
3. It is true 2+2=4
then we might have 3 entirely different truths. To define truth as "that which is" (or similar) moves this discussion farther into the metaphysical and asks whether that state of being of 2+2=4 is at all similar to the state of being of it snowing. I don't think it is.
"Whoever would be unaware of human fallibility?"
—Wayfarer
I don't know for sure, but I guess perhaps the people who claim to God, his will, what 'good'/'evil' is, as well as claim to know the answers to many other non-trivial problems could be some of the people that are not that aware of human fallibility. Of course this is just a guess.
mew:Doesn't it presuppose truth to say what truth is?
Yes.
mew:If this is so, is it bad?
It might seem bad for someone who wants to support some ontological view by leveraging a definition of truth, but on closer examination, those people aren't really hurting anything, so no, it isn't bad.
"Not sure about this. For example, it's clear that disease is bad; that's not something that is only accepted as a result of cultural indoctrination.... rather, it's the result of getting sick and finding it unpleasant."
—Banno
I'll try and explain it this way, the difference between what we think of as 'good'/'bad and what is objectively good or bad when dealing localized conditions and one single action often could be merely moot issue. However when dealing with a variety of actions and their complex consequences that pertain to the entire welfare of a group of people or the human race as a whole then you get into something that could be a non-trivial problem and where our idea of 'good'/'bad and what is objectively good or bad could be very different.
For example in the following YouTube video the author of it claims that the Black Death actually HELPED human civilization due to the overpopulation of Europe a the time.
What if the Black Death Never Happened?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1aULu6BqNs
Of course anyone having their love one wouldn't agree that having their love one's and around 30%-50% of the population die from the disease wouldn't tend to agree that it is a GOOD thing.
That which we think of being good for ourselves and the human race as a whole is usually considered 'good' (since it is somewhat difficult to imagine anything else being good other than something helping other non-sentient life or perhaps sentient life if we could find it) but that which may be good or bad for us in the short term may translate into something else in the unforeseeable future.
With trivial moral issues it is 'ok' to accept either Kant's moral imperative and/or one's own judgement being 'close enough' to 'objective morality' to not really sweat the details. However with much larger issues they could be a part of the whole bigger non-trivial issue I mentioned earlier, which turns what we think of as 'good'/'bad' into merely either what we think is useful for ourselves or perhaps merely a best guess as to what might be either good or evil. Theoretically if one is omniscient they might be able to resolve enough of the non-trivial issue to be more objective than we are, however as human beings it would be too difficult to know it that is even possible.
Also while a bit unorthodox there could be reasons why one's own concepts of 'good'/'bad' could be radically different than 'normal morality'. Examples of this are if someone is merely a 'brain in a vat' (ie none of their actions due anything since the world isn't real, nor are their consequences real), or they could be a real secret squirrel and believing harming people is 'good' and helping people is 'bad' (sort of like the Joker when he tries to attack Batman and innocent bystanders as well).
While this usually isn't an issue (I hope), it should give enough pause for someone to wonder whether they and others are more alike the red and white blood cells helping the body as a whole or if they are more like a virus, disease, and/or parasite by undermining the greater good. While the people that were killed by the black death where not parasites, the society and technology of the time couldn't maintain the population grow and their demise could have helped the 'greater good', even if saying that it is 'good' that millions of people dying a horrible painful death during the medieval period isn't a pleasant thing to say.
Reply to dclements Thanks for giving my potshot such a thoughtful reply.
If I understand you, you are pointing out that ethical value depends on context. Your example is that while a disease in one of my immediate family would be seen as bad, the same disease might be seen as having overall good results from a broader perspective.
Am I correct in thinking that you add to this a claim that the broader perspective is to be preferred?
And am I also correct in reading you as thinking that this places a limitation on our ability to know what is god and what is bad, a sort of moral scepticism?
Reply to Hanover Exactly right, Hanover. Any statement setting out a definition of truth will be flawed. But what can not be said can be shown.
We might have three distinct types of truth, as you say; but that would be different from having three distinct types of justification. My point to @ernestm, exactly.
And don't avoid the question by saying that "it is true" means "the snow is white," because I'm not speaking in the particular, but in the general as to how "true" is to be defined.
And this is significant it seems because it you can't offer the same meaning for "true" in the examples of:
1. It is true it is snowing,
2. It is true the sun will rise tomorrow, and
3. It is true 2+2=4
Isn't this like asking what "set" means in the general, not in the particular, and being unable to offer the same meaning for "set" in the examples of:
1. Andy Murray won every set
2. He set the table
3. The set of all odd numbers has the same cardinality as the set of all even numbers
4. The Sun set at 8:00pm.
My own take on the issue is that it is more fruitful to ask what function the phrase "it is true" performs. And the function it seems to perform in a lot of cases is one of affirmation. So to say that it is true that the snow is white is to affirm that the snow is white, hence why the phrase "it is true" is redundant in these cases.
The deflationary theory has gone by many different names, including at least the following: the redundancy theory, the disappearance theory, the no-truth theory, the disquotational theory, and the minimalist theory.
And it's not skepticism, as the redundancy theorist can happily accept that it is true that it is raining – which is just a redundant way of saying that they accept that it is raining.
Reply to Michael "The word true in these sentences may have the practical function of signaling to one's audience that one is agreeing with something that has already been said or conceding a point in advance that one expects to come up. However, it does not play any logical role, has no descriptive content of its own, and so does not contribute to the content of what is said.
"This view, referred to by Alfred Tarski as "the nihilistic approach to the theory of truth" is also known as redundancy theory of truth.""
That's from the truth skepticism chapter of Soames' Understanding Truth (not as easy to quote as the SEP).
Redundancy is truth skepticism. It's truth nihilism. It's behaviorism driven. It's bullshit.
It may be that it's been called deflationary. I said deflation, but not skepticism.
Then I don't know what you mean by "truth skepticism". To me, it would mean to question the claim that it is true that it is raining, which according to the redundancy theory of truth would mean to question the claim that it is raining. But the redundancy theorist isn't committed to this.
It seems to me that by "truth skepticism" you actually mean "non-redundant-truth skepticism" (or "non-redundant-truth nihilism"). In which case yes, I'd agree; the redundancy theory of truth questions (or rejects) non-redundant truth.
Neither of those describes truth nihilism. Look at the section I quoted from Soames' book above. That's one form of truth nihilism.
So to be a truth nihilist just is to believe that "truth [plays no] logical role, has no descriptive content of its own, and so does not contribute to the content of what is said"?
The Deflationary Theory of Truth - The deflationary theory has gone by many different names, including at least the following: the redundancy theory, the disappearance theory, the no-truth theory, the disquotational theory, and the minimalist theory. And it's not skepticism, as the redundancy theorist can happily accept that it is true that it is raining – which is just a redundant way of saying that they accept that it is raining.
Oh heck. I need to add Ayer and Quine to my formal statement of truth. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THE REFERNECE; Dammit )
Yes, I think you more or less have the idea I'm working from. My moral beliefs partly comes from the Jain's doctrine of Anekantavada / 'no-one sidedness' no matter how crazy another persons moral beliefs may seem and the problems that come from Kant's 'moral imperatives' which can horribly contradict when analyzing the consequences of ones actions. As far as I can tell CONSQUENCES are the only metric that can be used to determine whether an action is good or bad, however we as human beings are WOEFULLY INADEQUATE at determining the consequences of our actions in anything but the most trivial of conditions.
Also it is my personal belief that it would HELP if everyone realized that every action (other than some of the most trivial) requires a MORAL JUDGEMENT CALL where IT ISN'T a GIVEN that we can KNOW WHAT IS THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION TO TAKE. I know this sounds like some basic stuff on a certain level but it can get a lot more complicated than it sounds. I mean how may times is someone sure of what is the 'good' or 'right' thing to do, such as persecute people thought to be witches, and then later they find out that they were TOTALLY wrong.
Also I don't expect everyone to become a skeptic or nihilist (more or less like I am), but it might help if more people gave a little bit more pause to some of their actions (and/or were a little more swifter in others if the potential consequences require it) and perhaps used a little more critical thinking when making a judgement call before carrying out certain actions.
Than again my it is all just me as I feel like I'm in a world of crazy people that can't see the various problems that need to be fixed and other issues that could or should be ignored for the time being.
As a person partial to nihilism I think I wring my hands too often for my own good, and I should just not give a rat's backside to many issues if I can't do anything about it. However the difference between what I can and can not change is enough for me to fret over things some times as I do.
Here is the revised text. Thank you for indicating the format definition of truth nihilism.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Meaningfulness of Truth in the Post-Truth Era
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There’s been much discussion about ‘fake news’ recently, resulting rise to a new interest in the definition of truth. This topic explains why the controversy is likely to last a long time, via examination of the formal definition of the meaningfulness of 'post truth,' within the context of ideas of truth in modern philosophy.
The Postulation of 'Post Truth' as Truth
One advanced thinker on the semantics of truth is Donald Davidson, who is an absolute anomalous monist (there are only ideas, or mind, or matter, or language, but it cannot be known which). Therefore, he states truth is ultimately undefinable, yet through our ability to reason meaningfully, truth can be known, even if people do not know that they know the truth. For example, people can know that the sun will rise tomorrow; but they do not know that they knew that until after the sun has risen.
Rhetorical misconceptions have arisen from this, whereby people state what they wish to be true as being true, then strive to find facts to prove that truth afterwards, giving rise to the ‘post-truth era.’ One famous example is President Trump’s recent assertion that President Obama was ‘wiretapping’ his phone. President Trump held that he was telling the truth because he believed it certain that evidence will be found, regardless that he had no evidence at the time.
That then is the complete explanation of how ‘post truth’ has become meaningful. However much one might attempt to dismiss such efforts as obviously absurd, it is not so easy, because of the complexities of formal definitions of what truth actually is.
The Formal Definition of Truth
In modern philosophy, truth is defined by formal logic upon propositions (statements). There are three basic kinds of truth evaluation, which I here attempt to express in way compatible with the thinking of the modern philosophers Russell, Whitehead, Moore, Wittgenstein, Tarski, Carnap, Ayer, Strawson, Quine, Putnam, Searle, Mendelson, Kripke, Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson.
Tautological truths within formal systems, such as mathematical equations. These are established by syntactic consistency with core axioms. The core axioms themselves describe the formal systems, and so truths at this level are necessarily true, in accordance with syntactic rules which are themselves defined in formally as logical propositions. These propositional systems can also define rules of deduction and inference without introducing meaningfulness and causality. While the truth evaluation itself requires some semantic definition of ‘truth,’ in order for the proposition to be assessed, the process of evaluating the proposition’s truth value always requires syntactic analysis alone.
Empirical truths, which are determined via ratification by observation of material objects, states and events, as long as the propositions describing material states and events are logically coherent. If the observation verifies the proposition, then the RESULT of the observation is factually true, but the proposition itself without empirical ratification remains a proposition that is neither true nor false, and is simply an assertion. The specific and exact nature of truth itself depends not only on facts or data, but also on the epistemological factors relating the proposition to the material world in different metaphysical systems, most predominantly in the theories that define the relation of subject and predicate to objects, states, and events in the physical world. These theories add semantics (the meanings of words) to the syntactic relationships described in first-order logic. 'Internal' states, resulting from consciousness, are also evaluated empirically. The nature of consciousness itself is part of the epistemology.
Causal truths, which again first must be generally consistent within the rules of propositional calculus, and additionally, they must not contain any syntactic fallacies of deduction or inference. These are the most complicated forms of truth, and the basis of science. They are the most complicated because they involve both syntax, semantics, and additional rules. In particular, causal relationships cannot ever be proven necessarily true. They can only be proven not to be false. That is important because, in proposition logic, Aristotle’s law of excluded middle holds that any statement is either true or false; but in real-world language, there need be no excluded middle, hence, proving that a statement is not false does not imply that it is necessarily true. Metaphysical factors also influence the relation of the subject and predicate's in the cause, to the subject and predicate of the result.
Compound, Contractual, and Scientific Truth
While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This axiom of probabilistic certainty is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory. The extrapolation of this axiom is the creation of the scientific method, which is designed to define the minimum number of observations necessary to corroborate a theory. As per the rules for causal truth, theories can only be corroborated and not be proven true; but modern science theory might still call a theory true based on the axiom of probabilistic certainty.
Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect proposition, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above.
Truth in Theology, Morality, Ethics, Law, and Metaphysics
Much confusion about truth has arisen in these fields, but by the above schema, the nature of truth itself is relatively simple. Briefly:
Theology makes assertions about that which cannot ultimately be proven.
Morality strives to define that which is good or bad for an individual.
Ethics defines that which is good or bad for a society
Law strives to define that which is right or wrong
Metaphysics strives to define that which is real.
In all these cases the absolute truth of the assertions they make is undefinable. However within each of these disciplines, it is possible to evaluate the propositional consistency of statements within formal systems that they define; and from that, to evaluate the truth of their propositions empirically, within the formal systems themselves. so again, when different propositions across, these disciplines contradict each other, it is not possible to evaluate which are true or false in absolute terms. It is only possible to demonstrate whether the claims by each system are coherent, and therefore can be evaluated as truthful within the context of their own systems.
