Pretending isn't such a bad thing. This counts as a 'dog' - let's pretend. It gets us by. Use is pretty ubiquitous - not just a "key use"; we don't ju...
Perhaps that was his speaker's intent - that might explain the foux pas. But it would still be a mistake, as the example shows - and as Kripke argues ...
I don't understand. The first says that Kripke does not think a description is needed in order to fix a referent. The second, that Kripke thinks the s...
Sure, some ways of divvying don't work. We can juxtapose two views, that either the dog is an whole regardless of language, or it is a whole in virtue...
Tim apparently thinks that there is at most one correct way in which the world can be divvied up. God's way, presumably. Others, perhaps you and I and...
For consistency god must have created the world of necessity. In modal logic (S5) if there is a necessary being then everything in every possible worl...
Compare and contrast against See how one is about a description, and the other is about the referent? Now Kripke rather famously showed that names do ...
Did you see the argument, from a recent Philosophy Now paper, proposing that this was the perfect world, but not for us? The Best Possible World, But ...
Sure. What do we make of this? If god sees what we have done, and so cannot change it, then there is something god cannot do. Or god does not know wha...
Well, there is an argument from Broad to that conclusion. If God is omnipotent, he should be able to create a being with free will, but if he is omnis...
You really will do anything to avoid addressing the elephant sitting opposite you at the table. Ok, I'll keep playing. Yes, the intentional theorist a...
Here's the footnote quoting Kripke: This is in defence of: Notice that the quote does not mention descriptions at all. And notice also the use of the ...
I'm not seeing how this addresses my post. I do not see where your diagrams take into consideration the fact of language as social phenomena, as the i...
Who is the sentence "He did not write "Naming and Necessity" about? It is true of Kaplan, not of Kripke. Which is Sarah referring to? Her intent is to...
You might first explain what you think parasitic reference is. Do you agree that it is something like referring to the thought-object in someone else'...
The following appears mistaken: Kripke showed that speaker's reference may differ from semantic reference. However, he also showed that a name may ref...
Collingwood viewed metaphysics as unearthing the foundational assumptions behind our scientific theories - behind our understanding of how things are....
What happened in Canberra was the public servants who were dropped took on contract work to do the same job for more pay. In the interests of efficien...
Something along these lines is perhaps the inevitable result of the sustained critique of the Argument - that it has an historical, "metaphysical" pla...
Meh. You've squandered much of what good will I may have had towards you with your insults, but now that you have actually expressed your needs, I wil...
I flagged your post for you, so no need for you to draw their attention. You need not respond to my post if you do not wish to, and can proceed at wha...
So on to Part Four. There's a description of the intentional theory of reference, allowing for successful references even when descriptions are inaccu...
I supose it would. One problem with the pictures is that there is only one signification/meaning/interpretant/dicible. Perhaps they are addressing a d...
The emphasis on "sign" is problematic, in that it supposes that the main purpose, or fundamental element, in language is the noun. It isn't. Language ...
No one would admit to such a thing openly, of course. Well, almost no one. Language is more about constructing, rather than exchanging, information. T...
Taking the example from the text, one can clearly conceive of a greatest prime, and then look to see if such a thing makes sense. One can proceed, as ...
Here he offers three replies to the fool. The first is that theology has shown that the concept of god can be made consistent; of course, the fool wil...
Klima offers the fool a rhetorical exit - perhaps he has misunderstood the language involved in the argument, in the way of someone not understanding ...
I'll not reply to this directly. From past experience, including on this very thread, I do not regard Leon as an honest respondent. If any one else th...
Well... not so much. The definition (1) supposes that there is a greatest thing, which, even if we assume that "greatest" works in this way, is what i...
So I am happy to play the recalcitrant fool. Anselm’s second conclusion denies the obvious, namely that God can be thought not to exist. Contrary to t...
Crikey pointes out that Dutton now has two ministers responsible for reducing government waste... Think about that. Perhaps twice as many bureaucrats ...
And so to section Three. So this section takes the previous argument as valid and sound. Perhaps seeing that it is not sound requires more than a modi...
Yep. It's pretty hard to work with an empty domain, so we do tend to suppose that something exists. That something exists rather than nothing can be s...
Summarising my comments on section 2, here are four problems with the argument as it is present. 1. There is a problem in defining a maximum element i...
Then there is this odd paragraph. It is apparently an attempt to foreclose on the criticism that the argument begs the question, that it "presupposes"...
And so to (4) R(g) - god can be thought to exist in reality. Well, given the criticism of (1), this is unsound - if god is perhaps contradictory as di...
So I'll set aside Leon's endless requests to repeat myself and take the criticism of (1) as read. (2) is the assumption that god, as defined in (1), i...
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