Banno

perhaps. You and I seem to agree that descriptions, definite or not, are not compulsory for names to do their thing.

You went wrong?

odd, that such similar question have different answers.

Yep. But that picture of naming was held by most analytic philosophers for at least a century. N&N killed it.

Yep. Good stuff.

Never. N&N is obscure discussions about esoteric ideas about a small part of language. Just the sort of thing I like. Welcome to the forums.

It's not important. If you have a choice, avoid it.

So back to understanding Kripke. pp.93-95 or thereabouts. He doesn't want to present a better theory, just to point out how the existing theory is wro...

And so to §48 - one of my favourites. What we count as simple depends on what we are doing.

Neat analysis. I like it. Simples are what had names for the early Wittgenstein (§46). So the discussion of simples does follow on naturally from the ...

Forty or fifty years ago, that historical school of thought was The One. But not any more. And that's because, in a large part, of N&N. So, yes.

Perhaps thinking in terms of rules, or necessary conditions, or whatever, is approaching reference in the wrong way. What has to happen for a referenc...

It's a good question. What's the answer?

Reference as a result of a private intent or intuition?

Just wondering if there is a rule that includes people but not parrots.

If not, why not?

Just for a bit, I am being Banno, not Kripke.

I'm Sticking to my topic.

one thing.

When I learned to drive, I learned the rule about stopping at the red light. And I can tell you what that rule is. When did I learn the rule about usi...

@"Janus"; @"frank", @"Wallows", @"creativesoul" Is it the case that there are necessary and sufficient conditions that determine, for every given prop...

So one cannot be thinking of "anything specific" unless one can present a description of some sort - definite or not.

You meant target?

Since he says explicitly that this is not his aim, that's perhaps not surprising.

And now we get to what is usually taken to be the presentation of Kripke's own theory, of causal chains of reference. I will not copy it to here; it s...

I have been reading and writing systematically. Given that you do not recognise this, along with your misapprehension of the term definite description...

P.88-89 Why not, and perhaps this is what @"Janus" is suggesting, set up "Godel", that name, not as the man who discovered the incompleteness theorem,...

It's not far ahead in my reading. Where are you up to?

(4) : If the vote yields no unique object the name does not refer. Such a vote may not pick out a unique object; nor might it pick out any object at a...

Yep - So I think we might ignore it. There is too much misunderstanding here for that side argument to be at all helpful. Unless you really want to?

Are you reading the book?

They haven't seen it yet. The thesis I wrote more than thirty years ago argued in defence of Searle, somewhat along line adopted here by Janus. SO I h...

86.

You do understand that I am not Kripke? Shall we continue to read his book? This thread is about his book. Perhaps he will enlighten us.

Removing this sort of thing is the point of (C), p.71

SO in every possible world, Armstrong was first on the moon in the actual world.

If it doesn't, it's not a definite description.

Against "a noun phrase introduced by the definite article or its equivalent and denoting a particular entity or phenomenon." A bunch of predicates tha...

Well it is at odds with what I understand - and the definition from Google I cited above - and the discussion provided at the beginning of the text.

Where is this from?

Because it does not pick out a single individual to the exclusion of all others.

But "Nixon does not have blue eyes" is not a definite description.

Why?

This I don't get. We have just worked our way through ninety-odd pages of close argument. Instead of addressing any of that text, you posit exactly th...

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/233693

@"StreetlightX" Nice work. I'd like to point to the arch that stands over the text so far. ?1 gives an all-to-common example of a theory of language -...

It is really important to keep our terms clear. "Nixon" is not a definite description, it is a name. Nor is it essential that the stipulation used to ...

But he's gone anyway - except when he comes back.

It's just another name for "possible world"; plausibly without bringing as much baggage with it. I read without much interest. I suspect that there ma...

?40.N.N is dead - yet his name lives on. It does not become meaningless because there is no longer a referent. N.N is not the meaning of "N.N."