The Semantics of Truth
According to all modern logicians, truth is the result of evaluating a proposition, but the relation between truth and the proposition itself can be different depending on epistemological considerations. While one might initially believe the nature of truth to be intuitively obvious, the semantics of truth are complex. This starts with the issue as to whether one believes that tautological propositions are true before any person evaluates them; in which case, the truths must exist independently in some abstract space independent of material reality. That introduces the metaphysical considerations.
Classical realists hold that Platonic ‘ideas’ do exist independent of perception, and truth is simply known by correlation. Modern realists state only external material reality exists, and abstractions are simply known by common sense (as a result, many modern philosophers refer to classical realism as idealism). Dualists hold that there separate domains of physical materiality and conceptual ideas, both of which exist, and some hold tautologies are a priori true (are still truth regardless whether they are considered). Monists hold the known reality is only physical, or only exists in the mind, or something else (such as Wittgenstein's idea of logical positivism, which holds that language is the only thing which can be absolutely known). Such different perspectives change what is actually known when a truth is ‘discovered.’ For example, deflationary theorists extrapolate from theories of logical positivism to hold that truth by correlation is all that exists, leading skeptics to the popular modern idea oftruth nihilism.
Regardless how and whether propositional truth does exist independently of physical reality, a priori or not, empirical and causal truths may be properties attached to the proposition which are not ‘discovered,’ but rather ‘assessed.’ These latter cases introduce the meaningfulness of incorrect assessments, and how exactly something can be meaningful if its truth is beyond simple binary evaluation, such as for example, propositions which refer to non-existent objects or which contain metaphors. Thus the semantics of truth are not so simple, and become involved with metaphysical decisions defining the nature of reality, meaningfulness, and the definition of knowledge itself.
There are also three separate positions on causality. Some hold that there is no causality without intent, and that it is otherwise simply a logical inference or deduction. The second main position is that intent does not really exist either, but is only an apparent phenomena created by the physical workings of the world. The third main group say one or both of those ideas are reductionist, and so do not give any meaning to the word 'because.' The different positions on intent may also influence truth evaluation of empirical observations on internal states, such as feelings.
Assessing Post Truth
From the above summary, it is clear that a great deal of dispute is possible on the nature of truth, which is greatly to the advantage of rhetoricians wishing to persuade others that their opinions are true. Also, however, it is clear that such opinions are, in all cases of post-truth statement, merely opinions, even if one accepts the meaningfulness of post-truth statements. However, that is far beyond that which most people who ‘just want to know the truth’ are ready to learn. So as things are, we are likely to be stuck in the post-truth era for a very long time.
Isn't this like asking what "set" means in the general, not in the particular, and being unable to offer the same meaning for "set" in the examples of:
1. Andy Murray won every set
2. He set the table
3. The set of all odd numbers has the same cardinality as the set of all even numbers
4. The Sun set at 8:00pm.
Your example offers 4 entirely different uses of the term "set," where there's clearly a similarity in the way I used "truth." In each instance, I used "truth" to reference the accuracy of the statement, although the accuracy of each statement was measured differently in each statement, or, as Banno pointed out, it was the justification that varied.
Your example offers 4 entirely different uses of the term "set," where there's clearly a similarity in the way I used "truth." In each instance, I used "truth" to reference the accuracy of the statement, although the accuracy of each statement was measured differently in each statement, or, as Banno pointed out, it was the justification that varied.
But you're asking about how the redundancy theorist would define "truth". That you use "truth" to refer to accuracy is not that they would. The problem is that you were suggesting that the redundancy theory is wrong if it can't give a single, general definition of "truth". I was simply pointing out that there might not be a single, general definition of "truth", just as there isn't a single, general definition of "set".
Yes. Think about moral nihilsm. No change in language use is required.
The moral nihilist claims that nothing is moral. But the redundancy theorist doesn't claim that nothing is true. So if you're using moral nihilism as a comparison to truth nihilism then the redundancy theorist isn't a truth nihilist.
You can still affirm the claim "this man is unmarried and a bachelor" even though the "and a bachelor" part is redundant. And the redundancy theorist can still affirm the claim "it is true that it is raining" even though the "it is true that" part is redundant. Whereas the moral nihilist wouldn't affirm the claim "murder is immoral".
And the same principle with skepticism. There's a difference between being skeptical that the claim "it is raining" is true and claiming that the "it is true that" part of the claim "it is true that it is raining" is redundant.
Well, I am adding one sentence to my above summary:
Most people are totally disinterested in understanding alternate views, but instead only wish to prove their own views right, which is actually impossible.
Which is not my own statement either, it is Schopenhauer's. And that, I believe, completes the discussion to cover all cases. Thank you for your input.
Here is the revised text, with new introduction and conclusion.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Meaningfulness of Truth in the Post-Truth Era
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
There’s been much discussion about ‘fake news’ recently, leading to renewed arguments on the nature of truth, In fact. most people are totally disinterested in understanding the nature of truth, but instead only wish to prove their own views right, which is actually impossible. This topic explains why, via examination of the formal definition of the meaningfulness of 'post truth,' within the context of ideas of truth in modern philosophy.
The Postulation of 'Post Truth' as Truth
One advanced thinker on the semantics of truth is Donald Davidson, who is an absolute anomalous monist (there are only ideas, or mind, or matter, or language, but it cannot be known which). Therefore, he states truth is ultimately undefinable, yet through our ability to reason meaningfully, truth can be known, even if people do not know that they know the truth. For example, people can know that the sun will rise tomorrow; but they do not know that they knew that until after the sun has risen.
Rhetorical misconceptions have arisen from this, whereby people state what they wish to be true as being true, then strive to find facts to prove that truth afterwards, giving rise to the ‘post-truth era.’ One famous example is President Trump’s recent assertion that President Obama was ‘wiretapping’ his phone. President Trump held that he was telling the truth because he believed it certain that evidence will be found, regardless that he had no evidence at the time.
That then is the complete explanation of how ‘post truth’ has become meaningful. However much one might attempt to dismiss such efforts as obviously absurd, it is not so easy, because of the complexities of formal definitions of what truth actually is.
THE FORMAL DEFINITION OF TRUTH
In modern philosophy, truth is discovered by evaluating propositions (the formal representation of equivalent statements). Before considering semantics in more detail, a description follows which is commensurate with the thinking of the modern philosophers Russell, Whitehead, Moore, Wittgenstein, Ramsay, Tarski, Carnap, Ayer, Strawson, Quine, Putnam, Searle, Mendelson, Kripke, Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson.
- Basic Forms of Truth
Across modern thinkers overall, there are three basic kinds of truth, depending on the proposition's type:
Tautological truths within formal systems, such as mathematical equations. These are established by syntactic consistency with core axioms. The core axioms themselves describe the formal systems, and so truths of this kind are necessarily true, in accordance with syntactic rules which are themselves formally defined as logical propositions. These propositional systems can also define rules of deduction and inference without introducing meaningfulness and causality. While the truth evaluation of statements itself requires some semantic definition of ‘truth,’ in order for the statement to be assessed, the process of evaluating the proposition’s truth value always requires syntactic analysis alone.
Empirical truths, which are determined via ratification by observation of material objects, states and events, as long as the propositions describing material states and events are logically coherent. If the observation verifies the proposition, then the result of the observation is the proposition's truth value. The specific and exact nature of truth itself depends not only on facts or data, but also on the epistemological factors relating the proposition to the material world in different metaphysical systems, most predominantly in the theories that define the relation of subject and predicate to objects, states, and events in the physical world. These theories add semantics (the meanings of words) to the syntactic relationships. 'Internal' states, resulting from consciousness, are also evaluated empirically. The nature of consciousness itself is part of the epistemology.
Causal truths, which again first must be generally consistent within the rules of propositional calculus, so they must not contain any syntactic fallacies of deduction or inference. These are the most complicated forms of truth, because they involve both syntax, semantics, and additional rules. In particular, causal relationships cannot ever be proven necessarily true. They can only be proven not to be false. That is important because, in propositional logic, Aristotle’s law of excluded middle holds that any proposition is either true or false. But in the statements of real-world language, there need be no excluded middle, hence, proving that a statement of cause is not false does not imply that it is necessarily true. Metaphysical factors also influence the relation of the subject and predicate's in the cause, to the subject and predicate of the result.
- Compound, Scientific, and Contractual Truth
While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This axiom of probabilistic certainty is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory. The extrapolation of this axiom is the creation of the scientific method, which is designed to define the minimum number of observations necessary to corroborate a theory. As per the rules for causal truth, theories can only be corroborated and not be proven true; but modern science theory might still call a theory true based on the axiom of probabilistic certainty.
Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect propositoin, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above.
- Truth in Theology, Morality, Ethics, Law, and Metaphysics
Much confusion about truth has arisen in these fields, but by the above schema, the nature of truth itself is relatively simple. Briefly:
Theology strives to define that which cannot ultimately be proven.
Morality strives to define that which is good or bad for an individual.
Ethics defines that which is good or bad for a society
Law strives to define that which is right or wrong
Metaphysics strives to define that which is real.
In all these fields, the absolute truth of the assertions they make is undefinable. However within each of these fields, it is possible to evaluate the propositional consistency of statements within the formal systems on which they are based; and from that, to evaluate the truth of their statements empirically, within the formal systems themselves. But when different propositions across different disciplines in each of these fields contradict each other, it is not possible to evaluate which are true or false in absolute terms. It is only possible to demonstrate when the claims by each discipline are coherent, and therefore can be evaluated as truthful within context.
THE SEMANTICS OF TRUTH
While truth is the result of evaluating a proposition, the relation between 'truth' and the proposition itself varies depending on epistemological premises. So while one might initially believe the nature of truth to be intuitively obvious, the semantics of truth are complex. This starts with the issue as to whether one believes that tautological propositions are true before any person evaluates them; in which case, the truths must exist independently in some abstract space independent of material reality. That introduces the metaphysical considerations.
Classical realists hold that Platonic ‘ideas’ do exist independent of perception, and truth is discovered by cognitive correlation. Modern realists state only external material reality exists, and abstractions are simply known by common sense (as a result, many modern philosophers refer to classical realism as idealism). Dualists hold that there separate domains of physical materiality and conceptual ideas, both of which exist, and some hold tautologies are a priori true (are still truth regardless whether they are considered). Monists hold the known reality is only physical, or only exists in the mind, or something else (such as Wittgenstein's idea of logical positivism, which holds that language is the only thing which can be absolutely known). Such different perspectives change what is actually known when a truth is ‘discovered.’ For example, deflationary theorists extrapolate from theories of logical positivism to hold that truth by correlation is all that exists, leading skeptics to the popular modern idea of truth nihilism.
Regardless how and whether propositional truth does exist independently of physical reality, a priori or not, empirical and causal truths might be properties attached to the proposition which are not ‘discovered,’ but rather ‘assessed.’ These latter cases introduce the meaningfulness of incorrect assessments, and how exactly something can be meaningful if its truth is beyond simple binary evaluation, such as for example, statements which refer to non-existent objects or which contain metaphors.
There are also three main separate positions on causality. Some hold that there is no causality without intent, and that it is otherwise simply a logical inference or deduction, because there is no intent in material world, but rather it simply happens automatically. The second main position is that intent does not really exist either, but is only an apparent phenomena created by the physical workings of the world. The third main group say one or both of those ideas are reductionist, and so do not give any meaning to the word 'because.' The different positions on intent may also influence truth evaluation of empirical observations on internal states, such as feelings.
[b]TRUTH AS OPINION
AND THE MERITS OF STATEMENTS[/b]
From the above summary, it is clear that a great deal of dispute exists on the nature of truth. That is greatly to the advantage of rhetoricians wishing to persuade others that their opinions are true. In reality, most of those asserting that they 'know 'the truth' are not attempting to state the truth at all. Instead, they are only making assertions about truth to persuade others to their point of view. If pressed, they justify this simply by claiming their belief is true, which, as it is ultimately unprovable, actually does not define knowledge at all, but rather a religious belief (whether they themselves acknowledge the existence of religion or not).
With sufficient qualification as to one's preferred metaphysical and semantic foundation, it is possible to make statements that are true within context of that belief. There always exist alternate possibilities. Indeed, according to truth nihilism, there is actually no such thing as 'truth' at all. So according to formal logic in modern philosophy, assertions of a person that some fact is undeniable truth remains an opinion, in all cases without exception.
When a statement can be found true in more than one metaphysics (and whose interpretation is more unambiguously framed within the presumed premises and resulting rules), then it may be considered to possess greater merit. Hence, in modern metaphysics, the merit of a statement is considered more fruitful to consider than the truth of a proposition.
In every single case of post-truth assertion, it is especially clear that opinions on truth are merely opinions, and no more. However, that is far beyond that which most people who ‘just want to know the truth’ are ready to learn. So as things are, we are likely to be stuck in the post-truth era for a very long time.
When an assertion can be found true in more than one metaphysics, and whose interpretation is more unambiguously framed, then it may be considered to possess greater merit. Hence, in modern metaphysics, the merit of an assertion is considered more fruitful to consider than the truth of a proposition.
That is to say, reductionist theories can produce meaningful results, but they are only meaningful within reductionist disciplines, and thus they are considered less fruitful, which is why modern philosophers continue to seek better paradigms.
While "It is true that it is raining" means no more than "It is raining", falsehood does not work the same way at all.
"It is false that it is raining" means "it is not raining".
Truth may be redundant, but falsehood is not.
That's still the redundancy theory of truth. As the Wikipedia article explains, "The strategy of Ramsey's argument is to demonstrate that certain figures of speech — those in which truth and falsehood seem to figure as real properties of propositions, or as logical values that constitute real objects, however abstract, of discussion and thought — can always be eliminated in favor of paraphrases that do not reify truth and falsehood as nouns, nor even use true and false as adjectives" and offers the example of "it is false that Caesar was murdered" meaning the same thing as "Caesar was not murdered".
The point is that "true" and "false" are superfluous additions to language, not just that part of a sentence can be removed without changing the meaning.
Reply to Michael Yes. It is a small point intended to clarify that redundant does not mean without function as might be inferred from the constant use of 'true' in examples. One might say that 'is false' has a 'not' function which is an important operator and clearly not redundant in the 'eliminable without loss of meaning' sense that applies to 'is true'. It is a point made to the thread rather than a criticism of redundancy theory.
The Great WhateverApril 13, 2017 at 21:10#657880 likes
Reply to Michael I'm not sure they're superfluous, or it depends on what you mean by that. It's more like, certain constructions converge on synonymy. It's the same with 'He is not bald' meaning the same as 'He is non-bald.' 'non-' is an adjectival modifier, while 'not' expresses sentential negation. They don't mean the same thing, but it so happens that in some cases the structures in which they occur make them interchangeable.
Likewise with just saying 'It's raining' and 'it's true that it's raining.'
Here's a plausible account of the semantics of 'true:' it is a predicate of propositions, true of those propositions just in case the proposition is itself true. So for example, modeling a proposition as a function from world-states to values 1 or 0, 1 for truth, 0 for falsehood, 'it is true that p' maps to 1 just in case p maps to 1 (relative to the relevant world-state, usually the actual world). 'It's raining' says that a certain state of affairs holds – a raining event is occurring – while 'It's true that it's raining' says that a certain proposition, expressed by 'that it's raining,' has a certain property. Now it so happens that when you work out both these truth conditions, they end up being the same, like in the 'bald' and 'non-bald' cases. But that doesn't mean 'true' doesn't mean anything, or that it's redundant, in that it has no uses that couldn't be achieved without it.
For example, plausibly this use of 'true' can be used to predicate properties not only of propositions, but derivatively of sentences, statements, or utterances, according as they express a certain proposition, of which the property 'true' holds. And this is something that isn't redundant – for example, if A says, 'I'm a doctor,' and B says, 'that's true,' where that is anaphoric to the proposition expressed by 'I'm a doctor,' this is something that B could not have done by merely repeating the sentence that A said: or if B said, 'I'm a doctor,' he would have said something different. So here, 'true' is used to predicate a property of the proposition expressed by A, which is different from simply saying over again what A said.
And so the predicate increases the expressive power of the language in various ways – or at least, lets us express some things using certain constructions that we couldn't otherwise.
The Great WhateverApril 13, 2017 at 21:31#657910 likes
'Truth' also seems to be a noun predicated of propositions. So we can say that something 'is a truth' just in case it's true. That also seems not to be too mysterious.
What's maybe a little more puzzling is we can use the locution 'the truth,' as in 'tell me the truth' or 'that's the truth.' This seems to function as an ordinary definite description denoting whatever truth is contextually relevant. So for example if we want to know who smashed the vase, and we're interrogating someone who we think knows, we might say 'tell me the truth,' by which we mean, 'tell me that truth which answers the question, "who smashed the vase?"' If there are then two options, p = 'a smashed the vase,' and q = 'b smashed the vase,' this is similar to asking 'tell me who smashed the vase,' or 'if a smashed the vase, tell me p, and if b smashed the vase, tell me q.'
So 'the truth' seems to be an ordinary definite description that holds of individual true propositions. If anyone wants to know what the truth is, you have to ask them, the truth about what?
Then there is the kind-term 'truth,' as in 'I value truth.' This seems akin to 'redness,' which seems to denote the property of being read. Likewise, 'truth' then seems to denote the property of being true. But since we now know that the property of being true is, and when it holds of a proposition, it's not so mysterious what's meant by this, as it's not mysterious to say something like 'I like a little redness in the cheeks.'
So for example if we want to know who smashed the vase, and we're interrogating someone who we think knows, we might say 'tell me the truth,'
The answer is not what the truth is, but what the subject of the question believes the truth to be. As it is a question about belief, the only truth the person can state is about their belief, and not whether they actually smashed the vase. That seems rather obvious to me.
the person could have smashed the vase without knowing so. Or the person could have knocked the vase off a stand without breaking it, then it broke due to a dog or something without them knowing, before they found out it was broken. Then you get into questions if they were ordered to break the vase, whether they really did break it themselves of their own volition or not, which again is contingent on one's belief of causality.
Reply to ernestm Ernest, you're tending to address a wide variety of issues (justification, knowledge, the limits of knowledge, etc.) as if it's all truth. Those things do indeed have something to do with truth. There's nothing in philosophy that isn't related in some way to truth. But it's important to make distinctions. If you want, you could start a thread asking about these distinctions.
Reply to Mongrel Well I understand you saying that, as I am given to understand you believe truth is only justification. But other people believe differently, so I have to present their views too, because neither they nor you can prove each other wrong. So that's the end result, however much it does not coincide with your opinion.
Reply to dclements
Long ago I did some work, following Neils Brunsson, on why organisations are irrational. The idea is that an organisation is set up for a particular task, and hence must act; but an organisation never has all the facts; hence the action often precedes having sufficient facts to make a rational judgement.
It's the existential crisis of having to act. Even not giving a rat's arse is one action chosen amongst many. We are forced to act.
If I understand you aright, your position is that because we do not have all the facts we cannot be confident of making the right choice; we need increasingly broader perspectives from which to judge our choices; but we must acknowledge that we will never have all the facts and hence can never be confident in our choices.
This can lead to a nihilism, a pretence at refusing to make choices. But of course that is itself a choice.
My reply is that all you can do is make the best choice from where you are, and be ready to reconsider. This leads to morality that is both ad hoc and local. Ad hoc because what one considers the best choice will change over time, local because one must be able to assess the results of one's action.
One advanced thinker on the semantics of truth is Donald Davidson, who is an absolute anomalous monist (there are only ideas, or mind, or matter, or language, but it cannot be known which).
That does not appear to meet with my understanding of anomalous monism, nor with for example, IEP.
Reply to Banno Well, to me the discussion on the encyclopedia is limited to considering only mind/body dualism versus monism as being either mind or body, and excludes other possibilities--ignoring that Davidson did discuss other possibilities, and ignoring alternate postulations of the anomalous monist position. So I don't find its rendition a particular improvement.
Besides that, I recognize my description is a simplification, but in the context of presenting the difference between realism, idealism, dualism, and monism in 6 lines, anything I write has to be a simplification, or people who don't know it beforehand won't be able to understand it at all. I've already doubled its length due to various miscomprehensions here, and now the article is too long, so I am thinking of just ditching the additions and going back to how it was in the first place. This is because, what most philosophers seem to like to do is to stop at the first thing they think is wrong and then tell me I am wrong, without actually trying to understand what I am saying. So it doesn't really make sense to change things as they believe I should anyway.
So when you, as a redundacist, say p is true, you're just signaling that you agree with p.
No, when I say that it is true that it is raining I'm just saying that it is raining. The "it is true that" part is superfluous. That's the reductionist account.
You seem to be suggesting that the reductionist argues that "it is true that it is raining" means "I agree that it is raining". That's not correct.
If you say it's raining, one supposes your utterance signifies that you agree to P where P is that it is raining.
What else could your utterance show?
If you just mean that saying "it is raining" indicates that the speaker believes that it is raining, then sure. But if you mean that the expression "it is raining" means "I believe that it is raining", then that's wrong.
"It is raining" indicates speaker believes P
"It is true that it is raining" says no more than "P"
"It is true that P" indicates the speaker believes P
What part do you disagree with? This is redundancy dude. What did you think it was?
"It is raining" indicates speaker believes P
"It is true that it is raining" says no more than "P"
"It is true that P" indicates the speaker believes P
What part do you disagree with? This is redundancy dude. What did you think it was?
I don't disagree with any of that. I disagree with your earlier claim that the redundancy theory says that truth is agreement.
That was my shorthand for: redundancy says true signifies agreement. Do you disagree with that?
Yes. The redundancy theorist just says that "it is true that it is raining" means "it is raining". If you then want to say that "it is raining" signifies that the speaker believes that it is raining then that's a separate issue, and presumably also the case for the correspondence theorist.
Again, you seem to be suggesting that the redundancy theorist is saying that "it is true that it is raining" means "I agree that it is raining". That's just not the case.
Compare with "9/11 was orchestrated by the US government" indicating that the speaker is a conspiracy theorist. It doesn't then follow that "9/11 was orchestrated by the US government" means "I am a conspiracy theorist".
Reply to Michael Per Scott Soames, you're wrong, quote already provided. Perhaps two different perspectives both called Redundancy? Eh..maybe. I doubt it.
Per Scott Soames, you're wrong, quote already provided. Perhaps two different perspectives both called Redundancy? Eh..maybe. I doubt it.
The quote only says about agreement that "the word true in these sentences may have the practical function of signaling to one's audience that one is agreeing with something", which can also be said of the correspondence theorist.
There's a difference between the practical function of a phrase and the meaning of that phrase. The phrase "all Mexicans are criminals" has the practical function of signalling to one's audience that one is a racist, but that's not to say that the phrase means "I am a racist".
About the meaning of truth-claims, the redundancy theory only says (to quote Soames), that "[truth] does not play any logical role, has no descriptive content of its own, and so does not contribute to the content of what is said", and so "it is true that it is raining" means the same thing as "it is raining". But as "it is raining" does not mean the same thing as "I agree that it is raining", "it is true that it is raining" does not mean the same thing as "I agree that it is raining".
Correspondence doesn't give a flip about agreement.
That doesn't matter. If the correspondence theorist were to say "it is true that it is raining" then their statement has the practical function of signalling to me that they believe that it is raining, which is why we find Moore's paradox problematic.
Redundancy says truth is about agreement...social signs.
No, it doesn't. The redundancy theory only says "it is true that it is raining" means "it is raining". You just have to look at what redundancy theorists say:
[quote=Frege]It is worthy of notice that the sentence "I smell the scent of violets" has the same content as the sentence "it is true that I smell the scent of violets".[/quote]
[quote=Ramsey]It is evident that 'It is true that Caesar was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and 'It is false that Caesar was murdered' means that Caesar was not murdered.[/quote]
In talking with others, it appears I need to make a real clarification
While it may be your opinion that the assumptions of the formal school of logic are invalid, that's nothing to do with whether my opinion is correct. In fact, nowhere did I even state my opinion. I just observed, from the perspective of formal logic schools, the 'post-truth' method of defining truth as used by Trump is meaningful, but of little merit. That was my observation, for which purpose, I summarized the thought of the school, hoping that it would be understandable. Certainly a summary cannot capture all the finer details of the views, and I welcome any suggestions how to change what it says to make it more understandable and more accurate.
But its not actually anything to do with my opinion. I don't actually believe my opinion is of any real significance. I was just describing what other people think and made a new observation. That's all. The same was truth for what I wrote about natural rights. For this I was called things like 'pompous' and a 'fraud' for which I really do not have anything further to say. Thank you for reading.
"In talking with others, it appears I need to make a real clarification
While it may be your opinion that the assumptions of the formal school of logic are invalid, that's nothing to do with whether my opinion is correct. In fact, nowhere did I even state my opinion. I just observed, from the perspective of formal logic schools, the 'post-truth' method of defining truth as used by Trump is meaningful, but of little merit. That was my observation, for which purpose, I summarized the thought of the school, hoping that it would be understandable. Certainly a summary cannot capture all the finer details of the views, and I welcome any suggestions how to change what it says to make it more understandable and more accurate.
But its not actually anything to do with my opinion. I don't actually believe my opinion is of any real significance. I was just describing what other people think and made a new observation. That's all. The same was truth for what I wrote about natural rights. For this I was called things like 'pompous' and a 'fraud' for which I really do not have anything further to say. Thank you for reading."
--ernestm
I agree with your position, and your claims that human fallibility makes it difficult to know 'truth' when it comes to certain subjects or when we are making certain moral claims (or at least that is how I interpret some of your statements), but I think myself and others have somehow failed in certain other things to really explain the issue properly
In Modern/Post-Modern philosophy there is something called a narrative or context that explains many of the things around us and can be thought of as a mixture of ideology/ culture/ religion/ and other types of system of beliefs. They are built on something that is sometimes called axioms (ie self evident truths), but many of these (or perhaps most of) of these self evident truth are merely fabrications created to maintain the status quo and/or social order of society. To be honest I can not say that there ISN'T an axiom that is actually true, but every one I have encountered to me seems to based on human opinion and/or desire and seems to be a means to justify our own ends; even if they are really not justified.
I guess as a skeptic I'm so opposed to axioms that I'm almost as militant when it comes to arguing against them as the people that are militant in supporting the axioms they choose to believe. I may be a jerk in saying this, but ALMOST all ideology/religions/system of beliefs seem to be a kind of hedonism in one form or another and the 'morality' we create around it is used as a facade to hide the true nature as to why we do things. I'm not saying that there isn't any way for human beings to be 'noble','good', 'empathetic' one way or another, I just think that the people are that way do it because they are that kind of person and not necessarily because of proper moral beliefs.
"We do what we do, because that is the way we do it" and because we don't really know any better.
Focusing on proper 'ought's (which are created due to axioms in the narrative we chose to follow) regardless of their consequences is merely tautology and leads to various fallacies. I wish I could verbalize this better, but I'm unsure how to.
Anyways, as I said I still agree with you but hoped to kind of clarify things a little better.
The redundancy view is simply the observation that "P" and "it is true that:P" have the same truth value. That is, one will be true if, and only if, the other is true.
There are other, non-truth-functional uses for "it is true that:..."; making assertions of belief and so on. These are irrelevant to the redundancy theory of truth.
In so far as it has any place in this observation, the only correspondence here is between "P" (that statement) and P (that fact); the correspondence of use and mention.
The redundancy view is simply the observation that "P" and "it is true that:P" have the same truth value. That is, one will be true if, and only if, the other is true.
There are people who take it further. By redundancy, they mean to say that true only has a social function. As I said, leave that thesis out and you have something very easy to defend because it's trivially true.
For all the pretence of adhering to formal logic hereabouts, there has been little mention of the common definition of truth in formal logic in terms of satisfaction. Tarski deserves better.
By redundancy, they mean to say that true only has a social function.
If you just mean that the word "true" only has a social function, then yes. But if you mean that whether or not something is true, then no. A redundancy theorist is perfectly able to say that whether or not it is raining is independent of what we say and believe.
Reply to Michael Your take on redundancy puts no limits at all on what one can say. Its thesis is no more informative than that the word true starts with a t.
Its thesis is no more informative than that the word true starts with a t.
That's why it's called the redundancy theory. The point is that the word "true" is redundant; the claim "it is true that it is raining" is just the claim "it is raining".
I think we pretty much agree about truth. It's a primal concept.
No, that's not what we agree on. Under the redundancy theory, truth is a redundant concept. Given that "it is true that it is raining" means the same thing as "it is raining", truth-predication is a meaningless addition.
I suggest you start by looking up the definition of axiom on the Wikipedia.
— ernestm
There is nothing in the definition of axiom on the Wikipedia that I can determine what it is you are trying to get at. I know there are axioms that used in math and logic, but it is obvious that I'm talking about ideological/narrative axioms which are more or less the same thing as dogma. I think my argument ties directly into what Wikipedia says about dogma, and their page on axioms has a link to their page on dogma for a clarification on what non-mathematical/non-logical axioms are about.
Wiki-Dogma
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dogma
If this isn't what you are trying to get at please be a little less obtuse because it is difficult to guess what your argument is you are unable to explain it, and any guess I make will more likely than not be a straw man if I don't know EXACTLY what it is that your trying to get at. As far as I know, nobody is really good at guessing at what someone else's arguments are.
Given that "it is true that it is raining" means the same thing as "it is raining", truth-predication is a meaningless addition.
So I was going to provide a summary of Soame's thoughts on redundancy theory, but I'm finding that Michael has already done a great job. It's truth nihilism. Soames doesn't spend any time debating that. He spends about nine pages considering stuff like "Her thesis is true." He explains that redundancy can get a little closer to making sense if we look at it in the linguistic environment that includes "it is true that.."
So.. get over it Michael. Redundancy is truth nihilsm.
Reply to Banno Soames didn't provide any further details about Tarski's view of redundancy other than his comment that it's nihilistic.
So I was going to provide a summary of Soame's thoughts on redundancy theory, but I'm finding that Michael has already done a great job. It's truth nihilism. Soames doesn't spend any time debating that. He spends about nine pages considering stuff like "Her thesis is true." He explains that redundancy can get a little closer to making sense if we look at it in the linguistic environment that includes "it is true that.."
So.. get over it Michael. Redundancy is truth nihilsm.
If by "truth nihilism" you mean something like "moral nihilism" (as you suggested earlier) then you're just wrong. Moral nihilism is the position that nothing is moral, but redundancy theory isn't the position that nothing is true.
If your only defence is "Soames and Tarski say otherwise" then that's just an appeal to authority – and a mistaken authority at that. Or by "truth nihilism" they mean something that isn't comparable to "moral nihilism".
Perhaps by "truth nihilism" they just mean that truth isn't a real property? In which case I'd agree. But of course that doesn't then entail that "redundancy puts no limits at all on what one can say" as you claimed earlier. If it's raining then the limit on what one can say is "it is raining".
And, of course, neither does this entail that "truth is agreement" as you also claimed earlier. Under the redundancy theory, "it is true that it is raining" doesn't mean "I agree that it is raining".
Reply to Michael So you agree that redundancy is truth nihilism. Cool. I can say with confidence that we mean the same thing by "redundancy." Your position is not trivially true. It's not in line with the way "true" is commonly used. It's a failed theory.
So you agree that redundancy is truth nihilism. Cool.
Dishonest, much?
I said that redundancy is truth nihilism if by "truth nihilism" you just mean that truth isn't a real property. If, however, you mean it to be comparable to moral nihilism, as you suggested earlier, which is the position that moral claims are false (or meaningless), then no, redundancy isn't truth nihilism.
It's not in line with the way "true" is commonly used. It's a failed theory.
What do you mean by saying that it's not in line with the way "true" is commonly used? Are you saying that the propositions "it is raining" and "it is true that it is raining" are used in different ways, such that the two mean different things?
Reply to Michael Dude. Are you being sincere? A moral nihilist has no problem identifying things as good or bad. A truth nihilist has no problem with "true" and "false."
So yes... redundancy is a failed theory: "His thesis is true."
Dude. Are you being sincere? A moral nihilist has no problem identifying things as good or bad.
Yes, I'm being sincere. The main forms of moral nihilism are expressivism, which is a form of non-cognitivism, claiming that moral statements do not express propositions, and error theory, which claims that moral beliefs and assertions are not true because they "claim that certain moral facts exist that in fact do not exist".
This isn't at all comparable to the redundancy theory.
So yes... redundancy is a failed theory: "His thesis is true."
You keep asserting this without explaining how it is a failed theory.
"His thesis is true" is not equivalent to "His thesis."
The sentential form is an obvious fail. You can try propositions.
So? The redundancy theory isn't a theory about the syntax of truth statements. It doesn't say that any sentence of the form "X is true" is equivalent to the sentence "X".
In this case, the redundancy theory says that if his thesis is that e = mc[sup]2[/sup] then to say that his thesis is true is to say that e = mc[sup]2[/sup].
This along with your other claims regarding the comparability of moral nihilism and the entailment of truth as agreement shows that you don't understand the redundancy theory (or moral nihilism in the case of the former).
Comments (176)
I'll only comment on your last two questions. If what you seek to achieve is an explanation, or philosophical elucidation, of the concept of truth, then circularity isn't necessarily bad. You can start with the concept of truth as you understand it, and then proceed to analyse it by means of the examination of a variety of practical contexts where the concept is normally used. Circularity only is bad in deductive proofs, or demonstrations. In that case it is a fallacy. You can't assume what you intend to prove as a premise of your demonstration. In informal contexts of discussion, this is also called begging the question.
But where explanations are concerned, Wittgenstein has suggested that circularity only is bad when the circle is too small, and hence uninformative. So, the trouble with some circular explanations isn't the circularity itself but the excessive simplicity: such simplistic, quasi-tautological, explanations aren't sensitive enough to all the relevant aspects of the use of the concept one wishes to elucidate. The solution to this problem is to widen the circle of inter-related concepts one appeals to. Peter Strawson called this (wide) circular method of philosophical analysis "connective analysis" (which could be contrasted with reductive analysis). In epistemology, Clark Glymour has devised a convincing explanation of the somewhat circular nature of empirical evidence for scientific theories. It's called the bootstrapping theory of confirmation. It's a good way to account for the essential theory-ladenness of empirical concepts: your evidence always is couched in terms that presuppose some aspects of the theory you are attempting to confirm by means of scientific experiment or data gathering.
Aristotle tried this definition (I am paraphrasing): If one says it is that which objectively is, and isn't that which objectively isn't, then he speaks the truth; but if one says it is that which objectively isn't and isn't that which objectively is, then he does not speak the truth. In other words, if judgement reflects reality then truth, if not, then untruth. But this explanation seems circular to me, because to say "that which objectively is" is the same as saying "that which truly is".
Pascal says that some concepts are so fundamental that attempting to define them results more in confusion than clarity. I think truth is such a concept, as shown above. Maybe the best is to acknowledge that we all have the implicit knowledge of what truth is, even if we don't have the explicit definition. As such, we can still apply the concept correctly.
— mew
The closest thing we have to truth as human beings is something we call facts and/or data (ie. information about a physical thing) but such information is obviously transient and dependent on time, place, etc. in order for it to be useful. Also 'facts' in our mind seem to be not as transient as those applied to real world things (1+1 always equals 2, but the sky isn't always blue), but these things are either only true because we say they are true and or merely labels for real world things (ie. Main Street could be called Broad Street if we desire it and instead of 1+1= 2 we could have I + I = II).
This is not that hard to visualize until you have to deal with axioms; social/culture/ideological 'truth' most people have been ingrained with since they became aware of their surroundings. Such beliefs include human life is 'good', killing is 'evil' (unless it is done to defend oneself or country), famine/ war/ disease/etc is bad; I think you get the point.
In order to overcome your own indoctrinated axioms you have to realize there is an aspect of morality that is highly subjective, most ethical/moral beliefs are merely opinions/beliefs and not 'truths', and every action done by any human being requires a judgement call that is subject to own biases and prone to errors of one sort or another. While most people understand this to some degree, they don't like to admit how fallible our beliefs, knowledge, judgement, etc are and when we do screw up, we merely pass it off as IT IS THE BEST WE COULD DO WITH WHAT WE KNEW AT THE TIME, instead of realizing part of the problem is that we were too arrogant when taking certain actions.
I know this sounds like one has to be to politically correct or fret over one's actions too much, but that isn't a given. If fretting too much and being to PC IS counter productive then my arguments should be interpreted as to why someone SHOULDN'T care about fretting or trying to be PC if for them it creates more problems than it solves.
I guess my overall message is that the world, our choices of actions (as well as the lack of resources/time to always choose wisely), and other issues makes things more complicated than we often like to acknowledge them to be; and too often holding on to the idea we know some non-transient 'truth' just makes thing more FUBAR than they need to be.
So the answer to you OP is yes, presupposing something is 'truth' without doing the due diligence to prove something is actually truth (ie. which it is pretty much a given that it is impossible to due at this time) is "bad" because it can hinder one's judgement.
A good question for Holy Week.
[quote=John 18:33-38]
Pilate then went back inside the palace, summoned Jesus and asked him, "Are you the king of the Jews?"
"Is that your own idea," Jesus asked, "or did others talk to you about me?"
"Am I a Jew?" Pilate replied. "Your own people and chief priests handed you over to me. What is it you have done?"
Jesus said, "My kingdom is not of this world. If it were, my servants would fight to prevent my arrest by the Jewish leaders. But now my kingdom is from another place."
"You are a king, then!" said Pilate.
Jesus answered, "You say that I am a king. In fact, the reason I was born and came into the world is to testify to the truth. Everyone on the side of truth listens to me."
"What is truth?" retorted Pilate. With this he went out again to the Jews gathered there and said, "I find no basis for a charge against him.
[/quote]
Pilot doesn't get an answer to his question. It seems like Jesus is dodging the question, "just who the hell are you and what did you do?"
The 'truth' to which Jesus is testifying about has been presumably been revealed to the reader of the Gospel, in the life and teachings of Jesus, and this Jesus can't, won't, or isn't able to summarize in a "25-words-or-less-definition".
"Truth in labeling" is straightforward. If the package says "1 dozen large brown eggs" then there should be 12, large, brown, eggs in the package. A lot of labels are very difficult to define clearly. "Climate warming is True" or "Climate warming is False" are not simple claims. I believe the claim that "climate warming is True" because it seems to align consistently enough with statements I find factual. For instance, "January in Minnesota is 60% warmer now than it was 50 years ago" is a fact, according to the historical record. In the historical past, Minnesota was damned cold in January, so 60% warmer doesn't mean that that one can pick roses in January.
Those who disbelieve the claim of climate warming can site similar facts, like "July in Minnesota is not hotter than the historical average." If January is 60% hotter, then July should be 60% hotter too, right? Apparently not -- more facts about climate warming or climate stability have to be brought in.
So, some facts seem to support the truth, and some facts don't. One has to decide which facts have the most weight, or are most numerous and consistent, and which facts aren't. As Pierre-Normand says,
Quoting Pierre-Normand
All the facts connected with the truth of climate warming are voluminous, and the circularity is large.
While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This 'axiom of probabilistic certainty' is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory.
Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are 'self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect proposition, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above.
— ernestm
I disagree with your analysis and I will explain why...
"Tautological truths within formal systems, such as mathematical equations. These are established by syntactic consistency with core axioms. The core axioms themselves describe the formal systems, and so truths at this level are necessarily true, in accordance with first-order formal logic. These systems can be extended to create propositional logic, which defines rules of deduction and inference without introducing meaningfulness and causality."
— ernestm
Tautological truth are merely what I explained as mental constructs/models of the world around us and they are true only because we and/or our models say they are true. It has been well know since Ancient times that in our mind we can construct 'perfect models' (ie abstract models) of something in our own mind, yet these abstract models never translate into a real world thing. What your describing may be more accurate according to some philosophical text book, but my description is meant so that it can be understood by anyone while yet not being inaccurate. What we are talking about here is close enough to the same thing that I don't really feel the need to waste time splitting hairs about, even if our wording of things could be construed as that we each are talking about something else.
"{2} Empirical truths, which are determined via ratification by observation of material states and events, as long as the propositions describing material states and events are logically coherent. If the observation verifies the proposition, then the RESULT of the observation is factually true, but the proposition itself without empirical ratification remains a proposition that is neither true nor false, and is simply a statement. The specific and exact nature of truth itself depends not on facts, but on the epistemological factors relating the proposition to the material world in different metaphysical systems, most predominantly in the theories that define the relation of subject and predicate to objects, states, and events in the physical world. These theories add semantics (the meanings of words) to the syntactic relationships described in first-order logic."
— ernestm
These "Empirical truths" you talk about are merely best guess and opinions as opposed to actual truths. I'm not sure how much you read about the Enlightenment period of philosophy, as this passage seems to be one of the propositions made at the beginning of it which got torn apart as soon as some of the skeptics like Hume stepped in. I also hope you realize there is a difference between 'sort of the truth', 'sometimes the truth', what we guess is the truth', and actual 100% objective TRUTH which is the truth under any condition. The 'truths' devised from Empirical study/observation are merely thing derived from statistical analysis and/or human observation and are better describe as best guesses in order to not confuse them with actual objective truths.
Put it to you this way even nature laws, such as the Laws of Thermodynamics (which are about as close to something we know being true 100.000% of the time) are considered to be contingent on certain rules in our universe staying the same; however it is not a given that these rules have always been the same nor that they will ever change in the future. In other words every nature law, or any variation of "Empirical truths" is contingent on the things making them possible to never change, however it isn't a given that the thing that allow them to be will be as they are today.
While your argument may be more valid in a certain academic context, outside of that context it falls apart if one factors in the actual complexity of world
"{3} Causal truths, which again first must be consistent within first-order formal logic, and secondly must not contain any causal fallacies as defined in second-order formal logic. These are the most complicated forms of truth, and the basis of science. They are the most complicated because causal relationships cannot ever be proven necessarily true. They can only be proven not to be false. That distinction remains one of the least understood aspects of truth in the current world, because causality is so often claimed yet logical errors in statements of causal truth are so frequent. The metaphysical factors of causality are better understood if they are known to exist, but only a small number of people even know that there are metaphysical factors involved. Those who do know the metaphysical factors understand that the relation of the subject and predicate's in the cause, to the subject and predicate of the result, is an abstraction that can be very complex."
— ernestm
These "contingent truths" are even weaker than "Empirical truths" since the only thing different between is that causal truths almost wholly rely on human observation where as empirical truths have things like statistical analysis/studies, etc. in order to prove there validity. Needless to say because they are the same thing but weaker it is a given that they have the same problems (if not even more) as empirical truths.
"While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This 'axiom of probabilistic certainty' is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory."
— ernestm
In other words it our BEST GUESS that the sun will rise each morning that we are alive as long a wondering black hole, sun going supernova, or other similar event prematurely interrupts the stability of the star our planet orbits; but it isn't a given that nothing will interfere with a star during it's normal life cycle nor is it a given nothing will happen to our star in our lifetime. While we often like to talk about truths in an academic setting or working with something that is nothing more than a mental model; with dealing with real world issue
"Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are 'self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect proposition, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above."
— ernestm
Isn't it a given if these other 'truths' are always contingent on in order for them to be 'true' that something doesn't undermine them, that they are only 'sort of the truth' or 'truth unless some contingency/Act of God/etc changes it' truth, that they are a bit less than the 100% of the time objective kind of truth when we think of something being the TRUTH?
Of course, I might be just splitting hairs here if you already assume that these academic, contingent,
and/or empirical truths are obviously fallible under nearly an endless variety conditions and you are only using the word 'truth' as a means to describe a problem in a more.. palatable means; or perhaps the people that wrote the works you are referring from used such nomenclature and your just repeating it.
Your three items look like different reasons to believe some statement, rather than different types of truth.
It's not the sort of thing that can be said - although it can be shown.
is on the right track; although placing the word objectively in the Aristotle quote is erroneous and misleading; but then including the word objectively in almost any philosophical discussion is erroneous and misleading...
It is tempting to treat the T-sentence as a definition of truth, like so:
T is true if and only if T
But this only shows that "...is true" is redundant. An example by way of explanation:
"It is snowing at Charlotte Pass" (that sentence) is true if and only if it is snowing at Charlotte Pass
That is, the sentence '"It is snowing at Charlotte Pass" is true' is truth functionally identical to the sentence 'it is snowing at Charlotte Pass'; "...is true" is redundant.
I was always struck by the existential weight of that question within it's historical context, especially because he then says he sees no basis for a charge against Jesus.
No, it's not bad. I've always liked the simplicity of the argument you bring up: asking whether truth exists or not doesn't beg the question, but rather answers itself in an utterly pure manner. Indeed, it's circular in the best possible way. This is because truth is one of the very building blocks of consciousness. We live in an age where this is beginning to get fleshed out. Keep asking those deceptively simple questions.
And obviously, the framework I propose has to be rather basic, in order to support all their varying opinions without inconsistency, but I believe it does so adequately, albeit without the exactitude I would really prefer, but more details would extend its length beyond that which people actually read these days, so really I cannot avoid the laxity. If you can please provide the authorities behind your own thought, I would be able to respond appropriately."
— ernestm
Thank you for noticing the authority (perhaps even arrogance?) I try to speak with. It doesn't come studying but from the time I have devoted to the subject and effort I make in trying to get others to want to knock me off my soapbox; as well as the hope that I can find someone that can do this.
To be honest, I was just guessing that your arguments/parts of your posts came from a formal education and not just something you where pulling out of your..hat (or just cutting and pasting) like some people arguing philosophy do. The only formal education I have in philosophy is about three courses at a community college (Intro to Philosophy,Intro to Religions,and intro to ethics) but I have over a decade of studying and debating philosophy which in some ways can trump an actual education in the subject. However there have been countless debates and several books I have read that have influenced my opinions; and yes I am aware that my arguments are only my opinions. Also I have read the following books which have helped influence some of my thinking:
Philosophy For Beginners
Eastern Philosophy For Beginners
Postmodernism For Beginners
Kierkegaard For Beginners
(I even have a pdf copy of Kierkegaard For Beginners which I can give you a copy of, and point out the parts where he talks about morality being subjective; or at least the author of the book commenting on the subject.)
I will have to admit that since I have ADHD, I have trouble reading some of the more wordy text books and have to rely on sources, such as the 'for beginners' books, that cut to the chase. While you may look down on me now for admitting I don't have a real education on philosophy, the irony is that I have something better than an education which is ten years of having to deal with the subject without being hindered by a formal education in the subject where I have been forced to think for myself and come up with my own stuff without support from the philosophers that came before me. I don't know if you are aware of the quote from the teacher who commented on the full verses empty glass, but I think it sort of applies here.
If time is short and/or you are unable to access the books I noted you can even look up the following links which more or less same similar things as passages to the books I noted:
Is–ought problem
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem
"The is–ought problem, as articulated by Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume (1711–76), states that many writers make claims about what ought to be on the basis of statements about what is. Hume found that there seems to be a significant difference between positive statements (about what is) and prescriptive or normative statements (about what ought to be), and that it is not obvious how one can coherently move from descriptive statements to prescriptive ones. The is–ought problem is also known as Hume's law, or Hume's guillotine."
— Wiki
Turtles all the way down
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down
Münchhausen trilemma
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%BCnchhausen_trilemma
"In epistemology, the Münchhausen trilemma is a thought experiment used to demonstrate the impossibility of proving any truth, even in the fields of logic and mathematics. If it is asked how any knowledge is known to be true, proof may be provided. Yet that same question can be asked of the proof, and any subsequent proof. The Münchhausen trilemma is that there are only three options when providing proof in this situation:
The circular argument, in which theory and proof support each other
The regressive argument, in which each proof requires a further proof, ad infinitum
The axiomatic argument, which rests on accepted precepts
The trilemma, then, is the decision among the three equally unsatisfying options."
— Wiki
There are a couple more sources but I think this should do for now. I will have to admit the whole fact/data vs opinion/judgement call is just something I created to simplify the problem (as it can be worded in may other ways) so trying to find an EXACT source for it would be kind of futile except other than perhaps finding my previous posts.
— ernestm
So because your degree is bigger (or something else for that matter) than mine, you think you automatically know more than me?
I have taken courses and studied enough in digital logic/philosophical logic to not have to bother taking them over again. However the 'truth' when used by the nomenclature of such things is not the same thing as 'truth' when used in ethics/religions/morality. If you don't know that and/or the basics of identifying fallacies or differences between facts and opinions then you really don't know anything about philosophy itself and instead you are merely to regurgitating some of what you heard in your classes while not even bothering to think for yourself.
—ernestm
One's ideas/beliefs may be considered the 'truth' or more accurately 'true' in the context of their own work, but when critiqued by others it usually loses such meaning and especially so when critiqued by those who have different opinions. In Post Modern philosophy the search or hope for 'Truth' has all but been completely abandoned in the face of diametrically opposing viewpoints and the understanding/ acknowledgement of how complex the world really is.
"We do what we do because that is the way that we do it", and that is both the way it is and the way it is going to be for the foreseeable future. But seriously your type of arguments/viewpoints where abandoned back in the age of enlightenment when most philosophers had to grow up and realize 'perfection" and "truth" were merely an illusion and they had to adjust their perspective to account for such things.
I think Ernestm was merely paying you a compliment.
No. However, I do believe people who have devoted their lives to furthering this subject, and who have studied the prior thought for centuries, and who discuss their resulting thoughts with each other in formal ways, have together built a far better explanation than any one person can ever obtain via intuition.
— Pierre-Normand
Actually you are right, I misread the post and didn't see the part that he actually complimented me. :D
Sorry about that, my ADHD sometimes hinders me from seeing part of a post when another part kind of set me off but at least I'm not to arrogant to admit that it happens.
—ernestm
You are committing an argumentum ad populum fallacy, argument from authority fallacy, and likely a few others as well. Just because someone wrote down something in a book somewhere and other people sometimes agreed with them doesn't necessarily make such ideas better than those you can come up with from the top of your head. And besides there are just as many existentialist/ deconstructionist/ nihilistic philosophers that have dedicated their lives to writing books and making similar arguments to mine. Because of that it really isn't accurate to say I'm just pulling it all out of my hat even if I more often than not came to my conclusions before reading their work.
Also subjectivity isn't really about undermining math, scientific ideas, concepts (ie. pure science supposedly assumes hypothetically ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE even if from a technical standpoint we don't always have to be aware of that issue) it is about dealing with hard core ideological dogma that tries to paint the world in 'Good'/'Evil', Black/white, True/False as well as other binary/false dilemmas that are too common is Western ideology. If you don't understand WHY people need and use subjectivity as a tool, perhaps it is just something you are not ready for.
"Truth" can remain 'ok' when used to reference mental constructs, but human beings are too fallible for us to know whether these mental constructs really are one for one in regard to the real life counter parts. However once one gets over oneself and the fallibility of the human race as a whole is isn't that big of a deal, unless one encounters someone who is unaware of human fallibility.
—Chester
Or in other words human beings are to fallible for us to safely assume that any axioms or 'truths' through either mental construct and/or opinion really applies in the real world. And to quote Socrates again "I'm the wisest man in Greece, since I know that I know nothing". Actually I don't think it is noted that Socrates said that but since we only know him from what Plato wrote of him, it is plausible that he actually said something like that either at during his trail or perhaps some other time.
What is it you have in mind here? T-sentences? Kripke's recursive definition?
Ernestm, are you proposing that tautological truth is a different truth to epistemological truth and to causal truth?
That does not seem right to me.
Whoever would be unaware of human fallibility? That would never happen, would it? The streets must be teeming with people who reflect on their fallibility and the unreliability of their grasp of truth. Just read the news.
And that's the truth.
The OP asked for a definition of truth. You provided three ways in which one might justify claiming that a statement was true. I'm pointing out that this doesn't answer the question.
That is to say, if you ask a professor with a PhD in modern philosophy, who has read several thousand books with different opinions on the subject, that is as good an approximation to a short answer they the professor would state that I can currently write.
At any rate, your interpretation of his post as ostensive is generous. I took his post as a statement that there were 3 seperate truths, without a necessary overlap that distinguished them all as truth. That interpretation wasn't suggested in his post anywhere.
-----------------------
In modern philosophy, truth is defined by formal logic on propositions (statements). There are three basic kinds of truth evaluation, which I here attempt to express in way compatible with the thinking of the modern philosophers Russell, Whitehead, Moore, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, Kripke, Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson. According to all these various thinkers, truth is the result of evaluating a proposition, but the relation between truth and the proposition itself can be different depending on epistemological considerations.
While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This 'axiom of probabilistic certainty' is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory. The extrapolation of this axiom is the creation of the scientific method, which is designed to define the minimum number of observations necessary to corroborate a theory. As per the rules for causal truth, theories can only be corroborated and not be proven true; but modern science theory might still call a theory true based on the axiom of probabilistic certainty.
Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are 'self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect proposition, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above.
Truth in theology, morality, ethics, law, and metaphysics
Much confusion about truth has arisen in these fields, but by the above schema, the nature of truth itself is relatively simple. Theological systems make assertions about that which cannot ultimately be proven; morality strives to define that which is good or bad for an individual; ethics defines that which is good or bad for a society; law strives to define that which is right or wrong; and metaphysics strives to define that which is real. In all these cases the absolute truth of the assertions they make is undefinable. However within each of these disciplines, it is possible to evaluate the propositional consistency of statements within formal systems that they define; and from that, to evaluate the truth of their propositions empirically, within the formal systems themselves. so again, when different propositions within, or across, these disciplines contradict each other, it is not possible to evaluate which are true or false in absolute terms. It is only possible to demonstrate whether the claims by each system are coherent.
I'm a generous fellow. I hope Ernestm was not claiming that there are tree sorts of truth. Looks like he is.
I'm going to go with redundancy.
Tautologies do not need justification. Empirical statements are justified by observation.
Truth is the same in both.
What I am having a go at is the notion that the truth of a tautology might be a different truth to that of an empirical statement. If it was your intention to show that they are different, then I think you have not succeed.
But the account you gave suggests otherwise.
Now you may believe such distinctions rather arbitrary, so I will make one statement about why different views exist. It depends whether you think truth of a proposition exists before a person evaluates its truth value. That immediately starts to get into issues of monism versus dualism, or even in Wittgenstein's theory of logical positivism, whether language is the only thing that is actually real. So that is a deeper explanation of why the specific nature of truth is dependent on metaphysics, and it remains a hotly debated issue in modern philosophy.
My answer to the OP is that Mew, as a competent speaker of English, already knows what truth is, and that this would be demonstrated by their use of the word. Further, any proposed definition of truth would face the circularity Mew describes, but that circularity is not vicious if the definition of truth can be consistently ascribed to itself.
If you remove truth values from propositional logic, then you can create a simpler reductionist system in which statements about the truth of propositions are meaningless. But then the explanation of meaningfulness is also incomplete, and so such methods are of less merit.
Quoting ernestm
Hmm. That 'A implies A' is true just on the syntax, surely?
Quoting ernestm
Davidson takes truth as undefined, and uses it to elucidate meaning.
And I rather think that is a good approach. Truth is much easier to deal with than meaning.
Surely not.
That is, are you claiming that one needs a semantic interpretation in order to identify basic tautologies? Because that seems to me obviously false.
Why?
That's like saying:
If you state that '"it is raining" is logically equivalent to "It is Thursday"' then the statements is considered true.
SO at present I'm not at all sure what you mean.
Quoting ernestm
Are you saying "if you state that a is logically equivalent to b, then the statement 'a is logically equivalent to b' is considered true"?
But that's not right. Stating it does not make it so.
And if not, what are you saying?
Two statements are logical equivalent if they have the same truth value.
10(base 2) is not a statement; it has no truth value; and so cannot be logically equivalent to 2(base10)
Yes, they are.
Hm. A noble goal, but in modern logic truth is defined in terms of satisfaction.
What you appear to have done is provide three sorts of statements, and then claim that each sustains a distinct sort of truth.
This supposed problem is trivially resolved.
The transience of a statement can be resolved with a few indexicals - "it is raining" becomes "it is raining here, now".
Usually context makes such indexicals redundant. Certainly there are useful statements of fact without dependence on time, place, etc.
Tautology is a semantic notion – the semantics are presumably set up in a way where their interpretation of the syntactic form is always going to yield true. But it makes no sense to say something is tautologous from syntax alone. Syntactically, the sentence is just a structure of symbols, and so doesn't mean anything, let alone something always true.
If you want to understand the different approaches to truth evaluation, and why I state them separately, then you will also find that the need for semantics in the first kind of truth is summarized here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth#Formal_theories
for the first category, the formal description on the Wikipedia starts here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-order_logic
For the second kind, which as I say is based on the first kind, but which introduces the need for empirical verification, starts here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_descriptions
And for the third kind, which adds the idea of causality, the formal description starts here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality#Causal_calculus
For the basis of defining promises: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/promises/#ScaExpThe
And for the acceptance of scientific theories as truths: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_science
Not sure about this. For example, it's clear that disease is bad; that's not something that is only accepted as a result of cultural indoctrination.... rather, it's the result of getting sick and finding it unpleasant.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._E._Moore#Good_as_indefinable
and for the formal statement of ethical truth within an ethical system:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_ethics
That doesn't answer the OP though anymore than did Ernest when he itemized the different types of truth. As Ernest begged the question of "what is truth" by simply telling us different sorts of truths, you beg the question by simply telling us that "truth" adds nothing to the meaning of a proposition. You are not arguing obviously that "truth" adds nothing because it has no meaning, but that it is redundant to what already has been said. So, accepting fully that "it is true that the snow is white" is equivalent to "the snow is white," what does "true" mean?
And don't avoid the question by saying that "it is true" means "the snow is white," because I'm not speaking in the particular, but in the general as to how "true" is to be defined.
And this is significant it seems because it you can't offer the same meaning for "true" in the examples of:
1. It is true it is snowing,
2. It is true the sun will rise tomorrow, and
3. It is true 2+2=4
then we might have 3 entirely different truths. To define truth as "that which is" (or similar) moves this discussion farther into the metaphysical and asks whether that state of being of 2+2=4 is at all similar to the state of being of it snowing. I don't think it is.
—Wayfarer
I don't know for sure, but I guess perhaps the people who claim to God, his will, what 'good'/'evil' is, as well as claim to know the answers to many other non-trivial problems could be some of the people that are not that aware of human fallibility. Of course this is just a guess.
Unanalyzable.
Yes.
It might seem bad for someone who wants to support some ontological view by leveraging a definition of truth, but on closer examination, those people aren't really hurting anything, so no, it isn't bad.
—Banno
I'll try and explain it this way, the difference between what we think of as 'good'/'bad and what is objectively good or bad when dealing localized conditions and one single action often could be merely moot issue. However when dealing with a variety of actions and their complex consequences that pertain to the entire welfare of a group of people or the human race as a whole then you get into something that could be a non-trivial problem and where our idea of 'good'/'bad and what is objectively good or bad could be very different.
For example in the following YouTube video the author of it claims that the Black Death actually HELPED human civilization due to the overpopulation of Europe a the time.
What if the Black Death Never Happened?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1aULu6BqNs
Of course anyone having their love one wouldn't agree that having their love one's and around 30%-50% of the population die from the disease wouldn't tend to agree that it is a GOOD thing.
That which we think of being good for ourselves and the human race as a whole is usually considered 'good' (since it is somewhat difficult to imagine anything else being good other than something helping other non-sentient life or perhaps sentient life if we could find it) but that which may be good or bad for us in the short term may translate into something else in the unforeseeable future.
With trivial moral issues it is 'ok' to accept either Kant's moral imperative and/or one's own judgement being 'close enough' to 'objective morality' to not really sweat the details. However with much larger issues they could be a part of the whole bigger non-trivial issue I mentioned earlier, which turns what we think of as 'good'/'bad' into merely either what we think is useful for ourselves or perhaps merely a best guess as to what might be either good or evil. Theoretically if one is omniscient they might be able to resolve enough of the non-trivial issue to be more objective than we are, however as human beings it would be too difficult to know it that is even possible.
Also while a bit unorthodox there could be reasons why one's own concepts of 'good'/'bad' could be radically different than 'normal morality'. Examples of this are if someone is merely a 'brain in a vat' (ie none of their actions due anything since the world isn't real, nor are their consequences real), or they could be a real secret squirrel and believing harming people is 'good' and helping people is 'bad' (sort of like the Joker when he tries to attack Batman and innocent bystanders as well).
While this usually isn't an issue (I hope), it should give enough pause for someone to wonder whether they and others are more alike the red and white blood cells helping the body as a whole or if they are more like a virus, disease, and/or parasite by undermining the greater good. While the people that were killed by the black death where not parasites, the society and technology of the time couldn't maintain the population grow and their demise could have helped the 'greater good', even if saying that it is 'good' that millions of people dying a horrible painful death during the medieval period isn't a pleasant thing to say.
If I understand you, you are pointing out that ethical value depends on context. Your example is that while a disease in one of my immediate family would be seen as bad, the same disease might be seen as having overall good results from a broader perspective.
Am I correct in thinking that you add to this a claim that the broader perspective is to be preferred?
And am I also correct in reading you as thinking that this places a limitation on our ability to know what is god and what is bad, a sort of moral scepticism?
I'd like to be sure I understand you.
We might have three distinct types of truth, as you say; but that would be different from having three distinct types of justification. My point to @ernestm, exactly.
Isn't this like asking what "set" means in the general, not in the particular, and being unable to offer the same meaning for "set" in the examples of:
1. Andy Murray won every set
2. He set the table
3. The set of all odd numbers has the same cardinality as the set of all even numbers
4. The Sun set at 8:00pm.
Deflation, but not truth skepticism (which is what redundancy is).
The redundancy theory is deflation, and isn't skepticism.
The Deflationary Theory of Truth
And it's not skepticism, as the redundancy theorist can happily accept that it is true that it is raining – which is just a redundant way of saying that they accept that it is raining.
"This view, referred to by Alfred Tarski as "the nihilistic approach to the theory of truth" is also known as redundancy theory of truth.""
That's from the truth skepticism chapter of Soames' Understanding Truth (not as easy to quote as the SEP).
Redundancy is truth skepticism. It's truth nihilism. It's behaviorism driven. It's bullshit.
It may be that it's been called deflationary. I said deflation, but not skepticism.
Then I don't know what you mean by "truth skepticism". To me, it would mean to question the claim that it is true that it is raining, which according to the redundancy theory of truth would mean to question the claim that it is raining. But the redundancy theorist isn't committed to this.
It seems to me that by "truth skepticism" you actually mean "non-redundant-truth skepticism" (or "non-redundant-truth nihilism"). In which case yes, I'd agree; the redundancy theory of truth questions (or rejects) non-redundant truth.
The position that nothing satisfies the requirements to be true? Or that all claims are false?
E.g. Nietzsche: "Every belief, every considering something-true, is necessarily false because there is simply no true world".
It's called Redundancy.
So to be a truth nihilist just is to believe that "truth [plays no] logical role, has no descriptive content of its own, and so does not contribute to the content of what is said"?
Oh heck. I need to add Ayer and Quine to my formal statement of truth. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THE REFERNECE; Dammit )
Sorry I'm late in my reply...
Yes, I think you more or less have the idea I'm working from. My moral beliefs partly comes from the Jain's doctrine of Anekantavada / 'no-one sidedness' no matter how crazy another persons moral beliefs may seem and the problems that come from Kant's 'moral imperatives' which can horribly contradict when analyzing the consequences of ones actions. As far as I can tell CONSQUENCES are the only metric that can be used to determine whether an action is good or bad, however we as human beings are WOEFULLY INADEQUATE at determining the consequences of our actions in anything but the most trivial of conditions.
Also it is my personal belief that it would HELP if everyone realized that every action (other than some of the most trivial) requires a MORAL JUDGEMENT CALL where IT ISN'T a GIVEN that we can KNOW WHAT IS THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION TO TAKE. I know this sounds like some basic stuff on a certain level but it can get a lot more complicated than it sounds. I mean how may times is someone sure of what is the 'good' or 'right' thing to do, such as persecute people thought to be witches, and then later they find out that they were TOTALLY wrong.
Also I don't expect everyone to become a skeptic or nihilist (more or less like I am), but it might help if more people gave a little bit more pause to some of their actions (and/or were a little more swifter in others if the potential consequences require it) and perhaps used a little more critical thinking when making a judgement call before carrying out certain actions.
Than again my it is all just me as I feel like I'm in a world of crazy people that can't see the various problems that need to be fixed and other issues that could or should be ignored for the time being.
As a person partial to nihilism I think I wring my hands too often for my own good, and I should just not give a rat's backside to many issues if I can't do anything about it. However the difference between what I can and can not change is enough for me to fret over things some times as I do.
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The Meaningfulness of Truth in the Post-Truth Era
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
There’s been much discussion about ‘fake news’ recently, resulting rise to a new interest in the definition of truth. This topic explains why the controversy is likely to last a long time, via examination of the formal definition of the meaningfulness of 'post truth,' within the context of ideas of truth in modern philosophy.
The Postulation of 'Post Truth' as Truth
One advanced thinker on the semantics of truth is Donald Davidson, who is an absolute anomalous monist (there are only ideas, or mind, or matter, or language, but it cannot be known which). Therefore, he states truth is ultimately undefinable, yet through our ability to reason meaningfully, truth can be known, even if people do not know that they know the truth. For example, people can know that the sun will rise tomorrow; but they do not know that they knew that until after the sun has risen.
Rhetorical misconceptions have arisen from this, whereby people state what they wish to be true as being true, then strive to find facts to prove that truth afterwards, giving rise to the ‘post-truth era.’ One famous example is President Trump’s recent assertion that President Obama was ‘wiretapping’ his phone. President Trump held that he was telling the truth because he believed it certain that evidence will be found, regardless that he had no evidence at the time.
That then is the complete explanation of how ‘post truth’ has become meaningful. However much one might attempt to dismiss such efforts as obviously absurd, it is not so easy, because of the complexities of formal definitions of what truth actually is.
The Formal Definition of Truth
In modern philosophy, truth is defined by formal logic upon propositions (statements). There are three basic kinds of truth evaluation, which I here attempt to express in way compatible with the thinking of the modern philosophers Russell, Whitehead, Moore, Wittgenstein, Tarski, Carnap, Ayer, Strawson, Quine, Putnam, Searle, Mendelson, Kripke, Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson.
Compound, Contractual, and Scientific Truth
While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This axiom of probabilistic certainty is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory. The extrapolation of this axiom is the creation of the scientific method, which is designed to define the minimum number of observations necessary to corroborate a theory. As per the rules for causal truth, theories can only be corroborated and not be proven true; but modern science theory might still call a theory true based on the axiom of probabilistic certainty.
Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect proposition, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above.
Truth in Theology, Morality, Ethics, Law, and Metaphysics
Much confusion about truth has arisen in these fields, but by the above schema, the nature of truth itself is relatively simple. Briefly:
In all these cases the absolute truth of the assertions they make is undefinable. However within each of these disciplines, it is possible to evaluate the propositional consistency of statements within formal systems that they define; and from that, to evaluate the truth of their propositions empirically, within the formal systems themselves. so again, when different propositions across, these disciplines contradict each other, it is not possible to evaluate which are true or false in absolute terms. It is only possible to demonstrate whether the claims by each system are coherent, and therefore can be evaluated as truthful within the context of their own systems.
The Semantics of Truth
According to all modern logicians, truth is the result of evaluating a proposition, but the relation between truth and the proposition itself can be different depending on epistemological considerations. While one might initially believe the nature of truth to be intuitively obvious, the semantics of truth are complex. This starts with the issue as to whether one believes that tautological propositions are true before any person evaluates them; in which case, the truths must exist independently in some abstract space independent of material reality. That introduces the metaphysical considerations.
Assessing Post Truth
From the above summary, it is clear that a great deal of dispute is possible on the nature of truth, which is greatly to the advantage of rhetoricians wishing to persuade others that their opinions are true. Also, however, it is clear that such opinions are, in all cases of post-truth statement, merely opinions, even if one accepts the meaningfulness of post-truth statements. However, that is far beyond that which most people who ‘just want to know the truth’ are ready to learn. So as things are, we are likely to be stuck in the post-truth era for a very long time.
Your example offers 4 entirely different uses of the term "set," where there's clearly a similarity in the way I used "truth." In each instance, I used "truth" to reference the accuracy of the statement, although the accuracy of each statement was measured differently in each statement, or, as Banno pointed out, it was the justification that varied.
But you're asking about how the redundancy theorist would define "truth". That you use "truth" to refer to accuracy is not that they would. The problem is that you were suggesting that the redundancy theory is wrong if it can't give a single, general definition of "truth". I was simply pointing out that there might not be a single, general definition of "truth", just as there isn't a single, general definition of "set".
The moral nihilist claims that nothing is moral. But the redundancy theorist doesn't claim that nothing is true. So if you're using moral nihilism as a comparison to truth nihilism then the redundancy theorist isn't a truth nihilist.
You can still affirm the claim "this man is unmarried and a bachelor" even though the "and a bachelor" part is redundant. And the redundancy theorist can still affirm the claim "it is true that it is raining" even though the "it is true that" part is redundant. Whereas the moral nihilist wouldn't affirm the claim "murder is immoral".
And the same principle with skepticism. There's a difference between being skeptical that the claim "it is raining" is true and claiming that the "it is true that" part of the claim "it is true that it is raining" is redundant.
Most people are totally disinterested in understanding alternate views, but instead only wish to prove their own views right, which is actually impossible.
Which is not my own statement either, it is Schopenhauer's. And that, I believe, completes the discussion to cover all cases. Thank you for your input.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Meaningfulness of Truth in the Post-Truth Era
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
There’s been much discussion about ‘fake news’ recently, leading to renewed arguments on the nature of truth, In fact. most people are totally disinterested in understanding the nature of truth, but instead only wish to prove their own views right, which is actually impossible. This topic explains why, via examination of the formal definition of the meaningfulness of 'post truth,' within the context of ideas of truth in modern philosophy.
The Postulation of 'Post Truth' as Truth
One advanced thinker on the semantics of truth is Donald Davidson, who is an absolute anomalous monist (there are only ideas, or mind, or matter, or language, but it cannot be known which). Therefore, he states truth is ultimately undefinable, yet through our ability to reason meaningfully, truth can be known, even if people do not know that they know the truth. For example, people can know that the sun will rise tomorrow; but they do not know that they knew that until after the sun has risen.
Rhetorical misconceptions have arisen from this, whereby people state what they wish to be true as being true, then strive to find facts to prove that truth afterwards, giving rise to the ‘post-truth era.’ One famous example is President Trump’s recent assertion that President Obama was ‘wiretapping’ his phone. President Trump held that he was telling the truth because he believed it certain that evidence will be found, regardless that he had no evidence at the time.
That then is the complete explanation of how ‘post truth’ has become meaningful. However much one might attempt to dismiss such efforts as obviously absurd, it is not so easy, because of the complexities of formal definitions of what truth actually is.
THE FORMAL DEFINITION OF TRUTH
In modern philosophy, truth is discovered by evaluating propositions (the formal representation of equivalent statements). Before considering semantics in more detail, a description follows which is commensurate with the thinking of the modern philosophers Russell, Whitehead, Moore, Wittgenstein, Ramsay, Tarski, Carnap, Ayer, Strawson, Quine, Putnam, Searle, Mendelson, Kripke, Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson.
- Basic Forms of Truth
Across modern thinkers overall, there are three basic kinds of truth, depending on the proposition's type:
- Compound, Scientific, and Contractual Truth
While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This axiom of probabilistic certainty is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory. The extrapolation of this axiom is the creation of the scientific method, which is designed to define the minimum number of observations necessary to corroborate a theory. As per the rules for causal truth, theories can only be corroborated and not be proven true; but modern science theory might still call a theory true based on the axiom of probabilistic certainty.
Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect propositoin, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above.
- Truth in Theology, Morality, Ethics, Law, and Metaphysics
Much confusion about truth has arisen in these fields, but by the above schema, the nature of truth itself is relatively simple. Briefly:
In all these fields, the absolute truth of the assertions they make is undefinable. However within each of these fields, it is possible to evaluate the propositional consistency of statements within the formal systems on which they are based; and from that, to evaluate the truth of their statements empirically, within the formal systems themselves. But when different propositions across different disciplines in each of these fields contradict each other, it is not possible to evaluate which are true or false in absolute terms. It is only possible to demonstrate when the claims by each discipline are coherent, and therefore can be evaluated as truthful within context.
THE SEMANTICS OF TRUTH
While truth is the result of evaluating a proposition, the relation between 'truth' and the proposition itself varies depending on epistemological premises. So while one might initially believe the nature of truth to be intuitively obvious, the semantics of truth are complex. This starts with the issue as to whether one believes that tautological propositions are true before any person evaluates them; in which case, the truths must exist independently in some abstract space independent of material reality. That introduces the metaphysical considerations.
[b]TRUTH AS OPINION
AND THE MERITS OF STATEMENTS[/b]
From the above summary, it is clear that a great deal of dispute exists on the nature of truth. That is greatly to the advantage of rhetoricians wishing to persuade others that their opinions are true. In reality, most of those asserting that they 'know 'the truth' are not attempting to state the truth at all. Instead, they are only making assertions about truth to persuade others to their point of view. If pressed, they justify this simply by claiming their belief is true, which, as it is ultimately unprovable, actually does not define knowledge at all, but rather a religious belief (whether they themselves acknowledge the existence of religion or not).
With sufficient qualification as to one's preferred metaphysical and semantic foundation, it is possible to make statements that are true within context of that belief. There always exist alternate possibilities. Indeed, according to truth nihilism, there is actually no such thing as 'truth' at all. So according to formal logic in modern philosophy, assertions of a person that some fact is undeniable truth remains an opinion, in all cases without exception.
When a statement can be found true in more than one metaphysics (and whose interpretation is more unambiguously framed within the presumed premises and resulting rules), then it may be considered to possess greater merit. Hence, in modern metaphysics, the merit of a statement is considered more fruitful to consider than the truth of a proposition.
In every single case of post-truth assertion, it is especially clear that opinions on truth are merely opinions, and no more. However, that is far beyond that which most people who ‘just want to know the truth’ are ready to learn. So as things are, we are likely to be stuck in the post-truth era for a very long time.
While "It is true that it is raining" means no more than "It is raining", falsehood does not work the same way at all.
"It is false that it is raining" means "it is not raining".
Truth may be redundant, but falsehood is not.
That is to say, reductionist theories can produce meaningful results, but they are only meaningful within reductionist disciplines, and thus they are considered less fruitful, which is why modern philosophers continue to seek better paradigms.
That's still the redundancy theory of truth. As the Wikipedia article explains, "The strategy of Ramsey's argument is to demonstrate that certain figures of speech — those in which truth and falsehood seem to figure as real properties of propositions, or as logical values that constitute real objects, however abstract, of discussion and thought — can always be eliminated in favor of paraphrases that do not reify truth and falsehood as nouns, nor even use true and false as adjectives" and offers the example of "it is false that Caesar was murdered" meaning the same thing as "Caesar was not murdered".
The point is that "true" and "false" are superfluous additions to language, not just that part of a sentence can be removed without changing the meaning.
Likewise with just saying 'It's raining' and 'it's true that it's raining.'
Here's a plausible account of the semantics of 'true:' it is a predicate of propositions, true of those propositions just in case the proposition is itself true. So for example, modeling a proposition as a function from world-states to values 1 or 0, 1 for truth, 0 for falsehood, 'it is true that p' maps to 1 just in case p maps to 1 (relative to the relevant world-state, usually the actual world). 'It's raining' says that a certain state of affairs holds – a raining event is occurring – while 'It's true that it's raining' says that a certain proposition, expressed by 'that it's raining,' has a certain property. Now it so happens that when you work out both these truth conditions, they end up being the same, like in the 'bald' and 'non-bald' cases. But that doesn't mean 'true' doesn't mean anything, or that it's redundant, in that it has no uses that couldn't be achieved without it.
For example, plausibly this use of 'true' can be used to predicate properties not only of propositions, but derivatively of sentences, statements, or utterances, according as they express a certain proposition, of which the property 'true' holds. And this is something that isn't redundant – for example, if A says, 'I'm a doctor,' and B says, 'that's true,' where that is anaphoric to the proposition expressed by 'I'm a doctor,' this is something that B could not have done by merely repeating the sentence that A said: or if B said, 'I'm a doctor,' he would have said something different. So here, 'true' is used to predicate a property of the proposition expressed by A, which is different from simply saying over again what A said.
And so the predicate increases the expressive power of the language in various ways – or at least, lets us express some things using certain constructions that we couldn't otherwise.
What's maybe a little more puzzling is we can use the locution 'the truth,' as in 'tell me the truth' or 'that's the truth.' This seems to function as an ordinary definite description denoting whatever truth is contextually relevant. So for example if we want to know who smashed the vase, and we're interrogating someone who we think knows, we might say 'tell me the truth,' by which we mean, 'tell me that truth which answers the question, "who smashed the vase?"' If there are then two options, p = 'a smashed the vase,' and q = 'b smashed the vase,' this is similar to asking 'tell me who smashed the vase,' or 'if a smashed the vase, tell me p, and if b smashed the vase, tell me q.'
So 'the truth' seems to be an ordinary definite description that holds of individual true propositions. If anyone wants to know what the truth is, you have to ask them, the truth about what?
Then there is the kind-term 'truth,' as in 'I value truth.' This seems akin to 'redness,' which seems to denote the property of being read. Likewise, 'truth' then seems to denote the property of being true. But since we now know that the property of being true is, and when it holds of a proposition, it's not so mysterious what's meant by this, as it's not mysterious to say something like 'I like a little redness in the cheeks.'
The answer is not what the truth is, but what the subject of the question believes the truth to be. As it is a question about belief, the only truth the person can state is about their belief, and not whether they actually smashed the vase. That seems rather obvious to me.
the person could have smashed the vase without knowing so. Or the person could have knocked the vase off a stand without breaking it, then it broke due to a dog or something without them knowing, before they found out it was broken. Then you get into questions if they were ordered to break the vase, whether they really did break it themselves of their own volition or not, which again is contingent on one's belief of causality.
Long ago I did some work, following Neils Brunsson, on why organisations are irrational. The idea is that an organisation is set up for a particular task, and hence must act; but an organisation never has all the facts; hence the action often precedes having sufficient facts to make a rational judgement.
It's the existential crisis of having to act. Even not giving a rat's arse is one action chosen amongst many. We are forced to act.
If I understand you aright, your position is that because we do not have all the facts we cannot be confident of making the right choice; we need increasingly broader perspectives from which to judge our choices; but we must acknowledge that we will never have all the facts and hence can never be confident in our choices.
This can lead to a nihilism, a pretence at refusing to make choices. But of course that is itself a choice.
My reply is that all you can do is make the best choice from where you are, and be ready to reconsider. This leads to morality that is both ad hoc and local. Ad hoc because what one considers the best choice will change over time, local because one must be able to assess the results of one's action.
That does not appear to meet with my understanding of anomalous monism, nor with for example, IEP.
The truth nihilist says the truth of P is nothing other than that somebody agrees with P.
Besides that, I recognize my description is a simplification, but in the context of presenting the difference between realism, idealism, dualism, and monism in 6 lines, anything I write has to be a simplification, or people who don't know it beforehand won't be able to understand it at all. I've already doubled its length due to various miscomprehensions here, and now the article is too long, so I am thinking of just ditching the additions and going back to how it was in the first place. This is because, what most philosophers seem to like to do is to stop at the first thing they think is wrong and then tell me I am wrong, without actually trying to understand what I am saying. So it doesn't really make sense to change things as they believe I should anyway.
Which is why the redundancy theorist isn't a truth nihilist.
It doesn't talk about unknown truths. It talks about unknown things happening or existing.
That they exist and happen even though we don't know about them.
Again: if you aren't a truth nihilist, you don't believe truth is agreement. Redundancy says it is.
Redundancy doesn't say that truth is agreement.
No, when I say that it is true that it is raining I'm just saying that it is raining. The "it is true that" part is superfluous. That's the reductionist account.
You seem to be suggesting that the reductionist argues that "it is true that it is raining" means "I agree that it is raining". That's not correct.
What else could your utterance show?
If you just mean that saying "it is raining" indicates that the speaker believes that it is raining, then sure. But if you mean that the expression "it is raining" means "I believe that it is raining", then that's wrong.
P is that it is raining.
"It is raining" indicates speaker believes P
"It is true that it is raining" says no more than "P"
"It is true that P" indicates the speaker believes P
What part do you disagree with? This is redundancy dude. What did you think it was?
I don't disagree with any of that. I disagree with your earlier claim that the redundancy theory says that truth is agreement.
Yes. The redundancy theorist just says that "it is true that it is raining" means "it is raining". If you then want to say that "it is raining" signifies that the speaker believes that it is raining then that's a separate issue, and presumably also the case for the correspondence theorist.
Again, you seem to be suggesting that the redundancy theorist is saying that "it is true that it is raining" means "I agree that it is raining". That's just not the case.
Compare with "9/11 was orchestrated by the US government" indicating that the speaker is a conspiracy theorist. It doesn't then follow that "9/11 was orchestrated by the US government" means "I am a conspiracy theorist".
The quote only says about agreement that "the word true in these sentences may have the practical function of signaling to one's audience that one is agreeing with something", which can also be said of the correspondence theorist.
There's a difference between the practical function of a phrase and the meaning of that phrase. The phrase "all Mexicans are criminals" has the practical function of signalling to one's audience that one is a racist, but that's not to say that the phrase means "I am a racist".
About the meaning of truth-claims, the redundancy theory only says (to quote Soames), that "[truth] does not play any logical role, has no descriptive content of its own, and so does not contribute to the content of what is said", and so "it is true that it is raining" means the same thing as "it is raining". But as "it is raining" does not mean the same thing as "I agree that it is raining", "it is true that it is raining" does not mean the same thing as "I agree that it is raining".
That doesn't matter. If the correspondence theorist were to say "it is true that it is raining" then their statement has the practical function of signalling to me that they believe that it is raining, which is why we find Moore's paradox problematic.
No, it doesn't. The redundancy theory only says "it is true that it is raining" means "it is raining". You just have to look at what redundancy theorists say:
[quote=Frege]It is worthy of notice that the sentence "I smell the scent of violets" has the same content as the sentence "it is true that I smell the scent of violets".[/quote]
[quote=Ramsey]It is evident that 'It is true that Caesar was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and 'It is false that Caesar was murdered' means that Caesar was not murdered.[/quote]
While it may be your opinion that the assumptions of the formal school of logic are invalid, that's nothing to do with whether my opinion is correct. In fact, nowhere did I even state my opinion. I just observed, from the perspective of formal logic schools, the 'post-truth' method of defining truth as used by Trump is meaningful, but of little merit. That was my observation, for which purpose, I summarized the thought of the school, hoping that it would be understandable. Certainly a summary cannot capture all the finer details of the views, and I welcome any suggestions how to change what it says to make it more understandable and more accurate.
But its not actually anything to do with my opinion. I don't actually believe my opinion is of any real significance. I was just describing what other people think and made a new observation. That's all. The same was truth for what I wrote about natural rights. For this I was called things like 'pompous' and a 'fraud' for which I really do not have anything further to say. Thank you for reading.
While it may be your opinion that the assumptions of the formal school of logic are invalid, that's nothing to do with whether my opinion is correct. In fact, nowhere did I even state my opinion. I just observed, from the perspective of formal logic schools, the 'post-truth' method of defining truth as used by Trump is meaningful, but of little merit. That was my observation, for which purpose, I summarized the thought of the school, hoping that it would be understandable. Certainly a summary cannot capture all the finer details of the views, and I welcome any suggestions how to change what it says to make it more understandable and more accurate.
But its not actually anything to do with my opinion. I don't actually believe my opinion is of any real significance. I was just describing what other people think and made a new observation. That's all. The same was truth for what I wrote about natural rights. For this I was called things like 'pompous' and a 'fraud' for which I really do not have anything further to say. Thank you for reading."
--ernestm
I agree with your position, and your claims that human fallibility makes it difficult to know 'truth' when it comes to certain subjects or when we are making certain moral claims (or at least that is how I interpret some of your statements), but I think myself and others have somehow failed in certain other things to really explain the issue properly
In Modern/Post-Modern philosophy there is something called a narrative or context that explains many of the things around us and can be thought of as a mixture of ideology/ culture/ religion/ and other types of system of beliefs. They are built on something that is sometimes called axioms (ie self evident truths), but many of these (or perhaps most of) of these self evident truth are merely fabrications created to maintain the status quo and/or social order of society. To be honest I can not say that there ISN'T an axiom that is actually true, but every one I have encountered to me seems to based on human opinion and/or desire and seems to be a means to justify our own ends; even if they are really not justified.
I guess as a skeptic I'm so opposed to axioms that I'm almost as militant when it comes to arguing against them as the people that are militant in supporting the axioms they choose to believe. I may be a jerk in saying this, but ALMOST all ideology/religions/system of beliefs seem to be a kind of hedonism in one form or another and the 'morality' we create around it is used as a facade to hide the true nature as to why we do things. I'm not saying that there isn't any way for human beings to be 'noble','good', 'empathetic' one way or another, I just think that the people are that way do it because they are that kind of person and not necessarily because of proper moral beliefs.
"We do what we do, because that is the way we do it" and because we don't really know any better.
Focusing on proper 'ought's (which are created due to axioms in the narrative we chose to follow) regardless of their consequences is merely tautology and leads to various fallacies. I wish I could verbalize this better, but I'm unsure how to.
Anyways, as I said I still agree with you but hoped to kind of clarify things a little better.
I suggest you start by looking up the definition of axiom on the Wikipedia.
There are other, non-truth-functional uses for "it is true that:..."; making assertions of belief and so on. These are irrelevant to the redundancy theory of truth.
In so far as it has any place in this observation, the only correspondence here is between "P" (that statement) and P (that fact); the correspondence of use and mention.
There are people who take it further. By redundancy, they mean to say that true only has a social function. As I said, leave that thesis out and you have something very easy to defend because it's trivially true.
Indeed; as if there were no difference between P and ~P except thinking makes it so.
Such folk do not live in the real world, and are pretty much not worthy of rational discourse.
But What did Tarski say about redundancy?
The Wiki pages have long been a convolute mess with regard to this.
If you just mean that the word "true" only has a social function, then yes. But if you mean that whether or not something is true, then no. A redundancy theorist is perfectly able to say that whether or not it is raining is independent of what we say and believe.
That's why it's called the redundancy theory. The point is that the word "true" is redundant; the claim "it is true that it is raining" is just the claim "it is raining".
Quoting Mongrel
I don't know what you mean by this. If you mean that we can't take issue with someone saying "it is raining" when it isn't raining, then you're wrong.
There's just confusion about what redundancy is. I'll summarize Soames' thoughts on it later.
No, that's not what we agree on. Under the redundancy theory, truth is a redundant concept. Given that "it is true that it is raining" means the same thing as "it is raining", truth-predication is a meaningless addition.
I don't know what a redundant concept is.
— ernestm
There is nothing in the definition of axiom on the Wikipedia that I can determine what it is you are trying to get at. I know there are axioms that used in math and logic, but it is obvious that I'm talking about ideological/narrative axioms which are more or less the same thing as dogma. I think my argument ties directly into what Wikipedia says about dogma, and their page on axioms has a link to their page on dogma for a clarification on what non-mathematical/non-logical axioms are about.
Wiki-Dogma
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dogma
If this isn't what you are trying to get at please be a little less obtuse because it is difficult to guess what your argument is you are unable to explain it, and any guess I make will more likely than not be a straw man if I don't know EXACTLY what it is that your trying to get at. As far as I know, nobody is really good at guessing at what someone else's arguments are.
So I was going to provide a summary of Soame's thoughts on redundancy theory, but I'm finding that Michael has already done a great job. It's truth nihilism. Soames doesn't spend any time debating that. He spends about nine pages considering stuff like "Her thesis is true." He explains that redundancy can get a little closer to making sense if we look at it in the linguistic environment that includes "it is true that.."
So.. get over it Michael. Redundancy is truth nihilsm.
Soames didn't provide any further details about Tarski's view of redundancy other than his comment that it's nihilistic.
Gotta study ACLS. Bleh.
If by "truth nihilism" you mean something like "moral nihilism" (as you suggested earlier) then you're just wrong. Moral nihilism is the position that nothing is moral, but redundancy theory isn't the position that nothing is true.
If your only defence is "Soames and Tarski say otherwise" then that's just an appeal to authority – and a mistaken authority at that. Or by "truth nihilism" they mean something that isn't comparable to "moral nihilism".
Perhaps by "truth nihilism" they just mean that truth isn't a real property? In which case I'd agree. But of course that doesn't then entail that "redundancy puts no limits at all on what one can say" as you claimed earlier. If it's raining then the limit on what one can say is "it is raining".
And, of course, neither does this entail that "truth is agreement" as you also claimed earlier. Under the redundancy theory, "it is true that it is raining" doesn't mean "I agree that it is raining".
Dishonest, much?
I said that redundancy is truth nihilism if by "truth nihilism" you just mean that truth isn't a real property. If, however, you mean it to be comparable to moral nihilism, as you suggested earlier, which is the position that moral claims are false (or meaningless), then no, redundancy isn't truth nihilism.
What do you mean by saying that it's not in line with the way "true" is commonly used? Are you saying that the propositions "it is raining" and "it is true that it is raining" are used in different ways, such that the two mean different things?
So yes... redundancy is a failed theory: "His thesis is true."
Yes, I'm being sincere. The main forms of moral nihilism are expressivism, which is a form of non-cognitivism, claiming that moral statements do not express propositions, and error theory, which claims that moral beliefs and assertions are not true because they "claim that certain moral facts exist that in fact do not exist".
This isn't at all comparable to the redundancy theory.
You keep asserting this without explaining how it is a failed theory.
"His theory is true"
Failure.
How does that show that the redundancy theory is a failed theory?
The sentential form is an obvious fail. You can try propositions.
So? The redundancy theory isn't a theory about the syntax of truth statements. It doesn't say that any sentence of the form "X is true" is equivalent to the sentence "X".
In this case, the redundancy theory says that if his thesis is that e = mc[sup]2[/sup] then to say that his thesis is true is to say that e = mc[sup]2[/sup].
This along with your other claims regarding the comparability of moral nihilism and the entailment of truth as agreement shows that you don't understand the redundancy theory (or moral nihilism in the case of the former).
Gotta go.
What are you talking about?